2005 01 Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Organisations

Global Accountability Project Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Organisations: Background Research for the Complaint and
Redress Dimension January 2005

By Lucy de Las Casas
Houses of Parliament 2 Abbey Gardens London SW1A 0AA Tel +44 (0) 20 7219 3825 Fax +44 (0) 20 719 4879 Email owt@parliament.uk
Charity Commission No 210180
Trustees: Lord Archer of Sandwell QC Geoffrey Bindman Nazila Ghanea-Hercock Christopher Layton Peter Luff Dr Wendi Momen JP Joanna Reynolds Professor John Roberts Dr Gavin Strang MP Ted Wheatley
www.oneworldtrust.org
CONTENTS
Section 1: Introduction Section 2: Sector Overview 2.1 Intergovernmental Organisations 2.2 International Non-Governmental Organisations 2.3 Transnational Corporations Section 3: Analysis Contributing to Guidelines 3.1 Points Arising from Research for Intergovernmental Organisations 3.2 Points Arising from Research for Non-Governmental Organisations 3.3 Points Arising from Research for Transnational Corporations Section 4: Appendix of Research Notes and References 4.1 Notes from research on current practice in IGOs 4.2 Notes from research on current practice in INGOs 4.3 Notes from research on current practice in TNCs 18 24 26 12 14 16 4 6 9 3
Background Research for the GAP Complaint and Redress Dimension One World Trust http://www.oneworldtrust.org Charity No. 210180
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
Background to GAP The One World Trusts Global Accountability Project (GAP) was developed with the aim of promoting reform and enhancing the accountability of global organisations. By highlighting the key mechanisms that enhance the accountability of three main types of global organisation intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs) and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) - and assessing the accountability of representative organisations within these three sectors, the project will be able to identify accountability gaps and subsequently advocate for reforms on specific accountability issues. GAP has identified four core dimensions that make an organisation more accountable to its stakeholders. These must be integrated into an organisations policies, processes, and practices, at all levels and stages of decision making and implementation, in relationship with both its internal and external stakeholders. These four dimensions are transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaints and redress. Background to the Complaint and Redress Dimension Papers This paper was written in conjunction with the report Increasing Accountability through Complaint and Redress Mechanisms: Workshop Report, and together they informed the development of the GAP Framework Complaints and Redress Dimension. The GAP Complaint and Redress Dimension, including the guidelines, is available in Foundations of the Framework: the GAP Dimension Papers. The objective of this paper is twofold: 1. To provide an introduction to existing Complaint and Redress mechanisms for internal and external stakeholders of Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), and Transnational Corporations (TNCs), and the benefits and challenges associated with these (section 2); 2. To extract factors and considerations influencing the efficacy of complaint and redress mechanisms through a review of the information available on current mechanisms in IGOs, INGOs, and TNCs (section 3). The appendix (section 4) presents information on current mechanisms that informed section 3. This does not seek to give a comprehensive description, analysis, or critique of any or all of the mechanisms existing in each sector. Instead it presents information and comments from a number of sources (which do not necessarily represent the opinions of the One World Trust) relating to existing mechanisms. This information was used to extract what the One World Trust considers are important factors and considerations (section 3) for the development of guidelines for effective complaint and redress mechanisms which apply to IGOs, INGOs, and TNCs.
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SECTION 2: SECTOR OVERVIEW 2.1. Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs)1
The IGOs on which there is most information available on complaint and redress mechanisms, and in which these mechanisms appear the most developed, are the multilateral development banks (MDBs). This is perhaps because it is those IGOs that have the greatest public profile and have been at the centre of controversies regarding their policies in the past that have made the greatest strides to develop and improve their complaints procedures. The information and analysis of IGO mechanisms is therefore focused on those of the MDBs. Below is a brief overview of the state of Complaint and Redress mechanisms for internal and external stakeholders in MDBs: The protection provided for internal stakeholders (such as employees and contractors) bringing charges of compliance violations and corruption of the organisation with their own policies is crucial in ensuring accountability to all stakeholders. Robust whistleblower policies for IGOs are therefore vital. However, a study undertaken by the Government Accountability Project2, a US based non-profit, public interest law firm dedicated to whistleblower advocacy found substantial deficiencies in the whistle blower policies of four multilateral development banks (MDBs)3. The banks were assessed using a score card that examined whistleblower policies for their coverage (i.e. protection of relevant witnesses and audiences against retaliation or harassment), the independence of the setting in which the adjudication is undertaken, the integrity of the legal standards under which whistleblowers testify, the quality of compensation provided to those whistleblowers who have successfully fought their case, and the efficacy of the whistleblower process. All of the MDBs reviewed received an overall failing grade when compared to the legal norms compiled in the 24-point checklist4. This led the Government Accountability Project to conclude that given the present state of affairs it could not recommend that whistleblowers use the mechanisms currently available to them. However, the report notes that representatives of the MDBs reviewed are increasingly recognising the value of robust whistleblower protection policies as this is not only increases their accountability and perceived integrity, but is also a valuable management tool. The issue of complaints mechanisms for external stakeholders first gained ground in the light of a number of controversial cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the Sardar Sarovar Dam and Canal projects on the Narmada River in India5. The role of the World Bank in this project was criticised in a broad grassroots and international campaign, prompting it to commission an independent review of its role in the project. The resulting Morse Commission report documented failures of the World Bank to comply with its policies, and the serious human and environmental consequences arising from these violations. The report criticised the Banks approval culture in which the incentive structure encouraged staff to get projects approved as quickly as possible without adequate attention to their social and environmental implications4, 6. With international groups and member governments placing pressure on the
This section was informed by an internal background paper on Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in Intergovernmental Organisations prepared by Caroline Neligan. 2 Government Accountability Project, Challenging the Culture of Secrecy (2004) 3 The four MDBs in the report are the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 4 Government Accountability Project, Challenging the Culture of Secrecy (2004) 5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On, 2003. 6 Clark, D.L. (1999), A Citizens Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel, Center for International Environmental Law.
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Bank to develop more transparent accountability mechanisms to demonstrate its stated commitment to sustainable development, in 1993 the Board of Directors approved a policy on information disclosure and created the Inspection Panel whose objective was to hold the Bank accountable for violations of its policies and procedures. With this precedent set, other MDBs have since developed their own mechanisms to deal with cases where stakeholders have alleged that they have failed to comply with their own policies. The table below lists the mechanisms developed by the MDBs:
IGO World Bank (IDA and IBRD) World Bank (IFC & MIGA) Asian Development Bank (ADB) Inter American Development Bank (IDB) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) African Development Bank (AfDB) Name of mechanism Inspection Panel Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) Accountability Mechanism (which replaced the Inspection Function) Independent Investigation Mechanism Independent Recourse Mechanism Inspection Function Established 1993 1999 2004 1994 2003 In discussion
Within these mechanisms two approaches exist for dealing with complaints. One approach focuses on a review of the MDBs compliance with its policies and whether, if there has been a violation of a policy, this has had adverse effects on a group. The second approach is a problem solving approach, which aims to resolve the issue arising, without the need to apportion blame7. The World Bank Inspection Panel is a compliance review mechanism; the ABD and EBRD combine compliance and problem-solving approaches, and the CAO combines compliance and problem-solving approaches with an advisory remit under some circumstances. Other organisations in which complaint mechanisms have recently been developed include a number of export credit agencies, for instance the Japan Bank for International Cooperation Inspection Panel (2002), Canadian Export Development Corporation, and US Overseas Private Investment Corporation8. Benefits and Challenges These complaint mechanisms are important in increasing the accountability and transparency of the organisations; they have an important role in ensuring compliance with agreed standards, and, for those with a problem solving capability, in providing solutions to problems encountered, which may not be covered by agreed standards. They also provide an institutionalised means through which affected people can lodge complaints, thus encouraging complainants to work within agreed policies, rather than resorting to non-institutionalised means such as campaigns. However, there are challenges which can limit their effectiveness, including: Limited power of the mechanism to enforce recommendations; Compliance mechanisms do not solve the grievances of affected people9; Lack of leverage over some projects (e.g. where the MDB is a minority funder)10; Limited support from senior management11.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism, April 2003. Clark, D.L. (2004), Strategic Guide: Strategic Tips for Filing Complaints with International Financial Institutions, Friends of the Earth International and International Accountability Project. 9 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism, April 2003. 10 Asian Development Bank, Review of the Inspection Function: Establishment of a New ADB Accountability Mechanism, May 2003. 11 Fukada, K. Will We Finally See Accountability at the ADB? Critical Analysis of the New Accountability Mechanism of the Asian Development Bank, Mekong Watch Japan.
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2.2 Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs)12

