Copyright 2013

All Rights Reserved

Columbia University
Spring 2013
COLUMBIA
ROOSEVELT
REVIEW
Cover Page.indd 1 4/14/13 5:29 PM
The Executive Board
Lauren Tomasulo, Editor-in-Chief
Grace Rybak, Administrative Director
Natalie Zerwekh, Policy Director
Daniel Gonzalez, Treasurer
Sharin Khander, Outreach Director
Leah Reiss, Secretary
Center Leaders
Tyler Dratch, Equal Justice
Allison Schlissel, Health
Rayleigh Lei, Energy and Environment
Ricardo Rodriguez and
Brit Byrd, Economic Development
Katherine Haller, Education
Adrian Jaycox, Defense and Diplomacy
Editors page.indd 2 4/14/13 5:29 PM
1
Letter from the Editor
This is the fth annual Columbia Roosevelt Review published by the Columbia
University chapter of the Roosevelt Institute. We are proud to present
twenty-two policy proposals written by students from Columbia University
undergraduate students.
The Roosevelt Institute has a particular niche in the Columbia University
intellectual community. As a student-run, non-partisan, progressive think-
tank, we oer students a unique opportunity to discuss current events, issues
of public policy, and evaluate the eectiveness of proposals in an open
environment on a weekly basis.
Our membership is innovative and pragmatic, oering creative solutions
to perpetual problems and considering all obstacles in the way of progress.
The variety of proposals is evidenced by the range from discussions of sex
education in schools re-allocating U.S. Visas. The scope of the ideas and the
creativity of the proposals in this journal reect the best elements of the
Roosevelt Institutes commitment to open-minded but rigorous discussion.
The proposals are organized within our six centers: Economic Development,
Education, Energy and Environment, Equal Justice, Healthcare and Defense and
Diplomacy.
Serving as the Editor-in-Chief of the Columbia Roosevelt Review has been such
a wonderful privilege. I am pleased to present this publication that features
policy solutions to such daunting, complex issues that nations face today.
To all of our writers and executive board members, thank you for all your hard
work. It has culminated in a successful issue of the Columbia Roosevelt Review.
Sincerely,
Lauren Tomasulo
Cover.indd 1 4/14/13 5:30 PM
2 3
Table of Contents
Economic Development
5 An Analysis of IMF Structural Conditionality
Siran Jiang
8 Now or Never: Ending the U.S.-Brazil Cotton Dispute
Audrey Greene
10 A New Budgetary Paradigm
Ricardo Rodriguez
18 Rethinking the Regulation of RoSCAs Worldwide
Maren Killackey
20 Engaging Suburban Poverty: A New Federal Framework
Brit Byrd
Education
24 Reforming State Policies on Sex Education
Katherine Haller
28 The Violin as a Social Metaphor
Kevin Lee
30 Improving the EU Identity Problem through Foreign-Language Education Policy
Kendall Tucker
Energy and Environment
34 An All Energy on Deck Approach
Rayleigh Lei
35 Tackling Climate Change
Fiona Kinniburgh
37 Composting at Columbia
Triana Kalmano
38 Natural Gas and National Interest: A Brighter Future for Renewables
Sharin Khander
Equal Justice
41 Mandatory Minimums: Sentencing to Injustice
Grace Rybak
43 Reallocating Visas to Meet Demand
Natalie Zerwekh
46 Measuring Access to Food
Daniel Gonzalez
49 Get Your Day-Old Baked Goods Here
Ying Chang
Healthcare
52 Reforming Drug Policy: Alternative to the Legalization of Marijuana
Lauren Tomasulo
54 Agricultural Subsidies and Cooking Classes: The Solution to the Obesity Epidemic?
Allison Schlissel
55 Addressing Medicare Solvency through Market Solutions
Noah Zinsmeister
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2 3
57 An Urgent Wake Up Call: A Study of Cell Phones in HIV/AIDS Programs in Southeast Asia
Emily Corning
Defense and Diplomacy
63 Building Economic Ties with Myanmar
Adrian Jaycox
64 Rethinking the United States Embargo Against Cuba
Leah Reiss
Cover.indd 3 4/14/13 5:30 PM
4 5
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Econ.indd 4 4/14/13 5:26 PM
4 5
AN ANALYSIS OF IMF STRUCTURAL
CONDITIONALITY
Siran jiang
Background
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was estab-
lished as a means to ensure global economic stability.
Along with the World Bank, the IMF originated during
World War II as a result of the UN Monetary and Financial
Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July
1944. Just as the United Nations was founded to ensure
global political stability, the IMF was founded with the
intention of cooperation between countries in order to
promote economic stability. Originally, the IMF was to
act almost exclusively in emergency situations when
a countrys economy is in crisis, and therefore negatively
impacting global aggregate demand. In other words,
when the IMF deems that a countrys economic is in des-
perate need of aid, it will provide liquidity in the form of
loans to the country to stimulate its aggregate domestic
demand.
Its not hard to conjecture that the actors at the
Bretton Woods conference who founded the IMF had
the Great Depression of the 1930s on their minds. British
economist John Maynard Keynes, a key participant at the
conference, formed an economic theory at the time that
attributed economic downturns to a lack of aggregate
demand. With this economic theoretical backbone in
mind, the IMF sought to address economic crises through
external stimulation of aggregate demand.
However, throughout the 1980s, the IMF became
increasingly involved in developing countries, to the
criticism of many economists today. As the World Bank
became more involved in providing broad-based support
for poor countries, the IMF expanded its focus beyond
crises and towards the developing countries that were
constantly in need of help. Michel Camdessus, Manag-
ing Director of the IMF in the 1980s, characterized this
transition as the silent revolution that ripped through
many developing countries more and more countries
are making the painful decision to strengthen their eco-
nomic policies and implement growth-oriented adjust-
ment programs with nancial support from the IMF.
2
In
response, the IMF became more involved in the structural
and political policies of these countries an arena that
fostered the growth of the IMFs conditionality require-
ments later described in this article.
3
The new set of beliefs that replaced the Keynesian
framework of the IMF, which emphasized market failures
and the role for government in job creation, was coined
the Washington Consensus. This term refers to a set of
policiesagreed upon between the IMF, World Bank, and
U.S. Treasury by economist John Williamson to refer to
the lowest common denominator of policy advice being
addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin
American countries as of 1989.
4
In other words, these
were the set of roughly 10 economic policy prescriptions
that were considered right for debt-ridden develop-
ing countries namely in Latin America. These policies
included:
1. Fiscal discipline
2. A redirection of public expenditure priorities to-
ward elds oering both high economic returns and the
potential to improve income distribution, such as primary
health care, primary education, and infrastructure
3. Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden
the tax base)
4. Interest rate liberalization
5. A competitive exchange rate
6. Trade liberalization
7. Liberalization of inows of foreign direct invest-
ment
8. Privatization
9. Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and
exit)
10. Secure property rights
5
To analyze the IMFs role in the Latin American economic
crisis of the 1980s, we must rst examine the causes of
the crisis itself. From 1977 to 1982, Latin American cur-
rent account decits and net external borrowing grew
steadily. Interest rates also rose, perhaps due to the high
levels of debt nancing (rms sell bonds, bills, or notes
to individuals or other investors to fund investments and
expenditures in return for an interest on the debt) from
previous decits. The economic failure of so many coun-
tries in Latin America simultaneously have had debated
causes, including domestic policies of scal expansion
and exchange rate overvaluation, as well as external
variables like changing terms of trade.
6
Some say that the
relaxation of current account restraints led to an increase
in Latin American access to international capital markets
in 1970s, but when the 1980s brought a cuto of new
loans to Latin America, the countrys balance of payments
was signicantly altered. Others stress the combination of
internal and external factors: growth of major countries
such as the U.S. had an impact on interest rates, terms of
trade, and capital availability and the internal response
to these external factors together caused the 1980s
Latin American economic crises. A vicious cycle arose in
which Latin American borrowers, followed already by
debts, borrowed more from Western banks resulting in
increasing debt accumulation.
7

Regardless of the debated causes of the Latin Ameri-
can economic diculties, the shift to restrictive monetary
policy in the United States furthered these economic
Econ.indd 5 4/14/13 5:26 PM
6 7
troubles into serious crises that rippled through many
countries at the same time. Latin American export vol-
ume and prices declined while interest rates on previous
debts skyrocketed. According to IMF gures, Latin Ameri-
can reserves decreased by over 30%. Decreasing foreign
direct investment as a response also contributed to Latin
Americas capital ight.
8
e IMF Steps In
To make a very long story short, the power of the IMF
diminished signicantly in the 1970s due to the large
availability of private creditors in developed countries
such as the United States. Instead of loaning funds for
adjustment and nancing of balance of trade decits,
Latin American countries turned to these creditors for
borrowing and contributed to their ever-accumulating
debt. Many governments of these countries did not have
the regulatory measures in place to decrease the borrow-
ing and practice scal discipline, due to many ideologi-
cal, historical, and variant reasons that is a whole dier-
ent story in itself. In the 1980s, Latin American countries
found themselves cut o from the new private credit due
to the changing domestic policies of many of their credi-
tor countries. Thus, in a capital-scarce world, the capital
of the IMF became all the more important as a last resort
to avoid economic collapse.
9
With regards to the Washington Consensus as
described above, the IMFs international involvement
shifted from nancing investment and bailouts to pro-
moting policy reform. Ironically, at the Bretton Woods
conference, those types of tasks were delegated spe-
cically to the World Bank while bailing out countries
nancially in cases of economic emergencies what the
IMF did before the 1980s and 1990s was delegated to
the IMF. So why did this switch occur? Many view it as a
structural shift that was a long-term manifestation of the
Washington Consensus. In other words, setting a list of
successful or right economic policies that countries
should adopt translated into xating upon a countrys in-
ternal domestic economic policies. Thus, the IMF shifted
from bailout-oriented to policy-oriented.
The framework shift at the end of 1999 manifested
through two main agencies created by the IMF: country-
authored Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs),
which were expected to draw on broad-based consulta-
tion with key stakeholders, and the Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF), which was to arrive at poli-
cies that were more clearly focused on economic growth
and poverty reduction.
10
These two organizations were
to be results oriented and focused on outcomes that are
pro-poor.
11
More recently, the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) that would set targets on health, educa-
tion, and other poverty indicators for improvement.
These development-focused groups are the organiza-
tional manifestations of 21st century conditionality.
12
This new shift toward policy-orientation in countries
namely low-income countries was a result of the Latin
American crises of the 1980s and 1990s. The new policy
outlook of the IMF has led to many issues that aect the
IMFs eectiveness in the international arena. Conditional
Lending Today
Toward the beginning of the 21st century, the IMF
decided to streamline conditionality. This involved
restructuring the conditions set in the 1980s and 1990s
that set economic and structural preconditions for coun-
tries in return for IMF loans. A lot of the standards set
by the Washington Consensus were reversed or revised
due to protests. In setting domestic policies that country
leaders must implement in return for nancial aid in dire
circumstances, countries cried out that the IMF was mak-
ing them choose the lesser of two evils. As to the eec-
tiveness to these conditions, the debate continues.
However, conditionality is not completely unfound-
ed on the part of the IMF. By setting specic conditions
of the structure of government and economic policy,
including how the country repays debts, how long it
takes them, the amount of private and public investment
it encourages, and many others. These conditions are
mainly associated with the goals of balance-of-payments
adjustments, economic growth, and adjustment in times
of economic crisis. The IMF ensures that it too has safe-
guards against default. It also helps eliminate a phenom-
enon called debtors moral hazard, in which a borrower
tries less to repay debts if lenders make loans too gener-
ously simply because borrows see continuously taking
loans as a solution rather than repaying them.
13
Some
conditionality is needed, but has the IMF taken this one
step too far?
Types of specic conditions that have been in place
include prior actions, performance criteria, and structural
benchmarks. Prior actions considerations are exactly
what they sound like an evaluation of a countrys
nancial record. Performance criteria and benchmarks
monitor the progress of a members adjustment program
and corrections to guide programs back on track. Bench-
marks that are met reward a country with access to Fund
resources when conditions are met, and takes access
away when conditions are not. In the 1980s, performance
criteria conditions increased immensely as part of direct-
ing the policies of a countrys recovery program. Specif-
ics of performance criteria involve policies like requiring
members not to raise restrictions on trade or payments,
or even that a certain amount of some imports will be
liberalized by a deadline. However, the policies get more
complex and indirect when attaching some ceilings
to certain variables such as domestic growth by some
assumptions that a certain level of growth may lead to
too high a payment decit, etc. Therefore, many steps
in these conditions really hurt economies and allowed a
Econ.indd 6 4/14/13 5:26 PM
6 7
very signicant amount of IMF interference in domestic
aairs.
14
Contents of conditions also vary. There are core
conditions, which deal with tax policy and administration,
scal transparency, monetary and exchange rate policies,
and macroeconomic data. Shared conditions of the IMF
and the World Bank include nancial sector reform, trade
policy, and private sector promotion. Non-core condi-
tions include public enterprise reforms, privatization,
marketing and price reforms, civil service restructuring,
social safety nets, monitoring poverty reduction, and
other sectorial policies. Streamlining in the early 2000s,
according to the IMF, would eliminate all but core condi-
tions and conditions that may have a direct macroeco-
nomic impact if not implemented.
15
Much of IMF conditionality today addresses the
macro-scal policies of governments. However, many
argue that the while the breadth of conditionality has
decreased, the depth has remained constant. The IMF is
still setting incredibly high-demanding conditions in rela-
tion to economics that simply do not tailor to the status
of most low-income countries.
16
According to ndings by
Matthew Martin and Hannah Bargawi in a report on the
IMF and its relation to low-income countries by FONDAD,
the number of conditions in PRGFs has been reduced by
25%-33% in 2002.
17
However, these reductions have been
sporadic and inconsistent across countries. At the same
time, the number of prior actions conditions have fallen,
as well as the number of performance criteria.
18
The most
signicant streamlining happened at the beginning of
the 21st century and since then most IMF actions on con-
ditionality seems to be small-scale revision.
19
According to ndings by Matthew Martin and Han-
nah Bargawi in a report on the IMF and its relation to
low-income countries by FONDAD, scal conditionality
has now become dominant. Many structural conditions
have been eliminated and scal conditions have become
more details focusing on administration and specic tax
measures. As stated above, the majority of conditional-
ity falls into the core category of scal conditionality.
About two-third of the conditions are dened as core
conditions. With the proliferation of conditions regarding
governance, transparency, and non-corruption (which in
recent years were dened as core conditions), that num-
ber has only grown. However, while the much of micro-
level core structural conditions have been removed,
Marin and Bargawi argue that todays IMF conditionality
still contains too much micromanagement.
20
Therefore,
the eectiveness of streamlining conditionality at the
beginning of the century is still hotly debated.
So what kind of conditionality, if any, is the most
eective? This has been a question that scholars have
tried fervently to answer for the past few years. While the
IMF has stuck more or less to the same blueprint from
the early 2000s, many reports have emerged on how
conditionality can and should be changed. One of these
reports is from researches Matthew Martin and Hannah
Bargawi, and they argue that the IMF should divide struc-
tural conditionalities into three groups: to enhance stabi-
lization, to promote growth and poverty reduction, and
that have no key direct macro or growth impact.
21
Within
these three groups, Martin and Bargawi esh out specic
and complex policy directions, including sectoral strate-
gies beyond liberalization in regards to trade, labor and
infrastructure skills improvements, and revenue-raising
measures through central bank reform and monetary and
exchange rate policy. In short, the specic conditionalities
that are deemed eective do not follow a general trend.
22
However, Martin and Bargawi both believe that the
IMF needs to adapt its conditionality better to the needs
of low-income countries, which more country-led initia-
tive as well as IMF exibility. To achieve these long-term
goals, the IMF needs to promote more empowerment of
the borrowing governments to set their own long-term
goals.
23
While not all conditionality is negative, more
domestic government hegemony even with conditions is
imperative.
Deputy governor at Bank of Uganda Louis Kasek-
endes report suggests that if the IMF continues to func-
tion on the basis of the PRSPs, they need to be morphed
into more realistic goals. He states, The IMF could ease
the conditions necessary for absorbing external assis-
tance, especially grants, and the scal space required for
increasing investments in physical infrastructure.
24
Kasek-
ende cites the example of infrastructure improvements:
tight IMF programs that do not allow the government for
any scal breathing room will only frustrate the govern-
ment, because developing countries often place too
much reliance on the private sector to x infrastructure
problems (which almost never happens), and without
infrastructure the private sector remains weak. Instead,
giving governments less conditions and guidelines on
how to spend money will allow room for these miscalcu-
lations commonly seen in developing countries, and thus
promote for better growth. Loosening conditionality for
a countrys domestic economic policies may preserve the
exibility needed for faster growth.
25
Professor of economics Graham Bird also oers some
insight on possibilities to improve IMF conditionality
policies. He argues that there may be a conditionality
Laer curve.
26
In macroeconomic terms, the Laer curve
refers to the level of taxes that can be imposed to still
raise government revenue before individuals actually
begin to work less due to the low yield of working as
taxes increase, and thus government revenue decreases.
Laer curve language in reference to IMF conditionality
suggests that there will be a level of conditionality that
generates the highest eectiveness of IMF policy in de-
veloping countries, but once that level is passed program
eectiveness begins to decrease. Therefore, Bird suggests
Econ.indd 7 4/14/13 5:26 PM
8 9
a minimalist approach to conditionality, which involves
imposing conditions only on policies that will aect a
countrys ability to repay its debt or to avoid another
major economic emergency in the future.
27
Generally,
these policies are much more agreed upon than policy
solutions for economic growth and poverty reduction. In
these areas, Bird proposes, governments [of borrowing
countries] should be granted as much discretion as pos-
sible. The Fund could make recommendations but should
not impose these as performance criteria.
28
In addition, Bird also advocates for greater temporal
exibility in implementing IMF conditions. Since each
country is dierent, it is almost impossible to evaluate
and design (even on a case-by-case basis, which certainly
has been proposed) an appropriate time-line to assess
the success of the implementation of conditions. Bird
instead proposes that conditionality, especially those
that require some sort of structural change in a country,
should be fully self-designed. As a result, the bench-
marks and goals set for these countries also end up being
too rigid and is a recipe for failure especially when the
goals are over-ambitious and unrealistic targets in terms
of economic growth, export growth, and scal adjust-
ment.
29
While there are varying opinions on IMF Conditional-
ity, the overarching opinion of many is that these condi-
tions need to be reduced and adjusted. Though the IMF
made major progress in its steps to streamline condition-
ality in 2002, the problems that face low-income coun-
tries have persisted even in countries receiving IMF aid.
Although data from the latest years may be too recent
to analyze, we can certainly evaluate the eectiveness of
the change in conditionality at the beginning of the 21st
century to better craft conditionality today for the future.

When President Rousse and President Obama met
this past August at the White House, they discussed their
roles as heads of the Open Government Partnership,
whose aim is to increase transparency and accountability
in governments all around the world.
1
This latter value
accountabilityis missing from Congress economic ap-
proach towards Brazil. Every year since 2009, the United
States has paid more than $147.3 million to Brazil for our
failure to reform trade-distorting cotton policies. This pay-
ment is the result of a drawn-out conict between the
United States and Brazil that began in 2002. In this era of
scal belt-tightening, Congress should address Brazilian
demands immediately and bring an end to wasteful an-
nual payments.
In September of 2002, Brazil led a dispute against
American subsidies and trade policies, arguing that they
harmed Brazils cotton industry from 1992-2002. In 2004,
under the Aegis of the WTO, it was found that three
American cotton programsmarketing loans, subsidies,
and export credit guaranteesrequired reform in order
to comply with WTO regulations. The marketing loans
and subsidies provide cotton farmers with nancial sup-
port when the price of cotton is below a certain monetary
level. Brazil argued that an articially high monetary
level led American farmers to overproduce cotton and to
reduce the international price of the good. Meanwhile,
export credit guarantees were found to be a prohibited
export subsidy because the costs absorbed by the gov-
ernment exceeded the premiums charged to participat-
ing cotton farmers. In response, the United States elimi-
nated two of three oending export guarantee programs;
but left in place a program under GSM-102 that had been
ruled as trade-distorting. Additionally, the 2008 farm
bill did not lower the price triggers on marketing loans
and counter-cyclical payments. In 2007, Brazil began to
discuss retaliatory measures.
2
In 2009, the WTO ruled that Brazil could take
counter-measures against the United States. In order to
prevent Brazil from enacting these counter-measures
which would have allowed Brazil to circumvent American
patents on certain technologythe United States agreed
to a temporary solution: The United States would pay Bra-
zil 143.7 million each year until Congress makes changes
to follow the relevant WTO laws.
3
Rather than making
the necessary reforms, several in Congress have sought
to circumvent the WTO-sanctioned payments to Brazil.
The Brazil-U.S. Business Council (BRAZTAC) reports that,
In 2011 and 2012, there were four attempts in the House
and one in the Senate to stop the temporary payment of
Audrey Greene
NOW OR NEVER: ENDING THE U.S.
BRAZIL COTTON DISPUTE
Econ.indd 8 4/14/13 5:26 PM
8 9
funds under the temporary agreement.
4

Other pillars of the framework agreement included
the promise to nally resolve reform cotton programs
through the 2012 Farm Bill, which would be viewed as
successor legislation. The Senate passed S. 3240, the
Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012, on June
7. The House of Representatives created its own markup,
H.R. 6083. The farm bills proposed in 2012 continue two
programs that Brazil has taken issue with, according to
WTO rules: the marketing loan program and the export
credit guarantee program. One positive step proposed
in 2012 (by both chambers of Congress) was the elimina-
tion of the counter-cyclical payments; however, this was
replaced by the new Stacked Income Protection Plan
(STAX), which appears more trade-distorting than its
predecessor. Experts nd that STAX must be dramatically
reformed if it is to satisfy the Brazilian government.
5
Fiscal cli debates prevented Congress from autho-
rizing either of the ve-year farm bills in 2012. Instead,
Congress issued an extension of the 2008 law until
September 30, 2013. The extension continued the 2008-
era programs in question. Fortunately, Brazil did not view
the extension as successor legislation, meaning that the
United States will not suer harsher sanctions in the com-
ing months (provided that the US continues its annual
payment of nearly $150 million).
On January 14, Secretary Vilsack pressed Congress
to take action on a ve-year farm bill. The passage of an
omnibus farm bill is an urgent need for American farm-
ersnot just large agribusinessesthat that they can
make planting decisions and other nancial choices in
the coming months. However, ongoing budgetary talks
have pushed the timeline for a new omnibus bill into
late this summer. If Congress waits to address the cotton
issue through the omnibus bill, two negative scenarios
could unfold. First, Brazil could become impatient with
U.S. inaction regarding the farm bill, and enact retalia-
tory measures on the U.S. Second, Congress could fail to
take Brazils full concerns into account and pass a new
Farm Bill that does not resolve the crisis. Given these risks,
Congress should pass a separate piece of legislation that
deals primarily with the cotton program.
What would constitute such a bill? In the 2010
framework agreement, CAMEX indicated that accept-
able cotton subsidies must be signicantly lower than
$3.568 billion per year, the average sum given to upland
cotton farmers in recent years.
6
A cotton bill should be
sure to make changes to the marketing loan program,
export credit guarantee program, and STAX that Brazil
has requested. This would be seen as successor legisla-
tionoering the chance for a nal resolution to this
decade-long conict.
Key players in this cotton reform bill should be in
frequent communication with Brazilian authorities to
ensure that they will be satised by the new measures.
Domestically, this will require close cooperation between
the acting U.S. Trade Representative, Demetrios Marantis,
and Congress. The idea of separating cotton from other
USDA programs will face opposition in Congress. How-
ever, Mr. Marantis, who was the chief international trade
counsel for the Senate Finance Committee, has devel-
oped a close working relationship in the past with key
Congressmen such as Chuck Grassley (Iowa-R). Cotton in-
terests should view this as a bill that will create certainty
in the international cotton market.
Brazils patience in recent months should not be
taken for granted. Its willingness not to count the Con-
tinuing Resolution as successor legislation may be due,
in part, to the candidacy of Brazilian diplomat Roberto
Cavalho de Azevdo for head of the WTO.
7
Mr. de Azev-
do is one of nine nalists seeking to replace the current
head, Pascal Lamy, when his term ends in August 2013.
Before May 31st, the candidates must gain the approval
of all WTO members, including the United States. Mr. de
Azevdo himself has remarked that If one says no, just
one, it doesnt happen.
8
Because Brazil needs the U.S.s
support, it may be temporarily lenient on trade rela-
tions this spring. Following May 31st, however, Congress
should be prepared for a more assertive stance on this
trade dispute. Now is the time to act on a cotton-specic
reform bill that would end costly payments and improve
relations between the two largest economies in the West-
ern Hemisphere.
Econ.indd 9 4/14/13 5:26 PM
10 11
As most world governments face the challenges of
rising debt, an increasing number of policy-makers have
had to reluctantly face todays primal question: how do
we reduce our decit? Of course, answering this question
is impossible without rst understanding the govern-
ments continuously evolving role in the economy and
private life. Indeed, a century ago government was hardly
visible in times other than war; only during times of bel-
ligerence would government suddenly become a driving
force in the economy. These periods were usually accom-
panied by a rapid rise in debt, as governments dramati-
cally increased their military expenditure. However, they
were also quickly followed by years, if not decades, of
declining debt, as governments limited responsibilities
meant thatduring times of peacemost government
revenue was necessarily allocated toward reduction of
the debt accumulated during war.
1
This cycle of rising
and declining debt continued without interruption from
the early modern state until the First World Warand to
some extent, the Second. With the development of gov-
ernment as a caretaker of welfare, however, the responsi-
bilities of the public sector exponentially increased. With
these new responsibilities, decits can no longer be sim-
ply dismissed as the result of business or political cycles;
we can no longer assume that decits will resolve them-
selves once peace has arrived or the economy is expand-
ing. Having thus become a chronic pain in the health of
our national economy and political sphere, it is crucial to
nd new solutions to our seemingly never-ending decit
problems.
At a glance, resolving decits should be relatively
straightforward. After all, decits are a basic arithmetic
operation: revenue minus spending, where spending is
larger than revenue. Three simple solutions are imme-
diately clear: increase revenues, decrease spending, or a
combination of the two. However, none of these options
is without controversy, nor straightforward to accom-
plishparticularly the rst: raising government revenues.
For example, the Laer curve, formalized during the
1980s in the boom of supply-side economicspropos-
es what is actually a somewhat counter-intuitive assump-
tion: that at a certain point, tax revenue will decrease as
the tax rate increases. Thus, the Laer curve describes the
following tax rate-tax revenue relationship:
With Ronald Reagans election to the presidency,
supply-side economics and the Laer curve became the
recipe of choice at the time of formulating budgetary and
economic policy. To this day, many continue to propose
that tax cuts will invigorate our economy whileat
the same timeincreasing government revenues and
thus reducing budget decits. The issue is, of course,
that models like the Laer curve are never meant to be
entirely realistic. While there are a slew of well-known
arguments against this curve, the primary critique is that
it has severely limited the governments scope of ac-
tion and its ability to take proactive measures to reduce
decits. Instead of taking the common sense approach
that raising tax rates will increase tax revenue, the mere
mention of such a tax hike has become taboo in todays
political discourse. Thus, with never-ending tax cuts and
the Laer-curve justication behind them, government
has tied itself to a policy that only signicantly reduces its
sources of revenue, with no conclusive evidence that it
has any discernible impact on consumption and on eco-
nomic growth. In fact, as will be expanded upon shortly,
assuming some degree of Ricardian equivalence, it is safe
to say that another tax cut will neither raise government
revenue nor signicantly promote any growth.
In this piece, I will propose two possible solutions
to our decit problems: rst of all, we must scrap the
limiting assumptions behind the Laer curve. Instead of
viewing a tax increase as a deterrent to economic growth
and a drain to government revenue, we should view it
as an opportunity to increase government transfers and
spending that can promote economic growth, increase
national savings (and with it, investment), and help re-
duce our decit. Indeed, because the Laer curve fails to
account for government transfers as well as taxes, it does
not accurately describe peoples incentives to work based
on the level of taxation, and it should not be a model
that our policy-makers employ regularly to form budget-
ary policy. Secondly, I will propose that scal and policy
A NEW BUDGETARY PARADIGM
Ricardo Rodriguez
Econ.indd 10 4/14/13 5:26 PM
10 11
decentralization might be an eective solution to our
nations scal problems. By decentralizing our budget and
promoting citizen-level collective action in budgetary
policy at the local, micro level (in other words, participa-
tory budgeting), we can cater budgets to more specic
issues while fostering discipline and responsibility in
funding the programs in those budgets. Clearly, public
goods provision is easier at the local level, where transac-
tion costs are lower and regulation of free-riders is easier.
2

Thus, going local while ridding ourselves of our mislead-
ing, Laer-curve beliefs can be good rst steps toward
more scally responsible economic policies.
Decentralization and Participatory Budgeting
Looking at a two-dimensional policy space and plot-
ting preferred policies on tax revenues versus the level of
spending, we can show that budget decits are usually
the preferred policy outcome in our present system of
formulating budgetary policy.
In this game where points A, B, C, and D represent
dierent policy-making groups or individuals, any area
where there is overlap between each players indierence
curve is a possible policy outcome. Thus, assuming that
players prefer a policy outcome closer in space to their
own preferred policy, four distinct possible outcomes are
clear. Two of these outcomes represent a budget surplus:
those formed by the agreement between players A and B,
and players A and C. Indeed, because player As preferred
policy is a high level of tax revenue but a comparatively
low level of spending, any agreement with this player in
this game will result in a budget surplus. Any agreement
with player D, on the other hand, will result in a budget
decit, because his preferred policy is a high level of
spending but a low level of revenue.
Of course, this is a simplied model to explain the
origins of dierent policy outcomes under our present
system. In it, we must assume that there is no movement
of the players preferred policies, and that they have
perfect information and control over tax revenue. Yet, we
know that perfect control over tax revenue is impossible,
seeing as how government can only control the tax rate,
not tax revenue itself. It is the tax revenue, then, that will
be a function of the tax ratea function which can be
described, among many other options, by relationships
such as the Laer curve. Moreover, in our case of this
game, we must assumeand this seems a bold assump-
tionthat player A does not exist. However, in our real
world that is actually not such an unrealistic assumption
to make; of all the players in our game, A is the least likely
to exist in our worldfew policy-makers today call for
the inecient policy of high revenues but few programs
to spend that revenue on. Thus, our policy space ends up
looking like so:
where decits are the policy outcome according to player
Ds preferences, despite two other playersB and C
Econ.indd 11 4/14/13 5:26 PM
12 13
agreeing on the more scally responsible policy of the
balanced budget.
Therefore, decits are the usual outcome under our
present system. As can be corroborated with empirical
data and a look at history over the past four decades, it is
clear thatwhatever the causedecits have become our
recent scal reality. This fact, however, does not neces-
sarily have to imply that they will also become our future
scal reality. Instead, several solutions to this decit
problem can exist. In continuation I will be treating two in
particulardecentralization with participatory budget-
ing, and adopting the more common-sense approach of
tax increases.
First of all, by looking once again at our policy-space,
it is clear that balanced budgets and surpluses are possi-
ble by allowing for appropriate movement of our players
preferred policies and indierence curves. Thus, by allow-
ing bargaining, cooperation and collective action in our
policy space, we can create overlap between our players
indierence curves at more scally responsible areas.
Moreover, because bargaining is already a strategy we
employ today, another method to allow for even greater
overlap in these scally responsible areas is to naturally
make the players preferred policies and interests more
similar. While living in a same locality does not necessarily
translate into equal interests, it is safe to assume that, at
the micro-level, neighbors and families have much more
similar interests and preferences than a large collection
of citizens at a national stage. Thus, in smaller, micro level
organizations, regardless of the number of players
which has potentially increased as we make collective
action a broader, more inclusive aairand regardless of
the size of their indierence curves, interests are far more
similar and balanced budgets or surpluses easier to reach.
Looking at our policy space:
Low level of decentralization
High level of decentralization
Perfect decentralization (each individual has his own bud-
getthere is no government)
Thus, while it is no guarantee that a balanced budget
or a surplus will be reachedin fact, it is just as likely that
it will move towards a decit as to a surplus or a balanced
budget if the local communitys interests are as such
decentralization is nevertheless a useful tool to make col-
lective action much easier and, with more citizen input,
more scally responsible policies possible. If anything, it
at least increases the potential for cooperation, as evi-
denced by the larger overlap between groups of players
individual indierence curves when their interests are
more similar.
Indeed, it has been a well-known, intuitive fact for
decades that collective action is much easier at the local
level. Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Laureate in Econom-
ics, and other major thinkers in economic governance
have proven that resources can be very-well managed
and regulated without the need for a large government
Econ.indd 12 4/14/13 5:26 PM
12 13
or regulatory bodyinstead, communities of individuals
have relied on institutions resembling neither the state
nor the market to govern some resource systems with
reasonable degrees of success over long periods of time.
3

