Hunt and Hunt Et Al., Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization

Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization [and Comments and Reply] Author(s): Robert C.
Hunt, Eva Hunt, G. Munir Ahmed, John W. Bennett, Richard K. Cleek, P. E. B. Coy, Thomas F. Glick, Russell E. Lewis, Bruce B. MacLachlan, William P. Mitchell, William L. Partridge, Barbara J. Price, Wolf Roder, Axel Steensberg, Robert Wade and Imre Wellmann Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 389-411 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2741351 . Accessed: 16/05/2013 00:11
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CUJRRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
Research forAnthropological Foundation 1976by The Wenner-Gren
Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1976
Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization'

C. HuntandEva Hunt by Robert
(e.g., land tenure,trade,producResourcecontrolsystems aboutsocioeconomlargein mostmacrotheories tion)loomvery irrigation has been For a fewscholarsin social anthropology, three There would seem to be, historically, ic organization. 1957 of great theoretical importance(see especiallyWittfogel plantfoodproducwaysofintensifying major (and cumulative) and Steward1955; cf.Leach 1961, Childe 1954, Wolfand Paand indusagriculture, ofplants,irrigated tion: domestication lerm1955,and Sandersand Price 1968). Most anthropologists, trializedfarming. It is widely assumed that the yields from however, have ignoredit, evenwhen it was a major technique it. Irriare farhigherthanwithout withirrigation agriculture it only ofcultivation in the society theystudied,or mentioned richaddiwould thusseemto be an unusually gatedagriculture briefly in passing (Beteille 1965). We believe that irrigated tion to man's repertoire and for exploitinghis environment is a veryunusualsocial resource, thatit almostceragriculture ofunusualsocial power.The intensifia resource consequently relationships to otherfeatures of social tainlyhas systematic undersomecircumhas been proposed, cationdue to irrigation need to be pursued and that theserelationships organization, includingthe urban stances,to have had enormouseffects, 111nQX7.fi.-tnnfif- XAwnX worth states.It is therefore and theoriginofpristine revolution are and whetherit has its what characteristics determining 1 We wishto acknowledgethesupportreceivedfrom theNational corollaries. any systematic Science Foundation; NSF Grant GS-87, to Eva and Robert Hunt, the concerning ofgeneralpropositions number Of thelimited enabled us to gather data on the San Juan case, and NSF Grant some focuspriand social structure, of irrigation relationship and otherson marilyon the surplusgeneratedby irrigation labor inputsand theircontrol.Both sets hold that thereare ROBERT C. HUNT is Associate Professorof Anthro ology at functional,and even causal, relationshipsbetween irrigaBrandeis University(Waltham, Mass. 02154, U.S.A.). Born in no discusThere has been virtually tionand politicalstructure. 1934, he was educated at Hamilton College (B.A., 1956), the Universityof Chicago (M.A., 1959), and Northwestern Unisurplussince Childe. Discussion sion of the role of irrigation's versity (Ph.D., 1965). He has taughtat Northwestern University has focusedinstead on the controlof labor input,which is (1964-66) and at the University of Illinois Chicago Circle (1957; hypothesis Oriental-despotism in Wittfogel's prominent (1966-69). His research interests are comparative method and cf. Bennett1974:44-47). We shall focuson the labor-control irrigation and social organization. His publications include Personalities in Cultures: Readings inPsychological Anthropology (New aspecthere.2 York: Natural HistoryPress, 1967); "Components of Relationhas fourmain elements:(a) a particular theory Wittfogel's ships in the Family: A Mexican Village," in Kinship and Culture, resource land, large water source,potentialfor of (arid form edited by F. L. K. Hsu (Chicago: Aldine, 1971); "Social Anregimes, preindustrial works);(b) for agriculture irrigated large onLatinAmerithropology,"in Quantitative Social Science Research of centrally ca, edited by R. S. Byars andJ. L. Love (Urbana: University foritsexploitation (massive, imperative a sociological Illinois Press, 1973); and "Irrigation, Conflict, and Politics: organized and controlledlabor demands); and, as a conseINTRODUCTION
A Mexican Case," in Irrigation's Impact on Society, edited by Theodore E. Downing and McGuire Gibson (Tucson: Universityof Arizona Press, 1974). EVA HUNT is Associate Professor ofAnthropology at BostonUniversity(Boston, Mass. 02215, U.S.A.). Born in 1934, she was educated at the Universityof Chicago (M.A., 1959; Ph.D., 1962). She has taught at Northwestern University(1962) and at the University of Chicago (1966-69). Her researchinterests are social anthropology, Mesoamerica, ethnohistory,social structure,and symbolism.Among her publications are "The Meaning of Kinship in San Juan: Genealogical and Social Models" (Ethnology 8:37-53); "Irrigation and the Socio-political Organization of the Cuicatec Cacicazgos,"in The Prehistory of the TehuacanValley,vol. 4, Chronology and Irrigation, edited by R. S. MacNeish and F. Johnson (Austin: Universityof Texas Press, 1972); and The Transformation of theHummingbird: The Cultural Rootsof a Zinacantan Poem(Ithaca: Cornell UniMythic versityPress, in press). The presentpaper, submittedin final form8 I 76, was sent for comment to 50 scholars. The responsesare printed below and are followedby a replyby the authors. GS-3000, to Eva Hunt, is supportingthe gatheringand analysis of materialson Tehuacan in the colonial period. The materials on contemporaryTehuacan come in part from the work of our graduate studentsin the summerof 1970, most of which is not yetpublished.The workofKjell Enge (cf.Enge 1973), Paula Sabloff,and Gordon Drever was most helpfulin providing new ethnographicinformation. We have received commentson previous versionsof this paper from Robert McC. Adams, George Appell, George Cowgill, Thomas Glick, William Kelly, Barbara Price, Jerry and Paula Sabloff,Steve Sellers,and Sergio Sismondo. We trustthat we have not been capricious in our responsesto the large amount of good advice we have received. This is a greatlyexpanded versionof a paper entitled"Irrigation and Local Social Structure"whichwe presentedat the 1973 annual meetingof the American AnthropologicalAssociation. 2 The surplus argument is at least as interesting, especially for local social organization,and we plan to investigateit in another
naner.
Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
389
(managerial) kindofstatesystem quence ofthis,(c) a particular There distribution of power (despotism). with (d) a particular to the theory:one concernsthe role of are two main thrusts of the state,and the otheris a synirrigation in the evolution chronicfunctional(systemic)model of how certainkinds of There has been a large amountofdiscusstatesare structured. of these(cf.Adams 1966, Price 1971, Mitchell sion of the first littleofthesecond (cf.Mil1974), but relatively 1973,Bennett China (cf. Eberhard1965). lon 1962) exceptforits type-case, We shall concentrate on thisseconddimension. in whichwe wishto movehere is one thatis a The direction in a diachronicframeand testing of hypothesis precondition analysis of the system'sparameters involvesthe synchronic within (Godelier 1970). Canvassinga portionof the literature framemay sharpensome distinctions and suggest a synchronic resome hypotheses. We intendto exploresome sociocultural at thelocal level,payingspecial to irrigated agriculture sponses to (1) the local organization of the taskspursuantto attention irrigation, (2) the linkagesbetweenthe local level and higher betweenrolesin and (3) the relationship levelsof the system, the irrigation and otherrolesin the local social organisystem along the zation. We will be able to suggest a fewhypotheses withina sample of to covariation way, some of themreferring as a special pheand some to irrigation irrigated communities The lattercan onlybe tested witha different sample nomenon. as a control group. thatincludes communities without irrigation sample; None of thehypotheses can be testedwiththepresent and the hypotheses, it is too small,it has been used to suggest it cannotbe adequatelymeasured.3 are concerned generalpropositions Furthermore, Wittfogel's Water withwatercontrolin its relationship to whole societies. meansnot onlyirrigated but also, and percontrol agriculture, forthe generalhypothesis, floodcontrol haps moreimportant and canals as a meansofcommunication and drainagesystems As Price (1971) has pointed out, the larger and transport. is complexand comproblemof land and watermanagement in sothe literature Despite this, posed of multiplesubsystems. which has been consideredrelevantto his cial anthropology is almostexclusively based on detailedcase studies propositions which depend upon of small localities,usually communities, canal irrigation fora significant part of theirproduction(cf. Millon 1962). These case studiescover less than the total soand contemporary (cf.Kaplan cietyand tendto be synchronic of the problemin and Manners [1972:97-98] fora discussion there ofWittfogel's terms and Sahlins'swork).In consequence, and the case is a logical gap betweenthe generalhypotheses in shifts studieswhich purportto testthem.Three significant to comwhole societies have been made: from level of analysis and agriculture, from watercontrol to local irrigated munities, from a diachronicto a synchronic frame. A numberof anthropological fieldstudieshave takenplace in localitieswith irrigated agriculture. Almostnone of these, so mostare Oriental-despotism conditions, represents however, to Wittfogel's thesis. irrelevant Wittfogel, forexample,has conmaintained thattheclassic"hydraulicsociety"occurs sistently in an "arid" environment. As Conklin (1973) has remarked, ofhis thesis critics to this.Another variable rarely pay attention is "scale," whichmaybe takento mean thescale ofthephysical the works withwatercontrol, thepopulationserved, associated the lengthof canals, and so on. Measureacreage irrigated, mentofthesein theavailable studies is generally no better than
3 Ultimately,we would like to ask whetherthereare sociological or sociocultural formsof organization which are specific to irrigated agriculture as a resource. This is inherent in Wittfogel's work and in Marx's theoriesof the Asiatic society (cf. Wittfogel 1957). The researchdesign forthisdemands a comparisonof various systems, some with irrigatedagricultureand some without. It is uncertain if such a job of researchcould be done with the published literature.Our guess is that it could not, at least not without some additional archival work. 390
an intuitive ordinalscale. Leach (1961) givesa pictureof the old canal system leadingfrom one ofthetanksin Pul Eliya, and we presented as much information on the San Juan physical system as we had, including measures of atmospheric moisture conditions, scale of canals and irrigatedlands, and at least some folkviews of amountsof silting, etc. (Hunt and Hunt 1974). Geertz(1973) givesa generalaccountofclimaticconditionsand describes the generallayoutof the canal system, but gives no physical measures (size, amount of water, length, technicaldevices). All of the phenomenaof interest can be measuredphysically with currenttechnology, and most such measurements are withinthe competenceof the fieldworker withlittletraining. Until such data are generally available, a testofWittfogel's hypothesis from anthropological fieldstudies is out of the question. We shall focuson canal irrigation alone because thereis as yetno evidencein the literature ofcommunity-level floodcontrol or canals as means of transportation. In any case, canal irrigation is a significant aspect of local production and social organization and is worth in itsown right. understanding There is at least one good reason forconcentrating on the local level of integration: thereare major difficulties withconcept formation and measurement in the moregeneralpropositions.Such concepts as centralization, watercontrol despotism, other kindsofsocialpower,etc.,are all extremely creating difficult to workwith in an empiricalcase study (see Hunt and Hunt 1974). These conceptualand measurement problems can best be dealt withby establishing feedbackloops betweendetailed case studiesand generalizing comparativeefforts. The can mostefficiently case studies be conducted on smalllocalized wheretheanalyst has somereasonto be optimistic populations, about being able to controlthe values of parameters in suffiwe follow cientdetail. (In thisregard, Goodenough1970.) In addition,general propositions all contain, at the very least,implications forlocal structure. Although centralization, and agromanagerial refer despotism, stratification, bureaucracy ofthesociety, to phenomenaat thecenter theyshouldmanifest in someway at the mostlocal level,sincetheyrefer themselves to linkagesbetweenvertically arrangedunitsin a societyand of power withinthese linkages. especiallyto the distribution of thesephenomenatend to be disMost generaldiscussions will be abstract.A highlydesirablestep, therefore, tressingly to measurethesephenomenaat the local level. will largelybe based on a fewhigh-quality Our discussion on local irrigation svstems:Gray (1963) on the monographs Sonjo of Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Leach (1961) on Pul Eliya, Ceylon,Fernea (1970) on the El Shabana ofIraq, Glick on a re(1970) on medievalValencia, and our own materials gion of rural Mexico (E. Hunt 1972, Hunt and Hunt 1974). to workdone in Bali (Geertz 1959, 1973) and We also refer Japan (Eyre 1951, Beardsley,Hall, and Ward 1959). The ofthepolitical at the extremes sampleis thusheavilyweighted scale, therebeing large statesat one end and a small tribeat We also have used otherstudieswhich, although the other.4 on all variables,exemplify they do not contain information special problems(e.g., Bacdayan 1974). LOCAL ORGANIZATION OF TASKS
has several taskspeEvery societywith irrigated agriculture must to accomplish.The physicalsystem culiar to irrigation and maintained. Relationshipsamong those be constructed allocaothertasks, who would use thewaterpresent including and organization tionof waterto theusers,conflict resolution,
sample attemptedto utilize a largercross-cultural 4We originally the data and based on the "Ethnographic Atlas." Unfortunately, to discriminatewith precision in coding are simply not sufficient termsof our needs.
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
of ritual.The social organization of thesetasksis our interest here. betweenfreIn our Mexican case study,we distinguished or infrequent ones. quent or daily decisionsand intermittent The construction of a physicalsystem, forexample,is a rare event;the allocationofwaterto usersis veryfrequent (dailyor eventsinclude allocation,mainhourly).In general,frequent of internal intenance,and, in some cases, resolution conflict; ones includeconstruction, frequent repair,and, in some cases, of major internalas well as externalconflict. We resolution in the context of the Mexican case thatthe different suggested levels of social structure (household,village, municipio,district,state) are differentially responsiblefor these different kindsoftasks.In general,thereis a strong association between infrequent decisions and higher levelsand between frequent decisionsand lowerlevels. The social system(s)is(are) a collectivity of (collectivities) in one way or anotherconnectedwith roles and institutions the physicalsystem(s).A major stimulusfor the distinction is that physicalsystems betweensocial and physicalsystems in size. A difference between statesthat is crucial for differ political organizationabove the local level is the presence whichcut acrosslocal community or absenceofphysical systems boundaries. All societies withirrigation thatwe have so farstudiedhave locus which is primarily an institutional for the responsible maintenance, repair,allocation,and minor-dispute resolution functions (cf. Beardsley1963; Glick 1970:31). This organization is based upon a clearlybounded physicalirrigation sysor a tank.Its personnel tem,such as a feeder canal, a stream, is headed by somenamed,speciallydesignated role or role set. (These roles may be embedded in otherroles-village headand so on.) A body of norms, officials, man. local community law regulatesthe decisionsand behaviors rules,or customary role holdersand water users.The local of both management unitis smallin relationto the whole society;althoughin some it is thesmallest cases largerthana community, unitconcerned and is capable ofmanaging withcollective watermanagement It usuallyhas no morethan a affairs. mostof its own internal is always connectedto few hundredmembers.Recruitment or both. This local group cannot rewaterrights, land rights, solvedisputes withequivalentgroupsexceptby mediatednegoor violence.If it takeswaterfrom a larger tiation, submission, it has littleto do with the decisionsmade at artificial system, the level of the largersystem. unitto politically The relationship ofthislocal irrigation definedterritorial units (such as villages,cantons,municipios, variable. On occasionthey districts, prefectures, etc.) is highly may exactlycoincide (e.g., Sonjo), but wherelargerstatesystems exist territorial and irrigation units oftencrosscutone another. The irrigation in theTehuacYan associations Valley in Mexico cut across municipios.In San Juan, theyare smaller thanthemunicipio, locatedat thevillageand hamletlevel.Both of a singlewater areas, however,are under the management districtwhich cuts across three states. Irrigationunits cut acrossseveralterritorial unitsin Bali (Geertz 1959) and so do in Japan (Eyre 1955) and medievalValenwatercooperatives cia (Glick 1970). There appears to be considerable variationin the degreeto whichpoliticalunitsoccupyhydrological units.When political unitscrosscut ecologicalones,therehas to be some kindof suunitto manage thewatersystem. perordinate This can be one whichdeals specifically withwater,such as the qanat societies in the Tehuacan Valley in Mexico or the cooperativewater societies in Bali. At timestheseunits,at least in the 20thcentury, may occupythe whole of a watershed(e.g., the Tennessee ValleyAuthority and thevariousagenciesaroundtheworld whichmoreor lessreproduce it, such as thePapaloapan Commissionin Mexico). The 12-villagecooperativeis a unit occupying partsofthewatersheds oftworivers in southern Japan. Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION
AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