The existence and development of complaint and redress mechanisms in INGOs is a topic on which there is limited information publicly available, though it is clear that in some arenas this subject is receiving an increasing amount of attention. This section provides a brief overview of the state of these mechanisms and, from the limited information found on the topic, presents a number of learnings from this sector. The scarcity of published information on the topic means many of the views presented below are based on a synthesis of informal discussion with representatives of NGOs. Currently some INGOs that have developed internal and external operating standards (such as codes of conduct) acknowledge the need to have procedures in place to enable and respond to complaints, although it is often evaluations that drive the reassessment of organisational practices and performance rather than response to a complaint. However, these self-regulatory frameworks (such as codes of conduct, codes of ethics) are an important aspect of INGO accountability mechanisms, including complaints and redress. These frameworks may be individual to an organisation, and/or can apply to a number of organisations (working in the same field, for example), and can include rules governing the operations of the organisation, financial practices, conduct for Boards/Councils, working with beneficiaries, reporting etc. They develop an understanding of and agreement around expected standards, and therefore supply a framework against which complaints can be addressed (with regard to the violation of these). This does not necessarily mean that there is a mechanism in place to facilitate stakeholders to make complaints, although in some cases these frameworks may specifically deal with the need for, and operationalisation of, complaint and redress mechanisms. The use of these self-regulatory frameworks as a basis for complaints and redress does pose a number of challenges: Where a framework is internal to an organisation compliance with these standards is not independently verified, nor is there any leverage to ensure responses to violations of the framework; Where a framework exists for a group of organisations participation is voluntary, and therefore, although peer pressure can be used to attempt to enforce standards, an organisation does not have to belong to this framework agreement; In wider groups sanctions for non-compliance may be enforced, but this is not binding. Below is a brief comment on the state of complaint and redress mechanisms for INGO stakeholders. Employees Generally INGOs have principles and procedures available for dealing with staff complaints. Donors Processes are generally in place to respond to negative feedback and/or complaints from institutional donors as part of the broader reporting mechanisms through which INGOs interact with the donors.
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This section was informed by an internal background paper on Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Nongovernmental Organisations prepared by Monica Blagescu.
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Beneficiaries Some INGOs that work in the field and interact directly with their beneficiaries are currently developing mechanisms to respond to complaints from these stakeholders. Among these, the humanitarian sector is at the forefront of the debate. The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I), for example, advocates for the right of disaster-affected populations to raise complaints and concerns, and for the obligation placed upon humanitarian actors to listen and respond to legitimate complaints13. The HAP-I Accountability Principles (December 2003) states as principle six Addressing Complaints: Members enable beneficiaries and staff to report complaints and seek redress safely14. HAP-Is Complaints Procedure sets out that it is the responsibility of members to receive, handle and respond to complaints, and that HAP-I, through which its secretariat and Standing Complaints Committee (SCC), tracks the progress of complaints and monitors decisions and actions being taken by the member. The SCC provides advice and comment where necessary, and may recommend that membership is suspended or terminated. Any matters that the SCC believes are not dealt with appropriately by the agency, or an appeal against the SCC decision by the complainant, are taken to the Board, which has final decision15. Another example is the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) task force on Protection from Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises, which was set up in response to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of refuges by humanitarian workers in West Africa, and a report by the UNHCR and Save the Children UK to this effect in February 200216. The resulting Plan of Action (June 2002) recommended actions in three areas: prevention, response, and management and implementation. Within Response a section was dedicated to Avenues for Recourse with the following objective and actions outlined17, clearly paving the way for development and implementation of complaint and redress mechanisms: Objective: o To develop mechanisms that allow survivors of sexual exploitation and abuse to report incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse; access legal, judicial or community-based recourse systems; and seek redress, including disciplinary action against perpetrators. Action: o Distribute revised guidelines for gender and age sensitive investigative protocols and complaints mechanism; o Establish confidential systems for both directly and indirectly receiving reports about possible sexual exploitation and abuse and ensuring their follow-up, with the agreement of the survivor; o Develop a process for determining appropriate redress for individual survivors, based on consultations with the community and local authorities, and support survivors in seeking such redress, in a manner that respects the due process rights of the accused as well as the rights of the survivor; o Develop a mechanism for monitoring survivors to ensure that they do not face any repercussions as a result of having lodged a complaint. An example of an INGO setting up a complaint mechanism for its beneficiaries is Save the Children UKs feedback committees in Zimbabwe. This involved setting up children feedback
http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=15&IDcat=4, accessed 29/11/2004. HAP International Accountability Principles, December 2003, http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=3&IDcat=10, accessed 29/11/2004. 15 HAP International, Complaints Against Member Agencies: Procedures, December 2003, accessed from http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=15&IDcat=4, 29/11/2004. 16 McIvor, C. (Save the Children, UK) (July 2004), Childrens feedback committees in Zimbabwe: an experiment in accountability, accessed from Humanitarian Practice Network, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2640, 29/11/04. 17 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Task force on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian crises, Plan of Action, June 2002, accessed from http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/publications.asp, 29/11/04.
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committees and a channel of communication independent from the agency to enable complaints from children, who were key beneficiaries of the projects, but whose views were previously little heard, to make complaints and have these responded to18. Benefits and Challenges An effective complaint and redress mechanism improves accountability to stakeholders by providing a channel for them to lodge their complaints and have these reviewed, and can also provide information that may not otherwise come to light, and which can be useful in improving effectiveness of work19. This may also protect against situations such as the one that led to the need for the IASC task force on Protection from Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises, mentioned above. However there are challenges associated with setting up effective complaint mechanisms. For instance, challenges identified through the Save the Children UK feedback committees in Zimbabwe include20: Ensuring members of vulnerable communities are empowered to make complaints and have the information they need; Engendering a culture of welcoming complaints so complaints are not withheld because of concern about the consequences of disclosure (e.g. withdrawal of food aid); Introducing complaint mechanisms may not be welcomed as it can challenge the current way of doing things (e.g. local leaders, political representatives). Further challenges, which can apply across all stakeholder groups include21: Distinguishing between valid criticism and complaints, and invalid ones; Responding to information received, especially when some things are outside INGO control; Communication with affected people of responses, reasons, limitations; Drawing lessons and knowledge from complaints and integrating this into future work; Making complaints and redress part of normal practice.
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McIvor, C. (Save the Children, UK) (July 2004), Childrens feedback committees in Zimbabwe: an experiment in accountability, accessed from Humanitarian Practice Network, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2640, 29/11/04. Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 HAP, HAP Briefings 4, Concerns and complaints of disaster-affected people, May 2001, accessed from http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=15&IDcat=4, 29/11/2004. Background Research for the GAP Complaint and Redress Dimension One World Trust http://www.oneworldtrust.org Charity No. 210180 Page 8
2.3 Complaints and Redress in Transnational Corporations (TNCs)22