With particular regards to scal and budgetary policy, this
is in part because decentralization counters diusion of
responsibility. Devolving scal responsibilities to smaller,
local organizations increases the extent to which that
same locality acknowledges its responsibility for its scal
issues. For example, while most of a governments debt is
publicly held, it would be hard to believe that a head of
a household feels as responsible for the national debt as
he or she does for his or her own familys debt; it is simply
common sense thatif one is rationalone should feel
much more personally responsible with ones own money
and for ones own debt than that which is shared and
diused throughout many other citizens. In other words,
barring extreme cases, an individual household rarely
lets itself accumulate as much debt as our government
does, because said household feels much more person-
ally responsible for any debt it accumulatesit will nd it
harder to free ride on the eorts of others to pay it down
(or simply stop accumulating it).
Thus, decentralization is a sure method to decrease
diusion of responsibility, and make collective action
with the aim of reaching a balanced budget or surplus
easier (by increasing the potential for cooperation,
evidenced with the larger overlap in possible policy
outcomes in our two-dimensional policy space). How-
ever, several critiques can be made against decentraliza-
tion. The rst of these is that it might increase bailout
beliefsthe tendency to fall back on a higher, national
level of government in the case of failure.
4
Thus, by grant-
ing more power and responsibility over individual com-
munities, we might increase their incentives to simply
spend much more than they can pay for, in the false belief
that the national government will eventually step in and
bail them out. This moral hazard can easily turn into a
disastrous situation if every single community falls into
the temptation of these bailout beliefseventually, the
national government will nd itself unable to save every-
one who fails to meet its scal responsibilities. To counter
this, we can hold the larger, higher level of government
to a credible rule of not bailing out scally irresponsible
localities. While this is not ecient or desirable at the
individual level, it is at the collective one. In other words,
while it would not be benecial for a locality that does
nd itself in a scal dilemma, it would be benecial to
society as a whole because it avoids the potential disaster
of a nation-wide scal crisis if all localities decide to fall
back on these bailout beliefs.
Secondly, though the national government would
retain control over programs too expensive to devolve to
local governmentsand would also retain control over
responsibilities that are clearly the realm of the national
government, such as defensedecentralization does
pose a dicult complication in the issue of inequality.
Indeed, one of the major arguments in favor of a more
centralized budget is the issue of redistribution: higher-
income areas can help support lower-income areas by
making the federal budget one large pool of revenue
from which to draw resources to redistribute to needier
areas and necessary welfare services. If we decentralize
budgets, however, these lower-income communities will
certainly be impacted as they will see their resources
and revenueswhich they obtained largely through
redistribution from higher-income areassignicantly
decreased. In that case, an alternative policy would be to
have a certain amount of each localitys revenue sent to
a higher level of government (to a large extent what the
federal system does already). This level of government,
in turn, would redistribute these resources as needed
thus, some limited centralization to the largest local com-
munity capable of redistributing the necessary funds and
resources. Nevertheless, to the extent that spending can
be devolved and decentralized, it should.
Thirdly, another complication to a decentralization
argument is the issue of externalities.
5
To some extent, a
centralized budget internalizes most externalities by hav-
ing weighed the costs and benets of certain programs.
However, by having many more decentralized budgets
we are allowing for many more externalities to occur by
excluding many communities from the budget-formula-
tion process of each individual community. For example,
in our decentralized system, if a community is willing and
able to build a highly pollutant factory in its locality, it has
the right to do so regardless of the negative externalities
of pollution to the surrounding communities (who did
not have a say in whether or not the factory should be
built). We would then be faced with the classic dilemma
of who is responsible for osetting the negative externali-
ties and, perhaps most importantly, the more philosophi-
cal question of whether or not a community should have
the right to build a highly-pollutant factory knowing that
its surrounding communities will be negatively aected
(even if it has the necessary funds, resources and agree-
ment). Perhaps under a centralized budget, the surround-
ing communities may have been able to resist the con-
struction of such a factory and avoid the negative eects
from such a program.
The same goes for positive externalities: when a
community decides to build a high-tech research center
with its own budget and funds, it is providing positive
externalities to all the communities that benet from the
research and the discoveries done there. While seem-
ingly less contentious than negative externalities, posi-
tive externalities nevertheless bring out crucial questions
regarding the provision of public goods: If a community
knows it wont be compensated for the programs it funds
that provide positive externalities, is there any incentive
Econ.indd 13 4/14/13 5:26 PM
14 15
for it to continue such a program? Thus, if we decentral-
ize our budget, will we see a decline in these types of
programs that require incentives in order to be set in
place? In the classic example of a lighthouse, we know
that there must usually be some third-party enforcer or
neutral arbiter in order to set forth the construction of
said public good.
6
If budgets were decentralized, how-
ever, we could assume that no community would build a
lighthouse on a rocky shore, because each will be waiting
for its neighboring community to do soknowing that
if the neighbor builds the lighthouse, its own community
will obtain all the benets without having to pay any of
the costs of construction or funding. Thus, some limited
level of centralization is also required for the provision of
public goods.
Lastly, many claim that decentralization might
produce an ineciently small government. Alesina and
Glaeser lay out the classical critique: tax competition
between localities should lead to a race toward the bot-
tom in terms of provision of public goods leading to an
ineciently small size of government.
7
Indeed, while
certain communities may be willing to accept a relatively
high tax rate in order to pay for comprehensive services,
many other communities might wish a lower tax rate in
exchange for lower spending. Thus, rms and employers
might in turn wish to relocate towards those communi-
ties where tax rates are lower, ironically leaving those
communities willing to have a large amount of revenue
devoid of such resources. Eventually, those communities
who favor more spending might not have the necessary
funds (or jobs) to do so, while those communities who
would have the resources because of their low unemploy-
ment and large tax base, do not have the will to spend at
all. This argument, however, is not necessarily in the main-
stream when it comes to decentralization. Many others
in fact claim the opposite, in an argument very similar to
our one regarding bailout beliefs: decentralization might
lead to an ineciently large government, with reckless
spending from localities as they falsely believe that the
national government may be able to bail all of them out.
8
Thus, there really is no consensus regarding whether or
not decentralization might produce big or small govern-
ment. What is important, nevertheless, is that it produce
scal discipline, and that many dierent policies can be
implemented to address this potential moral hazard or
race to the bottom.
While these complications certainly place some
qualications on our argument, they do not entirely
discredit decentralization as a possible solution to our
scal crisis. For example, in Governing the Commons,
Elinor Ostrom presented what she called a self-nanced
contract-enforcement game.
9
In this one of many solu-
tions to the problem she was studyingthe tragedy of
the commonsshe proposed that the players them-
selves can make a binding contract to commit them-
selves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves
will work out.
10
This contract allows the participants in
the situation to exercise greater control over decisions
about who will be allowed to graze and what limits will
be placed on the number of animals the self-interest
of those who negotiated the contract will lead them to
monitor each other and to report observed infractions
so that the contract is enforced.
11
While it might seem
strange to apply Ostroms arguments about a common
resource to a national budget, the idea might not be that
far-fetched. After all, it is not that dicult to extend the
classic example of over-grazing to our own scal issues:
the national budget becomes the common resource,
all of the citizens become the players, and over-grazing
would be analogous to a budget decit. In order to avoid
the over-grazing (the budget decit) which could lead in
the long-run to a lack of the resource itself (a budget), we
will need to form some new contract by which all players
can decide to regulate themselves and use the resource
(revenues and spending) more eciently.
Up this point, most of the arguments presented have
been theoretical and based on economic models. Never-
theless, these ideas also have political justications and
have been applied in real-world scenarios. Especially dur-
ing the 1990s, the World Bank published extensive analy-
sis of the issue of scal and political decentralization. In
the East Asia and the Pacic Region, the World Bank con-
ducted research that demonstrated that direct democra-
cy in decentralized resource allocation results in a higher
level of citizen satisfaction with the allocation process
itself (though not necessarily the outcome).
12
With regard
to budget decits themselves, in Budget Institutions and
Fiscal Performance in Latin America, Alesina, Hausmann,
Hommes and Stein proposed that scal institutions
with ex-ante constraints on decitssuch as balanced
budget rulesare associated with a higher level of scal
discipline.
13
This has been corroborated in the U.S. by
Bohn and Inman in Balanced Budget Rules and Public
Debts: Evidence from the US States.
14
Extending this fact
to our decentralization argument, I propose that explicit
rules are not strictly necessary; as Elinor Ostrom pointed
out, self-enforcing contracts can be enough to provide
for ecient results. These self-enforcing contracts, in turn,
are only possible in highly decentralized, local commu-
nities. Moreover, it is important to remember that strict
rules are a very limiting factor in the case of shocks. While
we argue for a scally responsible budget, this argument
does not always necessarily imply a balanced budget or
surplus. Indeed, in Keynesian orthodoxy, during times
of recession a decit may very well be the appropriate
economic policy to implement. However, keeping those
assumptions in mind, in that case it might still be better
to have a decit at the local, decentralized level, where
spending can be used in the most community-specic
and appropriate way possible to stimulate recovery.
Econ.indd 14 4/14/13 5:26 PM
14 15
Leaving aside momentarily the economic argu-
ments in favor and against decentralization, there is one
important, political dimension to this proposal. Indeed, a
prime question in political science has always been how
to improve the congruence between citizens preferences
and policy outcomes.
15
One clear solution to increasing
this congruence should be decentralization. Indeed, in
our majoritarian, representative system, it is dicult to
determine whether voters choices are truly represented
or have any inuence on policy. Thus, with such an
important issue as tax policy, it might be best to redirect
decisions so that it is highly more representative and
inuenced by the voters and rms themselves. Moreover,
as Bingham Powell, Jr. made clear, our present system
assumes that all we can know about citizens preferences
is revealed through their vote choices. The problem is,
however, that they can only choose from among the
alternatives that are presented to them, not from what
might actually be their own preferences.
16
Therefore, col-
lective action and more personal input at the local level
might increase the positive, social and economic impact
of government services in each locality, because it was
the citizens themselves who made those preferences
clear, and not distant representatives.
Thus, having considered both the economic and po-
litical arguments in favor and against of decentralization,
we might feel safe concluding that it might be a good
strategy to solve our scal crisis. While clearly no theory is
a guarantee of success, making tax policy a truly coop-
erative endeavordecentralizing it and including actual
people and interests in the process, where everyone gets
complete, close-to-perfect informationshould provide
for a much more ecient use of funds and spending.
Thus, a more responsible and ecient budgetary policy
will imply decentralizing the budget to some extentto
the level where people have similar interests and priori-
ties, and where agreements are possible that put these
interests and priorities to best use. Moreover, in these
communities of similar interests, an agreement on expec-
tations, priorities and funding of governance might get
rid of the negative incentive eects of raising tax rates.
Ricardian Equivalence and Tax Structure
With the knowledge that theories of intertemporal
consumption and budget constraints give us, and assum-
ing Ricardian equivalence, our second essential argument
implies that knowledge of taxes, transfers, costs and
benetssimply put, knowledge of the processin-
ternalizes these costs and benets to the extent that we
can get rid of some of the negative incentive eects of
tax rate increases. Thus, in order to help solve our scal
crisis, we should get rid of the classic assumptions behind
debts and decits. This implies assuming some degree of
Ricardian equivalence, and scrapping many of the mis-
leading ideas behind the Laer curve.
Originated by the classical economist David Ricardo,
and developed more recently by Robert J. Barro, Ricard-
ian equivalence proposes that citizens internalize the
governments intertemporal budget constraint.
17
Thus, in
laymans terms, Ricardian equivalence claims that citi-
zens understand that what the government spends, it
must eventually pay for. Because citizens are able to look
ahead at the repercussions of the governments present
budgetary and scal policies, their consumption will not
be aected solely by their present income, but also by
their future income. Thus, any attempt by the govern-
ment to increase a consumers present income will not
aect the latters consumption, because the consumer
understands thatin the long-runthe government will
eventually have to pay for that stimulus by reducing his
future income. In his Macroeconomics textbook, Nicholas
Gregory Mankiw momentarily adopts the role of a con-
sumer subject to Ricardian equivalence. Under this new
role, he writes: The government is cutting taxes without
any plans to reduce government spending The govern-
ment is nancing the tax cut by running a budget decit.
At some point in the future, the government will have to
raise taxes to pay o the debt and the accumulated inter-
est. So the policy really represents a tax cut today coupled
with a tax hike in the future. The tax cut merely gives me
transitory income that eventually will be taken back. I am
not any better o, so I will leave my consumption un-
changed.
18
Thus, the Ricardian view of debt has strong
implications for scal policy: a tax cut that is nanced
with debt will have no eect on consumption, and hence
no eect on economic growth. Because it has no eect
on growth and only reduces revenue, in the eyes of a Ri-
cardian economist, a tax cut only represents a temporary
decit and accumulation of debt.
While there are denitely key critiques of Ricardian
equivalenceprimarily, the assumption that consumers
are myopic, and hence do not look forward enough to
understand that a tax cut today means a tax hike tomor-
rowit is nevertheless a signicant argument that calls
into question the governments present policy of perpet-
ual tax cuts. Indeed, if we assume Ricardian equivalence,
all the government is doing is reducing our sources of
revenue today, yet having no eect on economic growth.
Moreover, while the classical assumption is that economic
growth will lead to a rise in revenues that will nance the
original tax cut, Ricardian equivalence actually implies
that a tax cut is not really self-nancing. In fact, most
economists now understand that the incentive eects
are not large enough to make tax cuts self-nancing in
most circumstances.
19
Thus, understanding that tax cuts
do not necessarily have an eect on consumption and on
economic growth, and that tax cuts are not in fact self-
nancing, it might nally be time to switch strategies and
raise tax rates. As Ricardian equivalence has taught us,
this tax increase should not have as dramatic a negative
Econ.indd 15 4/14/13 5:26 PM
16 17
what the Laer curve assumes will happen at a 100% tax
rate). Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function and
a given utility function
, we can maximize utility subject to the constraint

22
Thus, plugging in ,
taking the frst derivative oI the utility Iunction and equal-
ing it to zero, we get that:
Thus, knowing that symbolizes the tax rate, we can
show that as the tax rate increases, the amount of hours
workedand hence, the tax basewill decrease. This
conrms the assumption that an increase in the tax rate
will lower the tax base because it lowers peoples incen-
tives to work. However, it is clear that the number of
hours worked cannot reach zero unless . Yet,
we know that is the labor share of income in the
economy, which cannot be zero for any production to
take place. Hence, it is safe to assume from this model
that the amount of hours worked in an economy will
never reach zeroand thus, the tax base will not reach
zero either. This is also simple common sense: in order to
survive, we have to work regardless of the tax rate. Thus,
no matter how low or high the tax rate, as long as people
want to live (and we assume that living includes being a
part of the market system), they will work.
Now that weve demonstrated that the tax base can
never reach zeroand hence, disproven the Laer-curve
assumption that even a 100% tax rate will mean no one
want to workwe have to describe what actually does
happen to the tax baseand hence, to revenueas the
tax rate increases. To do so, we might have to leave the
economic arguments behind and enter a political one.
Moreover, many may have noticed that under a 100% tax
rate, =1. In that case, a solution to the model of hours
worked does not exist. Thus, this particular economic
model is unable to properly describe what happens to
the tax base and tax revenue once the tax rate reaches
100%. We must now enter the realm of politics. While
more theory than model, in this last section I will argue
that we can get rid of the Laer curve and replace it with
new curves to describe the tax rate-tax revenue relation-
ship based on the socioeconomic and political character-
istics of each society. Basically, dierent societies will have
dierent incentives to work, work ethic, and cultures
which will aect the shape this curve will take. Most
importantly, the Laer curve does not take into account
one of the major factors that aect peoples incentive to
work and pay taxes: transfers and spending. Thus, when
we include spending in the tax rate-tax revenue relation-
ship curve, I predict we will see much dierent results
that could potentially allow us to raise tax rates and help
balance the budget.
eect on growth as many claim it will, andas common-
sense tells usit will probably increase government
revenue instead of decrease it. Scrapping this Laer-curve
assumption that tax cuts will always lead to growth and
to smaller decits might actually lead to more scal disci-
pline and debt reduction.
Even if we dont assume Ricardian equivalence and
simply take the traditional view of budget debt, it is clear
that continuous tax cuts can ultimately be quite harmful
to future generations. As Barro wrote: desired private sav-
ing rises by less than the tax cut, so that desired national
saving declines. It follows for a closed economy that the
expected real interest rate would have to rise to restore
equality between desired national saving and investment
demand. The higher real interest rate crowds out invest-
ment, which shows up in the long run as a smaller stock
of productive capital. Therefore, in the language of Franco
Modigliani (1961), the public debt is an intergenerational
burden in that it leads to a smaller stock of capital for
future generations.
20
In an open economy, on the other
hand, a debt implies an increase in foreign investment
as the government borrows more from abroad. In the
long-run, that implies that a larger and larger share of a
countrys output is claimed by foreign governments and
individuals. Thus, ultimately, running a budget decit
leaves a smaller and smaller share of capital stock and
output in the hands of our own children.
If, however, we wish to leave future generations a
larger capital stock than what we ourselves enjoy, we
must consider bearing a larger share of the burden of
our current social and military programs. That, as has
been stated, will most probably require an increase in tax
ratesa destruction of our current Laer-curve assump-
tions.
Yet, a refutation of the Laer curve does not only
arise from the need to raise tax rates. Instead, empirical
data has already demonstrated that this curve does not
necessarily hold in real life. Despite the assumption that
cutting tax rates will increase the tax base and with it (it is
assumed) tax revenue, in general many countries (includ-
ing the United States) have reached near-100% marginal
tax rates in the past and have not seen the predicted
collapse in tax revenue.
21
Even though the assumption
that raising tax rates will decrease the tax base is correct,
what is incorrect is the assumption that this fall in the tax
base over-compensates the rise in the tax rate, producing
declining tax revenues.
Indeed, we can begin relaxing the assumptions of
the Laer curve that have constrained our governments
economic policy. By looking at a simple model that de-
scribes the amount of hours worked taking into consider-
ation the tax rate, we can prove that the amount of hours
worked in an economy (which in this case will serve as a
proxy for the tax base) will never reach zero (which is
Econ.indd 16 4/14/13 5:26 PM
16 17
Our main assumption, thus, is that revenue does not
necessarily have to equal zero at a 100% tax rate, because
people will still work due to biological necessities, social
norms, political rules, and government transfers. These
variables, in turn, will depend on the type of social and
political system in place in the countryalong with the
respective work ethic and attitudes toward government.
Indeed, where the balance between individual free-
dom and collective responsibility will actually lie depends
on the type of society. It will depend on the social, eco-
nomic, and political behavior of each nation whether a
tax policy is designed to favor the collective over the indi-
vidual by taxing the latter in favor of the formers benet,
or whether it will favor the individual at the expense of
the collective (by taxing the former less). Moreover, it also
depends on the social, economic, and political behavior
of each society whether the goals of the government are
the same of the people, or vice versa. Once the goals of
the two are the same (or are adequately communicated
and agreed upon), then the proper balance will be found,
and all sides will truly beneta claim which reects
back on our previous political argument over decentral-
ization as a means to increase the congruence between
citizens wants and governmental action. Therefore,
government must learn to properly understand and com-
municate priorities: it must learn to understand whether
people prefer to be taxed much and receive equally high
amounts of government services, or they prefer lower tax
rates with correspondingly low levels of services from the
public sector. Moreover, in the scenario where the people
prefer both high government services and lower taxes,
government must learn to communicate that a natural
trade-o exists between taxes and services: if one desires
to be scally responsiblea term which we claried can
include budget decits when so requiredmany services
mean high taxes, while low taxes must mean fewer ser-
vices. How eective government is in understanding and
communicating the priorities and trade-os (and how
eectively the people make their priorities understood
andinverselyunderstand that the trade-os exist)
depends, once again, on the social, economic and politi-
cal behavior of each society.
Of course, because in the real world we have the
added dilemma of transaction costs, not all citizens agree
on what services they prefer and how much theyd like
to be taxed, and not all citizens speak with a clear and
unied voice, agreements like these might be more pos-
sible and ecient at the micro level. Nevertheless, at this
local level, agreements and communication between the
policy-makers (which at this level directly includes the
citizens) may lead to a tax rate-tax revenue relationship
very dierent from the Laer curve. Therefore, the Laer
curve isnt necessarily wrong, but because it simply looks
at revenue, its shape might not describe all economic sys-
tems and societies. Even at a 100% tax rate, people might
be willing to work if:
a. They are unable to maintain a decent standard
of living without a job. The primordial need to survive
impels them to work regardless of the tax rate.
b. The economic system in place in their country is
not a free market economy but a command one. More-
over, the political system might make it an obligation to
work.
c. Government transfers and spending are enough
tocompensate for their taxes.
d. Culture, work ethic and social norms impel
people to work regardless of the tax rate.
Thus, a proper tax rate-tax revenue relationship curve
should account for the uncertainty of these variables.
Attempting to consider all possible scenarios, we can
imagine the following general descriptive trends:
Clearly, depending on the economic and political
system in place, the attitudes towards government and
welfare, and the work ethic of the population, it is pos-
sible to imagine a tax rate-tax revenue relationship that
is much dierent from that of the Laer curve. It is in fact
possible to visualize curves with a constant positive slope,
and curves which reach maximum possible revenue at tax
rates near or exactly at 100%.
Conclusion
In conclusion, a strategy that combines some de-
gree of scal and policy decentralization, participatory
budgeting, and a dierent mind-set with regards to tax
policy might be a potential solution to the scal crises
which presently aect multiple countries around the
world. Instead of government policies guided by the
limiting assumptions of the Laer curve, we should focus
on collective action at the local level as the centerpiece
of our growth and tax policy. Indeed, because we want
the programs that foster growtheducation, healthcare,
research, and law enforcementto be well-funded, we
should not shy away from taking bold, new actions to
solve our scal issues and increase tax revenue. While
Econ.indd 17 4/14/13 5:26 PM
18 19
these arguments are more theory than model or fact, it is
essential that we begin considering new solutions to the
old problems that we have yet been unable to x. This
is thus not necessarily an argument for big government
or small governmentit is an argument for a respon-
sible government. Whether we want a large amount of
spending or a small one, we should nd the tax rates and
design the scal institutions that allow us to adequately
meet that spending with the necessary revenues. Indeed,
government truly has the capacity to foster growth and
prosperity, and instead of limiting it with misleading
economic assumptions, we should empower it to nd the
means to reach that outcome.
Maren Killackey
RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF
ROSCAS WORLDWIDE
As long as there has been need, there have been
savings and loan collectives around the world. From
the susu in Ghana and the tontine in Cameroon to the
bishi in India and hui in Vietnam,
1
those without ac-
cess to formal credit have developed their own informal
mechanisms of obtaining necessary economic resources.
The umbrella name for these groups is savings and loan
associations (SLAs), which can be generally divided into
rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) and
accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs).
2

In a RoSCA, a small self-selected group of individuals
decides to contribute set amounts into a pool on a daily,
weekly, or monthly basis.
3
After each member has been
awarded the pooled money, the RoSCA either restarts or
disbands.
4
In a random RoSCA, the pool is awarded by
lottery, after which the winner cannot be selected again
in that round.
5
In a bidding RoSCA, one receives the pool
earlier than someone else by pledging a higher payment.
6
ASCAs usually consist of more members, last longer, and
the pool is redistributed at members discretion.
7
Further-
more, whereas there is essentially no interest for loans
from RoSCAs, ASCAs have high loan interest, making it
better suited to those who wish to save than those who
need to pay for school fees or a wedding.
8
It has been well observed and argued mathematical-
ly that individuals join SLAs, RoSCAs especially, because
their lifetime utility increases under the condition of
saving on ones own (autarky).
9
As noted by Callier (1990),
the creation of a tontine is one of the most obvious
Pareto improvements that people who save in order to
purchase a bulky asset can create for themselves in a soci-
ety with fragmented capital markets since the wait time
for most participants is reduced, the last recipient do-
ing as well as he would have under autarky.
10
Some nal
awardees will still do better if there certain members of
the group who wish to purchase the same big ticket item,
a bicycle or motorcar for example, assuming the purveyor
oers a bulk-pricing scheme. However, it has also been ar-
gued that RoSCAs oer more than an opportunity to bet-
ter oneself on a more holistic level. As an informal institu-
tion, enforcement of the implicit contract created when
one joins a RoSCA is upheld with social capital. Members
are deterred from defaulting because of the shame it
would bring on their family and the strain it would bring
on future nancial transactions within the community; if
a potential member has been previously deemed un-
reliable or a possible ight risk, he or she is barred from
joining the organization. Such self-regulationhas proved
successful thus far, but some governments are wary of
Econ.indd 18 4/14/13 5:26 PM
18 19
hypothetical unscrupulous RoSCA heads whom they see
as in a prime position to run o with the communitys
money. The greater distance an individual has from the
risk associated with a particular investment or with
making o with deposits the more he or she has incen-
tive to invest riskily or steal.
11
Furthermore, without good
information, RoSCA members are particularly vulnerable
to uctuations in the market due to weather condi-
tions or other variables. Therefore, in a community that
predominantly grows sugar cane, an infestation of cane
beetles half way through the pool cycle could lead to
a default, and since RoSCA deposits are uninsured, this
could mean serious nancial hardship for a countrys
poorest citizens. I wont argue that RoSCAs are a cure-all
for global poverty, however they do have the potential
to dramatically benet communities. These benets are
drawn from the crucial role social capital plays in RoSCA
operations, which would be undermined should the
government intervene. I hold that many of the concerns
on behalf of governments regarding RoSCAs are unneces-
sary and that in general, it would be best to leave RoSCAs
to self-regulate.
Eorts have been made at regulation in the micro-
nance sector in general and RoSCAs specically, but often
with the wrong target. There are some government regu-
lated savings and credit co-operations (SACCOs), which
require groups to meet certain criteria, such as having at
least 30 members.
12
Regulation has been deemed nec-
essary in many countries following various crises in the
micronance sector, that in the Indian state of Andhra
Pradesh
13
being most notable. During the 1980s in China,
lawmakers gave a criminal penalty to those who took
public deposits illegally after RoSCAs in several prov-
inces began engaging in proteering and practices that
harmed the nancial security of RoSCA participants.
14
On
a macro level, the rational behind such moves is often
that many central banks around the world feel compelled
to involve themselves even in grassroots organizations
given their self-described mandate to protect deposi-
tors and avoid systemic risk.
15
Its understandable that
governments, especially those whose platforms centeron
the well being of its constituents might be wary of any
sort of micronance operations, as has been the case in
several Latin American countries,
16
especially those that
are bound by such seemingly tentative means as trust.
However, it is precisely that social capital that gives RoS-
CAs in particular their dramatic developmental capabil-
ity and yields such economic rewards. Despite the risk
involved for the borrower, he or she stands to gain much
more than his or her deposit from engaging in a mutual
aid association such as the RoSCA. While there are certain
circumstances where regulation may be practical (which,
for brevity, will not be discussed here), the organic suc-
cess of RoSCAs and their ability to evoke grassroots
bonding within a community are two fundamental rea-
sons why government regulation is unnecessary.
For millions of people around the world, RoSCAs are
a part of daily life.
17
They might belong to one, or many,
depending on the desired capital investment and loan
cycle,
18
or perhaps to broaden their social circles; Benda
(2012) cites networking opportunities and the sharing
of ideas as just a few of the non-nancial benets RoSCA
participation confers. According to Mayoux (2006),
grassroots micronance programs could also have a very
signicant contribution to gender equality and womens
empowerment, as well as pro-poor development and civil
society strengthening. They have already had a signi-
cant impact in womens activism in South Africa in terms
of providing nancing for houses, this despite a history
of discrimination against women in this area, even post-
apartheid.
19
The intense dependence on interpersonal re-
lationships and reliance on social capital transforms indi-
vidual RoSCAs into groups capable of oering support to
their members. Benda (2012) quotes, [] before joining
this group, I used to feel lonely, but now I can meet other
people, get support, and somehow share my problems,
and I feel better! This impressive sense of belonging and
support is something one would be at a loss for should
the group members lose autonomy of their collective.
It is virtually ubiquitous that a RoSCA have some sort of
constitution, elections, and rules of participation, down
to the practice of oering a prayer before meetings.
20
This
level of organization and information about the commu-
nity, makes savings groups like RoSCAs ideal for eecting
greater political change, perhaps the most well-docu-
mented case being that of women.
21
The main arguments
for imposing some sort of external regulation are born of
government or, more often, central bank skepticism that
a grassroots runnancial association could be benecial
for the worlds poor, but these arguments are ill founded.
Despite testimony such as, [...] during the meetings,
people open other peoples minds on how to develop,
how to improve own livelihood, how to start a business
[...],
22
the focus is economic and the worry is by and large
the moral hazard. Wright (2000) writes, the greater the -
nancial risk and the more money at risk by depositors, the
more important external regulations becomes to avoid
what economists call moral hazard by management and
owners. This suggests the need for separate tiers of regu-
lation and supervision based on quantitative measures.
Given the overwhelming evidence of social and political
development thats achieved by RoSCAs, it would be dif-
cult to imagine all but a few anecdotes wherein infor-
mal savings and loan associations have had detrimental
eects on a community. Furthermore, the translation of
formal regulatory policy onto a grassroots organization
would not only undermine the sense of achievement
many participants feel, but such laws are not engineered
Econ.indd 19 4/14/13 5:26 PM
20 21
account the indomitable social ties of a small, cohesive
community, rather they govern a modern society, with
[a] changing of social structure, [where] interpersonal
relationships gradually alienate, circumstances under
which the traditional ROSCA implies great risk,
23
which is
clearly not the case.
Even if the central banks were to attempt to de-
velop policies that allowed RoSCAs to retain the majority
of their self-governance as well as impose upon them
charters that allowed for the vast exibility and adaptabil-
ity they enjoy, says Wright (2000), One cannot help but
worry that the central banks, lacking the resources and
capability to supervise the formal commercial banking
sector, might be stretched beyond reasonable limits if re-
quired to supervise large numbers of MFIs running a busi-
ness for which central bankers usually have scant regard,
and of which they have less understanding. What would
be perhaps more ironic, says London School of Econom-
ics alumna Prajakta Kharkar Nigam, is the idea of central
banks in corruption-ridden countries like Bangladesh and
Indonesia trying to run small-scale operations that have
ourished with mostly clean reputations without legis-
lative intervention. Furthermore, in the event that the
government decides to insure deposits (an unlikely and
impractical undertaking), the idea of insuring against the
moral hazard could be undermined, leading to an in-
creased default rate, as RoSCA heads feel no more moral
compunction to guard savings if everyones money will
be returned anyway.
24
As Bin Hoque and Khalily (2002)
found in their exploration of the assumption that infor-
mal nance is a rudimentary substitute for formal nance,
Urban ROSCAs and ASCRAs exist and ourish in the pres-
ence of an institutional nancial system, which is evident
in our case studies. Also, in India dierent types of Chit
funds are growing in urban areas like Bombay, Madras,
and New Delhi. Participants from dierent occupational
groups are involved and organized in these chit funds
(Radakrishnan, 1975). This perhaps conveys us the mes-
sage that formal nance is an imperfect substitute for
informal nance. The procedural rigidities and several
rules and regulations of the formal nancial system make
it di cult to reach the people of all strata and these are
the reasons for emergence and reemergence of informal
groups like RoSCAs and ASCAs within the institutional
nancial system.
With the simultaneous rise of formal nancial insti-
tutions oering microloans to the rural and urban poor
(branchless banking) and the popularity of for-prot
micronance institutions, there is certainly a place for
regulation in the microbanking sector. However, given
the success grassroots nancial associations have experi-
enced armed with only self-regulation, and the improb-
ability that central bank governance would allow such
associations to retain the qualities that make them such
excellent mechanisms of community development, it
is highly recommended that any attempts at external
governance be redirected to policies that would promote
nancial literacy and ll in where grassroots can and likely
should not extend (i.e. in providing credit for capital-
intensive ventures).
The reemergence of urban centers has become
a bona de trend of the last decade and the post-2008
recovery. For the most part, this trend has been met
with celebration, largely with good reason. The rise of
inner cities presents a series of alluring progressive and
sustainable opportunities, but progressives should also
be cautious to not get too distracted with these genu-
ine sources of optimism. Outside of the promising signs
of the inner city is an emerging set of new challenges
in American suburbs and exurbs. Understanding these
problems and providing a federal framework for localities
to address them is a crucial step toward developing more
progressive, stable communities rather than a simple
redistribution of poverty toward the urban margin, and a
huge wasted opportunity. A federal framework that un-
derstands this demographic shift and provides resources
and a streamlined framework for localities to take action
is necessary.
e Changing Face of Suburbia
Once the ideal of American middle-class
pastoral-lifestyle-fetishism, the suburbs are in-
creasingly becoming the site of poverty. Accord-
ing to the Brookings Institutions Metropolitan
Policy Program, between 2000 and 2008, suburbs
in the countrys largest metro areas saw their poor
population grow by 25 percentalmost ve times
Brit Byrd
ENGAGING SUBURBAN POVERTY:
A NEW FEDERAL FRAMEWORK
Econ.indd 20 4/14/13 5:26 PM
20 21
faster than primary cities.
1
Although urban residents
are still more likely to be in poverty than their suburban
counterparts, the suburban poor population now out-
numbers the urban poor, and the suburban poverty rate
rose 0.9% compared to primary cities 0.3%.
The suburbs are also playing a critical role in a shift
in immigration trends. The foreign-born population of the
suburbs is growing at a much faster rate than cities. Since
2000, the percentage increase in foreign-born population
in the suburbs outpaced cities 37.4% to 13.2%. The com-
position of these foreign-born populations also diers;
the suburban foreign-born population is predominantly
Mexican, while cities have a more cosmopolitan composi-
tion.
2
This trend upends many prevailing notions of pov-
erty and American cities and demands a reevaluation of
poverty reduction and community development policies.
The traditional refrain against criticisms of cities as cen-
ters of poverty has been a plea to compare urban poverty
to suburban and rural poverty, rather than urban poverty
to suburban or rural prosperity. Cities are traditionally
thought to be good places to be poor: they provide social
and employment networks, access to social and public re-
sources, and more opportunities for neighborhood cohe-
sion. This rationale applied from the Ellis Island and Tam-
many Hall era of immigration well into the 20th century.
However, the reorientation of poverty toward the suburbs
threatens to invert this paradigm. These new suburban
centers of poverty are often located farther from jobs
than neighborhoods in the urban core, or in other parts
of the region, and lack convenient public transportation
options to move workers to nodes of employment.
3
The
assumption that the poor can choose between cities and
the countryside, and many sensibly choose cities is no
longer as safe, as they increasingly choose the cheap real
estate of the suburbs over the traditional social resources
of the city.
4
Vigilannce at the Local Level
Politicians and planners need to be more vigilant in
their eorts to provide social services. As of yet, there ap-
pears to be a risk over overemphasizing the arrival of the
Creative Class. Coined by Richard Florida in 2004, this
class of innovators, entrepreneurs, and young profession-
als dees older models of urban development focused on
manufacturing exports or concentrated in favor of a focus
on innovation. The most amboyant public expenditure
in pursuit of the Creative Class is the award of $100 mil-
lion in infrastructure and real estate investment in pursuit
Mayor Bloombergs vision of New York City as an East
Coast Silicon Valley. And it is not just the biggest cities
enjoying and celebrating the fruits that the Creative Class
yieldcities such as Cleveland, the oft-maligned example
of urban decay, have also enjoyed a surge of young
adults migrating to their downtowns.
5
These projectswhile importantshould not come
at the expense of providing services to the metropoliss
increasingly diused poor. These innovation-oriented
projects are often good components of a regional-cluster
paradigm of economic development, but also ironically
risk attempting a top-down model of development. If
anything, the reinvigoration of cities as centers of in-
novation indicates that policymakers should not worry
too much about them. Brookings Katz and Muro sum-
marize well: The preexistence of a [innovation] cluster
means that an industry hotspot has passed the market
test. By contrast, eorts at wholesale invention will likely
be fraught with selection issues, ineciency, and prob-
able failure and waste.
6
Policymakers should be careful
not to throw money, boondoggles, and lip service at the
nebulous concept of innovation while resources can be
allocated toward the real, tangible market failures of pov-
erty that are increasingly on the margin of their beloved
innovation centers. Innovation is by necessity organic
and eeting, while poverty is intractable and demands
persistent attention.
The challenge, of course, is that mayors and city
councils do have control over the large projects within
their city, whereas they reap no benets from directing
resources toward citizens outside their constituencies.
Self-help on a hyper-local level can be detrimental to re-
gional cohesion. There is a pressing need for a framework
that encourages local and municipal governments to
look outwards in addition to inwards, so as to encourage
regional development that benets both their constitu-
encies and the region at large.
A Federal Solution?
Besought on all sides with self-imposed crises and
paralysis, the federal government is no position to pro-
vide an ambitious package of grants or matching funds to
facilitate its goals. Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program
summarizes: the combination of federal paralysis and
sub-national purpose obliges the Obama administration
to look beyond Washington and pursue national revival
with a recognition that progress now depends on its co-
development with states and metros.
7

