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CONTENTS
Vol. 10, No. 4: OctoberDecember 1978
Tenth Anniversary Issue: Vietnam
Jayne Werner - Introduction
Earl Martin - A Journey to My Lai and Beyond
Ngo Vinh Long - The Indochinese Communist Party and Peasant
Rebellion in Central Vietnam 193031
Christine White - Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam/
Photographic Essay
Jayne Werner - New Light on Vietnamese Marxism / A Review
Essay
Thich Minh Nguyet - Memoirs/translated by Paul Quinn-Judge
Nguyen Khai - An Excerpt from March in the Tai Nguyen
(Central Highlands) / translated by John Spragens
Nguyen van Trung - The Bicycle / abridged and translated
by John Spragens
Serge Thion - Current Research on Vietnam / A Review Essay
David Marr - The State of the Social Sciences in Vietnam
Marilyn Young - Vietnam Rewrite
BCAS/Critical AsianStudies
www.bcasnet.org
CCAS Statement of Purpose
Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose
formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979,
but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose
should be published in our journal at least once a year.
We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of
the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of
our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of
Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their
research and the political posture of their profession. We are
concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak
out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to en-
suring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the le-
gitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We
recognize that the present structure of the profession has often
perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.
The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a
humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies
and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront
such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We real-
ize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand
our relations to them.
CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in
scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial
cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansion-
ism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a
communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a
provider of central resources for local chapters, and a commu-
nity for the development of anti-imperialist research.
Passed, 2830 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
Contents: Vol. 10, No. 31 October-December, 1978
VIETNAM
I
Jayne Werner 2 Introduction
I
I
Earl Martin 3 A Journey to My Lai and Beyond
Ngo Vinh Long 15 The Indochinese Communist Party and Peasant Rebellion
in Central Vietnam, 1930-1931
Christine White 36 Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam /
photographic essay
Jayne Werner 42 New Light on Vietnamese Marxism /
review essay
Thich Minh Nguyet 49 "Memoirs" / translated by Paul Quinn-Judge
Nguyen Khai 53 An excerpt from "March in the Tay Nguyen"
(Central Highlands) / translated by John Spragens
Nguyen van Trung 55 "The Bicycle" / abridged and translated by
John Spragens
Serge Thion 60 Current Research on Vietnam / review essay
David Maw 70 The State of the Social Sciences in Vietnam
Marilyn Young 78 Vietnam Rewrite
Pages 4,16,35 Maps of Vietnam
Inside back cover Index for Volume 10,1978
Editors
Bruce Cumings (Seattle); Saundra Sturdevant (Berkeley)
Associate Editor: Jayne Werner (Tucson, AZ); Managing Editor: Bryant Avery (Charlemont, MA)
-
Editorial Board
Len Adams, Nina Adams (Springfield, IL), Doug Allen (Orono, ME), Steve Andors (Staten Island), Frank Baldwin (Tokyo),
Ashok Bhargava (Madison, WI), Herbert Bix (Tokyo), Helen Chauncey (Palo Alto, CA), Noam Chomsky (Lexington, MA),
Gene Cooper (Hong Kong), John Dower (Madison, WI), Richard Franke (Montclair, NJ), Kathleen Gough (Vancouver), Jon
Halliday (London), Richard Kagan (St. Paul, MN), Sugwon Kang (Oneonto, NY), Ben Kerkvliet (Honolulu), Rich Levy (Jamaica
Plain, MA), Victor Lippit (Riverside, CA), Jon Livingston (New York), Ngo Vinh Long (Cambridge, MA), Angus McDonald
(Stanford), Joe Moore (Flagstaff, AZ), Victor Nee (Ithaca, NY), Felicia Oldfather (Trinidad, CA), Gail Omvedt (Pune, India),
James Peck (New York), Ric pfeffer (Baltimore, MD), Carl Riskin (New York), Moss Roberts (New York), Joel Rocamora
(Berkeley), Mark Selden (St. Louis), Hari Sharma (Burnaby, BC), Linda Shin Pomerantz (Los Angeles), Anita Weiss (Oakland,
I
CA), Thomas Weisskopf (Ann Arbor, MI), Christine White (Sussex, England), Martha Winnacker (Berkeley).
General Correspondence: BCAS, Post Office Box W, Charlemont, Massachusetts 01339. Typesetting: Archetype, Berkeley,
California. Printing: Valley Printing Company, West Springfield, Massachusetts.
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Oct.-Dec. 1978, Volume 10, No.4. Published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall, and
Winter. Subscril'tions: $9; student rate $7; library rate $14; foreign rate (outside North America) $10; student rate $8. Bryant
Avery, Publisher, P.O. Box W, Charlemont, MA 01139. Second class postage paid at Shelburne Falls, Massachusetts 01370.
Copyright Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 1978. ISSN No. 0007-4810 (US)
Postmaster: Please send Form 3579 to BCAS, P.O. Box W, Charlemont, MA 01339
Introduction to the Tenth Anniversary Issue
by Jayne Werner
With this issue we celebrate the tenth year of publication
of the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. The Bulletin's
parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Schol
ars, was founded to protest the war in Vietnam and the silence
of the Asian studies profession with regard to U.S. sponsorship
of the war. [See the Statement below.] From there, the
concerns of CCAS and BCAS spread more generally to anti
imperialism and to providing a forum for a more balanced
assessment of socialist societies in Asia.
In keeping with the original anti-war and anti-imperialist
purposes of BCAS, this special issue on Vietnam seeks to
elucidate events and problems in Southeast Asia from the
perspective of the countries themselves, and not U.S. policy.
We arc publishing this issue at a time when the socialist unity
of Indochina has been broken, if it ever existed, and when
Asian Studies and academia in the United States seem unwill
ing to lift the blanket of silence that fell on Indochina after
the war's end.
Earl Martin lived in Vietnam for many years as a Men
nonite missionary and stayed behind after liberation in 1975.
His article tells of his encounters with members of the revolu
tionary army and movement in central Vietnam and his visit to
an area near My Lai. Ngo Vinh Long chronicles revolutionary
events in approximately the same area almost 40 years before.
He analyzes the beginning of the communist movement in
central Vietnam and the first Communist Party-led uprisings,
which culminated in the Nghe-Tinh uprisings in 1930-31. His
article is also a major revisionist critique of work which has
portrayed the events of 1930-31 as "spontaneous" and "local"
in nature. On the contrary the movement was highly organized
and coordinated with events in other parts of the country and
laid the basis for later revolutionary action.
The remaining articles include: selections from a south
ern Vietnamese Buddhist monk's memoires recounting his
experiences with the southern revolutionaries; a translation of
an article by a South Vietnamese professor about life in Saigon
after liberation; a photo essay on Vietnam; reviews of some
recent books on Indochina; a report on the social sciences in
Vietnam; an& an essay on current efforts in the United States
to camouflage the meaning of the war.
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars
Statement of Purpose
We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggres
sion of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or
silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in
the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the conse
quences of their research and the political posture oftheir pro
fession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of
specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian
policy committed to ensuring American domination of much
of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to
change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of
the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated
many people in the field.
The CCAS seeks to develop a humane and knowledg
able understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to main
tain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as pov
erty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be stu
dents of other peoples, we must first understand our relations
to them.
The CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing
trends in scholarship on Asia which too often spring from a
parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and ex
pansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a cata
lyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western
scholars, a provider ofcentral resources for local chapters, and
a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.
[passed March 28-30, 1969, Boston]
2
A Journey to My Lsi and Beyond
by Earl Martin
"We'll ride out through My Lai, down to the sea, and
then north to my village. You'll see what the war really meant
to our people. We'll spend the night in my hamlet. You'll see
how life is in the Liberated Zone." Anh My, our young medic
friend from the Hospital's Rehab Center, was succeeding hands
down in his attempt to persuade Hiro and me to join him for a
two-day bicycle trip to the remote villages along the sea in
northeastern Quang Ngai Province.
Although Yoshihiro Ichikawa ("Hiro"), my enthusiastic
and bearded Japanese co-worker, and I had lived in central
Vietnam for five years, the "Liberated zone" had always been
beyond our reach. That was "V.C. Country" as the GI's had
always called it. But now that was all different. A week earlier,
with the Saigon army-the ARVN-experiencing repeated
setbacks throughout the country, the American officials had
advised us all to leave. There would be a bloody battle for
control of Quang Ngai, they had predicted. But Hiro and I had
opted to stay. To leave then, we felt, would have negated the
very promise of our presence there in the first place. The
position of the Mennonite Central Committee, our sponsoring
organization, had always been to offer open, neutral service to
anyone in need, regardless of their religion or politics.
For a week Quang Ngai city had churned in a hopeless
turmoil, until one evening the ARVN panicked. They fled
town in a suicidal attempt to get to the Chu Lai port to get
boats to Saigon. Tl1at night, without a fight, the guerrillas
strolled into town declaring "the liberation of Quang Ngai."
Ironically, now that the whole province had become
"V.C. Country," Hiro and I were to experience more freedom
to travel than, ever before. The reason was obvious: no more
battle lines to cross.
So an hour after sunup on Saturday morning, Anh My,
Hiro and I were off, riding three abreast down Phan Boi Chau.
We stopped in at the Buddhist pagoda to pick up a friend from
Anh My's native hamlet. Chi Sau, a sturdy, unmarried woman
in her early forties, had recently visited our home fora New
York Times interview about her five years in prison. A
"communications agent for the Viet Cong" had been the
charge, although there never had been a trial to establish
proof.
Enthusiasm ran high as we pedaled north out of town,
across the Tra Khuc bridge and east toward the sea. We were
soon passing one of the many refugee camps built on the
outskirts of Quang Ngai to house the people who had been
Adapted from Rooching the Other Side by Earl S. Martin. New York:
Crown, 1978. Printed with permission.
driven off their farms by the war. This morning a man was
swinging a heavy club, smashing the mud walls of his refugee
house. Others were pulling the thatch off the roofs of other
huts. In fact, most of the mud buildings in the camp were
already demolished. Men were salvaging the bamboo posts that
had formed the framework of the houses. Others were taking
beds, tables, cooking pots, bamboo poles or a few sheets of
USAID-supplied tin roofing and tying them onto bicycles or
shoulder poles. Already the road ahead of us was streaming
with people pushing their loaded bicycles or jogging to the
rhythm of swinging shoulder-pole baskets.
"Where are you heading?" we called as we biked past
one group of refugees.
"Back to Son Quang," one called back.
"Just tell them we're going home!" added another.
It had been a long time in going home for these people.
Some of them had been in the camps for eight to ten years.
One group of refugees came from east of My Lai in the villages
of the Batangan Peninsula which jutted out into the South
China Sea.
The area had known a strong guerrilla presence for
decades. During the "First Indochina Wir" the french had
never been able to make inroads into the province, and the
people of Batangan, like other regions, had built watchtowers
to scout for French bombers which occasionally harassed the
people of the province. After the French defeat in 1954 many
of the men from this region who had sided with the Viet Minh
revolutionaries were among those to "regroup" to North
Vietnam under the provisions of the Geneva Accords. It was
these men-and some women-who would subsequently return
to the South and playa vital role in the Viet Cong or, as they
called themselves, the National Liberation Front (NLF).
We had a close friend in Quang Ngai city whose native
home was in the Batangan. As a lad he had often heard his
mother relate the story of his father leaving with a party of
men for North Vietnam.
"My mother said that she and Father knew for several
months that someday he would be leaving, but no one knew
the exact day. It had to be kept secret so the French or the
Saigon troops would not sabotage their trip. Then one evening,
just as it was becoming dark outside, the knock came on the
door. It was the men who had planned to go with Father. He
picked up the cloth bandoleer of rice that Mother had
prepared for him and slung it across his shoulder. He put on
his conical hat-all ready to go. Then Mother says he picked
me up and embraced me. I was only three at the time. He said
3
good-bye to Mother and pulled his thatch grass raincoat
around his shoulders and walked out into the rainy night
carrying a small lantern. That is really the only memory I have
of my father, watching out the door of our little house as he
walked the winding dike through the rice paddies. I can still
remember that lantern bobbing up and down."
For the next twenty years our Batangan friend would
not hear of his father again.
"Batangan." It was the French and American variation
on the Vietnamese name, Ba Lang An, meaning the three
villages of war. Thanks to their revolutionary fervor which
spawned a strong guerrilla presence, the villages of the
Batangan and the surrounding area would, with the escalating
American presence, become subject to a merciless rain of fire
and steel. Repeated massacres, most frequently at the hand of
the mercenary Korean Blue Dragon Marine Brigade, and an
intermittent barrage of American artillery, napalm and bombs
would become the regular lot of the area's farmers. Despite the
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danger, many people decided to stick it out in the countryside.
It was, after all, home. The fields and cattle were there. To
leave them would mean no way to support your family. To
leave seemed like a vote for suicide by hunger.
In the end, the "Allied" strategists finally decided that
the presence of these "stubborn" peasant farmers in the region
meant increased support for the guerrillas. The oft-cited
maxim really was true: The guerrillas were like fish swimming
in the sea of the people. After many frustrated attempts to
"pacify" the Batangan region, the U.S. Americal Division
operating out of Chu Lai launched what they hoped would be
a final solution to the problem: Dry up the sea.
"Operation Bold Mariner" got underway in January,
1969. During a four-day period six American and ARVN
battalions-approximately two thousand troops-circled the
Batangan villages in a "soft cordon" formation. Leaflets
dropped from planes ordered all the residents of the villages to
assemble in open fields. From there the people were hustled
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4
aboard large Chinook helicopters, ferried six miles toward
Quang Ngai city and dumped out on a barren sand spit along
the Tra Khuc River. Into a three-acre area surrounded by
barbed wire, the 11,000 villagers were corralled, but only after
they had gone through intense interrogation by the
Vietnamese National Police to weed out and imprison the
"vcs" and the "vcc"-the Viet Cong Suspects and the Viet
Cong Confirmed. In fact, a great many of the able-bodied men
and unmarried women of the villages were guerrillas, but when
they had gotten advance warning of the operation they bade
farewell to their families and escaped to the west. Hence most
of the people caught in the dragnet were either children,
yoUng mothers or old folks. As these villagers were sent
through the g ~ t e into the camp, they were greeted by several
television sets featuring films which boasted the popularity of
the Saigon Government. Over the entrance to the camp a large
banner in Vietnamese welcomed the newcomers: "The People
are Grateful to the Government for Emancipating Them, for
Providing a Way of Escape from the Treacherous Com
munists."
