Thisdecisionhasbeenamended.Pleaseseetheendofthedecisionforalistoftheamendments.

CourtofAppeal NewSouthWales

MediumNeutralCitation: NorrievNSWRegistrarofBirths,DeathsandMarriages[2013]NSWCA145 HearingDates: DecisionDate: Before: 12November2012 31/05/2013 BeazleyACJat[1] SackvilleAJAat[208] PrestonCJofLECat[281] 1.Appealallowed 2.Order2oftheAppealPanelbesetaside 3.Inlieuthereof: (a)SetasidethedecisionoftheTribunaldated16March2010 (b)OrderthematterberemittedtotheTribunalfordetermination (c)Ordertherespondentpaytheappellant'scostsoftheappeal. [Note:TheUniformCivilProcedureRules2005provide(Rule36.11)thatunlesstheCourtotherwise orders,ajudgmentororderistakentobeenteredwhenitisrecordedintheCourt'scomputerised courtrecordsystem.SettingasideandvariationofjudgmentsorordersisdealtwithbyRules36.15, 36.16,36.17and36.18.PartiesshouldinparticularnotethetimelimitoffourteendaysinRule36.16.] Catchwords: INTERPRETATIONBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995,s32DCwhetherthe Registrar'spowerunders32DCtoregisterchangeofaperson's"sex"islimitedtoregisteringa changefrommaletofemaleorfemaletomale. ADMINISTRATIVELAWjurisdiction,AdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct1997,s119(1)whether questionoflaw. INTERPRETATIONextrinsicmaterialwhetherregardcouldbehadtosecondreadingspeeches, dictionarydefinitions,academicmaterialandotherActs. EVIDENCEproofjudicialnoticewhetherregardcouldbehadtoextrinsicmaterialinthe interpretationofthestatute. LegislationCited: AdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct1997 AntiDiscriminationAct1977 Births,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995 ChildProtection(OffendersRegistration)Act2000 Children'sServicesRegulation2004 CombatSportsRegulation2009 ConveyancingAct1919 CourtSecurityAct2005 CourtsandCrimesLegislationAmendmentAct2008 Crimes(AdministrationofSentences)Regulation2008 Crimes(ForensicProcedures)Act2000 CrimesAct1900 CrimesAct1914(Cth) DefenceForcesRetirementBenefitsAct1948(Cth) EvidenceAct1995 FairWorkAct2009(Cth) GenderReassignmentAct2000(WA) HigherEducationFundingAct1998(Cth) IndustrialRelationsAct1996 InternationalCriminalCourtAct2002(Cth) InterpretationAct1987 LandlordandTenant(Amendment)Act1948

Decision:

LawEnforcement(PowersandResponsibilities)Act2002 MarriageAct1961(Cth) MaternityLeave(CommonwealthEmployees)Act1973(Cth) PrivacyandPersonalInformationProtectionAct1998 RacialDiscriminationAct1975(Cth) SexDiscriminationAct1984(Cth) SuccessionAct2006 SuperannuationAct1922(Cth) Terrorism(PolicePowers)Act2002 Transgender(AntiDiscriminationandOtherActsAmendment)Act1996 TransportEmployeesRetirementBenefitsAct1967 CasesCited: ABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42244CLR390 AktiebolagetHasslevAlphapharmPtyLtd[2002]HCA59212CLR411 Alcan(NT)AluminaPtyLtdvCommissionerofTerritoryRevenue[2009]HCA41239CLR27 AttorneyGeneral(Cth)vKevin[2003]FamCA94172FLR300 AustralianCommunistPartyvCommonwealth[1951]HCA583CLR1 AustralianEducationUnionvDepartmentofEducationandChildren'sServices[2012]HCA386 ALJR217 AustralianGasLightCovValuerGeneral(1940)40SR(NSW)126 AytugrulvTheQueen[2012]HCA1586ALJR474 BainivTheQueen[2012]HCA5987ALJR180 BrownvRepatriationCommission(1985)7FCR302 CertainLloyd'sUnderwritersSubscribingtoContractNoIH00AAQSvCross[2012]HCA5687ALJR 131 CodyvJHNelsonPtyLtd[1947]HCA1774CLR629 ColemanvDPP[2000]NSWSC27549NSWLR371 CollectorofCustomsvAgfaGevaertLtd[1996]HCA36186CLR389 CollectorofCustomsvPozzolanicEnterprisesPtyLtd[1993]FCA32243FCR280 CooperBrooker(Wollongong)PtyLtdvFederalCommissionerofTaxation[1981]HCA26147CLR 297 CorbettvCorbett[1971]P83 CraigWilliamsonPtyLtdvBarrowcliff[1915]VLR450 DeputyCommissionerofTaxationvClark[2003]NSWCA9157NSWLR113 GattellarovWestpacBankingCorporation[2004]HCA678ALJR394 GerhardyvBrown[1985]HCA11159CLR70 GibbvFederalCommissionerofTaxation[1966]HCA74118CLR628 HarrisonvMelhem[2008]NSWCA6772NSWLR380 HollandvJones[1917]HCA2623CLR149 HopevBathurstCityCouncil[1980]HCA16144CLR1 InthemarriageofCandD(falselycalledC)[1979]FLC9063635FLR340 IndustryResearchandDevelopmentBoardvBridgestoneAustraliaLtd[2001]FCA954109FCR564 IWvCityofPerth[1997]HCA30191CLR1 KevinvAttorneyGeneral(Cth)[2001]FamCA1074165FLR404 KostasvHIAInsuranceServicesPtyLtd[2010]HCA32241CLR390 MaunsellvOlins[1975]AC373 MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalandIndigenousAffairsvSZAYW[2005]FCAFC154145 FCR523 MonisvTheQueen[2013]HCA4,87ALJR340 MoynavSecretaryofStateforWorkandPensions[2003]1WLR1929 NorrievRegistryofBirths,DeathsandMarriages[2011]NSWADT102 OceanicLifeLtdvChiefCommissionerofStampDuties[1999]NSWCA416168ALR211 OVvMembersofTheBoardofWesleyMissionCouncil[2010]NSWCA15579NSWLR606 ProjectBlueSkyIncvAustralianBroadcastingAuthority[1998]HCA28194CLR355 RvGee[2003]HCA12212CLR230 RvHarris&McGuiness(1988)17NSWLR158 RvHenry[1999]NSWCCA11146NSWLR346 RvLavender[2005]HCA37222CLR67 RvPeters(1886)16QBD636 ReSecretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityand"HH"[1991]AATA9423ALD58 RegistrarofTitles(WA)vFranzon[1975]HCA41132CLR611 RoadshowFilmsPtyLtdviiNetLtd[2012]HCA1686ALJR494 ScreenAustraliavEMEProductionsNo1[2012]FCAFC19200FCR282 Secretary,DepartmentofFamilies,Housing,CommunityServicesandIndigenousAffairsvMouratidis [2012]FCAFC29 Secretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"[1993]FCA57343FCR299 ThomasvMowbray[2007]HCA33233CLR307 TimburyvCoffee[1941]HCA2266CLR277 VictimsCompensationFundvBrown[2003]HCA5477ALJR1797 VictorianWomenLawyers'AssociationIncvFederalCommissionerofTaxation[2008]FCA983,170 FCR318 WatersvPublicTransportCorporation[1991]HCA49173CLR349

WesternAustraliavAH[2010]WASCA17241WAR431 WoodsvMultiSportHoldingsPtyLtd[2002]HCA9208CLR460 TextsCited: AustralianLawReformCommission,Evidence,ALRC26(Interim)Vol1(1985) DCPearce&RSGeddes,StatutoryInterpretationinAustralia,7thed(2011)LexisNexisButterworths DKSmith,"Transsexualism,SexReassignmentSurgery,andtheLaw"(1971)56CornellLaw Review963 JAGreenberg,IntersexualityandtheLaw:WhySexMatters(2012)NewYorkUniversityPress JDHeydon,"DevelopingtheCommonLaw",inGleeson,JTandHiggins,RCA(eds)Constituting Law,LegalArgumentandSocialValues(2011)FederationPress JLTaitz,"ConfrontingTranssexualism,SexualIdentityandtheCriminalLaw"(1992)60MedicoLegal Journal60 MAronson,BDyerandMGroves,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction(2009)LawbookCo MDKirby,"MedicalTechnologyandNewFrontiersofFamilyLaw"(198687)1AustralianJournalof FamilyLaw196 MacquarieDictionary,4thed(2005) RWilson,"LifeandLaw:TheImpactofHumanRightsonExperimentingwithLife",(1985)17(3) AustralianJournalofForensicSciences61 Principaljudgment Norrie(Appellant) NSWRegistrarofBirths,DeathsandMarriages(Respondent) Solicitors: DLAPiper(Appellant) CrownSolicitor'sOffice(Respondent) Counsel: DMJBennettQCAJAbadee(Appellant) KMRichardson(Respondent) FileNumber(s): CA2012/61881

Category: Parties: Representation:

DECISIONUNDERAPPEAL

Before: DateofDecision:

MagistrateNHennessy,DeputyPresident,KFitzgerald,JudicialMember,JSchwager,NonJudicial Member 29/11/2011

MediumNeutralCitation: NorrievRegistrarofBirths,DeathsandMarriages(GD)[2011]NSWADTAP53 CourtFileNumber(s): 103077

HEADNOTE
[Thisheadnoteisnottobereadaspartofthejudgment]
OnthereviewofadecisionbytheRegistrarofBirths,DeathandMarriagesnottoregistertheappellant's(Norrie)sex as"nonspecific"underPt5AoftheBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995(theAct),theAdministrative DecisionsTribunalheldthattheRegistrar'spowerunderPt5A,s32DCwasconfinedtoaregistrationofaperson's sexaseither"male"or"female".TheAppealPaneloftheAdministrativeDecisionsTribunalaffirmedthedecisionofthe Tribunal. OnappealtotheCourtofAppealonaquestionoflawpursuanttotheAdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct,s119(1) NorriecontendedthattheAppealPanelerredinlawinitsconstructionofs32DCoftheAct,inholdingthat: (i) (ii) theRegistrarcouldonlyregisterachangeofaperson's"sex"frommaletofemaleorfemaletomale thepreconditionins32DAthatapersonundergosexaffirmationsurgeryasdefinedins32Awasonlysatisfiedifthe personunderwentthesurgicalprocedureforthepurposeofbeingmoredefinitivelyregardedas"male"or"female"and asamatteroflaw,itwasnotopentotheRegistrartoregistertheappellant'ssexas"nonspecific". Thegroundsofappealraisedanumberofancillaryquestionsrelatingtotheproperapproachtostatutoryconstruction. Appealallowed: (1)BytheCourt:TheAppealPanelerredinlawinconstruings32DC(1)oftheBirths,DeathsandMarriages

(iii)

RegistrationAct1995aslimitingtheRegistrar'spowerstoregisteringaperson'ssexasonly"male"or"female". (2)BytheCourt:Asamatterofconstructionofs32DC,theword"sex"doesnotbearabinarymeaningof"male"or "female":[200],[242],[287],[291]. Considered:InthemarriageofCandD(falselycalledC)[1979]FLC9063635FLR340RvHarris&McGuiness (1988)17NSWLR158Secretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"[1993]FCA57343FCR299Kevinv AttorneyGeneral(Cth)[2001]FamCA1074165FLR404andABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42244CLR390: [129][164]. (3)PerBeazleyACJ(PresidentoftheCourtofAppeal)andPrestonCJofLEC:TheRegistrar'spowerunders32DC toregisterachangeofaperson's"sex"isnotlimitedtoregisteringachangefrommaletofemaleorfemaletomale [187][188],[200],[291],[291][303].PerSackvilleAJA:Section32DCempowerstheRegistrar,atleastinsome circumstances,toregisterachangeofsexofapersonfrommaleorfemaletoacategorythatisneithermalenor female:[257],[274]. (4)BytheCourt:TheAppealPanelerredinlawinconcludingthatitwasnotopentotheRegistrartoregisterNorrie's sexas"nonspecific":[205][274],[281][282]. (5)BytheCourt:ItwillbeamatterfortheTribunal,uponremittal,todetermineifitissatisfiedthataperson'ssexmay beregisteredas"nonspecific":[205][275],[281][282],[306]. (6)BytheCourt:Theproperconstructionofs32DC,havingregardtothemeaningof"sex"asusedinthestatute,isa questionoflaw:[62],[64],[210][304],[305].Errorsoflawanderrorsoffactdiscussedat[52][63],[304]. Considered:AustralianGasLightCovValuerGeneral(1940)40SR(NSW)126IndustryResearchand DevelopmentBoardvBridgestoneAustraliaLtd[2001]FCA954109FCR564AktiebolagetHasslevAlphapharm PtyLtd[2002]HCA59212CLR411.CollectorofCustomsvAgfaGevaertLimited[1996]HCA36186CLR389OV vMembersofTheBoardofWesleyMissionCouncil[2010]NSWCA15579NSWLR606ScreenAustraliavEME ProductionsNo1[2012]FCAFC19200FCR282HopevBathurstCityCouncil[1980]HCA16144CLR1. (7)Whetherthepreconditionofsexaffirmationsurgerysatisfieddiscussed:[195][199]perBeazleyACJand[244]per SackvilleAJA.Thetextandcontextoftheword"sex"inthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"donotlimitthesex affirmationproceduretoonlythemaleorfemalesexes:[298][302]:perPrestonCJofLEC. (8)TheextenttowhichtheCourtmayhaveregardtoextrinsicmaterial,includingsecondreadingspeeches,dictionary definitionsandacademicmaterial,intheconstructionofastatutediscussed:[69][70],[83],[84][85],[103][104]per BeazleyACJ,[227]perSackvilleAJA,[281][282]perPrestonCJofLEC. Considered:InterpretationAct1987,s34CertainLloyd'sUnderwritersSubscribingtoContractNoIH00AAQSv Cross[2012]HCA5687ALJR131RvPeters(1886)16QBD636DennisCPearce&RobertSGeddes,Statutory InterpretationinAustralia,7thed(2011)LexisNexisButterworths.ColemanvDPP[2000]NSWSC27549NSWLR 371EvidenceAct1995(NSW)s144GerhardyvBrown[1985]HCA11159CLR70GattellarovWestpacBanking Corporation[2004]HCA678ALJR394ReginavHenry[1999]NSWCCAat11146NSWLR346WoodsvMulti SportHoldingsPtyLtd[2002]HCA9208CLR460ThomasvMowbray[2007]HCA33233CLR307AytugrulvThe Queen[2012]HCA1586ALJR474at[21]TimburyvCoffee[1941]HCA2266CLR277AustralianCommunist PartyvCommonwealth[1951]HCA583CLR1VictorianWomenLawyers'AssociationIncvFederalCommissioner ofTaxation[2008]FCA983170FCR318. (9)Theextenttowhichotherlegislationisrelevanttotheconstructionofastatutoryprovisiondiscussed:[123],[195] perBeazleyACJ,[269][273]perSackvilleAJA,[281][282]perPrestonCJofLEC. Considered:CertainLloyd'sUnderwritersSubscribingtoContractNoIH00AAQSvCross[2012]HCA5687ALJR 131HarrisonvMelhem[2008]NSWCA6772NSWLR380

JUDGMENT
INDEX BEAZLEYACJ

Introduction Essentialbackgroundmatters Legislativeframework Births,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995 Part5A AntiDiscriminationAct1977 Crimes(ForensicProcedures)Act2000 Historyoftheproceedings DecisionoftheTribunal DecisionoftheAppealPanel TheappealtothisCourt Meaningofquestionoflaw Principlesofstatutoryconstruction Extrinsicmaterial TheSecondReadingSpeech Dictionarydefinitions Academicmaterial Otherlegislation Thecaselaw InthemarriageofCandD(falselycalledC)[1979]FLC9063635FLR340 RvHarris&McGuiness(1988)17NSWLR158 Secretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"[1993]FCA57343FCR299 KevinvAttorneyGeneral(Cth)[2001]FamCA1074165FLR404 ABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42244CLR390 Thecommonlawmeaningoftheword"sex" Consideration

1 6

12 17 29 31

34 41 51 52 65 76 77 84 91 115 129 130 135 138 147 153 165 167

Conclusion Orders SACKVILLEAJA:(Furtherandconcurringreasons) Preliminarymatters Thequestionoflaw Thelegislation Background Informationbeyondtheevidence Intersexualityandtranssexuality Somecaselaw ConstructionofPart5AoftheAct Textualanalysis ABvWesternAustralia Additionalconsiderations Consequencesofregistrationofachangeofsex Dispositionoftheappeal PrestonCJofLEC(Furtherandconcurringreasons)

200 207 208 210 211 216

220 228 232

237 254 257 268 274 281

BEAZLEYACJ:

Introduction
2 Thisisanappealbroughtbytheappellant(Norrie)fromthedecisionoftheAppealPaneloftheAdministrative DecisionsTribunal(theTribunal):NorrievRegistrarofBirths,DeathsandMarriages(GD)[2011]NSWADTAP53. TheAppealPanelaffirmedthedecisionoftheTribunal,constitutedbyJudicialMemberMontgomery,thattheRegistrar ofBirths,DeathsandMarriages(theRegistrar)didnothavepowerundertheBirths,DeathsandMarriages RegistrationAct1995(theAct),s32DCtoregisterachangeofsexbyapersonfromthesexrecordedontheRegister to'nonspecific'or'notspecified':NorrievRegistryofBirths,DeathsandMarriages[2011]NSWADT102. ThepresentappealisbroughtonaquestionoflawpursuanttotheAdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct1997,s 119(1).Forthereasonswhichappearbelow,Iconsiderthattheappealshouldbeallowedandthematterremittedto theTribunalfordeterminationinaccordancewithlaw. Finally,bywayofintroductorymatters,IhaveadoptedthenameNorrietoidentifytheappellantandIhaveusedthe personalpronouns"she"and"her"whenreferringtoNorrie.

Essentialbackgroundmatters
6 NorriewasborninScotlandasamaleandin1989underwentsexualreassignmentsurgeryinvolvingcastrationand thecreationofasemifunctioningvagina.Inherevidence,Norriesaidthatsheundertookthesurgerytoeliminatethe

ambiguityinrelationtohersex.Sheidentifiedthatambiguitytobethatalthoughshewasbornwithmalereproductive organs,sheidentifiedashavinganonspecificgenderidentity.HerapplicationtotheRegistrarwasforhersextobe registeredas"nonspecific".Norriecontendedthatthesurgeryhadnotresolvedherambiguityinrelationtohersex.In theTribunalandtheAppealPanel,inadditiontotheterm"nonspecific",variousothertermswereused,including "intersex","androgynous","neuter","eunuch"and"thirdsex". 7 On26November2009,NorriemadetwoapplicationstotheRegistrar:thefirsttoregisterachangeofnamepursuant tos27oftheActandthesecondtoregisterachangeofsexpursuanttos32DAoftheAct. On24February2010,theRegistrarwrotetoNorrieapprovingbothapplications.TheletterattachednewChangeof NameandRecognisedDetails(ChangeofSex)Certificates,whichrecordedNorrie'ssexas"notspecified".On16 March2010,theRegistrarwrotetoNorrieinformingherthattheRecognisedDetails(ChangeofSex)Certificatewas invalidandhadbeenissuedinerror.TheRegistraralsoinformedherthattheChangeofNameCertificateremained valid.ThereissuedCertificatehad,however,beenalteredsothattheentry"notspecified",inrelationto"sex",had beenreplacedwiththewords"notstated". On26March2010,NorrielodgedanapplicationforreviewoftheRegistrar'sdecisionintheTribunal.Theapplication wasdismissedandNorrieappealedtotheAppealPanel,whichalsodismissedtheapplication. Thequestionoflawraisedbytheappealiswhether,ontheproperconstructionoftheAct,theRegistrar'spowerunder s32DCtoaltertherecordofaperson'ssexontheRegisterisconfinedtoanalterationfrom"male"to"female",or from"female"to"male",orwhetherthereispowertochangethesexrecordedtosomeotherspecification. Norriesubmittedthattherelevantstatutoryprovisionsdonotconfineregistrationtoonly"male"or"female"andinfact readilyaccommodaterecognitionofasexwhichisneithermalenorfemale.Norriefurthersubmittedthatthe registrationof"nonspecific"genderwascompatiblewiththelanguageandpurposeofthelegislation.

10

11

Legislativeframework
Births,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995

12

TheActis,relevantly,anActtoprovidefortheregistrationofbirths,deathsandmarriages.TheobjectsoftheActare providedforins3andinclude:
"(c)theregistrationofchangesofnameandtherecordingofchangesofsex"

13

Section4isthe"Definition"provisionoftheAct.Theterm"sex"isnotdefinedintheAct.Theword"intersex"isnota termusedintheAct,nor,forthatmatter,isthereanyprovisionfortheidentificationof"sex"as"nonspecific"or"not specified". TheRegistrarisrequiredtomaintainaregisterorregistersof"registrableevents":s43(1).A"registrableevent"is definedins4tomean"abirth,adoptionordischargeofadoption,changeofname,changeofsex,deathormarriage". Part3oftheActprovidesfortheregistrationofbirths.Part3providesforthenotificationofbirths,bothinrespectof childrenborninNewSouthWales:s12,andforchildrenwhoaretobecomeresidentintheState:s13.TheBirths, DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationRegulation2006(repealed),cl4specifiedtheinformationrequiredtobegivento theRegistrarinrespectofthebirthofachild,includingthesexofthechild. AbirthisregisteredundertheActbytheRegistrarmakinganentryintheRegister,includingoftheparticularsrequired bytheregulations:s17(1).However,s17(2)permitstheRegistrartoregisterabirth,notwithstandingthatthe particularsareincomplete.CounselfortheRegistrarinformedtheCourtthats17(2)wassometimesusedtoregister thebirthofachildwithacongenitalintersexcondition,withnosexbeingstatedontheRegister.Thiswasto accommodateparents'wishesuntilsomelongertermdecisionwasmadeinrespectofthesexofthechild. Part3,Div4,s20oftheActisentitled"Alterationofdetailsafterbirthregistration"andprovidesfortheadditionof "registrableinformation"inaperson'sbirthregistration."Registrableinformation"isdefinedtomean"informationthat mustormaybeincludedintheRegister".However,s20(3)providesthatwhenusedinthesection,"registrable informationdoesnotincludeinformationrelatingtoaperson'schangeofsex".

14

15

16

Part5A

17

AnapplicationfortheregistrationofachangeofsexisdealtwithinPt5AoftheAct.Part5A,encompassingss32A 32J,entitled"Changeofsex",applieswhereapersonhasundergonea"sexaffirmationprocedure".Itistherelevant PartoftheActforthepurposesoftheseproceedings. Part5AwasinsertedintotheActbytheTransgender(AntiDiscriminationandOtherActsAmendment)Act1996 (repealed),whichalsoamendedtheAntiDiscriminationAct1977,towhichreferenceismadebelow.Atthattime,it

18

madeprovisionfortheregistrationofachangeofsexforpersonswhosebirthwasregisteredinNewSouthWales. PersonsnotborninNewSouthWalesdidnotcomewithintheseprovisions.Thiswaschangedbyamendments introducedintoPt5AbytheCourtsandCrimesLegislationAmendmentAct2008.Thepurposeoftheamendments wasdescribedbytheAgreementinPrincipleSpeechasprovidinga"meansfortransgenderpeoplewhowereborn overseastohavetheirchangeofsexlegallyrecognisedinNewSouthWales". 19 TheCourtsandCrimesLegislationAmendmentActreplacedthephrase"sexualreassignmentsurgery"inss32A,B andCwiththephrase"sexaffirmationprocedure",whichisdefinedins32A.Sections32GandHwereomittedbythe amendingActwhilstss32DA32DDands32JwereinsertedintotheAct. ThequestioninissueintheseproceedingsisthescopeoftheRegistrar'spowersunders32DCtoregisteraperson's changeofsex,inthiscaseuponapplicationmadebyapersonunders32DA.Section32DChastobereadinthe contextoftheotherprovisionsofPt5Aandinparticular,thedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A.The relevantprovisionsofPt5Aareasfollows. Section32Adefines"sexaffirmationprocedure"asfollows:
"sexaffirmationproceduremeansasurgicalprocedureinvolvingthealterationofaperson'sreproductiveorgans carriedout: (a)forthepurposeofassistingapersontobeconsideredtobeamemberoftheoppositesex,or (b)tocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson."

20

21

22

UnderthesucceedingsectionsofPt5A,applicationcanbemadetoalteroraddthesexontheregisterofaperson's birth.AsNorriewasnotborninNewSouthWalesandherbirthwasnotregisteredinthisState,therelevantprovision, whichistheprovisioninissueintheproceedings,iss32DA.Section32DAprovides:

"32DAApplicationtoregisterchangeofsex (1)Apersonwhois18orabove: (a)whoisanAustraliancitizenorpermanentresidentofAustralia,and (b)wholives,andhaslivedforatleastoneyear,inNewSouthWales,and (c)whohasundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure,and (d)whoisnotmarried,and (e)whosebirthisnotregisteredunderthisActoracorrespondinglaw, mayapplytotheRegistrar,inaformapprovedbytheRegistrar,fortheregistrationoftheperson'ssexinthe Register..."

23 24

Norriesatisfieseachoftheprovisionsofs32DA. Section32DBprovidesthatthefollowingsupportingdocumentationistoaccompanyanapplicationunders32DA:
"32DBDocumentstoaccompanyapplicationtoregisterchangeofsex Anapplicationundersection32DAmustbeaccompaniedby: (a)statutorydeclarationsby2doctors,orby2medicalpractitionersregisteredunderthelawofanotherState, verifyingthatthepersonthesubjectoftheapplicationhasundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure,and (b)suchotherdocumentsandinformationasmaybeprescribedbytheregulations."

25

ThestatutorydeclarationsofDrKearleyandDrSchultheisslodgedincompliancewiths32DBbothsupporteda changeintheregistrationofNorrie'ssexto"nonspecific". TheRegistrar,indetermininganapplicationmadeunders32DA,maymakeorrefusetomakeanalterationtothe recordoftheperson'ssexpursuanttos32DC.Section32DCprovides:

"32DCDecisiontoregisterchangeofsex (1)TheRegistraristodetermineanapplicationundersection32DAbyregisteringtheperson'schangeofsexor refusingtoregistertheperson'schangeofsex. (2)Beforeregisteringaperson'schangeofsex,theRegistrarmayrequiretheapplicanttoprovidesuchparticulars relatingtothechangeofsexasmaybeprescribedbytheregulations. (3)Aregistrationofaperson'schangeofsexmustnotbemadeifthepersonismarried."