Fortunately, it seems that the Obama administration
has acknowledged this reality through dierent means,
such as identifying 56 federally funded cluster initiatives
through the Small Business Administration,
8
devoting
time in the State of the Union Address to topic of regional
development, and the launch of the Sustainable Com-
munities Initiative, included in the stimulus bill of 2009.
Although the program was small in scope, it provided a
useful framework in which localities were encouraged to
communicate and cooperate. Because poverty is becom-
ing increasingly geographically dispersed, the ecacy
Econ.indd 21 4/14/13 5:26 PM
22
and relevancy of traditional placed-based programs and
grants should be put into question.
9
The Sustainable
Communities Initiative is an appropriate blue print for
allowing municipalities to manage their own programs
and funds to greater eect. This kind of framework also
presents greater opportunity for feedback on new ap-
proaches in this critical time of demographic shifts.
Unfortunately, the funding for the Sustainable Com-
munities Initiative was gutted upon the arrival of the
110th Congress and remains inert under the 112th. A new
program, referred to by the administration as SC2, follows
in its steps with a similar framework and sparse fund-
ing. Although unfortunate, there is cause for constrained
optimism because some of the most successful programs
under the Sustainable Communities Initiative suggested
that providing a framework for intergovernmental com-
munication alone was an eective impetus to coopera-
tion. The most illustrative example of the programs goals
is the cooperation between suburban communities in
Westchester County, NY, outside of New York City, where
outlying communities began to communicate on new
trans-suburban mass transit options that would connect
residents to more social and employment resources using
existing funds within the municipalities budgets.
10
The cruel irony behind the gutting of the program
by the new Republican congress is that its local govern-
ment goals are likely to coincide with the ideology of
many small government advocates. If kneejerk anti-urban
prejudices and aversions to any spending of federal funds
can be overcome, programs such as the Sustainable Com-
munities Initiative might stand a chance to be considered
by new Congresses as at least a stop-gap urban policy
strategy. In this way, the intractable and dicult nature
of federal politics can be seen as a blessing in disguise if
it can deliver a sensible policy that encourages develop-
ment led by local leaders that can best determine how to
administer the new challenges brought by the recent de-
mography of poverty. As Katz and Muro emphasize, the
cluster paradigm of economic development eectively
reects the nature of the new globalized economy.
11
However, local leadership should not get carried
away with the Presidents praise and blessings. Top-down
place-based projects at the local level are not the kind of
innovation that can eectively test the new challenges of
the geographic dispersion of poverty. In this manner, the
Obama administration should be cautious in doling out
praise to any mayors big-dollar initiatives without consid-
ering a holistic evaluation of its regional impact. Thus we
can conclude with four recommendations:
t -PDBMTUBUFBOEGFEFSBMQPMJDZNBLFSTTIPVMECF
aware of the changing nature of poverty and understand
that resources previously accessible in dense, urban envi-
ronments may no longer be in the less dense suburbs
t 5IF0CBNBBENJOJTUSBUJPOTIPVMEQVSTVFUIF
blueprint laid out by the Sustainable Communities Initia-
tive and SC2 and urge Congress to bolster the program
with additional funding. This goal should be increasingly
possible as the ideology behind the program should be in
line with small government advocates as well as reliable
progressives.
t $JUZQPMJDZNBLFSTTIPVMESFNBJOWJHJMBOUJOUIFJS
application of sound policy, and not blunder through
boondoggles in the name of buzzwords such as innova-
tion and veneration of the Creative Class
t 1PMJDZNBLFSTTIPVMECFQSPBDUJWFJOTFFLJOH
solutions to the new problems presented by suburban
poverty
These three recommendations can contribute suc-
cessfully to a future in which local policymakers can direct
a more progressive vision of our urban spaces without
neglecting the new centers of poverty in the suburban
poor.
Econ.indd 22 4/14/13 5:26 PM
23
EDUCATION
Education.indd 23 4/16/13 7:28 PM
24 25
Introduction
A sixteen-year-old public school student in Ar-
kansas may never have a sex education class in his or her
life. Arkansas state policies do not mandate sex or HIV
education, and if school districts do voluntarily imple-
ment such programs, the only requirements are that
abstinence is stressed and the importance of sex only
within marriage is included.
Alabama only mandates its students to partake
in HIV education classes, though the state has a paren-
tal opt-out, rather than opt-in, model. If sex education
classes are taught, these classes must emphasize, in a
factual manner and from a public health perspective,
that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to the
general public .
In contrast, a sixteen-year-old in New York Citys
public school system is required to attend comprehen-
sive sex education classes. The students parents can
opt-out of certain sections relating to prevention and
birth control. The New York City student will receive
medically accurate information on personal health and
hygiene, identifying and avoiding high risk situations,
sexual and reproductive health resources, etc .
Clearly, each of these high school students is
receiving vastly dierent information about sex. There
are very few federal laws regulating sex education in the
countrys public schools. Thus, it is left up to the states
and, to an extent, local school districts to create policies
for sex education. There is consequently an enormous
level of variation between and even within dierent
states when it comes to what public school students are
or are not learning about their bodies, their sexualities,
and their relationships.
There are few, if any, common factors that apply
to all state and school district policies regarding sex edu-
cation. The one common factor is that teenagers, regard-
less of where they live and attend school, are having sex.
According to the Center for Disease Control, among U.S.
high school students surveyed in 2011, 47.4% had ever
had sexual intercourse . 62% of high school seniors have
had sexual intercourse , and by their nineteenth birth-
days, seven in ten teenagers have had sex .
State and Federal Policies on Sex Education
State policies
As of February 2013, only 22 states and the District
of Columbia mandate sex education, and 33 states and
the District of Columbia mandate HIV education . Addi-
tionally, 27 states and the District of Columbia mandate
that, if provided, sex and HIV education programs meet
certain requirements. These requirements vary from
state to state, but most are minimal. For instance, only
twelve states require that the instruction be medically
accurate, and only two states prohibit the program from
promoting religion. 37 states and D.C. require parental
involvement in sex and/or HIV education programs, but
the type of involvement can range from parental noti-
cation to parental consent (opt-in) or parental opt-out.
Furthermore, states vary greatly in their content re-
quirements for sex education programs. Only seventeen
states and D.C. require that information on contraception
be provided. 37 states require that information on ab-
stinence be provided: 26 states require that abstinence
be stressed, while eleven states require that abstinence
be covered. Eleven states require discussion of sexual
orientation: eight states require that this discussion be
inclusive, while three states require only negative infor-
mation on sexual orientation.
Federal funding
While there is little federal regulation regarding
sex education, there are sources of federal funding avail-
able to states specically for the purpose of sex and HIV
education programs. Federal sources of funding include
Title V abstinence only funding, the Personal Respon-
sibility Education Program (PREP), and Teen Pregnancy
Prevention Initiative (TPPI) grants.
In 1996, as part of welfare reform, the federal
government enacted Title V, Section 510 of the Social
Security Act, which made funds available to states to pro-
mote sexual abstinence outside of marriage. States that
accepted these funds had to comply with the govern-
ments denition of abstinence education, a detailed,
eight-point denition with strict stipulations on what can
and cannot be taught about sex. This program techni-
cally expired in June 2009, but in a series of bipartisan
compromises, Title V was renewed for ve years (2010-
2014) in March 2010 as part of the Aordable Care Act.
$50 million is available each year for grants to the states;
states must match their federal grants at 75%. In 2010,
the Obama administration issued a series of guidelines
for implementing this reincarnation of the Title V ab-
stinence education program. While the administration
clearly tried to nd ways to work around the abstinence
only policies, it was limited by the strict denition of
abstinence education in the statue. Under these
guidelines, the Obama administration advised states
that receive Title V funding to design exible, medically
accurate and eective abstinence-based plans . The
guidelines provide further recommendations for ways to
use the funding for comprehensive programs. Despite
these strides, the fact remains that there is nothing the
Obama administration can do administratively to block
socially conservative states from using Title V abstinence
funds to implement rigid, abstinence-only-until-marriage
Katherine Haller
REFORMING STATE POLICIES ON
SEX EDUCATION
Education.indd 24 4/16/13 7:28 PM
24 25
programs that have been discredited by a wide body of
evidence .
A more progressive portion of the 2010 Aordable
Care Act is the Personal Responsibility Education Pro-
gram (PREP). PREP, the rst source of federal funding for
programs that teach about both abstinence and contra-
ception for the prevention of pregnancy and sexually
transmitted infections (STIs), provides $55 million each
year to states that apply for and receive grants for ve
years (2010-2014) . Unlike the Title V provisions, there
is no state matching grant required, so PREP does not
cost states any money. PREP-funded programs must
include content on building life skills for adulthood, and
these programs are encouraged to be inclusive of LGBTQ
youth.
The Teen Pregnancy Prevention Initiative (TPPI) is in
place for 2010-2015 with the goals of reducing teenage
pregnancy and addressing disparities in teen pregnancy
and birth rates . The TPPI provides grants to public and
private entities to fund evidence-based and innovative,
medically accurate, and age-appropriate programs that
reduce teen pregnancy and other related risk behaviors .
This programs focus is on reaching African American and
Latino/Hispanic youth ages 15-19 . The budget for Fiscal
Year 2013 funds the TPPI at $104.79 million.
Proposed federal laws
On February 14, 2013, two signicant bills relat-
ing to sex education were re-introduced in Congress.
The Real Education for Healthy Youth Act, originally
introduced in November 2011, was re-introduced by
Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Representative
Barbara Lee (D-CA). If this bill were passed, it would mark
a major change in how sex education policy works in the
United States, requiring states to comply with federal
policy provisions. The Real Education for Healthy Youth
Act outlines what a comprehensive approach to sex edu-
cation should look like; recognizes young peoples right
to sexual health information; requires all funded pro-
grams to be inclusive of LGBTQ youth; etc. The Act would
further prohibit federal funding for any programs that
withhold information about HIV, are medically inaccurate
or proven ineective, promote gender stereotypes, or
are insensitive and unresponsive to the needs of LGBTQ
youth . This bills suggestion of a thorough, progressive
overhaul of the nations sex education system is ground-
breaking. However, the bills unprecedented switch of
regulation power from the states to the federal govern-
ment is a drastic change from the current system. Sex
education policy has always been left to the states, and
the Real Education for Healthy Youth Act contains so
many revolutionary provisions that it is unlikely to pass in
Congress, or if it does pass, to go unchallenged by states
and school districts.
On the same day, the Abstinence Education
Reallocation Act was re-introduced in the House by Rep-
resentatives Randy Hultgren (R-IL) and Daniel Lipinski (R-
IL). This Act would reform federal funding of sex educa-
tion by requiring that at least 40% of funding be used for
sexual risk avoidance education whose sole focus is the
development and advancement of abstinence educa-
tion . The Abstinence Education Reallocation Act would
signicantly set back the progress made in 2010 with the
introduction of the PREP and TPPI programs.
Whats Wrong with Abstinence Only Education?
Advocates of abstinence only sex education
programs argue that the best way to reduce the risks as-
sociated with teen sexual behavior is to teach the ben-
ets of abstaining from sex. But there is strong evidence
that an abstinence only approach does not work. A
2007 Congressionally mandated federal report evaluat-
ing Title V abstinence only education programs found
that they had no impacts on rates of sexual abstinence
. In 2010, Mississippi had the highest teen birth rate of
all U.S. states, with 55 out of 1,000 girls ages 15-19 giv-
ing birth. Meanwhile, New Hampshire had the lowest
rate, with fewer than 16 births for every 1,000 teen girls
. While other factors, such as socioeconomic status and
access to contraception, reproductive health resources,
and abortion, certainly contribute to this discrepancy,
sex education policies also play a major role. Missis-
sippi law states that abstinence education shall be the
state standard for any sex-related education taught in
the public schools , and districts and cities can only
include topics such as contraception or STIs with special
permission from the State Department of Education . In
2010, New Hampshire mandated comprehensive sex
education that included both abstinence and informa-
tion about condoms and contraception (although that
law has since been repealed). Teenagers, regardless of
what kind of sex education they receive (if any at all), are
having and will continue to have sex. While abstinence
can and should be an important part of any sex educa-
tion program, a comprehensive approach that includes
information about contraception is necessary.
What Does a Comprehensive Approach Entail?
Comprehensive sex education teaches about
abstinence as the best method for avoiding unplanned
pregnancies and STIs, but it also involves discussion of
condoms and contraception to reduce these risks . This
approach further includes interpersonal and commu-
nication skills and individual values-based education.
Unlike many abstinence only programs, comprehensive
sex education does not promote specic religious values,
nor does it prohibit discussion of and/or present biased,
medically inaccurate information on controversial issues
like abortion, masturbation, and sexual orientation.
Several leading public health and medical professional
Education.indd 25 4/16/13 7:28 PM
26 27
organizations, such as the American Medical Association,
the American Nurses Association, the American Academy
of Pediatrics, and others, advocate a comprehensive ap-
proach . Additionally, University of Washington research-
ers found that teens who received comprehensive sex
education were 60% less likely to get pregnant or to get
someone pregnant than those who received no sex edu-
cation .
Reform Recommendations
How, then, can the United States move toward
implementing medically accurate, comprehensive sex
education programs? The following list of reform recom-
mendations takes into account the evidence of failure of
abstinence only programs and the need for comprehen-
sive education. Given the long history of state control
over sex education policy, the best avenue for progres-
sive sex education reform is working to restructure state
policies.
Reforming state sex education policies is sure to
be met with obstacles. Opposition from some socially
conservative school districts and state legislatures is cer-
tain. Additionally, a variety of organizations, from faith-
based groups to parent associations to local, state, and
national organizations, are highly interested in maintain-
ing or implementing abstinence only programs and/or
preventing comprehensive sex education. The following
recommendations take these and other sources of op-
position into account and, wherever possible, attempt to
address potential and probable concerns of opponents
of comprehensive reform.
1) Change content requirements
for sex and HIV education. As aforemen-
tioned, states vary considerably in their
content requirements for sex and HIV
education.
1a) Mandate that, when provided, sex and HIV
education programs be medically accurate. Medical
accuracy is paramount in any arena of health education,
and sex education should be no dierent. In several sex
education programs, students are receiving biased, se-
lective, and/or medically false information about anat-
omy, sexual behavior, and sexual orientation. (While,
theoretically, all states should mandate sex education, in
practice this universal mandate can sometimes backre.
For instance, Mississippi mandates sex education, but it
also mandates a stress on abstinence, emphasis on the
importance of sex only within marriage, and it prohibits
discussion of contraception or STIs without special per-
mission from the State Department of Education. Thus,
Mississippi students are required to attend sex education
classes that may do more harm than good.)
1b) Mandate the inclusion of information on
condoms and contraception. Only 17 states and D.C.
currently require that information on contraception be
provided . In many states and school districts, particu-
larly those with programs that stress abstinence and/or
with ties to faith-based groups, no information on con-
traception is provided to students, resulting in high STI
and teen birth rates. The New York City school systems
comprehensive sex education model includes a provi-
sion by which parents can opt their child out of lessons
having to do with HIV/STI prevention and birth control .
This provision can be added to state policies in order to
combat opposition.
1c) Change the requirement that abstinence be
stressed to one where abstinence must be covered.
While abstinence only programs are ineective, informa-
tion on abstinence is a vital part of any sex education
program. Currently, out of 37 states that require that in-
formation on abstinence be provided, 26 of these states
require that abstinence be stressed . In these 26 states,
the requirement should be changed so that abstinence
must be covered, not stressed.
1d) In states where sexual orientation content poli-
cies are negative or nonexistent, introduce an inclusive
policy. Only eleven states currently require discussion
of sexual orientation; of these, eight require that this
discussion be inclusive, but Alabama, South Carolina, and
Texas require that this discussion be negative. Negative
or nonexistent policies need to be re-
formed to be inclusive of LGBTQ+ youth.
1e) Include information about
consent and healthy relationships. State
policies should require that information
about avoiding coercion, refusal and
delay tactics, recognizing healthy and
unhealthy relationships, etc. be included in sex educa-
tion.
2) Ensure the use of comprehensive, science-based
curricula. There exists a wide variety of curricula from
which school districts can choose for their sex education
programs. Some of these curricula are created by Chris-
tian groups or organizations with a strongly conserva-
tive message. It is vital that whatever curricula states or
school districts select be science-based and medically ac-
curate. The New York City school districts sex education
program uses multiple curricula and combines elements
of each. Furthermore, the NYC program has modied
portions of certain curricula as was considered appropri-
ate. For instance, the city worked with the publisher of
the Middle School HealthSmart curriculum to remove
certain lessons that were not deemed to be age appro-
While abstinence can and
should be an important
part of any sex education
program, a comprehensive
approach that includes
information about contra-
ception is necessary.
Education.indd 26 4/16/13 7:28 PM
26 27
priate . A similarly comprehensive and specially-tailored
approach can be used by other states and districts to
ensure that curricula are both medically accurate and ac-
ceptable to parents, the community, and opponents.
3) Eliminate parent opt-in models in favor of opt-
out programs. Out of the 37 states (and D.C.) that require
school districts to involve parents in sex education, HIV
education, or both, 34 states and D.C. allow parents to
remove their children from instruction (opt-out) . Two
states require parental consent for students to partici-
pate in sex or HIV education (opt-in). And Arizonas
policy is mixed, with an opt-in method for sex education
and an opt-out method for HIV education. Opt-in mod-
els make it much more dicult for students to receive
the information about sex that they need. These pro-
grams, currently in place in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah
(with a bill in progress in the Montana state legislature as
of March 2013), require parental consent before students
can attend sex education classes. The parents who are
least likely to opt their child in are often the ones who
are most inattentive or the ones who fail to provide their
children with accurate information about sex. Opt-out
models are much more practical: parents will be happy
with their choice to opt their child out of classes, while at
the same time more students will be exposed to informa-
tion about sex. An even better approach to consider is
that of the New York City school district, where parents
can opt out of certain sessions (those relating to contra-
ception), but not out of most others.
4) Use federal funding innovatively to implement
comprehensive programs. States should reject Title V
abstinence only funding; or, if this funding is accepted,
states should use it in accordance with the Obama
administrations guidelines so that the abstinence only
provisions can be skirted. (Also, the current incarnation
of Title V expires in 2014 this program should not be
renewed!) Rather than apply for Title V funding, in which
federal funds must be matched at a rate of 75% by states,
states should apply for PREP and/or TPPI funding. These
funding sources do not have a matching requirement, so
proponents of decreasing states budgets will be pleased
to note that states will not have to pay any extra money.
PREP and TPPI funding can be used for a variety of com-
prehensive sex education initiatives and programs.
5) Frame the sex education discussion in terms of
health education, not morality. Sex education is an inte-
gral part of health education. When information about
sex is medically accurate, the sex education students
receive is just as necessary as lessons on nutrition, drug
abuse, and mental health. It is important for states and
communities to treat sex education as the health educa-
tion issue it is, rather than framing it in moral or religious
terms.
Conclusion
These recommendations for reforming state sex
education policies aim to reduce the wide discrepancy
in state sex education programs. It is important to work
for reform at the state level, since sex education has long
been in control of states and school districts, and not the
federal government. However, federal sources of fund-
ing like PREP and TPPI can and should be used, at no cost
to states, to implement comprehensive, medically accu-
rate sex education programs. Content requirements for
sex education can be reformed to result in a progressive
and science-based approach that, with the help of par-
ent opt-out programs, will be satisfactory to both policy
reformers and opposition groups.
Why is it so important that states move toward
providing comprehensive, medically accurate sex edu-
cation? According to a 2011 Center for Disease Control
study, 47.4% of U.S. high school students have ever had
sex, and 15.3% have had sex with four or more partners
during their lives . Among those who had had sexual
intercourse during the previous three months, 39.8% did
not use a condom the last time they had sex, while 76.7%
did not use birth control pills the last time they had sex .
These high levels of unprotected sex have consequences.
For instance, the United States still has the highest teen
birth rate in the industrialized world. Three out of every
ten girls will be pregnant at least once before their 20th
birthdays . Teenage mothers and their children are more
likely to depend on public assistance, live in poverty,
and have health problems. The National Campaign to
Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy estimates that
teen childbearing costs taxpayers at least $10.9 billion
every year . Moreover, teenagers are disproportionately
aected by STIs. Nearly half of the 19 million new STIs
each year are among young people ages 15-24 . Girls
ages 15-19 have the highest rates of gonorrhea and the
second highest rate of chlamydia of any age group; boys
are also aected, but they are less likely to have symp-
toms or seek medical care, so their infections often go
unreported and undiagnosed . Eorts to curb adoles-
cent sexual behavior through abstinence only education
have proven unsuccessful. Teenagers will continue to
have sex. If adolescents do not receive the necessary
information about sex, contraception, and STIs, the teen
birth rate and STI rate will continue to be disproportion-
ately high, costing taxpayers billions of dollars annually
and leading to devastating eects on young peoples
lives. Comprehensive sex education in all public schools
is the best and most feasible way to ensure that when
teenagers do have sex, they will be educated, safe, and
aware of its consequences.

Education.indd 27 4/16/13 7:28 PM
28 29
Introduction
A performance of classical music is an internal
dialogue which starts in the practice room with score
study and practice, centering on deep artistic reection
to be innovative. Yet unlike the contemplative and lonely
lifestyles of the Roman Catholic religious, this reection
begs to be heard, losing its metaphysical identity in be-
ing quietly unheard. A performance is thus a paradox:
while deriving meaning, value, and existence in the noise
and bustle of the public sphere (the concert itself ), a per-
formance also nds meaning, value, and existence from
the pure silence of self-reection (practice and prepara-
tion).
And as a metaphysical paradox, a performance as a
concept must endure the consequences of being a para-
dox: questions regarding its logical coherence. Further, if
the paradoxical performance is an expression of classical
music for us the listeners (the recipients of music and
members of larger society), these performances leave au-
diences confused and perhaps conicted about musics
meaning and societal relevance.
This tension is perhaps most apparent within the
sphere of public school music education; in the face of
the recent economic recession, music education has
consistently needed to defend its right to live and
often failed to justify itself. As a result, music programs
throughout the nation have been slashed.
Thus, we as classical musicians must take the time
to reect upon our art and rigorously rethink both it and
our role in society in relation to our art. In particular, we
need to challenge present concepts of art and justify our-
selves to a society which is waiting for the paradoxical
performance to be intellectually explained.
I would like to begin this process by examining a
ubiquitous archetype of the classical music experience:
the violin recital. In examining the microcosm of the
violin recital, I will derive ideas on classical musics place
in society as a pedagogical force.
Establishing a Framework: e Violin and His Artist
We can begin with the violin. While the smallest
of the string instruments, the violin is, much like John
Blackings mbira, an object deeply imbued with an entire
historical and cultural background. As such, the violin for
classical musicians is something beyond a mere tool or
instrument; rather, it semiotically associates with such
concepts as virtuosity, melodic and sociological domi-
nance, leadership, and artistic condence (otherwise
referred to as arrogance by the cello section of or-
chestras). And as a cultural receptacle of such concepts,
the violin has a power of its own, a concept perhaps
most aptly illustrated by the will or personality which
violinists and luthiers attribute to violins (e.g. this violin
will make you a better performer or you are a violinist,
therefore you must have these personality traits, etc).
It is in this spirit that I would like to discuss the idea
of dialectic as present between the living, cultural force
of the violin and the breathing mortality of the human
violinist. We can frame this discussion by drawing on
Christian body-spirit dualism, wherein body is associ-
ated with limits (the physical and spiritual limits of the
human condition, especially associated with death in
Christian frameworks) and wherein spirit is associated
with an unlimited existence (transcending the body and
inhabiting a world beyond, especially as associated with
Platonic forms).
These labels help us to understand the cross-related
nature of the violin-violinist relationship, wherein both
violin and violinist can be associated with either the
body or spirit label. In labeling the violin as body
and the violinist as spirit, the violin becomes associ-
ated with the physical limits associated with the instru-
mentthe awkwardness of the violinists physical con-
tortion around the instrument, the technical demands
of the instrument itself, etc. Meanwhile, the violinist as
spirit becomes associated with his musical ideas, i.e. the
transcendent of his idealization of what could come of
the musical score. Conversely, when the violin is labeled
as spirit and the violinist as body, the violin comes
to embody what potentially could come of the instru-
ment and thereby puts the burden of the performance
on the violinist (e.g. this violin is fantastic and has been
played by the greats; the violinist must better himself to
match the potential of what the violin can give). In this
line of thought, the violinist becomes associated with his
limited physical capacity.
Herein, we see a constant back and forth between
the violin and the violinist which informs the dialectic
nature of performance. By renegotiating the line be-
tween body and spirit, both the violin and violinist are
grappling with their identities, limits, and each others ex-
pectations in order to become something beyond them-
selves. This dialectic, dance, and/or relationship becomes
the very basis of what performance is: self-development.
Contextualization: e Violinist and the Audience
We can contextualize this micro-dialectic within
the larger macro-dialectic between on-stage (the artist
and his violin) and o-stage (the audience) elements.
Once again, we can unpack the more complex semiotics
of the violin recital. In line with popular twentieth cen-
tury conceptions of art, the artist and his violin become
THE VIOLIN AS A SOCIAL METAPHOR
Kevin Lee
Education.indd 28 4/16/13 7:28 PM
28 29
the world and inhabits the fantasy world of the
concert hall. Meanwhile, the audience, as members of
society who come to watch this fantasy world of art, rep-
resent the opposite experience: integration with society,
the capitalistic judges of relevance, and the statistical
objects of larger trends. Thus, the concert hall is a diplo-
matic coming together between the transcendent and
the non-transcendent; here again, we see a dichotomy
between the spirit (the transcendent artist) and the body
(the non-transcendent audience).
But what is the nature of this diplomacy? The violin-
ist physically and sonically dominates the silent hall. The
music he plays is his psychological attempt at aecting
the still free bastion of human free will which is unfet-
tered by the concert halls rules: the audiences minds.
Thus, performances are usually the violinists attempt at
bringing the audience into his fantasy world of art.
We might thus state that the violinist has the power
to create an Orwellian dystopia within this fantasy
worldthat this reects a more tyrannical side to art
which St. Augustine warns against in his Confessions.
And yet, there is a somewhat opposite view ascribed to
by Plato, wherein the violinists fantasy world is reec-
tive of a benevolent pedagogy rather than a nightmar-
ish dystopia. In contrast with Orwells dark vision of a
controlled society, Plato reminds us in his Republic that
music has the ability to properly dispose citizens to a
desirable morality. Thus, we witness the double-edged
sword which poses a problem for audiences: art is incred-
ibly powerful, and in trusting an artists art, audiences are
trusting the artist.
Therefore, while the concert is a powerful exhibi-
tion of self-development, audiences must question the
trustworthiness of these exhibitions. Thus, the violinist
must establish trust between himself and his audiences,
and in doing so, the violinist must negotiate between
the artistic fantasy and the audiences world of social
integration. The violinist, in attempting to successfully
gain larger audiences, must understand the concerns of
his audiences.
Consequences: An Art Sensitive to Civic Engagement
This model thus negates the dominating art for
arts sake mentality, wherein the violinist is encouraged
to ensconce himself within the fantasy world of the de-
contextualized art world. While this approach attempts
to create an art experience unsullied by the real world
(thus creating a transcendental experience as proposed
by ETA Homan), the current crisis in classical music has
brought the importance of audiences to the forefront.
Orchestras, opera houses, classical radio stations, etc. are
undergoing deep nancial constraints, especially as a re-
sult of exponentially diminishing audiences, and amidst
the sea of grey heads, one cannot help but feel that clas-
sical music is sounding its doom as an art form.
Thus, the classical music world is feeling the con-
sequences of being a metaphysical paradox. In being
an art form which constantly negotiates between the
introspective and extroverted, it has erred on the side
of introspection and fantasy, thus becoming an insular
cultural phenomenon which has been misunderstood as
elitist and antiquated. In other words, classical music
has been labelled as introverted, unable to compete
with its extroverted pop music cousins.
But, as author Susan Cain would assert, introverted
does not mean misanthropic or useless. While I will not
claim that classical music has a universal beauty or an
inherent aesthetic power, I will state that there is much
that is beautiful in classical music, as evidenced by the
large number of professionals, amateurs, and others who
are the lifeblood of this art form. And, as outlined earlier,
the concert experience provides a deep metaphor for
self-development.
However, this metaphor will stay a metaphor unless
acted upon by an outside forcethe audience. Thus,
musicians must renegotiate the metaphysical paradox
of the concert experience by prioritizing civic engage-
mentby (i) taking risks beyond the strict sociological
structures which bind classical music to itself and by (ii)
understanding that art is merely the vehicle for inspira-
tion rather than being inspiration in and of itself. As the
theologians might say, we have mistaken the means for
the endthe music for inspiration.
Having seen beauty, musicians must lobby for this
beauty in the public forum. Therefore, it is necessary that
we as musicians engage the public forum, and thereby
the experiential experience of life, without reserve. In
engaging, we must understand how to preach without
being pretentious, teach without being holier than
thou, and determined while constantly being patient.
Thus, we must be able to step down from our Justerian
castles in the air and remake our existence within a real-
ity removed from the fantasy world of our making.
Policy Application: Music in the Public Schools
This theoretical model can perhaps be made more
concrete in its application to the public school music
education system in the United States. In attempting to
educate Americas children, orchestra programs have
copied the protocol of the classical music world: class-
room time structured as orchestral rehearsals, hierarchi-
cal seating patterns, concerts with conservative styles of
presentation, etc. Having grown up in this system, I agree
with its greatest supporters that there is a great power to
programs like these in tapping into the creative potential
of students. However, the programs, much like the clas-
sical music world, have often been interpreted as acces-
sories to the larger and more important core academic
subjects of English, History, Mathematics, and Science. In
a school system which has traditionally focused on these
Education.indd 29 4/16/13 7:28 PM
30 31
physical education programs like football teams,
music and the arts have been neglected in the face of
income scarcity.
Previous arguments for music and the arts have
centered on its benets to students, be it qualitatively
(creating a more expressive and sensitive citizenry)
or quantitatively (e.g. a raise in SAT scores). However,
despite these arguments, arts programs carry with them
the burden of being associated with the introverted
nature of the ne arts. Thus, while we might argue for
the arts benets to students, we argue for bringing them
into a fantasy world apart from the immediate needs
of the community. And while this may be educational
in and unto itself, arts programs lose in competing with
other programs (especially sports programs) which can
claim to being both educational (building character, like
arts programs) and socially relevant (school spirit and
community building based on sports exhibitions, etc.).
Thus, drawing on our previously laid out model
can be important herein combatting the ne arts
reputation for being a fantasy world which has little
relevance to the real world, we can best argue for its
social relevance by being socially relevant to its audience
(the community). This includes holding concerts for local
charitable causes in need, performing outreach concerts
for the neglected (such as at hospitals, prisons, and nurs-
ing homes), holding community-centered events which
go beyond the traditional classical concert format, etc. As
a school is a representative and part of the local commu-
nity, its arts programs should likewise be integrated into
the fabric of the local community and enrich it through
the processes which enrich its participants. By doing so,
it directly lobbies to that which can most eectively save
arts programspublic opinion.
Conclusion
Therein, we must remake the image of the con-
cert hall in the image of reality, wherein our carefully
considered art pieces of self-development are actively
integrated into the fabric of a new, technological, and
collaboratively social world of civic engagement. With
this mindset, we as musicians will be better able to ad-
dress the aesthetic and philosophical concerns of the
21st century and thus allow ourselves (and the inspira-
tion we forge) to remain socially relevant. Classical music
will thus become a dialectic for the many.
Background
The current European Union faces numerous
economic, social and political problems. Theses have
been advanced within the academic community that
strengthening the European Central Bank, coordinating
scal policy and/or creating a European Commission
President would x some of these issues, but I argue that
the problems within the EU run much deeper than these
policy changes have the capacity to solve. If the EU is to
survive as a democratic governing body, its constituents/
citizens need to start identifying as Europeans and func-
tioning in some ways as a unied Europe rather than a
confederacy of European states. Opponents to my argu-
ment might say that the EU should never have been cre-
ated or that it deserves to be broken up now, but I would
respond that especially with economic and monetary
union (EMU) and the common currency, the dissolu-
tion of the EU is unfeasible and denitely the worst case
scenario right now. Instead of dissolution, solutions must
be developed to strengthen and improve the EU so that
it will become the democratic, sensible institution that it
was always meant to be.
Improving the European identity is crucial to saving
the EU. Europeans will only work for a collectively better
Europe and hold their EU elected ocials to a standard
of democratic accountability if they have a sense of col-
lective identity and a stake in the European future. Fritz
Scharpf in his book Governing in Europe: Eective and
Democratic? argued that public accountability is neces-
sary for democratic legitimacy even if one solely con-
ceives of the EU as a regulatory system. Scharpf argued
that democracy should be measured based on whether
it functions by the people and for the people. He called
this idea the input and output measures of democracy.
Based on his denitions, input-oriented democracy is
when people aect their government and hold it ac-
countable, while output-oriented democracy is when
the government serves the people. Scharpfs argument
is that the EU will never have input-oriented legitimacy,
because there is a lack of a pre-existing sense of collec-
tive identity, the lack of European-wide policy discourses,
and the lack of a Europe-wide institutional infrastructure
that could assure the political accountability of oce
holders to a European constituency. He conceded that
to a certain extent the EU does have output legitimacy,
but he contended that the EU has a democratic decit,
because it does not have any input-oriented democratic
legitimacy. Richard K. Herrmann and Marilynn B. Brewer
IMPROVING THE EU IDENTITY PROBLEM
THROUGH FOREIGNLANGUAGE
EDUCATION POLICY
Kendall Tucker
Education.indd 30 4/16/13 7:28 PM
30 31
in their book Transnational Identities: Becoming Euro-
pean in the EU agreed with this sentiment when they
wrote, mass-based identity with a community makes
governance easier. Their argument was that the EU
does not function to its fullest potential, because people
do not have a sense of European identity. EU citizens are
overwhelmingly uninterested or disdainful of EU gover-
nance, which means that for the most part they do not
hold their representatives accountable and fail to advo-
cate for eective/meaningful policies.
Numerous programs have been implemented
within the EU to try to deal with the lack of a European
identity. As Richard K. Herrmann and Marilynn B. Brewer
wrote in their book Transnational Identities: Becoming
European in the EU, Decades of eort have been de-
voted to making the European Union, institutionalizing
its integrative purpose, and promoting the emergence
of a European political identity that could underpin and
legitimate its governance. Programs that have been put
in place to foster a European identity include education,
mobility and information sharing policies. The most well-
known program that includes all three of these policy
areas is the ERASMUS program. The ERASMUS program
allows more than 230,000 European students each year a
chance to study abroad within the EU. ERASMUS partici-
pants travel to one of 33 countries and enroll in a for-
eign University. Whether students learn new languages,
new cultures or dierent learning styles while they are
abroad, the ERASMUS program does much to strengthen
international ties and to improve the quality of higher
education across Europe.
The ERASMUS program, although strong, is not the
answer to the EUs problems. ERASMUS only serves stu-
dents wealthy enough to go to University and to travel
abroad. It is also facing nancial diculties and ques-
tions abound about whether it will be able to be contin-
ued. A related program, the Schengen Agreement, which
allows EU citizens to travel throughout Europe without
visas, has already started to be scaled back because
many national leaders are facing a crisis of faith about
the security procedures in other countries. The problem
with both ERASMUS and Schengen is that they do not
address the deepest root of the identity problem. Nation-
al (or international) identities are created when children
rst start to understand language, notice dierence and
take part in culture. Because identities are formed from a
very young age, the problem of European identity must
be dealt with as soon as possible at home and in school.