After the people had all been removed from the
Batangan, the American and ARVN troops systematically
destroyed all the houses and other structures in the area. It
was, an American official had explained to me, an attempt "to
deprive these resources to the enemy." Once the "Viet Cong
infrastructure" had been wiped out, many of the Batangan
people were moved back to the peninsula. Not to their native
homes, of course. They had been burned to the ground. But to
"return to village" camps, where the people were placed under
sharp police surveillance and were required to be within the
perimeter of the camps by an early curfew each evening. Other
of these "refugees from Communism" remained in the camps
surrounding Quang Ngai City.
Now today, the "liberation" of Quang Ngai Province
spelled literal liberation for these farmers from the years of
idleness and despair in the camps. As our quartet pedaled east
toward the sea, we continued to pass the caravan of
home-goers. Five miles down the road we came to the site of
the most notorious symbol of the Vietnam War: My Lai.
Today the hamlet was silent. It was exactly seven years to the
month after Lt. William Calley and Charlie Company entered
this hamlet one morning and demonstrated graphically to the
world the logic that is war. Today the only memorial to the
scores of men, women and children who were gunned down in
cold blood was the plaintive whisper of the breeze through the
pine trees which lined that ignominious irrigation ditch where
many of the bodies had once lain.
We pushed on. Just several kilometers beyond lay the
South China Sea or, as the Vietnamese revolutionaries prefer
to drop the allusion to China, the "Eastern Sea." The terrain
was level here. The only vegetation was an overgrowth of
tough grasses and, here and there, a tree along the bank of the
river we were following. Anh My informed us that before the
war the river had been lined with coconut palms and bamboos.
Fruit trees had grown prolifically in the vicinity. The once-lush
fields by the path now lay fallow. The reason was soon
obvious.
At the juncture of the river with the sea, we saw a series
of charred posts protruding above the river's surface. It was all
that remained of the dike-bridge that once prevented the
ocean water from intruding into the fields of the area. It took
just several bombs in 1967 to deliver the blow. With sea water
backing up into'the river, three to four thousand acres of rice
land in the nearby villages were jeopardized. One crop of sweet
potatoes or manioc could still be raised on the high fields
during the rainy season, but growing the irrigated paddy rice
Quang Ngai
5
was now out of the question. Furthermore, the demolishing of
the dike-bridge meant that land travel was cut to the villages
across the river on the Batangan Peninsula. We would have to
wait for a boat to ferry us across.
Several dozen people gathered by the bank of the Tra
Khuc, many of them refugees also waiting for a boat so they
could return to their native hamlets across the river. Among
the group were several young guerrillas. Three young women
in their early twenties carried American M-16's and one
slightly older fellow had an American M-79 grenade launcher
slung on his back. Anh My struck up a conversation with the
young guerrilla who was cuddling a pudgy, tan puppy in his
arms. Shortly Anh My and the guerrilla were chatting about
the area and the people whom they knew in common. Bui Tan
D ~ n g seemed a particularly fitting name for this youth because
his skin was the deep color of bronze, dong in Vietnamese.
Anh Dong (anh means brother; chi, sister) was so soft-spoken
we had to conccntrate to catch his story.
"There. My home used to stand over there," he said
quietly in answer to our question. We could only estimate the
location from the angle of his pointing arm. There were no
landmarks remaining for reference. "The bulldozers came and
then it was over. The trees, the houses. Everything." He said
that the destruction of the pine trees and bamboos created
particular hardship for the returning villagers because now
they had no shade from the tropical sun, no windbreak from
the salty sea breezes and no building materials at a time when
all three were needed most.
But the scar of human injury went even deeper. Anh
Dong related how he had several close family members killed
in the My Lai massacre. As a local hamlet guerrilla, he had
been captured by the Americans in 1972 and was sent to the
prison island of Con Son, famous for its inhuman "tiger
cages." When he was released at the end of 1973, he returned
to this hamlet.
From our vantage point on the eastern seaboard of
Quang Ngai Province, it was totally impossible to conceive of a
defense for the American involvement in Vietnam. The
popUlation had been decimated, the villages destroyed, and
even the land-the base of the people's livelihood-lay in ruin.
When I asked Anh Dong how he now felt about the Americans
and, specifically, about the Vietnamese in the province who
had supported the American policy, I could only expect a
bitter response.
Instead, with a quiet earnestness, he spoke of
forgiveness. "Now that's all over. Now we can begin again. It's
the policy of our government to welcome back those people
who supported the Americans."
Our conversation with Anh Dong was interrupted with
the sudden appearance of a low-flying helicopter speeding in
from the sea and following the river in the direction of Quang
Ngai city. A visible alarm spread through the people. My mind
raced irrationally. A war plane in a land of peace! Shoot it
down! My anger boiled up so spontaneously that only after
the helicopter disappeared from sight up the river did I realize
that mixed with my rage had been a strong element of fear.
During my five years in Quang Ngai I had, of course, seen
countless helicopters. During the Tet Offensive in 1968 I had
seen helicopter gunships strafe and fire phosphorus rockets
from not a hundred feet over my head. That had been
frightening enough, but this was the first time I was standing
in what these choppet pilots considered enemy territory. For
the first time, I was in a position to be a potential target of
that helicopter's 30-caliber strafing guns. For the first time, I
stood where the Vietnamese villagers "on the other side" had
stood. Had I been in this position throughout the war, I fear
my pacifist principles may have gone up in smoke.
Anh Dong appeared as calm as ever with the appearance
and disappearance of the chopper. It obviously was not the
first time for him to be in this position. He speculated that the
pilots were attempting to make a rescue of ARVN officers or
police -who were hiding out in some thicket and radioing
Danang which was still in ARVN hands. He said that it was the
second helicopter for the morning. An earlier one had been
shot down somewhere to the north.
While we were waiting for a boat to show up, an ARVN
army jeep came driving toward us from the direction of Quang
Ngai. From a distance I could see a red plate with the insignia
of a three-star general mounted on the righthand windshield.
The jeep drove toward our group of people, then stopped. A
man in civilian clothes jumped out of the driver's seat and a
senior-aged revolutionary cadre emerged from the passenger's
side. The cadre strolled about without speaking. He surveyed
the landscape and the bombed-out dike, and then without a
word to anyone, he and the driver climbed back into the
three-starred jeep and drove off. Only then did Chi Sau
whisper to me that the cadre was one Anh Van, "one of the
highest ranking Party officials in Quang Ngai Province." Just
where he had gotten the ARVN jeep with the three-star
insignia remained a mystery because the highest AR VN officer
Quang Ngai had ever rated was a general of one star!
Eventually, we received word that a boat was available
to ferry us across the river. We pushed our bikes down over a
hill toward the water's edge where the sampan was waiting.
Upon spotting me, the tall boatman jumped out of his boat
and started waving his arms and yelling angrily, "American!
American! Grab him! Watch him! Hey, he's just running loose!
Get him!"
