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PLATOS PHILOSOPHY OF LISTENING

Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon
School of Education and Social Policy Northwestern University

Abstract. In the article, Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon asks, Did Plato have a philosophy of listening, and if so, what was it? Listening is the counterpart of speaking in a dialogue, and it is no less important. Indeed, learning from the dialogue is less likely to occur as people participate unless listening as well as speaking takes place. Haroutunian-Gordon denes a philosophy of listening as a set of beliefs that fall into four categories: (1) the aim of listening; (2) the nature of listening; (3) the role of the listener; and (4) the relation between the listener and the speaker. The beliefs, as they fall into these four categories, have implications for one another, and, because they are logically related, constitute a philosophy of listening. In the article, Haroutunian-Gordon argues that Plato had a philosophy of listening and describes its components.

Introduction
It is commonplace to think of Plato as the father of dialogic teaching. His portrayals of Socrates in conversation with interlocutors date from the fth century BC, and these classic dialogues have a place in the curricula of many academic disciplines belonging to the Western tradition. The image of Socrates as teacher, engaging people of all ages and walks of life in dialogue, the object of which was to learn, is no less than iconic. Indeed, Sren Kierkegaard once declared that Socrates was the only man he would call teacher.1 However, the study of Socrates as teacher has tended to focus upon what he and other people said in the conversations so as to address such questions as these: Did Socrates believe he was ignorant, as he claimed at many points?2 Was he trying to learn from others or merely show them to be ignorant?3 Did Meno, Theaetetus, Protagoras,4 and any number of other interlocutors with whom Socrates conversed realize they were ignorant, or were they mesmerized and confused by Socrates, as they often claimed? In the present essay, however, I take a very different tack on Plato and ask this: Did he have a philosophy of listening, and if so, what was it? Listening is the counterpart of speaking in a dialogue, and it is no less important. Indeed, learning from the dialogue is less likely to occur as people participate and sometimes it did not5 unless listening as well as speaking takes place.
1. Sren Kierkegaard, The Attack Upon Christendom (18541855), in A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. Robert Bretall, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), 466. 2. See, for example, Meno, 71a and 80d; and Protagoras, 329d and 348d. 3. See, for example, Callicles in the Gorgias or Thrasymachus in The Republic. 4. See Meno, 80b; Theaetetus, 198e199a; and Thrasymachus in The Republic, 350de. 5. As occurred when Thrasymachus withdraws from his dialogue with Socrates in The Republic, 354ac. Volume 61 Number 2 EDUCATIONAL THEORY 2011 Board of Trustees University of Illinois 2011

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So, what is a philosophy of listening? I take it to be a set of beliefs about the topic of listening, and I divide the beliefs into four categories: (1) the aim of listening; (2) the nature of listening; (3) the role of the listener; and (4) the relation between the listener and the speaker. The beliefs, as they fall into these four categories, have implications for one another and, because they are logically related, constitute a philosophy of listening if taken together, or so I shall argue. So, what is Platos philosophy of listening? The issue deserves resolution for the following reasons. First, if Socrates as questioner stands as a model teacher, then we need to ponder not only what he said the questions he posed in particular contexts but the role that listening played in his questioning. Second, in order to understand why the speaking and listening of Socrates are skillful, we need to recognize the philosophy of listening that Socrates practiced the aim of his listening, the nature of it, the role that he played as a listener, and the position that he assumed with respect to speakers. Armed with insight into these matters, we not only have more perspective on Socrates, but we may use that insight to examine ourselves as teachers who both speak and listen. In this essay, I begin my study of Platos philosophy of listening by reecting upon the dialogue that Socrates has with Diotima in the Symposium.6 I choose the text for the following reasons: (1) In the dialogue, Plato presented us with Socrates as listener a role we do not usually associate with him; (2) Socrates as listener, however, is a seeker of knowledge, so it is possible to draw inferences about what he hears and what he does with what he hears; (3) Because Socrates listens more than he speaks, Plato gave us an unusually sustained focus on the listener as seeker here. Consequently, we get ideas about Platos philosophy of listening by studying Socrates in dialogue with Diotima ideas that can serve as hypotheses to be tested in other cases. In order to understand Platos philosophy of listening, then, I begin by asking this: What is the aim of listening, as given to us by Plato in his Symposium through the dialogue between Socrates and Diotima?

