PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT

WORKPLAN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND MANAGEMENT TEAM

Objectives: (1) Assess the performance of the Intelligence Community (1C)1 in

collecting and analyzing information related to counterterrorism,
both prior and subsequent to the 9/11 attacks;
(2) Identify the reasons for such performance; and
(3) Recommend ways to improve the IC's future performance
regarding counterterrorism.

I. Compile a notional list of general areas of focus and key questions to answer,
with attention to possible overlap with other teams.

A. Consider the extent to which we are focusing on pre-9/11 versus post-

9/11.

B. General areas.

1. The IC's mission(s).

a. What was the IC's intended mission(s), and how did the
mission(s) evolve over time? Where has counterterrorism
fit into the mission(s)?

b. What organizing principle(s) governs how the 1C should

function in general and conduct counterterrorism in
particular?

2. Intelligence policy.

a. What major policy decisions have guided the 1C? Who

made such decisions, and under what conditions?

b. How did such policy decisions impact the IC's

counterterrorism capabilities and efforts, either
intentionally or unintentionally?

3. Organizational structure of the 1C.

a. How was the 1C intended to function, and what were its

organizing principle(s)? How has it functioned in reality?

1 I assume that the 1C includes: CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, NIMA, Army Intel, Navy Intel,
Marine Intel, Air Force Intel, Coast Guard Intel, State, Treasury, Energy, and FBI, plus
DHS and TTIC.
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b. What are the implications of such functioning for

counterterrorism?

4. Resources allocated to the 1C.

a. Sources of resources.

(i) Requested by the 1C.

(ii) Requested by the President and OMB.

(iii) Appropriated.

(iv) Spent by the 1C.

b. What resources were requested for, appropriated for, and

ultimately spent on counterterrorism? Were such resources
adequate?

5. Information collection.

a. Aspects of information collection,

(i) Priorities.

(ii) Types: HUMINT, SIGINT, open source, etc.

b. Where did counterterrorism fit in the priorities for

collection? What decisions were made regarding the type
of counterterrorism information to be collected, and how
successful were such collection efforts? What impediments
were there to successful collection of counterterrorism
information?

6. Information analysis.

a. Aspects of information analysis.

(i) Priorities regarding what topics are being analyzed

and thus what collected information is most
important to analysts.

(ii) Challenges to analysis, such as translation, data

mining, and "connecting the dots."

b. Did the 1C give sufficient attention to analyzing

intelligence information for counterterrorism purposes?
What challenges did the 1C face regarding analysis of such
information and "connecting the dots"?
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7. Information-sharing.

a. Venn diagrams depicting information-sharing,

(i) Within the 1C.

(ii) Between the 1C and other federal agencies (e.g.,

INS).

(iii) Between the U.S. Government and other entities

(State and local governments, foreign countries, and
the private sector).

b. What policies and procedures govern information-sharing?

How has such information-sharing worked in practice, and,
more specifically, how has information-sharing impacted
U.S. counterterrorism efforts?

8. Oversight.

a. Types of oversight.

(i) Executive Branch.

(a) President.

(b) Senior Presidential advisers.

(c) NSC.

(d) OMB.

(e) SecDef- of agencies within DoD budget,

(ii) Congress.

(a) HPSCI and SSCI.

(b) Armed Services.

(c) Judiciary.

(d) Appropriations.

(e) Other,

(iii) Judicial.

(a) FISA court.

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(b) Other federal courts,

(iv) Other.

(a) Media.

(b) Other interest groups.

b. What is the objective of oversight? How has oversight

affected the IC's mission(s), structure, self-perception,
exploitation of its authorities, and - ultimately -
performance? More specifically, what role did oversight
play in the IC's performance regarding counterterrorism?

C. Issues of possible overlap with other teams (please note that I am only
familiar with three other teams).

1. Possible overlap with the Al Qaeda team: intelligence collection

and analysis of Al Qaeda.

2. Possible overlap with the law enforcement team: analysis of FBI

law enforcement functions (assuming our team will focus on FBI
intelligence functions) and FISA.

3. Possible overlap with the foreign-relations team: relationships

with foreign intelligence services.

II. Initial phase (April 2003): acquire unclassified background information.

A. Review important work done over the past twenty years (Philip's
memorandum states " at least five years," but Kevin has suggested going
back at least to 1985), and maintain rolling list of key documents.

1. Congressional hearings and legislation.

2. Executive Branch documents (e.g., budgets, Executive Orders, and

CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence reports).

3. GAO reports.

4. Other literature.

B. Compile list of experts who are not objects of the Commission's inquiry,
and conduct interviews as appropriate (at this stage, interviews will most
likely be intended to generate recommendations on how to structure our
team's investigation and what publications to read).

C. Prepare chronology of key events since 1985.

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D. Prepare organizational charts for the 1C and relevant parts of other entities,
with key officials noted, since 1985.

E. Identify new key issues and key questions, and revise existing list of such
topics.

F. Develop notional list of individuals to interview and documents to request.

G. Draft plans for briefing the Commission on the IC's history and how the
1C functions.

1. Prepare the outline of a briefing book.

2. Prepare a notional schedule for one or two days of private briefings

or public hearings.

3. Consider whether the Commission in general should acquire such

information publicly or privately, or both.

H. Liaison with other teams to share information and navigate areas of

overlap.

III. Once personnel receive clearance, begin in-depth research covering both
classified and unclassified sources.

A. Factors affecting this phase.

1. Overlap with other teams, requiring our team to join with other
teams in requesting particular documents and/or interviewing
particular individuals.

2. The extent to which the Commissioners, as opposed to the

Commission's staff, will receive testimony or otherwise interview
individuals.

3. Whether we will be allowed to make general requests to agencies

for categories of documents, as opposed to being permitted to
request only specific documents.

4. The extent to which we have access to the documents submitted to

the Joint Inquiry and to the Joint Inquiry's report and whether we
feel additional research is needed.

B. Assessment of what classified documents should be obtained.

1. Specific documents based on knowledge of team members.

2. Document requests for general types of documents, to be submitted

to relevant agencies (in accordance with Commission procedures).
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C. Interviews.

1. Resolve whether we may have off-the-record conversations.

2. How many opportunities do we have to speak with a particular

individual, particularly policymakers and other current government
officials?

3. Acquire background material on the interviewees in preparation for

the actual interviews.

IV. Draft a report for the Commission with suggested recommendations (based on
guidance from the Commission and senior staff).

V. Draft language and recommendations for the Commission's report.

A. Will the report be classified or unclassified, or both?

B. What are the length and format strictures?