For a second the man's fury paralyzed us all. Then Anh
My and Chi Sau, situated between me and the boatman,
quickly walked up to the riled man. "No, no, everything's all
right. This American is different. He isn't going to hurt
anyone."
"But he shouldn't just be walking around loose like that.
After all, just look at what the Americans have done around
here. Look at this dike, look at our houses, look at our
fields.... Open your eyes, I say, and see what the Americans
did to our village. Get him, I tell you, get him!" The man's
arms kept waving as he continued. "Why those American
invaders even took their bulldozers and pushed the graves of
our ancestors into the river. Into the river! Our forefathers'
graves! And you say this American is not going to hurt
anyone. Grab him, I say! He's dangerous!"
"No, you don't understand," Chi Sau spoke softly as
Anh My placed his hand on the man's arm. "This American
and his Japanese friend ... they're different. They hate the
war. They hate the bombing, the bulldozers. These fellows
fought against the war. They're for peace. They want to help
rebuild the countryside. They're our friends."
The lanky boatman ran his hands through his tousled
hair. Anh My stood by his side quietly reiterating Chi Sau's
explanation of us. The barefooted man eyed us carefully. One
could tell he was straining to conceive of an American who
was not bent on creating hardship. Could an American actually
6
be friendly? Finally the boatman shook his head, threw down
his hands and said, "Well, if they are who yro say they are-if
they really help the people, then let me lift their bicycles into
my boat and I'll take them across the river."
American journalists and scholars had often ryped the
Vietnamese peasant as one whose interests revolved only
around farming and fishing, maintaining good relations with
the neighbors, paying homage to the ancestors and continuing
the family line. This image saw the peasant as devoid of
interest in political affairs and ignorant of the larger national
scene around him. In short, he was "apolitical, just wanting to
be left alone to farm his rice."
As with most stereorypes, there was a certain truth to
this image. But the feelings expressed by these people along
the sea in eastern Quang Ngai reflected those we had heard
from farmers allover the province. To be sure, they did want
to be free to grow their rice, but they had some pretty clear
ideas about what and who had been keeping them from their
fields and orchards. They were sophisticated enough to know
who had bombed their dikes and who had bulldozed their
villages. And that knowledge easily converted into some rather
powerful feelings about the political forces which swirled
about them.
Once across the river we bade adieu to the boatman who
turned out to be quite friendly-and talkative-after he
decided we were no threat. Now on the Batangan Peninsula we
walked past some of the "return to village" camps which were
set up after Operation Bold Mariner had been completed.
Unlike the traditional Vietnamese village which the noted
Vietnamese artist, Vo Dinh, once described as "a garden
within a larger garden of fields and hills, rivers and rocks,"
these camps were a series of hovels built next to one another
with none of the saving graces of the individual wells, tall
coconut palms or shading bamboos which are integral to the
traditional village.
An hour's walk along the white sands of the South China
Sea and across the peninsula brought us to a second river to be
crossed. Here the boats were in plentiful supply. So were the
children. And the inevitable chant began as soon as the
children spotted us. "Ong My, Ong My . .. Mr. American, Mr.
Ainerican!" When I had first arrived in Quang Ngai I found the
thronging of the children most unsettling, but I had long since
accepted it as an immutable feature of living in Vietnam.
Actually, such discourtesies rarely occurred among children
living in their traditional village habitat, only when they were
crowded together in the refugee camps or the cities. Whenever
it happened, adults nearby would perfunctorily chide the
youngsters for their raucous disrespect, but to no avail. The
chanting would continue unabated.
Today, it was safe for Chi Sau to take an approach I had
never heard used before. She turned to the swarm of children
behind us and said kindly, but firmly, "Here, here ... now
you children are the nieces and nephews of UnCle Ho! And it's
not polite to shou t like that at our guests." The allusion to the
national revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh did the trick. The
children immediately fell silent.
Our boat across this second river was larger and we rode
with several other pass:ngers. Chi Sau recognized one of the
women aboard. "Weren't you in prison the same time I was?"
Chi Sau exclaimed. And in the following minutes the two
women shared experiences of their time in the "Quang Ngai
came back,
this man
remained...
EARL MARTIN
"Earl Martin was one of the handful of Americans who stayed
on to witness the Communist takeover of Vietnam in the
spring of 1975 ... He is a good observer with a keen sense of
both the Vietnamese people and the countryside."
-Kirkus Reviews
"Vital profiles of ordinary people facing dramatic
changes in their way of living." -Publishers Weekly
Illustrated. $10.95, now at your bookstore CRO*N
7
Reformatory." They reminisced about one warden who was
especially heartless in his dealings with the prisoners, of the
meager fare in prison, of the cold cement floors which served
as beds for the inmates. The two women were silent for a
moment. Chi Sau's friend looked pensively up the river and
then simply, "Now no more prison."
"Yes, sister," Chi Sau affirmed, "prison's over."
The dock on the other side of the river marked our entry
into Binh Chau village. I had previously heard only the name
Binh Duc for this village but now learned that the Saigon
Government had changed all the village names in 1954 and
that Binh Chau was the name the Viet Minh used before 1954;
the revolutionary side continued to use that name until the
present day ..
Perhaps eight square miles in area, Binh Chau was the
"native hamlet" for both Anh My and Chi Sau. This village
was divided into many smaller hamlet areas, each originally
comprising approximately one to two hundred families and
their lands. We had to push our bicycles up a steep hill which
gave us a clear view of the region. From this vantage point we
could see the river we had crossed and the long dike that had
been built near the mouth of this river, similar to the one east
of My Lai. Anh My explained that this dike had been built in
1931 to prevent salt water intrusion over the five or six
hundred acres of fertile rice land just behind the dike. It was
this land which was the primary source of food for the hamlets
of Binh Chau village. But today as we viewed the flat land
behind the dike, it was entirely flooded with salty ocean
water. A hundred-yard section of the dike was missing. In
1967, several strategically placed American bombs had wiped
out the rice basket of Binh Chau village.
Although the embattled Binh Chau had frequently
changed hands throughout the war, Anh My's father had always
opted to stay, somehow working out an accommodation with
the belligerents on all sides of the war. But eight months
before, in July of 1974, the two sides once again began
shooting over Binh Chau. Anh My's father, a handsome and
magnanimous person by My's description, was killed in the
crossfire.
From the top of the hill we biked a winding course
toward Anh My's hamlet of Phu Quy. Nearly all the farmer
folk along the narrow path called out greetings to Chi Sau and
Anh My as we passed. It was the first homecoming in three
years for My; six years for Sau. As with a horse nearing its
home stall, the pace of Anh My;s bike steadily accelerated. We
were soon bouncing over ditches, around hedgerows and
through gardens until he turned a final corner and announced,
"We're here!" He propped his bike along a squash arbor and
ran toward the small house of mud and thatch, "Uncle,
uncle, are you home?" We were soon being introduced to this
uncle and that sister and other cousins and friends, all of
whom were being referred to as "brother so-and-so" or
"aunt-so-and-so. "
Ecstatic with the sweetness of homecoming, Anh My
forgot to invite. us to sit down. But the uncle quickly did the
honors. In a minute we were drinking tea around the bamboo
bed in the center of the small, crowded room. But Anh My
and Chi Sau were already off in the neighborhood looking up
old relatives and friends.