When considering Complaint and Redress within TNCs the most obvious and well developed mechanism is that provided for customers with grievances relating to service or product. Mechanisms for other stakeholders also exist, but are at varying stages of development; for instance employee complaint mechanisms are generally well developed, whilst those for communities impacted by the TNC are less so. Below is a brief overview of the state of Complaint and Redress mechanisms for different stakeholders in TNCs. Customer Complaints Perhaps the most well developed mechanism of Complaints and Redress in TNCs (and certainly the most visible) relates to customer complaints and the traditional definition of complaints arising from dissatisfaction with products and/or services. The need for customer complaints mechanisms developed in the 1970s and arose from the emergence of the consumer movement and its focus on consumer rights and safety and quality issues. Considerable research exists on this topic documenting many advantages of providing an effective customer complaint mechanism. These include contributing to a customer focused organisation, enabling companies to discover weaknesses in customer service/products and identify ways of improving these, demonstrating customer care, and instilling confidence in users. There is even evidence to suggest that complainants who receive a satisfactory response to a complaint become more loyal to the provider than those that had no problem23. In addition avoiding damage to a companys reputation from consumer word of mouth is an important advantage, especially given the ease of communication, ubiquity of watchdogs, and intense competition in the customer marketplace. It is therefore generally accepted that good customer relations involves having a complaints process available to deal with customer complaints effectively, and that the benefits of this outweighs the cost of its provision. As a result of this most companies today run an effective customer Complaint and Redress mechanism. Complaints procedures vary between companies, with most clearly trying to deal with issues at the lowest possible level, through front line staff either on the ground and/or in customer call centres. Guidelines relating to complaint management are covered in both ISO 9000 and BSO 8600 standards. Employee Complaints Another complaints mechanism that is generally well developed in TNCs relates to employee complaints. This mechanism has developed in response to legislation and increasing awareness and legal cases relating to discrimination, workers rights, health and safety etc. For instance in the U.S. from 1992 to 2002 monetary settlements for sexual harassment charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission jumped from $12 million to $50 million24. Formal processes relating to legal issues are usually housed within the Human Resources department. The advantages of these working effectively relate to the avoidance of costs of compensation and reputation damage (with knock on effects on recruitment). More informal processes for employee complaints also exist in TNCs (e.g. related to office facilities,
This section was informed by an internal background paper on Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in Transnational Corporations prepared by Lucy de Las Casas. 23 Adamson, C. (1993), Evolving Complaint Procedures, Managing Service Quality, vol. 3:2. Brennan, C. and Douglas, A. (2002), Complaints Procedures in Local Government: Informing Your Customers, The International Journal of Public Sector Management, vol. 15:3. 24 http://www.microsoft.com/smallbusiness/issues/management/employee_relations/the_dangers_of_tuning_out_employee_ complaints.mspx Background Research for the GAP Complaint and Redress Dimension One World Trust http://www.oneworldtrust.org Charity No. 210180 Page 9
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pay etc), often situated within departments or teams. In addition the evolution of whistle blowing procedures to protect employees who raise complaints of company misconduct are essential, and the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with respect to whistleblower rights and protection have been important in progressing this area. Supplier Complaints Less information is available on mechanisms of Complaints and Redress relating to suppliers. An important factor to consider is that the power in the relationship lies with the purchasing TNC. In many cases mechanisms to deal with complaints related to breaches of contract by the TNC are included in contracts, enabling companies to resolve issues without resort to legal means. These usually involve a specified contact for complaints, a timeline for resolution and an internal process of escalation should it prove necessary. Shareholder complaints Mechanisms for shareholder complaints vary, as does the willingness of different companies to accept and respond to these. Institutional shareholders will usually make complaints directly to management, at the AGM, or in collaboration with other institutional shareholders. The prevalence of this shareholder activism varies between countries, for instance being much more common in the U.S. than the U.K. However in general individual shareholders have little, if any, recourse to complaints mechanisms. External stakeholders Mechanisms of Complaint and Redress for external stakeholders appear less developed, possibly due to the fact that it is only recently that there has been widespread awareness of the rights of these stakeholders. One arena in which Complaints and Redress mechanisms have started to develop for external stakeholders is among producers and retailers of brand name clothing and sporting goods, specifically in response to labour rights issues. This does not relate to employee complaints, despite being in relation to labour rights, as the workers are generally employed by a supplier to the TNC. Instead, where workers either cannot raise the issue with their employer (the supplier), or there is no response to the complaint25, the complaint can be raised with the brand name TNC that deals with the suppliers either by the workers, or by NGOs/labour activists on their behalf. In many cases the mechanisms used to deal with these complaints are run by multi stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) to which the TNC belongs, which have codes of conduct or certification schemes. These organisations include the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC), the Fair Labour Association (FLA), the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), Social Accountability International (SAI), and the Fair Wear Foundation (FWF). The operational practices of these MSIs vary; in some they encourage complaints to be made to the supplier organisation, in some they file and investigate the complaints themselves, and others, such as the FLA and SAI ensure that complaints are made directly to the member company (sourcing company/TNC). In these cases the TNC/member companies have to develop internal systems to process and follow up on complaints of rights violations themselves. Where a TNC has its own internal process for dealing with complaints of this type it is a positive step, however there is little information available about how these processes work and their effectiveness. Some information suggests that internal processes may not be particularly comprehensive, as they often fail to engage the complainant and other workers26. Interesting questions arise from this situation, such as whether TNCs should rely on MSIs to solve their problems for them, the leverage that TNCs have over suppliers, and how supplier companies can be made accountable for their own labour issues. However the use of MSIs
25 This is a reflection on the state of employee complaint processes in the supplier company, which may also be a TNC 26 Ascoly, N. and Zeldenhurst, I. (2003), Considering Complaint Mechanisms: An Important Tool for Code Monitoring and Verification, Somo, Amsterdam. Background Research for the GAP Complaint and Redress Dimension One World Trust http://www.oneworldtrust.org Charity No. 210180 Page 10
does have advantages: they increase independence of a mechanism, ensure certain standards are adhered to in processing complaints, and can offer expertise in the area. Benefits and Challenges Effective Complaint and Redress mechanisms can be beneficial to TNCs in three main ways: By providing valuable learning opportunities for TNCs to improve their services, products and processes; By providing a means of input into decision-making and planning processes which can prevent issues arising in the final stages of planning or implementation, at which point it is often more costly and complex to resolve; By providing a means for issues to be brought to the attention of TNCs and dealt with effectively by the TNC without resort to non-institutionalised means such as watchdog campaigns, media pressure etc. Challenges also arise in providing Complaint and Redress mechanisms: Ensuring independence of the complaints process; Dealing with malicious or frivolous complaints; Ensuring non-retaliation for complainants; Responding to non-institutionalised forms of complaint such as protest or boycott; Expectation of taking responsibility for suppliers, and the question of how far this extends; The companys leverage to impact suppliers; Managing stakeholder expectations in line with the limits of TNC power; Developing credibility and trust in the mechanism; Balancing the resolution of complaints with business priorities.
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SECTION 3: ANALYSIS CONTRIBUTING TO GUIDELINES

The tables in section 3 present the factors and considerations produced from the One World Trusts review of information and opinion available on current Complaint and Redress mechanisms in IGOs, INGOs and TNCs. This information does not aim to provide a comprehensive picture of any sector, but rather reflects the information that was gathered from research (comments are therefore absent from some sections). The research notes that informed these are presented and referenced in the appendix (section 4). These points presented below were used to formulate the principles and guidelines for the Complaint and Redress Dimension of the GAP Framework.
3.1 Points Arising from Research for Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs)