of the centralpolSome of the specializedbodies are creations It would seem ity,and some are local in originand authority. settlements that manyof the pre-Hispanic (cacicazgos) in parts boundaries, ofhydrological ofMexico wereorganizedin terms prebetweenthemconcerned and indeedsome of the disputes unit attempting to excisely the issue of one basin-political into the basin of anotherunit (cf. E. Hunt pand its influence 1972 foran extendeddiscussion).On occasion,the largerunit polity(or ofsomeinterunitofthecentral maybe a preexisting foroverall mediatelevel) whichis given,or takes,responsibility system. This can be seen in conof the irrigation coordination district is also treated Iraq, wheretheadministrative temporary a decisionwhichseemsarbitrary from district, as an irrigation a hydrological pointofview (Fernea 1970). two alternativeprinciples Glick (1970:230) has identified the allocationof rights to irrigation waterwithina governing treats One, the Syrian,is associatedwithlarge rivers, system. and allocateswater land rights, from as inseparable waterrights schedules The other, maybe staggered. Planting proportionally. oases, theYemenite,is based on small sourcesof supply(often streams,or water tanks), treats very small or impermanent and as capable of water rights as separable fromland rights units.The pribeing sold, and uses fixedtime measurement betweenthe two is clearestwhen thereis a marydifference in theamountofwateravailable. In theSyrireduction serious in allocationofthe reduction an model,thereis a proportional equally. In the Yemenitemodel, suffers water,and everyone have primaryrightsto the some individualsor communities water,and theyare the last to suffer. of all be held independently Water rightscan sometimes can largelyignore in land. In thatevent,the discussion rights such as that land (although there are other complications, maythenbecomedominant).In subsystems politicalclientship in our sample, however,water rightsare most communities and inalienablyconnectedwith land said to be permanently of rules of land and allocation of water is a function rights, allocation. Whilewe think thatthedifferent waterallocationprinciples we doubtthattheycorreimportant, are real and sociologically withsize ofwatersource.It is also debatable late verystrongly is necessarily linked of distribution whetherproportionality or not waterrights withsize ofwatersource,or withwhether are separate fromland rights.For example, both Pul Eliya (Old Tank) and the 12-villagecooperativein Japan have a is based on a model,but theformer's proportional-distribution smallvillage (143 persons)and a verysmalltank(Leach 1961) withover5,300ha. ofirrigated and thelatter's on a largeriver, case, at the fields(Beardsley, Hall, and Ward 1959). In neither This land rights. be separatedfrom can waterrights moment, studiesaccordingto both the allocation coding of community revealsthat forwaterand thesize ofthewatersystem principle betweenthe two. There may thereis littleif any relationship and scara relation betweenallocationprinciples be, however, cycleof a crop (cf. cityofwaterat crucialtimesin the growth Downing1974). ofthetwoprinciples San Juan is in practicea case ofmixture of allocation.San Juan has a moderately large riverand two There are three whichjoin it, both permanent. small streams two of which use all the water communal physicalsystems, the river. and one ofwhichtakeswaterfrom from two streams which take water In addition,thereare privatecanal systems fromthe riveror buy it fromone of the communalsystems. to water,and it is the Mexican law is verydefinite about rights Syrianmodel whichit proposes.In San Juan, if thereis suffiis legal, thendistribution cientwaterin thecommunalsystems, however, accordingto the Syrianmodel. If thereis a shortage, wherethe lands of more the centerof the communalsystem, people are located,getsmorethan its share.This is, powerful 391
in effect, the Yemeniteformof allocation.The privatecanals are clearlyrun accordingto theYemenitemodel. Three different kindsof conceptualmodelsare available to there is a local folk model,which thesocialanthropologist. First, Levi-Strauss(1953) calls the homemade model. This model to by the analyst has been the one mostlikelyto be resorted of the irrigation This has had system. for an understanding exists, thereis likelyto harmful results. If a largersocial entity irribe a folkmodel,often phrasedas a legal code, explaining gationat thatlevel as well. In the Mexican case, each of these a normative one (e.g., a levelshas two separate components, "oughtto work") and a descripnativeviewofhow thesystem "reallyworks"). tiveone (e.g., a nativeviewofhow thesystem theprimary purposeof these As Levi-Strauss argues,however, to permitcontinuity folkmodels is to manage the system, of the statusquo, not to explain it. Considerableignoranceor of ethnographic realitymay be built into misinterpretation thesemodels,as Netting(1974a) has shown.Our job as anamodel which will explain not lystsis to construct a scientific system works,but also the folk only the way the irrigation models-how theyrelateto the social reality.We agree with is an integral processing part Flannery(1972) thatinformation of any ecologicalstudy,but we would add that in many irrinot only is water unevenlyallocated, but ingation systems, formation of how the system crucial for an understanding reallyworksis unevenly controlled. The folk theallocation prinmodelsofSan Juando notassign them systems, but consider ciplesjust described to twodifferent to be good and bad variantsof the same system. The average simplyas a faulty water user perceivesthe Yemenitesystem oftheSyrianone. Fromthenationallegal pointofview, version thisversionis corrupt and punishableby law. From the point of view of thosefavoredby the system, however, it is the only Thus analysis canrationalway ofcopingwithwatershortage. serious distortion.5 not be based purelyon folkmodelswithout of A majorfeature systems is the possibility ofwatercontrol a shortage is not a fixedconor excessofwater.Waterscarcity relationship between anyplace, butrather a particular dition,of supplyand demand forwater at a givenpoint in time.If demand is greater It is widely thansupply, thenthereis scarcity. thataridand semiarid environments are automaticalpresumed but thisis not always the case. ly characterized by shortages, For example,San Juan in thelate Post-Classic and mostofthe colonialperiod (whenpopulationwas greatly reducedbecause ofother ofwaterfor factors such as epidemics)had no shortage Valtraditional agriculture (E. Hunt 1972). In the Tehuacfan ley, which is also arid, however,early in the colonial period, watershortages and conflict developedbetweenvillagesplanting traditional crops and haciendas plantingsugar as a cash crop,because haciendastookmorethan their"legal" shareof communalwaters.This croppingpatternintroduced scarcity traditional because ofthehighwaterdemandsofsugarvis-a-vis for information crops(e.g., corn,beans). Wheremeteorological 30 or moreyearsis available, it becomesclear thatmostagriculturalsystems variationin are subject to veryconsiderable the amountof environmental moisture available. First,there are droughts, floods, and moreor lessnormalyearsin between.
5 The abilityto understandthe workings of a local systemof irrigated agricultureis totally dependent upon detailed information of high quality and degree of completeness.Such basic questions as how a person acquires rightsto land and water are oftenvery hard to answerfromthe ethnographicrecord.Beardsley,Hall, and Ward are among the few who specify,and they say that water is absolutelya function of access to land but do not demonstrate how they know this. Furthermore,as we have pointed out, there is a danger in takingthe folkmodel as a model of actual behavior. The onlyway to know what distribution practicesare is to studya goodly number of actual cases. There are precious few of these cases reported in the literature,and yet statementsabout distribution abound.
degradation (e.g., Second, there are cases of environmental Valley). steadylowering of thewatertable in theTehuacfan Social systems can, to a point,increasethe supplyofwater. societies(China, This has happened slowlyin manydifferent Japan, medieval Valencia, Pul Eliya, San Juan). In modern times,it sometimes happens very rapidly (Lees 1973). One technology to expand supply,and strategy is to utilizepresent is to searchfornew technology. another Bothoftheseare representedin mostof the studieswe have consulted.Still another is to locate a new source. Bacdayan (1974) has destrategy scribedsuch a solution.In thiscase, individualsslowlyadded to thesystem terraces until,at somepoint,thefactthatdemand The first was significantly than supplywas recognized. greater of mismanagepublic responsewas to accuse the authorities was the decided thatdeforestation ment.Next the community cause of the "drop" in supply,tightened up rulesforexploitfora new source.They were able ing, and searchedthe forest to tap one, and now supplyis back up above demand. a society Another may use in balancingsupplyand strategy is a well-balanced on demand.If there demandis to place limits the major means of limiting system, traditionalagricultural demand is to resistnew uses (new canals, new terraces, new fields,new crops, etc.). Glick (1970) shows how and why in medievalValencia fought new construction. Since irrigators Valencia used a proportional-allocation principle,everyone If thedemandexpanded suffered equallyin thecase ofdrought. so as to exhaustthewaterin a normalyear,it would be insufficientwhenthesupplywas less,so therewas greatresistance to the expansionof the cultivatedarea withouta corresponding increasein totalsupply. to a shortageof water may be individual Other responses emigration(e.g., Iraq, Mexico) or a shiftin the allocation towards watermonopolization such thatsomesocial principles is morethan others. This latterresponse mustsuffer segments at leastforone of our cases (colonial Tehuacan). documented If land is in shortsupply,croppingcan be intensified to the point of involution, providingthe water supply is adequate (Geertz 1963). is chosen is a The conditions underwhicheach alternative It is likelythataccessibility to outofresearch. subjectworthy of side markets(labor as well as commodity) and the system in the largersocial syssocial (e.g., class, ethnic)stratification such choices. temwill affect LINKAGES beabout the relationships Wittfogel's general propositions are concerned tweenirrigation and social organization primaribetweena politicalcenterand thesubly withtherelationship or absenceofa centralized, The presence ordinate local systems. has been specializedbureaucracywhich deals with irrigation Most social anthropologists a prominent part ofthediscussion. have concluded who have triedto respondto thishypothesis concomiis not a constant, or a necessary, that centralization tantofirrigation (e.g., Gray 1963,Fernea 1970). The original is a complexstructure ofvariablesdesignedto apply hypothesis A moreusefulmodel would in its entirety to a fewsituations. and withsourcesof power,the organization be one concerned betweenlevelsoforganizause ofpower,and the relationships tion in a social system. Buildingsuch a model is beyondthe scope of thisarticle.What we shall do insteadis considerthe on two comparativestudiesto date which have concentrated on and then presentsome findings the issue of centralization ofrolesin the the linkages betweenlocal and nonlocalsystems contextof irrigation. Kappel (1974) has arguedthatas populationsize and density increase, so do politicalcentralization and thesize oftheirrigahe extion system. Using Murdock's Outline of World Cultures,
392
whilethe acreage oftheJapanese the minimalone. Moreover, there is no stable case is clearlygiven in the ethnography, In somecases, thewholeofthecooperative. for figure population forpopulationand acreagewhich Millonuses the figures then, upon a givenhead work.In othercases,he uses are dependent to do with has nothing as faras can be determined, a unitwhich, he choosesunitswhichare not all deIn stillothers, irrigation. pendentupon a head workin the same senseas the others.It that his measure of size of the is our conclusion,therefore, is not stable enough to warrant even the system irrigation table he presents. variable is not clearly Millon's centralization Furthermore, defined.In one "centralized"case, the Sonjo, the top officers of the village deal with allocation; in the other two, the El Shabana and Teotihuacan (bothpartsofstates),national-level make allocationdecisions.In the "decentralized" bureaucrats cases, Bali, Pul Eliya, and Japan (also partsof states),allocaand there are officers, tion is not handled by national-level rulesfor traditionalized" what Millon (p. 80) calls "strongly the allocationofwater.It is not at all clear what he meansby rules but apparentlyit is that customary traditionalization, by some ofwatercannotbe contravened about thedistribution The linkagehereof"decentralized"and "traditionauthority. whichhave been seems not veryuseful.In all systems alized" The studiesof relativelysmall irrigation that systems. . . illustrate rules is no necessary ofirrigation in operationforany lengthof time,thereare customary between thepractice there relationship of to be used, regardless to waterand procedures about rights to the and thatsocialresponses as suchand centralized authority, may structure are as variedas the social and the amount of controla centralizedauthority practiceof irrigation agriculture ecological settingsof the people who practice irrigation.... One have. There is evidenceforthisin Millon's account of Teoticonclusion by the evidenceexaminedhere is strongly suggested to waterbased on huacan, whereone villagehad special rights of authority to the thatcentralization is an exceptional response He also states (p. documentary proofof pre-haciendarights. ofirrigation problems agriculture. 79) thaton thevillagelevel "waterwas allocatedto individuals agreements." Millox's point is that Millon's conclusions have been mentioned more or less favor- on the basis of traditional the allocationrulesforthe basin as a whole have not been inably by Lees (1973) and have been accepted by Wolf (1966), but withincorporateunitstheyhave been so stitutionalized, Price (1971), and Mitchell(1973). His workis therefore worth has become involved fora long time.The federalgovernment in somedetail. examining levels and latelyin the villagesthemselves. in the intervillage First,the narrowscope of Millon's paper mustbe emphafeel that the addition of "traditionalized"does We therefore sized. Millon is interested onlyin the allocationofwater,not in to the analysis. not contribute it should be noted,was interested othertasks. (Wittfogel, as seems to be of centralization Millon's (implied) definition much in construction and maintenanceas in allocation.) Of ofthehighest are handledby an office thatallocationdecisions thefivetasksor functions thatwe have concentrated on, Millon If thisis accepted, in thesociety. thatexists levelofgovernment for him to do so, choosesonlyone. It is perfectly legitimate in thecases oftheSonjo, Teotibut thereadermustbe careful notto generalizetoo muchfrom we agreewithMillon's findings huacan, and the El Shabana. We also agree withhis findings in R. Hunt 1973). so narrowly defineda study(cf. discussion as we shall demto allocationinJapan (although, in most discussionsis closely withrespect Secondly,while centralization in anotherpaper, thisdoes not hold forothertasksin onstrate connectedwith the idea of despotismand total controlof a of the that case). We are unable to evaluate his assessment in thiscase centralization is concerned only withallocasociety, tion.There is no strong a priorireasonto suspectthatcentral- Nahid, because the data have not yet been published.That leaves two cases,Pul Eliya and Bali, and herewe disagree. to ization of allocationwould have anysystematic relationship decentralized Millon concludes that Pul Eliya is strongly In thelongrun, ofotherfunctions in thesociety. centralization broad comparative studieswill be able to examinethismatter with respectto water allocation.Netting(1974b) also argues in Pul Eliya. controlof irrigation we mustconfine our inter- that thereis no centralized however, closely.For the moment, tvidence to demonLeach's book (1961) containssufficient ofMillon's studyto the rangeofhis assumptions. pretation is embedded in a system A majordifficulty withMillon'sstudy is thatsizeoftheirriga- strate,however,that the irrigation statepoliticalsystem. is inconsistently arranged,unified hierarchically tion system measured.For some of the cases fromtwo reservoirs, village and temple. from in thesample,it is easy enoughto takea measuredirectly Pul Eliya irrigates the ethnography Only the village tank is large and in good repair.Its wateris (e.g., Japan, Pul Eliya), but forat least two Millon's measures channelledto fields by canals. One or two tanksappear to be others wide ofthemark. are almostcertainly of north-central CeyIn thecase oftheEl Shabana, he givesthe apparentarea comtypicalof some villagesin the provinces lon, but manyvillagesin the area sharetankswhichare under mandedby the tribein 1918 rather than the area commanded All tanks ofthenationalcentralgovernment. either thearea thedirectcontrol at thetimeofthefieldwork, or,moreimportant, from are said to belongto the Crown,and thisis howvillagecorvee servedby the local irrigation district or the area irrigated he the Daghara main canal. In the case of Bali, the figures labor to repairthe tank,called "Crown's work,"is legallyenforced(pp. 17, 43, 45, 46). unique small princelystate, and in gives are fora virtually underthe The tankofPul Eliya was builtin the 11thcentury the articlein which thisunit is discussedGeertzdoes not say whichLeach (p. 16) ofa classicalSinhalesekingdom betweenit and any irrigation authority anything about the relationship and characteristic society. In fact,we have so farbeen unable to findany popuexample of what describesas a "striking lationfigures forirrigation societiesat any level higherthan " Beforethearrival civilization.' has called 'hydraulic Wittfogel 1976 Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 393
evidence on amines 17 societiesforwhich he findssufficient of population,size of irrigation and facilities, size and density of decisionmaking.None of the cases degreeof centralization As he points ofirrigation. in his sampleis a classicalfieldstudy in the measurement of his variables. out, thereare difficulties is with politicalcentralization. difficulty The mostimportant He states(p. 370) thathe wishesto measure"decision-making to but his data seemto refer groupswhichmanage irrigation," of the politicalunit. It cannot levelsof integration the highest level of sovereignty be assumedthatthe highest automatically Until the relais also the highest level of controlof irrigation. betweentheselevelshas been analyzed,hisconclusions tionship are doubtful. The major attempt at a comparative empiricalinvestigation is bv of the relationship betweenirrigation and centralization Millon (1962). He uses materialsfromseven case studiesto betweensize of the irrigation sysinvestigate the relationship tem (definedin termsof both acreage and population) and of authority centralization over the allocation of water. He finds thatforPul Eliya,Bali,Japan,and theNahid (in Arabia), allocationis strongly or partlydecentralized, while forTeotihuacan, the Sonjo, and the El Shabana allocationis centralized. He goeson to conclude(p. 80) that"centralized authority and the practice of irrigationare not necessarilyrelated." he states(pp. 86-87): Further,
Pul Eliya was part of the lowestlevel of a large of the British, froma capital outwas controlled This system feudalsystem. side Pul Eliya and had more than threelevels,with named who dealt withwater issuesabove the village. "The officials, Colonial Periodwere a of the British categories administrative
systemization of the .
.
landby aristocratic At thevillagelevel,land was controlled feudal lord and grantholders,who were tenantsof a district managed the servicesof the villagers,collected taxes, enterand maintained the irrigation officials, tained government tank in good workingorder. Such obligationscontinuedfor afterthe abolitionof quite a while under the Britishsystem, had (pp. 153-54). In exchange,the local aristocracy feudalism in ritualand in theuse ofbothland and water clearprerogatives tenuresystem(pp. 155, old-field accordingto the traditional in partfrozethelocal politi166, 103-4, 124, 153). The British (e.g., p. 156), but at thesame time cal and economicstructures connectedwithland and the control theycreatednew offices fromthe point of Of thesethe mostimportant, of irrigation. headman. The view of Pul Eliya, was the village irrigation " (p. 154). Miloffice headmaniswhat Leach calls a "dictatorial is effectively that the Pul Eliya system lon believes,however, and that"no singleindividualor group of indidecentralized over its operation" (Millon viduals exerciseanyreal authority 1962:64, emphasisours). ofbothheadman and cenon the authority Leach is explicit he tellsus, untilabout 1838, In theold system, tralgovernment. was in the hands of ... the Ratemaauthority "all effective hatmaya" (thehead ofthetop regionalunit).Now all effective at the village level is in the hands of the irrigation authority A person headman; below him are theheads ofkingroupings. holds the headman'sjob forlife,and until 1926 he had to be He ratifies land titles.He has the exclusiveprean aristocrat. rogativeof operatingthe village tank's sluice. He keeps the is to see responsibility village land and tax records."His first of the fairdistribution regarding regulations thatgovernment is mainlyeconomadheredto." His "authority waterare fully wide and autocratic ic," but "he can, ifhe so chooses,exercise disputes,includingthose over water. Bepowers." He settles he has accumuforwaterdistribution, sides being responsible lated great economic and political power by manipulating customto his advantage. orthodox Indeed, the headman managed,in the 1940s,to change the by Leach of rights to water,a factnoticedneither distribution had apparently norbyMillon. Priorto thelate 1930s,irrigation to a small area knownas the Old Field. There been confined was normally enoughwaterto cultivatethisplot twicea year. camofa central-government In the 1940s,underthestimulus in paign to increaserice production(due to supplydifficulties World War II), the headman and his associatesbroughta stillusingthesame large amountofnew land underirrigation, in one old sourceofsupply.The new land was thencultivated the new season,the Old Field in the other.As a consequence, relands have takenhalf the water away fromits traditional in theOld Field. cipients-all thosewho have rights Moreover,althoughPul Eliya is todayfarfrombeing part holdersexist ofa feudalarrangement, and thelocal land-grant and land the marriagesystem, in name only,the caste system, titlesin only a and water distribution have kept aristocratic fewfamilies, who happen to be the wealthyof the community power offices and who, not by accident,hold the traditional (pp. 20, 28, 47, 64, 160, 198, 154, 204, 227, 232). in factor is the mostsignificant Thus, in Pul Eliya irrigation in theformaofkinship, social organization, in therecognition ofpoliticalpower, tionofmarriage alliances,in thedistribution as well and in relationships withtheoutsideworld.Historically pureis not a local invention, thePul Eliya system as at present, the from from impingement nor is it free ly locallymaintained, 6 In another work now in preparation, we are exploring these of largersocial and politicalworld. The centralgovernment with a larger sample than we have relationshipssystematically thevillages (p. 32), forces offamine aid in times Ceylonprovides been able to use here. 394