As we talked it turned out the "uncle" was not really a
brother of either My's father or mother, but here that was
irrelevant. In the confines of the hamlet there was a sense to
8
which everyone was part of one's extended family. Hiro and I
were soon engaged in conversation with "Uncle Hai." Having
grown up in Phu Quy hamlet, Uncle Hai had farmed here for
nearly all of his fifty-seven years. He used to cultivate land
down in the valley behind the Binh Chau dike, but after that
was bombed he had to depend on less productive garden plots
closer home. He grew a few vegetables and enough tobacco to
supply his water pipe throughout the year. Even now, we
could see some of his freshly harvested and shredded tobacco
pressed onto woven bamboo racks drying in the sun outside
his front door. Six years earlier, foreign soldiers had herded
Uncle Hai aboard a Chinook helicopter and flew him toward
Quang Ngai city. He was one of the eleven thousand persons
caught in the dragnet of "Operation Bold Mariner." Uncle Hai
never even got into the refugee camp. Like most of the
able-bodied male "refugees" in this operation, he was weeded
out by the Vietnamese National Police as a "Viet Cong
suspect. "
"They took me to the Quang Ngai Interrogation
Center," Uncle Hai related in response to our curiosity. "Oh, I
guess I didn't get treated any worse than any of the others.
They beat me on the back with the casing of a mortar shell.
Then they beat me across the knees. Two men in our group
were beaten to death. Many others were injured badly."
Uncle Hai pulled a small wad of tobacco out of a stained
plastic bag while he talked and stuffed it into the neck of his
water pipe. Then he held the steady flame of a small cigarette
lighter over the tobacco while he sucked several short breaths
through the pipe. The tobacco now glowing red, he took one
long sustained draw, mingling the cosmic elements of fire and
water and inhaling the smoky fury into the center of his being.
"They had a strange way," he continued through the
cloud of smoke he released around his head. "When they beat
or tortured us, they said it was to teach us not to follow the
Communists. But the more they beat us, the more we wanted
to follow the Communists." Uncle Hai shook his head as he
laughed aloud. Rather than expressing bitterness or even anger,
Uncle Hai seemed almost to pity the Saigon Government for
having to contend with such hard-headed prisoners.
The smoke evoked an added mellowness from the
tough-skinned farmer. "They just didn't have a chance," he
sighed with a lugubrious shrug of his shoulders. And then
brightening, he added "Now as for the revolution ... well,
above all, it's virtue. In the revolution you've got to have
virtue. Why did we win? Because we had virtue. Due lue nao
eung thang! Virtue always wins!"
Eventually Chi Sau and Anh My reappeared and we all
sat cross-legged on Uncle Hai's bamboo bed and ate a meal of
small fish and squash. Sliced manioc was fixed with the rice
indicating a more spartan diet than the preferred all-rice meals
of most Vietnamese who could afford it.
After the meal we four sojourners took our leave of
Uncle Hai and began a trek through the hamlet. One could tell
by the relatively unweathered appearance of the thatched
roofs that the few houses scattered here and there over the
hamlet had been of fairly recent construction. It had been less
than a year since the NLF had retaken this village from the
ARVN and only a valiant-or desperately hungry-few farmers
had then moved back to the hamlet to begin planting their
gardens. We walked stretches of several hundred yards where
there were no houses. The paths cut through untilled fields
grown over with high grasses.
Without the bicycles we were more in touch with the
soil, and with the persons moving along these paths who gave
the soil its soul. In all likelihood these same paths had for
centuries been trodden by the coarse feet of farmers whose
basic instincts were similar to Uncle Hai's. These paths had
been the playgrounds for barefoot children spinning tops and
flying kites in the cool hours of the evening. And certainly
these paths had felt the nervous steps of the young groom
escorted by father, uncles and matchmaker to the house of the
appointed bride, to take her back to the family of the groom
for marriage.
Then came the boots, leaving over-sized tracks in these
dusty paths. Government Issue boots, carrying men of giant
r oportions. Men with steel pots on their heads and rifles at
,beir hips. Other men of modest proportions and familiar
almond-shaped eyes, but wearing the same boots. Boots on
the path.
And the sandals, cut from discarded tires, darting across
these paths in the cover of darkness. Sandals carrying erstwhile
farm boys each wearing a headdress of grass and carrying a
small basket of TNT-filled tin cans topped with simple
pull-string fuses.
Then ominous shadows of airborne machines streaked
over these paths at lightning speeds. And in their wake the
paths lay broken with deep craters.
Then other sandals, even a pair of leather shoes, and a
few bare feet moving slowly, in cadence to the wailing dirge of
the procession making its way over these paths toward the
distant plot with the hole freshly dug in the earth.
Then the flat, spread-toed footprints of women who
never covered their feet, leading once again to the scattered
gardens of squash, corn, beans, and sweet potatoes.
These paths knew all. But today as our foursome walked
through the remains of Phu Quy hamlet, the paths were silent.
At a juncture of our path with another, we could see the
thatch roof of a small hovel rising inconspicuously above the
tall grass that surrounded it. A young woman in front of the
house called to Chi Sau as we passed. Chi Sau returned the
greeting, "Em Duyen, is that you? Troi ai, you still live here?
How's your mother? Is she well?"
"She's doing very well, thank you. She's not here now.
She's still in the mountains. But won't you all come in for a
bit. How are you, Chi Sau? You know, we were all worried
about you for a long time. We got word that you had been
arrested. Do come in," the young woman implored.
"What have you been doing these years?" Chi Sau asked
her friend.
"Chi Sau, do you remember my father?" Duyen's eyes
glowed with admiration. "He's spending several days with us
just now."
"Uncle Tan, of course-oh, it's been so long. He was a
regroupee, wasn't he? And now he's back already!"
Apparently the father had "regrouped" to North Virtnam in
1954 with the Communist-led Viet Minh as stipulated in the
Geneva Accords.
Then Chi Sau turned to introduce Hiro and me-"two
progressive foreigners"-to Em Duyen. We all followed the
radiant young woman into the small house composed of a
single mud-walled room. "Father, it's Chi Sau and Anh My,
Uncle Quang's son, and their two progressive friends," she
announced. Her father rose from a stool by a small table to
greet us and then quickly cleared a space on the bamboo bed
for us to sit down.
"Quang's son," he said quietly looking at Anh My. "Yes,
that's easy to see. And it's good to see you again, Chi Sau."
"You're looking very well, Uncle Tan," Chi Sau said.
"Doesn't look like the north has been too hard on you!"
Vo Duy Tan was tall and slender. lIe was wearing the
green khaki trousers and rubber-tire sandals of the Liberation
Army, but his white threadbare civilian shirt made him seem a
natural part of this peasant setting.
After some reminiscing with Chi Sau and Anh My about
relatives, Anh Tan poured tea for us all. We had to drink in
turn because there were not enough cups for us all. His
pouring of tea was without flourish as was his speech. As with
a child, it was easy to meet his eyes which were pensive and
steady. Hiro and I were particularly eager to learn of Anh
Tan's experiences because while we had heard much about the
1954 regroupment of the Viet Minh, we had never before
actually met a "regroupee."