The Aim of Listening

Like many of Platos dialogues, the Symposium is a story told about a particular situation by one who witnessed the events to one who did not. We readers, along with some of the characters in the dialogue, are invited in as listeners. From the opening lines, we catch a glimpse of Platos philosophy of listening: its aim seems
6. The dialogue between Socrates and Diotima that is under discussion in this essay occurs in the Symposium, Stephanus pages 201212. The translation of the Symposium excerpts included in this essay is by Michael Joyce and is found in Plato: Collected Dialogues (Bollingen Series LXXI), ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961). SOPHIE HAROUTUNIAN-GORDON is Professor of Education and Social Policy at Northwestern University, 618 Garrett Place, Evanston, IL 60208; e-mail <shg@northwestern.edu>. Her primary areas of scholarship are philosophy of education, teacher education, interpretive discussion, and philosophy of psychology.

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to be to form or address a question to which one does not know the answer. The Symposium begins with the following words:
APOLLODORUS: Oh, if thats what you want to know, it isnt long since I had occasion to refresh my memory. Only the day before yesterday, as I was coming up to the city from my place at Phalerum, a friend of mine caught sight of me from behind, and while I was still a long way ahead he shouted after me, Here, I say, Apollodorus! Cant you wait for me? . . . [Y]ou are the very man I am looking for. I want to ask you about the party at Agathons, when Socrates and Alcibiades and the rest of them were at dinner. What were all those speeches they were making about love? . . . You know we always count on you, Apollodorus, to report your beloved Socrates. (172ab)

Here, the speaker, Apollodorus, presents himself as a listener. As he tells the story, he was asked by someone on the street (it turns out to be Glaucon) to recount what took place on the occasion depicted by the Symposium a dinner at which guests made speeches about the topic of love. Indeed, the very rst words of the dialogue indicate that Apollodorus has been asked to recount the story of the event yet again: Indeed, if thats what you want to know, it isnt long since I had occasion to refresh my memory. By introducing Apollodorus to us as a listener, Plato prepared us to hear him as speaker. We learn that others have asked him to speak about the events that took place at Agathons house, and that he, Apollodorus, is regarded as a trusted reporter of Socrates doings and sayings. Therefore, people approach him with requests for recitations on these matters, even going so far as to arrest his progress on the street. What took place on the occasion in question? That is Glaucons question of Apollodorus, and it becomes our question as well, as we read the opening lines of the dialogue. Thus, we prepare ourselves to hear so as to understand what another has to say by identifying a question we wish to answer a question that we cannot resolve by ourselves and so we want to hear what the speaker has to say. In what follows, I present further evidence that according to Plato, in cases where one is trying to learn or understand something, the aim of listening is to form a question or to pursue its resolution by working to understand what another has to say about it.7

Platos View of the Nature of Listening

If the aim of listening so as to learn is to form or try to resolve a question, then what does listening involve? Within the Symposium, Socrates positions
7. Elsewhere, I have defended the claim that every act of listening listening so as to learn involves trying to form or answer a question. See Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening and Questioning, in Leonard Waks, ed., Listening and Reecting, special issue of Learning Inquiry 1, no. 2 (2007): 143152. Some have taken exception to my position, and I have begun to reply to those critics. For critiques of my position, see Leonard J. Waks, Listening and Questioning: The Apophatic/Cataphatic Distinction Revisited, and A.G. Rud and Jim Garrison, The Continuum of Listening, both in Waks, ed., Listening and Reecting, special issue of Learning Inquiry 1, no. 2 (2007): 153161 and 163168, respectively. For my response, see Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon and Leonard J. Waks, Listening: Challenges for Teachers, in special issue of Teachers College Record 112, no. 11 (2011): 27172727. However, as my purpose here is to begin to articulate Platos philosophy of listening, I leave that project of reply to the side.

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himself as a listener when he recounts to Agathon and the others what the Mantinean woman, Diotima, said to him about the nature of love. As we watch Socrates listening to Diotima, we learn much about the nature of listening as Plato conceived it, for we see how Socrates forms and addresses questions through listening.

Excerpt I
At 201e, Socrates says that Diotima told him that Love was neither beautiful nor a god, to which he replied:
SOCRATES (S) 1: My dear Diotima . . . Are you trying to make me believe that Love is bad and ugly? DIOTIMA (D) 1: Heaven forbid. . . . But do you really think that if a thing isnt beautiful its therefore bound to be ugly? S 2: Why naturally. D 2: And that what isnt learned must be ignorant? Have you never heard of something that comes between the two? S 3: And whats that? D 3: Dont you know that holding an opinion which is in fact correct, without being able to give a reason for it, is neither true knowledge How can it be knowledge without a reason? nor ignorance when it happens to be true? So may we not say that correct opinion comes midway between knowledge and ignorance? S 4: Yes . . . thats perfectly true. D 4: Very well . . . why must you insist that what isnt beautiful is ugly, that what isnt good is bad? Now, coming back to Love, [I say that] he is neither good nor beautiful, but thats no reason for thinking he must be bad or ugly. The fact is that he is between the two.

