UNGLASSIFED MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 3 Auguat 1964 SUBJRETt White House Staff Meeting, 5 Auguat 1964, L. Mw, Bundy presided. 2. Soutbeest Asin. Much of today's sauslec was spent discassing Varlous aspects af the Southenct Agia ond the extire water- front wan covered, Before getting into specilica, I should, ‘state that cepesiully Bundy'ay wax that thas far oll in hand. As te possible future uncertainty, the feeling being thar both friendly and unfriendly reacticas would became batter known during the day, Deady bagan by saying that it 1s difdionls te wader niand the ORV motives in attacking US warehips, He bald thare abvieualy w {ana relation between the reeoas covert attache on DRV inssitivae be but how wineh wae net clear, Latex in the seating I came back to the point of DRY intentions Py Asking wbat ateps we ware taking to find out what Haaoi ae thinking. J recalled teat at ene point wa were trying to cultivate the Canadians wae eae ibis chown, Bandy responded that things were being done Wilson of USLA asked what evidence wa ceuld offe: bllely that the attacks hed taken place, Bundy replied that Rowan ted pressed laat night the importance of making the evidence public, and he was right, On the flret attack, the evidence weuld be peatty good, On the second one the amount of evidence we have today is lesw than we had yesterday, This Fesulted primarily from correlating bite amd pleces of Information eliminating double counting and mistaken signale. This much seemed certain: There was an attack. How many PT boate UNGLASSIFEDUNCLASSIFIED ware involved, how many torpedogs were fired, otc. ~~ all this was still somewhat uncertain. This matter may be of same importance slace Hanol hae denied making the secand attack, si Dougiaes Cetey, sitting in at his firat staff meeting, rhised 2 question about the Co: sional resolution on SE Asia. waidhe had not thought it through completely, but the logic behind the resolu- tlon troubled him somewhat, and he aleo questioned use of the Middle Bast precedent -- that turning out a act too aucceasful venture, The Jogic that trowtiled him was how an attack on US forces apecifically Justified « resolution in favor of maintenance of freedom in SE Aata, Bundy, I reply, jokingly told him perhaps the matter should not be thought through too far. For his own part, te welcomed the recent events as justification for a resolution the Administration tind wanted for some time. Other points of interest mentioned: Bre Smith the t It prudent to empbaalze that our attacks were rearieala Thus he engi that restrikes or follow-on alr attacks should not continue over an extended period of days. He agked who Laue Approve restrikes. After the meeting f confirmed what Bundy thought: that authority for reatrikes would come trom Washington, at least from McNamara and probably fron: the White House, In the sane Vein, Bromley Smith also théught wa should emphasise that "Irap" Pesabe axe being used, aot nuelear ones. No one thought tie » problem: thia word Le out already. Some ons asked whit would happen If the ChiCame brought Mat Alt Power on the DRY. Bundy cautlously anid that our people thought we could bandle them. He then looked at me and asia, "General LeMay doesn't think in terme of the enemy, doesihe? He aeeumde they won't be there." I made aome response to the effect that General SueMay tures some of bis people will take Care of the enemy for bim; he doesn't have to worry toa much @bqut tHat, Al this was sald in good bumer, and the matter dropped. “Referring to the President's meeting with the Congresslonal ‘Meader ship" yeaterday, Bundy commented that “Leadersbig' was a INCLASSIFENUNCLASSTRED funny word in this case, in that there was little Congresamen could do im the way of lending in a situation in which the oe dent's role 6 President's speech. The President originally was to speak of the dangers of nuclear war at Syracuse tode) y + He firat, among others, decided today was the wrong day; sea ne w subject was chosen. SE Acta will be covered, to some extent, at leant —UAGIASSIFIED sss