Uncle Tan was thirty-two when he left his wife, a small
son and daughter to go north. "We were just finishing a new
house ... hadn't yet closed the door and I went. It was a fine
house. Stood right over there across the path," he motioned
with his hand. "Actually I had taken part in the resistance
since 1945, during the French occupation."
"And you were in North Vietnam until just recently?" I
asked.
"I returned south for the first time in September of last
year. In the mountains west of here, that's where I was
assigned. I met my wife there and Duyen too. They had moved
up there because it was impossible to live here. It was difficult
to live in the mountains, but they were not as vulnerable to
the bombing as here."
"You said you also have a son, Uncle Tan?" Hiro asked.
"Yes, I had a son whom I met again just briefly when I
returned to the South last September. lie was serving as a
guerrilla here in this district. Then just one month ago, as he
was crossing over a road, he was shot by the Saigon soldiers."
"Shot!" the muffled exclamation echoed through our
group. We sat in silence for a moment. Uncle Tan's eyes
deepened. Then, as if eager not to burden his guests with a
saddening silence, he continued, "I asked permission to have
several days' leave from my duties in the mountains to come
back to Phu Quy to visit the grave of my son. So this is the
first time I've been here in twenty years."
We asked Uncle Tan if he would be staying in Phu Quy
now that all of Quang Ngai Province had been liberated.
"Oh no, there's much more work to be done. I'll return
to my post and I'll continue working for the revolution until
we have peace and unification for our whole country." lie
paused thoughtfully. "Phu Quy?" A slight smile played over
his face. "Perhaps someday ... maybe when I'm old, I'll
return to Phu Quy to retire."
We commented that Phu Quy today must seem different
from the hamlet he left in 1954. lIe nodded. "When I came
back it was hard for me to get my bearings. I couldn't tell
where anyone used to live. The houses are gone. The people
are gone. The trees are gone." He paused 'again, as if ever
conscious he did not want to dominate the conversation, but
then continued with reverence. "For me, I think it's the trees I
missed most. Phu Quy used to be full of trees. Now ... well,
you've seen it for yourselves. I mentioned that I built our
9
I
I"> rih : 1 >';'"
_I I ..
Saigon Cemetery, French section, 1974,
house just across this path out here. Well, right at the
intersection of the two paths there used to be a huge banyan
tree, centuries old. Our house was shaded by that tree. Phu
Quy really had three of those great trees. There was a saying
we had: 'Village head, a tree; village heart, a tree; village tail, a
tree.' The -tree that stood here marked the village tail. But
now-the people here say the Americans brought in giant
bulldozers." He paused again, but as no one spoke, he
concluded, "Those old trees, especially the banyans-they
provided shade and comfort for the villagers, a sense of
well-being. For us, I don't know if you have this in your
countries or not"-he looked at Hiro and me-"but for those
of us who lived here, well, we believed a kind, guardian spirit
inhabited those old trees. Now-now they're gone."
After we left Vo Duy Tan's house, we continued our
trek through uninhabited areas of the village. Along the route
we encountered Anh Thoc, a hamlet guerrilla and long-time
friend of Anh My. Hiro and I had met him then and he
proposed we visit Phu Quy's hamlet "sometime soon, while
the wounds of war are still obvious." That statement
characterized Anh Thoc's zeal. Native to this hamlet, Thoc's
job throughout tlie war was to defend the home village. Now
that the war was over for Quang Ngai Province, he was eager to
see the hamlet rebuilt. He knew the job would be formidable
but Thoc seemed to thrive on hardship.
Today when we met Thoc he was unarmed, wearing only
a plain khaki outfit and a conical hat. The guerrilla cadre,
probably in his mid-thirties, carried himself with the honest
seriousness that marks the farmer boy upon whom great
responsibility has been placed. Delighted that we had come to
visit his village, he led us on an extended walk up and down
the rolling grass-covered hills. Here and there he would point
out where houses or clusters of trees had once stood. From the
top of one hill we could see the Eastern Sea, lolling in the late
afternoon sun. Thoc pointed toward the ocean. "You notice
those few pine trees on that ridge that forms the sea cliff?
Well, the whole ridge used to be lined with those trees. They
were planted years ago to keep the sea breezes from destroying
the gardens of the people in that hamlet. Now they're gone
too. "
We walked downhill toward the hamlet he had pointed
out. Along the path I noticed an inconspicuous grave marker,
barely visible among the grasses. I walked around the stone but
it was impossible to read the inscription because the face of
the marker had been so badly pocked with rifle bullets. Thoc
said he remembered when there were many other tombstones
at that site, but most of them too had fallen victim to the
bulldozer's blade.
We arrived in the nearby hamlet of Chau Thuan. Anh
Thoc and Chi Sau explained our presence to the hamlet cadres.
Chi Sau introduced us to "the comrade in charge." The
"comrade" invited us to sit down in a small thatched room
where he indulged in a ten-minute lecture about "the crimes of
the American imperialists and their lackeys" in Chau Thuan
hamlet. But in the end, everything turned out well because of
"the unswerving spirit of the people and the resplendent
leadership of the Party."
After his rhetorical speech, Hiro and I asked him some
specific questions about the welfare of the people in his
hamlet. At that point the "comrade" suddenly dropped his
didactic manner and replied in an earnest, almost pleading,
tone of voice. "Truthfully, friends, I must tell you that the
people are hungry. There's just not enough food. Liberation
has just come and there's so much to be done. But now the
people don't have farm tools. Even hoes and shovels are scarce,
let alone plows or water buffalos. There are no cattle left in
the village. And the people go to their fields, but they must
constantly worry about explosives lying in the soil. And then,
as far as this village is concerned, it's the dike-without the
dike there is no rice. Without the dike our people cannot live.
We must rebuild the dike."
Earlier that morning, east of My Lai, we had heard that a
helicopter had been shot down along the sea. Throughout the
day we had heard people referring to the incident. Now after
our discussions with the Chau Thuan officials, someone again
mentioned the downed helicopter. "Oh yes, that happened
just south of here," replied one of the hamlet leaders. "In fact,
maybe you would be interested in-Here, come with me." We
walked through the hamlet and came to a shuttered school,
the only masonry building I remembered seeing in the
settlement. A young guerrilla with an AK-47 rifle leaned
against one of the porch posts. The official pulled open one of
the windows and motioned for us to look iri.
Sitting on stools or on the floor of the school room were
twenty men in undershorts and T-shirts. They looked at us
nervously. The fear in their eyes was compounded with their
confusion at the sight of two foreigners. Toward one corner
sat a frightened woman and a small child. Prisoners.
"They were trying to escape from Danang this
morning," the official explained. "They were apparently
following the coastline so they wouldn't get lost. That's why
the brothers were able to shoot down their plane. They tried
to escape after they crashed, but we rounded them up with no
trouble. They say there is still one man at large, however."
The explanation was plausible. For the last several days
Danang, some seventy miles to the north, had been surrounded
by Liberation Army units. These young ARVN soldiers
without their uniforms it was now impossible to discern
10
rank-had jumped on a helicopter and were making a desperate
attempt to fly south to an area still controlled by Saigon. I
wanted to speak to the men but could think of nothing to say
which would relieve their obvious shock and fear for their
future. Feeling a sense of shame for peering at my fellow men
like animals in a zoo, I lamely turned away from the haunting
faces.