26

27

TheeffectoftheregistrationofachangeofsexontheRegisterisprovidedforinss32Iand32JoftheAct,which provide:
"32IEffectofalterationofregisterandinterstaterecognitioncertificates (1)ApersontherecordofwhosesexisalteredunderthisPartis,forthepurposesof,butsubjectto,anylawof NewSouthWales,apersonofthesexassoaltered. ... 32JEffectofregistrationofchangeofsexandinterstaterecogniseddetailscertificates (1)ApersontherecordofwhosesexisregisteredunderthisPartis,forthepurposesof,butsubjectto,anylawof

NewSouthWales,apersonofthesexsoregistered. (2)Apersontowhomaninterstaterecogniseddetailscertificaterelatesis,forthepurposesof,butsubjectto,any lawofNewSouthWales,apersonofthesexstatedinthecertificate. (3)AninterstaterecogniseddetailscertificateisacertificateissuedunderthelawofanotherStatethatis prescribedbytheregulationsforthepurposesofthissection."

28

WhilstNorrie'sapplicationforthealterationoftheRegisterwasmadeundertheActanditistheconstructionofthat Actthatisinissue,NorriealsoreferredtotheprovisionsoftheAntiDiscriminationActandtheCrimes(Forensic Procedures)Act2000.Thetermssaidtoberelevanttotheconstructionofs32DAaresetoutbelow.

AntiDiscriminationAct1977

29

Asnotedat[18]above,theAntiDiscriminationActwasalsoamendedbytheTransgender(AntiDiscriminationand OtherActsAmendment)Act.TheAntiDiscriminationActwasamendedsoastoinsertdefinitionsoftheterms "recognisedtransgenderperson"and"discriminationontransgendergrounds".Relevantly,s4defines"recognised transgenderperson"tomean:

"...apersontherecordofwhosesexisalteredunderPart5AoftheBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct 1995orunderthecorrespondingprovisionsofalawofanotherAustralianjurisdiction."

30

Part3AoftheAntiDiscriminationActdealswithdiscriminationontransgendergrounds.Section38Aprovidesthe followingdefinitionofatransgenderperson:
"38AInterpretation AreferenceinthisParttoapersonbeingtransgenderoratransgenderpersonisareferencetoaperson,whether ornotthepersonisarecognisedtransgenderperson: (a)whoidentifiesasamemberoftheoppositesexbyliving,orseekingtolive,asamemberoftheoppositesex,or (b)whohasidentifiedasamemberoftheoppositesexbylivingasamemberoftheoppositesex,or (c)who,beingofindeterminatesex,identifiesasamemberofaparticularsexbylivingasamemberof thatsex, andincludesareferencetothepersonbeingthoughtofasatransgenderperson,whetherthepersonis,orwas,in factatransgenderperson."(emphasisadded)

Crimes(ForensicProcedures)Act2000

31

TheCrimes(ForensicProcedures)Act,s3(1)definesa"recognisedtransgenderperson"as:
"...apersontherecordofwhosesexisalteredunderPart5AoftheBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct 1995orunderthecorrespondingprovisionsofalawofanotherAustralianjurisdiction."

32

Section3(6)alsodefinesatransgenderpersonforthepurposeoftheCrimes(ForensicProcedures)Actinthesame termsastheAntiDiscriminationAct,s38A. ItcanbenotedatthispointthatalthoughtheAntiDiscriminationAct,s38AandtheCrimes(ForensicProcedures) Act,s36refertoapersonof"indeterminatesex",thetermisnotdefinedineitherAct.

33

Historyoftheproceedings
DecisionoftheTribunal

34

On26March2010,Norrie,pursuanttotheAct,s56,lodgedanapplicationforreviewoftheRegistrar'sdecisiontothe Tribunal.PursuanttotheAdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct,s63,theTribunal'spoweronthereviewwasto decidewhatthecorrectandpreferabledecisionwas,havingregardtothematerialbeforeit,includinganyfactual materialandanyapplicablewrittenorunwrittenlaw. TheTribunal,at[1],statedthatthereweretworelateddecisionsoftheRegistrarbeforeitforreview:

"(a)thedecisionthata'recogniseddetailscertificate',previouslyissuedtotheApplicanton11February2010and specifyingtheApplicant'ssexas'Notspecified',wasinvalidandwasissuedinerrorand (b)thedecisionthata'changeofnamecertificate',previouslyissuedtotheApplicanton11February2010and specifyingtheApplicant'ssexas'Notspecified',shouldbereplacedbyanewchangeofnamecertificatedated16 March2010whichspecifiestheApplicant'ssexas'NotStated'."

35

36

TheTribunalstated,at[2],thatinordertodeterminewhetherthosedecisionswerethecorrectandpreferableones,it wasnecessarytoconsiderthepreliminaryissuewhethertheRegistrarhadpowerunders32DCoftheActtoregister achangeofsexofapersonto"nonspecific"or"notspecified".This,intheTribunal'sconsideration,turneduponthe preliminaryissuewhethertheword"sex"usedinthelegislationmeans"male"or"female"orhadsomemore expansivemeaning.TheTribunalconcludedthattheRegistraronlyhadpowertoregisteraperson'ssexas"male"or "female":seetheTribunal'sreasonsat[99]. Duringthecourseofitsreasons,theTribunalmadeanumberofobservationsastotheunderlyingfactualmatters

37

relatingtotheapplication.ThesemattersweresummarisedbytheAppealPanel,at[9],initsdeterminationofNorrie's appealfromtheTribunal'sdecisionanditisconvenienttoadopttheAppealPanel'ssummaryofthosematters:
"(1)Norrie'sapplicationforachangeofsexwasaccompaniedbythenecessarysupportingdocumentation (2)onthe'StatutoryDeclarationtoRegisteraChangeofSex'dated26November2009,Norrierecordshersexat birthas'male'andappliestoregisterachangeofsexas'NonSpecific'.Thisstatutorydeclarationisintheform approvedbytheRegistrarundersection32DAoftheAct (3)statutorydeclarationsswornbyDrsKearleyandSchultheissinsupportofNorrie'sapplicationtoregistera changeofsexbothsupporttheregistrationofachangeofsexshowingthesextobe'NonSpecific'anddeclarethat Norriehasundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure.Thesestatutorydeclarationsareintheformapprovedbythe Registrarundersection32DBoftheAct (4)theRespondentdoesnotdisputethattheApplicanthasundergoneasurgicalprocedureandthereismedical evidencebeforetheTribunalthatestablishesthattheApplicantwouldmeetthelegislative requirementstoregisterachangeofsexfrommaletofemaleand (5)theApplicantdoesnotidentifyaseithermaleorfemalebutas'nonspecific'."(emphasisadded)

38

TheTribunalmadenofindingaswhetherNorriehadundergoneasexaffirmationprocedurewithinthemeaningofs 32A(a)ors32A(b). TheTribunaldetermined,at[100],thatthedecisionsmadebytheRegistrar"werethecorrectandpreferableonesand theyshouldbeaffirmed"andorderedthat"[t]hedecisionsunderreviewareaffirmed".TheTribunalconsideredthatthe lawinNewSouthWaleswaspredicatedupontheassumptionthatpersonscouldbeclassifiedintotwodistinctand identifiablesexes,namely,thatofmaleandfemale.TheTribunalconcludedthattheconstructionoftheActurgedby Norriewasnotconsistentwiththenumerouslegislativeprovisionsthatwerepremiseduponthebinarynotionofsexas meaning"male"and"female":seeat[87]and[94].TheTribunalalsoconsideredthattheconstructionforwhichNorrie contendedwasnotconsonantwiththecommonlaw. TheTribunalacknowledged,at[96],thatthisviewmaybeoutofstepwithcurrentsocial,medicalandscientificviews. Nonetheless,at[97],theTribunalconsideredthatitwasimprobablethatParliamentwouldhaveintendedthatthe amendmentstotheActeffectedbyPt5AtohavetheoutcomeforwhichNorriecontended.

39

40

DecisionoftheAppealPanel

41

NorrieappealedtotheAppealPanelonaquestionoflawpursuanttotheAdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct,s 113(2)(a).ThequestionsoflawposedfortheAppealPanel'sdeterminationwere:
"(1)DidtheTribunalerrbyfollowinganincorrectprocedurethatis,byfailingtodetermineasaquestionoffactthe appellant'ssubjectivepurposeinundergoingthesurgicalproceduredefinedintheActasa'sexaffirmation procedure'? (2)DidtheTribunalmisconstrues32DCwhenitfoundthatthepowersoftheRegistrarwhenregisteringaperson's changeofsexunderthatprovisionarelimitedtorecording'male'or'female'inthesexfield?"(at[18])

42

Duringthecourseoftheappealhearing,Norriealsoappliedforleavetoappealonthemeritsoftheapplication:seethe AdministrativeDecisionsTribunalAct,s113(2)(b).Thisapplicationwasrejectedbecauseitwasmadewithoutnotice totheRegistrarandbecausetheTribunalhadonlydeterminedthepreliminaryquestionoftheRegistrar'spowersand hadnotreachedthestageofmakingadecisionastothemeritsoftheapplication:seeAppealPanel'sreasonsat[38]. However,itshouldbenotedthattheeffectoftheTribunal'sdecisiononthepreliminaryquestionwastofinally determineNorrie'sapplication.Thatistosay,astheTribunaldeterminedthatPt5Aonlypermittedaperson'ssextobe registeredasmaleorfemale,Norrie'sapplicationcouldnotsucceedevenifconsideredonthemerits. Inherargumentonthequestionsoflaw,NorriecontendedtotheAppealPanelthathercircumstancescamewithinthe secondlimbofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A(b)andthatalthoughshehadundergonesurgery forthepurposespecifiedinpara(b),thesurgeryhadnotbeensuccessfulinthesensethatithadnotresolvedher ambiguityinrelationtohersex.TheAppealPanel,at[20],rejectedthisargumentonthebasisthattheTribunal'sfailure todetermineNorrie'ssubjectivepurposeinundertakingthesexaffirmationprocedurewasnotanerroroflaw.The AppealPanelstated:
"TheTribunalaskeditselftherightquestion,thatis,assumingtheprerequisitestoexercisingthepowerunders 32DChadbeenmet,whetherthescopeofthatpowerincludedregisteringaperson'ssexas'notspecified'.The Tribunalwasdeterminingapreliminaryissue,namelythescopeofthepowerins32DC.Havingdecidedthatthe scopeofthatpowerwaslimitedtoregisteringachangeofsexfrommaletofemaleorfromfemaleto male,itfollowedthattheRegistrarhadmadethecorrect,indeedtheonlyavailable,decision."(emphasis added)

43

44

TheAppealPanelnextconsideredthemeaningof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A,notingthatthatprovisionwasa definitionsectionandthatdefinitionswerenottobetreatedassubstantiveprovisions:seeGibbvFederal CommissionerofTaxation[1966]HCA74118CLR628at635.TheAppealPanelconsideredthatthatprinciple,and thefactthattheTribunalwasconsideringapreliminaryquestionoflaw,meantthatNorrie'sargumentastothe meaningof"sex"ins32Awassuperfluous.TheAppealPanel,nonetheless,addressedthatquestion"for

completeness".ForthereasonsIgivebelow,Idonotconsiderthatthemeaningof"sex"ins32Aissuperfluous. However,atthispoint,IwilldonomorethanrefertotheAppealPanel'sfindings. 45 TheAppealPanelrejectedNorrie'ssubmissionthatwhilst"sex"ins32A(a)meant"male"or"female",s32A(b)was draftedsothattheword"sex"extendedtoasexualidentitywhichcouldbeneither.TheAppealPanelstated,at[22], thatsuchaninterpretationwas:

"...contrarytoabasictenetofstatutoryconstructionthatwherethelegislatureusestheword('sex'),especiallyin asingleprovision,itshouldbegiventhesamemeaning:CraigWilliamsonPtyLtdvBarrowcliff[1915]VLR450at 452perHodgesJ."

46

TheAppealPanelstated,at[23],thattheuseoftheword"opposite"ins32A(a)suggestedthatgenderwasbinary,that is,eithermaleorfemale.IntheAppealPanel'sreasons,s32A(b),readinthecontextofs32A(a),meantthatthe surgerywascarriedouttoaltertheperson'sreproductiveorganssothatthepersonmaybeconsideredmore definitivelyaseithermaleorfemale. TheAppealPanelnextconsidered,at[24],thelimitsoftheRegistrar'spowersunders32DC.Indoingso,itobserved thatthedeterminationoftheordinarymeaningoftheword"sex"wasaquestionoffactwhichwasfortheTribunalto determine.However,thescopeoftheRegistrar'spowerins32DC,whichwastobedeterminedbyconstruingthe wordsofthesectioncontext,wasaquestionoflaw:AustralianGasLightCovValuerGeneral(1940)40SR(NSW) 126at137CollectorofCustomsvAgfaGevaertLtd[1996]HCA36186CLR389at395MoynavSecretaryofState forWorkandPensions[2003]1WLR1929at1935. NorriecontendedbeforetheAppealPanelthattheTribunalhadmisconstruedthemeaningofthewordsinanumberof ways.Thecentralargumentswerethatonceanapplicanthadsatisfiedthepreconditionsspecifiedins32DA,the Registrarwasobligedtoregisterthechangeofsexrequested,andthattheTribunalhaderredbyreadingintos32DA, after"changeofsex",thewords"frommaletofemale"or"fromfemaletomale". TheAppealPanelrejectedbotharguments.Astothefirst,theAppealPanel,at[28][29],heldthatthequestioninissue wasnotwhetherthepreconditionshadbeenmetbutwhatwasthescopeoftheRegistrar'spowersunders32DC.As tothesecondofthesearguments,theAppealPanelheld,at[35],thattheTribunalhadnotreadwordsintos32DCbut hadconstruedthewords"changeofsex"inaccordancewiththeirordinarymeaning,namely,achangefrommaleto femaleorviceversa. TheotherargumentsuponwhichNorriereliedwerealsorejectedbytheAppealPanel.

47

48

49

50

TheappealtothisCourt
51 NorriesubmittedtothisCourtthatonthefindingsoffactuponwhichthematterproceededintheTribunalandbefore theAppealPanelshedidnotidentifyaseithermaleorfemale.Norriearguedthatthatleftherinthepositionwherethe bestdescriptionofhersexualstatuswas"nonspecific".Againstthatbackground,Norriecontendedinhernoticeof appealthattheAppealPanelerred: (1)Initsconstructionofs32DCoftheAct,byholdingthattheRegistrarcouldonlyregisterachangeofaperson's "sex"frommaletofemaleorfromfemaletomale,butnotfrommaleorfemaletoadesignationthatisneither specificallymalenorfemale (2)Initsconstructionofs32DAoftheAct,byholdingthesectioncouldonlybesatisfiedifanapplicanthadundergone asurgicalprocedureforthepurposeofbeingmoredefinitivelyregardedaseither"male"or"female"butnotforthe purposeofcorrectingtheambiguitybetweenthephysicalcharacteristicsandtheindividual'ssexidentityand (3)Inholdingthatasamatteroflaw,itwasnotopentotheRegistrartoregistertheappellant'ssexas"nonspecific".
Meaningofquestionoflaw

52

AsIhaveearlierstated,thejurisdictionoftheCourtonthisappealislimitedtoquestionsoflaw:Administrative DecisionsTribunalAct,s119(1).AstheFederalCourtstatedinCollectorofCustomsvPozzolanicEnterprisesPty Ltd[1993]FCA32243FCR280at287:

"Distinctionsbetweenaquestionoffactandaquestionoflawcanbeelusive.Theproperinterpretation, constructionandapplicationofastatutetoagivencaseraisesissueswhichmaybeorinvolvequestionsoffactor lawormixedfactandlaw."

53

TheCourtinPozzolanicnonethelesssuggested,at287,thattherearefivegeneralpropositionsastowhethera questionoflaworfactisatissue:
"1.Thequestionwhetherawordorphraseinastatuteistobegivenitsordinarymeaningorsometechnicalor othermeaningisaquestionoflaw.

2.Theordinarymeaningofawordoritsnonlegaltechnicalmeaningisaquestionoffact. 3.Themeaningofatechnicallegaltermisaquestionoflaw. 4.Theeffectorconstructionofatermwhosemeaningorinterpretationisestablishedisaquestionoflaw. 5.Thequestionwhetherfactsfullyfoundfallwithintheprovisionofastatutoryenactmentproperlyconstruedis generallyaquestionoflaw."(citationsomitted)

54

ThesecondandthirdpropositionsaresupportedbythestatementofJordanCJinAustralianGasLightCovValuer Generalat137:
"ThequestionwhatisthemeaningofanordinaryEnglishwordorphraseasusedintheStatuteisoneoffactnotof law.Thisquestionistoberesolvedbytherelevanttribunalitself,byconsideringthewordinitscontextwiththe assistanceofdictionariesandotherbooks,andnotbyexpertevidencealthoughevidenceisreceivableastothe meaningoftechnicaltermsandthemeaningofatechnicallegaltermisaquestionoflaw."

55

InCollectorofCustomsvAgfaGevaertLimited[1996]HCA36186CLR389,theHighCourtobserved,at396,in relationtothePozzolanicpropositions:
"Suchgeneralexpositionsofthelawarehelpfulinmanycircumstances.Buttheyloseadegreeoftheirutilitywhen, asinthepresentcase,thephraseorterminissueiscomplexortheinquirythattheprimarydecisionmaker embarkeduponisnotclear."

56

Inparticular,theHighCourtquestionedthedistinctiondrawninPozzolanicbetweenthesecondandfourth propositions:
"Withrespectthisdistinctionseemsartificial,ifnotillusory.Themeaningattributedtoindividualwordsinaphrase ultimatelydictatestheeffectorconstructionthatonegivestothephrasewhentakenasawholeandtheapproach thatoneadoptsindeterminingthemeaningoftheindividualwordsofthatphraseisboundupinthesyntactical constructionofthephraseinquestion.InRvBrown[1996]1AC543at561[1996]1AC543at561,arecent HouseofLordsdecision,LordHoffmannsaid: "ThefallacyintheCrown'sargumentis,Ithink,onecommonamonglawyers,namelytotreatthewordsofan Englishsentenceasbuildingblockswhosemeaningcannotbeaffectedbytherestofthesentence...Thisis notthewaylanguageworks.Theunitofcommunicationbymeansoflanguageisthesentenceandnotthe partsofwhichitiscomposed.Thesignificanceofindividualwordsisaffectedbyotherwordsandthesyntax ofthewhole." Ifthenotionsofmeaningandconstructionareinterdependent,aswethinktheyare,thenitisdifficulttoseehow meaningisaquestionoffactwhileconstructionisaquestionoflawwithoutinsistingonsomequalification concerningconstructionthatiscurrentlyabsentfromthelaw."

57

ItwasunnecessaryfortheHighCourtinAgfaGevaerttoresolvethatissue.Itwassufficient,forthepurposesofthat case,inorderforareviewablequestionoflawtoarisefordetermination,"foraphrasetobeidentifiedasbeingusedin asensedifferentfromthatwhichithasinordinaryspeech":seeat397. InIndustryResearchandDevelopmentBoardvBridgestoneAustraliaLtd[2001]FCA954109FCR564.LindgrenJ (BransonandMansfieldJJagreeing)stated,at[54]:

"Inthepresentcase,thefactshavebeenfoundandwhatisleftisachoiceastowhichoftwosuggestedmeanings ofthewordsofthestatuteistobeappliedtothosefacts.Thatchoiceisnotamatterofdiscretionthestatutetruly bearsonlyoneofthetwosuggestedmeaningsthechoicemadewillbecorrectorincorrectinlaw...These considerationsshowthataquestionoflawisinvolved."

58

HisHonourthenreferredtotheobiterremarksoftheHighCourtinAgfaGevaertsetoutaboveat[56]. 59 InAktiebolagetHasslevAlphapharmPtyLtd[2002]HCA59212CLR411,GleesonCJ,Gaudron,Gummowand HayneJJ,citingAgfaGevaert,stated,at[36],that"[t]henotionsofmeaningandconstructionareinterdependent"and thatthemeaningofaparticularwordinthelegislation"mustbeaffectedbytheotherwordsandsyntaxofthewholeof [theprovision]."SeealsoKirbyJat[138]. InOVvMembersofTheBoardofWesleyMissionCouncil[2010]NSWCA15579NSWLR606,theNewSouth WalesCourtofAppealappliedAgfaGevaert:see[2][8]and[27][31].AllsopP(ashisHonourthenwas)commented thattheHighCourt'sdecisioninAgfaGevaert:

"...shouldnotbetakenasdenyingtheconceptualdistinctionbetweentheascertainmentofsemanticmeaning (interpretation)anddetermininglegaleffectorlegalcontent(construction)ofalegaltext.Theprocessescanbe seentobedistinctintermsoflegaltheoryandfunction.WhattheHighCourtstatedwasthattheirinterrelationship intheprocessofascriptionofmeaningtoalegaltextmeantthatforthepurpose,atleast,ofdistinguishingbetween questionsoflawandfact,thedistinctionwasillusory."

60

61

InScreenAustraliavEMEProductionsNo1[2012]FCAFC19200FCR282theFullFederalCourtalsoappliedthe HighCourt'sstatementinAgfaGevaertastotheinterdependencyofmeaningandconstruction,observingat[41],that the"clearlyconsidereddicta"oftheHighCourthadbeenfollowedinOVvMembersofTheBoardofWesleyMission CouncilandcitedwithapprovalinAktiebolagetHasslevAlphapharm:see[39][42].TheCourtconcluded,at[42]:

"Wherethereisuncertaintyastothemeaningofastatutorywordorexpression,ashere,theprocessof constructionraisesaquestionoflaw.

62

TheHighCourt'sobiterremarksinAgfaGevaertandtheirapprovalinAktiebolagetHasslevAlphapharmindicates thatitcannotbesaidthattheordinarymeaningofawordoritsnontechnicalmeaningisaquestionoffact,atleastas astandaloneproposition.Rather,whentheCourtisengagedinataskofstatutoryconstruction,itisrequiredtohave regardtothelanguageusedbyParliamentandthecontextinwhichitisused.Thattaskinvolvesaquestionoflaw. Further,aswasexplained,correctlyinmyopinion,byMarkAronson,BruceDyerandMathewGroves,JudicialReview ofAdministrativeAction(2009)LawbookCoat213:

"Misunderstandingthegoverninglawhasalwaysbeenanerroroflawinitsownright,andthatshouldinclude misunderstandingthelegalmeaningofastatutoryterm,ordinaryorspecial.Misunderstandingistheerror,andthat canoccurinrelationtoordinaryaswellastechnicalterms.Inotherwords,thepropermeaningofanylegalterm shoulditselfbeaquestionoflaw...Ifitiserroroflawtostraybeyondtheboundariesofanordinarymeaning,then fixingtheordinarymeaningmustsurelyitselfbeaquestionoflaw."

63

64

ThecentralissueontheappealrelatestothescopeofthepoweroftheRegistrartomakeanentryastoaperson's sexintheRegister.Thatquestionraisestheproperconstructionofs32DChavingregardtothemeaningof"sex"as usedinPt5A,andontheauthoritiesandcommentarydiscussed,isaquestionoflaw.

Principlesofstatutoryconstruction
65 TheprimarytaskoftheCourtindeterminingtheproperconstructionofastatuteistodeterminethemeaningofthe provision"byreferencetothelanguageoftheinstrumentviewedasawhole":seeCooperBrooker(Wollongong)Pty LtdvFederalCommissionerofTaxation[1981]HCA26147CLR297at320ProjectBlueSkyIncvAustralian BroadcastingAuthority[1998]HCA28194CLR355at[69].InProjectBlueSkythepluralitystated,at[78],"theduty ofacourtistogivethewordsofastatutoryprovisionthemeaningthatthelegislatureistakentohaveintendedthem tohave".Thecontextandpurposeofthelegislationareinvolvedinthistask. InBainivTheQueen[2012]HCA5987ALJR180GagelerJobserved,at[42],thatinthetaskofstatutory construction,contextistobeconsideredattheoutsetandnotonlyatsomelaterstageifitisconsideredthatambiguity mightarise.HisHonouraddedthe"modernapproachtostatutoryinterpretation"used"context":
"...initswidestsensetoincludesuchthingsastheexistingstateofthelawandthemischiefwhich,bylegitimate means...onemaydiscernthestatutewasintendedtoremedy."

66

SeealsoMonisvTheQueen[2013]HCA4,87ALJR340at[309]. 67 IndeterminingthemischieftowhichthestatutewasdirectedtheCourtmayhaveregardtootherjudicialdecisionsthat mayindicatetherelevantmischief:seeABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42244CLR390at[10].However,the authoritiesstressthatthematterremainsoneofstatutoryconstruction. TheInterpretationAct1987,s33providesthatastatuteistobegivenaconstructionthatpromotesthepurposeor objectunderlyingtheActinpreferencetoaconstructionthatwouldnotpromotethatpurposeorobject.Theprimary sourcefordeterminingpurpose,isagain,tobediscernedfromtheexpresstermsofthelegislation.AsKirbyJ observedinRvLavender[2005]HCA37222CLR67at[94],theCourt'sdutyistoascertainandgiveeffecttothe legislativepurposeasexpressedinthelanguageoftheprovision:seealsoAustralianEducationUnionvDepartment ofEducationandChildren'sServices[2012]HCA386ALJR217at[26]RoadshowFilmsPtyLtdviiNetLtd[2012] HCA1686ALJR494at[22]Alcan(NT)AluminaPtyLtdvCommissionerofTerritoryRevenue[2009]HCA41239 CLR27at[47]. However,indeterminingthelegislativepurpose,theCourtisnotconfinedtothetermsofthelegislationonly.Section 34(1)providesthatconsiderationmaybegiventoextrinsicmaterialthatmaybecapableofassistinginascertaining themeaningoftheprovisionbutonlyforthefollowingpurposes:
"(a)toconfirmthatthemeaningoftheprovisionistheordinarymeaningconveyedbythetextoftheprovision (takingintoaccountitscontextintheActorstatutoryruleandthepurposeorobjectunderlyingtheActorstatutory ruleand,inthecaseofastatutoryrule,thepurposeorobjectunderlyingtheActunderwhichtherulewasmade), or (b)todeterminethemeaningoftheprovision: (i)iftheprovisionisambiguousorobscure,or (ii)iftheordinarymeaningconveyedbythetextoftheprovision(takingintoaccountitscontextintheActor statutoryruleandthepurposeorobjectunderlyingtheActorstatutoryruleand,inthecaseofastatutory rule,thepurposeorobjectunderlyingtheActunderwhichtherulewasmade)leadstoaresultthatis manifestlyabsurdorisunreasonable."