Solution
The solution to solving the European identity prob-
lem is teaching EU students two European languages
aside from their home language. There are 11 ocial
languages of the European Union and in 1997, when the
Eurobarometer did a survey, over 90% of students in the
Scandinavian countries self-reported that they knew a
foreign language, while 58-79% of students in the other
European countries reported that. The UK was the only
exception to this trend, because less than 50% of Brit-
ish students reported that they knew another language.
These numbers suggest that most school systems are
already teaching languages outside their home coun-
trys native tongue, so these programs just need to be
strengthened and expanded.
Not only do many European students already
know foreign languages, in the same Eurobarometer
study mentioned above, more than 75% of European
students outside of the UK expressed a desire to learn
another foreign language. This enthusiasm for learn-
ing foreign languages is not surprising. As a number of
Roland Tharp, Peggy Estrada, Stephanie Dalton and Lois
Yamuchi wrote in their article Teaching Transformed:
Achieving Excellence, Fairness, Inclusion, and Harmony
for the Center for Research on Education, Diversity &
Excellence, teaching students foreign languages helps
them to achieve excellence, fairness, inclusion and
harmony. Also, studies have shown that students with
an understanding of foreign languages excel in read-
ing and mathematics. More pertinent to students in
the EU is that, as the European Report on the Quality of
School Education said, Prociency in several Community
languages has become a prerequisite if citizens of the EU
are to benet from the professional and personal oppor-
tunities open to them in the single market. An article for
The Economist reiterated this when it said, language has
replaced work visas as the main barrier to mobility. For-
eign languages are key to solving the European identity
problem because, as the European Report on the Qual-
ity of School Education said, Language prociency is a
key instrument for a common understanding between
citizens of Europe and for exploiting the rich cultural
heritage of Europe.
Teaching two foreign languages in European
schools is a good policy solution hypothetically, but
the implementation of any program across countries
borders will be tough. In the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, Article 165 tasked the European
Community with developing the European dimension
in education, particularly through the dissemination
of the languages of the Member States. Obviously the
policy prerogative is here, but any real solution should be
implemented through the Open Method of Coordination
(OMC) rather than through an executive or legislative
order that would make home governments feel like they
were being subverted. The OMC is the alternative policy
method to the European Parliament, and European Com-
mission. The OMC bypasses the Community Methods
legislative procedures by allowing national govern-
ments to agree to specied goals and to implement
these goals through their own methods. The OMC has
incurs signicant labor costs that increase dramatically
based on increases in ridership. Using only this as a solu-
tion becomes extremely expensive when there are either
large number of passengers, or signicant variations in
the number of people using this service. For this reason,
paratransit services are useful only in providing trans-
port for those who cannot use the bus. This would allay
concerns that section 504 imposes too rigid a solution,
and allow for the most amount of people to gain access
to transport while still minimizing the per-passenger cost
of transportation.
Education.indd 31 4/16/13 7:28 PM
32
no way to enforce its policies, but the idea is that states
who do not abide by the mutually agreed upon goals will
be publicly shamed and will appear to have violated a
code of conduct. In a situation like this paper describes
concerning education policy, it is less likely that a country
would be publicly shamed for not teaching two foreign
languages, but national governments would have strong
incentives to abide by these guidelines in order to benet
their citizens and to keep their economies competitive.
Languages encourage open borders and improved trade,
so it makes sense that governments would support lan-
guage programs.
A coordinated education policy across state lines
should encourage school systems to start teaching for-
eign languages at the youngest age possible. Assuming
that almost all European schools enroll students in one
foreign language already, it is likely that they already have
the teachers in place and the budget lined up to pay for
these programs. In order to expand the school systems
to allow students to take two language courses, schools
should shift focus from history and literature courses to
language courses. History and literature courses are cer-
tainly valuable to students and should be preserved, but
if languages were introduced at a young age, history and
literature could be taught on a rotating language sched-
ule that included the home language and the foreign
languages in a well-balanced curriculum. By teaching
history and literature in other languages, students would
become more global citizens, they would better under-
stand European history and they would become stronger
at comprehending universal linguistic rules.
The major drawback to teaching two languages to
European students would be the budgetary concerns
that this program would bring about. Politicians might be
nervous about a program that would presumably raise
education costs and burden previously strained systems,
but hiring young, multilingual teachers and emphasizing
language and cultural classes as alternatives to history
and literature classes would not greatly increase costs
and would provide overall economic and social net ben-
ets. As was discussed above, teaching European foreign
languages to EU students would provide a better sense of
a European identity and more communication between
countries. These eects in turn would stabilize the com-
mon currency, legitimize the EU governing system and
strengthen the EUs position as a centralized world power.
Also, if each country decided the best method of imple-
mentation for this program themselves, educational lead-
ers could tailor the program to t their countries needs
and the cost of education would not need not to change
much at all.

Education.indd 32 4/16/13 7:28 PM
33
ENERGY &
ENVIRONMENT
Energy (PDF).indd 33 6/6/13 8:22 PM
34 35

In both his Inauguration and his 2013 State of the
Union address, President Barack Obama stated that for
future generations, the United States must take action
against climate change . While his inauguration focused
more on ideological reasons , his State of the Union
pragmatically argued the need to move forward and out-
lined general proposals to do so . For instance, President
Obama declared that if Congress wouldnt take action for
a market-based solutions, he would direct [his] Cabinet
to come up with executive actions he can take, now and
in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communi-
ties for the consequences of climate change, and speed
the transition to more sustainable sources of energy.
These actions would presumably include some to sup-
port wind and solar energy because President Obama
pointed out that half of the new energy added last year
was wind based and solar energy is becoming cheaper .
However, there was an awkward and contradictory
point in his State of the Union on energy: natural gas.
While cleaner, natural gas is not entirely the clean energy
source. After all, while burning natural gas releases fewer
byproducts and emits less carbon dioxide than coal and
oil, burning it still releases some carbon dioxide, a green-
house gas. Despite natural gas helping to drive down
carbon dioxide emission , there is a oor to these reduc-
tions and thus a limit to how much it can slow down
climate change. Further, it is also worth pointing out
that hydrofracking, the extraction method responsible
for the latest boom in natural gas production, has been
accompanied with health complaints from those living
near drilling sites. Because the contracts are structured
to make it hard to determine the eects of hydrofracking
, it would seem appropriate to do research to determine
if hydrofracking was safe or not, especially in light of the
EPAs report that in Pavilion, Wyoming, hydrofracking
chemicals were found in ground water .
There are other concerns associated with natural
gas. Currently, even with the heatlh complaints, hydro-
fracking is in many ways unregulated because of regu-
lators lack of resources and exemptions from federal
regulations, such as an exemption from reporting the
chemicals being used . And yet, President Obama an-
nounced intentions to cut regulations to encourage
more drilling ., Another problem is that the supply of
natural gas in the US. Supposedly, the US have a 100 year
supply . However, this is based on industry gures, which
include probable, possible, speculative, and coal-bed
reserves . Looking only at proved reserves, assuming
current consumption does not grow, there is only an 11
year supply within the US . This too may be over-optimis-
tic because proved reserves include areas next to those
being hydrofracked, which may not be as productive . So,
the actual amount of natural gas in the US is uncertain
and may continue to be so until there are more years on
record . This could be problematic because a MIT report
predicted that the use of shale-based natural gas would
stunt the growth of renewable energies .
However, if we stop using natural gas, it is not clear
how we can quickly transition from coal to renewable
energies, such as wind and solar. According to the EIA, in
2011, around 2.79 billion megawatt hours of electricity
were produced from fossil fuel sources; In comparison,
only around 122 hundred million megawatt hours of
electricity were produced from wind and solar .
Thus, the pertinent question is what policies can be used
to ensure that natural gas serves as a bridge fuel to re-
newable sources. In addition to the other approaches we
have taken and may adopt, one other approach could be
to make existing power stations incorporate increasingly
more renewable sources. For example, one such system
could be to concentrate solar energy to heat molten salts
to generate electricity. The infrastructure to transport
power already exists in this situation. Then, by doing so,
we could further drive down the cost of renewable sourc-
es because of mass implementation, put in place market
incentives for better sources of renewable energy, and
create a labor force that could help enable a transition
toward a more sustainable future. It should also be noted
that in the long run, through this approach and/or other
policies to supplement it, we should also create renew-
able energy plants placed in the most optimal areas,
such solar energy plants in deserts, that can still contrib-
ute to our energy grid.
In the short run, this approach could lead to higher
electricity costs. However, this could be dealt with by
encouraging energy conservation. For instance, the
government could provide grants to help individuals and
businesses to make buildings more energy ecient. This
would probably then create local weatherization and/or
construction jobs.
Congressional action would probably be needed
for these grants. It may also be needed for the approach
mentioned above as well, at least for existing power
plants. After all, something similar to this proposal is the
renewable fuel standard. According to Professor Michael
Gerrard, Director of the Center of Climate Change Law at
Columbia University, the EPA set renewable fuel stan-
dards because a specic statue requires the agency to .
Further, the EPA can only suggest guidelines for existing
power plants to the states, which then implement them.
However, the EPA does have the authority to create
performance standards for new power plants, which
could conceivably require renewables . While these
tougher performance standards would be controversial
, this could be a good rst step toward implementing
this proposal. As stated above, to convert existing power
Rayleigh Lei
AN ALL ENERGY ON DECK APPROACH
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34 35
plants would probably require an act of Congress.
It is important to note that this is merely a start. We still
have to deal with transportation. We still have to deal
with domestic energy use, such as heating and cooking.
We still have to deal with agriculture and other areas as
well. Still, if we can successfully incorporate renewable
energy to existing power sources to spur the adoption
of more renewables, then that might be a start to an all
energy on deck approach that helps us create a more
sustainable future.
The devastating eects of climate change, from
direct environmental damage to indirect socioeconomic
disturbances, have become increasingly visible and have
consequently attracted widespread international atten-
tion. That fossil fuels are the foundation of the modern
global economy makes tackling climate change all the
more challenging. However, lessons from the generally
successful Montreal Protocol, which targeted ozone-
depleting substances, can be applied to future environ-
mental international agreements. Similarly, the failures
of international climate agreements thus far can inform
future negotiations as long as countries with the larg-
est emissions commit to action. At the Conference of
the Parties in Warsaw in November 2013, the US must
lead the eort to negotiate and ratify new separate but
linked agreements that will engender broad interna-
tional participation and include long-term commitment
periods with short-term enforcement and compliance
incentives. As the country with the largest share of global
greenhouse gas emissions, the United States must make
up for past years of inaction and show the moral lead-
ership necessary to inuence other countries to com-
mit to reducing their emissions. A cooperative sectoral
approach is one potentially viable strategy to begin to
tackle climate change that would address concerns that
have thus far impeded the development of a binding
and enforceable international agreement.
While the 1992 UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) established a basis of equity
and of common but dierentiated responsibilities to
be shared by developed and developing countries, the
outcomes of the Doha conference twenty years later
demonstrated that few countries are actually committed
to an agreement with enforceable regulations. As the
Conferences of the Parties in Bali, Copenhagen, Durban
and Doha have shown, the development of any legal
instruments to address climate change continues to be
pushed back to a later date. In Doha, the parties ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol agreed to extend the commitment
period past its scheduled target date of 2012 and to
complete, by 2015, a new protocol that will come into
eect and be implemented from 2020. Given the Parties
stated grave concern with the signicant gap between
their mitigation pledges (or lack thereof ) and the likely
increase in global average temperature, it is unaccept-
able that implementation of a new agreement has been
pushed back until 2020 and that it will only target ap-
proximately 15% of global carbon emissions.
Many of the worlds leading emitters have not
ratied the Kyoto Protocol or have not committed to spe-
cic targets. In A Course Adjustment for Climate Talks,
Greenspan and Blechman note that, The all-or-nothing
UNFCCC strategy is too easily derailed by the views or
actions of one or two countries, which then become the
rationale for other countries to refuse to act. It is clear
that a new agreement necessitates the participation
of all major emitters in order to be successful, and it is
highly unlikely that developing countries will commit
to an agreement if the US does not. At the same time,
as Benedick notes in Ozone Diplomacy, because of the
geographic size and population of the US, its economic
and scientic strength, and its international interests and
inuence, progress in addressing global environmental
problems can probably not be achieved without Ameri-
can leadership. Moreover, strong leadership by a coun-
try such as the US can be a signicant force in develop-
ing international consensus and is the most realistic
option for encouraging participation by the worlds most
rapidly growing economies, including China, India, Brazil,
South Africa, Indonesia, South Korea and Mexico. A US-
led agreement that acknowledges the growth aspira-
tions of developing countries could encourage broader
participation of both developing and developed coun-
tries, since the EU claimed it would increase stringency
of its reduction target from 20 percent to 30 percent
below 1990 levels by 2020 if other countries would make
commitments to large reductions.
Ideally, a new set of climate agreements could target all
carbon emissions and would be long-term. Following
the precedent of the Kyoto Protocol, a future agreement
of this type would also allow for the exibility of market-
based solutions. However, a longer commitment period
than that of the Kyoto Protocol would be more benecial
in that it would increase incentives for both the public
and private sector to make the investments necessary to
spur technological change and innovation. At the same
time, the urgency of the problem demands emissions
targets for shorter time periods (such as ve-year periods
from until the end of the century) to ensure that immedi-
ate action is being taken.
However, given the political and practical chal-
lenges of developing and implementing an all-encom-
passing climate agreement and the lack of international
agreement as to the best methods to ensure participa-
Fiona Kinniburgh
TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE
Energy (PDF).indd 35 6/6/13 8:22 PM
36 37
tion, enforcement and compliance, a more promising
approach to addressing climate change is that of separate
but linked agreements. Several dierent approaches to
breaking down the climate challenge have been sug-
gested. One approach would be to target both produc-
tion and consumption using a sector-based approach.
The Montreal Protocol and the issues it sought to ad-
dress provide an overview of some of the challenges that
a sector-based approach might also encounter as well
as ways to overcome them. First, the Montreal Protocol
addressed issues of international competitiveness by
restricting trade with countries not party to the protocol,
which undoubtedly contributed to near universal partici-
pation. The Protocol also set a precedent for future envi-
ronmental accords in that developed countries acknowl-
edged their responsibility to help developing countries
implement necessary environmental policies without
sacricing their aspirations for increased living stan-
dards. Moreover, it created an explicit linkage between
developing countries performance in terms of reducing
ozone-depleting substances and the amount of nancial
and technical support they received. This rst use of the
concept of common but dierentiated responsibilities
and the creation of the Multilateral Fund proved suc-
cessful. Similarly, the compliance regime, which required
annual reporting of data on production, imports and ex-
ports of controlled substances, allowed parties to estab-
lish plans to meet requirements. In addition, for parties
that volunteered information on their non-compliance,
a system was developed for establishing a plan of action
that would allow them to overcome specic diculties.
Though the Montreal Protocol was of a dierent nature
than a climate agreement would be in terms of environ-
mental objectives, the Protocols precedent for address-
ing issues of political feasibility as well as economic and
institutional factors is a promising sign that, given politi-
cal will and leadership by the countries with the largest
economies (particularly the US), a sectoral approach can
play an important role in a post-Kyoto framework.
A sectoral approach to addressing climate change
through international policy would seek to engage a
particular industrial sector on a broad international basis,
thus improving eciency and reducing emissions. In a
2009 research review, Industry Sectoral Approaches and
Climate Action: from Global to Local Level in a Post-2012
Climate Framework, the UN Environmental Programme
(UNEP) discussed various types of sectoral approaches,
the criteria for determining participating sectors, and the
feasibility of sectoral approaches in a national and inter-
national framework. The study includes a quotation from
the Centre for European Policy Studies that highlights
some important advantages of the sectoral approach:
The structure of some industrial sectors is so highly
concentrated that just a handful of companies are re-
sponsible for producing a signicant share of that sectors
total greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. [] So-called
sectoral approaches are seen as having the potential to
broaden the range of contributions by all parties, includ-
ing emerging economies, to greenhouse gas emissions
reductions, and to help moderate competitiveness con-
cerns in trade-exposed industries.
A well-designed sectoral approach would have
participants agree to specic technology or emissions
standards for individual energy-intensive, globalized
commodities, such as steel, paper, aluminum, and ce-
ment, amongst others. Transnational sectoral approaches
can be broken down into three primary forms: voluntary
industry-to-industry initiatives (such as the Cement Sus-
tainability Initiative, a global eort by 24 major cement
producers with operations in more than 100 countries
who believe there is a strong business case for the pursuit
of sustainable development ); public/private partner-
ships (such as the Asia-Pacic Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate, which focused on expanding
investment and trade in cleaner energy technologies,
goods and services in key market sectors ); and govern-
ment commitments on transnational sectors.
The benets to an international, policy-based
sectoral approach are numerous. Firstly, it allows govern-
ments of developing countries to receive recognition
and support in the form of nancial and technological
solutions and therefore allows for greater participation
of developing countries. It would also avoid locking in
carbon-intensive processes in rapidly industrializing
countries, a trend that tradable carbon permits encour-
ages rather than discourages. Secondly, it is more direct
than other market-based solutions such as a carbon tax
or a cap-and-trade program. It facilitates setting tangible
emissions or technology based targets, which would
help enable a streamlined enforcement and compliance
regime since emissions could be quantied eectively
based on strict criteria for a given sector. This would also
provide opportunities for investment and would incen-
tivize market-driven innovation. Secondly, provided
international adoption of a sector-based approach, the
agreement would minimize damage to a single nations
economy. It would help circumvent diculties associ-
ated with international competition and thereby prevent
carbon leakage, the phenomenon whereby production
shifts to countries without binding emissions targets. If
necessary, trade restrictions could be used to incentivize
countries to comply with the standard.
The past failures of the international community
to reach a viable climate agreement are a testament to
UNEPs claim that climate change presents international
political and business leaders with a challenge of the
highest order. While it is unlikely that the US will dare
to initiate any climate negotiations that may restrict its
economy given the recession, it is possible that Obamas
recent expression of concern in regards to addressing
Energy (PDF).indd 36 6/6/13 8:22 PM
36 37
climate change (as expressed in his State of the Union
speech) may inuence him to make concessions. By pro-
posing a sector-based approach, the US would be
showing a necessary willingness to address industry in
a new and targeted way that would not detrimentally
impact on any specic countries. While such an agree-
ment would not necessarily prompt investments in clean
energy, which are undoubtedly another key component
of addressing climate change, it would be a useful rst
step towards reducing emissions while new technologies
are being developed. A sector-based system would allow
for the type of equity adjustments seen in the Montreal
Protocol and would make compliance and enforcement
of treaties more manageable in the short- and long-
term, promising an immediate attempt to tackle this
monumental global challenge.
Background
The Green Movement is fueled by the younger
generations, causing many colleges and universities
across the country implement changes in their dorms
and dining halls, making them more eco-friendly. Provid-
ing green options such as recycling and composting is no
longer considered progressive at university, but rather,
demanded by the student population. Here at Columbia
University, many of the buildings on campus are Green
Buildings, and there are many opportunities to recycle
all around campus. Recently, Columbia has won a Gold
rating for sustainability but there is more to be done. All
these initiatives are university-wide policies, making the
Columbias image greener, but we can do much more to
follow through on making the policies more ecient and
truly create an environmentally friendly campus.
The problem originates with the lack of student
involvement in the above policies and environmental
implementations. Although there are a number of envi-
ronmentally aware student groups on campus, such as
the CU Green Umbrella and the Barnard EcoReps , howev-
er there isnt a widespread campaign to spread environ-
mental awareness, nor do there exist many opportunities
for students to become green themselves, and become
environmentally responsible for their own lifestyles.
Composting at Columbia
One area particularly lacking on Columbias campus
is composting. Composting one of the many ways to
decrease our carbon footprint and go green, is one of the
easiest ways to decrease ones impact, on the environ-
ment, as it requires only the sorting of a meals remnants.
Nationally, food wastes accounts for 34 million tons annu-
ally, just shy of 14% of the total. Only 3% of this is
COMPOSTING AT COLUMBIA
Triana Kalmano
actually composted, resulting in 33 million tons that end
up in landlls . In New York City, 17% of the waste pro-
duced is food waste , meaning what ends up in a landll
has the potential to be turned into soil.
Columbia has recently taken notice of this issue and
installed a composting system, coined the rocket in
Ruggles Hall. Scott Wright, Vice President of the Student
Administrative Services says, On the Morningside cam-
pus, composting has been the vital missing component
of a consistent, aggressive dining sustainability program .
e Problem
Columbias recent eorts to begin a composting pro-
gram are valiant, but seriously lacking in a few respects.
Firstly, the university has ot undertaken a large enough
commitment to make a signicant step forward. The
Rocket, now up and running in Ruggles, is nowhere near
large enough to sustain the entire universitys compost.
Its location makes it convenient for approximately 200 of
the 30,000 plus students and sta at the university. None
of the other residence halls have compost bins.
Composting deciencies are even more obvious in the
dining halls, where most campus dining halls food waste
originates. With the exception of Barnards Hewitt Din-
ing Hall , the campus dining halls do not have a compost
option available. This leaves diners at John Jay and Ferris
Booth dining halls no choice but to dispose of their un-
eaten food in the trash.
However, Ferris Booth does claim the Green title.
This dining hall, located in Lerner, the student center, is
stocked with quick, manageable food for meals on the
go. The disposable dishware and cutlery allows for take-
away meals, though many students choose instead to
dine-in. Designed to be disposable, the plates in Ferris
Booth are paper and the bowls and cutlery are made of
a corn. All dishware and cutlery is compostable- allow-
ing the dining hall to erect a Green Revolution placard .
But the lack of options to discard these compost-friendly
utensils and the food leftovers at the end of the meal
creates a problem. Though the food and utensils in Ferris
Booth are compostable, there is no compost option avail-
able. All students uneaten food and compostable eating
utensils must be thrown into one of six trashcans, none of
it being composted.
Not only does this contribute to the tremendous
amount of food waste produced by the university, it com-
prises of a considerable waste of money- the composta-
ble dishware and cutlery is signicantly more expensive
than the conventional plastic plates and forks. It has been
approximated that there is a one-third increase in the
cost in switching from polystyrene (Styrofoam) to biode-
gradable dishware. The ideas are already in place, but the
system is greatly lacking. How can students be expected
to become environmentally conscious if they are not
Energy (PDF).indd 37 6/6/13 8:22 PM
38 39
given the chance?
e Solution
As soon as the University installs compost-collecting
bins around campus, the dining and residence halls, there
emerges the problem of what to do with the compost. A
clear solution is modeled by Barnards dining hall, Hewitt,
which has a composter. Implementing one in each
Columbia dining hall would be the rst necessary step
towards a successful composting program and a greener
university future.
Once these composters are installed, a simple col-
lection plan for the food that would have been taken to a
landll, now in the form of compost, needs to be created.
This would dier from the normal waste collection proce-
dures minimally. In locations where there are trashcans,
paper and bottle recycling, composting can also be
installed at a low cost. This will allow students and faculty
to decrease their own carbon footprint, as well as lower
that of the university.
The compost collected from the dining halls turns
quickly into nutritious soil, with which there are endless
possibilities for usage. One incredible resource right on
campus is Barnards Green House and Green Roof. The
Barnard Green House is a vast 3,400 square feet, contain-
ing a variety of plants used for research and teaching.
10
The greenhouse would benet greatly from the nutrient-
rich compost generated by the university. Additionally,
the universitys award wining landscaping has thousands
of plants and trees that could also benet from the cam-
puss food waste. Another incredible opportunity for the
usage of the compost is the New York City Green Thumb
Gardens located throughout the city, are community
gardens that provide locals and passersby with a natural
environment to relax, view artwork, or even farm. Many
of these Green Thumbs need volunteers and compost to
help build the garden. A donation of the campuss com-
post would be extraordinarily benecial to these corner
gardens, providing fertilizer to the plants and ultimately
the neighborhood wellbeing.
Our Environment, Our Future
Going green is the coined term for environmen-
talism that focuses on conservation and other forms of
improving the health of the environment. Some of the
most common ways people have been going green
including driving less and taking public transportation
more, turning of lights and water when not in use, and
recycling. Even the US government, as discussed in the
2012 Roosevelt Review , is going green and investing mil-
lions in sustainable energy developments. At the State of
the Union Address in February, Obama announced intent
to implement a cap-and-trade-like policy , reducing the
countries carbon emissions.
Now that environmental conservationist policies are in
eect, it is time to make them ecient. It is no longer
enough that our university appear green from the out-
side. Our actions must match our words. As a leading
higher education institution it is our responsibility to
be a green role model and do what we can to help the
environment and local communities. It is possible to do
so at a low cost, and more importantly, with a benet to
our campus and surrounding neighborhood. By setting
an example and implementing a widespread compost-
ing policy on our campus students will be able to see the
cycle of food waste becoming new material rst hand.
Daily interaction with waste deposit ensures daily envi-
ronmental awareness. Although it is extremely important
to minimize our environmental impact, it is even more
important to understand why we need to do so.
Ways to Go Greener Until Columbia Can Too:
- Compost from your room: all you need ls a bln wlth a
lid, or a plastic bag
- The Parmers' Market located on 8roadway and w ll5th
has a compost collecting station: you can empty your
personal compost there on Sundays (8am-1pm).
- Por more lnformatlon go to www.grownyc.org/colum-
biagreenmarket