On our way back to Phu Quy hamlet I asked Anh Thoc
what he thought would happen to the prisoners. His answer
was only partially reassuring. "They'll be taken to the
mountains for a period of reeducation and then they'll be
brought down here to live again, or wherever they want to go
to make an honest living. They too are covered by our policy
of reconciliation and concord."
Earlier in the day when I saw a helicopter flying over our
heads east of My Lai, I had felt instant rage-and fear-at the
thought of Quang Ngai at peace once again being invaded by
one of these war machines. In that moment of rage, I had
wanted the helicopter to be brought down out of the skies. It
must have been the same impulse of the guerrillas who shot
down the chopper here in Chau Thuan. But now, brought face
to face with the men and woman who had been shot out of
the blue, I found myself secretly wishing they had been
successful in their flight to the south. This morning when the
machine had been predominant, the response was rage, an
impulse towards violence. Now when the human face emerged,
the response turned to sadness, an impulse to empathize.
Back in Phu Quy, Chi Sau and Anh My went off to look
up more old f r i e ~ d s and relatives, leaving Hiro and me to
spend the evening with Anh Thoc. We sat on stools in the dirt
courtyard in front of Thoc's small thatched house. Thoc
reminisced about the days of American and Korean military
operations into Binh Chau village. An old farmer sitting nearby
could not help interjecting, "It was frightful to live here during
those days. When the Americans and Koreans came through,
they said everything that's got two legs is V.C. Bang! That was
the end of you. What's more, they must have thought that
anything with four legs was also V.C. There's not a cow left in
the hamlet!"
It had been the job of Anh Thoc-a genuine "V.C. "-and
two or three other hamlet guerrillas to sabotage such invasions
into Phu Quy. Booby traps, hideous inventions that they are,
played a key role. Whenever their village was invaded the
guerrillas were, of course, grossly outnumbered. Sometimes,
according to Thoc, two or three guerrillas had to contend with
a platoon or a company of Korean, American or ARVN
troops. But the mines and booby traps had been set in advance
and the few guerrillas would scatter in separate hide-outs over
the terrain with which they were intimately familiar. So while
the invader held numerical superiority-sometimes fifty to
one-the guerrilla held the advantage of familiarity of locale
and of the element of surprise in attack.
Ultimately, one of the most effective tactics of the
guerrilla was the option not to fight back at all. He could
stealthily sneak away through high brush or clandestine
tunnels if he was overwhelmed. Then at a time of his choosing
he could call in assistance from a larger guerrilla unit and strike
back at the troops which occupied his hamlet.
Neighbors of Thoc's came and went as we talked. The
hamlet was beginning to be reoccupied by farmers who had
been living in refugee camps near Quang Ngai city. While we
talked, one such man showed up in Thoc's courtyard to make
special intercession with the guerrilla leader. Perhaps in his
fifties, this man had been a member of the former Binh Chau
Village Council under the Saigon Government. Now, with the
defeat of the Saigon forces in Quang Ngai, this man was
frightened. Whatever the particular details of his background,
he obviously feared that he would suffer retribution for his
former position on the Village Council. He knelt on the
ground in front of Anh Thoc. His head dropped toward his
knees as he mumbled, "Oh, most honored representa.tive of
the Revolutionary Government in Phu Quy hamlet. I implore
you to grant understanding and mercy. Some of the people
want to make trouble for me because I served on the Village
Council of the puppet government. But let me assure you,
most honored representative, that I was forced by
circumstances to take that assignment and in all cases I dealt
most fairly and honestly ...."
"Enough. Enough. Stop your whimpering," interrupted
Anh Thoc, obviously unimpressed with the man's toady
servility "Why don't you get up off your knees and speak
clearly. Around here we're not so concerned about what you
did as about what you're going to do from here on. You're
welcome to come back here to this hamlet and live naturally,
just so long as you work for your living and don't take
advantage of people. A lot of folks around here are pretty hot
about some of the tricks you Saigon Government qfficials
pulled, but don't worry, we're serious about this policy of
national concord. If some of the people give you a hard time
or treat you roughly, it's because they've not lived with the
revolution long enough. They don't understand the policy of
reconciliation. I can assure you, you won't get treated like that
by any guerrillas or cadres among our ranks. "
The official started to mumble something else, but Anh
Thoc cut him off, telling him to go home and get to work
building a house for himself. The man climbed to his feet and
left, perhaps reassured, but obviously less than elated. Even if
Enroute to Tan Son Nhut airport, 1974.
11
he could believe Anh Thoc's words about "national
reconciliation," it did not mean life would be easy. The days
of bribe-taking and corruption were over for this official. He
would now.have to work-and work hard-for his own living.
The sun disappeared and darkness gradually rose out of
the soil obscuring first the trunks of the banana trees, then the
fronds. Eventually the curtain of night rose to leave just the
silhouettes of bamboos and an occasional jackfruit tree that
had escaped the bulldozer's blade. It was a pure darkness,
untouched by the cold lights of electricity. Anh Thoc invited
us inside where we sat cross-legged on a bed and by the light of
a small lantern ate together the meal prepared by Thoc's aunt
in whose house he was living. Only after supper did we learn
that Anh Thoc had spent five years in prison. He was captured
in 1968 and after being routed through prisons in Quang Ngai
and Danang he was sent to the southern island of Phu Quoc
which' served as a stockade for prisoners of war. There, Anh
Thoc related, beatings and torture became a way of life.
"Finally they told all of us in our camp that they would
quit beating us if we would drink water mixed with our own
excrement." The lantern on the bed cast distinct Shadows over
Anh Thoc's lean face which made his cheekbones seem all the
more prominent. He wet a forefinger with his tongue to peel
off one of the thin white tissues from his pack of cigarette
wrappers. He spread a small wad of tobacco on the paper and
rolled it between his forefinger and tumb into a slightly
conical shape leaving a triangular tab of paper which he sealed
against the cigarette by moistening it with his tongue. He lifted
the lantern to the end of the cigarette which soon pulsated
with a glowing red.
"At one point we went on a hunger strike for twelve
days to protest the death of a comrade who had died after
they threw him into boiling water. In one camp when the
comrades protested, the MPs shot into the camp, killing forty
and wounding over a hundred. For comrades whom the prison
authorities considered to be troublemakers they had Camp 7.
Camp 7 was a series of cubical cells, two meters by two meters
by two meters. They put from four to six prisoners in each
one of the cells. There was a bucket for excrement. That
bucket would be emptied once a week.
"And if we would continue to protest our treatment,
they would only beat us all the more." Anh Thoc had
apparently come to terms with the treatment he had received
because there was a conspicuous lack of hostility or revenge in
his voice. He spoke matter of factly, refraining from
elaborating the details of their treatment almost as if he feared
he would be rehashing what certainly must be common
knowledge for anyone who knew anything about the Saigon
Government prison system.
Humane considerations aisde, I had always been puzzled
even on pragmatic grounds by the Saigon regime's extensive
use of beating and torture of its prisoners. Granted, over the
years I had met some refugees who said they would not return
to their farms in disputed territory or young men who would
not dodge the draft because they feared the flogging of the
police. But for nearly all the people we knew who actually had
undergone prison experience, the brutality had only increased
their determination to fight against the Saigon regime. When I
suggested my bewilderment to Anh Thoc, his reply was simple.