68

69

70

Recoursetosuchmaterialunders34(1)(b)(ii)is,however,permittedonlywherethepurposecannotbedetermined fromthewordsofthestatuteorinferencefromitstextandstructure:seeCertainLloyd'sUnderwritersSubscribingto ContractNoIH00AAQSvCross[2012]HCA5687ALJR131,whereFrenchCJandHayneJstated,at[25]:

"Determinationofthepurposeofastatuteorofparticularprovisionsinastatutemaybebaseduponanexpress statementofpurposeinthestatuteitself,inferencefromitstextandstructureand,whereappropriate, referencetoextrinsicmaterials[emphasisadded].Thepurposeofastatuteresidesinitstextandstructure. Determinationofastatutorypurposeneitherpermitsnorrequiressomesearchforwhatthosewhopromotedor passedthelegislationmayhavehadinmindwhenitwasenacted.Itisimportantinthisrespect...torecognisethat tospeakoflegislative'intention'istouseametaphor.Useofthatmetaphormustnotmislead.'[T]hedutyofacourt istogivethewordsofastatutoryprovisionthemeaningthatthelegislatureistakentohaveintendedthemtohave' ..."(originalemphasiscitationsomitted)

71

Inthesamecase,KeifelJ,at[89],referredtothelegitimacyofresortingtoextrinsicmaterials.HerHonournoted, however,thatitwasimportant:
"...tobearinmindthepurposeofdoingsoandtheprocessofconstructiontowhichitisdirected.Thatpurposeis, generallyspeaking,toidentifythepolicyofthestatuteinordertobetterunderstandthelanguageandintended operationofthestatute."

72

HerHonourwarnedthat:
"Anunderstandingoflegislativepolicybythesemeansdoesnotprovideawarrantfordepartingfromtheprocess ofstatutoryconstructionandattributingawideroperationtoastatutethanitslanguageandevidentoperation permit."

73

Therequirementthatastatutoryprovisionmustbeconstruedhavingregardtoitscontextandlegislativepurpose,is reinforcedbythecanonofconstructionthatremedialandbeneficiallegislationistobegivenaliberalconstruction, ratherthana"literalortechnical"onethatis"unreasonableorunnatural":IWvCityofPerthat12.SeealsoABv WesternAustraliaat[24],wheretheCourtstated:

"Itisgenerallyacceptedthatthereisaruleofconstructionthatbeneficialandremediallegislationistobegivena 'fair,largeandliberal'interpretation."(citationsomitted)

74

Inmakingthoseremarks,theCourtinABreferredtothesimilarapproachtakeninrespectoflegislationinvolving humanrights.SeeWatersvPublicTransportCorporation[1991]HCA49173CLR349whereMasonCJand GaudronJstated,at359:

"...theprinciplethatrequiresthattheparticularprovisionsoftheActmustbereadinthelightofthestatutory objectsisofparticularsignificanceinthecaseoflegislationwhichprotectsorenforceshumanrights.Inconstruing suchlegislationthecourtshaveaspecialresponsibilitytotakeaccountofandgiveeffecttothestatutorypurpose."

75

Inthepresentcase,asIindicatebelow,theRegistraracceptedthatPt5Aisbeneficiallegislationandthatthe principlesstatedinIWvCityofPerthapply.

Extrinsicmaterial
76 BothpartiesreliedextensivelyuponextrinsicmaterialinaidoftherespectiveconstructionsoftheRegistrar'spowerfor whichtheycontended.Thatmaterialwas:(i)thesecondreadingspeechtotheamendinglegislation(ii)dictionary definitions(iii)academicmaterialsaidtobeauthoritativeonthequestionofgenderidentity(iv)otherStateand Federallegislation(v)andcaselawdealingwithlegislationwheretheword'sex'wasusedandwasthesubjectmatter ofthedecision.

TheSecondReadingSpeech

77

TheSecondReadingSpeechisspecificallydesignatedasmaterialtowhichregardmaybehadforthepurposesof subs(1):seeInterpretationAct,s34(2)(f).HowevertheSpeechmayonlybeusedinthemannerprescribedins 34(1)(a)ands34(1)(b)ofthatActforthepurposestatedbytheHighCourtintheCertainLloyd'sUnderwriterscase. Onitsexpressterms,Part5ApermitstheRegistrartoregisteraperson'ssexthatcorrespondswiththatperson's sexualorgenderidentityatthetimeofseekingtheregistration.Theregistrationissubjecttothepreconditionofhaving undergonesexaffirmationsurgery.TheActprescribesthemannerinwhichthatpreconditionistobeestablished, namely,byastatutorydeclarationbytwomedicalpractitionersthatthepersonhasundergonethesurgery.However,in empoweringtheRegistrartoregisteraperson'ssex,Pt5Adoesnotspecifythataperson's"sex"mayonlybe,oristo be,registeredas"male"or"female".Nordoesitstatethatthereareotherkindsofsexualidentitythatmaybe registered.Accordingly,itislegitimateinthiscasetohaveregardtotheSecondReadingSpeech,asitisnotapparent fromthelegislationitselfwhethertheword"sex"isusedinthetraditionalsenseof"male"and"female"orwhetherit hasawidermeaning. IntheSecondReadingSpeech,theMinisterstatedthattheamendmentstotheActweretoprovideforthelegal recognitionofpostoperativetransgenderpersonsand,inparticular,to:
"...enableapersonwhowasborninthisStateandhasundergonesexualreassignmentsurgerytoapplyforanew birthcertificateshowingtheirnewsex."

78

79

80

Tothisextent,theSecondReadingSpeechstatednomorethanwhatwasexpresslyprovidedforintheAct.However, theRegistrarsubmittedthatboththetitleoftheamendingBill:viz,theTransgender(AntiDiscriminationandOther ActsAmendment)Billandthesecondreadingspeechsupportedhissubmissionthattheword"sex"wasusedina binarysenseinthelegislation.Thiswasbecauseatransgenderpersonisapersonwhohasthephysiological characteristicsofonesexandthepsychologicalcharacteristicsoftheothersex. ThissubmissionbuiltupontheRegistrar'sprimarysubmissionthattheword"sex"wasawordofordinaryEnglish usageandthiswasreflectedinthefollowingportionoftheSecondReadingSpeech,towhichregardcouldbehad:

"...TheGovernmentbelievesitisappropriatetointroducethis[billbecause]transgenderstatusisaquestionof genderidentity,andnotsexualpreference... Itis...proposedthat'transgender'bethetermusedtoidentifythebasisofacomplaintunderthe[Anti Discrimination]Act.Thisincludesapersonwhoisbornasamemberofonesexbutwhohaslived,orlives,or seekstoliveasamemberoftheothersex... Theterm'transgender'inthe[AntiDiscrimination]legislationhasthereforebeenusedtorefertoalltransgender persons,regardlessofwhethertheyhaveundergonesurgicalintervention....Thisdefinitionisnotintendedto coverpersonswhocrossdressorwhohaveadoptedthecharacteristicsoftheothersex,say,forexample,amale personwhofromtimetotimewearsmakeup,orhighheels,whohasnotchosentoliveasamemberoftheother sex."(emphasesadded)

81

82

ThereisanimmediatedifficultywiththeRegistrar'srelianceonthesepassagesinthatthatpartoftheSecondReading SpeechwasdirectedtotheamendmentstotheAntiDiscriminationActandnottotheAct.Theprovisionsofthe formerActusedifferentlanguagefromthatusedinPt5A.Inaddition,relianceontheemphasisedportionsofthe SecondReadingSpeechwouldhavetheviceofusingthelanguageofthesecondreadingspeech:viz,"memberofthe onesex""andmemberoftheothersex"insubstitutionforthelanguageofthestatutoryprovisionunderconsideration. ThoseexpressionsarenotusedinPt5A.TousetheSecondReadingSpeechinthatwaywouldoffendtheprinciples statedintheCertainLloyd'sUnderwriterscase. However,theSecondReadingSpeechprovidessomeassistanceinunderstandingtheunderlyingpolicytothe introductionofPt5AinthatitdemonstratesthattheParliamentrecognisedthattherewerepersonswhomaynotfit withinwhatIwilldescribeasatraditionalsexorgenderidentificationof"male"or"female".Parliamentthushadseen theneedtoprovide,intwosignificantways,forsuchpersons,firstbymakingprovisionfortheregistrationofthe person'ssexandsecondlybyenactingantidiscriminationlegislationdealingwithdiscriminationinrelationtothose persons.

83

Dictionarydefinitions

84

Whereawordisnotdefinedinlegislation,recoursetodictionarydefinitionsisanacceptedtechniqueinthetaskof statutoryconstruction.AsLordColeridgeobservedinRvPeters(1886)16QBD636at641:
"...dictionariesarenottobetakenasauthoritativeexponentsofthemeaningsofwordsusedinActsofParliament, butitisawellknownruleofcourtsoflawthatwordsshouldbetakentobeusedintheordinarysense,andweare thereforesentforinstructiontothesebooks."

SeealsoColemanvDPP[2000]NSWSC27549NSWLR371at3735. 85 However,asDennisCPearce&RobertSGeddes,StatutoryInterpretationinAustralia,7thed(2011)LexisNexis Butterworthsnoted,at[3.30],theuseofadictionarytoenabletheordinarymeaningofawordtobeidentifiedmustnot resultinthewordsusedinthestatutebeingabandonedinfavourofsomeothersynonymouswordorexpression.Nor canthemeaningofawordasamatterofordinaryEnglishusageoverridethenecessitytoconstruethestatutory languageincontext. InSecretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"[1993]FCA57343FCR299,BlackCJreferredtothedictionary definitionsofthewords"female","woman"and"sex"toascertaintheirmeaningasamatterofordinaryEnglishusage. Asat1993,beingthedateoftheCourt'sdeterminationinSRA,theOxfordEnglishDictionaryprovidedthefollowing relevantmeaningsfortheword"sex":
"1.a.Eitherofthetwodivisionsoforganicbeingsdistinguishedasmaleandfemalerespectivelythemalesorthe females(ofaspecies,etc,espofthehumanrace)viewedcollectively. ... 3.a.Thedistinctionbetweenmaleandfemaleingeneral.Inrecentuseoftenwithmoreexplicitnotion:Thesumof thosedifferencesinthestructureandfunctionofthereproductiveorgansonthegroundofwhichbeingsare distinguishedasmaleandfemale,andoftheotherphysiologicaldifferencesconsequentonthesetheclassof phenomenawithwhichthesedifferencesareconcerned."

86

87

TheMacquarieDictionarydefinitionsof"sex"included:
"1.Thecharacterofbeingeithermaleorfemale:personsofdifferentsexes. 2.Thesumoftheanatomicalandphysiologicaldifferenceswithreferencetowhichthemaleandthefemaleare distinguished,orthephenomenadependingonthesedifferences."

88

Whilstthedefinitionof"sex"containedinthemostrecenteditionoftheMacquarieOnlineDictionaryhasnotchanged, thefollowingdefinitionistobefoundinthecurrentversionoftheOxfordEnglishDictionary:
"1a.Eitherofthetwomaincategories(maleandfemale)intowhichhumansandmanyotherlivingthingsare dividedonthebasisoftheirreproductivefunctions(hence)themembersofthesecategoriesviewedasagroup themalesorfemalesofaparticularspecies,esp.thehumanrace,consideredcollectively. b.Inextendeduse,esp.asthethirdsex.A(notional)thirddivisionofhumanityregardedasanalogousto,oras fallingbetween,themaleandfemalesexesspec.thatconsistingof:(a)eunuchsortranssexuals..."

89

Theextendedusagein(b)isnotedtodatefrom1821intheworksofLordByron:seeDonJuan,CantoVxxvi,148and CantoIVlxxxvi,114. ThedifferenceinthecurrentdefinitionintheOxfordEnglishDictionaryfromthatinthe1993versionreferredtoinSRA istwofold.First,thedefinitionin1(a)variesfromthatgivenin1993,inthatthereisareferenceto"thetwomain categories"ascomparedtotheearlierreferenceto"thetwodivisions".Secondly,anentirelynewdefinitionhasbeen insertedin1(b),givingrecognitiontoausageoftheword"sex"thatencompassessexualidentitythatisnotconfinedto "male"or"female".

90

Academicmaterial

91

NorriealsourgedupontheCourtarangeofacademicandothermaterialwhichdealtwiththequestionofsexual identity.Inparticular,thefollowingpublicationswereprovidedtotheCourtforitsconsideration:JulieAGreenberg, IntersexualityandtheLaw:WhySexMatters(2012)NewYorkUniversityPressJusticeMichaelKirbyCMG,"Medical TechnologyandNewFrontiersofFamilyLaw"(198687)1AustralianJournalofFamilyLaw196andanextract entitled"Intersex"fromWikipedia. Aquestionaroseduringthecourseoftheargumentastotheauthoritativestatusofthismaterial.SeniorCounselfor NorrieindicatedthatanychallengetothestatusofthematerialwasamatterfortheRegistrartoraise.Idonot considerthatthematterissosimple.TheCourtmustbesatisfiedthatthereisabasisuponwhichitisentitledto receiveandrelyuponsuchmaterial. ThecircumstancesinwhichtheCourtisentitledtouseextraneousmaterialwasconsideredinThomasvMowbray [2007]HCA33233CLR307.Thatcaseconcernedthevalidityofantiterrorismlegislationwherebyinterimcontrol orderscouldbemadeinrelationtoaperson:seeCriminalCode(Cth),s104.4.Inthecourseofconsideringthat question,HeydonJidentifiedfivedifferentgroupsoffactsthatmayhavetoestablishedinparticularlitigation:seeat [614].Thesegroupswere:(i)factsinissueorrelevanttofactsinissue(ii)factsgoingtotheconstitutionalvalidityof statutes(iii)factsgoingtotheconstructionofnonconstitutionalstatutes(iv)factsgoingtotheconstructionof constitutionalstatutesand(v)factsthatrelatetothecontentanddevelopmentofthecommonlaw.Forpresent purposes,itisonlynecessarytoconsiderthefirstandthirdgroupofhisHonour'sclassification. Factsinthefirstgrouparerequiredtobeprovedinaccordancewiththeordinaryrulesofevidence,includingtherules relatingtojudicialnotice.Insofarasfactsinthefirstgroupweretobeestablishedasamatterofjudicialnotice,his Honourobserved,at[619],thatthecommonlawdoctrineofjudicialnoticewasnarrowanditselfinvolvedtwo categories.Thefirstwaswherejudicialnoticewastakenoffacts,withoutinquiry.Suchfactshadtobe"openand notorious".Astothesecond,wherejudicialnoticewastakenoffactsafterinquiry,theinquirywastobebasedonthe "commonknowledgeofeducated[persons]"asrevealedin"acceptedwritings","standardworks"and"seriousstudies andinquiries":AustralianCommunistPartyvCommonwealth[1951]HCA583CLR1at196.SeealsoHollandv Jones[1917]HCA2623CLR149at153,wherejudicialnoticewasdescribedinsimilarterms.Referencetoa medicaltextisanexampleofaninquirythatmaybemadeforthepurposesofthesecondtypeofjudicialnotice:see TimburyvCoffee[1941]HCA2266CLR277at283284.HeydonJconcluded,at[619],that"mattersjudicially noticedatcommonlawmustbeindisputable". HeydonJobserved,at[635],thattherewasauthorityforthepropositionthatfactswithinthethirdgroupcouldberelied onbytheCourt,althoughnotprovedundertherulesfortheadmissibilityofevidence:seeGerhardyvBrown[1985] HCA11159CLR70at141142perBrennanJWoodsvMultiSportHoldingsPtyLtd[2002]HCA9208CLR460at 479perMcHughJ.HeydonJnotedthattherewasauthoritytothesameeffectinrespectoffactswithinthefourthand fifthgroup. TheissueinGerhardyvBrownwaswhetheraStateLandRightsActwasinconsistentwiththeRacialDiscrimination Act1975(Cth).BrennanJ,at141,observedthatordinarily,questionsoflawdidnotinvolvefactualconsiderations,or atleasttheconsiderationoffactsthatwerenotnotoriousandbeyonddispute.HisHonourobserved,however,thatthe casebeforetheCourtwasanexception.AshisHonourexplained,itwasnecessaryfortheCourttounderstandthe circumstancesinwhichtheStateActwasintendedtooperate.ThefactswithwhichhisHonourwasdealingwere factswithinHeydonJ'sthirdcategory.

92

93

94

95

96

97

Inthatcontext,BrennanJsaid,at141142:
"Thereisadistinctionbetweenajudicialfindingofafactinissuebetweenpartiesuponwhichalawoperatesto establishordenyarightorliabilityandajudicialdeterminationofthevalidityorscopeofalawwhenitsvalidityor scopeturnsonamatteroffact.Whenacourt,inascertainingthevalidityorscopeofalaw,considersmattersof fact,itisnotboundtoreachitsdecisioninthesamewayasitdoeswhenittriesanissueoffactbetweenthe parties.Thevalidityandscopeofalawcannotbemadetodependonthecourseofprivatelitigation.The legislativewillisnotsurrenderedintothehandsofthelitigants."

98

HeydonJ'sfivecategoriesmightalsobecharacterisedasadjudicativefacts(thefirstcategory)andlegislativefacts (theothercategories).Inhisextracurialwriting,HeydonJhasobservedthatlegislativefactscouldrelevantlybe sourcedfromlegislativefactsacceptedinothercasesandfromstandardworksofreferenceorotherwritingsof expertsonthephysical,medical,socialandothersciences:JusticeJohnDysonHeydon,"DevelopingtheCommon Law",inGleeson,JTandHiggins,RCA(eds)ConstitutingLaw,LegalArgumentandSocialValues(2011)Federation Press,at96. InWoodsvMultiSportHoldingsMcHughJidentifiedlegislativefactsasfactsthathelpthecourttodeterminethe contentoflawandpolicy.HisHonournotedthatsuchfacts"generallyrelatetothelawmakingfunctionofthejudicial process".HisHonourthendealtwiththecircumstancesinwhichthecourtcouldhaverecourse,includingthroughthe judges'ownresearch,toextraneousmaterialindeterminingthevalidityandscopeoflegalrulesandprinciples. McHughJsaid,at[65]:
"AsBrennanJpointedoutinGerhardyvBrown,acourtthatinconsideringthevalidityorscopeofalaw'isnot boundtoreachitsdecisioninthesamewayasitdoeswhenittriesanissueoffactbetweentheparties'.Whether thelawisaConstitution,alegislativeenactmentoraprincipleorruleofthecommonlaworequity,the'validityand scopeofalawcannotbemadetodependonthecourseofprivatelitigation'...asthelearnedauthorofCrosson Evidencehaspointedout,'[i]tisclearfromthecasesthatjudgeshavefeltthemselvesrelativelyfreetoapplytheir ownviewsandtomaketheirownenquiriesofsocialethics,psychology,politicsandhistorywhererelevantwithout requiringevidenceorotherproof'."(citationsomitted)

99

100 InWoodsvMultiSportHoldings,CallinanJ,wasmorecautious,stating,at[162][163],thattheCourtshouldbe cautiousininformingitselfoflegislativefactsandshouldonlydosowhennecessaryandonlyifsatisfiedthatthe materialtowhichitwashavingregardwas"reliableandnecessary".Notwithstandingthiscaution,thelawhaslong acceptedthatsuchfactscouldbedeterminedbytheCourtafterinquiryfromsourcesotherthanfactsprovedin accordancewiththerulesofevidence.Aquestionarises,however,whetherproofofsuchfactsisnowgovernedsolely bytheEvidenceAct1995,s144. 101 Section144provides:

"144Mattersofcommonknowledge (1)Proofisnotrequiredaboutknowledgethatisnotreasonablyopentoquestionandis: (a)commonknowledgeinthelocalityinwhichtheproceedingisbeingheldorgenerally,or (b)capableofverificationbyreferencetoadocumenttheauthorityofwhichcannotreasonablybe questioned. (2)Thejudgemayacquireknowledgeofthatkindinanywaythejudgethinksfit. (3)Thecourt...istotakeknowledgeofthatkindintoaccount. (4)Thejudgeistogiveapartysuchopportunitytomakesubmissions,andtorefertorelevantinformation,relating totheacquiringortakingintoaccountofknowledgeofthatkindasisnecessarytoensurethatthepartyisnot unfairlyprejudiced."

102 InGattellarovWestpacBankingCorporation[2004]HCA678ALJR394,GleesonCJ,McHugh,HayneandHeydonJJ stated,at[17]:

"InNewSouthWalestherewouldappeartobenoroomfortheoperationofthecommonlawdoctrineofjudicial notice,strictlysocalled,sincetheenactmentoftheEvidenceAct1995(NSW),s144."

ThisstatementwasapprovedbyFrenchCJ,Hayne,CrennanandBellJJinAytugrulvTheQueen[2012]HCA1586 ALJR474at[21]JusticeJohnDysonHeydon,CrossonEvidence,8thed(2010)LexisNexisButterworthsat[3160]. SeealsoRvHenry[1999]NSWCCA11146NSWLR346perSpigelmanCJat[66]. 103 Bothasamatterofconstructionofs144andhavingregardtothecommentsoftheHighCourt,itislikelythatthe betterviewisthatfactsthatareacteduponbytheCourt,otherthanthosethatareinissuebetweentheparties,are governedbys144.Evenifthisisnotcorrectandproofoflegislativefactsfalloutsides144(1)(b),therequirementsfor proofatcommonlawandunderthesectionareessentiallythesame.Ineithercase,theCourtwouldbeentitledto haveregardtoauthoritativetextsandlegislativefactsacceptedinothercases. 104 Thereisonepossibledifferenceintheteststatedins144andthecommonlaw.Section144requiresthatthe knowledgeofwhichjudicialnoticemaybetaken,is"notreasonablyopentoquestion".Thismaynotbeasstringentas thecommonlawtestif,asHeydonJstated,factsjudiciallynoticedatcommonlawmustbe"indisputable".Buton

eithertest,theCourtcould,inacaselikethis,actuponknowledgeortakenoticeoffacts,thatwerethesubjectof authoritativetexts,evenindevelopingareasofscience,medicineortechnology.Forexample,itisunlikelythatscience hasheardthelastwordingenetechnology.Thatwouldnot,inmyopinion,preventacourtfromhavingregardto materialrelatingtothattopicsoastounderstandthelegislativepurposeofenactinglegislationrelatingtothatsubject matter,provideditwasacceptedthatthematerialwastheworkofarespectedexpertinthefield.Itislikelythatstudies relatingtogenderorsexualidentityfallintothesamecategory,particularly,butnotonly,insofarassuchstudies examinethepsychologicalaspectsofsexualidentification. 105 ThatbringsmetothematerialtowhichtheCourtwasreferredand,inparticular,toProfessorGreenberg'smaterial. TheCourtwasnottoldwhoProfessorGreenbergwas,orherareaofexpertise.Theextractofthepublication "IntersexualityandtheLaw,WhySexMatters"providedtotheCourtcontainednoinformationabouther.Presumably, aGooglesearchmayhaverevealedwhattheCourtneededtoknowtodeterminewhetheritwasanauthoritativework. 106 Asitturnsout,myconcernastothismatterwasallayedbytheextensivereferencetoProfessorGreenberg'sworkby ChisholmJinKevinvAttorneyGeneral(Cth)[2001]FamCA1074165FLR404whereitwasacceptedas authoritative.TherewasanotherproblemwithNorrie'srelianceonProfessorGreenberg'sworkinthattheCourtwas providedwithvariouspagesfromdifferentchapterswhichitwassaidshouldberead.Belowisareferencetowhat wouldseemtoberelevantfromthematerialprovided. 107 ProfessorGreenbergobservedinherintroductionthatthetopicofintersexualityhasmovedfrombeingarelatively obscuremedicaltopictobeingthefocusofexaminationacrossarangeofacademicdisciplines,includingpsychology, history,anthropologyandmedicalethics.Shealsoobservedthatthemeaningorambitoftheterm"intersex"isnot necessarilysettled.Shealsopointsoutthatanintersexconditionisnotnecessarilyapparentatbirth.Shesuggests, however,that"mostexpertsagree"that1to2percentofthepopulationarebornwithsexualfeaturesthatvaryfrom themedicallydefinednormalfor"male"and"female". 108 ProfessorGreenbergalsopointedoutthattheterm"transgender"and"transsexual"arenotthesubjectofauniformor settledusage.Assheexplained,theword"transgender"isoftenusedasanumbrellatermtomeanpersonswho transgressgenderboundaries.Whenusedinthatsense,itwouldincludetranssexuals,transvestitesorotherswhose behaviourfailstoconformtogendernorms.Shealsomadereferencetostudiesofintersexchildrenwhichindicated thatgenderidentitydoesnotnecessarilydevelopinconcertwithsexualanatomy. 109 Forthepurposesofherwork,ProfessorGreenbergdefined"intersex",at1:
"...initsbroadestsensetoincludeanyonewithacongenitalconditionwhosesexchromosomes,gonads,orinternal orexternalsexualanatomydonotfitclearlyintothebinarymale/femalenorm."