One of the most disappointing trends over the last
few years has been a backsliding of ocial U.S. trade
policy into protectionism and strategic trade. Although
the progressive tone on free trade is mixed, most policy
makers agree that freer trade improves productive ef-
ciency and oers consumers better choices. In the long
run, these gains improve the standard of living on aver-
age and are much larger than any short-term eects on
unemployment.
1
One area in which protectionist policies have been
inhibiting economic eciency is in the natural gas
trade. Since 2009, the price of natural gas has dropped
in nominal terms; more importantly, the relative price of
natural gas against oil has dropped 60 percent over the
same time frame.
2
An enormous expansion of supply has
sustained the decline in natural gas prices -- the U.S. now
is trying to shrink a glut of natural gas. Natural gas also
has true promise as a transitional energy source between
higher-pollutant fossil fuels -- coal and oil -- and even-
cleaner alternative energy over the very long term. Given
surplus in the U.S. and higher natural gas prices in Europe
Sharin Khander
NATURAL GAS AND NATIONAL
INTEREST: A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR
RENEWABLES
Energy (PDF).indd 38 6/6/13 8:22 PM
38 39
and Japan, American producers of natural gas would like
to export some of their production as LNG. Many policy-
makers have suggested taxing these imports in order to
fund clean energy research. This would open up op-
portunities for both the private sector and vital research
that has been put on the back burner in Congress due
to partisan opposition and the looming scal crisis. Yet,
the federal government is standing in the way of a more
promising future for renewables by promoting a vaguely-
dened concept in trade policy called 'national interest'.
Since 2004, President George W. Bush signed Execu-
tive Order (EO) 13337, which decreed that all proposals
for energy-related facilities which cross U.S. borders must
receive government approval. More specically, it made it
the prerogative of the Departments of Energy and State,
through the Oce of International Energy and Commod-
ity Policy, to receive, consider, and approve or decline
permit applications for "for the construction, connection,
operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the United
States, of facilities for the exportation or importation of
petroleum, petroleum products, coal, or other fuels to or
from a foreign country." The Oce is responsible for de-
termining whether any proposed energy facility "would
serve the national interest...in such form and with such
terms and conditions as the national interest may in the
Secretarys judgment require."
3
Only one rm, Cheniere
Energy Partners, has received approval to export LNG to
countries lacking free trade agreements with the U.S.,
according to The Wall Street Journal. Nearly 10 other pro-
posals are pending before the Energy Department, but
the agency says it wont approve any additional projects
until it nishes a comprehensive review of the exports
impacts on the U.S. The Energy Department is expected
to complete that review later this summer.
4
The Energy
Department is using discretionary powers of review to
eect a de facto moratorium on LNG exports, reports
Bloomberg.
Critics of this pose a contrary set of arguments.
They fear that demand for gas exports might encourage
hydraulic fracturing, threatening water supplies, and they
worry that siphoning o domestic gas for export will raise
costs for domestic consumers and disadvantage Ameri-
can manufacturers that benet from low-cost fuel. There
are also national security concerns. Some see an oppor-
tunity to frustrate the two biggest holders of natural gas
reserves: Russia and Iran. Critics would prefer that natural
gas be used to replace oil in American automobiles. In a
recent study, the New York Times estimates that American
rms could make up to $3 billion per year by producing
and exporting liqueed natural gas.
5
Its true that gas-
dependent industries would have to pay more because of
higher gas prices, but those costs would be substantially
smaller than the benets. But there are bigger stakes
involved than just money. A decision to constrain natural-
gas exports could have dangerous reverberations for
American trade. Critics are, however, correct in point-
ing out that exporting natural gas could increase en-
vironmental risks to communities where natural gas is
extracted. Even so, a recent report from the International
Energy Agency makes clear that inexpensive steps could
substantially mitigate those dangers.
6
It will take years
before any export terminals are up and running in the
meantime, producers and regulators should strengthen
safeguards so that gas is extracted safely. Exports would
also raise natural gas prices a bit, adding as much as
$50 to the annual electric bills for the poorest American
households by the end of the decade. But the federal
Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program could
help shield the most vulnerable as long as its nancing is
protected.
National interest determination is the new face of
protectionism in the United States. In the long run, the
national interest is best served not by empowering the
Energy and State Departments to restrict energy trade
in its name, but rather through strong and consistent
American support for trade liberalization. Removing this
barrier from natural gas imports would not only balance
trade decits and secure America's role as the world's
top energy producer but would also provide funding for
clean energy research. Executive Order 13337 should
be rescinded immediately. The United States, which has
imported natural gas for many years, has long beneted
from a relatively open system for global trade in energy.
Allowing natural-gas exports while protecting the envi-
ronment and low-income consumers is the right way to
go.
Energy (PDF).indd 39 6/6/13 8:22 PM
40 41

Everyday, it becomes increasingly evident that the
United States has to reform its energy market to increase
overall eciency and curb carbon emissions. Investing in
certain cleaner fuels should decrease our overall emissions
and create the bedrock for an entirely domestic market
un-reliant on global markets. Algal fuel, a carbon neutral,
entirely domestic, and energy ecient source, could be the
key, or at least a stepping-stone, to achieving these goals.
e implementation of more algal fuel research would
indicate the US is dedicated to food security as well. In-
stead of using our crops for fuel, we would instead attempt
to make them cheaper by decreasing their fuel consump-
tion and leaving a larger supply for domestic and interna-
tional food programs. Under current US law, 40% of all
corn grown must be used for the production of ethanol.
e UN, NGOs, and several think tanks have lambasted
this policy because they perceive it as having jacked up
food prices. Investing in Algal fuel could wean us o of the
use of agrarian products for fuel.
In December of 2007, President Bush signed into law
the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), which
included a mandate that at least 36 billion gallons of bio-
fuels a year be produced by 2022, mainly in the form of
ethanol.
1
However, we have seen more problems arise as a
result of this policy, and not even a small dent in our CO2
emissions. In fact, the Congressional Budget Oce found
that reducing CO2 emissions from burning ethanol costs
at least $750 per ton of CO2.
2
Some scientists have pro-
posed that biofuels, in fact, increase our overall emissions.
Experts not that it has hurt our food exports. 8 bushels of
corn, enough to feed a person for a year, are used to make
21.6 gallons of ethanol.
3
US ethanol production consumes
40% of the countrys corn; the National Academy of Sci-
ence concluded that 20-40% of the price increases in 2008
were due to biofuel expansion.
4
e World Banks August
2012 Food Price Watch cited the mandate, along with corn
used for livestock feed, as creating substantial competition
to the use of maize for food purposes, raising the agencys
Food Price Index by 10%.
5

Title II, Section B of the EISA stipulates that the DOE
conduct research of algae as a feedstock for biofuel pro-
duction, and we have already begun doing so. While cur-
rent production of algal biofuel is nowhere near reaching
the 36 billion gallons in the scal year 2022, as stipulated by
the EISA, it could still have a fundamental role to play. We
can invest in algae to gradually wean ourselves o of etha-
nol, and later on move for a new mandate on Biofuels, in a
new Energy Bill, to be pushed for in Congress. We should
instead look to the potential of Green Crude, produced
from algal farms, along with our continuing investments in
wind and solar energies, and work to establish a competi-
tive and innovative industry. Algae could be the instru-
ment for reforming and drastically improving the biofuel
industry altogether, as scientists project that it can produce
more than 80 times more oil than corn per hectare per
year.
6
One of the most important dierences between corn
and algae is that the latter does not require arable land, only
space on which to build and sustain their tanks. Another
essential quality of algae is inherent in its structure. e
Aquatic Species Program the Department of Energy un-
dertook from 1978 to 1996 showed that some algal species
were found to accumulate as much as 60% of their dry
weight in the form of lipids, which is a far greater percent-
age than that of ethanol based biomass.
7
is gives algal
crude a higher energy density, making it production more
ecient than other biofuels.
8
Furthermore, nearly all of
algaes energy is concentrated in its chloroplast, its compo-
nent that turns sunlight and CO2 into organic carbon. Its
number-one nutrient source is CO2, and consumes 13-14
kg of CO2 per gallon of green crude.
9
is could conceiv-
ably make it a more carbon neutral fuel than any other
biomass.
Green Crude is a liquid substance produced from algae
grown in large tanks of water, fed mainly by sunlight and
CO2.
10
Potentially, we could have kilometers of tanks in
deserts producing the fuel, with near consistent sunlight
to let them photosynthesize. Constituencies that would
favor this type of industry are in Texas, Arizona, and other
southern states. While burning algae will still release emis-
sions, Researchers have pointed out that the algaes photo-
synthesis, which essentially sequesters carbon, can make
development of this fuel carbon neutral. Investing in algal
biofuels could ultimately curb our emissions, give us more
energy eciency, and create a home-based market for fuel
that will ultimately create thousands of new jobs that can-
not be outsourced.
Many are concerned about the water-intensity of these
potential farms, and whether they would detract from ir-
rigation. Yet algal tanks can utilize a wide range of dier-
ent water sources, including brackish, salt, and wastewater,
thereby reducing competition for freshwater. Like other
biofuels, algae absorb CO2 from the atmosphere for photo-
synthesis. And yet it does not require the nutrients found
in soil: only water, sunlight, and CO2.
is past summer 2012, Sapphire Energy opened their
Green Crude Farm in New Mexico, having received an ad-
ditional $85 million from private investors along with the
federal funds.
11
It is the worlds only commercial outdoor
algal biorenery, stretches to 30 acres, seeks to expand to
300 acres, and ultimately aims to extract 1.5 million gallons
of green crude oil a year from patented algal ponds, fed
only by carbon dioxide and sunlight.
12
Currently, Sapphire
A BIOFUEL THAT DOESNT REQUIRE
FOOD: ALGAE
Swara Salih
Energy (PDF).indd 40 6/6/13 8:22 PM
40 41
has a fuel capacity of 1,00,000 gallons a year, thanks in large
part to public and private investment in the company. We
can see with the Sapphire example that algae energy, with
enough proper investment, could become a market player.
e Industry as it stands now does not allow algal crude
to play a signicant role in the energy market. Algal fuel
costs about $8 a gallon, and that same gallon could require
up to 350 gallons of water to produce. A study by the Rand
Corporation concluded that algal fuels are at least ten years
away from marketability.
13
Researchers at Heliae, an algal
biofuel company, have estimated that production costs will
decrease enough in 5-10 years for algae to be an eective
player in the market for transportation fuel. Pike Research
estimates that it could be a 61 million barrels a year com-
modity with a market value of $1.3 billion by 2020.
14
Ad-
ditionally, a study in 2011 by Pacic Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) delineates that Algae energy produc-
tion could cut up to 17% of US oil imports. e study
conveys that if algal farms are situated in humid areas, we
could in fact curb the amount of water needed to sustain it.
e researchers found that if algae energy were produced in
the sunniest and most humid US regions, such as the Gulf
Coast, the Southeastern Seaboard, and the Great Lakes,
then water usage would be less overall.
15

A tax break for algal development is needed to speed
production and increase the fuels market viability. We
should also push for the passage of a new energy bill that
requires at least 35-45% of biofuels in 2030 be constituted
from algal crude. is might seem ambitious, but it is still
a necessary step to decrease our reliance on ethanol and
reduce the price of corn. ere are several programs and
pieces of legislation that we could encourage as well to
hasten the development of the industry.
Apart from federal funding, algae R&D has various
state funding programs and research support from private
industries. Overall, private investment in the past few years
has been increasing signicantly, and is now outpacing gov-
ernment funding.
16
Besides Sapphire, BP, Chevron Corp,
and Exxon Mobil all have investments in Algae.
17
Exxon
in particular, alongside Synthetic Genomics Inc., a biotech
company, began a $600 million investment in Algal biofuels
in 2009.
It is clear that private investment in algal biofuels far
outpaces the Federal governments. We have already seen
companies like Exxon pour millions into Algae R&D.
Establishing public-private relationships with these compa-
nies, in which we send our own scientists and researchers
to work with theirs, could have several benets. We could
determine the optimal areas to grow algal farms, develop
models of the price per gallon and per barrel currently and
within the next several years, and determine which actions
are needed, such as tax breaks and tax credits, to create
more economic incentive for these companies to produce
the fuel. Like other forms of renewable energy, such as eth-
anol, we could see a free-market for algae that benets from
government subsides, essentially a public-private hybrid.
ere are several pieces of legislation from the past
several years that could give algal fuel a stronger pres-
ence in the biofuel market. Sapphire used to benet from
the Alternative Fuels Mixture Excise Tax Credit, which
incentivized algal fuel production by giving them a $0.50/
gallon tax incentive for each gallon of fuel produced.
18
is
tax credit, however, expired Dec. 31st, 2011. If we want to
see algae become a viable market player, this tax incentive
must be reinstated, and must even be expanded to bring the
price per gallon substantially below the current $8.
In April of 2011, legislation was introduced in the
House to speed up the reduction of algal crude develop-
ment costs. e Quantifying Renewable Chemical Pro-
duction Tax Credit Act of 2012, introduced by Democrat
Representative Bill Pascrell and Republican Representative
Brian Bilbray, if passed, would create a tax credit for the
production of biofuels from corn, non-harvested wheat,
soybeans, and algae.
19
We have already seen the wind en-
ergy sector benet with such a tax credit , which has seen
its gigawatt capacity increase exponentially in the past de-
cade.
20
e same could happen for the Algal Fuel industry.
e Obama administration has already given support
for startup costs. Earlier this year in February, the Presi-
dent outlined a $14 million round of R&D grants for algal
biofuels.
21
In a speech, the President echoed the PNNL:
We could replace up to 17 percent of the of the oil we im-
port for transportation with this fuel that we can grow right
here in the United States, he said, at means greater
energy security and a stronger economy. e President is
also seeking to begin construction on at least four commer-
cial-scale reneries for biofuels by 2013.
22

e approach to stimulate viable market for algae
undoubtedly appears risky, but the US has used such an
approach with ethanol, wind, and solar energies. Tax incen-
tives for corn-based biofuels have helped production levels
reach 12,000,000 gallons in FY 2010.
23
Current levels of
algal fuel production are at 1,000,000 gallons/year. Because
the research is still in its infant stage, and because it cur-
rently requires a substantial amount of water and fertilizers,
it may be at least a decade before algal farms produce these
levels. However, if companies increase the focus on usage
of wastewater and saltwater for algal ponds, they could
consume less freshwater that would be put to better use for
agricultural development.
If the private and public sectors increase investments
in long-term projects, we could see algal fuel become a
major market player by 2030. If we experiment with using
salt water for algal tanks, could see new methods of saving
freshwater, decreasing production costs and saving water
for our agriculture. With proper investment, commitment,
and vision, algal crude could be the biofuel of the future,
and will curb food wastage in the United States.
Energy (PDF).indd 41 6/6/13 8:22 PM
42
EQUAL
JUSTICE
43
Stephanie George was 26 when she was sentenced
to life in prison without parole. A single mother with
three children, Stephanie became involved in illegal
activities while she was dating a man who sold drugs.
Stephanie occasionally helped her boyfriend by mak-
ing deliveries. When she was 23, police caught her in a
drug deal. Following her arrest, she served three months
in jail. Three years later, police raided Stephanies house
and found powder cocaine and a large amount of cash
in a safe in her attic. Her ex-boyfriend, who held the
key to the safe, testied that the drugs and the cash
were his. Stephanie was taken to trial and charged with
possession of the cocaine. Due to her prior conviction,
Stephanie met the criteria for a mandatory life sentence.
The judge who sentenced her objected to the charge,
stating, Theres no question that Ms. George deserved
to be punished. The only question is whether it should
be a mandatory life sentence ... I wish I had another
alternative. He characterized Stephanies involvement
in illegal activities as minimal your role has basically
been as a girlfriend and bag holder and money holder.
So certainly, in my judgment, it doesnt warrant a life
sentence. In Stephanies case, as in all cases where
mandatory sentences apply, the judge was forced to set
aside his evaluation of the facts of the case and grant a
sentence he considered to be unreasonably punitive. The
mandatory sentence law gave him no choice but to send
a 26-year-old woman to prison for the rest of her life
against his professional judgment.
Mandatory sentences are laws requiring that specif-
ic crimes receive a certain sentence. There are two types
of mandatory sentences. Mandatory minimums specify
aminimum number of years that a defendant must
spend in jail for a certain crime. Sentence enhancements
add time to a sentence based on aspects of a crime, such
as whether a gun was involved. This piece will focus
specically on the issue of mandatory minimums. Most
mandatory minimums specify sentences for drug crimes.
Several decades ago, these laws fell out of favor: in
1970, Congress repealed many of its mandatory mini-
mum laws. At the time, the report issued by the House
of Representatives stated that these sentences did not
allow judges to take the circumstances into account, put
serious oenders and casual oenders at the same level,
and led to sentences out of proportion to the crime.
Mandatory minimums returned, however, during the
War on Drugs as public sentiment turned against drug
use. In 1986, Congress passed mandatory minimums for
possession of crack and powder cocaine after basketball
player Len Bias cocaine overdose led a public outcry.
From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Congress passed
20 new mandatory minimum laws for federal crimes, and
all states implemented one or more for state crimes. The
U.S. has far more mandatory minimums than any other
countryjust a few other countries have any mandatory
sentences, and those are limited and less constraining on
judges.
Mandatory minimums are fundamentally at odds
with the principles of sentencing in the United States
because they remove a judges discretion. In a typical
sentencing for a criminal charge, a judge calculates the
advisory sentence using formulas provided in the United
States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The guidelines
provide a range, and the judge then assesses the evi-
dence to determine whether to grant a sentence within
that range, or whether to depart from the guidelines
based on mitigating circumstances. This system provides
a necessary balance between the need for uniformity
between sentencesfor the same crime, and the need for
judicial discretion to take account of the circumstances
of specic crimes. Judges determine a sentence based on
the four principles of punishment: retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. A sentence
should only be long enough to fulll these principles;
anything longer is unjust and does not provide any ben-
ets to society or the individual being punished. Manda-
tory minimums do not take these principles into account.
By applying one standard sentence to all defendants
convicted of a certain crime, they remove the judges
ability to determine what sentence would best fulll the
principles of punishment. Under the system of manda-
tory minimums, discretion is concentrated in the hands
of prosecutors rather than judges. Prosecutors decide
whether or not to pursue charges that carry mandatory
minimums, and once they make this decision, the judge
has no choice but to award the mandatory sentence
if the defendant is proven guilty. Prosecutors can use
the threat of a charge carrying mandatory minimum to
persuade a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge.
Granting all of the sentencing discretion to prosecutors
rather than judges is problematic because a prosecutors
role is to extract a strict sentence, while a judges role is
to award a fair sentence. Judges are expected to adhere
to the principles of punishment, and to justify their deci-
sions for awarding a sentence in open court. By contrast,
the process through which a prosecutor decides whether
to pursue a charge carrying a mandatory minimum is not
at all transparent. According to Judge William G. Young,
a federal judge in Boston, Prosecutors run our federal
justice system today. Judges play a subordinate role
necessary yes, but subordinate nonetheless. Defense
counsel take what they can get. Prosecutors themselves
are not to blame; the system is at fault. Mandatory mini-
mums take away a judges power to ensure a fair sen-
tence in each case.
Grace Rybak
MANDATORY MINIMUMS:
SENTENCING TO INJUSTICE
44
Supporters of mandatory minimums typically argue
that they serve three purposes: ensuring uniformity be-
tween sentences, promoting transparency, and deterring
potential oenders from committing the crime. In reality,
this logic is very awed. Mandatory minimums do not
result in uniformity or transparency because prosecutors
decide whether or not to pursue a charge that carries
a mandatory minimum. This decision is made behind
closed doors, and unlike sentences granted by judges,
the justications for the decision
are not placed in the public record.
The third justication for mandatory
minimums, deterrence, is not borne
out by the evidence. Data taken over
30 years indicate that mandatory
minimums do not play any role in
deterring serious crimes. Mandatory
minimums for drug tracking are
particularly futile because evidence
shows that drug dealers on the street are replaced quick-
ly. Since the nancial incentives for becoming involved in
the drug trade are so great, there is an ample supply of
people who are willing to serve as replacements for drug
oenders who are imprisoned. This does not mean that
drug oenders should escape punishment entirely, only
that excessively long sentences for drug oenses do not
serve any purpose to society.
The ideal policy solution would be to repeal all
mandatory minimum laws. By removing judicial discre-
tion, these laws undermine the system of sentencing
and lead to unjust outcomes for defendants. Unlike the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which are determined
by an independent agency, mandatory minimum laws
are passed in Congress as a means of scoring political
points for being tough on crime. Repealing mandatory
minimums would improve our judicial system by ensur-
ing that sentences are determined by the principles
of punishmentsentences should be long enough to
rehabilitate an individual and protect society for as long
as it takes for that rehabilitation to take place. When a
sentence is longer than necessary to accomplish those
purposes, the result is a miscarriage of justice. No person
should be forced to serve an unnecessarily long sen-
tence. Each additional year spent in prison represents
an enormous burden on individuals and their families,
and we cannot justify the severe penalties required by
mandatory minimums.
Those who are not persuaded by the moral argu-
ments can look at the economic reasons for repealing
mandatory minimums. Imprisonment comes at a high
cost. In 2008, corrections cost states a total of $47 billion.
On average, keeping a person in prison for one year costs
$35,000. These estimates do not even take into account
the broader societal costs of keeping people in prison for
longer than is necessary to fulll the principles of pun-
ishment. Research has demonstrated clear ties between
incarceration rates and poverty levels. One study by Vil-
lanova sociologists calculated that the poverty rate in the
U.S. would be 20% lower today if incarceration levels had
remained at the level they were before the 1970s.
Some may object to repeal of mandatory mini-
mums by arguing that removing these standards will
detract from uniformity in sentencing. However, the
guideline system that is already in place serves the pur-
pose of promoting this goal. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines provide advisory
sentences based on the seriousness of
the oense and the defendants criminal
history. These guidelines encourage uni-
formity, but also allow judges to depart
from the advisory sentence if mitigat-
ing circumstances make it clear that the
advisory sentence would be unjust and
would not serve the purposes of pun-
ishment. This balance is essential in sentencing. While
uniformity is very important to our system of justice, we
also need a mechanism to ensure that each defendant
receives a sentence appropriate to his or her crime.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines give judges enough
discretion to grant a just sentence to each defendant. Re-
pealing mandatory minimums would allow this system
to function properly.
Unfortunately, full repeal of mandatory minimums
may not be feasible, given the political challenges of
appearing soft on crime. In light of this political climate,
there are more modest reforms that can be implemented
to improve the existing system. President Obama began
the process of reform when he signed the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act of 2010 into law. The FSA partially resolved the
disparities between mandatory minimums for crack
cocaine and powder cocaine. Under previous laws, a
defendant convicted of possessing ve grams of crack
received a ve-year mandatory minimum sentence,
while the threshold for powder cocaine was ve hundred
grams. This 100-to-1 disparity was long criticized for its
racial implications, since black oenders are more likely
to use crack, while white oenders are more likely to
use powdered cocaine. The Fair Sentencing Act did not
resolve the disparity entirely, but it narrowed it to 18-to-
1, which represents substantial progress.
There are many other practical reforms we can
undertake to x the system of mandatory minimums.
One possibility would be to change the way these bills
are written and presented in Congress. Under the cur-
rent system, members of Congress who propose a bill on
sentencing are required to present the cost of the bill,
but they are not required to present empirical evidence
justifying these sentences. Congress should implement a
requirement that sponsors of mandatory minimum bills
also oer evidence showing the new mandatory mini-

By removing judicial
discretion, these laws under-
mine the system of sentencing
and lead to unjust outcomes
for defendants.
45
mum would improve the system of punishment. Ensur-
ing that mandatory minimums are based on empirical
evidence would make these sentences less arbitrary and
prevent implementation of unnecessarily long periods of
punishment.
Another possibility would be to include expiration
dates in all mandatory minimum laws. Voting to repeal
these laws is politically dicult for members of Congress.
Including a sunset provision would allow the laws to
lapse after a period of time without politicians subject-
ing themselves to charges that they are soft on crime. A
third promising solution to the problem of mandatory
minimums would be to make these sentences advisory
rather than required. Defendants would be automatically
sentenced to the minimum unless a judge found evi-
dence of extenuating circumstances. This solution would
account for the legislative judgment that the crime de-
served severe punishment but would also allow judges
to take account of the individual defendants situation.
Under this reform, judicial discretion would be restored
to the sentencing process.
Mandatory minimums condemn defendants to
one-size-ts-all sentences and prevent judges from
acting on their professional evaluation of a case. These
sentences are not eective at deterring crime, and they
undermine the principle of fairness in our judicial system.
The U.S. currently has the highest incarceration rates in
the world. Empirical evidence demonstrates that these
rates are not linked to higher crime levels or more ef-
fective policing, but rather to more charges and longer
sentences. Dramatic reforms are needed to address the
issue of mass incarceration, and they will require changes
at all levels of law enforcement. As part of these reforms,
we must x the awed system of mandatory minimums.
A functional immigration system must balance the
economic pressures that drive immigration as a global
force with the needs of immigrant families. The United
States existing immigration system is sorely lacking in
its capacity to meet either of these objectives, and many
new proposals for reform ignore the systems primary
failureit simply cannot meet the great demand for
visas. This structural inadequacy promotes unauthorized
immigration and unnecessary deportations.
Comprehensive immigration reform must vastly ex-
pand the number of visas available to low-wage laborers,
those currently most likely to immigrate without papers,
and upon whom multiple sectors of the national econo-
my depend. Allocating visas based on economic demand
would ensure employer access to cheap, legal labor,
while resolving pressures to crack down on hard-working
and well-meaning immigrants. At the same time, prefer-
ences for family-based visas should be reorganized to
ensure fair and equal treatment for applicants who wish
to immigrate to be with their relatives who are already
citizens and permanent residents. New categories should
be created for the relatives of low-wage workers who
would be otherwise likely to come without papers.
Current Visa Allocation
The United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) issues a limited number of visas each
year, split between visas allocated for workers and visas
allocated for relatives of citizens and permanent resi-
dents. Each year, USCIS capping family-sponsored visas
at 480,000. In the spirit of family reunication, the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA) makes an unlimited
number of visas available to immediate relatives of U.S.
citizens. These are included in the 480,000 cap. The num-
ber of visas available to applicants who do not happen to
be immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, then, is equal to
however many visas are left over from those allotted to
citizens relatives.
Unsurprisingly, demand for these visas far exceeds
the supply, so applicants who hold no immediate rela-
tion to a U.S. citizen receive a visa number based on
a preference category, in which they wait until a visa
becomes available. First preference (F1) goes to the
unmarried, adult children of US citizens. Their derivative
family members (dependent children) are also included
in this category. Spouses and children of legal perma-
nent residents go into the second preference category
(F2A for spouses and minor children; F2B for adult,
unmarried sons and daughters). Third preference (F3)
goes to the married children of U.S. citizens (and deriva-
tives). Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens (and their de-
rivative family members) fall into the fourth preference
category (F4).
Employment-based visas are allotted from a sepa-
rate pool than are family-based visas, capped at 140,000,
annually.2 First priority for employent-based visas (E1)
goes to priority workers of extraordinary ability, as well
as certain multinational executives. Professionals with
advanced degrees have E2second prioritystatus.
Third preference includes professionals with bachelors
degrees, skilled workers, and unskilled workers in short
supply. Fourth preference is reserved for special immi-
grants: religious ministers, government employees, and
certain international workers. Fifth preference goes to
investors, persons who create employment for at least
ten unrelated persons. Each category also includes an
applicants qualied derivative family members.
One point of agreement in the current debate
on immigration reform is that the system should be as
welcoming as possible to highly skilled professionals
in science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
While these workers are capable of making great contri-
butions to our national economy, we must recognize that
REALLOCATING VISAS TO MEET DEMAND
Natalie Zerwekh
46
the current systems visa allotment is already glaringly
skewed towards professionals. Market forces pull low-
wage workers without respect to the limited number of
visas allotted to their category of worker, creating much
of the force behind undocumented immigration. Certain
economic sectors, such as construction and agriculture,
depend upon workers who have extremely limited access
to legal permanent residence.
Certain limits are also placed on the number of visas
made available to each country of origin. Regardless of
varying demand, the total number of immigrant visas
made available to natives of any single foreign state or
dependent area...may not exceed 7 percentof the total
number of such visas made availablethat scal year. In
2011, then, a total of 476,249 visas were issued, 195,285
of those to applicants from the Western Hemisphere.
Comparing these numbers with an estimated num-
ber of unauthorized entries each year reveals a shocking
gap between the supply and demand for immigrant visas.
In 2011, along the U.S.-Mexico border, alone, 327,577
people were apprehended for attempting to cross the
border without papers. Thats not including the majority
of undocumented migrants, who enter the country in
other ways, and its 167% of the number of visas allot-
ted in the Western Hemisphere (195,285) for the same
year. Clearly there exists a huge glut of
workers who are not able to obtain visas
through the existing process.
Trends in Enforcement
It is even more shocking to com-
pare the numbers of visas issued for
permanent residence with the number
of migrants who are deported each year.
In 2011, in which 476,249 visas were
granted, deportations totaled 396,906.6 The number is
a slight increase from the previous year, 2010, in which
392,826 people were removed from the country. It repre-
sents a 6% increase from the number deported in 2008,
President George W. Bushs last year in oce. Since 1990,
over four million people have been deported from the
country.
Subjects of deportation include both undocument-
ed people and legal permanent residents. Many people
are under the impression that legal permanent residents
are not vulnerable to deportation. In fact, legal perma-
nent residents convicted of an aggravated felony are
subject to mandatory deportation and other severe im-
migration consequences. Prior to 1996, those in danger
of deportation were entitled to a hearing in which their
criminal convictions would be balanced against an evalu-
ation of their social contributions and obligations within
the United Statesincluding the impact that deportation
would have on children (3). Many deportees have chil-
dren born or raised in the USbetween 1997 and 2007,
103,000 children were aected by the deportation of
their permanent resident parents (86% were U.S. citizens).
The number of children left behind by undocu-
mented immigrants who are deported is more dicult
to gauge. Undocumented immigrants are deportable
regardless of their criminal historyillegal immigration
is a civil, rather than criminal violation, and many deport-
ees are otherwise law-abiding citizens. President Obama
has publically emphasized prioritizing the deportation
of dangerous criminals over law-abiding members of
the community, but deportations continue to target
unassuming community members. In 2011after the
Presidents announcement45% of deportations were
people who had never been convicted of a felony or mis-
demeanor. The year prior, just over 50% of removals were
undocumented immigrants who had not been charged
with crimes.6 Even as ICE zeroes in on convicted crimi-
nals, nearly half of those deported are people without
legal infractions.
The price-tag for enforcing the deportation sys-
tem includes the costs of apprehension, detention, and
removal, as well as increasingly stringent border security.
The grand total for enforcement ends up costing the
federal government billions of dollars, amounting to $17.
9 billion for the 2012 scal year.vi Costs are increasing as
more emphasis is placed on securing
the borderthe cost of that enforce-
ment increased by 85% between 2005
and 2012.
Despite increasingly harsh
rhetoric, unauthorized entries have
steeply declined in recent years. Un-
documented immigration peaked be-
tween 2000 and 2007, between which
roughly 500,000 people entered the
country each year without papers. In 2009 and 2010, the
number dropped to roughly 300,000. Comparing these
rates of entry reveal the most eective factor in curbing
illegal migration: a suering U.S. economy.
Sustainable Reforms
Declining entries point to the futility of pouring
money into enforcement, which often amounts to de-
porting law-abiding people who play an important role
in certain industries. By spending unnecessary billions
attempting to resist global economic trends, we humor a
system that is fundamentally mismatched with economic
reality. Money spent on enforcement should be refocused
towards adapting the immigration system towards those
trends.
Increasing and reallocating visas to match demand
will result in fairer distribution and decreased undocu-
mented immigration. Rather than relying on xed caps,
reform eorts should increase or decrease the number of
visas available to be issued each year to match the num-
In 2011, along the U.S.-Mex-
ico border, alone, 327,577 people
were apprehended for attempting
to cross the border without pa-
pers... Clearly there exists a huge
glut of workers who are not able
to obtain visas through the exist-
ing process.
47
ber of qualied applicants. As is currently the case, each
qualied applicant should be placed in a category based
on employment or family relations. These categories
should be logically reorganized and re-prioritized.
The number of visas available for each category
of employment should uctuate with economic de-
mand, and the categories should be streamlined from
their current ve-tier preference system. Reform should
also eliminate the current restrictions on the number
of visas available to any one countrythe number of
employment-based visas allotted to each country should
be uid, relative to the demand for visas in that country.
Such a system takes into account the reality that im-
migrants from certain home countries predominate in
certain industries. Neither high nor low-wage workers
should be denied the opportunity to contribute to the
U.S. economy because many of their compatriots have
similar skills to oer.
In distributing employment-based visas, rst priority
should be reserved for the special immigrant category,
currently E4, that includes government and international
workers and religious leaders. Presumably, the limited
demand for these rst-preference visas will not severely
subtract from the number of visas available for the fol-
lowing categories, which are of greater demand. This
group could be referred to as P1, to avoid confusion with
current categories.
This group should be followed by a category of ex-
traordinary workers, advanced professionals and inves-
tors (workers who currently make up Groups E1, E2, and
E5). The number of visas available for this group, which
could be referred to as Group P2, should again uctuate
with demand. If an applicant can show that they have
secured a job or established a basis for investment, a visa
should be made available to them.
Third priority should go to a vastly expanded E3 cat-
egory (including professionals with a bachelors degree,
skilled workers, and unskilled workers). For this category,
which could be renamed P3, it is especially important
that allotment be tied to economic demand. The current
cap should be eliminated so as to ensure that supply
meets demand for low-wage workers, who are currently
the most likely to immigrate without papers. In fact, any
sustainable plan for immigration reform must make a far
greater number of visas available to those currently in the
E3 category. Certain industries draw low-wage immigrant
labor regardless of limits on the number of visas available
to them. A uid expansion of the E3 visa availability will
curb low-wage workers likelihood to come without pa-
pers, allowing the government to devote more resources
to processing and fewer resources to enforcement.
As these workers are less likely to secure a position
prior to their arrival in the country, they should be al-
lowed to begin the application process from their home
country, and then be granted a grace period in which
they can search for employment and complete the visa
application process. The venture should be self-nanced,
and would also be self-enforcing, as legal migrants are
not permitted to access federal benets for ve years af-
ter their arrival. A P3 worker could then complete the visa
application process by providing proof of employment.
An alternate path should allow them to complete the
visa process before arriving, as is the case with P1 and P2
categories. P3 workers should be granted the same status
as other legal permanent residents, and the same oppor-
tunity to apply for derivative family members.
A system that ties employment-based visa availabil-
ity to economic demand will discourage undocumented
migration, allowing the government to channel resources
currently devoted to enforcement to processing family-
based visas, as well. The number of family-based visas
made available should be decided based on a dynamic
cap, annually increased or decreased in relation to
changes in the number of applications.
Preference categories should be structured with an
eye to fairness and equity. Present categories prioritize
citizens relatives over legal permanent residents, with
little regard to closeness of relation, and are not sensitive
to family dynamics that should necessitate priority. Rela-
tives of citizens should receive priority over relatives of
legal permanent residents if they are of equal, but not fur-
ther, relation. For instance, the adult children of citizens
(currently rst preference) should not be given priority
over the spouses and minor children of legal permanent
residents (currently second preference).
A potential model would split rst preference
between three groups: F1A, for spouses (and derivative
relatives) and minor children of citizens, and F1B, for
spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents
(F1B applicants should receive lower priority than F1A
applicants, but higher priority than applicants from lower
preference categories). Same-sex spouses and partners in
civil unions should be included in these categories. A new
category, F1C, should include applicants with young
children who are U.S. citizensparents who lack legal
status and are currently in danger of deportation and
separation from their U.S. born children.
Second preference, Group F2A, should go to
certain relatives in special need of supportimmediate
family members dependent upon their family sponsor.
This category would include aged parents and specially
dependent siblings and adult children. Group F2A would
include relatives of citizens, and F2B for relatives of legal
permanent residents. Third preference should be re-
served for unmarried adult children not included in the
previous category. Again, such children of legal perma-
nent residents (F3B) should receive lower priority than
such children of citizens (F3A), but priority over appli-
cants from lower categories. Fourth preference should be
reserved for married adult children, and parents and sib-
48
lings not included in the previous categories. Applicants
whose children are citizens, legal permanent residents, or
DREAM-eligible should also t into this category. A nal
category, F5A and F5B, should include more distant rela-
tives.
Restructuring the current system of visa allocation
will curb undocumented immigration, curtail deporta-
tion and the unnecessary separation of families. Enforce-
ment should continue along the path of prioritizing
violent crimes over civil infractions. Likewise, non-serious
misdemeanors and other oenses should be taken into
consideration against the general backdrop of a persons
community contributions and commitments. If an other-
wise deportable immigrant has children whose lives are
grounded here, they should be given the opportunity to
apply for a visa. A childs well-being should be given the
utmost import in the process.
Structural inadequacies in the current immigration
system are self-defeating. The shortage of visas keeps
families apart and curtails the economic benets of an
active immigrant work force by encouraging undocu-
mented migration. Visa issuance should be restructured
in order to better address the real global forces behind
immigration, as well as the needs of families.
In 2011, the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) classied 1.42 million New Yorkers, about
17 percent of the citys population, as food insecure,
meaning these New Yorkers had experienced multiple
instances of disrupted eatingand reduced food intake.
Contrasting explanations for the statistic have been of-
fered. On one side, classical economists argue that eco-
nomic production naturally creates supply short falls that
prevent the entire population from receiving sucient
quantities of food. Data on economic production, how-
ever, contradicts this assertion. According to the United
States Department of Commerce, the economy produced
1.928 pounds of fruits and vegetables, 0.314 pounds of
red meat, 0.206 pounds of poultry, and 1.806 pounds of
dairy product for an American to consume daily in 2009.
This proves that short falls have historically been avoid-
able and that a short fall should not have occurred in
2011, assuming economic output remained somewhat
steady. On the other side, hunger advocates oer the
predominant view: an inability to access food.
3
Unfortu-
nately, food insecurity can be signicantly damaging to
individuals. When the food environment the area where
a person acquires and consumes food contains little
to no aordable and nutritious substances, residents are
more prone to purchasing cheap, unhealthy alternatives.
4