. feudal system" (p. 28).
in irrigaassistance to keep records(pp. 28, 47), givesfinancial the typesof land tenurepossibleand tion (p. 46), legitimizes mawaterallocation(p. 20 et passim),and subsidizes therefore we tanks(pp. 45-46). Therefore, jor repairson the irrigation should not be conclude that the Pul Eliya allocation system describedas decentralized. In Bali, water and land are managed by a corporateunit separate fromthe called the seka subak.This unit is entirely village and has both sacred and secular activities.It tends to be small (Geertz and Geertz [1975] mentiontwo, one of and the other159 whichhas 70 ha. of land and 197 members over water sources ha. and 439 members).It has authority frommajor canals), canals, and all matters (dams or take-offs of the physicalsystem, inhavingto do withthe management to maintainit and the allocation cludingthe worknecessary of water. Each such society has an elected chief (Geertz 1959:996). A readingof some additionalsourcesrevealsthat thereare All sets of evidence on the questionof authority. conflicting agree that land and water are managed by a subak, that the and subak is quite separatefromotherkinds of associations, law whichapplies to subak thatthereis a complexcustomary matters (Grader 1960, Geertz 1959, Geertz and Geertz 1975). of each subak to a superWhat is not clear is the relationship Geertz (1959:995-96) says that ordinate political hierarchy. subaks are groups,such that an entirewatershedis a single, with connected by meansofan office albeitloose,organization, household: the princely activities role in coordinating ... the lordsplayedan important interlocal societies andsettling granting disputes, between irrigation newsocieties, to clear newland, buildnewdamsand form rights of the royalhousewas appointed a member and so on. Usually, and each noble forthewholeregion ofirrigation overseer general ofitsown. officials househad one or twoirrigation for the surveys Grader, a Dutchman doing administrative in the 1930s,reportedthat theheads of colonial government and thata printhesubakswereappointedby thegovernment was to overseeand manage cipal job of the entirehierarchy waterallocation(Grader 1960:270,287). The clear conclusion On fromthismaterialis that allocationin Bali is centralized. theotherhand,Geertzand Geertz(1975:19-20) unequivocally and autonomous. is egalitarian society statethateach irrigation underthesecircumstances. Eitherchoice seemsarbitrary diffiofthe sampleand theextreme Because ofthesmallness it seemsto us thatMillon'sconclusions withthemeasures, culty thismaWhat does emergefrom and doubtful. are premature berelationship pictureof a strong terialis a quite consistent levelsofauthorhigher and power.Veryoften, tweenirrigation and not involvedin local affairs, itythanthelocal are strongly Direct evidenceforthiscan be oror passiveagents.6 as distant of the typesof taskswe have outlinedabove: ganized in terms and resolution, allocation,conflict maintenance, construction, ofritual. the organization in scale thanprevious whichis greater 1. New construction worksis usuallyimposedby an outsideagency.Centrallyorand has occurred is surely not infrequent ganized construction in all samplecases exceptSonjo. ForJapan, Mexico, and Iraq, by centralagencies, thereare severalaccountsof construction and in all cases locals were largelyunable to resistthem.In of opinionat all medievalValencia, therewere deep divisions if so it is difficult about new construction, levelsof the society to say thatlocals wereor werenot able to resist not impossible In thecase ofPul Eliya, thereis no instance external decisions. construction decision. imposed in Leach's accountofa centrally Murphey (1957), however,does mentionearly historicconwhichhad the effect struction schemes undercentraldirection
of tyingthe dry-zonetanks into a centralizedcanal system. Yalman (1967:37, 248-49) mentions thatthegovernment built and thatone villagebuiltitsown tank. a new system The new workscentrally imposedmay well be detrimental to the local societyor the local ecology.This has been documentedforIraq (Gibson 1974) and forthe Valley of Oaxaca ofthelocal com(Lees 1972). One function ofhavingmembers munity occupy roleswhich involveextra-localpower may be to protectthe locale againstthe damagingpoliciesof higherlevelinstitutions. This is clearly whatwas triedby theSan Juan elitewhena centralbureaucracy dealingwithwater,thePapaloapan Commission, proposeda new canal thatmight threaten theireconomicpower. kindofconstruction There is a second,minor, whichis within the means of mostparticipants in an irrigation the system: extension and enlargement ofa physicalsystem. Canals can be widenedand deepened littleby little,and new ditchescan be added on to the end in a piecemeal fashion(Geertz 1963). This does not seem to involveextensive executive organization or a tie-into decision-making centers. It is uncertain how this is accomplished,for there is part of the construction effort virtually no information on it. In Tehuacan, qanats and associatedcanals are financed by cooperative groupsof peasant men,while the workis actually a man withtechnicalexperidirectedby a singlelocal expert, ence who is hiredforsuchjobs. The completion ofa qanat can it can be used take,often, up to 50 years,although waterfrom beforethe total lengthis reached. Althoughthe initiative is local, the federalgovernment has to give permission. 2. Routine maintenanceof a physicalsystemat the local level is apparently alwaysin the hands of the local social organization.While the centralpart of a canal system is the responsibility of an extra-localcollectivity, the maintenanceof the peripheral is under local control.We parts of the system would not be surprised to discover, however, that,wherethere is industrial agriculture based on highly capitalizedcanal irrigation,some extra-localunit is takinga stronginterest in at least monitoring local maintenance conditions. This seemsto be the case on the new canal system of our Japan example, where the modernsectionof canals (Ashimori)and the new facilities of the old canals are maintained directly by the prethecooperatives in thesystem fecture, bypassing (Eyre 1955). 3. The allocationof waterto local branchesof a large artiis usuallydone above the local level,and thereis ficialsystem littlethatthelocal unitcan do to alterthestateofaffairs (e.g., Iraq, Japan). Allocationwithin thelocal physicalsystem is apparentlyalmost always the responsibility of the local social and withinthisis managed by minorexecutive organization, roles (e.g., gate guards). Allocation and maintenanceroles may or may not be combinedin the same personnel. In the communalsystem in San Juan,daily allocationis in thehands of water policemen,but maintenanceis determined by the watercommittee. Privatecanal owners in San Juan make both setsofdecisions.In Pul Eliya, bothdecisionsare made by the samepersonnel. In villageJapan,wherewaterrights are firmly associatedwithland rights and the Syrianallocationprinciple is dominant, thereis apparently littleneed forobviouscentral organizationand decision making about allocation. (It is probablythissituation whichleads Millon [1962] to conclude thattheserepresent only"traditional"forms of organization.) That such systems seem to run themselves over the shortrun, is insufficient however, reason to conclude that no formal decision-making procedureis available. As Beardsley, Hall, and Ward (1959) show,new decisions mustoften be made because ofunusualevents(such as a flashfloodin theriver). 4. The resolution ofconflict over allocationhas two dimensions.One has to do withconflicts thatare internal to thelocal unit but cannot be resolvedlocally. It is a universalfeature ofstatesystems thatconflict not resolvedat the local levelwill be taken to higherlevels (e.g., throughthe courts). In the Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
Since 1940,this thecoursefollowed. Mexican case, thisis often has also been the case in our Japanese example.As far as we is always connectedultiresolution can see, internalconflict which politicalrolesin the society, matelywithhigher-ranked linkedwiththesocial organization may or may not be directly specializedroles(such as the Sometimes ofthephysicalsystem. waterjudges in Valencia) are createdto deal withthisspecial set ofproblems. is defense.Conresolution The otherdimensionof conflict waterhas over irrigation betweentwo local organizations flict for ourValenThis issueis mentioned a highviolencepotential. cia, Mexico,Japan, and Iraq cases and maywell be universal. because it can resort can imposedecisions The centralauthority ofthem.This seems or the threat measures or punitive to force system of a working to be a major factorin the maintenance over time.In the case of the Nahid cited by Millon (1962), it led to appears that the collapse of the centralpoliticalsystem levels. at lowersystem conflict paralyzing The otherside of thiscoin is that,fromthe local point of or expansionofone's own terriview,theissueis one ofdefense role the centralauthority's tory.As far as we can determine, by peacefulmeanswithleast are resolved is to see thatdisputes This may normallymean a cost to the largersocial system. of supervision of some form courtprocedureor the imposition levelsup, but it may to maintainpeace and keep production of localitiesin water allotreatment also involvepreferential cation. The degreeto whichthe finaldecisioncan be imposed by thecourtis notclearforall cases. In manycases ofhaciendain colonialTehuacan, the courtwas largelythe villageconflict (the haof the two contenders servantof the more powerful a decisionmade by rubber-stamping cienda) and was in effect to thiscan be attributed one of the local parties.Ultimately, the factthat it was to the advantageof the colonial elite that peasants.The cash-croplandlordsbe favoredover subsistence court decisions villagers,on the otherhand, oftenboycotted prolongagency,sometimes claimsto a different and tooktheir In ing a case in one courtor anotherforseveralgenerations. the colonial period and duringthe "hacienda boom" in the 19th centuryin Mexico, absentee landlords had a virtual and changes in the monopolyover allocation, construction, not only fortheirhaciendas,but also forthe villages system, of sharingthe watershedor water which had the misfortune favored sourceswiththem.Even when the courtsoccasionally the villages, the hacendados continuedto impose theirwill because of theirothersourcesofpower. without majorconflict In the Tehuacan Valley, forexample, because of the shift in the 16th to sugarcash-cropping subsistence from agriculture the haciendas had illegallyreduced the allocationof century, When such cases were taken to water to local communities. invariablylost theirtraditional court,the local communities thehaciendaswas favoring and a new allocationsystem rights, above. The hacendadosas a groupwere able to imposedfrom linkswith because of theirextra-local controlthe courtsystem the government apparatus,because of theirabilityto convert theirwealth into power over the judiciary personnelat the their roleas watermanlevel,and because,ultimately, regional rolestheyhad by the otherbureaucratic agerswas legitimized cornered for themselveswithin the regional political and these changes led to moFurthermore, economicstructure. manyof the local peasof local power by making nopolization water ants,who could no longerplant because of insufficient supply,into hacienda peons. (This, it needs to be remarked, but because notbecausethepeasantsbecamelandless, occurred theybecame waterless.) court cases in the archiveson Tehuacan are The lengthy to convert illegalwaterallocaample evidencethatprocedures hacifavoring tionsintonew legal codes forwaterdistribution endas and mills were highly standardized.They involved,
among other things,the recurrent bribingof witnesses, the stealingof wooden water-measuring the controlof templates, lawyersin the capital, local military and threats harassment, ofeconomic sanctions againstthevillages(e.g.,Archivo General de la Nacion, Ramo de Tierras 1673-1745, 1689-1801, 1690, 1711-35, 1769). In order to understand more fullyhow and why thesedecisionsare made, we need detailed case studies witha fullsocial context.Since thislegal context involvesthe it is clear centralgovernment, and especiallyits courtsystem, need new skills and strategies thatanthropologists to deal with it. One pointwhichneedsinvestigating is theimpactofcolonial systems on the management of irrigation Both Cherfacilities. nyak(1968) and Frank(1970) have arguedthatWestern social scientists thisproblembecause oftheir have ignored ideological biases on the issueofcolonialism. 5. Beyondtheselinkages withlarger there politicalunits, may and religious also be linkages to ritualorganizations institutions. There is in the literature verylittleon thistopic,and in most of the modernstatesthe phenomenon can hardlybe said to inJapan exist.Linkagesofthiskindwere,however, significant and Indonesia in the past, and in the Mexican region we studiedtheritualcycleand rolesare involvedin complexways with the irrigation systemin the Indian villages. Here well cleaning,communalrepair,and construction, fromthe point ofview ofthe local culture, necessitate the activeparticipation in ritualand the delegationof powerto ritualspeofworkers cialists.These are now local-levelroles,but it is possiblethat in the past, when the Roman Catholic Churchwas the major landownerin the area, the Church controlled access to water by the local community This was throughritual scheduling. true in Tehuacan, because severalhaciendas were owned by religious corporations (monasteries and convents)whichwere absenteelandlords. Some generalizations fromthesedata are possible:Massive construction and conflictresolutionare closely linked with extra-localorganization, while maintenance and daily allocation matters are in local hands. With large artificial systems, allocationofwaterto the local segments is a matter ofcentral policyand management. If thereare any demandsof a small local irrigation system whichencouragecentralization, theyare the social problems betweenhomologous unitsratherthan the technical ones. This may well not be thecase wherefloodcontroland large-scale canals are the issue,or wherea verylarge (in both extentand volume) artificial water supplysystem is in operation.Here again, the limitations of the community studymustbe noted.No community studycan throwlighton the problemsof the organization of the large artificial supply systems. Community studiescannot therefore bear upon questionsinvolving such a higher-level system. Community studies can show,however, how local organizations are linkedor related to such a largersystem, as we have triedto show,tentatively, here. ROLE EMBEDDEDNESS The relationship betweenroles which manage the irrigation and otherroles,especiallypowerful system ones, in the local social organization has receivedless theoretical discussion than the linkages just described, but moredata on it are available. Social stratification is an integralpart of the problem; in termsof the case studieswe have examined,therecan be no doubt that where thereis irrigated agriculture thereis social stratification and that the stratification is importantly linked to differential decision-making poweroverthe tasksoftheirrigationsystem. A majorconcernwithmostofthegeneralpropositions is the existence ofa specializedorganization forcopingwiththetasks ofthephysical system. (Wittfogel's agromanagerial bureaucracy is one form.) In our sample,wherethereis a smallphysical sys396
tem and no large artificial supplysystem, and wherethe local irrigation systemis nearly isomorphicterritorially with the governmental unit,thereis a high degreeof embeddedness of irrigation-system roles in other powerfulroles in the local society. Furthermore, watertasks maybe controlled by agencies which have other political tasks,for example, a municipal board or a villagegovernment. In San Juan,forexample,while thereare some specialized personnel(e.g., water policemen) and threespecial water committees, almost all the authority roleswhichdeal withtheproblems ofthe irrigation system are embedded in otherrole systems of the local elite (economic, political,and, in the past, religious),and manyare not formallypart of thewater committees at all (e.g., the sugar-mill managercontrols one wholephysical system, ignoring thecommittee overhim). The same is trueforPul Eliya, with officially itsheadman embeddedin the statepoliticalstructure, and for the Sonjo and theirchiefs. Degree of role embeddedness at the local level seemsto be If thereis low relatedto the degree of internalstratification. internalstratification, authority differences of water-managewhile the real authority lies ment roles may be minimized, outside the locality.In Pul Eliya, the irrigation headman is the bottomrung of a long ladder of government offices and local elite roles, and he is integratedinto the state power His role is also embeddedin a numberofotherroles structure. involving control oftaxation, kinship groups, judicial functions, and executive tasks.In southern Iraq, the centralgovernment has been trying to cut back the powerofthe shaykhs formany decades. At the time of Fernea's study,the local irrigation of the central government, officer whose functions were formally technical,was respondingto local pressure to make decisionsabout allocation in the fashionof a local political leader. We have, then, apparently, some structural pressure to coalesce the roles of technicaldecision maker about the and decisionmakerabout allocation.That the physicalsystem technical aspect of his role comes first, however,may have more to do with the reductionin power of the traditional shaykhthan with its being connectedwith a centralbureaucracy, and factorsof historicalpriority may be related to exogenousvariables. the management of the basic functions of an irriNormally, is assignedto a highly setofrankedroles. gationsystem specific These roles per se, however,may not carry much political weight.The set of roles which is usually associatedwith the is a mixedcategory, management oflocal social affairs including local governmental roles, dominant economic interests, high-prestige It is rarely the case, persons, and perhapsothers. apparently, that theserolesforma singleor consistent system (cf. Bell and Newby 1972:186-249). We are therefore, in reto it as a system, ferring difficulties paperingoverconsiderable and ambiguities. This is not the place to tryto solve these which in any case we are in no positionto do. We problems, wishto start from theposition thatthereare (a) ranked simply local roles associatedwith social affairs and (b) rankedlocal rolesassociatedwiththe management of the irrigation system and to have a preliminary look at how thesetwo sets relate to each other. Since an irrigation is onerousto run, the incentives system leading individualsto seek executivepositions are of interest. If thereis relatively demandforwater, highactual or potential managementskills are crucial for daily operations,but the thannot,findtheir occupantsofmanagement roles,moreoften lot to be harassment and even grief. For example,in San Juan, water policemencarry during the period of water shortage, riflessimplyto protecttheir lives frompossible attacks by withdryfields. From the studiesin our sample angryfarmers with sufficient information on identityof officeholders and identity of landowners (Pul Eliya, Sonjo, San Juan,Japan), a patternemerges. The chiefs of the Sonjo have executivetasks and clearly gain in termsof the local stratification system