Judging from the foregoing, it seems that according to Plato, listening involves reasoning. At (S 1), Socrates reasons he begins to draw the inference that if Love is neither beautiful nor a god, Love must be bad (the opposite of god-like) and ugly (the opposite of beautiful). His listening, it seems, does not simply involve auditory reception. Rather, what is heard when Diotima avers that Love is neither beautiful nor a god is something to which Socrates responds with the proposed inference that he offers at (S 1). Here, he reasons about the implications of what he has heard. Notice, however, that his inference is given as a question rather than a declarative statement, suggesting that Socrates is unsure about the conclusion he is entertaining. Second, Plato shows us that not only does listening involve drawing inferences, but the inferences are drawn with respect to the question that one is forming or trying to resolve. At (S 2) and (S 4), the inference that Socrates draws is with respect to the question, What is the nature of Love? At (D 1), Diotimas response to Socrates question indicates that she, too, is listening, and that her listening, like that of Socrates, involves reasoning about the implications of what she has heard, again with respect to questions. For she pronounces his proposed inference to be false and then proceeds to expose the aw in his reasoning.

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Exposing the error in Socrates reasoning requires several steps. At (D 1), Diotima poses a question, namely, do you think that if X is false, the only truth is its opposite? At (S 2), Socrates answers her question afrmatively. Diotima then modies the question slightly at (D 2), but adds another question one that calls into question the answer Socrates has given. Here she asks, Have you never heard of something that comes between [knowledge and ignorance]? It is this question that persuades us that Diotima has drawn the inference that Socrates belief is false and that there is evidence to prove it. At (S3), Socrates responds to Diotimas question with a question, And whats that? At (S3), we see a third feature of nature of listening, according to Plato: Socrates listening seems to have been interrupted.8 Here, Socrates listening is interrupted because he can no longer draw inferences about the meaning of what he is hearing inferences with respect to his initial question about the nature of Love.9 The initial question of whether Diotima believes that Love is bad and ugly is no longer in direct focus, for a new question has his attention: What does Diotima have in mind when she asks whether there is something between knowledge and ignorance? Apparently, Socrates cannot respond by reasoning to an answer to the question that she posed, so he asks Diotima to provide it. His listening has been interrupted, meaning that he raises a new question that he cannot answer, so now he is listening for something he was not listening for previously. One might say that his listening has changed direction.10 At (D 3), Diotima obliges and offers Socrates a possible answer to the second question she posed at (D 2), namely, correct opinion. Is correct opinion not something between ignorance and knowledge, since one who holds correct opinion believes the truth but has no reason for so doing, hence has neither knowledge nor ignorance? In so saying, Diotima is reasoning about what she has heard Socrates say: from his question, And whats that? (S3), she draws the inference that he does not know an example of something between ignorance and knowledge, and so she provides one. At (S 4), Socrates seems to accept Diotimas suggestion of correct opinion. When he says, Yes. . .thats perfectly true, he indicates that he has both
8. The topic of interruption is one I consider in Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening In a Democratic Society, in Philosophy of Education 2003, ed. Kal Alston (Urbana, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 2004), 118; Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening To a Challenging Perspective, Schools: Studies in Education 1, no. 2 (2004): 4162; and Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon and Elizabeth Meadows, The Role of Interruption in Building Trust, Schools: Studies in Education 6, no. 2 (2009): 3756. 9. In Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening In a Democratic Society, Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening To a Challenging Perspective, and Haroutunian-Gordon and Meadows, The Role of Interruption in Building Trust, I show that listening can also be interrupted when one hears a challenge to an existing belief a belief that heretofore has remained tacit. In the rst excerpt included in this essay, the interruption occurs because Socrates cannot follow the reasoning of Diotima, and therefore cannot understand the relation between what he has heard and the resolution of the question that concerns him, namely, what is the nature of Love? 10. Haroutunian-Gordon and Meadows , The Role of Interruption in Building Trust.

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grasped her second question at (D 2) and that her suggested answer may be accepted as correct. Once again, Socrates listening involves drawing an inference about the meaning of what he has heard: he reasons that correct opinion is an example of something that stands between knowledge and ignorance, and therefore that it is possible for there to be something between the two. Socrates acceptance of Diotimas suggestion signals that his question posed at (S 3) has been resolved. From the fact that Socrates accepts her example of correct opinion as coming between knowledge and ignorance, Diotima (D 4) seems to infer that Socrates is ready to entertain the possibility that Love, like understanding, need not be described in terms of extremes. For she now boldly asserts that Love is between the beautiful and the ugly, the bad and the good. Here, she seems to be inviting Socrates to return to the initial query and to think analogically: to imagine that if there can be something between knowledge and ignorance (namely, true opinion), then perhaps there could be something, perhaps Love, between what is beautiful and what is ugly, between what is bad and what is good.