110 ProfessorGreenbergaddedthat"[s ]omeintersexconditionsinvolveaninconsistencybetweenaperson'sinternaland externalsexualfeatures".Shealsonoted,at11,thatmedicalexpertsnowrecognise"atleasteightattributes contributetoaperson'ssex",includingchromosomalsex,physiologicalattributes,assignedsexandgenderof rearing,aswellasgenderidentity. 111 Aspreviouslymentioned,NorriealsoreferredtoanarticlebyJusticeMichaelKirby,"MedicalTechnologyandNew FrontiersofFamilyLaw".Inthatarticle,hisHonourdrewuponcaselawandothersources,someofwhichare discussedinthesereasonsandallofwhichcoverthesameground.Ihavenotfounditnecessary,therefore,to separatelyconsiderhisHonour'swritingonthistopic. 112 NorriealsoreferredtothefollowingentryinWikipedia,whichstates:
"Intersex,inhumansandotheranimals,isthepresenceofintermediateoratypicalcombinationsofphysical featuresthatusuallydistinguishfemalefrommale.Thisisusuallyunderstoodtobecongenital,involving chromosomal,morphological,genitaland/orgonadalanomalies..."

113 ThestrengthsandweaknessesofacollaborativeencyclopaediasuchasWikipediaarewellknownbythoseinthe communitywhofrequentlyaccesstheInternet.Itisnotnecessaryinthesereasonstodeterminethecircumstancesin which,ortheprinciplesgoverningwhen,theCourtmayhaveregardtoentriesinit.Itissufficienttonotethatthe informationinWikipediawastothesameeffectastheothermaterialtowhichtheCourtwasreferred. 114 Itisapparentfromthismaterialthatquestionsofsexualidentityaremorecomplexthanthecharacterisationofpersons being"male"or"female".

Otherlegislation

115 BothpartiesreliedupontheprovisionsoftheAntiDiscriminationAct,whichwereintroducedatthesametimeasPt 5AoftheAct.TheRegistraralsorelieduponotherNewSouthWalesandCommonwealthlegislationwithwhich,he contended,Pt5Awasintendedtobereadharmoniously.

116 TheprovisionsoftheAntiDiscriminationActintroducedatthesametimeasPt5Aaresetoutaboveat[29][30]. Norriesubmittedthatthereferenceintheinterpretationprovisions38A(c)toapersonbeingof"indeterminatesex" indicatedthattheNewSouthWalesLegislaturehadrecognisedthataperson'ssexneednotbeeithermaleorfemale butthatapersonmaybeneither.TheRegistrarsubmitted,however,thatitwasapparentfroms38Athatthe LegislaturehadusedthebinarymeaningofsexintheAct,aswasevidentfromtheuseofexpressions"oppositesex" inparas(a)and(b)and"particularsex"inpara(c).TheRegistrarsubmittedthatitwastobepresumedthatlegislation amendingboththeBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationActandtheAntiDiscriminationActusedthewords "transgender"and"sex"consistentlyineach. 117 Therearecircumstancesinwhichacourtwillconstruelegislationinthesamewayas,orsoastobeconsistentwith, otherlegislation.Suchcasesinvolveanapplicationoftheparimateriarule.InHarrisonvMelhem[2008]NSWCA67 72NSWLR380MasonP,at[131],statedtheoperationoftheruleinthefollowingterms:
"Thereisaprincipleofstatutoryinterpretationsupportingapresumptionthatalegislatureintendstoattachthe samemeaningtothesamewordswhenusedinasubsequentstatuteinasimilarconnection(LennonvGibson& HowesLtd[1919]AC709at711712RamaciottivFederalCommissionerofTaxation(1920)29CLR49at53 Pearce&Geddes,StatutoryInterpretationinAustralia6thed,Butterworths,Sydney,2006at3.36)."

118 Theextenttowhichaword,orwords,usedinonestatutecanbeconstruedashavingthesamemeaningasawordor wordsusedinanotherstatutewasthesubjectofcommentbyKiefelJintheCertainLloydUnderwriterscase.The CourtofAppealinthatcasehadconsideredthatthetwostatutesinthatcaseformedpartofastatutoryscheme.Kiefel Jacceptedthatbothstatutesweredirectedtothesamecommonpurposeandusedthesameterminology.However, herHonourstatedthatunlesstheoperationofeachstatutedependedupontheother,therewasnobasistoconstrue themtogether:seeat[94][104]. 119 WhilsttheRegistrardidnotarguethatthetwopiecesoflegislationformedacommonscheme,theargument encompassedthenotionthattheamendedprovisionsofeachActweredirectedtoasimilarend,namely,the recognitionoftransgenderpersonsinspecifiedcircumstances.Itwassubmitted,therefore,thattheword"sex"should beconstruedinthesamewayineachpieceoflegislation. 120 Part5ArecognisedthattheRegistrarmayregisterthesexofapersonwherethatpersonhasundergonesurgeryfor oneorotherofthereasonsspecifiedins32A.Tothisextent,itrecognisesthatapersonmaywishtobeamemberof theoppositesex,ormayhaveambiguitiesinrelationtotheirsex.ThepurposeoftheAntiDiscriminationActPt3A,Div 5wastomakeunlawfulvilificationonthegroundthatapersonwasatransgenderperson:sees38Sands38T.The interpretationprovisionofs38Aprovidedthatatransgenderpersonwasapersonwasapersonwho"hasidentifiedas amemberoftheoppositesex"orwasaperson"ofindeterminatesex".TheAntiDiscriminationActthusprovides protection,interalia,topersonswhoareofindeterminatesexwhoidentifyasamemberofaparticularsex. 121 Part5AdoesnotdependforitsoperationontheAntiDiscriminationAct,Pt3A,Div5,nordoesitinteractinanyway withthatAct.Theconnectionbetweenthetwolegislativeenactmentswastheirconcurrentenactmentandtheir recognitionthatnotallindividualsare,orliveasiftheywere,ofthesexthataccordswiththeiranatomicalsexual structure.Inthisregard,bothenactmentsrecognisedthattherearepersonswhosesexmaynotbe"male"or"female". Thisindicatesanincreasinglegislativerecognitionthat"sex"isnotnecessarilyabinaryconstruct.However,the meaningoftheword"sex"ineachActmustbearthemeaningthatthelegislatureintendedinthatAct.AstheActsare notinterdependent,theword"sex"intheAntiDiscriminationActand,inparticular,thefactthatitisusedinseveral placesaspartofthephrase"oppositesex",doesnotdeterminethemeaningof"sex"inPt5A. 122 Ihavereferredabovetomyunderstandingofthepurposeofthelegislation.TheRegistrarcontendedthatthepurpose ofPt5Apermittingtheregistrationofachangeofsexwastoconferalegalstatusuponapersonsothatpersonwas "apersonofthesexsoregistered"subjecttoanylawoftheState:sees32J.Inthisregard,theRegistraridentifiedthe relevant"mischief"towhichPt5Awasdirectedasbeingtoensurethatapersonwouldbetreated,forthepurposesof thelargerbodyofthelawsoftheStatewhichoperateontheassumptionthatsexisbinary,inaccordancewiththe person'schangedsexualstatusasenteredontheRegisterofBirths,DeathsandMarriages.TheRegistrarsubmitted thatitwouldbecontrarytothepurposeoftheAct,namely,theclarificationofanapplicant'slegalstatus,toenablethe registrationofaperson'ssexas"nonspecific",whichisnotastatusrecognisedinanyotherStatelaw. 123 TheRegistraridentifiedarangeofNewSouthWaleslegislativeprovisionspremisedonabinaryconstructionof"sex" asfollows:CrimesAct1900,s61HCrimes(ForensicProcedures)Act2000,s3LawEnforcement(Powersand Responsibilities)Act2002,s32(7)ands32(11)Terrorism(PolicePowers)Act2002,Sch1(5)CourtSecurityAct 2005,s10ChildProtection(OffendersRegistration)Act2000,s12F(2)Crimes(AdministrationofSentences) Regulation2008,cl22,cl23,cl31,cl43(2)andcl182Children'sServicesRegulation2004,s36(3)Transport EmployeesRetirementBenefitsAct1967,s23(4)(a)IndustrialRelationsAct1996,s55(4)LandlordandTenant (Amendment)Act1948,s62(t)ConveyancingAct1919,s34(1),s76CombatSportsRegulation2009,cl38

PrivacyandPersonalInformationProtectionAct1998,s53(7A)andtheSuccessionAct2006,s54. 124 TheRegistraralsoidentifiedthefollowingCommonwealthActswhicharepremisedontheexistenceofamaleand femalesexonly:MarriageAct1961(Cth)DefenceForcesRetirementBenefitsAct1948(Cth)HigherEducation FundingAct1998(Cth)SuperannuationAct1922(Cth)FairWorkAct2009(Cth)andtheMaternityLeave (CommonwealthEmployees)Act1973(Cth)InternationalCriminalCourtAct2002(Cth)SexDiscriminationAct1984 (Cth)andtheCrimesAct1914(Cth). 125 TheRegistrarcontendedthatif"sex"wasconstruedtoincludeastatusoutsidethemaleorfemaledichotomy,Norrie wouldfalloutsidethepurviewofthesevariousstatutes.TheRegistrararguedthatthiswasofparticularimportance becausetheintentionofsomeofthelegislationwastoprotectandbenefittheindividualand,moregenerally,wasfor thebenefitofsociety.TheRegistrarsubmitted,therefore,thatitcouldnothavebeenParliament'sintentiontoallowa persontoberegisteredotherthanas"male"or"female"pursuanttotheprovisionsofPt5AoftheAct. 126 ItisusefultorefertosomeofthislegislationtodemonstratethepointthattheRegistrarsoughttomake: (1)TheCrimesAct,s61Hdefines"sexualintercourse"forthepurposesofserioussexualoffencescontainedinthat Actas"sexualconnectionoccasionedbythepenetrationtoanyextentofthegenitalia(includingasurgically constructedvagina)ofafemalepersonortheanusofanyperson".TheRegistrarpointedoutthatapersonwitha"non specified"sexualstatus,butwithasurgicallyconstructedvagina,wouldfalloutsidetheseprovisionsinsofarasthey relatetothepenetrationofthevagina. (2)TheCourtSecurityAct,s10(2)(f)requiresasearchofpersonstobeconductedbyasecurityofficerofthesame sex,andifasamesexsecurityofficerisnotavailable,theActempowersanotherperson(inthecompanyofasecurity officer)ofthesamesextoconductthesearch. (3)TheCrimes(AdministrationofSentences)Regulation,cl43(2)providesthataninmatemustnotbestripsearched byorinthepresenceofapersonoftheoppositesex,exceptinthecaseofanemergency. (4)TheIndustrialRelationsAct,s55(4)providesthatadoptionleaveisleavetakenbymaleorfemaleemployees. (5)TheLandlordandTenant(Amendment)Act,s62(5)(t)placescertainlimitsonthegivingofanoticetoquittoa tenantinprotectedpremiseswherethelandlord"who,beingamale,isoforovertheageofsixtyfiveyearsor,beinga female,isoforovertheageofsixtyyears"subjecttosatisfactionofcertainotherrequirementsintheparagraph. (6)TheConveyancingAct,s76provides:
"Intheconstructionofacovenant,orproviso,orotherprovisionimpliedinadeedbyvirtueofthisorany otherActwordsimporting...themasculinegendershallberead...asextendingtofemales..."

127 InsofarasCommonwealthlegislationisconcerned,itissufficienttonotethattheHigherEducationFundingAct providesthatgrantsmadeunderthatActaretobemadeequallyavailabletomaleandfemalestudents.The SuperannuationActmakesanumberofdistinctionsbetweenmaleandfemalepensioners.TheInternationalCriminal CourtActwasenactedtofacilitateAustralia'sobligationsundertheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt. Art7,cl3oftheRomeStatute,whichisreproducedinSch1totheInternationalCriminalCourtAct,provides:

"ForthepurposeofthisStatute,itisunderstoodthattheterm'gender'referstothetwosexes,maleandfemale, withinthecontextofsociety.Theterm'gender'doesnotindicateanymeaningdifferentfromtheabove."

128 Iwillreturntotheseargumentswhenconsideringthetextofthestatutoryprovisionsthemselves.

Thecaselaw
129 Thequestionofaperson'ssexualidentityand/orchangeofsexhasarisenforconsiderationinanumberofcases. Eachrelatedeithertodifferentstatutoryprovisionsorthecommonlawandthusanycommentsmadehavetoberead inthecontextinwhichthecasewasdecided.Itisconvenienttodealwiththecaselawinchronologicalorder.
InthemarriageofCandD(falselycalledC)[1979]FLC9063635FLR340

130 InthemarriageofCandD(falselycalledC),theCourtwasconcernedwithwhetheramarriagebetweenafemaleand ahusbandwhohadbeendiagnosedas"atruehermaphrodite"wasvoid:seeat342,343.BellJ,at345,foundthat"the husbandwasneithermannorwomanbutwasacombinationofboth".Theconsequenceofthisfindingwasthatno marriagecouldhavetakenplacebecauseamarriageundertheMarriageActwasthe"unionofamananda woman"(emphasisadded):seeat345. 131 Incomingtothisconclusion,hisHonourfollowedtheEnglishdecisionofCorbettvCorbett[1971]P83at106,where OrmrodJidentifiedthequestioninissueinthatcaseasbeing"whatismeantbytheword'woman'inthecontextofa

marriage".OrmrodJconcludedthatforthepurposesofdeterminingwhetherpartieshadbeenvalidlymarried,thetest toapplyindeterminingwhetherapersonwasamaleorafemale,wastoascertaintheperson'ssexbyreferenceto theperson's:

"...chromosomal,gonadalandgenitaltests,andifallthreearecongruent,determinethesexforthepurposeof marriageaccordingly,andignoreanyoperativeintervention."

132 OrmrodJremarkedthat"realdifficulties,ofcourse,willoccurifthesethreecriteriaarenotcongruent",althoughthat wasnotadifficultywhichconcernedhisHonouronthefactsofthatcase. 133 ThedecisioninCorbettbecamethesubjectofincreasingcriticismasvariancesinaperson'ssexualidentitybecame moreunderstood.ThiscausedSirRonaldWilsontoobservethattheeffectofthedecisioninCorbettwastoignorethe factthatthe"wife"inthemarriagehadundergonesexreassignmentsurgery:SirRonaldWilson,"LifeandLaw:The ImpactofHumanRightsonExperimentingwithLife",(1985)17(3)AustralianJournalofForensicSciences61.This causedSirRonaldtoobserve,at80:

"...Medicinehasoutstrippedthelaw.[Thewife]representedassuccessfulachangeofsexascanbeimaginedyet anylegalsignificanceattachingtoherpostsurgeryconditionwasdenied...thedecisionsignalstheneedfora greaterflexibilityinthelawtoenableittocometogripswithcurrentrealityfreedfrombondagetodisplaced historicalcircumstances."

134 Corbettnolongerrepresentsthelawandthedecisionremainsofhistoricalinterestonly.Shouldfactssuchasarosein IntheMarriageofCandD,ariseagainfordetermination,theoutcomewoulddependuponthetermsofanyrelevant legislationandanyscientificormedicalevidencethatmaybeadduced.

RvHarris&McGuiness(1988)17NSWLR158

135 InHarris&McGuinesstheCourtwasdealingwithtwoquestionsonacasestatedbyajudgeoftheDistrictCourt.The questionsaroseoutoftheprosecutionoftheappellantsinthateach"beingamaleperson[attempted]toprocurethe commissionbyanymalepersonof,anyactofindecencywithanothermaleperson",contrarytotheCrimesAct,s 81A(nowrepealed).Theappellantshadbeenfoundguiltyofthecharges.Thequestionsstated,insofarastheyare relevanttothismatter,were:

"(a)CanathirdsexexistforthepurposesoflegislationinNewSouthWaleswhichisdraftedintermsofmaleand female. (b)Ifthelawrecognisesathirdsex,thatoftranssexual,howisittobedetermined."(at163)

136 ItbecameunnecessaryfortheCourttodeterminethosequestions,asMathewsJ(withwhomStreetCJagreed) decided,at194,thatthecriteriatobeconsideredindeterminingaperson'ssexforthepurposesofNewSouthWales Lawincludedthataperson:

"...throughmedicalintervention...hasassumedtheexternalgenitalfeaturesoftheoppositesex,therebybringing thosegenitalfeaturesintoconformitywiththeperson'spsychologicalsex."

137 AstheappellantHarrishadundergoneasexaffirmationproceduresoastoacquirefemalephysiological characteristicsandthereforesatisfiedthosecriteria,theappellantscouldnotbeguiltyofanoffenceunders81A. However,inanobitercomment,MathewsJobserved,at194:

"...IthinkIshouldcommentthatIcanseenoplaceinthelawfora'thirdsex'.Suchaconceptisanovelone,which couldcauseinsuperabledifficultiesintheapplicationofexistinglegalprinciples.Itwouldalsorelegatetranssexuals toalegal'noman'sland'.ThisIthink,couldonlyoperatetotheirconsiderabledetriment." Secretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"[1993]FCA57343FCR299

138 InSecretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"theFullCourtoftheFederalCourtwasconcernedwiththe questionwhetherapreoperativemaletofemaletranssexualwasqualifiedtoreceiveawife'spensionundertheSocial SecurityAct1947(Cth).Section37(1)(a)ofthatActprovided:

"37(1)SubjecttothisPart,awoman...whoisthewifeof (a)anagepensioneroraninvalidpensioner... ...isqualifiedtoreceiveawife'spension."

139 TheFullCourtheldthattherespondentwasnotawomanwhowasthewifeofaninvalidpensionerwithinthemeaning oftheActandwastherebynotqualifiedtoreceivethepension.Inreachingthisconclusion,theFullCourtconsidered themeaningoftheundefinedterms"woman"and"female"intheAct. 140 Theterm"woman"wasnotdefinedintheAct.However,"wife"wasdefinedtomean,unlessacontraryintention appeared,"afemalemarriedperson"."Husband"wasdefinedtomean"amalemarriedperson"."Marriedperson", includeda"defactospouse",whichwasdefinedas"apersonwhoislivingwithapersonoftheoppositesex,towhom heorsheisnotlegallymarried".

141 BlackCJstated,at301302:
"Inprovidingforanentitlementtowhatiscalleda'Wife'sPension'theActthusreflectstheordinarynotionthat therearetwosexes,eachbeing'theoppositesex'oftheother,andthatawifeisafemalemarriedperson andahusbandisamalemarriedperson...thewords'woman'and'female'andtheexpression'oppositesex'are notdefined[intheAct].ThewordsareofcourseordinaryEnglishwords. InordinaryEnglishusagewordssucha'male'and'female','man'and'woman'andtheword'sex'relateto anatomicalandphysiologicaldifferencesratherthantopsychologicalones."(emphasisadded)

142 BlackCJ,afterhavingregardtotheDictionarydefinitionsoftheseterms,continued,at303:
"AlthoughtheSocialSecurityActisconcernedwithsocialpolicy,andbeingremediallegislationshouldnotreceive anarroworpedanticconstructionthesettledrulesofconstructionapplyandordinarywordsusedintheActshould receivetheirordinaryandnaturalmeaningunless,inaccordancewiththeacceptedrulesofstatutoryconstruction, thereisgoodreasontoprefersomeothermeaning. ThereisnooccasiontodepartinthiscasefromtheordinarymeaningofthewordsusedintheActanditwouldbe goingwellbeyondtheordinarymeaningofthewordsinquestiontoconcludethatapreoperativemaletofemale transsexual,havingmaleexternalgenitalia,isa'woman'forthepurposesoftheSocialSecurityActandmaybea 'wife'asthatexpressionisdefinedintheAct.IdonotconsiderthatthelanguageusedintheActallowsprimacyto begiventopsychologicalfactorsandcertainlynottothevirtualexclusionofanatomicalfactors."(citationomitted)

143 BlackCJ,at303,consideredthatthisviewwasinconformitywithHarris&McGuinessinthattheCourttherehad "rejectedtheviewthatthelawshould...treatbiologicalfactorsasentirelysecondarytopsychologicalones".Itfollowed onthisapproachthattherespondentwasnoteligibleforawife'spensionundertheAct:seeat305.Nonetheless,his Honourrecognisedthatapostoperativemaletofemaletranssexualwouldhavequalifiedforthepensionunderthe Act.HisHonouralsoacceptedthattherehadbeendevelopmentsinthelanguageasitappliedtotranssexuals. 144 AshisHonourobserved,at304:

"...Inacasesuchasthepresentthequestionisofcourseoneofstatutoryinterpretationandinconsideringthe possibleapplicationofwordssuchas'woman'and'female'toapostoperativemaletofemaletranssexualitis appropriatetoconsiderhowthelanguagehasdevelopedinitsapplicationtotranssexualpersons. Whatevermayoncehavebeenthecase,theEnglishlanguagedoesnotnowcondemnpostoperativemaleto femaletranssexualstobeingdescribedasbeingofthesextheyprofoundlybelievetheydonotbelongtoandthe externalgenitaliaofwhich,asaresultofirreversiblesurgery,theynolongerhave.Wherethroughmedical interventionapersonbornwiththeexternalgenitalfeaturesofamalehaslostthosefeaturesandhasassumed, speakinggenerally,theexternalgenitalfeaturesofawomanandhasthepsychologicalsexofawoman,sothatthe genitalfeaturesandthepsychologicalsexareinharmony,thatpersonmaybesaid,accordingtoordinaryEnglish usagetoday,tohaveundergoneasexchange.Theoperationthatbroughtaboutthechangeinexternalgenital featureswouldbereferredtoasasexchangeoperation."

145 LockhartJgaveconsiderationtothemeaningoftermsthathadbecomepartofthelanguageofsexualitybutwhichhis Honourconsideredwerefrequentlymisunderstood.Inthisregard,hisHonourobserved,at315:

"Transsexualsarefrequentlyconfusedwithtransvestites,homosexualsorintersexuals(hermaphroditesand pseudohermaphrodites). ... Anintersexualisapersonwithgonadsorgenitaliaofbothsexes,whereastranssexualshavethebiologicalbodies andfunctionsofanormalmemberoftheirinitialsex.Transsexualsarenothermaphrodites,norarehermaphrodites transsexuals."(citationomitted)

146 InreachingthesameconclusionastheChiefJusticeontheappeal,LockhartJstated,at325326:
"Sexisnotmerelyamatterofchromosomes,althoughchromosomesareaveryrelevantconsideration.Sexisalso partlyapsychologicalquestion(aquestionofselfperception)andpartlyasocialquestion(howsocietyperceives theindividual). Thewords'woman'and'female'aresubstantiallysynonymous.Awomanisanadultfemalehumanbeing.Inmy opinionawomanorafemale,asthosetermsaregenerallyunderstoodinAustraliatoday,includesapersonwho, followingsurgery,hasharmonisedpsychologicalandanatomicalsex.Amaletofemaletranssexual,following reassignmentsurgery,isawomanandafemale....Amaletofemaletranssexualisnolongercapableof procreationbutsheisnolongerofheroriginalsex.Functionallysheisamemberofhernewsexandcapableof sexualintercourse.Shedoesnothavethegonadalfactorofthepresenceofovariesbutshedoeshave,albeit artificiallyimplanted,avagina.Likewisehersecondarysexcharacteristicsarethoseofhernewfemalesex.Sheis psychologicallyawoman,apersonwhoisconvincedthatsheisawoman.Atranssexualwhohasundergone successfulsexreassignmenthasanapparentlynormalfemaleanatomyandshewillfeelconvincedthatshe belongstohernewsexandthatshehasachievedanintegratedidentitybyadoptingthephysicalcharacteristicsof thefemaletoherpsychologicalnature."(emphasisadded) KevinvAttorneyGeneral(Cth)[2001]FamCA1074165FLR404

147 KevinvAttorneyGeneral(Cth)involvedthequestionofthevalidityofamarriagebetweenafemaleandapersonwho hadbeenthroughafullprocessoftranssexualreassignmentsurgerysoastoacquirethephysicalcharacteristicsofa male.TheAttorneyGeneralarguedthatthehusband,'Kevin',wasnotamanforthepurposesofthelawofmarriage. ChisholmJanalysedwithsomecaretheformationanddevelopmentofaperson'sgender.Thisanalysisis uncontroversialandprovidesausefulbackgroundtothequestionofsexorgenderidentification.

148 At[216][223],ChisholmJconsideredthe"normalprocessesofsexualdevelopmentandidentification",includingthe stagesinuterowhensexdifferentiationfirstoccursandhowthesex/genderofthefoetusthendeveloped.HisHonour noted,at[220],thatnewbornbabiesareroutinelyidentifiedasgirlsorboys,thatis,asafemaleormale,shortlyafter birth,onthebasisofinspectionofthegenitals.HisHonourfurthernoted,at[221],thatinthecaseoftranssexuals, therewasnodoubtatbirthaboutababy'ssexonthebasisofaninspectionofthebaby'sgenitals.Theissueofa transgenderperson'ssexorgenderusuallyonlyaroseatalaterstageandsometimeswouldleadtoarequestfor medicalattention. 149 HisHonourcontinued,at[222],thatexceptinthecaseofsexualambiguitiesapparentatbirth,thatis,ambiguitiesin thebaby'sgenitalia,achildisidentifiedasaboyorgirlatbirth.ChisholmJemphasised,however,thattherewas:
"...nowevidencetotheeffectthattheprocess[ofthedeterminationofsex]maynotbecompletedatbirth,since relevantdevelopmentsinthebrainoccurduringaperiodfollowingbirth."