with the irrigation The irrigation through connection system. forthe headman in Pul Eliya has clear executive responsibility and has been able to use his positionto develop whole system a separatephysicalsystem and his clients. mainlyforhimself In San Juan,the"owners"oftheprivate canals clearly manage such management themand gain personally from water (from sales,rights to buy cropsofwaterclients, etc.). The communal system, on theotherhand, confers littlegain on theexecutives, and it is said to be hard to get people to serveon the water oftencall it "a waste of time." Water committee. Informants said to be "contentedwith policemenare poorer townsmen small bribes." Glick (1970) mentionsthe same phenomenon formedievalValencia, but we have no information on landholdingor on other positions fortheexecutives. In theJapanese case, mosthamletmembers prefer not to takethepostofheadman, and it is a rolewhichis difficult to fill;thehoursare long, the work prodigious,and the personalgain apparentlynear zero (Beardsley, Hall, and Ward 1959). We therefore propose thehypothesis thatthe incentive fora personto assumeexecutiveresponsibility fora local irrigation system lies in the possibilityof differential controlof the deployablesurpluses of the system. It would also seem to be the case in our sample that the higherroles in the local stratification system are linkedwith instrumental decisionsin irrigation, whetheror not the individual occupies a water-management role. Again, water-managementroles are actuallypower roles only when controlof water is associatedwith controlof the flowof productionor distribution. The degreeof local stratification where seemsto be greater thereis somemeansforconverting surdeployableagricultural plusesin someextra-local economicsystem. The mostprevalent suchmeansis themarket. This appearsofparticular importance in systems were irrigation is utilized to raise cash crops,but redistributive systems at lower mayoperatein thesame fashion levelsofefficiency in terms of increased differentiation. Therefore,thereis a strong case to be made fora linkagebetween controlover water resources and controlover otherdecisions in thelocal unit.We have no doubt thatthisis thecase forthe fewcloselystudiedlocal systems thatwe have (Pul Eliya, San Juan, Sonjo, and El Shabana). Therefore, is not watercontrol theonlysourceofpower,but one ofa complexsetofproduction variableslinkedto economicflowin the societyand to other whichdetermine factors thedistribution ofpoliticalpower. A major questionraised byWittfogel is the directionality of the relationships betweenpower over water and power over othervalued social resources. Wittfogel's positionis thatwater powerdominates. itsrelationThe studyoflocal stratification, ship to irrigation, and the directionality of that relationship demands considerabledetailed information about power and otherdifferences betweenroles and betweenparticularindividuals,both at the local level and above. Some of our case studies providethisinformation and somedo not. Some studies give only a general overall view of the local communities (Geertz,Glick, Lees); othersgive at least some detail on the relevantvariables of one case (Leach, Beardsley,Hall, and Ward, Hunt and Hunt, Fernea,Gray). In San Juan,we have argued,thereis complexmutualinfluence (feedback)between variables.In Pul Eliya, the headman was able to gain control overa new sourceofirrigation he became headman waterafter forthe originalsource.For the Sonjo, thereis no clear indication of which comes first, power over water or power over people; Gray discussesboth, but in his materialson recruitment to the office thereis sufficient ambiguitythat we can make no decision.There are, in a givenvillage,severalsetsof roles,arrangedhierarchically, each of whichhas some sonr of rightsover water, and one set is the primaryexecutiveand judicial body ofthevillage.Positions in thesesetsare inherited patrilineally, but they can also be bought and sold (Gray 1963:146). When a personis recruited to the position, a large Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
Gray's from be paid. It is notpossible feeofgoatsmust initiation of goats and lineage posiaccount to separatethesepayments controlofwater,althoughGray himself differential tionsfrom has priority. feelsthatwatercontrol between these two sets of of the relationship Assessment for phenomena demands, firstof all, adequate frameworks Rights of access to land, labor, capital, other measurement. (such as salt in theChinesecase or perresources monopolized mits to mill sugar and distill alcohol in Mexico), markets, ofsurpluses, distribution judicial and ritualroleswhichcontrol All too oftenthese distinguished. etc., must be analytically are mergedin the accounts,perhapsbecause the roles rights model and thefolk in smalllocal systems merged are frequently mechanicalmodel (in Leviis presentedas an ethnographic documentaworks.Further Strauss'ssense) of how the system modelsmaybe needed to answermanyofthe tionofstatistical unanswered questions. phenomenamustbe anchored thesedifferent Furthermore, for technique measuredtime.The major empirical in carefully is temporalsequence, and it must cause and effect inferring part of any researchdesign. The therefore be a prominent studyis perhaps least likely community ordinarysynchronic issue.As Adams to thedirectionality to be able to addressitself have pointedout, the timespan of observa(1973) and others tionis muchtoo short.It would be desirableto have measures over a long enough variablesextending on all the interesting In thisway, timeperiodto coverseveralchangesofleadership. and irripoliticaloffice, to property, changesin relationships This mightgive at least some gationrolescould be correlated. system. as it relatesto theirrigation measureofelitecirculation the timespan can be extendedconsiderably With documents, (see, e.g., Adams 1965,Adams and Nissen 1972), but anthroin doingboth who are bothcapable ofand interested pologists documentary historical and extensive observation participant and longresearchhave been rare. Probablyboth teamwork area are needed on a particular termcommitment to research (cf.R. Hunt 1973: 90-92). It is a curiousfactoftheintellectual structuralthattheRadcliffe-Brownian ofourdiscipline history studieswhichhave dominatedthe fieldand which functional have so often ignored systemics" "holistic emphasize supposedly (Leach timedepthas a variable,or dealt withit as mythology into the structure 1954), or simplyprojectedthe synchronic or a steady-state system. homeostasis, cyclicity, past, assuming designwill have to allow forthe possiFinally,the research bilityoffeedbackloops betweenpower overwaterand power thatsimple forit seemsintuitively unlikely overother resources, approach, a systems-analysis Clearly, isinvolved. linearcausality correlatimespan to permitmultidirectional witha sufficient dealingwithverycompliis indicated.We are obviously tions, whichcan even now be measuredby a large cated phenomena number of variables. At this stage in the evolutionof the whichwill reflect we shouldadopt research strategies analysis, and manage thatcomplexity. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS studies ofirrigation systems it shouldbe clear thatfuture First, on the physical systemand the should include information As Netting(1974b) and Conklin(1973), environment. relevant is to mentiononly two, have pointed out, the environment Meteosituation. the local irrigation crucialforunderstanding coveringa long period of rologicaland climaticinformation situation. in orderto assessthe contemporary timeis necessary of for the investigation are necessary Physicalmeasurements one locale to another. from in ecologicalsystem differences connected the role system to specify Second, it is important and the role ofthelocal physicalsystem withthe management 397
system which manages the local political institutions and to the relationship betweenthem. This will demand inclarify on land tenure, waterrights, office thefuncformation holding, ofterritorial tioning politicalunits,etc. mustbe Third,the external(extra-local)social environment specified, includingpolitical (governmental), economic, and between religious dimensions. The specification ofconnections the national and regionalpolitical and economic structures is crucial. Similarly, and the local role system to relationships outside markets, credit systems, transportation systems, etc., need to be investigated because of theirdirectimpact on the local system. The same applies to the ritualorganizations (if any) involvedin the system. what we are calling Ultimately, thetraditional foris a shift offocusfrom We community study. thinkit now self-evident that important questionsabout irrigation as a social systemcannot be answeredby confining analysisto a year or two and to a single"isolated" locale. We are in fundamental withNetting(1974b:34) on the agreement above points. Irrigation is clearlya resource ofunusualfecundity. It occurs withdifferentiation ofpowerin thetotalsociety, and thepower is frequently, if not universally, associatedwith the management of the irrigation system itself. It is therefore connected withstratification systems based in part on differential control of means ofproduction. We have argued thatlocal communities embedded in state systems are linked in complex ways, especiallywithhigherlevelsof organization ofwatermanageand thatthesehigher levelsoforganization ment, are significant variablesin at least somecrucial aspectsoflocal process which concernirrigation. We have shownthatthemanagement roles forthe local irrigation system are closelylinkedwith systems of rolesbelonging if such exist. to higherlevelsof integration, In many cases, the local unit is incapable of resisting forany lengthof timemany of the decisionsmade at higherlevelsof integration. thusclearlyis a resource Irrigation agriculture ofgreatstructural potential;it is systematically linkedwith major features ofthesocialorganization, linked withdifferential closely power, and embeddedin the local-national linkagesof states.It may therefore be associatedwith distinct forms of social organization which requirefurther study.There is littleethnographic information thatis useful forthe testing ofhypotheses. We can choosebetweendifferent viewsonlyon thestrength ofour convictions. What we need, instead,is to return to thefieldwitha moreclearlyspecified setofquestions. We have triedto outline a fewin thispaper.
tional literature to renderit more representative could have been accommodated by shortening the somewhat too long discussionof Wittfogel, Millon, Lees, et al., of slightor doubtful relevanceto the article'stitle.The conclusions sum up all of theresearch: itsscope and limitations. A plea is,however, made thatwe return to the fieldwitha "clearlyspecified set ofquestions"for further study.In thislies hope ofunfolding thesecrets ofenvironmental and other sociocultural covariations thatbind irrigation and social organization.
byJOHN W. BENNETT Department of Anthropology, Washington University at St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo. 63130, U.S.A. 10 iii 76
Comments
byG. MUNIR AHMED Department of Geography, Chicago State University, 95thSt. at III. 60628,U.S.A. 13 iv 76 KingDrive, Chicago, This articleis well documented, a voluminous summarizes litand admirablycontributes erature, to researchas a review.It fallsshort, of the significance however, claimed in the titlefor local social organization. Notwithstanding some remarks, one wonders ifthe particular factors and elements ofsocial organization discussedcan be construed to constitute a portrayal of social organization per se. Furthermore, thevalue ofthereview is limitedby the authors'choice of literature. Though thisis in itsown terms, justifiable theycould profitably have included one ofthe mostextensive canal irrigation in the world, systems in South Asia, not to mention others.Had theydone so, their critiqueof the literature and the preconditions fortesting hypotheseswould have been conceptually more functional and regionally morebalanced. The samplingtechniqueadopted in the presentation could have been a littlemoreflexible. Addi398
We should be grateful to the Hunts forthis interesting contribution to theslender comparative literature in anthropology. For manyyearssecondary analysishas been a ticket to professional oblivion,and I had hoped that my recentpaper on in anthropology water-resources writings (Bennett 1974) would a certainamountofinterest in comparative stimulate work. The Hunts are justifiably skepticalabout the value of communitystudies-especially community studies done without to the larger systems in which they are adequate reference located-for derivinggeneral theory.Nevertheless, they atstudiesto findregularities temptto use community ("systemic of water-resource correlates")in the relationship development I think to social organization. theyshouldbe congratulated for takingon a job whichwas almostsure to producemeagerreof classical ethsults.Only in thisway will the shortcomings nographic community studybe revealed. the dearthof theory Their paper demonstrates in the study to social behavior. ofresourcedevelopment of the relationship does notsubstitute A description of an irrigation system foran to explain the behaviorof people in varying attempt contexts of that system.Only a theoretical approach to the problem, featuring adaptational conceptswhich ask what people want and at different and how theyget it,in different systems times in the same system, can do thejob. In two places the Hunts note the tendency forlocal systems to devolvetowardillegal or inequitablestates: (1) in the discussionof the San Juan schemesand the "good" and "bad" betweenwater rights distinction on assignedon watercourses the basis of land-tenure rights(which,following Glick, they on thebasis ofownercall theSyrian)and waterrights assigned ship of source of water,makingthem saleable (which Glick ofstratification, calls the Yemenite); and (2) in the discussion to a searchforpower on the part of especiallywithreference as a vehicle. who see waterresources local persons on water A varietyof models is available in the literature forthe analysisof theseverycommonsituations. management is basic betweenthe two kindsof waterrights The distinction in thisfield. The Syriansystem is equivain all studies and texts whichis thefounlentto the"doctrine ofpriorappropriation," dation of modernwesternNorth Americanwater laws. The Yemeniteis similarto the classic riparian-rights system, prein the West. vailingin easternNorthAmerica,and formerly an institutional The twoapproacheshave displayed progression because the underlying problemis a physicaland instrumental one-the fluidnatureof and absoluteneed forwater.Hence, increasingpopulation plus increasingrational controlof resourcesin orderto maintainequity of allocationof water in tend to evolve fromthe this population means that systems Yemenitetowardthe Syrian-that is, as long as land tenure remainsin private hands. This happened in westernNorth America as population and water use increasedin arid and semiarid lands. Whenland tenureand use movetowardcollectivesolutions, however, theprior-appropriation (Syrian)system maybe modified or abrogatedby thestateor otherbodysupervisingcollectiveuse or controland replaced by collective-use schemesor relatedmethodsof allocation.This three-or-moreCURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
is basic in NorthAmericaand elsewhere, stageprogression and variations betweensocieties can influence whileinstitutional it, thereis an underlying uniformity introducedby the amount of available water,the need forit, and the size of the populationusingit.' to view one or theotherallocaWithregardto the tendency theHuntsmight have profited tionsystem as illegalor corrupt, how in NorthAmerica from mymodel (Bennett 1967) showing allocationtendto movefrom universalistic systems ofresource (i.e., equal or fairallocationforall) to particularistic (i.e., unequal and covertallocationto the few),usuallywiththe collusion of government bureaus that become involved in local affairs and with wealthyor highlyproductiveoperatorsas a result of their decision-making functions, adjudication proalso seemsto have cedures,etc. This evolutionary progression in the Neolithic-Bronze occurred As the Hunts Age transition. noticed,people tendto use irrigation as a meansforcollecting and the accumulationof power because water is a necessity behavioraltendency. poweris a universal Still another whichI have publishedon in brief2 progression concerns the interaction betweenexternal bureaucratic control to theallocation agenciesand thelocal populationwithrespect ofwaterand operating ofthe irrigation arrangements scheme. In manynations,local, technologically simple,and inefficient privateschemesare replacedby government-constructed community schemeswhich are costlyand mustbe operatedby a professional watermasterlest the "corrupt"particularism alluded to above develop and a generalfree-for-all emerge.In mostcases thissituationwill last forsome time,untilgovernment decides it can no longer afford wages and salaries for to settle personnel quarrels, setallocations, open and shutgates, etc. Then government attempts to give the responsibility for thesefunctions to the local water users,who are requiredor persuadedto organizetheirown users' associationand establishprocedures. This is usuallyresisted because it costsmoney, which must be collectedby a tax on the users or by raising ifand whenthelocal users' waterfees.The cyclemaycontinue theschemebeginsto breakdown, association fallsintodisorder, the government stepsback in, and so on. At several points the Hunts' paper could have benefited from greatly the use ofeconomicmodelsor at leastelementary economicperspective. About halfway through the paper they er in scale thanprevious works is usuallyimposedby an outside agency" and (2) that "routinemaintenance of a physicalsystem at the local level is apparently alwaysin the hands of the local social organization." Well, ofcourse.There are a number ofreasonsforbothofthese,but one overriding one: cost.Local are usually-in tribal,peasant,and entrepreneurial sosystems cieties-relatively simplebecause theyare largelylabor-intensive: few local agrarian communities at any level of developmentcan generate enoughcapital to afford elaborateschemes, whichin watermanagement are veryexpensive,not onlyfor but also for engineering construction, expertiseand maintenance.Hence, ifthesystem is to be enlarged orimproved, someone else has to pay forit. I am talkingnot onlyabout money,
1 For historiesand analysis of water rightsand water-management practices in North America and elsewhere, the following make a usefulstart:Dobkins (1959), especiallygood forthe history of water rights and the interplay between the cooperative and privateelementsin Westernwater law; Green (1973), an excellent study of the spread of irrigationin the Texas plains and the dynamics ofresourceabuse; White (1969), a basic essay on the nature of American water management and developmentand how it has been influencedby social structure; White, Bradley, and White (1972), an approach to East Africanwater use, but with references to our own society and its systemsof water use; and Smith and Castle (1966), a basic "readerr"on water management,economics, and law. 2 See Bennett (1976:290-92); the material there has since been expanded to chapter lengthand will appear in a book on the anthropoloyv of resourceand agriculturalmanagement.
come to two conclusions: (1) that "new construction .
. great-