Excerpt II
At (S 5), however, it is Socrates who interrupts Diotimas listening when he says:
S 5: And yet . . . it is generally agreed that he is a great god. D 5: It all depends . . . on what you mean by generally. Do you mean simply people that dont know anything about it, or do you include the people that do? S 6: I meant everybody. D 6 (laughs): Then can you tell me, my dear Socrates, how people can agree that hes a great god when they deny that hes a god at all? S 7: What people do you mean? D 7: You for one and I for another. S 8: What on earth do you mean by that?

At (S 5), Socrates seems to resist Diotimas suggestion that he reason by analogy to the conclusion that Love is between the good and the bad, between the ugly and the beautiful. Rather, he seems to ask how such a conclusion can hold if It is generally agreed that [Love] is a great god? Here, Socrates may reason as follows: if Love is a great god, then he must be good and beautiful, not something between good and bad, or between beautiful and ugly. The evidence that Diotimas listening has been interrupted by Socrates comment at (S 5) is this: At (D 5), Diotima reasons to a new question, which she puts to Socrates: Who are the people who think Love is a great god? That question is raised so as to assess the truth of the assertion, It is generally agreed that [Love] is a great god (S5). Notice that in this exchange Diotima is no longer focused on the question of how she can get Socrates to recognize that Love is between the good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly, but has shifted attention to the issue of which people think that Love is a great god. At (S 6), Socrates makes

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it clear that generally refers to all the people, to which Diotima responds by raising still another question at (D 6): How can all people believe Love is a great god when they deny he is a god in the rst place? In so saying, Diotima further renes the question she raised at (D 5).11 At (S 7), Socrates listening seems to be interrupted once more: Instead of trying to answer the question of whether Love can be something between the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad the issue with which he struggled initially (S1S4) he now asks, What people deny that Love is a god at all? When at (D 7) Diotima answers Socrates by saying that she and Socrates himself number among that group, Socrates presses his quandary: What on earth do you mean by that? (S 8), by which he seems to mean: Why do you say that I dont believe that Love is a god? I am unaware of holding such a belief. At (S 8), Socrates seems to reach his deepest point of doubt thus far in the conversation: of the questions he has entertained, the one posed at (S 8) seems to be the one he wishes most to resolve. His rst question at (S 1) was a query: When he asks Diotima, Are you trying to make me believe that Love is bad and ugly? he is asking for an explanation from her so that he can follow her reasoning. His second question (S 3), And whats that? suggests additional puzzlement still he cannot follow her reasoning. While I have argued that Socrates listening is interrupted by the words of Diotima at (D 2), so that he starts listening for the answer to a new question, the two questions are related: if there is something between ignorance and knowledge, then perhaps there is something else between two extremes (for example, Love could be between good and bad, ugly and beautiful). At (S 8) when Socrates says, What on earth do you mean by that? he seems to be even more perplexed than he was at (S 3). What does the foregoing tell us about the nature of listening, according to Plato? The rst point we observed is that it involves drawing inferences about the implications of what one hears. Second, it involves trying to understand the meaning of what one hears with respect to the question one is forming or trying to resolve. Third, we have seen that sometimes the listener is unable to draw an inference about the meaning of what has been heard in reference to the question he or she is forming or trying to resolve. At such moments, the listening is interrupted: since the inference cannot be drawn, the meaning of what has been heard is not clear, and so a new question arises, specically, what is the meaning of what was heard? Answering that new question takes the listening in a different direction, at least for the moment. In the next section, we consider why questions become more pressing for the listener, Socrates, as the dialogue proceeds.
11. Again, the listening seems to be interrupted because the listener cannot follow the speakers reasoning. Thus, we see Diotima ask Socrates about his reasoning (D 5).

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The Role of the Listener

In the excerpt that follows, Socrates reaches an even deeper point of doubt, forming a question that he is even more eager to resolve than the question he posed at (S 8): What on earth do you mean by that? He comes to that point of doubt through listening, which again involves drawing (or trying to draw) inferences about the meaning of what he has heard. By examining the role of the listener, we gain insight into why and how questions can become more pressing. We pick up the dialogue at Diotimas response to the question posed by Socrates at (S 8).