150 EvidenceofthosemattershadbeengivenbyanumberofexpertsintheproceedingsbeforehisHonour.Onesuch expert,ProfessorGooren,aspecialistendocrinologist,explainedthatdisorderscouldoccurintheprocessofsex differentiation.Inthecaseoftranssexuals,ProfessorGoorenstatedthatthedecisiontorecommendbothhormonal andsexaffirmationsurgicalprocedureswas:

"...basedontheconclusionofathoroughpsychodiagnosticprocessthatconcludesthatadisorderhasoccurredin theprocessofsexualdifferentiationandthatthepersonwillbenefitfrom[suchprocedures]."(at[223])

151 SeniorCounselforNorriereferredtothejudgmentat[224][225],whereChisholmJmadereferencetothose individualswhowere"notunambiguouslymaleorfemale"fromabiologicalpointofview.Inthisregard,hisHonour referredtotheevidenceofProfessorGreenberg,uponwhoseworkNorriesoughttorelyinthiscase,relatingto personswho,inthemedicalterminologyusedinKevin,weredescribedas"intersex".Relevantlyforpresentpurposes, ChisholmJstatedthatProfessorGreenberg'sevidenceexplainedthatsuchpersonsmayhave"chromosomal variationsfromthenorm,ambiguitiesinthegonadsorgenitalia,andvariationsintheproductionofhormones".His Honournoted,at[229],inaccordancewiththeevidencebeforehim,thattranssexuals"donothaveanyofthe incongruitiesorambiguities"thatoccurredphysiologicallyinanintersexperson.Whatdistinguishedtranssexualsfrom intersexindividualswasa"discontinuitybetweentheirmentalstatepsychologyandtheirphysicalstatebiology". 152 Onappeal,theFullCourtoftheFamilyCourt,inupholdingChisholmJ'sdecision,accepted,at[326],thattheevidence beforehisHonourwassufficientforhimtofindthattherewasabiologicalbasisfortranssexualismandthattherewas noreasontoexcludethepsycheasoneoftherelevantfactorsindeterminingsexandgender:AttorneyGeneral(Cth) vKevin[2003]FamCA94172FLR300.
ABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42244CLR390

153 ABvWesternAustraliawasconcernedwiththeGenderReassignmentAct2000(WA).UndertheAct,apersonwho hadundergoneareassignmentprocedurecouldapplytotheGenderReassignmentBoardfortheissueofa recognitioncertificate.Thepurposeofthecertificatewastoenabletheapplicanttoregisterthecertificatewiththe RegistrarofBirths,DeathsandMarriages,whowasrequiredtoaltertheregistertoreflectthesexstatedinthe certificate:s17(1).ApreconditiontoapplyingforacertificatefromtheBoardwas,relevantly,thatthepersonhad undergoneareassignmentprocedure.Pursuanttos15oftheAct,beforeissuingthecertificate,theBoardhadtobe satisfied,interalia,thattheapplicantbelievedhisorhertruegenderwastheperson'sreassignedgenderandhad adoptedthelifestyleandgendercharacteristicsofthatgender. 154 A"reassignmentprocedure"wasdefinedins3asfollows:
"...amedicalorsurgicalprocedure(oracombinationofsuchprocedures)toalterthegenitalsandothergender characteristicsofaperson,identifiedbyabirthcertificateasmaleorfemale,sothatthepersonwillbeidentifiedas apersonoftheoppositesexandincludes,inrelationtoachild,anysuchprocedure(orcombinationof procedures)tocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesinthechild'sgendercharacteristics"

155 Theterm"gendercharacteristics"wasdefinedtomean"thephysicalcharacteristicsbyvirtueofwhichapersonis identifiedasmaleorfemale". 156 ABandAHhadeachappliedforarecognitioncertificatepursuanttotheGenderReassignmentAct,s14thattheyhad undergoneagenderreassignmentprocedureandwaseachofthesexstatedonthecertificate.ABandAHhadbeen bornwithfemalegendercharacteristicsbutidentifiedasmalefromanearlyageandhadbeendiagnosedwithgender dysphoria,aconditiondefinedintheEnglishOxfordDictionaryas"persistentdissatisfactionwithordistressrelatingto one'sanatomicsex".ABhadcommencedtestosteronetherapyin2004andundergoneabilateralmastectomyin 2005.AHhadcommencedtestosteronetherapyin2006andundergoneabilateralmastectomyin2007,withafurther relatedsurgicalprocedurein2007.Thiswastheextentofthesurgicalproceduresundergonebybothapplicants.Both retainedafemalereproductivesystem.

157 TheBoardrefusedtograntthecertificates,asbothapplicantsretainedafemalereproductivesystem,whichtheBoard consideredwasinconsistentwithbeingmaleandforthatreason,was"inconsistentwithbeingidentifiedasmale".The Boardconsideredthattherewereadversesocialandlegalconsequencesiftheappellantswereissuedwith certificateswhilsttheystillhadthecapacitytobearchildren. 158 BeforetheWesternAustraliaCourtofAppeal:WesternAustraliavAH[2010]WASCA17241WAR431,BussJA (dissenting),identified,at[202][203],thepurposeoftheGenderReassignmentActtobetheprovisionofa mechanismwherebypersonssufferingfromgenderdysphoriacouldhavetheirreassignedgenderlegallyrecognised. BussJAconcluded,at[197],thattheAct'sreferencetogendercharacteristicsasmeaningthe"physical characteristicsbyvirtueofwhichapersonisidentifiedasmaleorfemale"wasareferencetoaperson'sexternal physicalcharacteristics.Thus,thefactthattheapplicantseachretainedafemalereproductivesystemdidnotmean thateachhadnotundergoneareassignmentprocedureasdefinedintheAct.Thisconclusionwasbasedonavariety offactors:see[198][206].Inparticular,hisHonourconsidered,at[206],thathadtheLegislatureintendedthata reassignmentprocedure,forthepurposesoftheAct,requiredmorethanthealterationofaperson'sexternalgenitals, itwouldhaveuseddifferentlanguagethanwasusedinthedefinitionprovision.HisHonour'sdissentingapproach prevailedintheHighCourt. 159 ThecentralissuefordeterminationintheHighCourtwastheproperconstructionofs15(1)(b)(ii).Thatsection requiredthattheBoardbesatisfiedthatthepersonapplyingfortherecognitioncertificatehadadoptedthelifestyleand gendercharacteristicsoftheperson'sreassignedgender.TheCourt(FrenchCJ,Gummow,Hayne,KiefelandBellJJ) at[2],agreedwithLockhartJinSRA,at398,that:
"...gendershouldnotberegardedmerelyasamatterofchromosomes.Itispartlyapsychologicalquestion,one ofselfperception,andpartlyasocialquestion,howsocietyperceivestheindividual."(emphasisadded)

(Note:LockhartJusedtheterm"sex"andnot"gender"inthepassagetowhichtheHighCourtreferred.) 160 TheHighCourtheld,at[23]:

"ThegeneralapproachofBussJAistobepreferred.Itgiveseffecttotheevidentpurposeofthelegislationandis consistentwithitsterms.Itisanapproachthatgivesproperweighttothecentralissuewithwhichthe legislationgrapples:thatthesexofapersonisnot,andaperson'sgendercharacteristicsarenot,in everycaseunequivocallymaleorfemale.Asthedefinitionof'reassignmentprocedure'makesplain,a person'sgendercharacteristicsmaybeambiguous."(emphasisadded)

161 TheHighCourtobserved,at[26],thats14oftheActcontainedtheminimumconditionforarecognitioncertificate,that is,thattheapplicanthasundergoneamedicalorsurgicalproceduretoaltertheirgenitalsorothergender characteristics.TheirHonoursthennoted,at[31]:

"Section14(1)cannotbetakentorequireaparticularlevelofsuccessinachievingthegendercharacteristicsof theoppositesex.SuchanapproachwasconsideredinRvHarris,inrelationtoamaletofemaletranssexual. However,asLockhartJobservedinSRA,amaletofemaletranssexualaftersurgeryisnolongerafunctionalmale, butafemaletomaletranssexualisinadifferentsituation.Evensuccessfulsurgerycannotcausehimtobeafully functionalmale.Anapproachtotherequirementsofs15(1)(b)(ii)whichhasregardtotheextenttowhichaperson obtainsgendercharacteristicsofthegendertowhichtheyidentifywouldthereforeoperatedifferentiallyand unfairly.Suchaneffectcannotbetakentohavebeenintendedinlegislationsuchasthis,whichisofaremedial andbeneficialkind."(citationsomitted)

162 At[33],inrespectofthedefinitionof"reassignmentprocedure",theCourtsaid:
"Ononeviewthedefinitionof'reassignmentprocedure'mightsuggestaconcernwiththeresultachievedbythe surgicalprocedure.Thewords'sothatthepersonwillbeidentifiedasapersonoftheoppositesex'may bethoughttoconnotealevelofcertaintyofidentificationasmaleorfemale.However,ss14(1)and 15(1)(b)(ii)maybereadtogetherinamoreharmoniousway,byattributingthepurposiveaspectofs14(1)tothe person.Section14(1)maybeunderstoodtorequirethatthepersonundertakesareassignmentprocedurewiththe intentionthatheorshemaybeidentifiedbyothersasbeingofthegendertowhichheorsheseeksreassignment. Furthermore,s14(1)requiresonlythatthemedicalorsurgicalprocedurealterthegenitalsandothergender characteristicsofaperson.Itdoesnotrequirethatthepersonundertakeeveryproceduretoremoveeveryvestige ofthegenderwhichthepersondenies,includingallsexualorgans."(emphasisaddedcitationomitted)

163 TheCourtalsostated,at[36]:
"Theconcernofs15(1)(b)(ii)maybetakentobewhetheratranssexualperson'sappearanceandbehaviourinthe conductoftheirlifewouldbeacceptedbyothermembersofsocietyasconformingtothegendertowhichthe personseeksreassignment.Thatiswhatisintendedbythephrase'isidentifiedasmaleorfemale'inthes3 definitionof'gendercharacteristics'.Suchanunderstandingoftheoperationofs15(1)(b)(ii)isconsistentwiththe objectsoftheAct,whicharetofacilitatetheacceptanceofaperson,asbeingofthegendertowhich theyarereassigned,withinsocietysothattheymayfullyparticipatewithinit.Nopointwouldbeserved, andtheobjectsoftheActwouldnotbemet,bydenyingtherecognitionprovidedbytheActtoaperson whoisidentifiedwithinsocietyasbeingofthegendertowhichtheybelievetheybelongandotherwise fulfilstherequirementsoftheAct."(emphasisadded)

164 Relevantly,theCourtadded,at[38]:

"TheActcontainsnowarrantforimplyingfurtherrequirements,suchaspotentialadversesocialconsequences,to whichtheBoardhadregard,orcommunitystandardsandexpectations,towhichthemajorityintheCourtofAppeal referred...Considerationsofpolicyandanunderstandingoftheextenttowhichsocietyisacceptingofgender reassignmentarematterswhichmaybetakentohavebeenconsideredwhentheActwaspassed.TheActreflects thepolicydecisionstaken.TheobjectivesoftheAct,andtheirsocialandlegalconsequences,aretobemetby referencetoitsstatedrequirements.Thoserequirements,includingthoseofs15(1)(b)(ii),aretobegivenafair andliberalinterpretationinorderthattheyachievetheAct'sbeneficialpurposes." Thecommonlawmeaningoftheword"sex"

165 TheRegistrarcontendedthat,basedonthiscaselaw,thefollowingpropositionsemergedforthepurposesofthe commonlaw: (a)theordinaryEnglishmeaningoftheword"sex"isthequalityofbeingmaleorfemale:SRAat301,302perBlack CJ (b)thelawisbasedonanassumptionthatthereareonlytwosexes,maleandfemale:SRAat313perLockhartJ (c)thereisno"thirdsex"recognisedatcommonlaw:Harris&McGuinessat194perMathewsJ (d)itis"impractical"andwouldcause"insuperabledifficulties"toabandonthetwosexassumptionatlaw:Re Secretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityand"HH"[1991]AATA9423ALD58at[13]Harris&McGuinessat194 (e)thetaskofthelawistoassignpeopletoonesexortheotherforlegalpurposesratherthanseekingtodiscover someentitythatistheperson's"truesex":Kevinat[119],[315]perChisholmJ. 166 TheRegistrarsubmitted,therefore,thatthecorrectnessoftheTribunal'sandtheAppealPanel'sconstructionofthe word"sex"inPt5Aasmeaning"male"and"female"wasreinforcedbythecommonlaw'sunderstandingand applicationoftheword.TheRegistrarsoughttodistinguishABonthebasisthatinthoseproceedingstherewasno disputeastowhether"sex"wasotherthanmaleorfemaleand,instead,thattheCourt'sreasoningassumedabinary classificationof"sex":see[1],[7],[10],[22],[31],[33],[34].

Consideration
167 Thequestionoflawraisedbytheappealwastheproperconstructionofs32DCandinparticularthemeaningofthe word"sex"inthatprovision.BothpartiesrecognisedthattheRegistrar'spower,inthesenseofwhatcouldbe recordedintheRegister,dependedupontheanswertothatquestion.Iftheword"sex"meantonly"male"or"female", theRegistrarhadnopowerunders32DCtoregisterachangeofsextoanythingotherthanmaleorfemale. Converselyiftheword"sex"intheActwasnotconfinedtothosemeanings,whatcouldbeenteredintotheRegister waslikewisenotconfined.Theappealdoesnotraiseforresolutionthequestionofthesexualidentificationthatmaybe enteredontheregisterorwhattermsmaybeusedforthepurposesofrecordingaperson'ssexontheregisterifthe constructionforwhichNorriecontendediscorrect. 168 Norrie'scentralsubmissionwasthattheRegistrar'spowertochangeaperson'ssexfromwhatwasrecordedonthe Registerwasnotlimitedtoregisteringaperson'ssexasbeingeither"male"or"female".Norrierelieduponthe absenceofadefinitionwithintheActfortheterm"sex"andthefactthatthelanguageprovidingforanapplicationto altertheRegisterwasneutralinthesensethats32DAdidnotspecifythatthealterationmustbetoeither"male"or "female".NorriefurthersubmittedthatifitwastheintentionoftheLegislaturetolimittheRegistrar'spowertochange thespecificationofaperson'ssextosimplythatof"male"to"female"or"female"to"male",thelegislaturecouldhave explicitlyimposedthatlimitationbyincludingwordsinthelegislationthatrequiredthatoutcome.Attheheartofthis submissionwasthenotionthatthelanguageoftheActandRegulationdidnotconfinetheselectionto"male"or "female"only.Norriecontendedthathersubmissionwassupportedbythedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"(set outaboveat[21]),whichinvolvedtwoseparateanddistinctpurposesforthecarryingoutofsuchaprocedure. 169 OnNorrie'sargument,thefirstpurposewas,asspecifiedinpara(a),"for...assistingapersontobeconsideredtobe amemberoftheoppositesex".Norrieacceptedthatthelanguageof"oppositesex"inpara(a)indicatedthatthe purposewastoachievethestatusofeithermaleorfemale.Incontrast,para(b)providesthatasexaffirmation proceduremaybecarriedoutto"correctoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson".Norriesubmitted thatthereferenceto"ambiguitiesrelatingtothesexofaperson"indicatedthatthelegislaturerecognisedthataperson maynotbeunambiguously"male"or"female"andthatthepurposeofpara(b)wastoensurethatapersonmay undergoasurgicalproceduretocorrectoreliminateanyambiguityastotheperson'ssex. 170 Norriesubmittedthatthathadoccurredinthiscase,inthatshehadhadsurgerytocorrectoreliminatetheambiguities relatingtohersex,butthatthesurgeryhadfailedinthattheambiguityremained.Norriealsosubmittedthatpara(b) recognisedthatanindividualmaynotconformtoconventionalattitudesthatoneiseitheramaleorafemale. 171 TheRegistrar'ssubmissionfocussedontheabsenceofanydefinitionintheActoftheterms"sex"or"changeofsex",

sothat,inaccordancewiththeprinciplesofstatutoryconstruction,thosewordsweretobegiventheirnaturaland ordinarymeaningunlessacontraryintentionwasindicatedbytheActitself:CodyvJHNelsonPtyLtd[1947]HCA17 74CLR629at64perDixonJPearce&Geddesat[2.24].TheRegistrarsubmittedthathere,notonlywasthereno suchcontraryintention,theActand,inparticular,theuseofthephrase"oppositesex"ins32A(a),evidencedan intentionbytheLegislaturetousetheword"sex"initsordinarymeaning.Inthisregard,theRegistrarsubmitted,asthe TribunalfoundandtheAppealPanelconfirmed,"sex"meant"male"and"female"onlyand"changeofsex"meanta changefromonetotheother.TheRegistrarrelieduponthemeaningtheFullCourtinSRAgavetotheterm"sex"inits constructionoftheterm"woman".Inmakingthissubmission,theRegistrardidnotchallengetheAppealPanel'sfinding thattheActwas"beneficiallegislation". 172 TheRegistraralsocontendedthattheAppealPanelhadbeencorrectinapplyinganotherbasictenetofstatutory construction,namely,thatwhentheLegislaturehasusedawordinanAct,itistakentobegiventhesamemeaning throughouttheActandthatthisisparticularlysowherethewordisusedmultipletimeswithinasingleprovision:see CraigWilliamsonPtyLtdvBarrowcliff[1915]VLR450at452perHodgesJ.SeealsoRegistrarofTitles(WA)v Franzon[1975]HCA41132CLR611at618perMasonJMinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalandIndigenous AffairsvSZAYW[2005]FCAFC154145FCR523at539. 173 TheissueinthepresentcaserelatestothescopeoftheRegistrar'spowerunders32DCoftheAct.Thatinturn dependeduponthemeaningoftheword"sex"asusedinPt5AoftheAct:seeat[167]above.TheRegistrar's argumentmaybesummarisedasinvolvingthefollowingpropositions.First,asamatterofordinaryEnglishusage, "sex"meant"male"or"female".Secondly,inthecontextoftheActasawhole,"sex"wasusedinthatbinarysense. Thirdly,itisabasictenetofstatutoryconstructionthatwordsusedinastatutebearthesamemeaningthroughout.In particular,reliancewasplaceduponthefactthattheword"sex"wasusedinotherprovisionsinPt5Awhereitcould onlybearabinarymeaning.Next,theRegistrarrelieduponthestatutorylandscapewherebyconductinavarietyof circumstanceswaspremiseduponpersonsbeingeither"male"or"female".Finally,theRegistrarrelieduponthe variousauthoritiesdiscussedaboveinwhichtheword"sex"washeldtohaveabinarymeaninginavarietyofstatutory contexts. 174 Itisconvenienttodealwitheachofthesepropositionsinturn. 175 TheRegistrar'sfirstpropositionwasthattheterm"sex"inthelegislationboreabinarymeaningof"male"and"female". ItwaspartoftheRegistrar'sargumentthatthiswastheordinarymeaningofthewordandthatthedeterminationofthe ordinarymeaningwasaquestionoffact.However,asIhavealreadyexplainedabove,at[62]and[64],thisCourt'stask istodeterminethemeaningofthewordinthestatute,whichisaquestionoflaw.Indoingso,theCourtisnonetheless requiredtoascertainwhatmeaningsthewordhasandwhethertheLegislatureusedthewordinaparticularway. 176 Questionsofthemeaningofwordsandtheirusageinvolveanunderstandingofthefunctionoflanguageandthewayit develops.WhilsttheCourthasnoexpertiseinthatmatter,itcanbereadilyacceptedthatlanguageisameansof communicationofobservations,ideasandemotions.Itprovidesabasisuponwhichabodyofknowledgecanbe organised,classifiedandunderstood.Asideasandknowledgedevelop,sodoeslanguage.Thisisareflectionthat languageisadynamicprocessthatdevelops,evolvesandchanges.Sometimes,wordsfallintodisuseasotherwords taketheirplace.Theword"hermaphrodite"maywellbeanexample,asitappearedfromthematerialpresentedtothis Courtthatthewordmaybefallingintodisuseandtheword"intersex"isbeingused,atleastinterchangeably,ifnot completelyinsubstitutionfor,thatterm. 177 Whenlanguageisinastateofevolution,neworextendedmeaningsmaynotand,indeedareunlikelytohave, immediateoruniversalacceptance.Althoughtheevolutionoflanguagemaybedrivenbymedical,scientificor technicaladvancements,suchadvancementsarenotalwaysthesubjectofcompletecommunityacceptance.Thisis particularlysowhenadvancementsrelatetomattersofhumansexualityandreproductionorothermattersthatare consideredtofallwithinamoralframework.Matterssuchasgenderidentityandsexualpreferencesareoftenoverlain withsocial,moralandreligiousconsiderationsthatmayvarywidelyindifferentsegmentsofthecommunity.Thelaw's roleintheregulationofsuchmattersmayitselfbecontroversialor,attheleast,influencedbythedifferentviewswithin thecommunityonsuchmatters.SirRonaldWilsonadvertedtothisinthepassagequotedat[133]above. 178 Iftheunderlyingscientificormedicaladvancement,orevensociologicalresearch,isnotfullyacceptedbythe community,changeinthelanguageassociatedwithsuchmattersislikelytohavevariableacceptanceinthe community. 179 However,thefactthatparticularlanguagemaybeinastateofevolutionandthatachangedorextendedmeaningmay nothaveuniversalacceptance,doesnotmeanthatthetraditionalmeaningofthewordmustbetakenasthemeaning ofthewordasamatterofcommonusage.Indeed,theevolutionarystatusofaparticularwordinthelanguagemay meanthataparticularwordnolongeronlybearsitstraditionalmeaningorthatthetraditionalmeaningreflectsthe

commonEnglishusageoftheword. 180 OneoftheresourcesuponwhichtheRegistrarreliedwasthedictionarydefinitionof"sex"intheMacquarieDictionary. However,adictionaryisnotamanualoftheordinaryusageofaword.Itisreferenceworkforthemeaningofwords andusuallyincludesotherinformation,includingtheetymologyofaword.Thusthefactthatthereisadictionary definitionof"sex"asmeaningthemaleandfemalegenderisnotnecessarilyastatementthatthatisitsordinary meaningorthattherearenootherrelevantmeanings. 181 TheentryintheEnglishOxfordDictionaryindicatesthereisarecognisedusageoftheword"sex"whichisnot confinedtoitsbinarymeaning.Whetherthatmeansthat,asamatterofordinaryEnglishusage,theword"sex"no longerbearsabinarymeaning,isadifferentquestionandisnotresolvedbytherebeingmorethanonemeaning attributedtothewordinatleastoneofthestandardreferencedictionaries.Noristhemeaningofawordinlegislation necessarilydeterminedbyreferencetoasinglesource,evenifthesourceisastandardworksuchastheMacquarie Dictionary.AsIhavealreadystated,thequestionoflawtobedeterminedisthemeaningof"sex"inPt5Aands32DC inparticular,asamatteroftheproperconstructionoftheAct. 182 Themedical,psychologicalandsocialdevelopmentsrelatingtosexualidentityreflectedintheliterature,caselawand dictionarydefinitionsandthestatutorychangesoverthelasttwodecadesdiscussedabove,evidenceanincreasing understanding,notonlyinscienceandmedicinebutalsointhelawandinotherprofessionaldisciplines,thatsexual identityisnotdependentsolelyuponphysicalcharacteristicsandisnotnecessarilyunambiguous.Thisisreflectedin thedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A(b). 183 Forthereasonswhichfollow,Iamoftheopinionthat"sex"asusedinPt5Aisnotusedinthesenseof"male"and "female",astheRegistrarcontended.Astheprimarytenetofstatutoryconstructiondirectsattentiontothetextofthe legislationandthecontextinwhichthelegislativeprovisionwasenacted,theCourt'staskistobeginwiththeterms usedbythelegislatureinthelegislationinquestion.ThesecondandthirdpropositionsintheRegistrar'sargument, whichraiseoverlappingconsiderations,maybeseenasbeingdirectedtothisprinciple. 184 ThecontextinwhichPt5AcametobeinsertedintotheActwasarecognitionthattherehasbeenincreasingmedical, psychologicalandsocialrecognitionthat"sex"or"gender"isnotastraightforwardnotionreflectingonlya"male"and "female"sex.TheSecondReadingSpeechevidencesalegislativerecognitionthataperson'ssexmaynotbe unambiguouslymaleorfemale.Thisisdirectlyreflectedinthetermsoftheamendedlegislationinitsreferenceins 32A(b)to"ambiguities"inaperson'ssex.Itisalsorelevanttonotethatinitsterms,Pt5Adoesnotconfinethe recognitionoridentificationofsexorgenderto"male"and"female".TheonlyreferenceinPt5Athatpointsto"sex" beingusedinthatsenseisins32A(a).Buteveninthatcase,thereferenceisnotto"male"or"female".Thelanguage usedisthe"oppositesex". 185 Accordingly,totheextentthattheRegistrararguedthatwordsusedinlegislationshouldbegiventhesamemeaning,it istoberememberedthatthattenetofconstructionissubjecttoanyclearindicationtothecontraryintheprovisionsof thestatute.Theword"sex",ins32A(a)isusedinthecompositephrase"oppositesex".Astheword"opposite" qualifiestheword"sex",inthatprovision,itisapparentthattheLegislatureusedtheword"sex"inthephrase"the oppositesex"ins32A(a)inabinarysense. 186 However,thatistheonlyoccasionintheActwherethatissoandthatitselfisanindicationthattheword"sex" elsewhereinthelegislation,doesnot,oratleastmaynot,bearabinarymeaning.Whenregardisthenhadtothe languageofs32A(b),wheretheword"sex"isnotonlyunqualified,buttheprovisionexpresslyrecognisesthe existenceofsexualambiguities,theproperconstructionoftheword"sex"inPt5Aands32DCinparticular,pointstoa meaningthatisnotconfinedto"male"and"female". 187 Acceptingthatforthemoment,whenthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32Aistransposedintos 32DA(1)(c),thatsectionwillrequireoneoftwothings.Either,apersonwillhaveundergoneasurgicalprocedure involvingthealterationofaperson'sreproductiveorganscarriedoutforthepurposeofassistingapersontobe consideredtobeamemberoftheoppositesex.Orthepersonwillhaveundergoneasurgicalprocedureinvolvingthe alterationofaperson'sreproductiveorganstocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson.A personwhosatisfiesthelegislativepreconditionofhavingundergonesurgery,whetherbyreferencetothefirstor secondlimbofs32A,isentitledtoapplyfortheregistrationoftheperson's"sex". 188 Ifapersonsatisfieseachofthepreconditionsins32DA(1),includingthepreconditioninpar(c)ofhavingundergone asexaffirmationprocedure,theperson"mayapplytotheRegistrar...fortheregistrationoftheperson'ssexinthe Register".Theword"sex"inthatphraseisunqualified.Inparticular,thereisnoreferencetoregistrationofthe "oppositesex"ofthatwhichthepersonwaspriortosurgeryortotheregistrationofasexaccordingtotheperson's postsurgeryanatomicalfeatures.Thesectionfacilitatestheregistrationofaperson'ssex,whateverthatmaybe.Itis apparent,therefore,fromthetermsofs32DA,thatwheretheLegislatureintendedfortheword"sex"tobequalified,it