These patterns cause residents to become either under-
weight from the inability to purchase sucient quantities
or obese from consuming foods high in fat and choles-
terol.
5
An underweight person may suer from anemia
and nutrient deciencies; heart irregularities and blood
vessel diseases; and increased vulnerability to infection
and disease, each of which makes it more dicult for
the person to concentrate in educational and workplace
environments.
6
Conversely, an obese person may suer
from coronary heart disease, type 2 diabetes, liver and
gallbladder disease, and other illnesses, all which lead to
similar complications.
7
While many characterize New York as a unique
place in the country, it is not unique in terms of these
problems. Similar problems have arisen throughout the
country, prompting many geographers, epidemiologists,
political scientists, and ocials from the USDA and vari-
ous municipalities to study the issue. The majority of the
papers published by these groups begin with a proposal
for a method of measuring access. The methods focus
on measuring either the distance between homes and
the nearest stores selling food or the density of these
stores in a chosen area.
8
When the distance between
the homes and stores is less than, or when the density
of stores in the area reaches, a certain number, these
methods label such areas high access.
9
But when the
distance is greater than, or when the density is less than
another number, they label them low access.
10
(Each
method implements Geographic Information Systems
(GIS), a software that enables spatial and thematic data
to be organized, managed, and combined and results to
be represented and analyzed according to geographic
location.)
11
Researchers then develop policies to improve
access based on the ndings produced by these meth-
ods. Researchers, however, have not taken the time to
standardize their techniques. In the following pages, I will
review and critique their methods to pinpoint an optimal
method(s). My intention is to consolidate the techniques
that researchers use when measuring access and to pro-
pose a new policy for improving access.
Part I: Distance
Euclidean Distance
Part I: Distance
Euclidean Distance
MEASURING ACCESS TO FOOD
Daniel Gonzalez


49
Euclidean distance is the straight distance between
two locations.
12
A researcher who implements this
technique in GIS chooses two locations and calculates
the distance needed to travel from one to another in a
straight line. The method assumes terrain is completely
at. Terrains, however, are never at, and people rarely
travel from one location to another linearly. When us-
ing distance as a metric to measure access, it is intuitive
that the metric should represent distance as traveled by
a person, not as traveled by an entity that can traverse
geographical obstacles. Euclidean distance is awed for
these reasons.
Manhattan Distance
A researcher who implements Manhattan distance
in GIS chooses two locations and calculates the distance
needed to travel from one to another when traveling only
along axes at right angles.
13
(The technique was origi-
nally used to measure distances when traveling along
rectangular blocks in Manhattan.) Because this method
oers a more sophisticated conception of distance than
the Euclidean method, it is an improvement over its pre-
decessor. However, Manhattan distance measures access
adequately only on rectangular terrains, meaning a dier-
ent technique is needed in non-rectangular terrains.
Network Distance

A researcher who implements this technique in
GIS chooses two locations and calculates the distance
needed to travel from one to another along a network.
Networks represent transportation routes constructed by
a set of nodes (or vertices) and a set of arcs (or edges or
links) that connect the nodes.
14
Some arcs are restricted,
meaning it is permissible to move in only one direction
(e.g., one-way streets), while other arcs are not restricted,
meaning it is permissible to move in both directions
(e.g., two-way streets). To compute network distance, the
distance between each connected node and then the dis-
tance between two points when passing through every
possible combination of nodes is found; comparing the
combinations gives the shortest route the network dis-
tance. This value is preferable to the distances obtained
from Euclidean and Manhattan distance because it is the
distance a person actually traverses to reach a store rather
than the direct distance between a person and store or
the distance between a person and store when traveling
only in right angles.
Part II: Density
Circular Buer

A circular buer is a circular polygon created around
a given location and elongated to a specied distance.
15
A
researcher who implements this technique in GIS creates
a circular polygon, sums the points within the polygon,
and divides this sum by the area of the polygon. The tech-
nique weighs each store within its area equally, implying
it considers a person to have equal access to each store.
A store, however, can be less accessible the farther away
from an individual. When using density as a metric for
measuring access, it is intuitive that a less accessible store
should not count equally towards the density as a more
accessible store. Circular buer is awed for this reason.













50
Network Buer

Rather than create a circular polygon, a researcher
who implements network buer creates a polygon
over the network. Then the stores within the polygon
are summed and divided by the area of the polygon.
16

Because network buer includes in its calculations
only stores on its path, a proxy for stores accessible to
a person, it is better than circular buer. However, the
technique also weighs each store within its area equally,
falling into the same problem as circular buer.
Kernel Density Estimation

Kernel density estimation solves the problem ap-
parent in both circular and network buer. In this esti-
mation, a researcher creates a circular buer, gives each
store within the area a weighted value depending on
its location relative to the center of the polygon, sums
these weighted values, and divides the sum by the area
of the polygon. The values are greatest when they are in
the [center of the polygon] and diminish as they move
away from the center, reaching zero at the search radius
distance from the center.
17
Unlike circular and network
buer, kernel density estimation dierentiates between
stores based on their distance from a chosen location
and therefore accounts for dierences in accessibility
between stores.
Conclusion
From this overview, it is apparent that Euclidean
and Manhattan distance and Circular and Network buer
are awed. The rst two conceptualize distance without
considering that a person can travel only along certain
routes, and the second two assume all stores are equally
accessible. Fortunately, there are adequate methods.
Network distance measures the distance a person travels
along transportation routes, the most likely paths a per-
son would traverse to a store selling food. Kernel density
estimation weighs each store in an area depending on its
distance from a chosen location and then calculates den-
sity based on these weighed values, meaning the method
considers dierences in accessibility between stores.
This paper contends that future studies of access
should implement only network distance or kernel den-
sity estimation to measure access. This is an important
point today as the United States Congress considers a
new Farm Bill. The Farm Bill is the United States gov-
ernments primary agricultural and food policy tool. It
is a comprehensive piece of legislation that is renewed
every ve years or so. [It] was created in 1933 as part
of President Franklin D. Roosevelts Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act.The Farm Bill has since expanded to include
many dierent categories, or titles. The last bill to be
authorized, in 2008, had 15 titles, including nutrition
(food stamps), crop subsidies, conservation, livestock,
crop insurance and disaster assistance. The 2008 Farm Bill
approved $300 billion in spending. Of that amount, 67
percent was spent on food stamps; 15 percent on agricul-
tural subsidies; 9 percent on conservation; and 8 percent
on crop insurance.
18
The Farm Bill is then an important
tool in improving access as it allocates billions of dollars
to the cause. However, it does not allocate these funds
properly. Funding for the Farm Bill is based on data from
the USDAs Economic Research Service (ERS), a federal
organization that annually quanties the number of
people who suer from poor access. While the agency is
advanced in many research techniques, it still uses the
Euclidean method to determine accessibility. Consider-
ing the problems with this method, this paper suggests
that the ERC adopt network distance or kernel density
estimation to measure access. Funds for the farm bill can
be allocated more correctly once new data is available a
perfect example for future studies.










51
Ever wandered the streets of New York City when
the blur of shop lights is just dimming? Its at that lull
near closing time, when the busy cafes are nally being
relieved of the copious tourists and busy New Yorkers
that frequent it by day. Unfortunately, one thing that has
not been relieved is the shelf holding the baked goods. In
fact, if you walk by a bakery or any store that sells baked
goods at the closing time of 10 or 11 PM, chances are you
will spot the employees dutifully (dare I say begrudg-
ingly?) shuing the baked goods away into a large plastic
bag. Upon further observation, you might notice that this
plastic bag is actually going into the trash, where entire
shelves of sliced bread, donuts, muns, and other baked
goods are going to end up in- A dead weight consumer
and producer loss. A curious spectator might approach
the person at the counter and inquire for more informa-
tion, while the confronted might mumble something
about state laws and regulations. We have to throw them
away, theyll tell you.
And so they do. There are many reasons for such
an oversight, as health and sanitary issues, quality con-
cerns and image marketing are among the rst to come
to mind. The baked goods in question may not keep to
the next day (though most do), and even if they do, they
would have to be sold as discounted goods that are not
quite as fresh, which may tarnish the businesss reputa-
tion in terms of quality. Then there exists the aforemen-
tioned notion that there are regulations that declare the
overnight redistribution of food to be unsanitary. This is
true, to an extent. It such cases, it depends on the type
of the food in question, and upon a fruitless search, this
writer has not found any concrete law or regulation that
states explicitly that baked goods need be discarded
upon the starting day of sale. It then has come to our at-
tention that perhaps we are being a little too wasteful in
our rush to be out with day-old bread.
It is true that there are health concerns that legiti-
mize such waste, as everyone knows that the mun you
left at night is instantaneously inedible the second day.
New York State Law has one of the more comprehensive
and minutely dened regulations on Agriculture and
Markets, yet while most categories of food are addressed
by the NYSL, baked goods does not seem to have its own
regulation code. This gives great leniency to the retailing
party, and businesses, in a real world where people do
not always act rationally, tend to make overestimations
of how much supply is demanded from your avid bread
consumers.
From the retailers point of view, it is understandable
why such waste may come into procedural being. It has
always been in the interest of businesses to maintain a
certain freshness with produce. This manifestation of
vanity is most prevalent in the fresh produce sector,
especially with vegetables and fruits, where the astute
buyer might pick and prod around for the daintiest, most
spiy-looking apple that appeals to the eye. Because of
such a tendency, grocery store owners tend to want to
throw out the old, rotten looking produce when the day
is done to ensure that the shelves are a cornucopia of ra-
diant fruit and vegetables plucked from life seconds ago!
Certainly, this concern translates to the retailers world of
baked goods, and a specic sort of baked good sellers as
well. While bakeries do make up a majority of the wasted
pastries and grain-goods, they have also considered more
thoroughly their choices in dealing with day-two breads.
Some resort to discounted two-day-old bread, though
this is often perceived to have the stigma of discounting
their brand as well. Others have worked more proactively,
aligning themselves with charities, shelters, soup kitchens
and other non-prot organizations to make use of those
overstocked goods from the pantry. One such exem-
plary model is Panera Bread, a bakery based in Chicago
that has started its own campaign, aptly titled Day-End
Dough-Nation. On its website, it pledges that At the
end of each day, Panera Bread donates all unsold bread
and baked goods to local area hunger relief agencies
and charities. Collectively, Panera bakery-cafes donated
a retail value of approximately $100 million worth of un-
sold bread and baked goods in 2010 to help neighbors in
need. Many of these organizations are served by Feeding
America, formerly Americas Second Harvest, the nations
largest domestic hunger-relief organization.
Meanwhile, an often overlooked sector of the baked
goods retailing crowd are the many coee stores and
dessert stores that do not specialize in baked goods but
sell them anyways as compliments of their own goods.
These stores are the ones that most often do not seek
to utilize their baked goods wastage, as such goods are
considered to be in the sidecar of their main merchandise
in the race to riches. This writer has often walked past
many a Cold Stone or Starbucks, to see employees daftly
swiping the baked goods away into the trash. Its a true
pity, and consumers across the nation have noticed as
well. On Chowhound, an online forum, one user wrote: In
Manhattan, NY my local DAgostino supermarket puts out
bruised fruits and vegies in a plastic bag and I can see the
homeless and an assortment of people picking through
the bags. I guess its easier to do that than to try to sell
imperfect bruised fruit/vegies. When Ive bought them,
it wasnt worth the money because I had to throw half
the food away. Also, the stores have to be careful about
not selling food past its expiration date. And there it is:
the two main methods of redistribution of baked goods
degraded by time Discounted goods and donation.
In the laissez-faire state of market that we currently
reside in, it is up to the small business to decide which
Ying Chang
GET YOUR DAYOLD BAKED GOODS HERE
52
method of saving they would like to adopt. However, this
doesnt mean that the government should not interfere.
The government should work on nding ways to make
participating in such charitable or sustainable acts more
attractive. One restriction we should consider when push-
ing forward pro-sustainability policies is that the amount
of compensation the federal government provides does
not exceed the potential prot to be owned had food been
consumed in its ideal state. The idea is to make sure that
the revenue garnered from discounted or donated food is
less than the cost of wasted food plus the opportunity cost
of resources used on production and distribution of said
wasted food.
Golden rule in mind, o to policy planning we go.
Ever promoting the altruistic road of social wealth adjust-
ment, the government should disclose more liabilities and
propose tax deductions in order to encourage businesses
to donate their food. In terms of protecting businesses
from the fear of liabilities, the NY State Legislation has
already made eorts towards this goal, as it states in Article
4-D of Agriculture and Markets that Not withstanding any
other provision of law, a good-faith donor of any canned or
perishable food, farm product, game or wild game, appar-
ently t for human consumption, to a bona de charitable
or nonprot organization, for free distribution, shall not be
subject to criminal penalty or civil damages arising from
the condition of the food. Here the government is actually
beckoning social welfare organizations to step forward,
and some have, as previously mentioned.
This is a complicated process with many steps and
decisions to be made, such as the nature of the charities
that redistributed the day-old food. Should an overarching
charity organization be set up to ensure the speedy deliv-
ery of day-old goods, or should it instead be composed of
a ragtag system of volunteers who send the food directly
to the soup kitchens and shelters nearby? Should stations
be set up for this purpose? These are all questions that the
government and the business must decide together.
Sure, a little bread lost now and then doesnt seem
like much, but its accumulated amount can be alarmingly
proigate. The problem seems to involve many stages
though, ranging from transportation issues to redistribu-
tion quandaries. One approach to take is the attitudinal
reconstruction route, where we aim to solve this problem
from the ultimate source of all things basic: the human
perception. One may say that it is lacking in instantaneous
eectiveness and leans limply towards soft culture, but
this is actually not so. Changes in attitudes are actually ex-
tremely important and can be reinforced in many ways that
will help solve the problem both immediately and in the
long term. This can be implemented by nding a group of
laborers who would be willing to solve the delivery prob-
lem to ensure that the baked goods on the counter of
that store on the street corner can be eciently delivered
to corresponding organizations responsible for further
distribution. Finding such a group may be costly, and so
far the most cost reducing option this writer can foresee
is to engage high school students in the problem-solving
process under the name of community service where else
might one nd concentrated numbers of willing beings
eager to work without pay?
I propose that we construct a state-recognized
organization grounded in an alliance between a food
redistribution agency and a student achievement organiza-
tion. For the city of New York, organizations such as Food
Bank would be a top pick, as would the National Honor
Society for student achievement. Such sponsorships by
well-known organizations would do much in appealing to
students.
One of the merits of this approach is that it would be
simultaneously working towards solving both the short-
term and long-term problem. In the short run, the redistri-
bution issue will be taken care of with minimal xed cost
investment setting up the framework for an entire work-
force catering to our day-old baked goods needs would
be both costly and unrealistic, so the option of high school
students glimmers in comparison here, while in the long
run such community involvement would educate stu-
dents of the aws of the market and some actual real word
ways to solve it. There are a lot of implicit long term social
benets, as students grow to be adults who are aware
of the amount of food waste that goes on in businesses,
and would hopefully foster sense of social responsibility
and charity. Additionally, this is a model that would work
particularly well in NYC, as the density would make trans-
portation between stores and soup kitchens much easier,
though it should still be fully functioning outside of the city
as well.
The solution above seems like a plausible approach to
the problem of day-old baked goods, but I do believe that
multiple forces would work best in this case the trouble
here is that even in competitive markets an over-estimation
of supply is extremely hard to avoid, as there will always
be some real world friction that does not quite match the
neatly drawn equilibrium supply-demand graphs. As one
employee at pizza joint Fagmilia said to this writer, Some-
times we make a little more than we can sell. Its dicult
to predict the precise amount of how sales go each day,
and by the time we are closing up, whats left here on the
counter must go. Its a business choice we make to guaran-
tee only the freshest. Alas, it seems that the only solution is
an ex post solution, and x up policies should be plentiful
to say the least. Supplementary and alternatives abound,
as we examine the long list of remedial actions: discounted
day-old food (with the preliminary requisite that the prot
garnered from discounted food is less than the sum of the
cost of wasted food and the opportunity cost of resources
used on production and redistribution of said wasted
food), packaged food, knocked down food delivery ser-
vices, etc.
53
HEALTHCARE
54
REFORMING DRUG POLICY: ALTERNATIVE
TO THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA
Lauren Tomasulo
Marijuana education should be approached
from a similar approach as alcohol. We teach people
how to engage in behavior related to alcohol that
minimizes harm and enhances safety. This is the sort of
realistic education that should be used in parallel with
decriminalization laws. Marijuana legalization would
not allow the government to manage the supply of
marijuana, yet decriminalization allows for better public
education and fewer unnecessary arrests that ruin the
lives of many people.
The most eective drug policy would be the
decriminalization of marijuana. Under decriminalization,
the sales of all illicit drugs remain criminal oenses.
However, as drug research expert and professor, Carl
Hart at Columbia University, explains, decriminalization
still sends the message that society is still concerned
about drug use.
1
As a result, there will be infractions for
engaging in that behavior.
The war on drugs is not only costly, but also leads
to many arrests that can be considered unwarranted and
unnecessary. Drug related arrests allow the government
to infringe upon the civil liberties of those convicted.
Public housing, voting, are just some of the public
privileges that are revoked upon a drug-related arrest
and felony label. Furthermore, the United States has 5%
of the worlds population and 25% of the its criminals.
2

47.5% of all drug-arrests are marijuana-related.
3
The
billions of dollars poured into the drug war would benet
society if we instead channeled those funds towards
education about drugs and better infrastructure, schools,
and so forth.
Marijuana decriminalization saves an extraordinary
amount of money. A 2009 report by the Capitols Oce
of Fiscal Analysis explained that decriminalization could
save the state [of Connecticut] up to $11 million and
generate $320,000 annually in revenue from nes.
4

Furthermore, converting possession into an infraction
eliminates the requirement for the state to appoint
a public defender for defendants who cannot aord
counsel.
5
Thus, money is not only saved, but revenue
is also generated through the decriminalization of
Marijuana.
In New York, marijuana has been decriminalized
since 1977. Possession of small amounts of marijuana
has been a civil violation (a misdemeanor). It is thus a
misdemeanor to smoke or possess marijuana in public.
This has lead to issues with enforcement, as about 50% of
those arrested in New York City for marijuana are African-
American.
6
Furthermore, police intimidation remains
an issue, leading to many arrests even though
decriminalization occurred over three decades ago.
As Alfredo Carrasquillo, a community organizer with
VOCAL-NY, told The Daily Chronic, Mayor Bloomberg
now recognizes that we cannot aord to criminalize
youth of color for carrying small amounts of
marijuana.
7
As of January 1, 2011, Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger signed into law that in California
there will be no arrest, no court appearance, and no
criminal record for those who possess less than an
ounce of marijuana.
8
Prominent politicians have voiced their opinions
on this controversial and complex issue. Rand Paul,
who is a self-described Libertarian Conservative,
supports decriminalization instead of legalization,
since the latter may instead encourage people to do
drugs.
9
President Barack Obama voiced his opposition
to both legalization and decriminalization of drugs,
although he has supported the decriminalization
of marijuana in the past at a debate in 2004 at
Northwestern University: The war on drugs has been
an utter failure. We need to rethink and decriminalize
our marijuana laws. We need to rethink how were
operating the drug war.
10
As even President Obama himself highlighted
in 2004, the war on drugs has failed to achieve its
aims of producing a drug-free America. It has not
eectively reduced drug use in America. There are still
2.5 million people who use drugs for the rst time each
year and this has been fairly constant throughout. This
is demonstrated through the National Survey on Drug
Use and Health (NSDUH). In 1980, there were 3 million
new marijuana users and in 2011, there were 2.6
million new marijuana users.
11
The billions of dollars
spent per year does not justify this slight decrease that
could even be attributed to other factors. Drug use
peaked in the 1970s and then started to decrease and
has remained relatively stable despite all the money
spent. In fact, drug use was already declining once the
war on drugs was initiated.
Portugal has already decriminalized all drugs.
There are no criminal penalties associated for
use, possession, or acquisition for all illicit drugs
for quantities up to a 10 day supply (a somewhat
subjective quantity that is determined based on
the persons use).
12
The accused meet with a board
called the Commission for the Dissuasion of Drug
Addiction consisting of a social worker, physician, and
psychologist who then determine if he or she should
be recommended treatment and/or ned.
13
Since
incarceration is more expensive than treatment and
the state gets funds from nes, this policy generates
money.
14
A report funded by the Cato Institute found
55
that illegal drug use by teenagers in Portugal had
decreased since the enactment of decriminalization of
the possession of drugs.
15
It also found that the rates
of HIV infections caused by contaminated needles had
decreased, while the rates of those seeking treatment for
drug dependence increased. The result was that drug-
induced deaths decreased and drug use rates similar, or
slightly better, than other European countries. America
has one of the highest rates of cocaine and marijuana use
in the world, which suggests that the stringent policies
that accompany the war on drugs is not the most
eective method for decreasing drug use and promoting
the safety of society.
Many detractors of decriminalization argue that
such policies will actually increase the rate of drug
use among the population. However, as evidenced
by Portugal, it is clear that the rate of drug use did not
increase at all. Although there may be some debate
about whether the decline in drug-use can be attributed
to the policies or to the natural cyclic pattern of drug
use increasing and decreasing, it is certainly untrue that
decriminalization in Portugal caused more people to use
drugs, or that it caused people to use drugs in greater
quantities. Instead of labeling drug users as criminals,
Portugal has taken a more pre-emptive approach and
labeled them as those aicted with a disease (similar
to the approach Alcohol Anonymous takes towards
alcoholism).
20
This approach treats drug use as a public
health issue rather than a legal issue that is resolved
through punishment. Essentially, decriminalization is a
far more humane, cheaper, and eective method than a
rigid, detrimental philosophy of criminalization.
Harm reduction can be enabled through a realistic
education. Humans have always and will continue to use
psychoactive compounds to alter their consciousness.
Instead of trying to reduce the demand of drugs with
the war on drugs propaganda, we should instead teach
people to live in a world that necessarily includes these
psychoactive compounds.
21
It is statistically infrequent
to die from a heroin overdose alone, where the only drug
ingested is heroin. The cause of death is often heroin in
combination with sedatives (usually alcohol), as shown by
the 2010 Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Mortality
Data 13,000 out of the 17,000 deaths from all opioids due
to drug combinations.
22
Thus, it is imperative that we
teach people not to consume alcohol while using heroin.
This is not currently being taught because of the drug
atmosphere.
Because of the emphasis on the criminalization and
harmful eects of drugs, the prevailing attitude is one
that is not consistent with facilitating the public health of
our society. Politicians have been adverse to increasing
the availability of naloxone, an opioids antagonist that
blocks the mu receptor and thus reverses the fatal
respiratory depression caused by an opioid (such as
heroin). By increasing the availability of naloxone, the
prevalent view is that it will convey to society that opioid
(or specically, heroin) use is acceptable.
23
It is simply
horrendous that people are unnecessarily dying from
overdoses because the antidote is not widely available.
The drug war has interfered with our ability to protect our
citizens.
There are multiple alternatives to ensure societys
safety other than legalization. By focusing on
decriminalization, drug education, and the way we
enforce these policies, we can eliminate the racist eects
of such policies while protecting the publics safety. By
changing drug policy without legalization, we can ensure
that the way we police these issues and better drug
education that focuses on reducing harm associated with
drugs rather than the unrealistic, erroneous perspective
about drugs in terms of how evil they are.
24
56
It is no surprise that obesity is widespread in the
United States. In 2009-2010, 35.7% of adults and 16.9%
of children in the United States were obese. Obesity is a
national problem because it is associated with medical
conditions such as heart disease, stroke, type 2 diabetes,
and certain types of cancer. Obesity costs the United
States $190 billion annually in medical expenditures,
which means that obesity related health issues put a
great strain on government programs such as Medicare.
In recent years, the government has taken policy initia-
tives to treat current obese cases and prevent new ones
from occurring. Since junk food is a signicant contribut-
ing factor to obesity, it is important to assess the avail-
ability of fresh fruits and vegetables compared to the
availability of junk food. If we want to combat obesity,
the playing eld must be level between fresh produce
and processed foods in regards to price and conve-
nience. For this reason, I propose two solutions. The
federal government should increase subsidies to fresh
produce industries. State and local governments should
sponsor healthy cooking classes with food included.
Because of its convenience and low price, more
junk food and less fresh produce are more likely to be
consumed in low income areas compared to their higher
income counterparts. Unsurprisingly, the obesity rates of
low income communities are much higher than obesity
rates in wealthier communities. However, it is impossible
to change current eating habits in low income neighbor-
hoods unless fresh produce is a more attractive option
than junk food in terms of price and convenience. Cur-
rently, in New York City, a packet of six individual snack
bags of Lays chips costs $2.49, whereas four Gala apples
cost $4.99 , twice the price for two-thirds the amount of
food. Simply put, families that are struggling to make
ends meet are more likely to choose the less healthy
option if it is cheaper in the short term. However, in the
long term, if the unhealthy options are frequently eaten,
dire health consequences can result. If these unhealthy
choices are made by the collective United States popula-
tion, it will eventually lead to a bigger burden on Medi-
care.
Fast food and junk food are cheaper than fresh pro-
duce partly due to the large subsidies that the U.S. gov-
ernment grants farmers. These subsidies curb the price of
many ingredients used in fast food, such as corn. Unfor-
tunately, subsidies are much larger for ingredients used
in fast food than subsidies granted for fresh produce. In
2011, $4.5 billion was granted in corn subsidies alone. In
addition to corn subsidies, the government signicantly
subsidizes animal feed, sugar, fats, hormones, and antibi-
otics which benets the fast food industry. Although it is
dicult to determine the exact amount granted in sub-
sidies to fresh produce because the subsidies are spread
out among dierent produce industries, it is safe to say
that fresh produce farms receive signicantly less subsi-
dies than crops associated with the fast food industry.
Agricultural subsidies are signicant because they
directly aect the price of consumer goods. Fast food
prices are articially low in the United States: the cost of
a typical fast food meal would triple without the various
subsidies granted to crops used in fast food. Because of
the disparity of subsidies associated with fast food versus
fresh produce subsidies, the price of fresh produce is
signicantly higher to the consumer compared to the
price of junk food across the U.S., from Supermarkets to
restaurants.
In order to make healthy food competitive, fresh
produce must be cheaper to the consumer. People can-
not be expected to eat healthier if the price of healthier
options is not competitive. However, decreasing corn
subsidies has been a controversial issue in recent years
and not much progress has been made. It is doubtful
that any signicant legislation will be passed in the 113th
Congress to reduce subsidies to crops associated with
the fast food industry due to both internal political pres-
sure and external pressure from interest groups. Cutting
subsidies associated with the fast food industry is not a
realistic option in the short term. Therefore, instead of
focusing on decreasing corn subsidies, we should focus
our eorts on increasing government subsidies for fresh
produce and other crops that promote a healthy diet. Al-
though in past years, more subsidies have been granted
to fresh produce industries, not nearly enough have
been granted to make the price of fruits and vegetables
competitive with junk food. In order to successfully
promote healthy choices, the price of six apples should
equal the price of six individual serving bags of potato
chips.
One possible argument against granting subsidies
to the fresh produce industry is the high cost of the
program. Although a large subsidy program would be
expensive, I believe that it is an investment for the long
term. If healthy options are competitively priced against
junk food, people would have more of an incentive to
eat healthier. Therefore, obesity rates will decrease and
we will have less disease associated with obesity, which
will ultimately drive down healthcare costs. Thus, in the
long term, fresh produce subsidies may actually save the
government money because of the money saved from
healthcare.
However, merely decreasing the price of healthier
alternatives may not go far enough to yield the optimal
results. Part of the reason for fast foods popularity is
AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
AND COOKING CLASSES: THE SOLUTION
TO THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC?
Allison Schlissel
57
because it is perceived as more convenient than healthy
food. Especially in low income areas, people often work
long hours and do not necessarily have the time to pre-
pare meals for themselves or their families. Even though
convenient healthy alternatives do exist, many people
do not know how to choose healthy options or prepare
healthy meals.
For the reasons above, I believe that education is
imperative to combating the obesity epidemic. Although
there have been remarkable achievements in childrens
education to combat obesity, adult education is often
overlooked. However, adult education is very important
because adults typically prepare and provide food for
children and teach them eating habits. Therefore, in ad-
dition to competitively priced healthy food, adult educa-
tion classes should be available to teach people what
are healthy food alternatives and how to prepare them.
These cooking classes may have the potential to further
level the playing eld between fast food and healthy
food by teaching that healthy food can be convenient,
too. These classes could be federally funded by grants to
the states, and the states and local governments in turn
can decide the best way to teach classes that promote
the federal objectives.
Unfortunately, adult education is more dicult
to promote simply because most adults do not attend
school anymore. Further, if people do not think that they
have the time to prepare healthy meals, they certainly
will not have the time to attend classes. However, people
may attend the classes if the incentive is high enough,
for example, providing food for the participants. One
particular national private program that has been very
eective and successful is Cooking Matters. Cooking
Matters oers nutrition education and cooking classes
targeted at low income populations. The classes meet
two hours a week for six weeks, and participants are
given ingredients and recipes to take home. The program
has eectively improved eating habits, for example, 69%
of Cooking Matters for Adults graduates report that they
eat more vegetables. The fact that there is interest for
adult nutrition programs and that they are eective sug-
gests that they can be implemented on a wider scale, for
the current Cooking Matters program is relatively small
compared to the country.
Promoting healthy food is an eective strategy be-
cause it treats current obesity cases and serves as obesity
prevention. We cannot combat obesity unless healthy
food is on the same playing eld as junk food, which
means that more subsidies should be given to promote
fresh produce. Once healthy food has become more
available and a realistic option, people need to learn
how to make healthy choices and about convenient
healthy alternatives, thus nutrition and cooking classes
are necessary programs to ght obesity. In the long term,
this policy can lower healthcare costs by treating and
preventing obesity.
ADDRESSING MEDICARE SOLVENCY
THROUGH MARKET SOLUTIONS
Noah Zinsmeister
Background
Shortly after 3:00 on a Friday afternoon in 1965,
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed H.R. 6675, more
commonly know as Medicare, into law. At the ceremony,
President Johnson credited Harry S. Truman for plant-
ing the seeds of compassion and duty
1
which would
eventually grow and ourish into a social insurance
program for the elderly in America. President Johnson
deemed such a program vitally necessary to the interest
of the country: at the time over 18 million elderly Ameri-
cans were threatened by illness and medical expenses
2

which many of them could ill-aord. Medicare would
allow every citizen [to] be able, in his productive years
when he is earning, to insure himself against the ravages
of illness in his old age.
2
Today, Medicare provides a wide
array of government-subsidized medical insurance to
seniors aged 65 years and older, and people with disabili-
ties. The program is almost exclusively nanced through
a 2.9% payroll tax split between employers and employ-
ees, as well as by premiums paid by individuals receiving
benets.
Since its genesis, Medicare has gone through sev-
eral legislative revisions, and now consists in parts A, B,
C, and D. Part A, Hospital Insurance, provides for inpa-
tient care and includes payments to hospitals, hospice
care facilities, and the like. Part B, Medical Insurance,
covers outpatient services, providing direct subsidies to
physicians for services rendered, such as x-rays, chemo-
therapy, blood transfusions, and vaccinations. Part C,
also know as Medicare Advantage, is a type of Medicare
health plan oered by a private company that contracts
with Medicare to provide...Part A and Part B benets.
3