Excerpt III
D 8: Oh, its simple enough. . . . Tell me, wouldnt you say that all the gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you suggest that any of them are neither? S 9: Good heavens, no! D 9: And dont you call people happy when they possess the beautiful and the good? S 10: Why, of course. D 10: And yet you agreed just now that Love lacks, and consequently longs for, those very qualities? S 11: Yes, so I did. D 11: Then if he has no part in either goodness or beauty, how can he be a god? S 12: I suppose he cant be . . . D 12: And now . . . havent I proved that youre one of the people who dont believe in the divinity of Love? S 13: Yes, but what can he be then . . . a mortal? (202ad)

What is the role of the listener in the dialogue? First and foremost, it is to carry out the activities that listening involves to draw inferences about the meaning of what has been heard so as to form or address a question of concern, to form new questions when what is heard is not understood to address the question, and to modify or resolve the question, given what has been heard. But there is more to see here. In order to clarify what the listener does, let us look closely at what Socrates does to reach his deepest point of doubt, (S 13). At (S 9), Socrates answers the question that Diotima poses the question of whether the gods can be other than happy and beautiful. Socrates declares that they cannot be otherwise. Here is evidence that drawing inferences about a speakers meaning, according to Plato, involves attending to what the speaker says trying to grasp (trying to draw inferences about) the meaning of what has been heard. If the listener believes that he or she has grasped the speakers meaning, then the second thing the listener does is to provide what he or she believes is a suitable response. Socrates response to Diotimas question regarding whether the gods can be other than happy and beautiful suggests that he believes that he understands her meaning and that he has a response that he believes to be suitable and so states it: Good heavens, no. Likewise, at (S 10), he answers Diotimas question (D 9), and again indicates that he believes he has grasped the question that she has posed. When he says, Why, of course, he provides what he believes is a suitable

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response to the question: If the people (or the gods) are happy, then they have what is beautiful and good; otherwise, they would not be happy, correct? We observe that the role of the listener in a dialogue, according to Plato, is to try to grasp the meaning of what is heard and to respond to the speaker based on the inference that is drawn about the meaning of the spoken words. At (S 12) and (S 13), Socrates accepts Diotimas reasoning that upon his own admission, Love cannot be a god. But that inference, which he arrives at by accepting that the gods are happy and beautiful (S 9), that they are so because they possess the beautiful and the good (S 10), that Love lacks those qualities (S 11), and that therefore Love cannot be a god (S 12, S 13), is the implication of accepting several propositions. So the role of the listener is not simply to draw implications about the meaning of immediately preceding statements but also about the meaning of those statements when juxtaposed to ones that have been uttered and accepted earlier in the conversation. So the listener may attend to several claims simultaneously. Thus, we see that the role of listener is to respond to the speaker based upon the inference drawn about the meaning of what has been said said now and previously. When Socrates says Yes, so I did at (S 11), he conrms Diotimas assertion about something he agreed to earlier in the conversation. Given his admission, she reasons and asks accordingly: if Love lacks and longs for goodness and beauty, then how can he be a god, for gods possess these things? Now, there may seem to be an ambiguity here: It may appear that the listener sometimes tries to grasp the meaning of what is said in an open-minded way without reference to its implication for the resolution of a question. Judging from the three Symposium excerpts presented here, the latter seems not to be the case.12 As we have seen, the question can change. Indeed, at least one condition under which it changes is that the listener is unable to draw inferences about what he or she hears for the resolution of the question. Hence, a new question arises about the meaning of what has been heard, as it did for Socrates at (S 3) and (S 8). But there is always some question to which one refers what is heard. Given the role of the listener in the conversation, why is it that the questions arising as the dialogue proceeds become more and more pressing? We have seen that listening to several claims or propositions simultaneously involves reasoning about the implications of accepting them together. At (S 1), Socrates says, My dear Diotima . . . Are you trying to make me believe that Love is bad and ugly? Socrates raises the question in response to Diotimas assertion that Love was neither beautiful nor a god. The question seems to arise because Socrates has
12. In Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening In a Democratic Society, I did not make the claim clearly when I said that initially, Theaetetus was listening to grasp Socrates meaning and follow his argument (p. 7). I should have said that initially, Theaetetus was listening to grasp Socrates meaning and follow his argument with respect to whether the aviary model was suitable for describing the acquisition of knowledge.