Factors and considerations arising from research
Complaint mechanisms can include both problem solving/ombudsman and compliance review processes. These have different objectives: a problem-solving process aims to resolve the issue of the complainant without judging or apportioning blame; a compliance review process aims to assess whether an organisation is at fault and if so to issue redress, i.e. to hold it to account for its actions. The presence of a problem solving mechanism should not prevent or make it more difficult for complainants to hold an organisation to account by lodging a complaint through a compliance review mechanism Mechanisms should encourage the resolution of the issue at lower levels within the organisation (e.g. with project based staff). Referral to the mechanism should be a last resort only. Mechanisms should ensure accountability throughout the project process. As far as possible there should not be a cut-off point after which the organisation cannot be held to account (e.g. 95% disbursement) Terms of Reference should include: o Explanation of complaints that will be accepted; o Explanation of who can lodge a complaint (this can allow complaints to be made on behalf of an affected party in some situations, with the agreement of the affected party); o An outline of the process for dealing with a complaint; o Clear timelines for every stage of dealing with a complaint; o Any preconditions for filing a complaint. Complainants must be able to request that their identities are kept confidential. Complainants may be able to request that information they provide is kept confidential. The Complaints Body must be set up so as to be independent from the management of the organisation, and must be able to make recommendations which are not influenced by the organisation: o Complaints Body should report directly to the Board/President o The independence of the mechanism should not be compromised by allowing Management to change recommendations made by the Complaints Body. Members of the Complaints Body should be independent of the organisation, and should not have any conflicts of interest: o E.g. not employed at the organisation for x years previously, not able to work at the organisation following the post; o E.g. members could be appointed using external sources to increase credibility of independence. The Complaints Body should not be involved in any work with projects (such as advisory work), which might later affect their independence, were a complaint to arise. The recruitment of staff for the Complaints Body should be done in such a way as to ensure their independence (e.g. CAO). The Complaints Body should be permanent. The Complaints Body should have its own support function and agreed budget. The Complaints Body should be able to employ additional resources, including specialists/consultants for specific tasks, where necessary.
Organisation Policy
Organisation Capacity
Resources
Governance
Terms of reference
Mechanism design
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Embeddedness
The complaints mechanism should have full support of the Board and Senior Management. To be successful in dealing with complaints the organisation should develop a culture of openness to receiving and dealing with complaints. Staff at all levels of the organisation should be aware of, and be trained to deal with, complaints. Information on the complaint mechanism should be made available in all project agreements and documentation. The mechanism terms of reference and information on how to file a complaint should be readily available and easily accessible to all stakeholders. Terms of reference need to be available in appropriate languages to ensure accessibility. Terms of reference could be actively distributed by the organisation to stakeholders who are likely to need to make a complaint. Ideally complainants should not need specialist knowledge in order to be able to file a complaint (e.g. be able to identify policy violations). Requirements for filing a complaint should be such that stakeholder investment necessary to file a complaint (time, finances) is minimised. The language in which complaints can be filed should be considered, taking into account the likely capability of stakeholders. The independent Complaints Body must undertake assessment of the complaint. If the independent Body recommends an investigation the Board should authorise this unless there are valid objections. Clear criteria by which the eligibility of a complaint will be assessed should be available. In the event of a complaint being rejected the reasons for this should be communicated to the claimant. Consideration should be given to whether there is a right to, or route for, appeal, should a complaint be rejected. The Complaints Body should: o Ensure consultation with the full range of stakeholders; o Be guaranteed to be able to undertake site visits; o Be allowed access to internal documents; o Consult with the claimants. The Complaints Body should ensure comprehensive documentation and records of the investigation, including clarity regarding material that should be kept confidential. All issues raised in the complaint should be investigated. Complainants should be given access to a draft of the report and recommendations, and allowed to comment on this. Organisations should address the issue that currently, in most cases, the Complaints Body is not in a position to offer binding recommendations or redress to the claimants. The mechanism should be set up in such a way as to create maximum pressure for the Board to agree and implement the Complaint Bodys recommendations. The final report of the Complaints Body should be published, unabridged, so that stakeholders can evaluate how the Board responded to the recommendations. Organisations should have a systematic program to feed back lessons learnt from the complaint, ensure that practices which have contributed to the problem are not repeated, and to ensure practices and project outcomes continuously improve. In the case of a problem solving process this should be able to trigger a compliance review if applicable.
Complaint Filing
Complaint Investigation
Outcomes
Organisational corrective action
Redress for the complainant
Process of investigation
Assessment of complaint
User friendliness
Information availability
Post Resolution Follow-Up
A mechanism should be in place to monitor implementation of recommendations and review the impact of these. This mechanism could be the Complaints Body, or an independent third party.
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3.2 Points Arising from Research for International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs)
Mechanisms should ensure that they are designed to be accessed and used by the most vulnerable, particularly those who may not usually be considered and consulted. Mechanisms must provide a channel for complaints that is separate from the person/project/action to which the complaint relates. Where possible the Board/Council that the mechanism reports to should have power to recommend and enforce changes in response to the complaint investigation. If possible the mechanism should include a process for appeal, for if the outcomes are not satisfactory to the complainant. This could take the form of an independent third party, which is referred to if necessary (e.g. HAP-I). The definition of complaints accepted should be made clear, with reference to codes or guidelines where applicable. Confidentiality must be respected, unless all parties agree to the release of information. Timelines should be provided for investigation and reporting to the complainant. Complainants must be protected from retribution. The body dealing with and investigating the complaint should as far as possible be independent from any organisation involved, for instance by: o Having members from other organisations, which are independent and not involved in the situation; o Ensuring that members do not investigate a complaint if there is any conflict of interest. Sufficient resources and expertise must be made available for the complaint mechanism. Senior management must recognise the importance of an effective C&R mechanism and try to secure adequate funding from donors.
Organisation Policy
Resources
Governance
Terms of reference
Mechanism design
Embeddedness
Policies should take into consideration the existing political, economic and cultural background in which the field offices operate; if a specific policy for the field office is not adopted, local staff should be trained on how to adapt and implement it accordingly.
Complaint Filing
Information availability User friendliness Assessment of complaint
INGOs should use local knowledge to make information available through the most effective means.
Training can be provided to potential complainants to help them to access the mechanism.
The filing of the complaint and process of investigation should be recorded. The investigation of the complaint should be carried out within provided timelines. The complainant should be kept informed of the progress and status of the investigation. The investigation of the complaint should either be independent from the organisation, or could be monitored by an independent body/have an independent body that is able to receive and investigate issues with the process.
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Organisational Redress for the corrective action complainant
Consideration should be given as to whether the complainant is involved in determining redress. In general there is often no, or very little, redress available for the complainant.
Outcomes
Where possible an independent party should monitor implementation of agreed actions arising from investigation.
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3.3 Points Arising from Research for Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Mechanisms must be designed to meet the needs and situations of the complainants. An escalation process should exist for when the complaint cannot be resolved. In cases where the internal mechanism fails to resolve the complaint referral to an existing external, independent mechanism should be considered. The organisations should consider whether an appeals process should be in place, and how this would work. It may be an external third party. Companies can belong to third party mechanisms to improve their capability to deal with complaints, their independence, and their legitimacy. If organisations belong to a third party which can process their complaints is this acceptable or should they develop the internal capability necessary to deal with complaints effectively? Relationships, roles and responsibilities between parties involved in a partnership must be clear. Terms of reference should include: o Scope of the mechanism; o What constitutes a complaint (working definition with reference to guidelines/codes etc if necessary); o Who can make a complaint; o To whom a complaint should be referred (especially where multiple parties are concerned, e.g. MSIs); o Rules governing decisions made; o Legal force of decisions; o Costs; o Clear timeframe targets for each stage of the process. Complaints must only be able to be filed on behalf of workers with their proven consent. The identity of the complainant should be able to be kept confidential. Mechanisms should be in place to prevent possible repercussions on the claimant (e.g. monitoring). The mechanism should be free or involve minimal costs. The governance structure of mechanisms must ensure independence from the companies involved. Decision makers in the mechanism must be independent (consider time appointed for, connections (past, present and future) with the organisations involved). Where the mechanism included representation from external stakeholders these stakeholders must be truly independent, well informed and active, and their views and inputs must be taken note of. In partnerships roles and responsibilities must be clearly assigned. Adequate resources must be deployed to the mechanism: o Budget; o Staff; o Capability. Significant investment is necessary in the mechanism. Flexibility is necessary due to unpredictability of work. Top management involvement and commitment is essential. Management responsibility should be assigned for ensuring that confidential, accessible systems are available for the logging of complaints. The mechanisms should be in place throughout the organisation to ensure that complainants are able to lodge and resolve their complaint at the level to which it applies. The organisation should be open to receiving complaints.
Organisation Policy
Resources
Governance
Terms of reference
Mechanism design
Embeddedness
The mechanism should be well advertised and visible. Accurate and relevant information should be readily available on: o Terms of reference (what is a complaint, how to file it, etc); o How to access the complaint mechanisms - where, how and to whom. Information should be presented in a way that is easy to understand. Information should be available in different languages where necessary. Mechanism must be accessible to all stakeholders for whom it is designed. Ideally access to the mechanism should be free and lodging the complaint should involve minimal commitment of resources (financial and time) from the complainant. The mechanism must cater for access by disadvantaged and minority customers (e.g. language, impaired sight etc). Requirements for filing a complaint should be as straightforward as possible; ideally specialist knowledge should not be required. Where specialist knowledge is required for complaint submission support should be provided for this.
Complaint Filing
User friendliness
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Complaints should be assessed against a clear, published definition of a complaint. The acceptance/rejection decision must be made transparent. If a complaint is not sufficient to trigger the complaint mechanism the information should feed into the monitoring and verification or evaluation process as a safeguard.
Organisational Redress for the corrective action complainant
Outcomes
The investigation team must be independent. The investigation team must have the necessary capabilities and knowledge for the situation. The investigation plan should be agreed in consultation with the complainant. The complainant must be allowed to present their case. Should complainants have the right to hear the arguments and facts put together by the other party and any expert statements? The investigation must include consultation with all relevant stakeholders. The process must allow for timely resolution of the complaint. Safeguards must be in place to ensure accurate and representative information is collected. Quality standards relating to the process of investigation could be put in place. Redress should be determined with reference to clear criteria. A range of redress options should be considered. The complainant should be involved in the determination of the redress. The complainant/person who filed the complaint must be satisfied with the process and outcome. The redress must be specific to the situation and local conditions. Timelines should be set for completion of the agreement and responsibilities assigned.
Complaints received should be analysed to provide feedback and learning. The root cause of complaints should be identified and addressed to prevent the complaint arising again. Plan should include corrective and preventative action for future.
Implementation of the agreement should be monitored. This could be by an independent 3rd party. An escalation process should be in place for circumstances where the agreement is not satisfactorily implemented.
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SECTION 4: APPENDIX OF RESEARCH NOTES