of social mobilizaskill,techniques but also about knowledge, whichare assembled tion,and so on. These are all monopolies cannot simply in statebureausor thelike; thelocal community thecostsofimprovements be expectedto have them.Moreover, can be so greatthat local commumaintenance or high-level nitieshesitateto embarkon them even when theymightbe well. As the Huntsremark, fairly able to managetheoperation is "onerous."This explainsa greatdeal. irrigation boil propositions In otherwords,some of the Wittfogelian efficiency e.g., as increasing down to simpleeconomictruisms: there in local communities, systems is desiredin water-control ofsomekindto pay the bills-not is need fora supra-authority etc. You don't have to to mentionpolitical aggrandizement, this,either-it has happenedin the go to ancientEgyptto find and practicallyevery other enTennessee Valley Authority systemin westernNorth larged and rationalizedirrigation America,India, Pakistan,and elsewhere. There is anotherfactorhere: George Zipf's "least-effort" have in action.Whenthepeople ofa local community principle to havingsomeoneon the outsidepay the become accustomed someoneto do forgetting bills,or can perceivean opportunity or no. If theycan get pass it up, local autonomy so, theyrarely about and worry watermorecheaply,theytendto put thisfirst later.Here again,we don'thave "culture," freedom losingtheir of behavior,and in all channelling but simplythe structural we will findsuch channelsystems instrumental thesestrongly thecourseofchange ling.Obviouslyone cannotalwayspredict fromtime to and of course humans act perversely precisely, similarin time,but at keylevelsthe outcomesare remarkably if you knowwhereto look situations thesewater-management theHunts studies to ask.Sincethecommunity or whatquestions one can hardlyexpectthem did not ask such questions, survey the answers. to furnish the concerning by the Hunts' finding I am notoverwhelmed roles powerful rolesin other ofirrigation-system "embeddedness in the local society," since everyonedealing with resource in a practicalsensehas been aware ofit. Resource management ofruralsocial principle aside, it is a fundamental management as Frankenberg(1966) and many othershave organization, pointedout. When the local societyis composedof neighbors forany one individualto play thereis a tendency and relatives, really, roles; thereis no alternative, a numberof overlapping of numbers-morerolesthan and it is almosta simplematter since watercontrolis a major concernin an people. Further, as the Huntshave init is automatically, agrariancommunity, detailsof"embeddeddicated,a sourceofpower.The specific ness" will of coursevaryfromcase to case, since at thislevel come intoplay. features institutional specific The basic problemin all thought: This leads to a concluding to social ofresource management intotherelationship inquiries betweena numberof and ideas is the interplay organization behavior determinable sequences, and instrumentally physically of allocation, methods on the one hand, and local institutional institutional (bureaus,taxes,etc.), imperatives plustheexternal whichis interaction on the other.This is a complexthree-way and even case-study ofempiricalresearch, susceptible perfectly of the problem are research,providingthat the dimensions siteschosenwithcare. The and theresearch formulated clearly extentto whichphysical(the natureofwaterand the amount (human wants,powerdrives,costs) needed) and instrumental variantsand externalpressures can prevail over institutional is guidedby into whichthe system is a measureofthe extent concerns.The germof truth ratherthan symbolic strumental lieshere.The potenin MarvinHarris's"culturalmaterialism" thatinstrumental in hisposition appear ifhe assumes tial errors always prevail,or that theyalways so prevail considerations otherthan the instrumental. in domainsof humanexperience to humanbehavior pertaining This is whymodelsand theories
Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
and not unihave to be foundedon empiricalgeneralization versaltheorems. Some factors, ofcourse,are well knownwithrespect to their some: all societies or variability. The Huntsmention regularity have an "institutional locus" (I take it theymean responsible theworks, and all irrigation for authority) are maintaining systems or laws (and nearlyall are also "regulated"bybodiesofnorms violationofsame!). Then the Hunts characterized by constant to ponote that the relationship of the responsible authority liticaland territorial units is a variable, and indeeditis.This is so forthesimplereasonthatyoucan do thejob as longas someone gives you the authority and the properorders,and it doesn't mattermuch wheretheycome from-a propercase of definitionofthe level ofinstitutional variation.The Hunts also note that thereis "variationin the degreeto whichpoliticalunits occupy hydrological units." Of course,since the boundaries depend on the nature of the land survey,land tenure,and settlement history-all variables.It wouldseemthatone could determinethese levels of regularity and variabilitywithout having to look into a specific literature But then (irrigation). is "preparadigmatic":it lacks a centralcore of anthropology principles, hence we have to recapturethe essence foreach case. Another zone ofambiguity lies in the bias in culturalanthropology towarddiversity: that culturesalthe assumption a beliefwhichreinforces to do comways differ, the tendency munitystudieswithoutadequate reference to the largersystems. Hence anthropological literature is slanted away from regularities, even thoughit frequently seeksthem.The Hunts comment on the "logical gap" betweenthe grand-scale teleological generalizing, on theone hand, and the microcommunal on the other(as I also observe, in Bennett studies, 1976:25,30, 212, 271). It isjust the kindoftheorizing the Huntswishto do thatgetslostin the "gap." if theydid a little Anthropologists could move ahead faster readingin thetechnical and historical literature on thesubjects theywish to research.Althoughthisliterature oftenmistakes culturalvariablesforconstants, it nevertheless containsinformation on the verygeneralizations anthropologists seek and drawsits data from familiar societies.
byRICHARD K.
"small" systemswith proportionalallocation as a diffused element. presents two problemsbut lightly The precedingdiscussion touchedupon by the authors.One is the concept of scale of including Hunt and which most recent writers, irrigation, ofirriSome typology Hunt, agree needsbettermeasurement. relating gation based on scale is criticalto most hypotheses irrigation to social organization.Spooner's (1974) workwell betweenscale and social comillustrates thatthe relationships plexityinvolve not only physicalscale, but the scale of the measuredin social and economicterms.In irrigation system Spooner'sIranian cases, scale measuredin termsof economic variable. Until our coninvestment proveda keyexplanatory relatrejectionof hypotheses ceptsofscale have been refined, scale (usuallyphysical)to other ofirrigation ing vague notions phenomenaseemsunwise. The second problemhas been noted by the authors:that which there is a logicalgap between mostirrigation hypotheses, case studies,which deal with whole societies,and irrigation This seems a criticalproblemin any deal with communities. althoughthe second aspect of proposedcross-cultural analysis, exploring"the linkagesbethe authors'analyticframework, mayallelevelsofthesystem," tweenthelocal leveland higher viate the problemif the second major termof the Stewardtheory,"centralizationin social organization,"is Wittfogel ofthe "centralidefined. The authors'discussion operationally zation" conceptis to the point,but withouta more rigorous typology of social organization,which obviouslyhas strong the discussionremains relationsto centralization, functional ambiguous. byP. E. B. Coy FK9 4LA, Stirling University ofStirling, ofSociology, Department a forward The Hunts have to be congratulated upon bringing topic long neglected.I am not sure, however,that a crossis so much such as theyhave attempted culturalcomparison as tantalizing. Where,forexample, are the refersatisfactory contributions of the French humanences to the significant such as Brunhes(1908) and Sorre (1934)? Where geographers ofthedifferent ofwaterallocationdown is a consideration styles Elche coast of Spain fromAlicante through the southeastern and Murcia to Lorca? Can one pass over the whole gamutof as represented overwaterresources, by the differlocal control ent sortsof tribunalsand their different powers over transwith two ambiguous sentencesabout "specialized gressors, roles... [being]createdto deal withthisspecial set of probforand againstwaterauctions? lems"?What are thearguments Is enoughmade ofthe different impactupon a local irrigation whenthereis a local manufacturing industry competing system forthe water?What are the consequencesof kinshiplinksbechannel?Finally,I on the same distribution tween irrigators in colonialMexicancourts, theimplication wouldquestion that, to rights local communities "invariably"lost theirtraditional waterand wood (see Coy 1968).
Scotland.29 iii 76
400 University Dr., West Bend,Wis.53095,U.S.A. 28 III 76 The Hunt and Hunt articleextends recentefforts to modelthe The reformulation irrigation-society relationship. and refinementofthesubhypotheses ofthe Steward-Wittfogel theory initiated by Mitchell (1973) and the 1972 Symposiumof the Southwestern Association on "Irrigation's Anthropological Impact on Society" (Downing and Gibson 1974) formthe basis forthisexcellent effort. The Steward-Wittfogel theory foundered on a lack ofdefinitionof the terms ofthe theory, the scale ofirrigation and cenin social organization. tralization Hunt and Hunt's attempt to refine these termswithina three-part framework focusing on labor controlseems a viable approach,but severalaspectsof the discussion requireelaboration. The authorsrejectGlick's (1970) two alternative modelsof water allocation,Yemeniteand Syrian,partlybecause there existsome "small" watersources(Pul Eliya) withproportional allocation instead of the expected time-unit allocation and partlybecause examination of theirsample indicatedno relationshipbetweenallocationprincipleand "size" of the water system.This rejectionseems premature, inasmuch as Glick (1970:215-16) also proposes a developmentalhypothesis in whichtimedistribution is succeededby proportional distribution as demand or scarcityincreases.It could well be that "small" systems withproportional allocationunderwent some pressureforcing the successionof the proportional principle. Alternatively, given the existenceof proportional distribution systems in the widersociety, it would not be surprising to find
400
CLEEK
Boston andGeography, University, Boston, ofHistory Departments Mass. 02215,U.S.A. 17 III 76 as an to the natureof proportionality I wishto addressmyself organizingprinciplein allocation of water. Both Syrian and have proportionality-based Yemenite systems rationales,but measurement techniqueswhichin turn theyrequiredifferent on the watersupply:the are dictatedby the degreeof pressure the greateris the need forprecisionin greaterthe pressure, thereis a broad correlation Therefore I do think measurement. between supplyrelativeto demandforwaterand the tendency
byTHOMAS F.
GLICK
byBRUCE B. MACLACHLAN Illinois University, Southern of Anthropology, Department CarIll. 62901,U.S.A. bondale, withoutexplicaonly bald comments Allottedspace permits tion: institufarming in irrigation 1. The Hunts have identified greattheotionsan empiricalarena of researchof potentially They have indicated apparent gaps in retical significance. a program. and theyoffer publishedsources, well-documented sys2. In view ofthe concernwiththe linkageofirrigation I beor levelsof a complexsocial system, temsto subsystems lieve that theywill findallocation of water more significant locus The systemic or maintenance. thanconstruction generally of allocationwill largelydepend upon the conception.Thereof the condevelopment explicitand systematic foreI suggest cept of allocation,specializingthe termto a meaningapproother possible priate for their purposes and discriminating spee.g., by groupingthem under other,similarly meanings, purHunts' the for well-designed concept A terms. cialized byRUSSELL E. LEWIS poses may be a linchpinin the realizationof theirprogram; Department ofSociology, University ofEvansville, Evansville, Ind. in a conconcept may mire the enterprise an unconsidered 47702,U.S.A. 29 III 76 ceptual slough. thanwith As I am morefamiliar withgeneralecologicaltheory forcesthem to narrowthe 3. Althoughavailable literature the specifics of irrigated I shall attemptto place agriculture, I suspecttheywill have to scope of this paper to irrigation, Hunt and Hunt's stimulating articlein a broader ecological of materialto such uses of a canal If I am not mistaken, framework. the following is the multi- broaden theirgathering and source of toll revetransport, as drainage,fishing, system as a tentative variable proposition offered explanationforthe centralizedconelaborate more of involvement For the nues. and social organibetweenagricultural relationship irrigation in significance. trol,some ofthesemay rankwithirrigation leads to an increase zation: An irrigatedagricultural system aside on intelleca tangential 4. Since the paper introduces in energy supplyand an increasein the abilityofcertainroles I shall insertmy own: It is a curiousfactof the tual history, (or role sets) to exertcontrol(power) overthe social system. as the Hunts put it, that of our discipline, history intellectual of the relationship beAlthoughHunt and Hunt's synthesis to "set an customforan anthropologist I am disappointed it is a well-practiced and power is important, tween irrigation and conof his predecessors' picture fictitious) extreme (and relatetheirfindings thattheydo not explicitly to a significant to hisown" (Hoebel 1954:183, workto lend virtue betweenenergy temporaries' bodyofliterature dealingwiththe relationship of Malinowski).The virtueof the Hunts' speakingspecifically and social organization(see, esp., Adams 1975; Hanks 1972; topic lies in the reasonsthey,and otherscited by them,have Margalef1968; Odum 1971; Rappaport 1968,1971; and White lies in its appositeof theirprogram adduced; the significance would suggestthat theirhypothesis re1943). This literature ness, internallogic, and feasibility-notin its noveltyor its garding"a linkagebetweencontrolover waterresources and in other to otherprograms designedat othertimes, superiority overotherdecisionsin the local unit" could be altered control forotherpurposes. by substituting "energyflow"for"water resources."Another circumstances, the social organiza5. Aside fromtheoretical significance, pointemphasizedby Hunt and Hunt is that"not onlyis water has practicaladvantagesas an obcrucialforan understand- tionofspace and resources unevenly allocated,but information (e.g., hydrogeographic For example,well-chosen ing of how the systemreally worksis unevenlycontrolled." ject ofstudy. and native; will have meaningto anthropologist logic) features This is an important point,but the unevenallocationofwater between anthropologists reliability of intersubjective problems mustbe precededby the unevenaccess to information regardand nativewillbe minimal(though and between anthropologist I see thisrelationship as follows:An increase ing the system. present). in information leads to an increasein powerforcertainroles, conceivedand is systematically 6. One attractive possibility or role sets,via controlover energyflow,only when said inof a ethnographers collaboration group among coordinated is monopolizedby said roles. Obviously,there is formation One skillmorecommonamong archaeoloand archaeologists. some differentiation of power in all societies,because even is that of elicitingand intergiststhan among ethnographers when all information is public,individualswill differ in their chemical,biological,and meteorophysical, geological, preting and their abilities to perceptionsof the same information the Hunts' program. ofthe sortsupporting logicalinformation apply it. More generally,I would eschew unilateral intellectualimI would agree withthe need to utilize a methodology such with colleagues perialismin favorof exhaustiveconsultation as the systems approach, which would allow the testingof "A social or human scienof disciplines. in a wide spectrum multidirectional and many variables. The relacorrelations otherthan his own. It is disciplines by studying tionships betweensuch conceptsas information, energyflow, tistmay profit and appropriate dangerousto practisethemwithouttraining mass-energy, resourcebase, power, role sets, and economics skills"(Devon and Gluckman1964:261). are indeedmuchtoo complexto accept a "simplelinearcausality." However,the measurement ofvariablesrelatedto irrigaby WILLIAM P. MITCHELL tionand otherenergy sourcesis not nearlyas simpleas the auWest Monmouth Branch, Long Department College, ofAnthropology, thors state (see Hanks 1972:62 and Lewis 1976). 07764,U.S.A. 31 III 76 NJVt. The pointsregarding the necessity of more detailed ethnoin utilizing I have encountered graphicdata to allow forthe testing Witffogel's of hypotheses relatedto One oftheproblems under theconditions irrigation and power (or energyand power) are excellent. hypothesis to determine has been in trying Hunt and Hunt's analysis should indeed stimulateethnog- whichit would provetrueor false.The merepresenceofirrito raphers"to returnto the fieldwith a more clearlyspecified gation in centralized politiesis not sufficient and stratified set ofquestions." To thisend it seemsto ofthe hypothesis. the validity establish Vol. 17 JNo. 3 * September 1976 401
towardone or the othermodal type.Where demand is high, moresocial control is needed,as is tighter technicalcontrol in the formof more accurate measures.The Syrian model beinflexible as pressure forwatergrows;this comes increasingly sets in motiona shift towardthe Yemenitemodel sometimes wherebywater once public becomes privateand greatereffithe establishment of a ciencyin allocationis attainedthrough marketin water or water rights. Thus, the two typesare frein the same region, withthe direcquentlylinkedsequentially tionofchangealwaysfrom As demand SyriantowardYemenite. denforwaterrises(as the resultof a climaticshift, increasing to move to sityofsettlement, etc.), thereis a markedtendency a more patrimonialized, privatizedsystem.This can be observedin many places in easternSpain, wherethereis a distinction between"old rights,"assignedon a Syrianprinciple, and "new" ones,on a Yemeniteprinciple. Whensucha change occurs,those affected perceivea loss in justice and in equity (see Glick 1972:166 n.105), and the Yemeniteversionis seen as a faulty version ofthe Syrianone.