Part D, created with bipartisan support in 2003 under
President Bush, subsidizes the costs of prescription drugs
for Medicare recipients.
Burning Money
The programs enrollment has expanded wildly from
its original 18 million. According to the 2010 census, 47.5
million individuals, 7.9 million of whom are disabled,
are now covered by Medicare. This number is projected
to increase dramatically as baby boomers age, and the
imminent glut of retirees poses problems for Medicares
nancial solvency. For a sense of scale, one out of every
ve dollars spent on health services in 2008 was nanced
through Medicare. The Congressional Budget Oce also
notes that health care spending per person has grown
58
faster than the nation's economic output per person by
about 1.5 percentage points per year, on average, for
the past few decades.
4
More retirees and sky-rocketing
health costs pose dire threats to Medicares future which
necessitate action from our lawmakers.
Currently, government expenditures on Medicare
exceed the revenue it generates. In other words, more
money ows out of the system than comes in. Douglas
Holtz-Eakin and Jim Nussle comment in the conservative
publication National Review that since its creation in
1965 the program has run cash decits every year except
1966 and 1974.
5
This trend will likely continue; Medicare
expenditures amounted to 3.6% of GDP in 2010, and
are projected by the CBO to rise to 4.2% by 2020, and a
whopping 8.6% by 2050.
To compound the problem of perpetual decits, the
fund on which the government currently relies on to sup-
port Medicare is running out. The CBO stated in 2011 that
the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund is projected to become
exhausted in 2020.
6
The HI Fund is replenished primarily
by the 2.9% payroll tax, as well as in small part by income
taxes paid on Social Security benets, interest returned
on trust fund investments, and Part A premiums. In seven
years, this fund will be empty, and in order to continue
providing coverage, the government will have very few
options: legislators will have to raid Treasury funds, cut
benet or reimbursement levels, or levy crippling taxes,
all economically and politically damning prospects.
The urgency of Medicares current state has prompt-
ed an overhaul, embodied within the Patient Protection
and Aordable Care Act, popularly known as Obamacare.
Recognizing the vast budget shortfalls in the system,
the ACA increased the Medicare payroll tax to 3.8%
from 2.9% for wages in excess of $200,000 for individu-
als and $250,000 for couples. Disregarding the negative
economic eects typically associated with higher taxes,
the increased burden on this income group functions as
a stopgap to sustain the systembut only temporarily.
Despite the tax increase, the ACA maintained the systems
general structure, only perpetuating its aws.
Subtitle E of the ACA famously creates an Indepen-
dent Payment Advisory Board to develop and submit
detailed proposals to reduce the per capita rate of growth
in Medicare.
7
Peter Orszag, former Oce of Management
and Budget Director under President Obama, has called
the IPAB the single biggest yielding of power to an inde-
pendent entity since the creation of the Federal Reserve.
8

But according to non-prot think tank the Kaiser Family
Foundation, this panel of 15 bureaucrats is prohibited
from submitting proposals that would ration care, in-
crease revenues or change benets, eligibility or Medi-
care beneciary cost sharing.
9
As a result of its mandate
as well as these limitations, the Board could potentially
pressure hospital and patients to accept lower
reimbursement rates.
Limits in Care
In 2012, the Department of the Actuary for the De-
partment of Health and Human Services wrote that for
inpatient hospital services, Medicare payment rates in
2009 were about 67 percent...of private health insurance
payment rates.
10
This means that the government pays
hospitals and care facilities two thirds the market price
for the exact same procedures. These institutions cannot
continue to accept grossly inadequate reimbursements
for services rendered; the continuation of this practice
will inevitably drive up prices for private insurance hold-
ers as hospitals struggle to stay in the black. This policy
would also result in an articial ination of the price
of medical procedures, which will further distort price
signals, making it much harder for healthcare consumers,
both those supported by Medicare and by private plans,
to make intelligent decisions about their care.
The same Actuary report also points out that by
2030, roughly one quarter of all current hospitals, skilled
nursing facilities, and home health agencies
10
will be
forced to stop oering coverage for Medicare patients.
Seniors will see a radical reduction in their care choices,
and could have to endure longer travel and waiting times,
as well as the possibility of limited service by overworked
organizations. Congress must soon choose between
accepting this possibility, or increasing reimbursement
rates, which would further exacerbate Medicares thorny
scal situation. With such a bleak portrait of the status
quo, many may be asking, Where can we go from here?
Although the current situation is dire, several hopeful
alternatives exist.
Moving Forward
One of simplest xes, at least for future Medicare re-
cipients, would be to establish personal Medicare saving
accounts for enrollees. Under this system, Medicare taxes
collected throughout ones career would accrue in an ac-
count to be used for the exigencies of old age, rather than
for redistribution to current retirees. This change would
increase accountability in the system, forcing the govern-
ment to be transparent in their handling of medical ac-
counts, while simultaneously providing a strong incentive
for workers to be productive throughout their lives, as
they will be able to observe an increasingly rm personal
safety net which they themselves have built. Such a
private savings plan also would end the redistribution of
wealth from current workers to retirees. Medicare today
functions as an engine of redistribution, not as a social
insurance program, the dierence being that the former
has led to the programs current insolvency, and the latter
would expand the freedom that individuals have to ac-
crue and spend their earnings in ways they see t.
59
AN URGENT WAKE UP CALL: A STUDY
OF CELL PHONES IN HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Emily Corning
However, this policy would only benet future
recipients of Medicare. For those who currently rely on
Medicare, Congress could deate the articially high cost
of care by increasing market options for health care, and
competition between those options. Such a proposal
could look to Part D, the prescription drug portion of
Medicare, as a model. Rather than creating a centralized
subsidy package for a range of drugs, part D outsources
coverage to private companies, allowing seniors to
choose from a range of options at varying prices. The
Galen Institute, a non-prot research organization, writes
in a report that private drug plans have an incentive to
provide the greatest choice at the lowest price to attract
the greatest number of participants.
11
This claim is borne
out by a 2011 report from the Journal of the American
Medical Association, which estimated that Part D drug
coverage saves Medicare about $1,200 per beneciary an-
nually in lower hospital, nursing home and other medical
costs.
12
By subjecting healthcare to market forces, prices
would be driven down by competitiondramatically so.
If such a model were applied to the entirety of
Medicare, it could radically decrease prices while elimi-
nating complicated bureaucracy and mitigating tension
between government and healthcare providers. In fact,
many individuals and entities have already put forth such
proposals, known as premium support plans. Essentially,
the government sets a minimum threshold of coverage,
and various companies compete to attract seniors to their
plan. These programs could drive down Medicare costs
and preserve the program as it transitions to a private
model.
All told, the Congressional Budget Oce estimates
that under Obamacare about 95 percent of legal non-
elderly residents will have insurance coverage in 2021,
compared with a projected share of about 82 percent in
the absence of that legislation.
13
We as citizens have the
duty to ask, At what cost? Do we wish to force Ameri-
cans in the workforce to prolong an inherently awed sys-
tem? Medicares grim future is unlikely to improve unless
the governments role as we know it is radically curtailed.
By increasing personal choice and accountability and
allowing market forces to drive down prices and improve
eciency, America will move towards a more free and
sustainable future.
In the late 1980s, Southeast Asia was suddenly faced
with an HIV/AIDS epidemic of staggering proportions.
Experts projected that Southeast Asia would experience
higher rates of HIV infection than Sub-Saharan Africa and
that in 2017, Thailand, a nation of 23 million adults, would
include 500,000 HIV positive citizens, while the United
States, a nation of 117 million, would possess 750,000,
only a quarter of a million more than Thailand.
1
Worse,
these were the most optimistic of reports.
The regions response to the epidemic, however, was
just as unexpected. Galvanized by Thailand, which faced
the bleakest projections of future HIV/AIDS infections,
Southeast Asian nations embraced revolutionary policies,
including the decision to regulate, and not suppress, the
commercial sex industry and governments public com-
mitments to the ght against HIV/AIDS. These strategies,
from national health education programs to the de-stig-
matization of the disease, have produced unexpected, yet
welcomed results.
2
Ten years after the panic of 1988, the
region no longer teetered on the brink of an uncontrol-
lable epidemic.
Over the past twenty years, the face of HIV/AIDS has
changed dramatically both medically and socially. The
advance in antiretroviral drugs means that HIV positive
people live longer, healthier lives and the reduction in the
cost of these medicines means that more people world-
wide have access to treatment. In short, an HIV prognosis
is no longer a death sentence.
3
In the early 1990s, a com-
mon sentiment heard in rural Thailand was If you get HIV,
you will die. Today, banners trumpet, If you get HIV, you
will live.
4
However, the world has changed dramatically in
the past fteen years and has pulled Southeast Asia along
with it. Recent changes, from the increase in multiple
sexual partners among youth, to the rising prevalence of
new technologies, are threatening to mark the beginning
a new HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southeast Asia by rendering
the regions previously successful prevention and treat-
ment programs obsolete.
What is at the worrying core of this revolution? Sur-
prisingly enough, cell phones. Once reserved for the rich
and elite, cell phones are now ubiquitous in Southeast
Asia; from cabbies in Bangkok, to farmers in Cambodia, to
factory workers in Vietnam, most have access to mobile
devices.
5
However, cell phones are not essential to future
HIV/AIDS policymaking simply due to their prevalence. In-
stead, it is the cell phones dualistic function. Cell phones
are both part of the problem and an integral component
of the solution.
60
The question explored in this essay is the following: how
must HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs in
Southeast Asia be adapted for the rising popularity and
use of cell phones in the region? To best address this
question, four main areas will be explored: current appli-
cations of cell phones in HIV/AIDS programs worldwide,
current problems posed by the popularity of cell phones
and their use in HIV/AIDS programs, potential future
problems in these same areas and, nally, suggestions for
improving HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs
in Southeast Asia with regards to the prevalence of cell
phone usage.
I. Current applications of cell phones in HIV/AIDS preven-
tion and treatment programs
The current applications of cell phones in HIV/AIDS
programs worldwide are numerous. Most common is the
usage of cell phones, either via SMS text message or a
pre-recorded phone calls, to send HIV-infected individu-
als reminders to adhere to their medication regimen.
6,7

This is particularly useful considering that long-term anti-
retroviral therapy regimens are challenging in all popula-
tions, but especially in the context of poverty, migration,
homelessness and mental illness.
8
Studies in Peru, South
Africa and Los Angeles have shown these programs to be
highly eective in increasing patient regimen adherence,
and thus health outcomes, in the long term.
9,10
Other
common uses include appointment reminders, partner
tracing and partner notication via text or phone call.
11

The applications of cell phones in prevention and
treatment programs, however, is not only limited to com-
munication with HIV-infected individuals, it is also very
helpful within governmental agencies and NGOs. The use
of cell phones for communication between health work-
ers, the transmission of lab results and the assessment
of community health workers have all been employed
with great success.
12
These programs do, however, raise
important questions regarding the privacy of patients
and condentiality.
13
Despite these objections, the use of cell phones
in HIV/AIDS programs has been widely celebrated as
a considerable step forward in the quest for the com-
prehensive prevention and treatment of the virus and
disease. Studies show that cell phone reminders dramati-
cally reduce the incidence of patients failing to adhere
to medicine regimens and have shortened the time gap
between testing and the availability of results, narrow-
ing the window in which infected individuals (unaware
of their HIV status) may unknowingly spread the virus.
14,15

Furthermore, the use of pictogram text messages and
the facility of recording messages in minority languages
allows cell phone based prevention and treatment pro-
grams to reach populations that are usually excluded or
not as eectively addressed by traditional programs.
16

Finally, the availability of text message based counsel-
ing services and the increased accessibility of counseling
phone lines due to cell phones has increased rural popu-
lations access to information and counseling regarding
HIV/AIDS.
17
II. Current problems posed by the popularity of cell phones
and their use in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment pro-
grams
The problems posed by cell phones concerning HIV/
AIDS prevention and treatment programs can be divided
into two categories: the weaknesses of current applica-
tions of cell phones in HIV/AIDS programs and the meth-
ods by which the popularity of cell phones is rendering
pre-existing and previously successful HIV/AIDS programs
less eective.
Firstly, the limitations within the current applications
of cell phones within HIV/AIDS programs must be ac-
knowledged. Many of the revolutionary cell phone based
programs that were discussed in the previous section are
limited to pilot programs, specic NGOs, or narrow geo-
graphical areas due to logistical limitations, limiting the
overall ecacy of cell phones in HIV/AIDS programs.
18
A substantial obstacle is the issue of cost. In some
nations, the cost of SMS text messaging and cell phones
is relatively low. In India, for example, the national AIDS
program has instituted a program that delivers weekly
treatment reminders to 1,600 patients in a Bangalore clin-
ic that include a picture message and a interactive voice
response call. The current cost per person is reported to
be US $2.82 per patient annually and by 2017 the cost is
expected to fall to US $0.68. Researchers estimate that
expanding the program to include the projected 800,000
people on antiretroviral treatment by 2017 will only cost
0.16% of Indias current ve-year AIDS budget.
19
In na-
tions like Myanmar, however, the feasibility of scaling up
a similar program to the national level is less nancially
viable, both due to poor cell phone networks and exorbi-
tant prices.
20
A further obstacle relating to cost is the issue of
reimbursement. The diculty involved with reimbursing
community health workers and third-party services has
been shown to limit the ecacy of pilot cell phone based
programs in Nairobi, and similar issues have been report-
ed in Southeast Asia.
21
If cost and reimbursement issues
exist in programs that are limited to single villages or
clinics, these challenges will simply be exacerbated when
scaled up to a national level, and may, in fact, prevent the
expansion of cell phone based programs if not appropri-
ately addressed. This requires a signicant investment in
the human resource and IT departments of ministries of
health, government departments and NGOs.
61
Another signicant weakness of the current applica-
tions of cell phones in HIV/AIDS programs is the reliability,
or lack thereof, of cell phone service and long-term access
to patients via cell phone. Although the ownership of cell
phones in Southeast Asia is widespread, there are many
regions, particularly in rural or border areas, with little to
no cell phone service, resulting in the further alienation of
groups that are often already marginalized. Rural popula-
tions already have limited access to public education, and
thus health education, while border populations are of-
ten immigrant populations that do not speak the national
language or receive public education.
22
Furthermore, frequent acquisition and change of cell
phones and SIM cards in Southeast Asia, as well as the
possibility of the loss or theft of cell phones, introduces
additional areas of consideration.
23
Long-term communi-
cation between health workers or clinics and patients is
made vulnerable by the possibility that a phone may be
disconnected or discarded, limiting the ecacy of HIV/
AIDS prevention or treatment programs that are overly
reliant on the use of cell phones. Moreover, the ease of
transfer of cell phones between people, either by choice
or through theft, magnies the problems concerning
patient condentiality and privacy rights if cell phone
based programs include the transmission of lab results,
HIV status or even antiretroviral reminders via cell phone
due to the stigma that remains regarding HIV/AIDS in
some Southeast Asian nations.
24,25
Thus, these issues must
be taken into consideration when drafting nation-wide
HIV/AIDS policy or programs that involve the use of cell
phones.
The second way cell phones pose problems for HIV/
AIDS programs is how the rising popularity of cell phones
has altered social practices in Southeast Asia, thus limit-
ing the current ecacy of previously successful treatment
and prevention programs. The most glaring example of
this phenomenon are the recent changes in commercial
sex practices in Southeast Asia. The cornerstone of the
regions groundbreaking response to the potential HIV/
AIDS epidemic of the 1980s was its remarkable focus on
the commercial sex industry. In Thailand and Cambodia
particularly, where commercial sex workers exhibited
shocking rates of HIV infection and commercial sex es-
tablishments formed the majority of prostitution activity,
the government targeted commercial sex establishments
and made the proprietors responsible for 100% condom
usage. Furthermore, by providing free condoms to com-
mercial sex workers, focusing sexual health education on
known areas of commercial sex activity and by testing sex
workers regularly, the spread of HIV through commercial
sex was dramatically reduced.
26
However, the nature of prostitution in Southeast Asia
has changed, in large part due to cell phones. While the
majority of the commercial sex industry used to be
concentrated in brothels located in densely focused red-
light districts, prostitutes with inexpensive cell phones
are now able to pursue their profession outside tradition-
al institutions.
27
While this might be regarded as an eco-
nomic victory for sex workers as they now receive their
full fees, it has come at the sacrice of progress against
HIV/AIDS. Sex workers who operate independently and
rely on cell phones are far less likely to require condom
usage than those in brothels, and thus are much more
likely to contract HIV. As reported by the New York Times
in November of 2012, Prostitutes [in India] said they had
surrendered some control in the bedroom in exchange
for far more control over their incomes.
28
The advent of cell phone usage in the commercial
sex industry has not only increased HIV infection rate
among commercial sex workers, it also has dramati-
cally lessened the ecacy of sexual health education
programs as they can no longer be targeted at specic
geographic areas. Additionally, the testing of commercial
sex workers is now much more dicult and less wide-
spread since they operate independently of traditional
institutions.
29
It is thus imperative that Southeast Asian
nations adjust their HIV/AIDS programs to this new social
landscape, one revolutionized by the prevalence of cell
phones.
III. Potential future problems posed by the popularity of cell
phones and their use in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment
programs
While the changes in the commercial sex industry
due to cell phones are the most apparent and easily
detectable, cell phones will likely also change the nature
of other risk-behaviors, including drug usage and the
trend of multiple sexual partners. Similar to commercial
sex workers, intravenous drug users in Southeast Asia
have traditionally been very densely focused in terms
of geography, particularly in urban areas.
30
The ease of
communication via cell phone, however, is slowly chang-
ing this dynamic. Instead of congregating in areas known
for drug usage to conduct sales and, consequently, inject,
intravenous drug users now have more mobility to meet
in isolated locations. This will not only reduce the e-
cacy of HIV/AIDS education programs and the frequency
of HIV testing that Southeast Asian governments have
traditionally conducted in areas known for drug sales, but
it will also dramatically threaten clean needle and opioid
substitution programs that have been proven remarkably
successful in limiting new infections among drug users.
31
In fact, intravenous drug usage is now the major
driver of HIV transmission in Asia. According to UNAIDS,
approximately 16% of intravenous drug users in Asia are
HIV positive. In some nations, this rate is even higher,
between 30% to 50% in Thailand and 32% to 58% in Viet-
62
nam. Furthermore, recent research shows that com-
mercial sex workers are now more likely to contract HIV
through intravenous drug usage than from their sexual
partners.
32
The changing infrastructure of drug usage
and HIV transmission due to cell phone usage must be
addressed.
Similarly, the popularity of cell phones has been
shown to increase the prevalence of multiple sexual
partners amongst young populations (between 16 and
25 years of age) in Southeast Asia. By making it easier to
meet with multiple partners and to hide partners from
each other, cell phones are facilitating risky sexual behav-
ior. The particular challenge of this trend is that it often
aects married couples or couples in long-term relation-
ships, a population that is not in any way geographically
concentrated nor discernable from an outside perspec-
tive and that is unlikely to consistently use barrier protec-
tion like condoms.
33,34
IV. Suggestions for adapting HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment programs in Southeast Asia to the rising
popularity and use of cell phones
As the current applications, as well as current or fu-
ture problems, regarding cell phones and their relation to
HIV/AIDS programs are discussed, it quickly becomes evi-
dent that cell phones are indeed both part of the solution
and part of the problem. Thus, in order to most compre-
hensively adapt current HIV/AIDS programs in Southeast
Asia to the rising use of cell phones, both of these oppos-
ing functions must be addressed. It is necessary to both
capitalize upon the advantages of cell phones in public
health programs and to tackle the dynamics through
which cell phones now hinder the ecacy of current
programs.
Firstly, Southeast Asian nations must commit them-
selves to take advantage of the benets of cell phone
usage in HIV/AIDS programs. The most exciting improve-
ment of current prevention and treatment programs is
that cell phones grant governments the chance to reach
out to populations that are usually excluded from sexual
health or HIV/AIDS education in Southeast Asia. A press-
ing issue is that of language barriers. Due to the preva-
lence of ethnic minority groups, immigrants, migrant
workers and undocumented residents in Southeast Asian
nations, a considerable segment of the population is
often not procient in the national or ocial language.
This not only means that they likely do not attend public
schools and thus do not receive any institutional sexual
health education, but it also means that they are often
excluded from the reach of advocacy and education
campaigns due to their language barrier.
35
The ability and
relative ease of sending pictograph text messages and
pre-recorded phone messages in languages other than
the national language would allow for the inclusion of
groups usually marginalized by language in national HIV/
AIDS programs.
36
Another commonly marginalized segment of the
population are gay, lesbian and transgender individuals
who often face social stigma or exclusion due to their
sexual orientation and behaviors.
37
The ability to reach
out to these populations through the relative privacy of
text messages or phone calls, which does not require dis-
closing their sexual status to their community and facing
the repercussions of this information, must be grasped
by Southeast Asian governments. Any future HIV/AIDS
program must capitalize on this opportunity to engage
with LGBT communities, especially since the prevalence
of HIV/AIDS amongst men who have sex with men (MSM)
and transgender individuals remains high in Southeast
Asia.
38,39
Governments must also adapt their HIV/AIDS pro-
grams to better engage low socio-economic populations
via cell phone. Many children born into poor, rural com-
munities in Southeast Asia drop out of school at a young
age to begin working as laborers. As a result, many are
illiterate or have very limited reading levels. Further-
more, these populations were unlikely to receive sexual
education in school.
40
Thus, the usage of pictogram text
messages and pre-recorded phone calls, as well as the
establishment of nationwide help-lines and counseling
services via text message, would integrate populations of
low socio-economic status into national HIV/AIDS policies
and programs from which they have been traditionally
excluded or less eectively targeted.
41
Finally, cell phones also give Southeast Asian govern-
ments the unique opportunity to reach out to the young
members of their societies in a way that does not alien-
ate them from their peers. Most adolescents or young
adults in Southeast Asia (between 16 and 25 years of
age) missed the intensive HIV education campaigns of
the 1990s and thus are generally less informed in regards
to HIV/AIDS than the generations that preceded them.
42

This is reected in the increased incidence of HIV among
youth in Southeast Asia.
43,44
Unsurprisingly cell phone us-
age is higher among the youth in Southeast Asia than in
the general population. Thus, cell phone based education
and counseling programs are a particularly eective man-
ner to inform upcoming generations about the disease in
a way that includes lower risk of social stigma or discrimi-
nation than traditional, in-person education programs.
Apart from the targeting of populations that are
usually marginalized from HIV/AIDS eorts or were not
included in the extensive programs of the 1990s, there
are several other areas in which Southeast Asian govern-
ments must take advantage of cell phones. A revision of
current oversight systems must be undertaken with the
goal of employing cell phones to oversee the information
63
that is being propagated by community health workers,
to access their follow-up work with clients and to track
trends in community health activities. Moreover, partner
tracing has historically been a weakness of HIV/AIDS pro-
grams, mainly due to logistical and privacy diculties. A
reinvigoration of partner-tracing programs is long over-
due and Southeast Asia, with its history of revolutionary
HIV/AIDS programs, has both the opportunity and, per-
haps even the responsibility, to invest in a comprehensive
cell phone based partner tracking system.
Finally, the long-term success of the application of
any cell phone based treatment and prevention program
requires a well-developed and extensive human resource
and IT capabilities for reasons including: the reinforce-
ment of the use of cell phones, the targeting of retention
rate obstacles and the simplication of reimbursement
complications. Thus, Southeast Asian governments ought
to modernize their human resource and IT departments
to not only catch up with and support existing cell phone
based programs, but also to provide for the needs of
future cell phone based systems.
The second necessary component of Southeast
Asian nations response to the modern reality of HIV/AIDS
is the adaptation of past programs to the dynamics cre-
ated by widespread cell phone usage. The majority of this
eort will be through the realization that action focused
on at risk groups (such as commercial sex workers,
intravenous drug users and men who have sex with men)
can no longer be designed and implemented with the
same level of reliance on geographically focused popula-
tions. Instead, these groups must be addressed in a more
geographically exible and individual manner. Further-
more, the factors that lead to the changes in social trends
and the dynamics of risk behaviors, such as the economic
incentives of engaging in commercial sex work outside
traditional institutions, must be taken into account. A fea-
sible method for creating such individualized and local-
ized prevention and treatment responses is through the
cell phone based methods delineated above.
Moreover, instead of continuing with HIV/AIDS pro-
grams that focus on at risk groups that are no longer as
geographically localized as they were in the past, South-
east Asian nations should shift their existing well-devel-
oped and comprehensive infrastructure of geographically
and population-focused HIV/AIDS programs to instead
target adolescents and young adults. While it is no longer
as feasible to address commercial sex workers or intra-
venous drug users en masse, it is still possible to employ
the large-scale policies and programs that were proven
eective in the 1990s and early 2000s; they simply must
be redirected towards upcoming generations.
The trend that most alarms public health and medi-
cal professions regarding HIV in Southeast Asia is the
number of adolescents and young adults who contract
the virus every year. Mechai Viravaidya, the famous Thai
HIV/AIDS campaigner who, in 1991, began a program
that is credited by the United Nations with creating a 90%
decline in new infections over 12 years, estimates that
250,000 Thais are currently unaware that they are HIV
positive, most of whom are young adults who continue to
engage in sexual activities. As Mechai warns, young Thais
no longer realize how easy it is to become infected with
HIV. They allow their erections to rule their lives rather
than their brains.
45
Southeast Asia, led by Thailand, once mobilized a
staggeringly impressive coalition of national governmen-
tal departments, NGOs and local community health cen-
ters that, together, turned around what was expected to
be an HIV/AIDS epidemic that would ravish their nations.
The world is admittedly no longer the same place it was
in 1988; it is a more complicated one. This time around,
however, the region has the advantage of 20 years of HIV/
AIDS experience. While existing policies and programs
must be adopted for the current realities of the virus,
notably the role cell phones play in modern society, and
the transition of bureaucratic infrastructure will undoubt-
edly be laborious, it is doable. In December, Mechai ac-
cused the Thai government, along with their counterparts
across Southeast Asia, of falling asleep at the wheel.
46
It
is time to wake up.
64
DEFENSE
DIPLOMACY
&
65
Adrian Jaycox
BUILDING ECONOMIC TIES
WITH MYANMAR
Introduction
Myanmar has had a long history of autocracy,
stretching back to a military coup in 1962, when General
Ne Win toppled a civilian government, and Myanmar has
had military rulers ever since. The current military leaders
started in the State Law and Order Restoration Coun-
cil (SLORC), which was formed in 1988 amidst popular
unrest. The SLORC denied the results of a 1990 election
that overwhelmingly elected the National League for
Democracy (NLD) and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, forming
the foundation of todays two primary internal political
actors (though SLORC did change its name to the State
Peace and Development Council, or SPDC, in 1997)1. The
formation of the junta and its rejection of the election
results led to the emplacement of US and international
sanctions against the country, isolating it from much of
the world and slowing economic growth. Among the
US sanctions were the prohibition of new investment in
Myanmar and the banning of Burmese imports.
On the other hand, China did not follow suit. Ben-
eting from the lack of competition, especially from
Western rms, and the lack of political engagement
from Western governments, China invested heavily in
its relationship with Myanmar. China shielded Myanmar
diplomatically, especially in the UN Security Council,
blocking Western-led resolutions against it and stand-
ing up to subsequent US pressure. In addition, Chinese
state-owned companies invested heavily in the country,
especially in natural resources and infrastructure, as a
way for China to obtain stable sources for the requisite
raw materials it needs to fuel its economy.
Myanmar is made even more important to China
because of its strategic location in Southeast Asia, with
sea access to the Bay of Bengal and a direct border with
China. This gives China the opportunity to create transit
links that go directly from China to Myanmar and the
Indian Ocean region, which reduces Chinas dependence
on the heavily tracked Straits of Malacca, through
which four fths of Chinas oil imports pass5. This part-
nership where Myanmar sells its resources and allows
China to take advantage of its position, in return for
Chinas propping up of the regime internationally and
economically, has greatly beneted both states.
More recently, however, Myanmar shifted to a nomi-
nally civilian government in 2011 with Thein Sein, the
former prime minister of the SPDC, as the new president.
Several months later, important policy changes started
occurring. Myanmar suspended the giant Chinese-
backed Myitsone Dam project amongst both wide-
spread popular discontent over the project and rising
fears amongst the junta of growing Chinese inuence
over Myanmar, released some political prisoners, al-
lowed greater press freedoms, and began working with
the newly-freed Suu Kyi4. These, along with elections
that have seen the NLD and Suu Kyi herself become part
of the new Parliament, have led to the relaxing of most
international sanctions6. Now is the time for the US to
take advantage of and support the changes occurring in
Myanmar by pushing for closer ties, especially by increas-
ing trade and investment.
e Case for Closer Ties with Myanmar
Myanmar is one of the most underdeveloped coun-
tries in the region, and yet is resource-rich and a critical
link between the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, South
Asia, and China. American companies have the where-
withal, expertise, and technology needed to establish
themselves before competitors get entrenched. But
speed is an important factor here. Building economic ties
would be especially benecial now in order to speed up
the current economic recovery, and the US was late in the
game to relax its sanctions, giving European countries
and Japan, among others, a head start. For example, Ja-
pan is making a concerted eort to improve its economic
position in Myanmar, sending top government ocials
to improve relations with Burmese ocials, oering near
giveaway loans, forgiving Myanmars debt to Japan, and
organizing Japans largest corporations to plan and con-
struct a variety of infrastructure projects, which will con-
veniently be nished before Mr. Thein Seins reelection.
Increased economic ties with Myanmar would have
the additional eects of reducing its dependence on
China and diversifying its economic relations, which
would enable greater cooperation with the US. Myanmar
has historically pursued a non-aligned foreign policy, and
Myanmars growing economic and diplomatic depen-
dence upon China for regime survival is becoming a
growing concern for military leaders, coinciding with
an increasing popular hostility towards China. Myanmar
doesnt want to become so beholden to China that it
gains inuence over the countrys internal dynamics it
has an interest in democratization and economic reform.
By allowing greater participation from its people in
government decision making and by relaxing restric-
tions on the population, Myanmar encourages the lifting
of international sanctions and the resumption of wide
international economic activity, which enables a broader
rebalancing in its foreign relations. . Its new relationship
with the outside world has helped Myanmar shed its
image as a pariah state, giving it greater respect and new
opportunities for regional leadership, underlined
66
Leah Reiss
RETHINKING THE UNITED STATES
EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
by its intention to assume the ASEAN chairmanship in
20143. Myanmar will gain greater legitimacy at home too,
with a general improvement of peoples lives economi-
cally, the granting of some freedoms, and its public col-
laboration with Suu Kyi, which contrasts with its previous
increasing alienation from society because of autocratic
rule and the concentration of the countrys wealth in the
hands of the military elite.
Possibilities for US Policy
The US should do what it can to encourage democ-
ratization in Myanmar, but its important that it recognize
its limits and the potential for its actions to backre.
Myanmar is implementing reforms out of the militarys
own free will, with protests, sanctions, and other forms
of pressure for decades failing to coerce Myanmar into
liberalizing. The US needs to give Myanmar breathing
room to go at its own pace as much as wed like it, they
arent going to become a Western-style democracy over-
night. Before the reform process began, the military had
complete power over the country, and their continued
strength gives them the ability to reverse reforms if they
chose to do so.
At the same time, the new political and economic
climate is empowering new social organizations in
Myanmar. Until new actors become large and estab-
lished enough to challenge it, the military will remain the
central actor in Myanmar. Greater economic opportunity
could bring many people out of poverty, and lessened
repression grants greater space and new power centers
in political organization and civil society. To facilitate
this, the US should strive to provide incentives for further
reforms and be sure to reward Myanmar for the reforms
it does implement. Rewarding reforms will simultane-
ously help opposition groups and strengthen the reform-
minded members of the military in their struggle against
hard-liners who oppose surrendering any of the militarys
power, enabling further reform.
The US can also focus on helping Myanmar to
modernize its legal system. For ve consecutive years,
Myanmar has been ranked as having the worlds worst
legal system for doing business, and has little protections
for foreign companies and investment. Much of its legal
structure was established in the 1960s, a period inu-
enced by socialist ideology. The US rst needs to take a
few important steps in order to help craft modern busi-
ness rules for Myanmar and enable American businesses
to take advantage of Myanmars future development.
Rather than pre-arrange a package of reforms to hand
to the government in exchange for monetary aid, as was
done in parts of Central America, the US should partner
with both elements from the ruling military elite and op-
position groups such as Suu Kyis NLD to craft short,
medium, and long-term goals that reect local customs
and realities. The US should then provide varying stages
of economic aid as new legal reforms are negotiated and
implemented, contingent on the substance of proposed
reforms and continued cooperation between the mili-
tary and the opposition in the legal reform process. This
would have the double eect of facilitating economic
development while fostering the meaningful use of
democratic processes in governance.
Conclusion