usedlanguagethatreflectedthatintention.Accordingly,Iamoftheopinionthattherearesufficientindicationsinthe languageusedbyParliamentthatwhentheword"sex"wasnotsoqualifiedinPt5A,theLegislaturedidnotintendthat itboreabinarymeaningsuchasisreflectedintheuseofthephrase"oppositesex". 189 TheRegistrar'sfourthpropositionrelieduponexistinglegislationandthehistoricalandsocialcontextinwhichsuch legislationwasdrafted.Thislegislationisreferredtoaboveat[123][124].TheunderlyingcontentiontotheRegistrar's argumentwasthattherewouldbesignificantramificationsifapersonwasregisteredwithasexotherthan"male"or "female". 190 Asisapparentfromthediscussionabove,therecognitionofgenderidentityextendingbeyondthebinaryformof"male" and"female"isrelativelyrecentandlegislativerecognitionofthathasoccurredinthecontextofincreasingmedical, scientificandsocialawarenesstowhichIhavereferred.Todate,thelegislativechangesinthisStatehavebeen confinedtoantidiscriminationlawsandstatutoryregistrationrequirements,suchastheprovisionsoftheBirths, DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationActpresentlyunderconsideration.TheGenderReassignmentActofWestern Australiaalsodealswiththerecognition,forregistrationpurposes,ofachangeofsex. 191 TherehasnotyetbeenageneraladoptionbytheLegislatureofthewiderconceptionofsexandgenderdiscussedin thesereasons.Thatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheword"sex"inPt5Aistobegiventhesamemeaningasina rangeoflegislationpredicateduponabinarynotionof"male"and"female".Section32DAdoesnotfallintothecategory ofcasediscussedinHarrisonvMelhem,nordidtheRegistrarsuggestthatitdid.However,thenarrowoperationof theprinciplediscussedinthatcaseindicatestheunlikelihoodthats32DAshouldbeconstruedsoastobeconsistent withotherlegislationinwhich"sex"isusedinabinarysense.Anydifficultiescausedbytheexistenceofsuch legislation,whereapersondoesnotidentifywitheithersex,isamatterforconsiderationbythelegislatureand/orlaw reformbodies.Inanyevent,Pt5AmakesprovisionfortheconcernthattheRegistrarraised.Section32Jprovidesfor theeffectofregistrationofachangeofsex.Section32J(1)statesthatapersonisofthesexthatisregistered,"subject toanylawofNewSouthWales".Accordingly,ifapersonbecamesubjecttoalawwhich,properlyconstrued,referred to"sex"initsbinarymeaning,theapplicationoftheActtoapersonwhowasnotregisteredas"male"or"female"may dependuponaperson'sanatomicalstatus.WhetherthatissowilldependupontheapplicationoftheparticularAct, properlyconstrued,totheparticularcircumstancesofthecase. 192 ThatleavesthefinalmatteruponwhichtheRegistrarrelied,namely,themeaninggiventotheword"sex"bycourtsin arangeoflegislationinwhichthewordappears.Inparticular,theRegistrarrelieduponthestatementofMathewsJin Harris&McGuiness,at194,asauthorityforthepropositionthat"sex"wasabinaryconstruct.Norriesubmitted, however,thattheviewexpressedbyMathewsJwasdistinguishablefromthismatterintwoways.First,inthather Honour'sremarksweremadeinthecontextofapersonwhodidnotwanttobecharacterisedasbeinga"thirdsex". Secondly,herHonourwasnegatingtheexistenceofathirdsexwithrespecttolegislationdraftedintermsofmaleand female,whichwasdifferentfromthelegislationcurrentlyunderconsideration.Norrie'ssubmission,inthisregard,was basedinpartonthefactthattheapproachtakeninHarris&McGuinesswasconsistentwiththemedical,scientific andsocialknowledgeofthetime.Further,SRAdidnotconsiderthepositionwheresexreassignmentsurgerywas "unsuccessful",inthesensethatafterthesurgerythepersonfailstoidentifywithhernewsexasNorriecontendsis herposition.Inaddition,asispointedoutat[88],[90]above,therehasbeenachangeordevelopmentofthedictionary definitionoftheword"sex"sinceSRAwasdecided. 193 TheRegistraralsorelieduponthemeaningthatwasgiventotheword"sex"inSRAdiscussedaboveat[141][142]. However,astheHighCourtobservedinAB,thequestionremainsamatterofstatutoryconstruction.Thelegislationin SRAwasdifferent,inthatthelegislationhererecognisessexualambiguity.Further,thelegislationintheother authoritiestowhichtheRegistrarreferredwasnotsufficientlyclosetothetermsusedintherelevantprovisionsofPt 5Atobeofassistanceindeterminingthemeaningoftheword"sex"ins32DA.Nonetheless,thecaselawhasclearly recognisedthatsexualidentificationisnolongerarecognitionof"male"or"female"inthetraditionalsense.Tothat extent,itprovidessupportforthepropositionforwhichNorriecontends. 194 ThemattersthatIhavedealtwiththusfarrelatedtothefirstissueontheappeal.Beforeexpressingmyconclusion,it isnecessarytodealbrieflywiththesecondgroundofappeal.Thethirdgroundofappealisdealtwithbelowat[205]. 195 Inthesecondgroundofappeal,NorriecontendedthattheTribunalerredinitsconstructionofs32DAinholdingthats 32DAcouldonlybesatisfiedifanapplicanthadundergoneasurgicalprocedureforthepurposeofbeingmore definitivelyregardedaseither"male"or"female",butnotforthepurposeofcorrectingtheambiguitybetweenphysical characteristicsandaperson'ssexidentity. 196 TheRegistrarsubmittedthatthisquestiondidnotarisefordetermination.Hesubmitted,first,thata"sexaffirmation procedure"withinthemeaningofthePt5Awasapreconditiontoanapplicationforchangeofsexunders32DA. Secondly,thesubjectiveintentionofapersonundergoinga"sexaffirmationprocedure"wasirrelevanttotheproper

constructionofthestatutoryprovision.And,thirdly,Norriehadundergonea"sexaffirmationprocedure"withinthe meaningofs32Aandwouldsatisfytherequirementsforachangeofsexfrommaletofemale:s32DA. 197 TherewasnoissuethatNorrieunderwentasexaffirmationprocedureandthussatisfiedthepreconditiontomaking anapplicationundertheActfortheregistrationofhersex.However,theevidencedidnotestablishwhetherthe procedureundertakenfellwithinthemeaningofparas(a)or(b)ofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A. Norwasthereanymedicalevidence,noranexpressfindingbytheTribunal,thatregardlessofwhetherthesurgical procedurefellwithin(a)or(b),thesurgicalprocedurewassuccessfulorwhetheritfailedandineithercase,whatit meanttosaythatsurgerywassuccessfulorthatitfailed. 198 AttentionwasgiventothisquestioninABvWesternAustraliainrespectoftherequirementins14oftheGender ReassignmentActthatapersonhadundergonereassignmentsurgerybeforebeingentitledtoapplyforarecognition certificate.TheCourtobserved,at[14],thats14(1)oftheGenderReassignmentActcouldnotbetaken"torequirea particularlevelofsuccessinachievinggendercharacteristicsoftheoppositesex".Thoseremarksweremadeinthe contextofreassignmentsurgerydesignedtoenableapersontoidentifyasamemberofthe"oppositesex".TheCourt noted,at[26],thattherequirementthatapersonundergoreassignmentsurgerywastheminimumconditionfora recognitioncertificate.However,theCourtobserved,at[33],thatonaharmoniousreadingoftheActandss14and15 inparticular,s14wasnotconcernedwiththeresultofthesurgery.Rather,itwasconcernedwiththefactthatthe surgeryhadbeenundertaken. 199 Inthiscase,theTribunalcommented,at[5],that"[t]heevidencealsoestablishesthat[Norrie]doesnotidentifyas eithermaleorfemalebutas'nonspecific'",whichatleastrecognisedthatonthematerialbeforeit,Norrie'sclaimed sexualidentificationfollowingsurgerywas"nonspecific".However,therewasscantevidenceonthesemattersand theTribunal'sremarksweremadeinthecontextthatitwasconsideringapreliminaryquestionoflaw.Iwouldonly commentthatthereisnothingintheActtoindicatethatthelegalandadministrativeprocessesavailableandrequired underPt5Abecomeinapplicableshouldthesurgicalprocedurefail,inthesensethat,followingsurgery,apersondid notidentifyasamemberoftheoppositesex,oralternatively,thesurgerydidnoteliminateorcorrectapersons'sexual ambiguity.

Conclusion
200 ItfollowsfromwhatIhavesaidthatIconsiderthattheword"sex"inPt5AoftheActdoesnotbearabinarymeaningof "male"or"female"andthatapersonisentitledtohaveanentryintheRegisterofasexotherthaneitherofthosetwo identifiers.Thereareothersexualidentificationsthatmayberegistered.Thatleadstothenextcriticalconsiderationas totheproperoutcomeoftheappeal. 201 TheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct,s120providesthattheCourtmaymakesuchorderasitthinksappropriate havingregardtoitsdetermination.AstherehasbeennodeterminationbytheTribunalofthefactualissue,Iamofthe opinionthatthisCourtshouldorderthatNorrie'sapplicationshouldberemittedtotheTribunalfordeterminationin accordancewithlaw.Thiswillmeanthatthelegislationshouldbeappliedonthebasisthatitisnotconfinedto registrationofsexasonlymaleorfemale. 202 Indealingwiththemeritsoftheapplication,itwillbenecessarytodealwithNorrie'sapplicationforhersextobe recordedintheRegisteras"nonspecific"orsuchotherspecificationastheTribunalmaypermittobeconsidered.I should,however,saysomethingaboutthewaythematterwasdealtwithbytheTribunalattheinitialhearing.Itwillbe recalledthattheRegistrarhadissuedacertificaterecordingNorrie'ssexas"notspecified".Notonlydidthisnot accordwiththetermsofNorrie'sapplicationandsupportingdocumentation,theregistrationofaperson'ssexas"not specified"doesnotseem,asamatterofordinaryEnglish,tobearegistrationofaperson'ssexatall.Itis,oratleast couldeasilybeunderstoodtobe,astatementthatthesexofthepersonwasnotrecordedor"notstated",asthe Registrarhadsaidonthereissuedcertificate.Inthatregard,itwouldnotbedifferentfromtherebeingnoentryatallas toaperson'ssex. 203 ThequestionfortheTribunalwillbewhetherthereisevidencetosupportanentryintheregisterofNorrie'ssexas "nonspecific"."Nonspecific"hasadictionarymeaningof"notspecificnotrestrictedinextent,effectsomething lackinginspecificity,definitenessorprecision":OxfordEnglishDictionary.Norrie'sidentificationwithbeingneither malenorfemalemaywellappropriatelybedescribedintermsofthisdefinition.Whetherthatistheidentificationof "sex"withinthemeaningoftheActisanotherandmorevexingquestion. 204 ThematerialbeforetheCourtdidnotindicatethatanyspecifictermhascomeintocommonusagetodescribea personwithNorrie'ssexualorgenderidentity,thatis,assomeonewhodoesnotidentifywithbeingmaleorfemale. ThemedicalcertificatesNorrielodgedwithherapplicationforchangeofsexsupportedherdescriptionofsexas"non specific".WhetherthatwillbesufficientevidenceonahearingofNorrie'sapplicationwillbeamatterforherlegal

advisorstoassessandfortheTribunaltodetermine. 205 WhethertheTribunal,onwhatevermaterialithas,willbesatisfiedthataperson'ssexmightberegisteredas"non specific",willalsobeamatterforitsdetermination,havingregardtothecasethenadvancedbeforetheTribunal.AsI haveconcludedthattheword"sex"intheActisnotconfinedto"male"or"female",itislikelythatotherappropriate identificationssuchas"intersex","androgenous",or"transgender",beingwordsthatappeartoberecognised designationsofsexualidentity,mayberegistered,subjecttotheapplicantsatisfyingthepreconditionofhaving undergonesexaffirmationsurgery.ItwillbefortheTribunaltodeterminewhetheraperson'ssexmaybeso registered.Likewise,inthiscase,itwillbefortheTribunaltodeterminewhether,withinthetermsoftheAct,asex describedas"nonspecific",thatis,asexthatisnotpreciseordefinite,mayberegistered.TheTribunal's determinationwilldependuponthetermsoftheapplicationmadeandtheevidencebeforeitinsupportofthe application.Forthereasonsgiven,therefore,thethirdgroundofappealthatitwasnotopentotheRegistrar,asa matteroflaw,toregisterNorrie'ssexas"nonspecific",shouldbeupheld. 206 Ishouldmakeonefinalobservation.Ontheargumentontheappeal,Norrie'sSeniorCounselusedthelanguageof "intersex"todescribeNorrie'ssexualidentity.Therearetwoproblemswiththis.First,Norriedidnotmakean applicationtotheRegistrarthathersexberegisteredas"intersex".Secondly,fromtheunderstandingoftheterm "intersex"Ihavegleanedfromthematerial,itwouldseemthatNorrieisnotanintersexperson,althoughProfessor Greenberg'sworkindicatesthereissomefluidityaroundthelanguagerelatingtothesematters.Norriewillneedtotake careinspecifyingthe"sex"thatshecontendsshouldberegistered. 207 Accordingly,Iproposethefollowingorders: 1.Appealallowed 2.Order2oftheAppealPanelbesetaside 3.Inlieuthereof: (a)SetasidethedecisionoftheTribunaldated16March2010 (b)OrderthematterberemittedtotheTribunalfordetermination (c)Ordertherespondentpaytheappellant'scostsoftheappeal. 208 SACKVILLEAJA:IhavehadtheadvantageofreadingthejudgmentofBeazleyACJ(thePresidentoftheCourtof Appeal)indraft.IgratefullyadoptherHonour'sanalysisofthefacts,thelegislationandtheargumentspresentedonthe appeal. 209 IwishtostatemyownreasonsforconcludingthattheAppealPaneloftheAdministrativeDecisionsTribunalerredin itsconstructionofs32DCoftheBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995("theAct").InwhatfollowsIuse thesameabbreviationsasinBeazleyP'sjudgment.

PreliminaryMatters
210 Itisconvenienttorecordanumberofmattersattheoutset. (1)TheappealtothisCourtisagainstadecisionoftheAppealPaneloftheTribunal:NorrievRegistrarofBirths, DeathsandMarriages[2011]NSWADTAP53.Theappealisonaquestionoflaw,asprovidedbytheAdministrative DecisionsTribunalAct1997,s119(1).IagreewithBeazleyPthattheappealtothisCourtinvolvesaquestionoflaw. (2)TheAppealPanelaffirmedadecisionbytheTribunal,constitutedbyaJudicialMember:NorrievRegistryofBirths, DeathsandMarriages[2011]NSWADT102.TheTribunalsoconstitutedaffirmedadecisionoftheRegistrarthats 32DCoftheActdoesnotpermittheRegistrartoregisterachangeofsexto"nonspecific"or"notspecified"andthat thereforethepurportedregistrationofachangeofsexbyNorrieto"notspecified"wasinvalid:[2011]NSWADT102,at [99],[100]. (3)Norrieinfactappliedfortheregistrationofachangeofsexto"nonspecific".ItwastheRegistrarwhoinitiallyused thedesignation"notspecified". (4)TheAppealPanelinterpretedtheTribunal'sreasonsasassuming,butnotfinding,thatNorriemettheconditionsfor theexerciseoftheRegistrar'spower,conferredbys32DCoftheAct,todetermineanapplicationforchangeofsex: [2011]NSWADTAP53,at[20].TheAppealPanelwascontenttoproceedonthebasisthatNorriehadsatisfiedthe preconditionsstatedins32DA,includingtherequirementins32DA(1)(c)thatanapplicantmusthaveundergonea "sexaffirmationprocedure"asdefinedins32A.However,itaffirmedtheTribunal'sdecisiononthegroundthat, althoughthepreconditionsmayhavebeensatisfied,theRegistrar'spowerunders32DCislimitedtoregisteringa

changefromthefemalesextothemalesexorviceversa.Itfollows,accordingtotheAppealPanel,thats32DConits correctconstructiondoesnotauthorisetheRegistrartoregisterachangeofsexfrommale(orfemale)toasexthatis "notspecified"or"notspecific":at[33],[35],[37]. (5)ItisnotclearthattheAppealPanelcorrectlyinterpretedtheTribunal'sreasons.TheTribunalfound(at[5])thatthe Registrar:

"doesnotdisputethat[Norrie]hasundergoneasurgicalprocedure,andthereismedicalevidence...that establishesthat[Norrie]wouldmeetthelegislativerequirementstoregisterachangeofsexfrommaletofemale."

ThispassagesuggeststhattheTribunalfoundthatNorriesatisfiedthestatutorypreconditionsandthatNorriehad undergonea"sexaffirmationprocedure"priortolodgingtheapplicationforregistrationofachangeofsex.Neitherthe TribunalnortheAppealPanelconsideredwhichparagraphofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"Norriehad satisfied. (6) NothingappearstoturnontheAppealPanel'sinterpretationoftheTribunal'sreasonsforthepurposesoftheappealto thisCourt.TheappealtothisCourtwasarguedonthebasisthatNorriehadsatisfiedallstatutorypreconditions, includinghavingundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure.Theissuethatwasdebatedontheappealwaswhether, acceptingthatNorriehadsatisfiedthepreconditionsins32DAoftheAct,theAppealPanelhaderredinlawindeciding thattheRegistrardoesnothavepowertoregisterachangeofsexfrommale(orfemale)to"nonspecific"or"not specified". Norrie'snoticeofappealidentifiestheerrorsoflawsaidtohavebeencommittedbytheAppealPanel(seeat[51] above).Norrie'sprincipalcontention,mirroringground1inthenoticeofappeal,isthattheAppealPanelerredinlawin construings32DCoftheActasauthorisingtheRegistrartoaccedetoachangeofsexonlyfrommaletofemale,or femaletomale.MrBennettQC,whoappearedwithMrAbadeeforNorrie,submittedthats32DCempowersthe Registrartoregisteranapplicationtoregisteraperson'schangeofsexfrommale(orfemale)toasexthatisneither malenorfemale. ThefunctionofthisCourtonanappealonaquestionoflawisnottoreviewfindingsoffact.Inthiscase,theTribunal madeonlylimitedfindingsrelatingtoNorrie'sphysiologicalcharacteristics(preandpostoperative)andtoher psychologicalattitudetohersexualidentity.Idonotmeanthisasacriticism,sincethemedicalevidencebeforethe Tribunalwasscanty. ThekeyfindingsoffactbytheTribunalwereasfollows:

(7)

(8)

(9)

Norriedoesnotidentifyasmaleorfemalebutas"nonspecific"(at[5]) Norrieprobablyperceivesherselfandisperceivedbyotherstobeofnonspecificsex(at[95]) Norriemayexperiencedifficultiesassociatedwitharequirementthatshespecifyhersexaseithermaleor female(at[95])and Norrieconsidersthatidentifyingasmaleorfemaleistheequivalentofmakingafalsestatement(at[95]).

(10) TheabsenceofdetailedevidenceandfindingsastoNorrie'sprecisecircumstancesandastothemedicaljustification forrecognisingasexthatisneithermalenorfemalemaybesignificantforthefutureconductoftheproceedings, shouldNorrieestablishthattheAppealPanelerredinlaw(asinmyopinionitdid).Thepaucityofevidencebeforethe TribunalmayalsoraiseanissueastohowfarthisCourtcanhaveregardtoexternalsourcesofinformation concerningthetaxonomyofsexualidentity.

TheQuestionofLaw
211 Ground1ofthenoticeofappealtothisCourtisasfollows:
"TheAppealPanelerredinlawinconstruings32DCoftheBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995by holdingthattheRegistrarcouldonlyregisterachangeofaperson's'sex'frommaletofemaleorfemaletomale, butnotfrommaleorfemaletoadesignationthatisneitherspecificallymalenorfemale."

212 ItisimportanttoappreciatethebasisfortheTribunal'sdecisionandtheAppealPanel'saffirmationofthatdecision. TheTribunalconcluded(at[99][100])thattheRegistrarhadcorrectlyrefusedtoregisterthechangeofsexsoughtby Norrie,becausetheRegistrarhasnopowerunders32DCoftheActtoregisterachangeofsexbyapersonto"non specific"or"notspecified".However,thebasisforthisconclusionwasthattheword"sex",wheneverusedinPart5A oftheAct,meanseitherthemalesexorthefemalesexandcanhavenomoreexpansivemeaning(at[93]).Inthe Tribunal'sview(at[94],[98]):

"theconstructionurgedby[Norrie]isnotconsistentwiththenumerouslegislativeprovisionsthatarepremisedona binarydivisionbetweenthesexesinto'male'and'female'... [The]Actispredicatedonanassumptionthatallpeoplecanbeclassifiedintotwodistinctandplainlyidentifiable sexes,maleandfemale."

213 TheAppealPanelendorsed(at[32])whatitsaidwastheTribunal'sconclusionthat:
"ParliamentwouldnothaveintendedtheenactmentofPart5Awouldcreatea'thirdlegalsex'withtheresultthat personssoregisteredwouldfalloutsidethelegislativeprovisionsthatarepremisedonabinarydivisionbetween thesexesinto'male'and'female'".

ThustheAppealPanelheld(at[35])thattheTribunalhadcorrectly:
"interpretedthewords'changeofsex'incontextandconcludedthattheirordinarymeaningwasachangefrom maletofemaleorviceversa".

214 TheAppealPanelrejected(at[38])anapplicationbyNorrieforleavetoextendtheappealtoareviewofthemeritsof theTribunal'sdecision.Onegroundgivenforrejectingtheapplicationwasthat:

"TheTribunalwasdeterminingapreliminarylegalissue.Itdidnotreachthestageofmakingadecisionaboutthe meritsoftheapplication".

215 Norrie'sargumentinthisCourtwasthattheAppealPanelhaderredinconstruingPart5AoftheActasadoptinga binaryclassificationofsex.Thaterror,soitwasargued,wastheverybasisoftheAppealPanel'sdecisionand warrantedthisCourtsettingitaside.

TheLegislation
216 Part5AwasintroducedintotheActbytheTransgender(AntiDiscriminationandOtherActsAmendment)Act1996 ("1996Act"),Sch2,cl4.The1996Actcameintoforceon1October1996,ninemonthsaftertheprincipalAct commenced.AsBeazleyPhasexplained(at[18]above),Part5AwassubsequentlyamendedbytheCourtsand CrimesLegislationAmendmentAct2008("2008Act"). 217 Part5A,asinsertedbythe1996Act,includedadefinitionof"sexualreassignmentsurgery"ins32A.Thatdefinition correspondspreciselytothecurrentdefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A,whichthe2008Actsubstituted fortheearlierdefinition. 218 Section32BoftheoriginalPart5Aprovidedthatapersonovertheageof18:
"(a)whosebirthisregisteredinNewSouthWales (b)whohasundergonesexualreassignmentsurgeryand (c)whoisnotmarried".

couldapplytotheRegistrarfor"alterationoftherecordoftheperson'ssexintheregistrationoftheperson'sbirth".The Registrarwastodetermineanapplicationunders32Bbymakingthealterationorrefusingtomakeit:s32D.Those provisionsremaininthelegislation,exceptthattheexpression"sexualreassignmentsurgery"hasbeenreplacedby "sexaffirmationprocedure". 219 The2008ActintroducedintoPart5AaprovisionenablingapersonwhowasnotborninNewSouthWales,butwho haslivedintheStateforatleastoneyear,toapplytotheRegistrarfortheregistrationoftheperson'ssexinthe Register:seenows32DAoftheAct.Amongthepreconditionsthatmustbesatisfiedistherequirementthatthe applicanthasundergonea"sexaffirmationprocedure":s32DA(1)(c).Section32DArefersonlytoanapplicationfor theregistrationoftheapplicant'ssexintheRegisteranddoesnotrefertotheapplicationasonefortheregistrationof achangeofsex.However,s32DC(1)statesthattheRegistraristodetermineanapplicationunders32DA"by registeringtheperson'schangeofsexorrefusingtoregistertheperson'schangeofsex".

Background
InformationBeyondtheEvidence

220 IhavereferredtothepaucityofevidencebeforetheTribunalandtheAppealPanel.AsJusticeHeydonhaspointedout inanilluminatingarticle,courtsarenotnecessarilylimitedintheirinquiriestotheevidencecalledbytheparties:JD Heydon,"DevelopingtheCommonLaw"inJTGleesonandRCAHiggins(eds),ConstitutingLaw:LegalArgument andSocialValues(FederationPress,2011)Ch5.Eveninrelationto"adjudicativefacts",whichJusticeHeydon definesasfactsinissueorrelevanttoafactinissue,acourtmayrelyonitsknowledgeofsuchmattersastheuseof theEnglishlanguage,elementarymathematicalprinciplesandsimplephysicalandscientificfacts(at96). 221 Inrelationto"legislativefacts",whichincludethosewhichhelpacourtdeterminewhataruleshouldbe,acourtmay relyonawiderrangeofknowledge.JusticeHeydongivesexamplesofacourttakingintoaccountrepeatedfindings

madebycourtsinearliercases,eventhoughthefindingsthemselvesarenotgenerallyadmissibleasevidence(at 116117).Healsogivesexamplesofcourtsrelyingonexpertliteratureinfieldssuchasmedicineandpsychologyon issuessuchascausation,foreseeabilityofpsychiatricinjuryandthedangersofidentificationevidence(at118120). Whileurgingcautionintheuseoflegislativefacts(at124127),JusticeHeydonrecognisesthat,subjectto requirementsofproceduralfairness,relianceonlegislativefactsissometimes"bothnecessaryandinevitable"(at 136). 222 IndeterminingtheextenttowhichNewSouthWalescourtscantakeintoaccountmattersoutsidetheevidence adducedbytheparties,s144oftheEvidenceAct1995mustbeconsidered.Itprovidesasfollows:

"(1)Proofisnotrequiredaboutknowledgethatisnotreasonablyopentoquestionandis: (a)commonknowledgeinthelocalityinwhichtheproceedingisbeingheldorgenerally,or (b)capableofverificationbyreferencetoadocumenttheauthorityofwhichcannotreasonablybe questioned. (2)Thejudgemayacquireknowledgeofthatkindinanywaythejudgethinksfit. (3)Thecourt(including,ifthereisajury,thejury)istotakeknowledgeofthatkindintoaccount. (4)Thejudgeistogiveapartysuchopportunitytomakesubmissions,andtorefertorelevantinformation,relating totheacquiringortakingintoaccountofknowledgeofthatkindasisnecessarytoensurethatthepartyisnot unfairlyprejudiced."