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heard Diotimas claim and because he believes that if she is right, one must infer the opposite: that Love is bad and ugly. So, he seems to be listening to two claims simultaneously the claim just uttered by Diotima that Love is neither beautiful nor a god and the claim that if Diotimas claim holds, then the opposite must be true of Love. Has Socrates identied a heretofore tacit belief that has now been challenged? At (S 3), when Socrates says, And whats that? the question arises because he is entertaining three propositions, one of which clearly challenges a belief that he holds, as he seems to recognize. The three propositions are (1) if something is not beautiful, then it is ugly (D 1, S 2); (2) Love is therefore bad and ugly (S 1); and (3) there may be something between what is learned and ignorant (D 2). Now, if the third proposition holds, and there is something between learned and ignorant, that may have implications for the truth of the rst and second propositions: perhaps there is also something that comes between good and bad, beautiful and ugly, and perhaps Love, although not good and beautiful, may not be bad and ugly. Therefore, the question that Socrates poses at (S 3) And whats that? is more pressing than the question he posed at (S 1) because not only is he entertaining several propositions, but one of them (the third proposition) challenges a belief he holds that, if proved false, may have implications for the acceptance of the rst two propositions. The question at (S 1) does not clearly challenge an existing belief. In posing the question, Socrates may suspect such a challenge, but his question at (S 3) is more intense because at that point in the exchange he seems to have heard the challenge. At (S 8), Socrates raises another question: What on earth do you mean by that? he asks after he hears Diotima claim that neither she nor he believes that Love is a god (D 7). Here, the question seems to be even more pressing than the question at (S 3). And, why might that be? At (S 8), Socrates is entertaining the following propositions: (1) people generally agree that Love is a great god (S 5); (2) generally means everybody, which would include Socrates himself (S 6); (3) some people deny that Love is a god at all (D 6); and (4) Diotima and Socrates are two people who deny that Love is a god at all (D 7). Here, we see not one but two challenges to Socrates beliefs. First, if Diotima is right at (D 6) and some people deny that Love is a god, then the rst of the propositions just outlined is false: it is false that it is generally agreed that [Love] is a great god (S 5). Second, at (D 7), when Diotima says that neither she nor Socrates believe that Love is a great god, she asserts something about Socrates himself that he does not yet recognize to be true. Thus, Diotima challenges not one but two beliefs of Socrates, the second of which is a belief about what he thinks he believes. And Socrates seems to recognize that both beliefs have been challenged. Could it be that the more of ones beliefs that one hears challenged by the speakers words, the more pressing the listeners question becomes?13
13. In Haroutunian-Gordon, Listening In a Democratic Society, I argue that in the Theaetetus, Plato showed that puzzlement deepens when the listener recognizes that his or her beliefs or assumptions, or

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While such may be the case, let us note that at (S 13), Socrates listening is not interrupted by being unable to follow Diotima. That is, when Socrates asks Yes, but what can [Love ] be then . . . a mortal? it is not that he has been unable to follow Diotimas reasoning and so raises a question about what she means. On the contrary, at (S 13), he has followed her reasoning. Indeed, that is what he tells us when beginning his response with Yes, meaning that yes, he agrees that Diotima has shown that he, Socrates, does not believe that Love is a god. But as he continues at (S 13), Socrates tells us that by following Diotimas reasoning, he has come to a question about its implication. It is more pressing than the question at (S 8) because it is a specic question about the nature of Love the original query that Socrates has raised having drawn inferences about the meaning of what was said and heard in relation to that question. Here, we see that, according to Plato questions can become more pressing not only when ones beliefs are challenged, but also when the course of reasoning about the acceptability of those beliefs leads one to greater curiosity about the initial query. Let us return now to the role of the listener according to Plato, at least as thus far inferred from study of the foregoing Symposium excerpts. As I have argued, the role of the listener is to carry out the activities of listening. And so the listener 1. makes an effort to draw inferences about what has been heard in relation to the formation or resolution of some question; 2. tries to provide an appropriate response to what is said, given what is heard; and 3. may attend to several claims at once so as to reason about their joint implication for the formation or resolution of the question. We have seen that in the course of playing the role, Socrates formed new questions when his listening was interrupted when he was unable to draw inferences about the resolution of the question concerning him on the basis of what was heard. When the interruption challenged one or more of his beliefs, the new questions he formed seemed to grow increasingly pressing. And when his own reasoning about the soundness of his beliefs brought him to a revised version of the initial query as occurred at (S 13) when he exclaims in puzzlement, Yes, but what can [Love] be then . . . a mortal? the revised version seems to be even more strongly felt than the initial query.

The Relation Between the Listener and the Speaker

What, then, is the relation between the listener and the speaker? Given the foregoing analysis, the relation can be put quite simply: according to Plato, at least as observed in the foregoing excerpts from the dialogue between Socrates and
both, have been challenged by what has been said (see pp. 911). The evidence in the Symposium, as we see, is similar, although it raises the possibility that the greater the number of beliefs challenged, the more pressing the question can become. The Symposium also offers evidence for another explanation, as shall be seen presently.