Engagement with Myanmar oers the US a myriad
of benets, including increased cooperation and trade,
a Myanmar less dependent on China, and the potential
for stronger democratic institutions in the country. To im-
prove relations, US policymakers should take a careful ap-
proach to Myanmar. At least for the time being, it seems
that a good strategy is to let the regime-managed transi-
tion to democracy proceed, encouraging and rewarding
reforms as they materialize. Renewing business relations
and crafting legal reforms is less fraught with political
risk, while yielding the greatest returns for the future.
Introduction
Relations between the United States and Cuba have
been dened by varying degrees of strain since Fidel
Castros Communist takeover of the country in 1959. We
are decades removed from catastrophes such as the Bay
of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, but we are
still aected by more recent altercations like the Elin
Gonzlez controversy and the 2009 arrest of Alan Gross
in Cuba. That being said, does the US have legitimate
reasons for continuing the embargo?
Where do we stand?
According to the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act, the
reasoning behind the embargo includes the regimes dis-
regard for internationally accepted standards of human
rights and for democratic values, restriction of the Cu-
ban peoples exercise of freedom of speech, press, assem-
bly, and other rights recognized by Universal Declaration
of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, and no signals that the Castro regime is
prepared to make any signicant concessions to democ-
racy or to undertake any form of democratic opening.
1
In addition, our stated purposes include seeking a
peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of
67
economic growth [through]support for the Cuban
people, while seeking the cooperation of other demo-
cratic countries in this policy.
2
Do these charges and purposes still hold today? This
is an integral question when considering the future of the
embargo. Looking at one of the stated goals, gaining sup-
port of other democratic countries, it is clear that the US
has not followed through.
e Embargo on the World Stage
The embargo does not further our standing in the
world or our image as a global supporter of human
rights, especially among other democratic nations. The
General Assembly of the United Nations has condemned
the embargo and called for its removal every year since
1992, with Israel as the only consistent supporter of the
embargo, apart from the US itself.
3
But we cannot only
look at the eect of the embargo on the US. We claim
that the purpose of the embargo is to encourage Cuba
to implement an open economic system, and thus foster
economic growth, however, as stated in a report to the
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, the United States is the major regional
economic power and the main source of new medicines
and technologies Cuba is subject to deprivations that
impinge in its citizens human rights.
4
This testimony
demonstrates that not only is the US limiting Cubas po-
tential for economic growth, but it is also infringing upon
the human rights of its citizens.
What can we do?
There is multilateral support for an end to the em-
bargo with Cuba. The possibility is supported, not only
by the United Nations and other international bodies,
but also within the United States. Ocials as high up as
former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President
Barack Obama have both expressed reservations regard-
ing the continuation of the embargo. In addition, a ma-
jority of the US population supports ending the embargo.
With both political and popular support, this would be a
good time for the US to take the rst step towards estab-
lishing diplomatic relations with Cuba.
There are several options for dealing with the cur-
rent situation in Cuba. One option of course is to leave
sanctions as they currently exist and continue to follow
the principles laid out in the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
Act of 1966. However, I will not explore this option in
much detail because I do not believe that the current
situation is benecial for either Cuba or the US. The other
extreme would be to eliminate the sanctions all at once
in their entirety. This is also an option I will not explore in
detail because it is not politically feasible.
The other possibilities for consideration all
involve some degree of balance between opening trade
and communication between the US and Cuba, but still
holding some degree of sanctions (at least temporarily) in
order to encourage the Cuban government to open the
political system. One preliminary change that I argue is an
essential rst step in any plan going forward is to reopen
diplomatic relations with Cuba. Currently, the US is rep-
resented in Cuba by the US Interests Section (USINT) in
Havana. According to the USINT, its functions can be com-
pared to those of other US embassies or Consuls in other
nations, providing consular services, public diplomacy,
and other such functions. However, the USINT is really
quite dierent from other forms of US presence abroad.
Because the US and Cuba do not have formal relations,
USINT is ocially operated out of the Swiss Embassy.
However, the Cuban government and USINT do not have
a working relationship, thus its purpose as it currently
exists is questionable. In order to do this, the USINT, or
whatever consular administrative body replaces it, must
be ocially housed within the US government.
After this rst step is taken, there should be an
attempt made by the US government to begin formal ne-
gotiations surrounding the embargo and economic sanc-
tions. The current hands-o policy under which the US is
operating is insucient to eect any real change. The two
governments must meet to discuss terms and conditions
for a possible end to economic sanctions. The US cannot
use as a reason for the lack of negotiation the fact that
Cubas government is a single-party government. In fact
the US has diplomatic relations with other nations with
single-party governments, signicantly China.
Once the US and Cuba have opened a line of com-
munication, then actual negotiations can begin. The US
wants Cuba to cease the various human rights violations
it commits against its citizens including, but not limited
to, persecution of political dissidents and heavily restrict-
ing access to dierent forms of media and to open its
government so that it resembles a participatory democ-
racy. We can only infer as to what Cubas interests are,
given that we currently have no ocial communication
with the government, but it is probable that Cuba wants
to have a viable economy, to be able to provide for its
citizens, and to govern itself independently of outside
interference.
What comes next?
Cubas future is uncertain. In 2008 Fidel Castro
resigned from his position as President of Cuba, leaving
the position to his brother, Raul. This change, though its
clear that the Castros inuence in the country was still
strong, brought about speculation as to what the govern-
ment would look like when the members of the Revolu-
tion Generation began to leave their positions. Now is the
time to rethink our relationship with Cuba. Whichever
68
way the US ultimately decides to proceed, the process
for carrying out any policy changes must be undertaken
incrementally. Even if it is the step we eventually reach,
we cannot completely eliminate the embargo all at once.
We need to take small steps and observe the progress
made with each step. This has already begun on a small
scale with loosening travel and export restrictions. How-
ever, this may be too small of a scale to start. We cannot
wait for Cuba to take the rst move because we are the
stronger power. The US must make an eort to reestab-
lish diplomatic relations, and analyze the reactions and
results of every subsequent step taken.
69
Endnotes
Economic Development
Siran Jiang, An Analysis of IMF Structural Condi-
tionality
1. Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 88-90.
2. Michel Camdessus as quoted in James M. Boughton,
Globalization and the Silent Revolution of the 1980s,
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3. James M. Boughton, Globalization and the Silent Revo-
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4. John Williamson as quoted in Center for International
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5. Center for International Development at Harvard
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harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html (February
21, 2013).
6. Manuel Pastor, Jr., Latin American Perspectives , Vol.
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System. (1989), 82. (http://www.jstor.org/)
7. Manuel Pastor Jr., 83-84.
8. Ibid, 85.
9. Ibid, 87.
10. Jan Joost Teunissen, An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of Poverty: By Way of Introduction, from Helping
the Poor? The IMF and Low-Income Countries. Fondad,
June 2005, www. Fondad.org., 9.
11. Ibid, 9.
12. Ibid, 6.
13. Graham Bird, The IMF and Poor Countries: Toward a
More Fullling Relationship, from Helping the Poor? The
IMF and Low-Income Countries. Fondad, June 2005, www.
Fondad.org., 40.
14. Jacque J. Polak, The Changing Nature of IMF Condi-
tionality from Financial Policies for Global Dissemination
of Economic Growth, August 1991, http://www.oecd.org/
development/pgd/1919583.pdf, 24.
15. Matthew Martin and Hannah Bargawi, A Changing
Role for the IMF in Low-Income Countries, from Helping
the Poor? The IMF and Low-Income Countries. Fondad,
June 2005, www. Fondad.org., 96-97.
16. Jacque J. Polak, 24.
17. Matthew Martin and Hannah Bargawi, 96.
18. Ibid, 97.
19. International Monetary Fund, Operational Guidance
to IMF Sta on the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines: Re-
vised, January 25, 2010, www.imf.org, 6-7.
20. Matthew Martin and Hannah Bargawi, 97-98.
21. Ibid, 100-101.
22. Ibid, 99.
23. Ibid, 117-118.
24. Louis Kasekende as quoted in Jan Joost Teunissen, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Poverty: By Way of
Introduction, from Helping the Poor? The IMF and Low-
Income Countries. Fondad, June 2005, www. Fondad.org.,
11.
25. Ibid, 11.
26. Graham Bird, 44.
27. Ibid, 44.
28. Ibid, 44.
29. Ibid, 45.
Audrey Greene, Now or Never: Ending the U.S.-
Brazil Cotton Dispute
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Against the U.S. Cotton Program Congressional Research
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4. http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/les/
Funds%20Jan%2028%202013.pdf
5. http://www.brazilcouncil.org/sites/default/les/
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2. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution
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3. Ibid.
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6. Ibid, 264.
7. Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in
70
the US and Europe: A World of Dierence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 88.
8. Ibid.
9. Ostrom, Governing the Commons, 18.
10. Ibid, 15.
11. Ibid, 17.
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16. Ibid, 16.
17. Robert J. Barro, The Ricardian Approach to Budget
Decits, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3.2 (1989);
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19. Ibid, 478.
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8. Ibid
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Katherine Haller, Reforming State Policies on Sex
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9. Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP).
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22. University of Washington in Seattle, news release. Sex
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30. State Policies on Sex Education in Schools. National
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72
31. Ibid.
32. Sexual Risk Behavior: HIV, STD, & Teen Pregnancy
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13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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1. United Nations, Durban Platform, Establishment of
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73
4. Ibid
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6. Composting Coming to Morningside Campus. Colum-
bia Environmental Stewardship. N.p., n.d. Web. 15 Jan.
2013.
7. Figure 1. Sign in Barnard Colleges Dining Hall, Hewitt
8. Figure 2. Sign in Columbias Dining Hall, Ferris Booth
9. Howard, Scripps, and Wade Rawlins. Replacing Styro-
foam: Biodegradable Plates Enter the Fast-food Scene.
Business ATOM. Gloucester Times, 7 Mar. 2009. Web. 03
Mar. 2013.
10. The Arthur Ross Greenhouse. Department of Biology.
Barnard College, n.d. Web. 15 Jan. 2013.
11. Garden Tours. Columbia University Facilities. N.p., n.d.
Web. 15 Jan. 2013.
12. Rogers, Sophia. Public-Private Collaboration to
Improve Green Investment. Columbia Roosevelt Review
(2012): 26. Print.
13. Goldenberg, Suzanne. Two-Thirds of Americans Want
Obama to Act on Climate Change, Says Poll. The Guard-
ian. Guardian News and Media, 13 Feb. 2013. Web. 14 Feb.
2013.
Sharin Khander, Natural Gas and National Inter-
est: A Brighter Future for Renewables
1. Salvatore, Dominick. International Economics. Hobo-
ken, NJ: Wiley, 2009. Print.
2. Soltas, Evan. Evan Soltas | Natural Gas and Natural
Interest. Evan Soltas. N.p., 16 Aug. 2012.
3. Exec. Order No. 13337, 3 C.F.R. (2004). Print.
4. Tracy, Ryan. Energy-Post Candidate Led Study Favoring
Natural-Gas Exports. Wall Street Journal. N.p., n.d. Web.
5. Levi, Michael. The Case For LNG Exports. The New York
Times. N.p., 15 Aug. 2012.
6. Inman, Mason. International Agency Calls for Action on
Natural Gas Safety. National Geographic. National Geo-
graphic Society, 30 May 2012. Web.
Swara Salih, A Biofuel that Doesnt Require Food:
Algae
1. February 27, 2008, Editorials, The Washington Post: The
Problem with Biofuels
2. June 24, 2011, Steven Rattner;, The New York Times: The
Great Corn Con
3. June 12, 2012, Think Progress; The Corn Identity: The
US Will Make Ethanol Out of Enough Corn to Feed 412
Million People
4. September 5, 2012; The Guardian, Timothy Wise: If We
Want Food to Remain Cheap We Need to Stop Putting It
in Our Cars
5. World Bank: Food Price Watch August 2012
6. April 13, 2011; Frances White: Pacic Northwest Na-
tional Laboratory: Study: Algae Could Replace 17% of US
Oil Imports
7. Ibid.
8. Ferrell, Reed: May 2010: US Department of Energy:
National Biofuels Technology Roadmap (Executive Sum-
mary, p. ii)
9. 2012 Sapphire Energy: Why Algae
10. 2012 Sapphire Energy: What is Green Crude
11. September 24, 2012; Todd Woody, Forbes Magazine:
The US Militarys Great Green Gamble Spurs Biofuel Start-
ups
12. Ibid.
13. March 8, 2012, Nash Keune; National Review: Algae:
Fuel of the Future?
14. April 20, 2012, Ken Silverstein; Forbes: Will Algae Bio-
fuels Hit the Highway?
15. April 13, 2011; Frances White: Pacic Northwest Na-
tional Laboratory: Study: Algae Could Replace 17% of US
Oil Imports
16. April 20, 2012, Ken Silverstein; Forbes: Will Algae Bio-
fuels Hit the Highway?
17. Ibid.
18. US Department of Energy (website), Laws & Incen-
tives: Alternative Fuels Mixture Excise Tax Credit
19. April 20, 2012, Mel Fabrikant, The Paramus Post: Con-
gressmen Pascrell, Bilbray Introduce Bipartisan Legisla-
74
tion Aimed At Creating Jobs Biotechnology Industries
20. November, 28, 2012, Lucia Graves; Hungton Post:
Expiration of Wind Tax Credit Kills Jobs, Senators Say
21. February 23, 2012; Brian Wingeld, Bloomberg Busi-
ness: US To Invest $14 million for Algae Biofuels, White
House Says
22. Ibid.
23. November 30, 2010; US Department of Energy: Cur-
rent State of the Ethanol Industry
Equal Justice
Grace Rybak, Mandatory Minimums: Sentencing
to Injustice
1. Faces of Famm- Federal Proles- Stephanie George,
Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 20 Feb. 2013.
2. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Shadow of Advisory Guidelines and Mandatory Mini-
mums, Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review 19
(2009-2010), 19 Feb. 2013. 384.
3. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Ad-
visory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums. 384.
4. Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Man-
datory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings,
Crime and Justice 38 (2009), 19 Feb. 2013. 71.
5. Jennifer Seltzer Stitt, Worth Fighting For: Keeping
the Promise of Sentencing Reform, Federal Sentencing
Reporter 23 (2010), 19 Feb. 2013. 127.
6. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings. 69, 75.
7. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings. 86-87.
8. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Ad-
visory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums. 377-379.
9. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of Ad-
visory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums. 379.
10. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Shadow of
Advisory Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums. 387.
11. Richard A. Oppell Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New
Leverage to Prosecutors, The New York Times (25 Sept.
2011), 18 Feb. 2013.
12. Adam Liptak, The New York Times, A Tough Judges
Proposal for Fairer Sentencing (28 May 2012), 18 Feb.
2013.
13. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings. 67.
14. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings. 102.
15. Jennifer Steinhauer, To Cut Costs, States Relax Prison
Policies, The New York Times (24 Mar. 2009), 18 Feb. 2013.
16. John Tierney, Prison and the Poverty Trap, The New
York Times (18 Feb. 2013), 22 Feb. 2013.
17. Peter Baker, Obama Signs Law Narrowing Cocaine
Sentencing Disparities, The New York Times (3 Aug.
2010), 18 Feb. 2013.
18. Mark Memmott, Crack Cocaine Fair Sentencing Act
Should Be Retroactive, Holder Says, National Public Radio
(1 Jun. 2011), 18 Feb. 2013.
19. Baker, Obama Signs Law Narrowing Cocaine Sentenc-
ing Disparities.
20. Stitt, Worth Fighting For: Keeping the Promise of
Sentencing Reform. 128.
21. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings. 70, 104.
22. Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Eects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings. 70, 103.
23. Alfred Blumstein, Bringing Down the U.S. Prison
Population, The Prison Journal 91 (2011), 19 Feb. 2013.
15S-16S.
Natalie Zerwekh, Reallocating Visas to Meet
Demand
1. USCIS - Visa Availability & Priority Dates. USCIS - Visa
Availability & Priority Dates. N.p., 15 June 2011. Web. 11
Dec. 2012.
2. Embassy of the United States Manila, Philippines. What
Are the Immigrant Visa Categories. US Embassy, n.d. Web.
11 Dec. 2012.
3. USCIS - Green Card Through Family. USCIS - Green
Card Through Family. N.p., 13 May 2011. Web. 11 Dec.
2012.
4. Table IV: Summary of Visas Issued by Issuing Oce Fis-
cal Year 2011. Http://www.travel.state.gov/. U.S. Deptart-
ment of State, n.d. Web. 10 Dec. 2012 (Source 4)
5. Moreno, Carolina. Border Crossing Deaths More Com-
mon As Illegal Immigration Declines. The Hungton
Post. TheHungtonPost.com, 17 Aug. 2012. Web. 10 Dec.
2012.
6. The Cost of Deportation in 10 Eye-Opening Figures.
NationalJournal.com. National Journal, 9 Jan. 2013. Web.
14 Mar. 2013. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenex-
tamerica/economy/the-cost-of-deportation-in-10-eye-
opening-gures-20130109>.
7. In the Childs Best Interest? The Costs of Losing a
Lawful Immigrant Parent to Deportation. International
Human Rights Law Clinic (UC Berkeley); Chief Justice
Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity(UC
Berkeley); Immigration Law Clinic (UC Davis), Mar. 2010.
Web. 10 Dec. 2012.
8. Foley, Elise. Obama Administration Sets Deportation
Record. The Hungton Post. TheHungtonPost.com, 18
Oct. 2011. Web. 10 Dec. 2012.
10. Illegal Immigration Numbers Plummet. Illegal Immi-
gration Numbers Plummet. N.p., n.d. Web. 14 Mar. 2013.
<http://www.usimmigration.com/illegal-immigration-
numbers-plummet.html>.
Daniel Gonzalez, Measuring Access to Food
1. The Perpetual Storm: Hunger Before and After Hurri-
75
cane Sandy. New York City Coalition Against Hunger.
2. Per Capita Consumption of Major Food Commodities:
1980 to 2009. United States Census Bureau.
3. The Perpetual Storm: Hunger Before and After Hurri-
cane Sandy. New York City Coalition Against Hunger.
4. Larson, Nicole I., Mary T. Story, and Melissa C. Nelson.
Neighborhood Environments Disparities in Access to
Healthy Foods in the U.S.
5. Ibid.
6. Underweight Health Risks. Washington State De-
partment of Social and Health Services.
7. The Health Eects of Overweight and Obesity. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention
8. Charreire, Hlne. Measuring the Food Environment
Using Geographical Information Systems: A Methodologi-
cal Review.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Euclidean Distance algorithm. ESRI.
13. Modeling sptial relationships. ESRI.
14. Ibid. 21.
15. Density calculations. ESRI. 2 May 2007. http://web-
help.esri.com/arcgisdesktop/9.2/index.cf
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. U.S. Farm Bill. The New York Times.
Ying Chang, Get Your Day-Old Baked Goods Here
1. Panera Bread
2. AGM - Agriculture and Markets
Article 4-D - LIABILITY FOR CANNED, PERISHABLE FOOD
OR FARM PRODUCTS DISTRIBUTED FREE OF CHARGE
Healthcare
Lauren Tomasulo, Reforming Drug Policy: Alter-
native to the Legalization of Marijuana
1. Lecture given by Professor Carl Hart at Columbia Uni-
versity.
2. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arti-
cle/0,9171,1889166,00.html.
3. Ibid.
4. http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2011/02/25/state-con-
siders-marijuana-decriminalization/
5. Ibid.
6. Data in a lecture given by Professor Carl Hart at Colum-
bia University.
7. http://www.thedailychronic.net/2013/15526/bloom-
berg-no-more-jail-stays-for-minor-nyc-marijuana-busts/
8. Lecture presented by Professor Carl Hart at Columbia
University.
9. http://inthecapital.com/2013/03/25/rand-paul-re-
forms-on-marijuana-decriminalization/
10. http://blogs.reuters.com/bernddebus-
mann/2012/04/16/obama-and-the-failed-war-on-drugs/
11. Lecture given by Professor Carl Hart at Columbia
University.
12. http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2011/10/17/111017fa_fact_specter.
13. Ibid.
14. http://www.time.com/time/health/arti-
cle/0,8599,1893946,00.html
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Lecture given by Professor Carl Hart at Columbia
University.
25. Ibid.
Allison Schlissel, Agricultural Subsidies and
Cooking Classes: The Solution to the Obesity
Epidemic?
1. NCHS Data Brief January 2012
2. Begely, Sharon As Americas Waistline Expands, Costs
Soar
3. Levine, James Poverty and Obesity in the U.S.
4. freshdirect.com
5. EWG Chart
6. Freeman, Andrea Fast Food: Oppression through Poor
Nutrition
7. EWG Chart
8. Freeman, Andrea Fast Food: Oppression through Poor
Nutrition
9. EWG chart
10. Obesity & Diabetes Week Healthcare Reform Starts at
Home
11. cookingmatters.org
Noah Zinsmeister, Addressing Medicare Solven-
cy through Market Solutions
1. This Day in Truman History - July 30, 1965: President
Lyndon B. Johnson Signs Medicare Bill. Truman Library.
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, n.d.
2. Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks With President Truman at
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30, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
The American Presidency Project.
3. How Is Medicare Funded? How Medicare Is Funded.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.
4. Health Care. Congressional Budget Oce. Congressio-
76
nal Budget Oce, n.d.
5. Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, and Jim Nussle. Medicares Dirty
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6. March 2011 Medicare Baseline. Rep. Congressional
Budget Oce, 18 Mar. 2011.
7. H.R. 3590, 111th Cong., The Library of Congress Thomas
(2009-2010) (enacted). Web.
8. Roe, Phil. The IPAB Is Bad Medicine for Seniors. The
Hills Congress Blog. News Communications, Inc., n.d.
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10. Shatto, John D., and M. Kent Clemens. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES. Rep. N.p.: Oce of the
Actuary, 2012. Projected Medicare Expenditures under
Illustrative Scenarios with Alternative Payment Updates
to Medicare Providers. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 18 May 2012.
11. Turner, Grace-Marie. Part D Is Still Working. Issue brief.
Galen Institute, Oct. 2012.
12. Turner, Grace-Marie. In The Fight At The Fiscal Cli,
Dont Throw The Valuables Over The Side. Forbes. Forbes
Magazine, 06 Dec. 2012.
13. Elmendorf, Douglas W. Rep. N.p.: n.p., n.d. CBOs Analy-
sis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March
2010. Congressional Budget Oce.
Emily Corning, An Urgent Wake Up Call: A Study
of Cell Phones in HIV/AIDS Programs in South-
east Asia
1. Fauci, Anthony S. After 30 years of HIV/AIDS, real prog-
ress and much left to do.
2. Detels, Roger. HIV/Aids in Asia: Introduction.
3. Fauci, Anthony S. After 30 years of HIV/AIDS, real prog-
ress and much left to do.
4. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS out-
reach and prevention on social networks,mobile phones
and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
5. Talk is Cheap.
6. Puccio, JA, et al. The use of cell phone reminder calls
for assisting HIV-infected adolescents and young adults
to adhere to highly active antiretroviral therapy: a pilot
study.
7. Seidenberg, Phil, et al. Early infant diagnosis of HIV in-
fection in Zambia through mobile phone texting of blood
test results.
8. Puccio, JA, et al. The use of cell phone reminder calls
for assisting HIV-infected adolescents and young adults
to adhere to highly active antiretroviral therapy: a pilot
study.
9. Bahadur, Mukund, and PJ Murray. Cell phone short
messaging service (SMS) for HIV/AIDS in South Africa: a
literature review.
10. Curioso, Walter H., and Ann E. Kurth. Access, use and
perceptions regarding Internet, cell phones and PDAs as
a means for health promotion for people living with HIV
in Peru.
11. Bahadur, Mukund, and PJ Murray. Cell phone short
messaging service (SMS) for HIV/AIDS in South Africa: a
literature review.
12. Ibid.
13. Curioso, Walter H., and Ann E. Kurth. Access, use and
perceptions regarding Internet, cell phones and PDAs as
a means for health promotion for people living with HIV
in Peru.
14. Bahadur, Mukund, and PJ Murray. Cell phone short
messaging service (SMS) for HIV/AIDS in South Africa: a
literature review.
15. Curioso, Walter H., and Ann E. Kurth. Access, use and
perceptions regarding Internet, cell phones and PDAs as
a means for health promotion for people living with HIV
in Peru.
16. Safreed-Harmon, Kelly. Mobile technologies playing a
growing role in HIV care and treatment support.
17. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS
outreach and prevention on social networks,mobile
phones and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
18. Safreed-Harmon, Kelly. Mobile technologies playing a
growing role in HIV care and treatment support.
19. Ibid.
20. Petty, Martin. Disconnected for Decades, Burma now
Poised for Telecom Boom.
21. Safreed-Harmon, Kelly. Mobile technologies playing a
growing role in HIV care and treatment support.
22. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS
outreach and prevention on social networks, mobile
phones and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
23. Talk is Cheap.
24. Curioso, Walter H., and Ann E. Kurth. Access, use and
perceptions regarding Internet, cell phones and PDAs as
a means for health promotion for people living with HIV
in Peru.
25. Safreed-Harmon, Kelly. Mobile technologies playing a
growing role in HIV care and treatment support.
26. Detels, Roger. HIV/Aids in Asia: Introduction.
27. Harris, Gardiner. Cellphones Reshape Prostitution in
India, and Complicate Eorts to Prevent AIDS.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Detels, Roger. HIV/Aids in Asia: Introduction.
31. Barre-Sinousse, Francoise, and Adeeba Kamarulza-
man. Towards and AIDS-free World.
32. Ibid.
33. Mechai warns of new HIV/Aids Crisis. Bangkok Post.
Post Publishing, 21 Dec. 2012. Web. 3 Feb. 2013. <http://
www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/327319/mechai-
warns-of-new-hiv-aids-crisis>.
77
34. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS
outreach and prevention on social networks, mobile
phones and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
35. Ibid.
36. Curioso, Walter H., and Ann E. Kurth. Access, use and
perceptions regarding Internet, cell phones and PDAs as
a means for health promotion for people living with HIV
in Peru.
37. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS
outreach and prevention on social networks, mobile
phones and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
38. Detels, Roger. HIV/Aids in Asia: Introduction.
39. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS
outreach and prevention on social networks, mobile
phones and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
40. Ibid.
41. Safreed-Harmon, Kelly. Mobile technologies playing a
growing role in HIV care and treatment support.
42. Walsh, Christopher S. Mobile and online HIV/AIDS
outreach and prevention on social networks, mobile
phones and MP3 players for marginalised populations.
43. Mechai warns of new HIV/Aids Crisis.
44. Seidenberg, Phil, et al. Early infant diagnosis of HIV
infection in Zambia through mobile phone texting of
blood test results.
45. Mechai warns of new HIV/Aids Crisis.
46. Ibid.
Defense and Diplomacy
Adrian Jaycox, Building Economic Ties with
Myanmar
1. BBC, BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacic-12992883.
2. U.S. Department of the Treasury, An Overview of the
Burmese Sanctions Regulations. http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/burma.pdf.
3. Haacke, Jrgen. LSE IDEAS, London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, Myanmar: now a site for
SinoUS geopolitical competition?. http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/47504/.
4. Turnell, Sean. University of California Press, Myanmar
in 2011: Confounding Expectations. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.1.157.
5. Kaplan, Robert D. Stratfor, How Myanmar Liberates
Asia. Last modied 2012. http://www.stratfor.com/week-
ly/how-myanmar-liberates-asia.
6. The New York Times, Myanmar. http://topics.nytimes.
com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/
myanmar/index.html.
7. Fuller, Thomas. The New York Times, Long Reliant
on China, Myanmar Now Turns to Japan. http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/10/11/world/asia/long-reliant-
on-china-myanmar-now-turns-to-japan-for-help.
html?pagewanted=all.
8. Englehart, Neil A. University of California Press, Two
Cheers for Burmas Rigged Election. http://www.jstor.org/
stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.4.666.
9. Democratic Voice of Burma, Investors warned of un-
stable legal system. http://www.dvb.no/news/investors-
warned-of-unstabl-legal-system/20150.
10. Japan International Cooperation Agency, Modern-
izing Myanmars Legal System. http://www.jica.go.jp/
english/news/eld/2012/20120920_01.html.
11. Psara, Luis. Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, International Support for Justice Reform in
Latin America: Worthwhile or Worthless?. http://www.wil-
soncenter.org/sites/default/les/Jutice Reform in LATAM.
pdf.
Leah Reiss, Rethinking the United States Embar-
go Against Cuba
1. Cuban Democracy Act, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Documents/cda.pdf.
2. Ibid.
3. Amnesty International, The US Embargo Against
Cuba, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
AMR25/007/2009/en/51469f8b-73f8-47a2-a5bd-
f839adf50488/amr250072009eng.pdf.
4. Bossuyt, Marc: The Adverse Consequences of Economic
Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Working
Paper prepared for the Commission On Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, Geneva: UN
Economic and Social Council, 21 June 2000.
5. Doug Bandow, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, http://
nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-pointless-cuba-
embargo-7834?page=1.
6. Cuba, http://www.pollingreport.com/cuba.htm.
7. http://havana.usint.gov/about-us.html.
8. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41617.pdf.
Cover Photo by: Amrita Mazumdar
All other photographs courtesy Wikimedia Commons.