The information in the appendices below presents a record of the research OWT carried out from available information and opinion on current Complaint and Redress mechanisms. The objective of presenting the research notes in this way is to enable any interested party to understand and trace the information and sources that informed the development of the guidelines for the Complaint and Redress Dimension. Note that the appendix does not seek to give a comprehensive description, analysis, or critique of the mechanisms existing in each sector. Instead it presents information and comments from a number of sources (which do not necessarily represent the opinions of the One World Trust) relating to existing mechanisms. This information was used to inform the points for consideration presented in section 3, which in turn were used to develop the guidelines for the Complaint and Redress dimension. The research for IGOs (section 4.1), INGOs (section 4.2) and TNCs (section 4.3) is presented in a table format of notes assigned against key elements of Complaint and Redress mechanisms. N.B. A bracketed number after each note references the note to a source, which appears below the table.
4.1 Notes from research on current practice in IGOs

Compliance review/ombudsman role WBIP: compliance mechanism only (10) CAO: Three distinct roles: Ombudsman, Advisory, Compliance (8) CAO: ombudsman role/problem solving mechanism for affected parties, with some compliance audit responsibilities (10) ADB: Two stages to the mechanism: the Special Project Facilitator (SPF) is a consultation/problem solving stage, which uses consensus-based methods to reach outcomes rather than identifying blame; the Compliance Review (CR) addresses non-compliance of ADB operations (3). EDC: encourage dialogue and dispute resolution between parties in response to a complaint, and to recommend a compliance audit if necessary (separate from complaint) (14) EBRD: IRM includes a compliance review and problem-solving function (13) Overall accountability of process WBIP: 95% disbursement cut-off creates an accountability gap for projects (6) ADB: Complaint can be submitted until the project completion report is issued (usually within 2 years of physical completion of the project) (2) ADB requirement that complainants must first go through SPF phase delays complainants ability to file for Compliance Review, (84 days) and undermines affected peoples right to hold ADB accountable (16) EBRD: Complaint must be submitted within 12 months of physical completion of the project or last disbursement of funds (13)
Organisation Policy
Mechanism design
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Timescales WBIP has clear time limits on Managements response to Request and Panels determination of eligibility of Request. Managements response to Board timescale is not always adhered to (17) WBIP has no commitment to when Panel conducts investigation, when Board responds to Panel report and decides on action plan (7) CAO has clear time limits on acknowledgement of complaint, appraisal and acceptance/rejection, assessment, response and settlement (9). If the nature of the complaint or special circumstance make this impractical timescales are agreed with the complainant (9) CAO evaluation recommendation: Firm timelines for responses to complaints should be maintained and communicated by the CAO. Including for launching an investigation, time period for complaint assessment report, timely responses to parties communications. (10) IDB: No clear timescales for acknowledgement, investigation etc (4) ADB: Timescales set for registration and acknowledgement of complaint, determination of eligibility, Board authorisation, and informing complainant. Compliance review investigation is not time bound. Management and complainant response to draft report, final report and Board decision are time bound (1) Scope WBIP: Panel does not register complaints that are outside its mandate, anonymous, or frivolous (17) ABD: Matters not eligible for complaints are clarified (e.g. procurement, fraud, previously considered projects) (2) EBRD: Complaints are not registered if the complaint is not complete, is frivolous or malicious, is made to gain competitive advantage, is outside the scope of the IRM (procurement, fraud, corruption, Bank policies in general, matters only the Board of Directors can consider) (13). Terms of reference Eligibility for filing complaints WBIP: 2 or more local people threatened with material harm by WB supported projects, or a local representative acting on behalf of local people with proof of authorisation. In exceptional circumstances a non-local representative, a single executive Director, or the Board (6) ADB: 2 or more people, or authorised representatives EDC: Any party affected by EDCs CSR issues (incl. individuals), also on behalf of parties with authorisation (14) EBRD: a group of 2 or more people with a common interest, which has suffered or is likely to suffer direct harm as a result of a project that the Bank is likely to finance or has financed (13) Protection of claimants WBIP: Complainant can request that their names are kept confidential (6) CAO: Complainants can request that their identities and other information submitted be kept confidential (5). This is balanced with the need for disclosure to reinforce independence and impartiality (9) EDC: Material can be submitted confidentially to support a complaint. CO will not disclose nonpublic information submitted confidentially to any third party, including EDC management, without permission of complainant (14) ADB: Claimants can request confidentiality (16) but anonymous complaints not accepted (2) IDB has no procedure for guaranteeing anonymity of claimants (5) In some cases it is possible for claimants to be identified, despite requesting confidentiality, and for retaliation to occur (6) EBRD: Anonymous complaints are not accepted, but complainants can requested confidentiality (13) Preconditions WBIP: Complainants must have tried to raise concerns about the project with WB staff or management, giving the Bank an opportunity to address the problems (6) CAO: Affected parties must have first engaged with IFC and MIGA about the problems with the project (5)
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Independence WBIP: Panel independent form Bank Management, reports go direct to Board (17) WBIP: Officers must not have worked at the organisation for 2 years prior to serving, and cannot work for the institution again in the future (17). Members cannot participate in the investigation of a complaint which the member has a personal interest or involvement (17) EDC Compliance Officer is autonomous and independent office, within EDC (14) ADB: Compliance Review Panel independent of ADB management, and SPF independent of Operations Department (3) ADB: SPF reports to President, therefore not independent from Management. SPF can be appointed internally (16) In the previous ADB Inspection Function the Board Inspection Function (BIC) was made up of ADB Board members, some may have had conflicts of interests regarding countries that they represent as Board members (16) CAO: Independence reinforced through structure: CAO reports to President of WB Group, staff recruited by CAO, staff independent of IFC and MIGA management structure, office physically located in secure area, CAO and staff cautious about becoming involved in internal IFC and MIGA affairs (9) EBRD: Experts must not have worked at the organisation for 2 years prior to serving, and cannot work for the institution again in the future (12) Appointment CAO: External search committee for IFC/MIGA Compliance Ombudsman to build legitimacy (10) Members of the WBIP nominated by the President and approved by the Board of Executive Directors (6) ADB: CRP appointed by Board. SPF appointed by President (3) Other CAO evaluation recommendation: Maintain CAO independence from pre-complaint project specific advice (10) WBIP: Mechanism has own secretariat (permanent staff) with own budget (7) WBIP: Panel can call on external consultants to provide expert knowledge (17) CAO has full time staff, own secretariat, and budget (10) ADB: Panel is permanent (16), and SPF and CRP each have their own supporting office (OSPF, OCRP) (3) IDB has no permanent members of staff. A panel is convened from a Roster of Experts on an ad hoc basis (5) CAO evaluation recommendation: ensure that sufficient resources are available for CAO when intensive and extensive CAO involvement is necessary (10) CAO: fixed administrative budget. Additional funds from a Contingency Fund are available in the instance of an unexpected volume of work Senior Management Support Full support from the Board of Directors and political commitment to the mechanism needed (IDB) (4) No problem attitude of ADB: management ignores existence of problems (16) Staff training ADB: Staff of organisation must be trained regarding potential negative impacts of projects (16) CAO: Working with management of IFC and MIGA to ensure staff include notification of existence of CAO in dealings with sponsors and clients, and that information on the CAO is included in project cycle documentation (8) EDC: Terms of reference published on website (14) ADB: leaflet available on who can file a complaint, how to, eligibility of complaints, necessary content of a complaint (2) EBRD: Guide to making a complaint includes guidelines (who can make a complaint, what about, how, what happens), process summary, sample complaint form, and rules of procedure (13) EBRD: Information presented in question and answer format (13)