lated links between human behavior and its materiallyexonlyin the present, pressedconsequencescan be documented i.e., synchronically, where both sides of the equation are dican be closely rectly observable.When a seriesofobservations and systematically linkedto one statedset of phenomenaand only partially, tenuously, or indirectly linked to others,it is explanatory power.This theformer linkagethathas thegreater oftherelation ofirriis thesignificance oftheHunts'treatment organization. gationagriculture and sociopolitical offallacies Particularly salutary is theirdisposalofa number hypothesis over thathave attachedthemselves to the hydraulic oftheseis thatcentralizatheyears.Amongthemostimportant tion implies the constantmeddlingof a bureaucracyin the detailsof everyday operation.Their point that such intervention is mostprobable in termsof decisionsor actionswhich, allowhileonlyoccasional,affect the broadestlevelsofenergy cation and the largestnumbersof people is well taken. With the Hunts, I lament the absence of the cross-cultural data Their use of essentially againstwhichto testthis proposition. suits the problem and role-theory criteriaof centralization thatmayultimately be tested, generates additionalpropositions byWILLIAM L. PARTRIDGE such as the probabilitythat water-control roles and other Department ofAnthropology, Los University ofSouthern California, in smallisomorphic social-control roleswill tendto be largely Angeles, Calif.90007,U.S.A. 25 III 76 of data preclude er, simplersystems. While the limitations While Hunt and Hunt are mainlyconcerned withorigins, the this propositiontests systematic verification or falsification, analytical distinction among tasks associated with irrigation well upward througha broader networkof more inclusive is important to othertheoretical agriculture such as problems size and degreeofspecializatheory (cf.Adam Smithon market development.It leads to an analysisof arenas of interaction tionand Wittfogel's denown statements concerning hydraulic bothwithin communities and betweencommunities and to the fromegalitarianto ranked societycan sity). The transition recognition that a systemof stratification in one important also be viewedfrom thisstandpoint. arena may have littlesignificance in others.In a municipio in The Hunts' relatinglack of developmentof observation Colombia whereI have worked, thisis a useful distinction. The internal at local level with the structural stratification the network is theproduct ofthe United FruitCompany irrigation hierarchy centeredelsepositionat the bottomof an existing and Colombian government alliance from1896 to 1964. The a a pointtaken where is breath statement of of fresh air-the local (regional)elite had no role in this.When the Company into accountby too fewwho deal withpeasant societies.As is leftthisregionin 1964,the irrigation canals, together withthe of hierarchic quite correct,this accords to the interrelation railroad, land, and physicalplant, were turnedover to the fromtheir national government. stratathe statusof a fact. It is deducible directly Since then the government has recognized old contracts withthe Company as legal use-right of infertitle stricture the epistemological illegitimacy concerning to irrigated land. Formerbanana growers switchedto cattle ring developmentally simple or early phenomena fromthe ranchingof the colonial-period type,whichdoes not use irri- observation of the local, peasantsectorof a complex,stratified gated pasture. The Agrarian ReformLaw of 1961 calls for The link betweenbehaviorand its consequenceswill system. of land that is underutilized. expropriation the Consequently, have very different material expressionin these two types regionalelite dominanceis now threatened by squatterswho of case. invade the cattleestatesand by nationalgovernment support As does Wittfogel the Hunts emphasizelabor and himself, of squattersin the formof legal services, credit,technicalasrelatedfactors rather its more than theintimately organization and other services sistance, neededto form peasantcooperatives of of flow at the expense energy capture. productivity-energy devotedto mechanizedrice agriculture. a be as function analyzed Labor organization can, however, The regionalelite, while powerful in many arenas of local life,has no role to play in irrigation. Construction, mainte- of scale of size and energycontentof the system-in sum, as underwritten Here my own emphasisdeparts by productivity. nance, and allocation are all government functions. The rebetween labor The relationship gional stratification system comes into the disputesettlement somewhatfromWittfogel's. in whichregionalelitesfindthemselves is morethan implicitly recognized, however, process, in the position and productivity of defendant, but decision-making the power restswith the naas executive moreattractive rolesare regardedas relatively tionalgovernment representatives. the opportunity fordifferential access,direct greater theyoffer Neitherthe national nor the regionalstratification system or indirect, Unlike any other to the production of the system. came intobeingas a result ofirrigation (whichis probablythe form of paleotechnic monumental construction, irrigation case in moststates),and probablymore attention should be worksrepresent the investment of energyto produce more paid to the manipulation of human and nonhumanresources energy. withunusualpotenThe result is a mode ofproduction of all kindsratherthan merely water.Nevertheless, in Colomas a function tial forintensification, withproduction increasing bia the irrigation system of the northcoast appears to be one until in carrying of with increase labor and capacity input elementin the rise of a new system of stratification which is the increased some new is reached. factor Since carrylimiting to competewiththe olderone. Hunt and Hunt's disemerging means, the entirepositive tinction betweentasksand arenasofinteraction can be usefully ing capacity is based on artificial both to natural feedback is vulnerable also system peculiarly employedin such a case. and to the applicationof politicalsanctions.Obcatastrophe byBARBARA J. PRICE viouslythe labor and productivity parameters are closelyre250 W.94th St., N%ew rork, U.S.A.12 III 76 lated; quantified data on thisrelationship would be desirable, N>.r. 10025, Because evolutionis a diachronicprocess,any theory of culeven where,in pragmaticterms,I tend to share the Hunts' turalevolutionmustbe formulated diachronically. Yet postupessimism. of synchronic and diachronicstudies me that a combination as the Huntssuggest, In the synchronic we is necessary. study, without need to testa "sample thatincludescommunities irrigationas a control group." To do so, it is crucial (1) to operavariablesofthehypothesis and (2) to test tionalizetherelevant bothwithand without thesevariableson a sampleof societies irrigation. The Hunts' paper is a valuable stepin the first proin urging increased use of cedure.In addition,theyare correct thehypothesis. I would emphasize diachronic data in assessing and ethnothe utility of archeological as well as ethnohistoric graphic research on the problem. The hypothesis requires analysiswithas greata timedepth as possible. In additionto thespecific variablesmentioned by theHunts, I would emphasizethe importance of analyzingthe functions in the local ecosystem. of irrigation Not all irrigation systems forexample,that utilizewaterin the same way. I have found, in the PeruvianAndes wateris used differently dependingon of irrigation, altitude(Mitchell 1976). The different functions of course,will have a directeffect on the size of the irrigation and the amountof waterneeded by the community. system 402
byWOLF RODER Department ofGeography, University Ohio ofCincinnati, Cincinnati, 45221,U.S.A. 9 iII 76 The Huntsappear to stretch the management ofquite varying on a bed of Procrustes of canal irrigation in orderto systems arrive at generalizationsabout socioeconomic patterns of powerand control.Layoutsand mechanicsof canal irrigation from place to place, usually in response to systemsdiffer and sourcesofwater.Some demand a highdegree topography use and controlof waterresources, of disciplined especiallyin the face of limitedsupply. Others are capable of leaving inratherindependentof or communities, dividual cultivators, centralauthority, althoughsuch controlmay be superimposed to the needsofcarrying forreasonshavinglittleconnection on order of businessforthe fieldresearcher The first irrigation. may be a carefulassessment of the level of managementor conditions underwhichirricontrol requiredby the particular gationis carriedon in his studyarea. I do applaud the Hunts' call forinvestigation of irrigation in historicaldepth and in termsof their agriculture systems of the largersociety.It is probconnection to social structures exably rare that entirelarge societiesdepend on irrigation from hencesocietalcontrols other clusively, maybe transferred This may be particularly of the societyto irrigation. segments the case whereirrigation is a late technological development adjacent cultures. diffused from of the Shona in easternRhodesia, Among one community irrigation diffused in theearlyyearsofthiscentury technology from The absenceofa tradition ofcustomary Europeansettlers. in conceptsof waterallocationand of community cooperation maintaining canals hamperedthe development of thisform of As is so oftenthe case, diffusion of technological agriculture. to adjust. innovation outranthe abilityof the social traditions the estabThere are indications thatirrigation did strengthen lishedsocialstructure ofchiefly control (Roder 1965:93-102). The irrigation evolvedundergovwhicheventually projects ernmentauthority were in fact closelycontrolledby central The layoutofseveral,but by no means organsofgovernment. forthe alloall, of thesedoes requirea measureofsupervision cation of water,but by no stretch of the imaginationcould theserequirements explain the almostdictatorial role of government. of the projectsis a subRather, the administration ofthe Rhodesianauthority structure. Since the Rhodesystem sian government to keep close control considersit necessary over Africans in manyrespects, its power over irrigation prois merelyone consistent jects and development aspect of the overallsystem (Roder 1965). The dangerto be avoided is the ascription of features of centralizedcontrolto the necessities of irrigation when these may well derivefromothersources. A clear conceptand definition ofcentralcontrolis needed. As a researchstrategy I would recommend comparisonof political and social structure between communities that practice and those in the same larger societythat do not. irrigation Quite similarhierarchies ofpoliticaland social control may be observable.The factthatlocal irrigation unitstendfrequently to crosscut other politicallydefinedterritorial unitsseems to argue forothersourcesof social stratification and administrativecontrol thanirrigation. The involvement of national or regional government authorities in local irrigation projects tendsto derivefromneeds for capital. Next to under-glass agriculture, irrigation is the most capital-intensive methodof farmproduction.It carries highrisk, long lead-times, and slowpayout.To the extent that farmers can maintaintheirown irrigation system, theytendto remainfreeof centralcontrol.Where theycannot,privateor public capital tends to bring centraldirection.That money controlsresources, and resources implypower,is not unique to land or water. Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
factthatthe less one knowsabout a matter It is a well-known convincing and construct the easier it is to raise hypotheses to knowtoo much. This is modelsof it. It is alwaysconfusing to move,howare compelled ofthehumanities thewayscholars in our branchesofknowlever,and it is perhapsmorestriking edge than in the naturalsciencesthat everyproblemsolved raises unpredictablemasses of new questions. We have to reckonwithtoo manyvariables.For thisreason I thinkWittis alreadyout of date, and so are many others fogel'stheory of the same kind. Every attemptforcesotherscholarsto rethepaperpresented and therefore however, think theproblems, the by Hunt and Hunt is welcome. It would have simplified the questionto the politicalcontrol case if theyhad confined and the social organisations and allocationof waterresources seekinvolved;but, bravelyenough,theytake a stepforward, descriptions, withrelevant ing the technicalbasis,documented What a challenge! and figures. measurements, to thetheoretical to contribute It is beyondmyqualifications by however, to the discussion, discussion.I mightcontribute emphasisingknowledgewhich was not included in the aubecause the relevantliteraturewas not thors' prerequisites not in languageswhichare normally available or was written fallintothreecateMy remarks scholars. to American familiar and geographical-and forpracgories-technical,historical, in the temin the arid zones and finish tical reasonsI willstart perate and subarcticregionsof Europe, Greenland,and Asia. withdrainis to balance irrigation theproblem In someregions age; in othersthe problemis not only to providewater,but whenwater ofsalt left quantities also to getrid oftheimmense evaporates. of the Middle Ages, the From al-Tabari, an Arab historian Andrianov (1969) recordsthat thousandsof Soviet scientist layerof salts and black Zinj slaves had to removethe surface theirrigated plots.After thewastematerialaway from to carry land ofirrigated in A.D. 869, 50,000hectares the Zinj revolted were abandoned and ultimatelybecame salt marshes (see ofthe Soviet is secretary UNESCO Courier 2[1972]). Andrianov data on the practicaluses of historical Academy'scommittee and in his book he has drawnupon in the nationaleconomy, from the ofirrigation ofthe development his broad knowledge B.C. to the Mongolian invasion, middleof the 2d millennium He sugwhen the Amu- and Sir-Darja regionwas destroyed. In or fivefold. the yieldrisesby fourgeststhatwithirrigation in of irrigation his survey, generaltrendsof the development the Middle East and India are included. ca. 4000 B.C. ofMesopotamiafrom theirrigation Concerning fromconmaterials to Roman times,Salonen (1968) presents In Ugarit in the sourcesas well as the literature. temporary centuries 14th-13th B.C., the land belongedto the temple,to it to. the palace, and to such personsas the rulerentrusted werejointly responsible ofthevillagecommunity The members In a chapteron irrigation, fortheworkto be done in thefields. Salonen gives technical termsand details of the irrigation the allocationofwater, social relations, as well as their projects etc. devices,water reservoirs, lifting the numberof workers, oflabor. he deals withthe organisation Elsewhere, is Schi6ler's(1973) book, richsourceofinformation Another or saqiya, noria probablyinventedin HellenisticEgypt,which chain of small containers, approxiwaterin a continuous lifts the machine-driven pump. A Coptic papymatesin efficiency wheelwith40 plugs a man whohireda potgarland rusmentions on July24; June 25 to the harvest forthe periodofirrigation, he paid 19 measuresof wheat and guaranteedthe loan by 27 403
Wheels.It is interestingthat the Romanand Islamic Water-lifting
byAXEL STEENSBERG on theHistoryof Agricultural for Research Secretariat International National Museum, Brede, DK 2800 CopenhagenImplements, Denmark.11 iv 76 Lyngby,
In Greenland, Krogh (1974) recentlyinvestigatedand mapped an irrigation systemwhich made it possiblefor the bishop of Gardar to keep about 100 head of cattle; the last bishop died in 1377 or 1378. In Norway,too, irrigation of grassland musthave been practised sinceVikingtimes, because the Atlanticislands were populated fromthat country.In a decision from 1303,a typeofardplough (Vassarder) is mentioned which,according to Hasund (1932), was usedformaking water channelsforirrigation. Hatt (1915) once wrotean articleabout irrigation of grassland in Norway.More recently, Michelsen has published a comprehensive studyon irrigation in the Nordic countries(1953) and an excellent smallstudy on irrigation ofgrassland in Otztal, in the AustrianTyrol (1955). Nowheredid the peasantsuse water-lifting gear, but theyoftenchannelledthe water across
404
The same practice is described in Havard Isfjording'sSaga, Landand Gragas. namab6k,
keration in case it shouldbe stolenor he shouldnot be able to returnit to the properplace in the same conditionas he received it. This is only an example of the exact information in sourcesavailable from antiquity. of the cultivation A description of a modernIndian paddyis given by Claus and Lintner(1975), includingrelesystem vant details on population,distribution of labor input,labor demand throughout the agricultural year, agricultural landuse divisions, cultivation and equipment. systems, Hunt and Hunt referto the use of subterraneancanals, qanats or karezes, in the Tehuacan Valley, a late derivative of the morethan 2,000-year-old practiceof the Iranian plateau. Humlum (1965) has publisheda generalsurveyof theirdisthe world, illustratedwith maps and tributionthroughout Relevant details and with an Englishsummary. photographs of construction, and use are given,but unfortudistribution, natelyverylittleis said about theirsocial significance. Most of canals were paid forand maintainedby the the subterranean who allocated the waterto theirtenantsand big landowners, sold it to privateholdersof gardensand shops. Consequently their social implicationswere quite different fromthose of allocation systems regulatedby the society,the small landor the tenants themselves. owners, It is not alwaysthe wateritself, but the minerals and siltor themanureit contains, thatmakestheland fertile. This is well known from themounEgyptand Mesopotamiaas wellas from tainousregions ofEurope. In tropicalNew Guinea, people dig canals in which silt is allowed to settle,and the silt is then scooped up and distributed overthe banks,fertilizing taro and othercrops (Heider 1970). This practicecould well be as old as cultivation in theNew Guinea Highlands-which,according to Jack Golson,is likelyto be about 9,000 years. In Europe,irrigation has been practised sinceantiquity, not onlyforgraincropsand legumes, and vineyards, but orchards, also forpastures.Columella recommended ofthe meadtilling owsforthreeyearswithrootand graincropsand finally sowing grass mixed withvetch.After the first the meadow scything, would be irrigated.In his book on Roman farming, White (1970) has a whole sectionon irrigation and organisationof watersupplyas wellas drainagein Italy.This corresponds well with Scheuermeier's (1943) detailed descriptions of the techniques of irrigation and water-lifting devices,illustrated with maps, drawings, and photographs, especiallyfromLombardy, but also fromSicily. This workis of immense significance for the understanding ofwhatthe classicalauthorsdescribe.Since it is written in one oftheinternationally well-known languages, I shall notrelateitscontents evenin summary. The language difficulty is greaterwiththe Icelandic sagas. Irrigationof meadowsis knownfromEgil's Saga; Skallagrim of Borg tellsin chapter80 thatwhen the ice breaksup at the meadow Stakksmyra, the grazingfor cattle on this irrigated pasturebecomesquite as good as that on manuredmeadows.
valleys in wooden gutterssupported by poles and beams and scooped it out and spread it fromsmall reservoirs or dammed canals with a special shovel. In Gudbrandsdalen, situated in the shadow of the westernmountains,the climate is dry, as it also is in many deep valleys on the west side of the ridge.For thisreason the corn fieldsare also irrithe springploughing, gated before and the use of drillsowing machinesas early as the 1770s mustprobablybe understood as a means of preventing evaporation.Indeed, a kind of dry was practised in which,after farming sowing,sheep and goats weredrivenacrossthefield to trample thesoiland coincidentallyloosentheuppercentimetres withtheir hooves.In a drysumwith wooden scoops was practisedas oftenas mer,irrigation ten timesduringtheseason. This would alwaysbe done in the or in theevening, neverin the middleofthe day, and morning not duringthe night, whenit might cause erosionwhichcould onlybe noticedtoo late. A grassfield,however, could be irrigated duringthe night. Often,severalfarmswere irrigated fromthe same stream, and each springan official was elected to allocate the water. The share of a singlefarmcould be calculated fromits irrigated area or from itsdutiesto thestate.Irrigation is recorded fromlegal disputesfromthe late 16th century, and finesfor in the 1687 Christian damages are codified V's Norske Lov. The qualityofthe waterwas not alwaysthesame. We know fromarid zones thatsubterranean waterfromqanats was preferred because it was cold and would not evaporateas rapidly as surfacewater and leave soluble salts on the top layer. In temperatezones near mountainglaciers,the water could be too cold, and therefore water frombigger streamswas preferred to waterwhichcame direct from the melting ice. On the otherhand, in northern Sweden and in subarcticareas it was the practiceto dam therivers in orderthatthe meadowscould be covered withice during thewinter. This restricted thegrowth of mossesand shrubs,and in spring,when the waterwas released,thegrasswouldflourish and producea richhay-harvest. In the Alpine regions, irrigation is recordedfromthe 13th century.It was practisedin Wallis in Switzerlandand in Otztal (mentionedabove) fromat least 1313; in the upper Rhone Valley it is recordedfromthe Middle Ages. Probably the techniqueof irrigation came to DenmarkfromGermany as late as the 18th century, together with the improvedhusbandry,but in some partsof Germany(e.g., Siegen) it was a commonpracticefromtime immemorial. In Norway as well as in otherregions, the meadowscould be manured,the dung being dissolvedln the irrigation water. In Stephens's(1855) The BookoftheFarm,manuring in that way is recordedfrom Sir George Montgomery's sheep farmin Scotland. He simply collected the water fromthe surrounding and sheep-drains fiveacres of meadow withit. In thisbook, different irrigated methods ofirrigation are described from private properties, and it is wellknownthatirrigation is an old practice in manyshires, as it is also in England. As my comments may have shown,irrigation is not always planned by a society, thoughthe societymay play its part by makinglaws forthe regulation of rivers, streams, and canals. I doubt that a singlemodel can collectall these Furthermore, variationsunder one hat, and I fear that models in modern often anthropology producea falseunderstanding because they build upon limitedknowledge. This is not intendedas a criticismoftheauthors butas a generalwarning specifically, against takingmodelsin the humansciencestoo seriously. byROBERT WADE Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex,Brighton, England. 27 II 76 "What we need ..,. is to return to thefieldwitha moreclearly specifiedset of questions." Our questions depend on what problemswe wish to address.The Hunts' questionsand conCURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