223 Section144displacesthecommonlawdoctrineofjudicialnotice:GattellarovWestpacBankingCorporation[2004] HCA6204ALR258,at[17],perGleesonCJ,McHugh,HayneandHeydonJJAytugrulvR[2012]HCA15286ALR 441,at[21],perFrenchCJ,Hayne,CrennanandBellJJ.TheAustralianLawReformCommission,whichproposed theenactmentofs144,saidthatthesectionisintendedtogiveeffecttoa"wideview"ofthegeneralknowledgethat courts,evenwithoutevidenceonthetopic,maytakeintoaccount:LawReformCommission,Evidence,Vol1(Report 26,Interim),at[974],[977].TheLawReformCommissionexpresslyrecognised(at[974])thatcourtscantakeinto accountfactswithoutproof,notonlyinrelationtotheprocessofmakingfindingsaboutfactsinissue,butalsointhe processofformulatinganddevelopingthecommonlaw. 224 Section144doesnotconferanunlimiteddiscretionarypoweronacourttotakeintoaccountunprovenfactsthatmight bearontheissuestoberesolved.ThusinGattellarovWestpac,theHighCourtheldthatitwasnotopentotheNew SouthWalesCourtofAppealtotakenoticeofthe"fact"thatabankusedastandardformofguarantee.InAytugrulv R,theHighCourtdeclinedtotakenoticeofpublishedresearchsuggestingthatsomewaysinwhichDNAstatisticsare presentedcarrygreaterpersuasivepotentialthanothers.Thepluralitydidso(at[21])becauseknowledgeofthe propositionassertedcouldnotbesaidtobe"notreasonablyopentoquestion"orcapableofverificationbyreferenceto adocumenttheauthorityofwhichcouldnotreasonablybequestioned. 225 Nonetheless,therearecasesinwhichs144hasbeengivenabroadinterpretation.InVictorianWomenLawyers' AssociationIncvFederalCommissionerofTaxation[2008]FCA983,170FCR318,forexample,FrenchJ(at[116]) tooknoticeofthedisadvantageexperiencedbywomenpractitionersinthelegalprofessionasamatterof"common knowledge...generally"withinthemeaningofs144(1)(a).HisHonourdidsoinacasewheretheissue,asinthe presentcase,wasoneofstatutoryconstruction. 226 TheCourtwasreferredinargumenttomaterialconcerningtheconditionsknownasintersexualityandtranssexuality. ThiswasnotdoneinordertoenabletheCourttomakeapolicyjudgmenttoassessthemeritsofaproposed modificationtoacommonlawrule.Ratherthematerialwasprovidedasinformationnecessarytoconstrueandapply Part5AoftheAct.ThematerialincludedarecentworkbyProfessorJulieGreenberg,IntersexualityandtheLaw:Why SexMatters(NewYorkUniversityPress,2012). 227 IdonotthinkthatthisCourtcantakeintoaccountallofthescientificandfactualinformationcontainedinthebook.A gooddealofthisinformationcannotbesaid,intheabsenceofspecificevidenceonthepoint,tobe"notreasonably opentoquestion"orcapableofverificationinthemannercontemplatedbys144(1)(b)oftheEvidenceAct.Butcertain basicinformationaboutintersexualityandtranssexualityseemstometofallwithinthecategoryofknowledgethatis notreasonablyopentoquestionor,alternatively,iscapableofverificationbyreferencetoProfessorGreenberg'swork asadocumenttheauthorityofwhich(ontheseissues)cannotreasonablybequestioned.Thisconclusionis reinforcedbythefactthatmuchthesameinformationhasbeenrecountedandacceptedpreviouslybycourtsin Australiaandothercommonlawjurisdictions.
IntersexualityandTranssexuality

228 ProfessorGreenbergdefines"intersex"broadlytoinclude(at1):
"anyonewithacongenitalconditionwhosesexchromosomes,gonads,orinternalorexternalsexualanatomydo notfitclearlyintothebinarymale/femalenorms".

Shestates(at12)thatthereareavarietyofintersexconditions:
"Some...involveaninconsistencybetweenaperson'sinternalandexternalsexualfeatures.Forexample,some peoplewithanintersexconditionmayhavefemaleappearingexternalgenitalia,nointernalfemaleorgans,and testicles.Otherpeoplewithanintersexconditionmaybebornwithgenitaliathatdonotappeartobeclearlymaleor female....Somepeople...mayalsobebornwithachromosomalpatternthatdoesnotfallintothebinaryXX/XY norm".

Norrieappearsnottobeanintersexperson.Buttheexistenceofintersexualityisamattertobetakenintoaccountin theconstructionofPart5A. 229 ProfessorGreenbergalsonotes(at11)thatmedicalexpertsrecognisethatatleasteightattributescontributetoa person'ssex,including:

"geneticorchromosomalsex,gonadalsex(reproductivesexglands),internalmorphologicsex(seminalvesicles, prostate,vagina,uterus,andfallopiantubes),externalmorphologicsex(genitalia),hormonalsex(androgensor estrogens),phenotypicsex(secondarysexualfeaturessuchasfacialhairorbreasts),assignedsexandgenderof rearing,andgenderidentity".

Thisknowledgeisnotnew:seeComment,"Transsexualism,SexReassignmentSurgery,andtheLaw"(1971)56 CornellLR963,at965.LockhartJidentifiedsimilarfactorsinSecretary,DepartmentofSocialSecurityv"SRA"(1993) 43FCR299,at316,acasedecidedbeforetheenactmentofPart5AoftheAct. 230 Ithasbeenknownsinceancienttimesthatsomepeoplehavebothmaleandfemalephysiologicalcharacteristicssuch asreproductiveorgans,althoughuntilrelativelyrecentlytheywereusuallyknownashermaphrodites:Secretaryv "SRA",at313,perLockhartJ,andsourcescitedthere.Intersexualityisnotthesameastranssexuality(sometimes knownasgenderdysphoriasyndromeandsodescribedbytheHighCourtinABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42 244CLR390)JLTaitz,"ConfrontingTranssexualism,SexualIdentityandtheCriminalLaw"(1992)60MedicoLegal Journal60,at61,63Secretaryv"SRA",at315.Atranssexualatbirthhasthesexualorgansofamaleorfemalebut doesnotidentifyasamemberofthesexthatwasassignedatbirth:JGreenberg,at2Secretaryv"SRA",at313314, 315,perLockhartJ.Inthissense,thetermincludespreoperative,postoperativeandnonoperativetranssexuals. 231 Theterm"transsexual"canhaveanarrowermeaning.InKevinvAttorneyGeneral(Commonwealth)[2001]FamCA 1074165FLR404,ChisholmJused"transsexual"tomean(at[12]):
"apersonwhohassomeorallofthephysicalorbiologicalcharacteristicsofonesex,butwhoexperienceshimself orherselfasbeingoftheoppositesex,andhasundergonehormonalandsurgicaltreatmentstochangesomeof thephysicalcharacteristicsinordertoconformmorecloselytotheoppositesex."

ChisholmJ'sjudgmentinKevinvAttorneyGeneralcontainsadetailedexaminationofthestateofmedicalknowledge asat2001relatingtobothintersexualityandtranssexuality(seeparticularlyat[216]ff).AlthoughKevinvAttorney Generalpostdatedthe1996Act,itisnoteworthythatChisholmJdescribedthebiologicalcharacteristicsofintersex personsas"notunambiguouslyeithermaleorfemale":at[224],[228].

SomeCaseLaw

232 Mostofthecaselawrelatingtotheclassificationofsexisconcernedwiththelegalpositionoftranssexuals.Thewell knownandmuchcriticisedcaseofCorbettvCorbett[1971]P83,forexample,decidedthatapostoperativemaleto femaletranssexualcouldnotvalidlycontractamarriagewithamale.OrmrodJconsideredthataperson'ssexisfixed unalterablyatbirth.Accordingly,heheldthatamalecouldnotchangehissexevenifheunderwentanoperationto removetesticlesandconstructanartificialvaginaandthereafterlivedasawoman. 233 Inthecourseofhisjudgment(at100102),OrmrodJexaminedmedicalevidencerelatingtotranssexualityand intersexuality(heusedtheterm"intersex").Theevidenceshowedthatsomepeopleexhibitdiscrepanciesinthe physiologicalcharacteristicsthatin1971wereregardedastheprincipalcriteriafordeterminingaperson'ssex: chromosomalsex,gonadalsexandgenitalcondition.Theevidenceindicatedthatsuchpeoplecouldproperlybe classifiedasintersex.OrmrodJexpressednofinalviewastotheappropriateclassificationofapersonwhose physiologicalcharacteristicsrelatingtosexualidentitywerenotcongruent.OrmrodJnotedthattheexpertsdisagreed astowhetherpeoplewhosephysiologicalcharacteristicswerecongruent,butwhosepsychologicalorhormonal factorswere"abnormal",shouldalsobeclassifiedasintersex. 234 AnissuearoseinAustralianin1979astothevalidityofamarriageenteredintobyanintersexperson:IntheMarriage ofCandD(falselycalledC)(1979)28ALR524.BellJfoundthataperson(describedasthe"husband")whowent throughaformofmarriagewithawomanwasa"truehermaphrodite".Thehusbandhadanormalfemalesex chromosomecomplement,butalsohadbothmaleandfemalegonads.Thehusband,whohadbeenraisedasamale, hadundergonesurgeryto"correct"externalsexorgans(apparentlyincludingtheconstructionofasmallpenisandthe removalofbreasts).BellJheld(at528)thatthemarriagewasvoidbecausethehusband"wasneithermannorwoman butwasacombinationofboth".

235 CorbettvCorbettandIntheMarriageofCandDhavegeneratedagreatdealofcriticalcommentinjournalsand elsewhere.InAustralia,thecommentaryincludesarticlesbytwoeminentjurists:MDKirby,"MedicalTechnologyand NewFrontiersofFamilyLaw"(1986)1AustJofFamilyLaw196,at197200RWilson,"LifeandLaw:TheImpactof HumanRightsonExperimentingwithLife"(1985)17AustJofForensicSciences61,at79.Anticipatingthe terminologyemployedbyChisholmJinKevinvAttorneyGeneral,JusticeKirbyreferredtosurgicalinterventionasa meanstohelpdetermine"anambiguoussexualidentification".HediscussedIntheMarriageofCandDinthat context. 236 Thesignificanceofthesecasesforpresentpurposesisnotthecorrectnessorotherwiseoftheactualdecisions. CourtsinAustraliahavedeclinedtofollowthereasoninginCorbettvCorbettinsofarasitsuggeststhatsexualidentity isdeterminedpurelybychromosomalorbiologicalcharacteristicsatbirthandisthereforeunchangeablethereafter: Secretaryv"SRA",at303304,perBlackCJat325,perLockhartJKevinvAttorneyGeneral,at[120],[160],per ChisholmJ.ThesignificanceofCorbettvCorbettandMarriageofCandD(andlatercasesdiscussedatlengthin Secretaryv"SRA"andKevinvAttorneyGeneral)isthattheydemonstratethatlongbeforeenactmentofthe1996Act, medicalandlegalopinioninAustraliarecognisedtheconditionsknownasintersexualityandtranssexuality.More particularly,itwasrecognisedthatintersexpersonsarenotunambiguouslymaleorfemaleandthattheymaybe regarded,forcertainpurposesatleast,asneithermalenorfemale.

ConstructionofPart5AoftheAct
TextualAnalysis

237 ThetaskofconstructionofPart5AoftheActmustbeginwiththetextofthelegislation.Thecriticalprovisioniss 32DC(1),whichprovidesthat:

"TheRegistraristodetermineanapplicationundersection32DAbyregisteringtheperson'schangeofsexor refusingtoregistertheperson'schangeofsex".

Theterm"sex"and"changeofsex"arenotdefinedinPart5A. 238 IfPart5Acontainednoprovisionselucidatingthemeaningof"sex",theconstructionofs32DC(1)wouldnodoubt dependontheordinarymeaningtobegiventotheword.That,however,wouldnotnecessarilyleadtotheconclusion thats32DCusestheword"sex"inabinarysense. 239 InSecretaryv"SRA",BlackCJ(withwhomHeereyJagreed)accepted(at301)thatinordinaryEnglishusage,there aretwosexes,maleandfemale,andthatthedifferencesrelatetoanatomicalandphysiologicalcharacteristics,rather thanpsychologicalones.Nonetheless,BlackCJconsideredthattheuseofthewordhadchangedsufficientlyto conclude(at304)that:
"theEnglishlanguagedoesnotnowcondemnpostoperativemalefemaletranssexualstobeingdescribedasbeing ofthesextheyprofoundlybelievetheydonotbelongtoandtheexternalgenitaliaofwhich,asaresultof irreversiblesurgery,theynolongerhave".

TheChiefJusticetookintoaccount(at305)thegrowingawarenessinthecommunityofthepositionoftranssexuals andaperceptionthatapostoperativemaletofemaletranssexualcouldappropriatelybedescribedasfemalein ordinaryEnglishusage.Thus,inhisview,theword"wife"wasapttoincludeapostoperativemaletofemale transsexual,wherethepersonotherwisesatisfiedthestatutorydefinitionof"wife".(Seealsoat325326,perLockhart J.) 240 Itisatleastarguablethattheword"sex"andtheexpression"changeofsex"inPart5A,asamatterofcurrent terminology,areapttoinclude,respectively,intersexpersonsandaperson'schangefrommaleorfemaletointersex (acategorythatisneithermalenorfemale).Insupportofthisargumentitcanbesaidthatintersexualityhasbeen sufficientlyrecognisedbythemedicalandlegalauthoritiestothepointthatanintersexperson,ifthatpersonso chooses,canproperlybeclassifiedasneitheramalenorafemale.Onthisbasis,forexample,apersonwhois registeredatbirthasamale,butwhoissubsequently(whetherinconsequenceofsurgicalinterventionorotherwise) showntobeintersex,couldsuccessfullyapplytotheRegistrarunderPart5Atoregisterachangeofsexfrommaleto intersex. 241 Ifthisargumentwereaccepted,aseparatequestionmightariseastotheclassificationopentoapersonwhois registeredatbirthasamaleorfemale(orisregardedassuchintheperson'spreviousplaceofresidence),butwho undergoesasexaffirmationprocedureandsubsequentlywishestoidentifyasneitheramalenorfemale.Itwouldnot necessarilyfollowfromtherecognitionofanintersexpersonasneithermalenorfemalethattheordinaryusageofthe word"sex"inAustraliahasdevelopedtothepointwherethesexofapersoninthepositionIhavedescribed(which broadlycorrespondstoNorrie'scircumstances)canbeclassifiedasnonspecific,indeterminateorsomesimilar

description. 242 Idonotthinkitisnecessarytodeterminewhetheranargumentbasedsimplyonthechanginglinguisticuseofthe word"sex"shouldbeaccepted.Inmyopinion,thetextofPart5AoftheActcontainsclearindicationsthat"sex"isnot usedexclusivelyinthebinarysenseattributedtoitbytheAppealPanel.Theindicationsarefoundinthedefinitionof "sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A:

"sexaffirmationproceduremeansasurgicalprocedureinvolvingthealterationofaperson'sreproductive organscarriedout: (a)forthepurposeofassistingapersontobeconsideredtobeamemberoftheoppositesex,or (b)tocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson."(Emphasisadded.)

(AsIhavenoted,thisdefinitionhasformedpartofPart5Asinceitsintroductionin1996,althoughthedefined expressionwasoriginally"sexualreassignmentsurgery".) 243 Thedefinitionins32Aclearlyrecognisestwothings: apersonmayhave"ambiguitiesrelatingtothesexof[that]person"and asurgicalprocedureinvolvingalterationtotheperson'sreproductiveorgansmightbenecessaryorappropriate "tocorrectoreliminate"theambiguities. 244 Thatbeingso,thedefinitionisconsistentwiththeword"sex"inPart5A,unlessthecontextsuggestsotherwise, encompassingnotonlymalesandfemales,butpersonswhosesexis"ambiguous".Thestatutorylanguageimplies thatthe"ambiguitiesrelatingtothesex"ofsomepeoplewillpersistunlessanduntiltheyhavesurgerytocorrector eliminatetheambiguities.Thelanguagealsoimpliesthatapersonmayhavesurgerytocorrectoreliminate ambiguities,yetstillretaintheambiguitiesaftersurgery.Inthisrespectitissignificantthatparagraph(b)ofthe definitiondoesnotrefertosuccessfulsurgery.Indeed,theappealwasarguedonthebasisthatthepreconditionins 32DA(1)(c)oftheActissatisfiedifasurgicalprocedureisundertakenforthepurposeofcorrectingoreliminatingthe ambiguities,regardlessofwhetherthesurgeryachieves(oriscapableofachieving)itsobjective.Thisapproachis consistentwiththeconstructiongivenbytheHighCourttos14(1)oftheGenderReassignmentAct2000(WA)("GR Act")abroadlyequivalentprovision,inABvWesternAustralia[2011]HCA42244CLR390,at[33]. 245 Part5Adoesnotdefine"ambiguities".Thedictionarydefinitionsoftherelatedword"ambiguous"include:
"1.Indistinct,obscure,notclearlydefined... 5.Doubtful,asregardsclassificationindeterminate"(OxfordEnglishDictionary) "2.ofdoubtfuloruncertainnaturedifficulttocomprehend,distinguish,orclassify... 3.lackingclearnessordefinitenessobscure,indistinct"(MacquarieDictionary).

Itisnotastrainedinterpretationof"ambiguitiesrelatingtothesexof[a]person"tounderstanditasreferringatthevery leasttophysiologicalcharacteristicswidelyacceptedbymedicalauthoritiesasjustifyingclassificationofaperson's sexasneithermalenorfemale.Itmayhaveawidermeaning. 246 ThisreadingofPart5AoftheActisnotnegatedbythereferenceto"theoppositesex"inparagraph(a)ofthedefinition of"sexaffirmationprocedure".Paragraph(a)isconcernedwithasurgicalproceduretoassistamaletobeconsidered asafemaleorafemaletobeconsideredasamale.Theexpression"oppositesex"isappositeinthatcontext. 247 Paragraph(b)ofthedefinitionisconcernedwithadifferentkindofsurgicalprocedure:onedesignedtocorrector eliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson.Paragraph(b)eschewsanyreferencetothe"oppositesex". Thereasonispresumablythatthedrafterrecognisedthatasurgicalproceduretocorrectoreliminateambiguities relatingtothesexofapersondoesnot(oratleastmaynot)involveachangeofsexfrommaletofemaleorvice versa.Suchaprocedurecouldbedesigned,forexample,tochangeorfacilitateachangeofaperson'ssexfromthe ambiguitiesofintersextoeithermaleorfemale.Itisnoteworthythatparagraph(b)ofthedefinitionavoidsthepronouns "him"or"her". 248 Ishouldaddthat,apartfromparagraph(a)ofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure",Part5AoftheActdoesnot usetheexpression"oppositesex".ThiswastrueofPart5AasoriginallyenactedanditremainstrueofPart5Aas amendedbythe2008Act.Theuseoftheexpression"oppositesex"ins32Aaccordinglyprovidesnowarrantfora binaryinterpretationoftheword"sex"inPart5A,exceptwhereitisusedincombinationwiththeadjective"opposite". 249 Inmyview,thereisafurtherconsiderationthatsupportsthisconstructionofPart5AoftheAct.The1996Act,which introducedPart5AintotheAct,explicitlyrecognisedtheconceptof"indeterminatesex".Thisrecognitioniscertainly notconclusiveastothemeaningof"sex"inPart5A,butitconstitutesanacknowledgementbyParliament,inthevery legislationthatintroducedPart5A,thatsexisnotnecessarilyalwaystoberegardedasabinaryconcept.

250 Thelongtitleofthe1996Actwasasfollows:
"AnActtoamendtheAntiDiscriminationAct1977tomakediscriminationandvilificationontransgendergrounds unlawfultoamendtheBirths,DeathsandMarriagesRegistrationAct1995toprovidefortherecognitionofa changeofsex...".

251 The1996ActinsertedPart3AintotheAntiDiscriminationAct1977,undertheheading"Discriminationontransgender grounds":1996Act,Sch1,cl4.Part3Amadeitunlawfulforemployersandotherstodiscriminateincertainways againstaperson"ontransgendergrounds".Part3Acontainedthefollowingdefinition(s38A):

"AreferenceinthisParttoapersonbeingtransgenderoratransgenderpersonisareferencetoaperson... (a)whoidentifiesasamemberoftheoppositesexbyliving,orseekingtolive,asamemberoftheoppositesex,or (b)whohasidentifiedasamemberoftheoppositesexbylivingasamemberoftheoppositesex,or (c)who,beingofindeterminatesex,identifiesasamemberofaparticularsexbylivingasamemberofthatsex, andincludesareferencetothepersonbeingthoughtofasatransgenderperson,whetherthepersonis,orwas,in factatransgenderperson.(Emphasisadded.)

252 Thisdefinitionexplicitlyrecognisedthatapersonmaybeof"indeterminatesex"andthatsomepersonsof indeterminatesex(notnecessarilyall)mayidentifyasamemberofa"particularsex"bylivingasamemberofthat sex. 253 Inmyview,s38AoftheAntiDiscriminationActcanbetakenintoaccounttoalimitedextentintheconstructionofPart 5AoftheAct.Thedefinitionisaclearindicationthattheword"sex",whenusedinlegislationintendedtofacilitatea changeofsexbyapersonwhosesexualidentityisuncertain,isnotnecessarilytobeunderstoodinabinarysense. Takings38Aintoaccountinthislimitedwaydoesnot,inmyopinion,involveanyinconsistencywiththereasoningof themajorityinCertainLloyd'sUnderwritersvCross[2012]HCA56293ALR412.
ABvWesternAustralia

254 Part5AoftheActisindifferenttermstotheGRActconsideredbytheHighCourtinABvWesternAustralia.Inthat case,theappellantwasapostoperativefemaletomaletranssexual.Theissuewaswhethertheappellantsatisfied therequirementsoftheissueofaregistrationcertificateasamaleundertheGRAct.Theanswerdependedon whethertheappellanthadthe:

"gendercharacteristicsofapersonofthegendertowhichthepersonhasbeenreassigned",

asrequiredbys15(1)(b)(ii)oftheGRAct.Theexpression"gendercharacteristics"wasdefinedtomean:
"thephysicalcharacteristicsbyvirtueofwhichapersonisidentifiedasmaleorfemale".

255 TheHighCourtunanimouslyheldthattheappellanthadtherequisitegendercharacteristicseventhoughheretaineda femalereproductivesystem.TheCourtconsidered(at[22],[23])thattheword"identified"inthedefinitionof"gender characteristics"supportedaconstructionthatconfinedtheinquirytotheappellant'sexternalphysicalcharacteristics anddidnotincludeinternalcharacteristics,suchasorgansassociatedwithgenderatbirth.Sincetheappellanthad theobservablephysicalcharacteristicsofamaleperson,thestatutorycriterionwassatisfied. 256 TheHighCourtdidnotneedtodecidewhethertheGRActincorporatedabinaryconceptofsexorgender.However,it isclearenoughthattheCourttooktheviewthatitdid:seeat[1],[29],[31],[33].TheCourtinterpretedtheGRActin thiswaybecausethestatutorylanguagecontemplatedthatarecognitioncertificatecouldbegivenonlytosomeone whoidentifiedaseithermaleorfemale.Somuchwasclearfromthedefinitionof"gendercharacteristics".Itwasalso clearfromthedefinitionof"reassignmentprocedure"ins3oftheGRAct,whichdifferssubstantiallyfromthedefinition of"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32AoftheAct.IdonotthinkthatABvWesternAustraliaisinanywayinconsistent withwhatIconsidertobetheproperconstructionofs32DCoftheAct.
AdditionalConsiderations

257 ForthereasonsIhavegiven,Ithinkthatthebetterinterpretationofs32DCoftheAct,whenconstruedinitslegislative context,isthatitempowerstheRegistrar,atleastinsomecircumstances,toregisterachangeofsexofaperson frommaleorfemaletoacategorythatisneithermalenorfemale.Anexamplecouldbeapersonwhoisregisteredin NewSouthWalesatbirthasamaleorfemale(orissoregisteredintheperson'splaceoforigin),butwho subsequentlyascertainsthatthecorrectmedicalclassificationoftheperson'sphysiologicalcharacteristicsisintersex. IfsuchapersonwishestoinvoketheAct,itisnecessaryforthepersontoundergoasexaffirmationprocedure,since thatisastatutoryprecondition.Butifthatpreconditionissatisfiedandthepersonwishestoregisterachangeofsexto intersex(orsomeotherappropriatedesignation),inmyviews32DCoftheAct,readinitsstatutorycontext,permits theRegistrartoaccedetotheapplication.