Complaint Filing
Embeddedness
Resources
Governance
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User friendliness
Specialist knowledge required ADB: claimants do not need to identify policy violations. For the initial stage they need only identify a project and state that they have been or are threatened with harm. If the claim continues to the ADBs Compliance Review Panel the Panel will determine whether there has been a policy violation (6) (16) (3) WBIP: claimant must identify ways in which the Bank has violated its own operational policies and procedures, or the terms of its loan agreement, and how these violations have or could harm rights and interests of project affected people or their environment placing a large burden on projectaffected peoples (6) WBIP: Claimants do not need to cite specific policies. On the basis of the factual situation and elements of harm presented the Panel will identify whether any policies apply (17) Language ADB: claim to SPF and request for compliance review can be submitted in any official or national language of the ADBs developing member countries (16) In the previous ADB Inspection Function claimants were required to identify policy violations, where the policies were presented in English only (16) CAO: Complaints may be submitted in any language. CAO attempts to respond in the language of the complainant where possible (9) EBRD: Complaint can be submitted in the native language of the groups members. Response will be in English, or another EBRD working language if requested (13) Resource input WBIP: time and resource intensive (including financial), lengthy process, requiring considerable commitment, with possibilities of risk of retaliation, and no guaranteed outcomes (6) WBIP: Panel decides eligibility of claim (6), but WB Board must authorise investigation by the Panel (17). Claimant has no right to appeal WBIPs recommendation not to investigate (6) WBIP: Board authorises investigation on a no-objection basis (17) EDC: CO determines whether complaint falls within mandate. Letter outlining reasons sent to those whose complaints are rejected (14) CAO: if complaint is rejected CAO informs complainant in writing, outlining reasons (9) CAO can decide not to process complaints as ombudsman complaints but instead to do a compliance audit or to exercise advisory function. Complainant has no control over this decision, and if this occurs the complainant no longer has control over the process (5) ADB: Board decides whether a particular policy is an operational policy subject to compliance review (3) ADB: if complaint to SPF is found ineligible claimant can file a compliance review request. Complainants can also file a compliance review request if not they are not satisfied with the consultation process (3) Access to information WBIP: wide involvement of different parties, including claimants, ability to hire consultants, hold public hearings, request and receive submissions, research Bank files (6) CAO: Investigation includes researching IFC and MIGA files, meetings with complainant, other affected peoples, IFC and MIGA staff, sponsors, government officials, NGOs, visiting projet sites, holding public meetings in project area (9) Site visits ADB: Governments can object to site visits, restricting the ability of the Panel to investigate (16) WBIP: Panel needs governments consent to travel to project area for purposes of investigation (6) Involvement of complainant in production of report ADB: claimants are provided with a copy of the draft panel report and provided with 30 days to comment. Only the CRPs final view will be reflected in the report to the Board (1) WBIP: Claimants have no opportunity to comment on the Panel report, make recommendations to the Board, or appeal a decision or finding of the WBIP (6) Other CAO evaluation recommendation: ensure issues raised in the complaint are addressed, and distinguish from other issues arising during the course of the investigation (10) CAO evaluation recommendation: ensure comprehensive documentation and records of investigation process and outputs (10) CAO evaluation recommendation: ensure issues raised in the complaint are addressed, and distinguish from other issues arising during the course of the investigation (10) ADB: Panel cannot recommend suspension of loans while the inspection is in progress to prevent further damage to affected communities while investigation is occurring (16) EBRD: Filing and investigation of a complaint will not suspend disbursements for the relevant operation. If during the processing of the complaint the IRM believes that the continuation of the project may cause irreparable harm it may recommend that work or disbursement is suspended (12)
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Power of mechanism to make changes CAO has no power to award compensation, stop work on, or cancel a project (5) WBIP cannot award financial damages to aggrieved parties, or stop a project (6) Redress for the complainant Determining redress Action plan usually developed by Management in consultation with borrower government, and approved by Board with no input from claimants, affected people, or Panel (6). WBIP does not have oversight of action plans (6) In the previous ADB Inspection Function BIC could suggest alternative remedial measures to the Board to those suggested by Panel (16) EBRD: Mechanism can make recommendations that address any issues of non-compliance (11) Implementing redress WBIP: Little authority to monitor implementation of remedial actions once case is over (6) WBIP reports made public after process, allowing stakeholders to evaluate whether the Board has carried out Panel recommendations (6) ADB panel charged with monitoring implementation of recommendations for 5 years following report to Board of Executive Directors (6) CAO evaluation recommendation: develop a systematic program to feed lessons learnt from handling of complaints back into the system to ensure IFC and MIGA practices which have contributed to the problem are not repeated, and to ensure practices and project outcomes continuously improve (10) EDC: Compliance Officers recommendations from Compliance Audit are not binding on EDC. However a position is created whereby recommendations must be taken seriously (14) EDC: Compliance Office includes process for follow-up monitoring and review as part of resolution (14) ADB: monitoring of implementation for both phases (3) CAO: Seeks to ensure that agreements between parties make provisions for review and monitoring. May involve mutually agreed timelines and indicators to achievement (9) EBRD: Power to require a periodic review of the implementation of any recommendations approved (11)
Outcomes
References 1. Asian Development Bank, Review of the Inspection Function: Establishment of a New ADB Accountability Mechanism, May 2003. 2. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Bank Accountability Mechanism: Listening to Communities Affected by ADB-Assisted Projects and Enhancing Development Effectiveness, March 2004. 3. Asian Development Bank, Overview of ADB Accountability Mechanism, Presentation for the One World Trust Workshop on Increasing Accountability through Complaints and Redress, 14-15 October 2004, http://compliance.adb.org/dir0035p.nsf/alldocs/MAGV5X7CMW?OpenDocument, accessed 29/11/2004. 4. Center for International Environmental Law, CIEL Questions President of Inter-American Development Bank Over Systematic Problems with the Structure and Procedures of the Independent Investigation Mechanism, http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/IADB_IIM_21Feb03.html, February 2003, accessed 29/11/2004. 5. Center for International Environmental Law (2000), A Handbook on the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment guarantee Agency: A Discussion Draft. 6. Clark, D.L. (2004), Strategic Guide: Strategic Tips for Filing Complaints with International Financial Institutions, Friends of the Earth International and International Accountability Project. 7. Clark, D.L. (1999), A Citizens Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel, Center for International Environmental Law. 8. Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, 2003-04 Annual Report. 9. Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, Operational Guidelines, April 2004.
Background Research for the GAP Complaint and Redress Dimension One World Trust http://www.oneworldtrust.org Charity No. 210180 Page 22
Organisational corrective action
10. Dysart, B., Murphy, T. & Chayes, A. (July 2003) Beyond Compliance? An External Review Team Report on the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman Office of IFC and MIGA, Washington D.C. 11. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism, April 2003. 12. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism: Rules of Procedure, April 2004. 13. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism: The guide to making a complaint about an EBRD-financed project, July 2004. 14. Export Development Canada, http://www.edc.ca/corpinfo/csr/complianceofficer/, accessed 08/11/04. 15. Export Development Canada, 2003 Annual Compliance Report. 16. Fukada, K. Will We Finally See Accountability at the ADB? Critical Analysis of the New Accountability Mechanism of the Asian Development Bank, Mekong Watch Japan. 17. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On, 2003.
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4.2 Notes from research on current practice in INGOs