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Diotima, the role of the speaker is to prepare the listener to listen to what he or she has to say. And the role of the listener is to show the speaker what needs to be said in order for the listener to attend. Let me now defend both claims, beginning with the rst. Recall how the Symposium begins: Apollodorus is the speaker. But in his speech, he positions himself rst as listening to Glaucon, who has asked him to describe what occurred at a party where people made speeches about the nature of love. By speaking as he does, Apollodorus prepares us, the listeners, to listen to his recitation of events that took place at the party. By sharing with us Glaucons request of him and Glaucons comment, You know we always count on you, Apollodorus, to report your beloved Socrates, Apollodorus, the speaker, prepares us to listen to what he is about to say. Indeed, he entices us into the listening, and he does that by raising a question and making us want to learn the answer. The question is, What happened at the party where Socrates and others spoke about love? We want to hear Apollodoruss answer, in part because the question is of interest what did Socrates and others have to say about love, anyway? and in part because Apollodorus lets us know that, at least in Glaucons estimation, he, Apollodorus, is a reliable source of information about the answer. It is noteworthy that in the dialogue, Plato introduced Diotima as an authority when Socrates begins to recount their conversation to the guests at Agathons: I want to talk about some lessons I was given by . . . Diotima, a woman who was deeply versed in . . . many elds of knowledge (535d). In so saying, Socrates arouses our interest in what Diotima has to say. Indeed, Plato presented one authority gure (Diotima) introduced by another (Socrates), a strategy that enlivens our attention to her words. And yet, as we have seen, Diotima often addresses her listeners by posing questions rather than giving answers and speaking like an authority. To take one example, Diotima responds to the question Socrates poses at (S 1) by saying, Heaven forbid. . . . But do you really think that if a thing isnt beautiful its therefore bound to be ugly? When Socrates answers this question afrmatively, Diotima poses other questions in response: And that what isnt learned must be ignorant? Have you never heard of something that comes between the two? (D 2). By posing these questions, Diotima encourages Socrates to listen further because he cannot answer the questions. At (D 5) and (D 6), Diotima again asks questions of Socrates and in so doing makes him want to hear what she has to say. At (D 5) she asks, Do you mean [by generally] simply people that dont know anything about it [Love], or do you include the people that do? And at (D 6) she asks, How can people agree that [Love is] a great god when they deny that he is a god at all? Once again, the questions of Diotima interrupt the listening of Socrates so that he starts listening for answers to new questions the ones she has posed. Because he is not able to draw inferences so as to answer the questions, Socrates is poised to listen for the

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answers, and at (S 7) and (S 8), he asks Diotima directly to provide them. In so doing, he gives evidence that he wants to hear what she has to say. Now, as we have seen, Diotima sometimes poses questions that Socrates can answer. At (D 8), (D 9), and (D 10), she questions Socrates, and he responds without hesitation at (S 9), (S 10), and (S 11). In so doing, he gives evidence that he heard the questions and that he was able to grasp their meaning and reason to what seemed to him to be suitable responses. At (D 11), however, Diotima poses a question to which Socrates responds, but with an answer he seems reluctant to accept: I suppose he cant be, says Socrates (S 12), meaning that he recognizes the necessity of his conclusion, given the answers that he has given to previous questions, but that he does not embrace it enthusiastically. His reluctance is explained when at (S 13) he asks, What can he [Love] be then . . . a mortal? That question, as argued previously, is Socrates deepest point of doubt thus far the question he wishes most to resolve. Thus, we see that Diotima makes Socrates listen by posing questions he both can and cannot answer. In both cases, she brings his reasoning further, for if Socrates cannot answer, she helps him to do so, and if he can answer, his own reasoning raises the initial question in a revised, more pressing form. Now, let us consider the second claim about the relation between the speaker and the listener, namely that the role of the listener is to show the speaker what needs to be said in order for the listener to attend. I have argued that as Socrates presents himself in the conversation with Diotima, he plays the role of listener and seeker much of the time. Often, he sets Diotima up as a speaker by asking her questions. For example, at (S 1) Socrates asks, My dear Diotima . . . Are you trying to make me believe that Love is bad and ugly? As argued previously, Socrates raises that question on the basis of reasoning about what he has heard. By posing it, Socrates tells Diotima about his reasoning in relation to what he has heard and, at the same time, tells her what she needs to talk about in order to continue the conversation with him. Specically, he tells her that she needs to speak about whether Love is bad and ugly. Likewise, at (S 3) Socrates asks, And whats that? meaning please explain what is between learned and ignorant. Here, Diotimas words have interrupted Socrates listening in that he can no longer draw inferences about the nature of Love, more precisely, whether it is bad and ugly. Since he cannot answer Diotimas question at (D 2), he seeks an answer from her, which she gives him at (D 3). His response to her answer (S 4) indicates that she has told him what he wanted to hear: When he says, Yes . . . thats perfectly true, he tells Diotima that she has given a satisfactory answer to his question and that he agrees that something namely correct opinion does come between learning and ignorance. In addition, when Socrates asks, What on earth do you mean by that? at (S 8), he once again tells Diotima what she needs to talk about in order for him to have interest in listening to her. Here, Socrates is asking Diotima to explain why she