cepts may be usefulfor addressingproblemspertainingto theoriesof social evolutionand local social organization.If, become more conhowever,as seems likely,anthropologists of policy,we cerned to make theirworkrelevantto matters mustalso ask whether thekindofapproachused by the Hunts in the designand operationofirrigation is likelyto be helpful systems. can potentialIt seemsquite clearthatsocial scienceanalyses to irrigation ly make an important contribution policy,and it has notbeen realized. India, is equally clear thatthispotential withthe second-largest irrigated acreage in the world,is cura major rethinking of irrigation rentlyundertaking matters, of existing irriin responseto the generally poor performance for gation facilities(especiallycanals). Yet the prescriptions ofan engineering or narrowly improvement are almostentirely the canal structures, economicnature:modernize improvethe layoutofirrigated fields, set waterpricesright, and put in bettermarketing structures; theseare the limits ofthe suggestions made. Some attention is also being given to the formation of water-users' associations,but virtuallyno attentionis being at theirrigation directed and theotherbureaucrabureaucracy cies directly and irrigated involvedwithirrigation agriculture. I suspect(on the basis ofpreliminary fieldresearch)thatcharacteristics ofthe way irrigation is organized, especiallycharacteristics of the irrigation bureaucracy,are criticalinfluences on the performance ofirrigated and thatmanyof agriculture, thesecharacteristics are changeableby government action. Has anthropology any legitimate businessin this field?In the design and improvement cerof water-users' associations, tainly.One has to be cautious,however, about assumingthat rolesand procedures whichworkeffectively in small-scale systems,withwaterusersfully responsible foradministration, can be transferred to large-scalesystems in whichresponsibility is and users.At leastin the Indian consplitbetween government seemsto make so big text,thefactofgovernment involvement a difference to thebehavioroffarmers thatone can learnfewer lessonsfromthe studyof autonomous systems than one might think at first sight. In terms ofrelevanceto policiesforimprovement, however, the local level is surelynot the level to focuson, not,at least, in the context of Indian canals (whichtend to be largerthan those found in Southeast and East Asia or in Africa). The Hunts recognizethatone cannotlearn much about the larger from thestudy oflocal systems system within it,but theirpaper -and mostotheranthropological studiesof irrigation, apart fromthe macro studiesof Stewardand others-is about local and looksat largersystems the bottomupsystems, onlyfrom wards.It wouldbe a pityifanthropologists confined themselves to thislevel,fortheycan contribute to our understanding of the structure bureaucraciesin a and operationof irrigation way thatothersocial scientists cannotor will not,particularly ofirrigation observation by direct engineers (and otherofficials in theirnativehabitat,goingabout connected withirrigation) their usual business on the canals, at home. Space at the office, limitations preclude an attemptto specifyhow this kind of can contribute in the perforto improvement understanding mance of irrigated here I can only assertthat it agriculture; will. To reach this kind of understanding, however,requires that some anthropologists, some of the time,take theirproblems not from theories of social organization and social evoluthe concerns tion but from of the bulk of mankind-problems offoodproduction, productivity, incomedistribution, and employment-and work backwards into their discipline from there.
IMRE WELLMANN by Hungarian Agricultural Museum, 1367 Budapest XIV., Vajdahunyad-var PJ. 129,Hungary. 26 III 76 Hunt and Hunt seem to oversimplify historical evolutionby stating"three major (and cumulative) ways of intensifying
agriculture as and identifying irrigated plantfoodproduction" last by farming, mentioned the second. In fact,industrialized the authors,had partlybeen preceded,in Flanders and Enrevolution of moderntimes,which gland, by the agricultural Further, withlaid thefoundation ofmoderncrop production. genetics,plant out the developmentof science-trophology, could have had onlya limitpathology, etc.-industrialization it ed effecton agriculturalprogress.As regards irrigation, prevailing stage of developcannot be considereda generally mentin the history ofagriculture. Irrigation,along with the social organizationassociated it notonlyfacilitated withit,nonetheless had greatsignificance: but also rendered possibletheestabtheincreaseofcropyields, in arid zones. Hunt and Hunt mention lishment ofagriculture exbut it would be worthwhile rice and sugar production, meadresearch to all kindsofirrigation, amongothers tending ow irrigation, whichplayed an important role in the developThis is important because the dementof animal husbandry. of as well as the techniques mand forwaterand itsperiodicity, irrigation, vary fromone type of crop to another,and this affects the social structure. as well The demandthatresearch be extendedto otherfields the statement ofHunt and Hunt about the inonlyunderlines adequacy of the researchconductedso far. There reallyis a and detailed case studiesof gap betweengeneral hypotheses smalllocalities, and thisis whythe authorshave limitedthemto raisingproblemsand settinga coursefor selvesessentially beingso fewand further research-valuable local monographs far between.I fullyagree with them that, besides fieldwork, more attentionshould be paid to historicaldocumentation, development to be traced over longer which allows historical periodsof time,always withan eye to the changesthat have occurredin climate,methods of production, population,market relations,possessionrights, and social and political conditions. It is also rightto demand that researchnot be limitedto narrowlocal units-especially,ofcourse,ifone is dealingwith severallocal communities. artificial including irrigation systems studiesare no does not mean that community This, however, indicate that longer necessary.Hunt and Hunt themselves is embeddedin a wider even wherelocal irrigated agriculture technical problems and maintenance,the power structure, tasksof allocation,and matters of gradual developeveryday So were mentwere usuallyregulatedwithinthe community. internal rightly pointout thatthe central disputes:the authors and could be settledpeacefully powerwas happierif conflicts is even as cheaplyas possible.The autonomyof communities have been estabsystems greaterwheresmall local irrigation As long lishedthrough the efforts of the peasant community. and in local matters as none of the higherpowersintervenes such social differences, does notintensify cash-crop production are governedto a greatextentby local cusirrigation systems and religious concerns. norms, rites,beliefs, toms,community to leave folkmodels it would not be expedient In thiscontext, out ofone's investigations.
Reply
byROBERT C. HUNT and EVA HUNT Brandeis University, c/o Department Waltham, of Anthropology, Mass. 02154, U.S.A. 19 iv 76
Some 30 different pointshave been made in the comments. categories, They seem to fall into threemore or less distinct Research labelled"Comparative-Study whichcan be (roughly) Design," "Results," and "FutureField Research." research design. Bennett and Lewishave pointComparative-study 405
1976 Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September
ed out that both energyand resourceutilizationare larger contexts forour studyand have takenus to taskfornot highlightingthis. It was not our purpose to elaborate on all the paradigmswhich would be relevantforthisstudy.We agree thata generaltheory ofresource allocationis highly desirable, thata generaltheory ofenergy flowin humansociety is necessary,and that the two would probablylargelyoverlap,but it was notour intention to producea majortheory in thisarticle. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that, given the limited purposesof this paper, theywould have been served by the addition of the largercontexts When Hevelius set suggested. out to describethe cratersof the moon, he could hardlybe made responsible for not incorporating a theorywhich also explainedthe red spotofJupiter. Roder has statedthatour paper is set in a Procrustean bed. One ofour purposes was to sharpencategorical about thinking the subject (which has been muddilytreated) by being very carefulwithscientific It is unclear conceptsand distinctions. to us how Roder distinguishes betweenclear thinking and beds of Procrustes and why he thinksour analysis has been inhibited.Once he has presented his evidenceclearly, we will be happyto respondfurther. Ahmedseemsto findour discussion ofWittfogel and Millon irrelevant fora discussion of local social organization. He has failedto understand whatwe have done. We have presented a justification fortransferring from generaltheoretical attention whole societiesto communities. The major set of conclusions about local social organization is thatof Millon. Need we say more? MacLachlan has suggestedthat problemsof cross-cultural validity (the relativity, or equivalence, problem) are more easilysolvedin studiesofspace and resources. We are notsure about the generaltermsof his suggestion, but will agree with him thatforthe studyof irrigation, and probablywaterworks in general,problemsof cross-cultural conceptualvalidityare muchlessseverethanforvirtually any otherendeavor.Clearly theconcepts involved in allocation willbe themostproblematic, but thereis no indicationyet that, once theyhave been adequately studied,theywill not yield to cross-cultural conceptualization. Some of the details of our researchdesignhave also been commented upon. One of our purposeswas to distinguish several tasks attendantupon canal irrigation. We are gratified thatnobodyhas attackedeitherthe purposeor the results and thatLewis and Partridge approve. Ahmedhas in effect complained thatour sampleis too small, because we "could profitably have included one of the most extensive canal irrigation systems in the world,in South Asia, notto mention others." We suspect he is referring to thePunjab irrigation systems, but since he providesno references we are not certainas to whichare the publishedsourceswe have neglected.We will be happyto receiveany references to detailed empiricalstudiesof canal irrigation systems whichcovereven a partoftherangeofinformation involved in our studies.Most anthropologists do notdo field studies wherethereis irrigation. Those who do often ignorethephysical system completely, and the roles (and otherphenomena)associatedwithit are barely mentioned. If theyhappen to pay some attention to these,the subjectsare usuallynotclearlymarkedin thetable ofcontents, and sometimes notin the indexeither.Lastly,it is almostuniversalthat the book reviewspublishedin major anthropology journals in the U.S.A., Canada, and Europe do not mention the presence,or importance, of irrigation in the workunder review.Kinshipand othertraditional problems are muchmore likelyto receive specificattention.Only a few studies have focusedany significant amountof attention on irrigation, and finding themhas been a long, hard, and tediousjob of swimmingthrough the literature. In writing the paper, we decided to concentrate on a few well-known studies.Since then,one ofus (RCH) has embarked on a larger-scale comparative study 406
betweencanal irrigation and local social of the relationship More than two dozen additionalstudieshave been structure. workwill be based on a much turnedup, and theforthcoming a serious problem.India larger sample.SouthAsia stillpresents with the second-highest hectotal of irrigated is the country forwhichgood communitytaresin theworldand the country for to Steensberg to find. We are grateful leveldata are hardest to Claus and Lintner (1975). This largerwork the reference withseveralaspectsof local social organizawill deal directly tion. The major doubt about our model is raised by Steensberg, will a singlemodel of canal irrigation who questionswhether forall the variations. We agree thatprobablyno model suffice such without a serioustry can do so, although now in existence Whenwe have a sufficientpremature. a conclusion is somewhat therangeof cases,covering ofwell-described ly largecollection we can proceedwithmoreeffective modeling. variation, Several scholarshave remarkedon our call for historical believethattime-anchored cause-and-effect studies.We firmly are worthlookingforand that theyare likelyto relationships In thispaperwe deliberatewithirrigation. be foundconnected largelybecause the research ly avoided mostsuch statements, such relationships currently calls for design for establishing timeperiods, analat different i.e., a diachronic measurements ysis.We are not yetin a positionto producesuch a comparative study,or even a good completecase study.Incidentally, that measurements of two we disagreewithPrice's contention We feelthat or morevariablescan onlyoccur in the present. historical has the careful work,underthe rightcircumstances, potentialof yieldingthe appropriatedata at the appropriate of cause and effect. timeperiods, questions thereby permitting In the meantime,it is usefulto proceed with correlational and we are doingso. studies, That we have emphasizedthe labor input,and not the prohas been mentionedby Price, duction output, of irrigation Wade, and Lewis. As we pointed out, it is not because the due to irrigation are unimportant, or additionsto production than the organizationof labor. In the larger less important thisissuewill be dealt studynow in preparation, comparative with at some length.Sufficeit to say here that there were in the community no data on production studies,so virtually on labor. We agree that for the momentwe concentrated and more studiesof productioncapacity and intensification of production about the results forsocial orcarefulthinking important. ganizationare not onlydesirable,but extremely MacLachlan has pointedout thatotherwaterworks (and the we said so ourlist approaches a dozen) may be important; to examinecanal irriselves,but our purposehere was simply may be just as gation in some detail. The otherwaterworks socially,perhapsin varied ways,but untilthe data important to the betterto directour attention are available we prefer is in Cleekobserves thatscale ofworks documented phenomena. generalbadly conceived,and he pointsto the need fora good on We agree heartily of centralization. operationaldefinition bothcounts. studying Followingus, Roder and Mitchell have suggested and the one set withirrigation matchedpairsof communities, on social the effect of irrigation to determine otherwithout, on theparameters structure. Havingspentsometimeand effort ofsuch a research design,we can say thatthisis not as simple as it sounds.The onlystudieswe are aware ofthatcomparea with irrigation and anotherspecificone specificcommunity it are two in India (Epstein1962,Mencher1966) and without a Mexican case (Finkler1973). All presentproblemsif they are to be used as Roder suggests. wereverynear to In the Epsteincase, the two communities receiveda massive each other, and theregionhad veryrecently scheme.The "dry" vilcanal irrigation government-provided area and on a main lage was just on the edge of the irrigated whereasthe "wet" village was in the middleof the highway,
irrigated area and on a secondaryroad. Many individualsin the "dry" villagealreadyowned,or soon bought,"wet" lands in neighboring Is this,then,a true"dry" village communities. in any significant sense?We thinknot. In Finkler'scase, the "wet" village received a deep well from the government, whereasthe "dry" village did not. In both cases, the "wet" villages the"dry" onesturned intensified their farming, whereas to moreextensive contactswithoutsideagenciesand markets. In bothcases,the waterworks wererecently introduced by the central polity. it seemsto us, is relevant Neither ofthesestudies, fora testinvolving traditional long-term presenceand absence ofirrigation works. Mencher comparednucleationof villages,centralization of kingdoms, and the ecologyof waterworks and land transport betweenKerala and Madras in South India. She foundthat highlynucleatedvillages,highlydeveloped roads, and more highly integrated kingdoms were associatedwiththe area with lower rainfall and largerirrigation works(Madras). Mencher has a strongcorrelation, but it is clear that irrigation works are not the only difference betweenthe two areas. Assigning causal priority to irrigation is a relatively arbitrary decision. Withrespect to controlling in comparative variation studies, thereare basicallytwo choices:one can eithertryto minimize otherkindsof variationor to maximizethem (cf. Przeworski and Teune 1970: chap. 2). Anthropologists usuallychoose the Most SimilarSystems design.Our instinct is to do so also. This requiresus to controleverything but the presenceor absence ofirrigation. It is easyto control levelin thepoliticalhierarchy, populationlevel,perhapseven thedemography ofsocial strata. How, we ask,are we to control theease of communication with othercenters ofpopulation? Most important, does the specific structure of the local mode of production have an effect upon the matching procedure? In Mexico, mostof the valleyshave been irrigated forat least 1,000 years,while mountainregions use rainfall agriculture. Since mountains and valleysare structuredsociallyverydifferently and have been so formillennia (cf. Sanders and Price 1968, AguirreBeltr'an 1967), it is difficult to imaginefinding communities withand without irrigation in whichthe resourcestructure is in some way matched. If,however, thepointofthisdesignis not to matchtheresource base, how are differences betweenresourcebases other than irrigation to be takenintoaccount?These are seriousproblems whichneed a greatdeal offurther thinking. Results. The transition between the Yemenite and Syrian modes of allocationis commented on by Glick and Bennett. In the paper we adopt the same positionas Glick (Cleek is thatthereis a shift wrong), from Syrianto Yemenite.(The empirical workforboth of us has been in the Iberian-Mediterranean tradition.)Bennett, on the otherhand, proposesthat thesequenceis reversed, tendto evolvefrom that"systems the Yemenitetowardthe Syrian" wherethereis privateproperty in land and increasing demand forwater.He further suggests thatas land tenure movestoward collective theSyrian solutions, principle may be modified by the state and replaced by "collective-use schemesor relatedmethodsof allocation." We are not now in a position to decide the issue.Rather,two kindsof workare needed. Several components of theseallocationprinciples have been suggested forstudy,includingtechniques for measuringthe water,land tenure,size of water source, and supplyand demand curves.These need to be spelled out and clearlydefined. Second, we need empiricalstudiesin whichall the components can be measuredand a shift is documented to have occurred.It maybe thecase, as Bennett in effect suggests, thattwo principles ofwaterallocationare notenoughto cover the rangeofphenomena.It may also be the case thatit is possible for a societyto shiftback and forth cyclicallybetween allocationprinciples, dependingupon demand conditions that we may be able to specify.Certainlyno unilineal trend is visiblein the literature we have consulted. Thus the potential Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976