Save the Children (StC): Design should enable the most vulnerable and least consulted to access the mechanism (children in this case) (6) StC: People and organisations tasked with registering complaints may be the same people against which complaints are directed. Therefore dependent on person to pass on complaint for resolution. (6). An independent channel of communication (ombudsman) should be established for complaints (rather than relying on agency staff) (6) StC: Board has mandate to redirect food aid operations in response to comments received (6) HAP-I: complainant can appeal to HAP Board about the Standing Complaint Committee (SCC) decision within 30 days. The Board will review the case and make a final decision (3) HAP-I: all complaints and information associated with complaints are treated in confidence unless both the agency and complainant agree to their release (3) HAP-I definition of scope of complaints accepted as those failing to comply with HAP-Is accountability framework and the concerned agencys accountability framework (3) HAP-I: Clear timelines for some (but not all) actions and stages of process (3) StC: Some committee members have been stigmatised as agency spies (6) StC: Harsh retribution for the complainants often results (7) IASC: Establish confidential systems for both directly and indirectly receiving reports about possible sexual exploitation and abuse and ensuring their follow-up, with the agreement of the survivor (5) IASC: Develop a mechanism for monitoring survivors to ensure that they do not face any repercussions as a result of having lodged a complaint (5) StC: Ombudsman point of contact is independent from agency staff on the ground (6) StC: Ombudsman reports to a Board including the agency director, a representative from a principal donor, a government delegate, and a representative from another humanitarian agency (6) HAP-I: The SCC is composed of three members and two alternates elected by the Board. The SCC shall include: one member who is not an employee, volunteer or trustee of a member agency, two persons from member agencies, and two alternates from different member agencies (3) HAP-I: In the situation of a conflict of interest an alternative member of the SCC replaces the conflicted member (3) HAP-I: SCC members are elected for 1 year, which is renewable (3) HAP-I has a permanent secretariat to support the SCC HAP-I: consultants with necessary expertise are employed if necessary (3) Mechanism design Organisation Policy Organisation Capacity Resources Governance Terms of reference
Embeddedness
Complaint Filing
Information availability User friendliness Assessment of complaint Process of investigation
StC: Child committee representatives provided with training in skills necessary to enable them to collect and report on complaints, and represent and be accountable to wider group of children (6)
HAP-I: Assessment by organisation, and if necessary SCC, against defined scope for complaints (3)
HAP-I: clear process for complaint to be recorded, acknowledged, communicated to relevant parties, and reviewed (3) HAP-I: Secretariat ensures that complainant is kept informed of the status of the review, and of its outcome (3) HAP-I: SCC monitors the agency and its dealings with the complaint, and intervenes where it is not satisfied (3)
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Organisational corrective action Post Resolution Follow-Up
HAP-I: member agency submits report with conclusions and follow-up actions for review to the SCC (3) HAP-I: No financial redress can be imposed or provided by HAP-I (3) StC: Usually little redress for the victims (7) HAP-I: SCC requires that agency reports back on actions taken (3) IASC: Develop a process for determining appropriate redress for individual survivors, based on consultations with the community and local authorities, and support survivors in seeking such redress, in a manner that respects the due process rights of the accused as well as the rights of the survivor (5)
Outcomes
HAP-I: SCC monitors that agency reports back on actions taken, and that these are completed (3)
References 1) HAP International Accountability Principles, December 2003, http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=3&IDcat=10, accessed 29/11/2004. 2) HAP International, http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=15&IDcat=4, accessed 29/11/2004. 3) HAP International, Complaints Against Member Agencies: Procedures, December 2003, accessed from http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=15&IDcat=4, 29/11/2004. 4) HAP, HAP Briefings 4, Concerns and complaints of disaster-affected people, May 2001, accessed from http://www.hapinternational.org/en/page.php?IDpage=15&IDcat=4, 29/11/2004. 5) Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Task force on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian crises, Plan of Action, June 2002, accessed from http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/publications.asp, 29/11/04. 6) McIvor, C. (Save the Children, UK) (July 2004), Childrens feedback committees in Zimbabwe: an experiment in accountability, accessed from Humanitarian Practice Network, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2640, 29/11/04. 7) Naik, A. July 2003, West Africa scandal points to need for humanitarian watchdog, Humanitarian Exchange, Number 24.
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4.3 Notes from research on current practice in TNCs

4.3.1 Consumer Complaints
Recognise and address the needs of complainants (1) Speed of response is a key attribute which influences perceptions of a successful customer response system (1) Mechanism should be free or entail minimal costs (9) Mechanism should be comprehensive: one process to resolve all aspects of a complaints (9) There should be a process by which complaint will be escalated for action by more senior staff if necessary (4) Good resolution policies and procedures for complaints voiced are essential. Lack of this means the investment of getting the customer to voice complaint is wasted and the customer is more frustrated (1) Set response times targets for all stages of the complaints process (4) Include a working definition of a complaint (4) Information should be provided on: types of dispute accepted, rules governing referral to the process, rules governing decisions, legal force of decisions, costs (9) Make clear definition of a complaint (4) The complaints mechanism should be independent, including independence of decision makers (abilities, time appointed for, connection with organisation) (9) Governance: consumer representation on governing councils must be well informed and active, and avoid falling into line with the corporate interest (3) Adequate acquisition and deployment of resources is necessary (6) Mechanism design Resources Governance Organisation Capacity Terms of reference Embeddedness
Organisation Policy
Top management involvement and commitment is necessary (6) Make it clear that complaints and comments are welcomed (4)
Complaint Filing
The complaints process should be well-advertised (9) Visibility of the mechanism is essential (4) Guidelines for the process should be readily accessible in simple language (9) Relevant, accurate and easily understood information must be provided (4)
Assessment of complaint Process of investigation
Provide complainants with an open, effective and easy to use process (6) Mechanism should be directly accessible (not only through other channels) (9) Mechanism should be available to all (9) Accessibility of mechanism: complainants must know how to gain access (how, where, to whom), access should be via a variety of methods (preferably free) (4) Cater for disadvantaged and minority customers (e.g. with impaired sight, different languages) (4)
User friendliness
The procedure must allow all parties concerned to present their viewpoint and to hear the arguments and facts put together by the other party and any expert statements (9) The process must allow for speedy resolution of the complaint (9) The requirements of court-based rules of evidence must be tempered with realism (9)
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Outcomes
Redress for the complainant Organisational corrective action Resources Governance Terms of reference Mechanism design
The range of remedies provided must be comprehensive (9) Where possible include a menu of remedies, e.g. replacement, refund, compensation, apology, explanation (4) Include an external review process (e.g. ombudsman) for complaints which cannot be resolved internally and agree to abide by decisions made (4) Analysing and evaluating complaints to improve the product and customer service quality Analyse complaints to help understand root cause of problems (1) Decisions must be binding on industry (9) Schemes must be given the power to make recommendations leading to changes in law and practice (9) Effective processes for analysing complaints to ensure feedback and learning (7) Organisations should identify the root cause of a complaint and changes to prevent the same errors occurring (4) Auditing of complaints process (6) Reviewing effectiveness and efficacy of complaints process (6)
4.3.2 External complaints