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said that neither she nor Socrates believe that Love is a god (D 7). Again, Socrates listening has been interrupted: he seems not to understand why she has made the claim that neither of them believe that Love is a god. In so saying, Socrates, the listener, tells Diotima, the speaker, what she needs to talk about next in order to be listened to. Finally, at (S 13), Socrates again poses a question of Diotima when he asks, Yes, but what can he [Love] be then . . . a mortal? As argued previously, the question arises not because Diotima has interrupted Socrates listening with speech that he cannot follow, but, on the contrary, he raises the question precisely because he can follow what has been said and has thereby arrived at the question. In a sense, Socrates has interrupted himself: As he listens to his own reasoning, he comes to a new question about the nature of Love, and that question is the one that he now puts to Diotima.

Platos Philosophy of Listening and an Invitation to Question

If it is the case that Plato provided us with a coherent philosophy of listening, then we should nd that the claims, as they fall into the four categories, are consistent with one another. Is that the case? To conclude, I will argue that it is and that this invites us to question our practice as teachers. To begin, let us recall that the aim of listening according to Plato, at least as presented in the excerpts from the Symposium analyzed here, is to form or address a question. Now that aim is consistent with the nature of listening as Plato depicted it for us that listening involves reasoning about the formation or resolution of the question, that it can be interrupted when what is heard does not seem to address the question, and that the question can change when interruption occurs so that subsequent listening aims to resolve a new question. When interruption occurs because the listeners beliefs are challenged, the listeners questions can become more pressing in the face of those challenges. Indeed, we have seen evidence that the more challenges to ones beliefs, the more eager the listener can become to resolve the question posing the challenges. And if the listeners reasoning brings about revision of the initial dilemma, that question can become more pressing still. Furthermore, given the aim and nature of listening, it follows that the role of the listener is to draw inferences from what is heard about the formation or resolution of the question. Therefore, the listener must try to grasp what is heard so as to draw the inferences and to respond to the speaker in a way that is consistent with the inferences drawn, and the inferences may follow, in part, from one or several propositions that have been previously accepted in the dialogue. Given the aim and nature of listening, and the role of the listener, it follows that the speaker and the listener are related to one another in a particular way: the speaker says things that engage the listener in listening that entice the listener into attending to the speakers words so as to form or resolve a question and reason about their meaning with respect to the question. The listener, on the other hand, will let the speaker know whether he or she is or is not able to draw inferences

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about the formation or resolution of the question, given what he or she has heard. Whatever the case, the listener will tell the speaker what next must be said in order to sustain the listeners attention. It comes as no surprise that Socrates and Diotima often pose questions of one another. According to Plato, questions guide and make possible the dialogue. Platos philosophy of listening invites us to ponder the listening that we do as teachers. We may ask ourselves about the aim of our listening: What question does my listening to students in particular circumstances aim to resolve? Is it the question I should be trying to answer? And what question are the students trying to resolve in listening to me or to one another? We may ask ourselves about the nature of our listening: What inferences do I hear the students drawing about what I and others have said? Are their inferences justied? What questions are they trying to answer? Have their questions changed? If so, is it because they have resolved issues they began with, or has their listening been interrupted so that new questions have taken their place? If the initial question has not been resolved, has it become more pressing in the face of challenges and perhaps revised? We may ask about ourselves in the role of the listener: Have I tried to grasp what students have said so as to draw appropriate inferences about what they intend to say and their position on the question? Have I responded to the speakers in a way that helps them make their intentions clear? Is the speakers claim consistent with others that have been established by the dialogue? Finally, we may consider the relations between speakers and listeners and ask: Have speakers enticed listeners to attend to their words? Have listeners let the speakers know what they need to say in order to engage their attention and draw inferences about the meaning of what has been said? In short, are listeners and speakers working together to form and address questions of shared concern? Platos philosophy of listening opens us to posing these questions and seeking the answers.

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