development may be (a) Syrianto Yemenite,(b) Yemeniteto else,as yetunidentified. Syrian,(c) cyclic, or (d) something steady been undergoing The worldhas forthe past century populationgrowth.Up until some time in the 19th century, many areas had gone through however,mostof the irrigated successivephases of growthand decline of population. The demand forwaterand therefore fluxof populationwill affect the relationship ofsupplyand demand curves.If it is truethat it followsthat this relationship affects allocation principles, until the recentpopulationexplosiontherewould have been no unilineal and irreversible trend in shifts in allocationprinciples. cyclically, deback and forth Rather,theywould have shifted pendingupon demand.There is someevidenceforthiscycling in the Middle East (cf.Gibson 1974) and in our Mexican case (E. Hunt 1972, Hunt and Hunt 1964). It may be that under as Bennett theconditions ofthelast 100 yearssucha progression We now has in fact been true in large nation-states. suggests need a small numberof carefully researchedcase studiesto the conditions underwhicha shift one principle to from clarify the otheroccurs. This may simultaneously clarify how many ofallocationprinciple we are dealingwith.Then we can types return once moreto well-grounded theorizing. thatpoliticaland hydrologiWithrespect to our observation cal boundariesseem not to coincidemostof the time,at least that thiswould today,Roder makesthe excellentobservation and implythatthereare "othersourcesofsocial stratification When we can finally administrative controlthan irrigation." this turnour empiricalattention to matters ofcause and effect, one to answer.It is not certainthat questionwill be a primary themismatch is as old as thestate.It would oftheseboundaries seemto be the case in Post-Classic Tehuacan, medievalValenand politicalboundcia, and medieval Japan thathydrological If thisis true,and if aries were veryclose if not isomorphic. the crazy-quilt distribution ofboundaries is a modern(i.e., industrialor colonial) phenomenon, then we have a relatively to explain. If, however,the missimple set of circumstances match of boundaries is found much more generally,then Roder's hypothesis one. We verymuch becomesa verystrong need studies of the relationships between various kinds of boundariesin clearlyspecified historical contexts. Wade pointsout thatwe should,someofthe time,trya topdown view,in place ofour usual bottom-up one. In one sense, of peaswe agree wholeheartedly withthis.The anthropology and of complexsocieties, has been movingin thisdirecantry, terms, for40 yearsor more. In our tion,at least in theoretical fieldstudies,however, on a single we tend to focusprimarily bias. Top-down a localocentric place, and thisgives,inevitably, studiesof specific water-control systems (ratherthan of whole be verydesirable. bureaucracies)would certainly by our use of the Bennett statesthathe is not overwhelmed of thatit is a fundamental principle conceptofembeddedness, rural social organization. That is true,and beside the point. At stake in our presentation are a numberof general issues, and bureaucratization, centralization, specialization, including It was from ofirrigation control systems. powerwhichis derived that water and power easy forMillon to conclude,in effect, are not connectedif therewas no systematic specializationor We hope to have exposedsome of the flawsin centralization. is crucial The phenomenon ofroleembeddedness thisposition. to not having We plead (a little)guilty to thisdemonstration. The existence set the concept in its mostgeneralframework. is not obvious, of the phenomenonin certaincircumstances San Juan has a populationof over 3,000; the roles andpeople. of total numberof official powerrolesis in the neighborhood 35-40, and the actual powerbrokers are about 10. Rather,it seemsmorelikelyto be a function ofwhether the responsibility 407
of of the relativenumbers however, and it is notsimplya function
foroperating the physical is focusedon a locale or on a system centralgovernment, and thisis not simply a matter of thesize of the community or of the physicalsystem. The sourcesof variationare not yetclear to us, but it is certainly morecomplicatedthanmerenumbers. set of conclusions, Turningto a different thosesuggested by the commentators, we findthereare somewe can supportand some we feel should be challenged.Partridgepresents some data fora case in Colombia in whichthe local community apparentlynever had any significant forthe irriresponsibility gation system. This is exactlythe kind of case that is badly needed in the literature, and we urge Partridgeto get these data published. Steensberg'sadditions are particularly welcome. In general,we findhis discussion and opening exciting new areas of thought.One of the benefits of publishingin CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY iS the creationof truly international dialogues. One is able to discover importantreferences to workspublishedin languages one doesn't command and to become acquainted with the thinking and work of people it would have been difficult to knowabout under othercircumstances. Bennettclaims that thereis a tendency forgovernments to take over local systems, to run themfora while,to hand controlover to the local authorities, and then to take themover This is probablyuniversal, again if theybecome disordered. and the degreeto whichlocal people can and willruna system alone whenthereis a possibility thatan externaland superior agencyis interested in doingthejob, and underwhat circumstances (of capital investment, etc.) this occurs, badly need study.We have a clear case fromSan Juan which is the reverse-there was local oppositionfromall social classes and interest groupsto the proposedfederalconstruction of a new dam and canal, all seeingtheactionsofthestateas threatening to theirspecific interests (Hunt and Hunt 1975). In southern Japan, thereis also strong resistance to prefectural and national involvement in local management(Beardsley,Hall, and Ward 1959), even thoughtherehave been at least two recent government investments (reclamationof land around Niiike and improvement of the bed of one of the rivers)in thiscentury.In the Ebro Valley and in Iraq, thereis a degreeoflocal responsibility, althoughin both cases this has diminished in the last 50 years (Lison-Tolosana 1966, Fernea 1970). Some othercases are confusing, especially thatofTaiwan (cf.Pasternak 1972,VanderMere1971). Bennett's hypothesis seemssound and reasonableenough,yet the lack of comparative case materialsand some apparentcontradictions are seriousand warrantextreme caution. Roder suggests that oftensocietal controls can be extended fromotherinstitutional realms.When thisis true,it nullifies irrigation as the majorsourceofpower.There is no doubtthat it has sometimes been true. If we understand Adams's (1966) argument thisappears to have happenedin the citycorrectly, statesin Mesopotamia,as well as during theindustrial-colonial era ofmoderntimes.But to find, as surely we will in a general way, that the controlof an irrigation system is attractive to roleswithothersourcesof powershouldin no way deflect the searchforregularities in whichirrigation (and generally water control) is the primary source of power. Both typesof study are important and ideallywillyieldcomplementary insights. Both Roder and Bennettsuggestthat centralizedcontrolis a function ofthecostofthesystem. The moreit costs, themore likelythat an extra-local agencywill have to be involved.He who paysthe pipercalls the tune.Bennett's proposalsare complex. He argues that large construction is imposedfromoutside and maintenance is locallycontrolled because of costfactors.State bureaus have a monopolyin money,skill, knowledge, etc. He appeals to Zipf'slaw and goes on to claim that some Wittfogelian propositions boil down to economictruisms. In essence,Bennett'spositionseems to be that no elaborate theoryis necessaryor desirable to explain centralization of 408
We have sevof maintenance. or decentralization construction to this. eral responses etc.,are skill,knowledge, It is notat all obviousthatmoney, ofstatebureaus.This may well be the case in the monopolies but it maynotalwayshave been so. For example, 20thcentury, was local and pieceBali, much construction in preindustrial forqanats, meal. In Tehuacan, thestatemustgrantpermission local indepenbut the technicaladvisorsand capital are from againststateregulations. working often dentcooperatives, projectsare not handled It appears that large construction in today'sworld. Part of withlocal capital and otherresources of waterworks the reason for this is that most construction terrain(the "easy" projects today (a) takes place in difficult have already been built) and (b) is on such a scale that no necessmall social unit could possiblygeneratethe resources sary. true that local people will It is certainlynot universally dominachoosewhatis "cheaper" despitethefactthatit brings the case from tion fromoutside.We have already mentioned resistedcentral strongly San Juan, in which the community to build a new dam and canal which attempts government would have increasedthe irrigatedarea by more than 30%. was certainly the majorpartoftheir Resistanceofdomination response. projects It is not at all clear, again, thatmajor construction are alwaysimposedon the locale by the center.One mightbe was justifiedin arguingthat the SouthernCaliforniasystem by the local powergroups, imposedon the centralgovernment ratherthan the other way around. The movie Chinatownis ofsome cases. probablyaccurateethnography to deWith respectto maintenance,as part of the effort ofirrigation, it was necestermine thefacts ofthe organization as possible. Since the sary to be as detailed and systematic are to be exsample used here is so small,fewgeneralizations pected. If it turnsout to be true that maintenanceis locally then explainingit is easy, and one of the simple controlled, will probablytake by Bennett suggested economicpropositions ofexplanathentheproblem itis nottrue, care ofit. If,however, tion becomesmuch more complex.The only way to findout forthe cross-cultural what is true is to search systematically they factsand presentthem,howevertrivialor self-evident appear to someofus. might is desiredin efficiency Bennett also arguesthat "as increasing ... thereis need fora supra-authority water-control systems, matter, to pay the bills" (italicsours). This is a verydifferent is and one which our paper was not addressedto. Efficiency worried about statebureaucracy ofa central a concern typically it at a high increasingnational productionand maintaining states level. This concernis widespreadin some industrialized thesize ofthesys(Japan, Taiwan, Spain, U.S.A.). Increasing is verydiftem (whichis foundin everycase study),however, is designed ofuse. The first theefficiency from ferent increasing The second to increasetotal waterand/orland in the system. degradaaims at decreasingwaste of wateror environmental tion. A new dam and main canal involveonly a shorttimeand require only by centralauthority period of intervention on the other minimallocal cooperation.Increasingefficiency, to change trying activity, hand, usually involveslong-range the behaviorof everyuser of waterforat least allocationand Ironically,central maintenance,and oftenfor construction. is mostlikelyto become involvedin routinelocal government whenits goal is to increaseor maintain maintenance precisely 1976 foran example). efficiency (see Freemanand Lowdermilk in efficiency, however,poses a new The fact of state interest local social organiand interesting problemforunderstanding zation. Further workis clearlyneededin all thesedirections. boil propositions It is not clear to us which "Wittfogelian proposiSome Wittfogelian downto simpleeconomictruisms." wrong(cf.Adams 1966fora few);all are hightionsare clearly What is needed are not untested hypotheses. ly controversial
but rathercarefulstatements of the general generalizations, with the propositions and an equally careful confrontation ethnographic evidence.This is a long and tediousprocess, and in thispaper. There is we hope we have made some progress no substitute forthe hard work.Up to now,the fieldhas been dividedinto pro-Wittfogel and anti-Wittfogel parties,and the positionshave usuallyhad bases quite removedfromempirifrom the We therefore disagreethatwe could have benefited use ofother"economicmodelsor at leastelementary economic perspective."We have asked economic questions; what we have refused to do is answerthemin an elementary fashion or take unsupported positions.The assumption that all systems want growth or that all choose economicvariablesover other kindsis patently false.A community or small societymay refuseeconomicaid because it entailspoliticaldomination. One can say thatthe legendary old lady who sat in the front ofher hut in the valley while the TVA floodedher out is a lovely folk exampleoftheconflict betweenlocal and nationalsystems. We completely agree with Bennettthat instrumental considerationsdo not always prevail. This is not because the culturalmaterialist positionis naive, but because a sophisticated cultural materialist position,with which we identify, considersrelationsof productionas part of a complexset of variables which require synchronic and diachronicspecification to make sense of evolvingsociocultural conditions. The problem withtheso-calledanthropological Marxistapproaches is that theyare seldom at the level of ethnographic clarity or theoretical sophistication of Marx's or Engels's own thinking and are often producedby people who have notread Marx and who confuseeconomic (e.g., moneyflow) variableswith the ofservices, social aspectsofeconomics(e.g., theflow appropriaand so on). tionofresources, direction ofproduction control, makesso muchdifference Wade arguesthatthe government useful. thatthestudy is perhapsnotvery ofautonomous systems If we acceptas a legitimate purposeofour research theattempt then to encompass all kinds of experience with irrigation, is relevant.We would agree, clearlythe autonomoussystem however, thatin the case ofthe verylarge and centrally manin arid lands, local autonomy aged modernirrigation systems is simplynot a relevant factor, at least insofar as the thincurrentdata reveal. MacLachlan arguesthatallocationis probablymoreimportantthantheothertasks, contrary to whatwe merely speculate. In the largerstudynow underway we hope to be able to apwe proachthisquestionin a productive way. In the meantime, would welcometheoretical certainly arguments. Future We social anthropologists clearly have fieldresearch. much to learn fromthe archaeologists in termsof interdisciplinarycooperation.Both MacLachlan and Bennettsuggest thatwe shouldutilizespecia]ists We could in otherdisciplines. not agreemore.A relatedissueis Lewis's cautionthatphysical measurements maynotbe simpleto get.He is verylikely right, and this reinforces the need for cooperationwith technical such collaboration specialists. Presumably mightmake it possible to do what Roder suggests-establish what controlsare fora system. actuallynecessary Cooperationwiththe relevant would also perhapshelp to dilutethe localocentrism specialists identified by Wade. As thisreply suggests, and our commentators have remarked, muchremainsto be done. Let's keep going.
cism.
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WITTFOGEL, KARL.
total power.New Haven: Yale University Press. WOLF, ERIC. 1966. Peasants. Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall. WOLF, ERIC, and ANGEL PALERM. 1955. Irrigation in the Old AcolJournalof Anthropology 11: hua Domain, Mexico. Southwestern 265-81. Berkeley:University of CaliYALMAN, NUR. 1967. Under thebo tree.
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A comparative despotism: study of 1957. Oriental
Matti Sarmela of the Universityof Helsinki (cultural was electedchairmanand BjornKurten,also of anthropology) deputy the University of Helsinki (physical anthropology), * Anthropological in Finland has been spread over a research The Henni The of the Ilomaki. address chairman. secretary is number of disciplines,and representatives of the different Seura r.y./Antropologiska Societyis Suomen Antropologinen branchesof anthropology have had little contact with each Sallskapeti Finland r.f.,PL 248, 00171 Helsinki17, Finland. other.Culturehas been the domainofethnologists (social and materialculture)and folklorists (spiritualand social culture), * MANNFRAEDISTOFNUN HASKOLA ISLANDS (Institute ofAnthrowhile social anthropology has been linked with sociology. of Iceland) was establishedin 1975. Its pology, University Physicalanthropology has been a focusof interest for a few governingbody consists of four members chosen by the and researchinto "primitive"cultureshas, naturalscientists, Gudmundur Eggertsson, University Board-Gudjo6nAxelsson, since the time of Edward Westermarck, been virtually nonJohann Axelsson(Chairman),and SigurjonBjornsson(Secreexistentexcept for studies made by a few Finnish scholars tary); one appointed by the Director-Generalof Public probablybetterknowninternationally than in Finland. The Health-Olafur Olafsson;and one chosen by the Icelandic word "anthropology" itself has frequently been interpreted to Anthropological Society-David Davidsson. The directorof mean physical whilethegeneralstudyofculture anthropology, of Education and the the Institute, appointedby the Minister has been referred to as generalethnology. University Board, is Jens P'alsson.Its researchemphasesare The need fora forum whereanthropologists could meetand of Icelanders,pigmentation of hair and the anthropometry discusstheirinterests has been feltfora numberofyears.This eyes, age changes, secular changes, urbanisation,regional demandfora concentration of anthropological under interests effects, dental differences, "ethnogenesis," exogamy/endogamy one roof,so to speak, has been augmentedby the need to and cardio-pulmonary in relation characteristics morphology, promotethe studyof Finnishcultureon a wider basis than and development. to growth hitherto and to approach it fromviewpoints that cross the in Iceland include Earlier anthropologicalinstitutions traditional boundaries betweenacademic disciplines as well as Icelandic ISLENZKA MANUFRAEDIFELAGID Anthropological (the by Finland'sincreased participation in aid to theThird World, in 1969,whichhas organizedmanymeetings whichhas meantthat more needs to be knownabout foreign Society),founded topics. involvinglecturesand discussionon anthropological cultures. Its governing body includesJens Palsson,President;Magnu's On March 20, 1975,thetimewas at lastripefortheinclusion Einar Siggeirsson, Secretary; ofa new Finnish scientific society amongtheranksoftheexist- M'ar Larusson,Vice-President; and JohannAxelsson, Eggertsson, Helgi Eliasson, ingones. In setting up and namingtheFinnish Anthropological Gudmundur thefounders have adoptedtheAnglo-Saxon Society, conceptof MANNFRAEDINEFND HASKOLA ISLANDS (the Jon Julilfusson. anthropology as "the science of man." The Society,SUOMEN Committee of the University of Iceland) was Anthropological ANTROPOLOGINEN SEURA/ANTROPOLOGIsKA SALLSKAPET I FINcreatedin December 1971 to make suggestions about anthroLAND, is bilingual, and its aim, as expressed in the rules appological researchin Iceland and cooperationwith foreign provedat the first meeting, is "to further the studyof man, of Itschairman was Gudmundur itssecretary scientists. Eggertsson, humansocieties and cultures, theanthropologi- JensPalsson; othermembers byencouraging were David Davidsson,Sigurdur cal sciencesand closelyrelatedfieldsof studyand to increase and Olafur Olafsson. MANNFRAEDISTOFNUNIN Thorarinsson, the knowledge and understanding of foreignpeoples and in 1972 by the Institute of was established (the Anthropology) different cultures." by it and the Societyand supported The Society will publish a periodical,SuomenAntropologil Icelandic Anthropological of and its Parliament Iceland. Its director was Jens Palsson FinlandsAntropolog, to providea forum formethodological and body includedJohann Axelsson(Chairman), Gudtheoretical on anthropological articles research and to dissemi- governing It has been replaced mundurEggertsson, and OlafurOlafsson. nate information about current anthropological events, includby thenew Institute. ing recentstudentpapers. Among the activitiesunder consideration is the preparation For further information, please write: Mannfraedistofnun of a report about anthropological research in Finland. Iceland. H'askola Islands,Asvallagata54, Reykjavik,
Institutions
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Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization [and Comments and Reply] Author(s): Robert C.

Research forAnthropological Foundation 1976by The Wenner-Gren

Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1976

Canal Irrigation and Local Social Organization'

Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

. feudal system" (p. 28).

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

come to two conclusions: (1) that "new construction .

Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September 1976

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The same practice is described in Havard Isfjording'sSaga, Landand Gragas. namab6k,

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

1976 Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

1976 Vol. 17 * No. 3 * September

among Mexican ENGE, KJELL. 1973. The social aspectsofirrigation

Hunt andHunt: IRRIGATION

AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

A comparative despotism: study of 1957. Oriental

N 3 * September No. 1976

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