TNC can belong to a multistakeholder initiative (MSI) which has developed a mechanism to deal with complaints, or requires companies to ensure their suppliers have a system for handling workplace complaints, or receive complaint directly from workers (3) Escalation of complaints: if supplier or member company cannot reach a satisfactory agreement with complainant issue can be escalated to the MSI (SAI & ETI) (3) ETI: no obligation for member companies to ensure that suppliers have mechanisms in place for handling worker-to-management complaints (3) SAI: Appeals can be lodged regarding the handling of, or decision made regarding, a complaint by a TNC (3) Relationship between different levels at which complaints can be filed (workplace management, sourcing company, MSI) must be clear and understood. Potential for confusion and duplication, excess bureaucracy, could lead to waste of resources and loss of credibility of system (3) Variance in criteria for accepting a complaint (3) ETI: for acceptance complaint must be within scope of base code, and must be proved to satisfaction of both parties that the workplace in question is part of the member companys supply network (3) Where possible complaints should be resolved at the lowest possible level (i.e. with workplace management) (3) If a worker cannot file a complaint direct to the supplier company they can file it through the MSI or MSI member company (3) Complaints should only be filed on behalf of workers with their consent (3) (workers must decide if they want to take the risks associated) What constitutes a valid complaint? Against which criteria? (3) o Country legislation, company policy, IGO guidelines etc Complainants must have attempted to resolve issue with on the ground management (3) Confidentiality: ETI and FLA require a confidential reporting channel to report non-compliance to the member company (3) Avoidance of potential repercussions (3) All MSIs make it possible for the identity of the complainant to be kept confidential from the company concerned (3) Clarification of relationships and capabilities of parties involved (2) Independence. Governance of any third party mechanisms must be independent from the companies who are members (3) Correct and clear responsibilities must be assigned relating to dealing with complaints (3) Roles and responsibilities of different organisations (sourcing and MSIs) must be clarified (3) Mechanism must operate independently of interested stakeholders, especially industry, industry consultants and industry associations (8) Mechanism must be funded transparently to ensure independence (8) Capability (3) Large amounts of time involved (3) Difficult to plan in advance (3) Serious investment in terms of capacity is needed (3) Who covers costs of investigation? (3)
Organisation Policy
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Embeddedness
SAI certified companies must appoint a management representative responsible for ensuring there is a confidential, accessible system available for workers to lodge complaints (3) Management support for suspending and ultimately terminating a relationship with a supplier in violation of the code of conduct (2)
Assessment of complaint Complaint Investigation Process of investigation
How to file? Information required (3) Entry points and process of progressing complaint to resolution can be unclear to those seeking to access a mechanism (3) FLA has FAQ section on website dealing with what constitutes a complaint and how to make a complaint, and translation into local languages (5) ETI has flowchart presenting overview of system (3) Expectations must be managed relating to the speed of processing and the resolution of complaints (3) Information must be available in the appropriate language for communities at risk, and should be made available at all stages of the operation (8) Accessibility and ease of accessing process (3) Is an understanding of law/agreements breached necessary? If so is there support to provide this, e.g. to workers (3) o E.g. FLA requires detail of non-compliance (3) Complaint systems have been primarily geared to receiving complaints from NGOs and Trade Unions, however they must become accessible to workers, allowing workers direct access to the sourcing company or verification system (3) Workers can have less access to systems based on companies which are members of MSIs (3) It should not be the responsibility of the person/organisation filing the complaint to come up with all the necessary information (3) (e.g. proof of membership of supply network, non-compliance with codes of conduct) Clarity and ease of mechanism (3) Mechanism must be sensitive to community need and culture (8) Transparency of acceptance/rejection decision (3) ETI: If complaint is not specific enough to trigger the complaint system the information is communicated to ETI members to use information in planning supply chain monitoring activities. Connects information generated through complaints system to monitoring and verification (3) Who is involved? Who has responsibility for the investigation? (3) Which parties are involved? (3) Independence and capability of parties involved (3) WRC investigation team selected by Executive Director. Guidelines for composition of team, including local representation, WRC staff, specialists etc) (3) Skills and capacity for involvement in investigation often do not exist at local level and need to be developed (3) Consultation Consultation and participation (3) ETI: meeting between company and complainant to discuss plan for following up on complaint (3) WRC: maximum participation of local and regional actors (3) ETI requires continuity of representation through out follow up to a complaint (3) Consultation should take place throughout the process to ensure a credible investigation (3) Information gathering Accuracy (3) Problems with sourcing companies gathering accurate and representative information for investigations (3) Process WRC documents entire process (3) WRC extensive guidelines on processing complaints (3) Quality standards for investigation could be beneficial: o What constitutes a thorough investigation? o What standards are set for confidentiality and non-victimisation of workers who complain or contribute information? (3)
Complaint Filing
User friendliness
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Involvement of complainant Those filing the complaint should be able to indicate possible actions to be taken and how corrective actions would be checked back with the workers and their organisations (3) ETI: remediation plan negotiated between member company and supplier, with workforce views taken into account (3) Organisation that filed the complaint must be satisfied (3) Decisions on redress Criteria for judgement (3) Remediation is specific to local context and circumstances (3) Who has responsibility for different tasks (3) Content of redress ETI: remediation includes nature of and schedule for remediation action, and changes in ETI member company trading practice to make remediation effective Responsibility for implementation of plan assigned (3) Enforcement Mechanism should have the power to impost penalties on non-complying companies and their suppliers, contractors, agents and subsidiaries (8) Plan should include corrective and preventative action for future (3)
Outcomes
Organisational corrective action Post Resolution Follow-Up
ETI: member company has to monitor suppliers compliance with the remediation plan and once complete inform all parties (3) ETI: maximum time limit for completion and final report is one year, after which unresolved issues referred to ETI board (3) Results of investigations should be disclosed publicly (8) There should be monitoring of compliance performance against recommendations (8)
References 1. Adamson, C. (1993), Evolving Complaint Procedures, Managing Service Quality, vol. 3:2. 2. adidas-Salomon, 8/10/2004, adidas-Salomon statement on the Termination of Agron Business Relationship with PT Daejoo Leports Corporation, http://www.adidassalomon.com/en/sustainability/archive/2004/adidas_salomon_statement_on_the_termin ation_of_the_agron_business_relationship_with_pt_daejoo_leports_corporation_july20 04.asp, accessed 29/11/2004. 3. Ascoly, N. and Zeldenhurst, I. (2003), Considering Complaint Mechanisms: An Important Tool for Code Monitoring and Verification, Somo, Amsterdam. 4. Brennan, C. and Douglas, A. (2002), Complaints Procedures in Local Government: Informing Your Customers, The International Journal of Public Sector Management, vol. 15:3. 5. Fair Labour Association, http://www.fairlabor.org/all/complaint/index.html, accessed 29/11/2004. 6. ISO 10002:200: Abstract, Quality management - Customer satisfaction - Guidelines for complaints handling in organizations, http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=35539&I CS1=3&ICS2=120&ICS3=10, accessed 15/11/2004. 7. Kanniah, R. How to Set Up a Complaints Service, Consumers International Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. 8. Mining Ombudsman, Annual Report 2003, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad. 9. Rachagan, S. Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Criteria for Appraising Efficacy, Consumers International Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific.
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2005 01 Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Organisations

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2005 01 Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Organisations

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Global Accountability Project Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Organisations: Background Research for the Complaint and

Redress Dimension January 2005

2.2 Complaint and Redress Mechanisms in International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs)12

2.3 Complaints and Redress in Transnational Corporations (TNCs)22

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS CONTRIBUTING TO GUIDELINES

3.1 Points Arising from Research for Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs)

Organisational corrective action

Redress for the complainant

Post Resolution Follow-Up

Information availability User friendliness Assessment of complaint

Organisational Redress for the corrective action complainant

Post Resolution Follow-Up

3.3 Points Arising from Research for Transnational Corporations (TNCs)

Organisational Redress for the corrective action complainant

Post Resolution Follow-Up

SECTION 4: APPENDIX OF RESEARCH NOTES

4.1 Notes from research on current practice in IGOs

Post Resolution Follow-Up

Organisational corrective action

4.2 Notes from research on current practice in INGOs

Information availability User friendliness Assessment of complaint Process of investigation

Organisational corrective action Post Resolution Follow-Up

Redress for the complainant

4.3 Notes from research on current practice in TNCs

Assessment of complaint Process of investigation

Post Resolution Follow-Up

4.3.2 External complaints

Assessment of complaint Complaint Investigation Process of investigation

Redress for the complainant

Organisational corrective action Post Resolution Follow-Up

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