258 WhileIconsiderthistobethebetterconstructionofs32DC,Irecognisethatthelanguage,bothasoriginallydrafted andinitscurrentform,doesnotunequivocallycompeltheconstructionIfavour.Itispossible,forexample,toread paragraph(b)ofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"asincorporatinganassumptionthatapersoniseither maleorfemale,evenifambiguitiesmakeitdifficulttodetermineintowhichcategorythepersonfits.Thereferencetoa procedureto"correctoreliminate"ambiguitiescouldberead,withoutnecessarilydoingviolencetothelanguage,as assumingthataperson'struesexiseithermaleorfemale.Thisappearstobetheeffectofthedifferentlyworded legislationconsideredinABvWesternAustralia. 259 However,therearetwofurtherreasonswhythelegislationshouldbeconstruedtopermittheRegistrartoregistera changeofsexfrommaleorfemaletoacategorythatisneither. 260 Thefirstisthatthelegislation,includingthereferenceto"ambiguities",shouldbeconstruedhavingregardtothe longstandingrecognitionbymedicalandlegalauthoritiesthatatleastintersexpeoplecanbeandforcertainpurposes shouldbeclassifiedasneithermalenorfemale.Statutorylanguageneedstobeinterpretedagainstwellestablished advancesinscientificknowledgethatundercuttraditionalassumptions,inthiscaseaboutthebinarynatureofsexual classificationoridentification.Inpart,asBlackCJpointedoutinSecretaryv"SRA",itisamatterofthechanged meaningofapparentlystraightforwardtermsovertime.ButitisalsoamatterofconstruingthewordsParliamenthas usedagainstthebackgroundofagenerally(ifonlyrelativelyrecently)acceptedunderstandingofpreviouslyneglected ormisunderstoodconditions. 261 AsIhavesoughttoexplain,bothmedicalandlegalauthoritiesacceptedlongbeforethe1996Actthatnotallpeoplefit withinthebinarymodelofsexualclassification.IfthelanguageofPart5AoftheActcanreadilybeinterpretedas proceedingonthebasisofthatacceptanceasinmyviewitcanthatinterpretationshouldbeadopted. 262 ThesecondreasonisthatconstruingPart5AoftheActasadoptingabinaryclassificationofsexgivesinsufficient weighttotheinjunctionins33oftheInterpretationAct1987ortotheapproachtoconstructiontakenbytheHighCourt inABvWesternAustralia.Section33oftheInterpretationActprovidesthat:
"IntheinterpretationofaprovisionofanAct...,aconstructionthatwouldpromotethepurposeorobjectunderlying theAct...(whetherornotthatpurposeorobjectisstatedintheAct...)shallbepreferredtoaconstructionthat wouldnotpromotethatpurposeorobject".

263 InABvWesternAustralia,theHighCourtsaid(at[24])thattheWesternAustralianprovisionequivalenttos33ofthe InterpretationActwasrelevanttothetaskofconstruingtheGRAct.TheCourtcontinued:

"Moreover,theprinciplethatparticularstatutoryprovisionsmustbereadinlightoftheirpurposewassaidin WatersvPublicTransportCorporationtobeofparticularsignificanceinthecaseoflegislationwhichprotectsor enforceshumanrights.Inconstruingsuchlegislation'thecourtshaveaspecialresponsibilitytotakeaccountof andgiveeffecttothestatutorypurpose'.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatthereisaruleofconstructionthatbeneficial andremediallegislationistobegivena'fair,largeandliberal'interpretation."[Citationsomitted.]

264 Caremustbetakennottooverstatethepropositionstatedinthisextract.AswassaidbyBrennanCJandMcHughJin IWvCityofPerth[1997]HCA30191CLR1,at12,theobjectoflegislationmustbeunderstoodbyreferencetothe languageofthestatute.Aliberalinterpretationisnotapassporttoan"unreasonableorunnatural"constructionofthe statutorylanguage.TheessentialquestionisthemeaningoftherelevantwordsusedbyParliament:Victims CompensationFundvBrown[2003]HCA54201ALR260,at[33],perHeydonJ(withwhomMcHughACJ,Gummow, KirbyandHayneJJagreed). 265 TheobjectsoftheActincludeprovidingfor"therecordingofchangesofsex"(s3(c)).Thisstatementofpurposedoes notmakeitclearwhatkindsofchangesofsexwillbepermissibleunderthelegislation.Nonetheless,asIhavesaid, theActexplicitlyacknowledgesthatsomepeopleexperienceambiguitiesinrelationtotheirsexualidentityandare preparedtoundertakedrasticsurgicalprocedurestocorrectoreliminatetheambiguitiesortoassistthemtobe consideredmembersoftheoppositesex.Thelegislationsetsupprocedurestoenableapersontoapplytoalterthe recordofthatperson'ssex.Thelegislationisremedialinthesensethatitenablesthosewhodonotcomply,orwhodo notseethemselvesascomplyingwiththetraditionalbinaryclassificationtoaltertherecordtoaccordwiththerealityof theirsexualclassificationortotheirperceptionofthatreality. 266 TheHighCourtinABvWesternAustraliawasdealingwithlegislationthataddressessimilarissues,butisdrafted differentlyfromtheAct.Evenso,thelanguageusedbytheHighCourt(at[25])canreadilybeadaptedtodescribethe purposeofPart5AoftheAct.Part5Aacknowledgesthedifficultiesfacingpeoplewhosesexualidentityisambiguous andseekstoalleviatetheirsuffering.Itdoessobyprovidingfortheofficialrecognitionofasexualidentitydespitethe disconformitybetweenthatidentityandthesocialhistoricalrecordoftheirsex. 267 ThelanguageofPart5AoftheActands32DCinparticularisconsistentwithpermittingpeoplewhoaredistressed becausetheydonotwishtoberecordedaseithermaleorfemaletoberegisteredasneither,providedthattheyfulfil thestatutorypreconditions.Inmyview,itadvancesthepurposeofthelegislationtoconstrues32DCinthisway.

ConsequencesofRegistrationofaChangeofSex
268 Theregistrationofachangeofsextoacategorythatisneithermalenorfemalehaslegalconsequencesunderthelaw ofNewSouthWalesforthepersonconcerned.Section32IoftheActprovidesthatapersonwhoserecordofsexis alteredunderPart5A
"is,forthepurposesof,butsubjectto,anylawofNewSouthWales,apersonofthesexassoaltered".

269 AsBeazleyPhasexplained(at[126]above)muchlegislationinNewSouthWalesisclearlydraftedonthebasisthat sexisabinaryconceptandthat,accordingly,forthepurposesofthatlegislationthereareonlytwosexes.Iagreewith BeazleyPthatthepossibleconsequencesoftheregistrationofapersonasneithermalenorfemalecannotdictatethe constructionofs32DCoftheAct.Therearethreereasonswhythisisso. 270 First,theprocessforregistrationofachangeofsexisinitiatedbythepersonconcernedlodginganapplicationforthe changetoberegistered.Nooneiscompelledtoseekregistrationofachangeofsex.Itisamatterfortheapplicantto considerwhetherthebenefitsofregistrationasneithermalenorfemaleoutweighthepossibledrawbacksofnotbeing abletotakeadvantageofbenefitsorprotectionsavailableunderstatuteonlytomalesorfemales. 271 Secondly,beneficialStatelegislationthatisbasedonabinaryclassificationofsexwillnotnecessarilybeinterpretedin awaythatexcludesapersonwhosesexisregisteredasneithermalenorfemale.Itispossible,forexample,that legislationdraftedonthatbasiswouldbeinterpretedasapplicabletoeveryone,eventhosewhosesexisregisteredas neithermalenorfemale.Thismaygiverisetootherissuesofclassification,buteachenactmentmustbeconstruedby referencetoitsownlanguageandpurpose.Itcannotbeassumedthatallthelegalconsequencesofregistrationofa changeofsextoneithermalenorfemalewillbeunfavourabletothepersonregisteringthechange. 272 Thirdly,properconstructionofPart5AoftheActalsodependsonitsownlanguage.Nodoubtiftheconsequencesofa particularconstructionwereclearlyabsurd,acourtwouldexaminethelanguagetodeterminewhetheritisso intractablethattheabsurdityisunavoidable.Thereis,however,nothingabsurdinleavingthejudgmentastothemerits ofregisteringachangeofsextothepersonconcerned. 273 Section32IoftheActcannotanddoesnotpurporttohaveconsequencesforCommonwealthlaws.Theconstruction ofCommonwealthlegislationwillbedeterminedindependentlyofs32I:seeSecretaryv"SRA",at306,perBlackCJ.

DispositionoftheAppeal
274 ForthereasonsIhavegiven,theAppealPanelerredinconstruings32DCoftheActsoastoprecludetheRegistrar fromregisteringachangeofsexfrommaleorfemaletoacategorythatisneithermalenorfemale.Inmyview,the Registrarhaspowerunders32DCtoregisterachangeofsexofthiskind. 275 ThisconclusiondoesnotnecessarilyestablishthatNorrieisentitled,asamatteroflaw,torequiretheRegistrarto acceptherapplicationtochangehersexfrommaleto"nonspecific"(oranyothertermdesignatinghersexasneither malenorfemale).BoththeTribunalandtheAppealPanelbasedtheirdecisiononanerroneousconstructionofs 32DCoftheAct.NeitherconsideredthemeritsofNorrie'sapplicationtoregisterthechangeofsexas"nonspecific". AstheAppealPanelsaidwhenrejectingNorrie'sapplicationforittodealwiththemeritsoftheTribunal'sdecision,the latterdecidedapreliminarylegalquestionanddidnotaddressthemeritsoftheapplication. 276 TheappealtothisCourtisonaquestionoflawunders119(1)oftheADTAct.AsthepluralityinKostasvHIA InsuranceServicesPtyLtd[2010]HCA32241CLR390,madeclear(at[90])thenatureofanappealisdetermined bythelanguageofthestatuteprovidingfortheappeal.Wherethelegislationprovidesforanappealonaquestionof law,theexistenceofaquestionoflawisnotmerelyaqualifyingconditiontotherightofappeal.Thequestionoflaw aloneisthesubjectmatteroftheappeal:BrownvRepatriationCommission(1985)7FCR302,at304,percuriam Secretary,DepartmentofFamilies,Housing,CommunityServicesandIndigenousAffairsvMouratidis[2012]FCAFC 29,at[69],perFlickJ. 277 TheTribunalinthepresentcasedidnotmakethefindingsoffactthatare(ormaybe)neededtodeterminewhether Norrie'sapplicationforachangeofsexshouldhavebeenacceptedbytheRegistrar.Nofindinghasbeenmade,for example,thatmedicalopinionrecognisesthatthesexofapersonwhowasbornamaleinallphysiologicalrespects, hasundergoneasexaffirmationprocedureandnowidentifiesasneithermalenorfemaleshouldorcanberegarded asneithermalenorfemale.TheTribunalmerelyfound(at[11])thattwodoctorssworestatutorydeclarationsthat supportedregistrationofachangeofsexbyNorrieto"nonspecific".Thestatutorydeclarationsdonotdisclosethe doctors'reasoningprocessesorwhethertheiropinions(whicharenotclearlystated)aresoundlybased. 278 NorhastheTribunalmadeanyfindingsoffactastotheappropriateclassificationofNorrie'ssex,assumingthatshe

canberegardedasneithermalenorfemale.SuchfindingsmightbeimportantonthequestionofwhetherNorrie's applicationforhersextoberegisteredas"nonspecific"shouldhavebeenacceptedbytheRegistrar. 279 SincetheAppealPanelerredinlawandtheerrorwasdecisivetotheoutcomeoftheappealtoit,themattershouldbe remittedfordeterminationaccordingtolaw.ThatwillrequiretheAppealPaneltoreconsidertheappealonthebasis thats32DCoftheAct,asamatterofconstruction,permitstheRegistrar,inanappropriatecase,toregisterachange ofsexfrommaleorfemaletoasexthatisneithermalenorfemale.TheAppealPanelmaybedisposed,ifthereareno insuperableproceduralobstaclestodoingso,toaccordNorrieanopportunitytoadducefurtherevidencebearingon thefactualissuesthatnowarise.ThismaybetheappropriatecoursesinceboththeTribunalandAppealPanel consideredthattheywereresolvingapreliminarylegalissueandnotthemeritsoftheapplication.Butthequestionof whetherfurtherevidenceshouldbepermittedisamatterfortheAppealPanelortheTribunal,dependingonwhat coursetheproceedingsnowtake. 280 IagreewiththeordersproposedbyBeazleyP. 281 PRESTONCJofLEC:IhavehadtheadvantageofreadingindraftthejudgmentsofBeazleyACJ(thePresidentof theCourtofAppeal)andSackvilleAJA.Iagreewiththeconclusionthatthestatutorypowertoregisteraperson's changeofsexisnotlimitedtoregisteringaperson'ssexasonlymaleorfemaleandthattheAppealPaneland Tribunalerredinlawinconcludingotherwise.IalsoagreethatthemattershouldberemittedtotheTribunalfor determinationandwiththeotherordersproposedbyBeazleyP. 282 WhilstIagreewiththereasonsgivenbyBeazleyPandtheadditionalreasonsgivenbySackvilleAJAforthese conclusions,Iwishtoaddsomeobservationsabouttheconstructionofs32DAands32DCoftheBirths,Deathsand MarriagesRegistrationAct1995('theRegistrationAct'). 283 ThepoweroftheRegistrarunders32DC(1)is"todetermineanapplicationundersection32DA".Thispowerto determinetheapplicationmaybeexercisedinoneoftwoways,eitherby"registeringtheperson'schangeofsex"orby "refusingtoregistertheperson'schangeofsex".Thereferencetoa"changeofsex"ineithercaseisareferenceto thesexwhichthepersonhasappliedtoberegisteredintheperson'sapplicationunders32DA. 284 Anapplicationunders32DAmaybemadebyapersonwhosatisfieseachofthecriteriains32DA(1)(a)to(e).Oneof thecriteriaisthattheperson"hasundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure"(para(c)).A"sexaffirmationprocedure"is definedins32Atomean:
asurgicalprocedureinvolvingthealterationofaperson'sreproductiveorganscarriedout:
(a) (b)

forthepurposeofassistingapersontobeconsideredtobeamemberoftheoppositesex,or tocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson.

285 Apersonwhohasundergoneasexaffirmationprocedureandsatisfiestheothercriteriains32DA(1)mayapplytothe Registrarfor"theregistrationoftheperson'ssexintheRegister".Thereasonforthislanguageisthattheperson'ssex wouldnothavepreviouslybeenrecordedintheRegister.Theperson,inordertobeeligibletomakeanapplication unders32DA(1),wouldnothavehadtheperson'sbirthregisteredundertheRegistrationActoracorrespondinglaw (s32DA(1)(e))orbeenmarried(s32DA(1)(d))andhencehadtheperson'ssexrecordedasaparticularofthose registrableevents.Theperson'sapplicationunders32DA(1)enlivensthepoweroftheRegistrarunders32DC(1)to registertheperson'ssexintheRegister.Thesexthatcanberegisteredastheperson'ssexisthesextheperson appliestohaveregisteredunders32DA(1). 286 Thequestionofcriticalimportanceinthiscaseiswhetherthesexapersoncanapplyunders32DA(1)tohave registeredastheperson'ssexislimitedtoonlymaleorfemale.Theanswerdependsonthemeaningoftheword "sex"inthephrase"person'ssex"ins32DA(1). 287 Inmyview,thesexwhichapersoncanapplyunders32DA(1)tohaveregisteredastheperson'ssexintheRegister isnotlimitedtoonlymaleorfemale.Thewords"theperson'ssex"aregeneralwords.Whereastatuteusesgeneral words,theyaretobegiventheirordinarymeaning,unlessthestatuteindicatesanintentiontodepartfromitsordinary meaning:CodyvJHNelsonPtyLtd(1947)74CLR629at647MaunsellvOlins[1975]AC373at382.The RegistrationAct,andPart5Ainparticular,donotindicateanintentiontodepartfromtheordinarymeaningoftheword "sex".Thereisnostatutorydefinitionof"sex","aperson'ssex"or"theperson'ssex",or"aperson'schangeofsex"or "theperson'schangeofsex".Thecontextinwhichthewordsareusedalsodonotindicatealegislativeintentiontouse thewordsinaspecialisedsense. 288 Whereastatuteuseswordsintheirordinarysense,absentacontraryintention,thestatuteistobeconstruedas 'alwaysspeaking',sothatthewordsaretobeinterpretedinaccordancewiththeircurrentmeaning.Thelanguageof thestatuteisregardedasambulatory,embracingchangesthatoccurinthesubjectmatter:RvGee[2003]HCA12

(2003)212CLR230at241[7].Inthisway,althoughtheconnotationofthelanguagestaysthesame,itsdenotation maydifferovertime:DeputyCommissionerofTaxationvClark[2003]NSWCA91(2003)57NSWLR113at145 [139]. 289 Here,Parliamenthaschosentouselanguage,regardingaperson'ssex,ofsuchgeneralitythatacourtshould interpretthestatutoryprovisionsregulatingthemakingandapprovingofapplicationsfortheregistrationofaperson's sexintheRegisteronthebasisthattheintentionofthestatuteisthatthedenotationofthewordsandtheapplicationof theprovisionsmayvaryovertime.Indeed,theamendmentoftheRegistrationActtoincludePart5Awhichallows personswhoundergoasexaffirmationproceduretohavetheirchangeofsexrecordedintheRegister,revealsa legislativeintentiontoaccommodatechangesintheordinarymeaningoftheconceptofaperson'ssex. 290 Thenecessaryenquiryis,therefore,ofthecurrent,ordinarymeaningoftheconceptofaperson'ssex.AsBeazleyP hascarefullynarrated,thecurrentmeaningoftheconceptofaperson'ssexhasextendedbeyondonlythetwo traditionalcategoriesofmaleandfemaleandnowincludes,atleast,afurthercategoryregardedasfallingbetweenthe maleandfemalesexes,increasinglyreferredtoasintersex.Anintersexindividual,accordingtoProfessorGreenberg (referredtobyBeazleyPat[109]),includesaperson"withacongenitalconditionwhosesexchromosomes,gonads, orinternalorexternalsexualanatomydonotfitclearlyintothebinarymale/femalenorm". 291 Theconsequenceofthischangeintheordinarymeaningoftheconceptofaperson'ssexisthatapersonwho satisfiesthecriteriains32DA(1)(a)to(e)canapplytotheRegistrarfortheregistrationoftheperson'ssexinthe Registernotonlyasmaleorfemale,butalsoanyothercategoryofsexthatfallswithinthecurrentmeaning,suchas intersex,andtheRegistrarwouldhavepowerunders32DCtodeterminetheperson'sapplicationunders32DAby registeringtheperson'schangeofsexintheRegistertobethesexappliedfor. 292 TheRegistrar'ssubmission,thatthecurrent,ordinarymeaningoftheconceptofaperson'ssexislimitedtoonlymale orfemale,isthereforenotaccepted. 293 TheRegistraralsosubmitted,however,thatPart5AoftheRegistrationActevincesanintentiontolimitthesexwhicha personcanapplytohaveregistered,andtheRegistrarcanregisterastheperson'ssex,toonlymaleorfemale.Ido notagree. 294 First,s32DA(1)oftheRegistrationActdoesnotsolimitthesexwhichapersonmayapplytohaveregisteredasthe person'ssexintheRegister.Thelanguageusedisgeneralthepersonmayapply"fortheregistrationoftheperson's sexintheRegister".Thiscontainsnolimitation.Noristhisgenerallanguagelimitedbythelanguageofthecriteriains 32DA(1)(a)to(e)whichmustbesatisfiedinorderforthepersontobeeligibletomaketheapplication.Itistruethatthe personmusthaveundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure(s32DA(1)(c)).However,thereisnoexpressrequirement thatthesexwhichthepersonappliesunders32DA(1)tohaveregisteredastheperson'ssexintheRegisterbethe purposeortheresultofthesexaffirmationprocedure.Indeed,thedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32A doesnotmandatethatanyparticularresultoccur,letaloneasuccessfulresultoccur,onlythataparticularsurgical procedurebeundertaken.Forexample,apersonwhoundergoesasurgicalprocedurewithinthedefinitionins32Aof "sexaffirmationprocedure"thatwouldenabletheperson'ssextoberegisteredasfemaleisnotprecludedbyeither thedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"orthetermsofs32DAfromapplyingunders32DA(1)fortheregistration oftheperson'ssexasacategoryofsexotherthanfemale. 295 Secondly,thedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"ins32Adoesnotleadtoalimitationonthesexwhichaperson canapplyunders32DAtohaveregisteredastheperson'ssexintheRegister.AsIhavenoted,itdemandsa procedure,notaresult.Theprocedureis"asurgicalprocedureinvolvingthealterationofaperson'sreproductive organs".Thatprocedureisrequiredtobecarriedoutforapurpose:eitherforthepurposeofassistingapersontobe consideredtobeamemberoftheoppositesex(para(a))ortocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexof theperson(para(b)). 296 Thereisnorequirement,however,thatthesurgicalprocedurebesuccessfulinthesensethateitherofthese purposesbeachieved.Forexample,asurgicalprocedure,althoughcarriedoutforthepurposeofassistingaperson tobeconsideredamemberoftheoppositesex,maynotresultinthatpersonbeingconsidered(byothersorby themselves)asamemberoftheoppositesex.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatthepersonhasnotundergonea sexaffirmationprocedure.Thepersoncouldstillapplyunders32DA(1)forregistrationoftheperson'ssexinthe Register.Thesextoberegisteredastheperson'ssexcouldbethesexwhichthepurposeofthesurgicalprocedure wastoassistthepersontobeconsideredtobeamemberof,orthesexwhichthepurposeofthesurgicalprocedure wastoassistthepersontobeconsiderednolongeramemberof,notwithstandingitwasunsuccessfulinachieving eitherofthesepurposes. 297 Similarly,asurgicalprocedure,althoughcarriedouttocorrectoreliminateambiguitiesrelatingtothesexofthe person,maynotachievethatresult.Ambiguitiesrelatingtothesexofthepersonmayremainafterthesurgical

procedurehasbeencarriedout.Thisdoesnotmeanthatthepersonhasnotundergoneasexaffirmationprocedure withinthedefinitionins32Aonthecontrary,thepersonhasundergonesuchaprocedure.Thepersoncanstillapply unders32DA(1)fortheregistrationoftheperson'ssexintheRegister,notwithstandingthefailureofthesurgical proceduretocorrectoreliminatetheambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson.Again,thesexwhichthepersoncan applyunders32DA(1)tohaveregisteredastheperson'ssexintheRegisterisnotdependentonthesuccessofthe surgicalprocedure. 298 Thirdly,thetextandcontextoftheword"sex"inthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure"donotlimitthesex affirmationproceduretoonlythemaleorfemalesexes.Itistruethatthelanguageinpara(a)of"assistingapersonto beconsideredtobeamemberoftheoppositesex"suggestsabinaryclassificationofmaleandfemale.Thelanguage of"oppositesex"isonlymeaningfulifthesexesreferredtoaremaleorfemale. 299 However,thelanguageinpara(b)isnotsorestricted,referringto"ambiguitiesrelatingtothesexoftheperson".The words"sexoftheperson"donotpresupposeanypreexistingcategoryofsexorthatthesexcanonlybemaleor female.Further,theword"sex"isnotlimitedbyanyadjective,includingonesuchas"opposite",whichimpliesabinary classificationofsex.Theword"ambiguities"isofwidemeaning.Theconceptof"ambiguous"involves"2.ofdoubtfulor uncertainnaturedifficulttocomprehend,distinguish,orclassify"and"3.lackingclearnessordefinitenessobscure indistinct",MacquarieDictionary,4thed(2005).Theambiguitiesrelatingtothesexofthepersonmaymeanitisnot possibletoclassifythepersonasmaleorfemale.Finally,theconnectingphrase"relatingto"isofwideoperation: OceanicLifeLtdvChiefCommissionerofStampDuties[1999]NSWCA416(1999)168ALR211at[56].Itdoesnot specifyorconfinethenatureoftherelationshipbetween"ambiguities"and"thesexoftheperson". 300 Together,thesewordsandtheconnectingphraseinpara(b)createanexpressionofwidemeaning.Individuallyor together,theydonotlimitthesexofthepersontoonlybeingmaleorfemale,eitherbeforeorafterthesurgical procedureiscarriedout. 301 TheexamplegivenbytheAppealPanelinitsjudgment,andadoptedbytheRegistrarinsubmissions,ofsurgeryona personwhoisnotunambiguouslymaleorfemale(sometimesreferredtoasandrogynousorintersex)andwhowishes tocorrectoreliminatethatambiguitybybeingconsideredtobeeithermaleorfemale,maybeoneexamplethatfalls withinpara(b)ofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmationprocedure".However,itdoesnotexhaustthefieldofsurgical proceduresthatcouldfallwithinpara(b). 302 Thedifferenceinlanguage,bothtextandcontext,betweenpara(b)andpara(a)ofthedefinitionof"sexaffirmation procedure"makesinapplicablethetenetofstatutoryconstructionrelieduponbytheRegistrar,thatwherethe legislatureusesthesameword"sex"inthestatutoryprovision,itshouldbegiventhesamemeaning. 303 Part5AoftheRegistrationAct,therefore,doesnotlimittheconceptofaperson'ssexthatcanberegisteredtoonly maleorfemale. 304 TheconsequenceisthattheAppealPanel(andtheTribunalandtheRegistrar)wereinerrorinconstruingthepowerin s32DC(1)aslimitingtheRegistrartoregisteringaperson'schangeofsexasonlymaleorfemale.Anerrorinthe constructionofthestatutoryprovisiongrantingthepowertoregisteraperson'schangeofsexisanerroronaquestion oflaw:CollectorofCustomsvPozzolanicEnterprisesPtyLtd[1993]FCA322(1993)43FCR280at287.Thisisso notwithstandingthatthedeterminationofthecommonunderstandingofageneralwordusedinthestatutoryprovision isaquestionoffact.TheAppealPanel(andtheTribunalandtheRegistrar)erredindeterminingthatthecurrent ordinarymeaningoftheword"sex"islimitedtothecharacterofbeingeithermaleorfemale.Thatinvolvedanerroron aquestionoffact.ButtheAppealPanel'serrorinarrivingatthecommonunderstandingoftheword"sex"was associatedwithitserrorinconstructionoftheeffectofthestatutoryprovisionofs32DC(andalsoofs32DA),and accordinglyisoflaw:HopevBathurstCityCouncil[1980]HCA16(1980)144CLR1at10. 305 Theerroris,therefore,onewhichfoundsappellateinterventioninanappealonquestionsoflaw. 306 IagreethemattershouldberemittedtotheTribunalfordeterminationofNorrie'sapplication.Thiswillinvolvemaking factualfindingsontheappropriateclassificationofNorrie'ssextoberegisteredunders32DCoftheRegistrationAct. **********

Amendments
04Jun2013 Typographicalerror Paragraphs:282

DISCLAIMEREveryefforthasbeenmadetocomplywithsuppressionordersorstatutoryprovisionsprohibitingpublicationthatmayapplytothis judgmentordecision.Theonusremainsonanypersonusingmaterialinthejudgmentordecisiontoensurethattheintendeduseofthatmaterial doesnotbreachanysuchorderorprovision.FurtherenquiriesmaybedirectedtotheRegistryoftheCourtorTribunalinwhichitwasgenerated.