"They had no choice but to beat us. They couldn't u.se
reason because they don't have justice on their side. They're
not fighting for a righteous cause. If they tried to use reason
on us, we could easily answer them. So the only thing they
have left is to beat us."
Thoc gave Hiro and me an insight into an event we had
previously only read about in newspapers: the exchange of the
prisoners of war in the spring of 1973 after the signing of the
Paris Agreement. Anh Thoc was one of those exchanged
prisoners. "The MPs at Phu Quoc said we should get ready for
our release. They divided us into special groups. I was placed
in a group with about 500 other officers of the National
Liberation Front. Actually, I wasn't an officer but I think they
decided I was hard-headed enough to be one." The
remembrance evoked a rare audible laugh from this serious
guerrilla. "Frankly, we didn't think they were going to release
us at all. We just thought they were going to take us away for
reasons of their own. We were prepared for the worst. In fact
only when we saw that Liberation flag at the exchange site in
Tay Ninh did we believe we were to be freed. Oh, so many
people came out to meet us. Many of the prisoners were
sickly. The people took care of us just as though we were their
own children. It was very moving."
Anh Thoc's eyes danced in the lantern light and his voice
became more animated as he remembered the event. He pulled
from his shirt pocket a ballpoint pen which was printed with a
Liberation flag and an inscription in memory of their prison
experiences. "They gave us each one of these pens," Thoc
continued with obvious pride. "After our release, everyone
immediately volunteered for service in the most dangerous
spots possible. Many of us wanted to form a fighting force
made up entirely of released prisoners, but that idea was
eventually vetoed. The commanders decided the prisoners
were too gung ho to follow orders-in battles they always
wanted to attack; they didn't know when it was wise to
retreat!"
After his release, Anh Thoc stayed in the Tay Ninh
region west of Saigon near the Cambodian border to
recuperate for several months and then returned to his native
home of Phu Quy hamlet. We remarked that he must have
considered it fortunate to be able to return home.
"I guess I don't really think of any particular place as
home. Now, as far as I'm concerned, wherever there is a place
to serve, that is my home."
"Hard-core Viet Cong." That's the label American
officers in Vietnam would certainly have pinned on Anh Thoc.
And when it came to defending his hamlet from troops and
planes, there was no doubt about it: This native son of Phu
QIy was determined to the core. There was no changing his
course. But one sensed that Anh Thoc's hard-core-ness, his
stubbornness, was of a species with a mountain stream which
"stubbornly" insists upon running downhill instead of up. If in
time the tumbling water actually wears down rocks, what
choice has it? What it is determines what it does.
To sit and converse with a Viet Cong guerrilla in his
native setting, to see him as a rational-sometimes
sentimental-person was a perspective denied the American
fighting man and policy maker throughout the war. Nor could
the guerrilla ever really know the sincerity and generosity of
the average American soldier. But then distorted perspectives
have always been the fuel for the machines of war. Can one
wage war if one credits the same rational and sensitive
attributes to one's enemy as to oneself?
Seven years earlier, I found myself face to face with an
American military advisor at a party in Quang Ngai. His eyes
12
were intense, focused on me. He cut an impressive figure in his
freshly starched uniform.
"What the hell are you doing over here anyway? What
does a person with your kind of philosophy think he can
accomplish over here? I mean, how do you justify your being
in Vietnam?"
I had been in Vietnam for two years and was no longer
accustomed to the American custom of direct confrontation.
His sudden interrogation intimidated me, but I tried to
disguise my feelings. "I'm afraid I'm not sure what you're
talking about. "
"Oh, don't worry about me, I've had a drink or two
more than necessary"-the American major's revelation
allowed me to stereotype his strange behavior-"but you see, I
don't agree with what you're trying to do here in Vietnam. It
just won't work. People aren't ready for your kind of
philosophy. See, I believe the vast majority of people in the
world don't know what's good for them. And so you come
along . . . you believe in loving people, and you respond to
human suffering. But I don't agree with you. You've got to
show people what's good for them and that's why I believe in
the military. People just aren't intelligent enough to know for
themselves. "
I asked the major if he thought we-he and I-were
intelligent enough to know what was good for us.
"No, no, we're not. Everybody's got different
principles." He paused, his eyes jumping here and there. Then
he brought up his hand. "Take this bread, for example." In his
hand he bobbed a piece of French bread, served with the meal
on the veranda of the home of American Senior Province
Advisor for Quang Ngai. "Now I think this is damn good
bread. The French invented this bread and they brought it to
Vietnam and why shouldn't we all like their bread? And why
do we think we have to fight because one group of people
thinks one way and another group of people thinks another
way? Take my mother-in-law, for example. Now my
mother-in-law was a very good woman. She was bull-headed: I
fought with her constaniIy. But she told me one day, 'Negroes
are all right-if they are in their place.' Now, just what was
their place? She didn't know, just so they were kept in their
place. Well, I knew that place was just a little lower than the
Caucasians. Just a little lower. But she was a good woman. She
died hard. She fought to live. And I helped her, for what that
was worth."
The major took a bite of his French loaf. Not knowing
where to take a mother-in-law conversation, I waited for him
to continue.
Anh Thoc (facing camera) looks over the fields of Binh Chau.
"You and I are different. You've got a beard and I don't,
You've got brown eyes and I've got blue eyes. But what's the
difference? You eat and drink the same way. I do. I smoke and
you don't. I drink and you don't. But is there really basically
any difference? No, we're essentially the same. You like good
music and so do I. I don't know about you but 'Greensleeves'
is my favorite. 'Greensleeves' can solve just about any problem
for me so we're basically the same. In your home you treat
your wife the same way I treat mine. She makes you feel ...
well, she makes you feel better than you really are. So why do
we have to fight each other? Why can't we accept each other
and allow each other to be different?"
I asked the major if he felt he could accept the Viet
Cong, to let them live according to their beliefs.
"Him?" The major straightened and he squeezed the
bread in his hand. "Now that's the enemy. I'm a soldier and I
believe the best possible thing to do with the Viet Cong is to
kill him. I've killed plenty of the enemy in my lifetime. I've
killed Chinese, North Koreans ... I've killed North
Vietnamese and Viet Congo That is, I've personally killed
them. I killed two of them with my knife."
A dike that was destroyed by the United States' bombardment, permitting the sea to flood some Dinh Chau paddies.
13
Villagers of Quang Ngai celebrate liberation.
I asked if all these men were not also part of our
common human family.
"Yes, maybe they are. But in the army you act on
orders, and if my commander tells me to go in there and kill
the enemy, you can count on it, I'll carry out his orders."
I wondered out loud if our problems might not be
resolved if we attempted to communicate with the Viet Cong
in order to understand him.
The major's reply was quick. "I'll kill him first and then
I'll try to understand him. "
"And suppose the Viet Cong feels that way about us?"
"Then we'll just continue to fight each other."
Anh Thoc held the lantern up to another cigarette he
had just rolled. We sat on the bed in silence for a moment,
following thc flame with our eyes as he set the lantern on the
bed again.
"I'm ready to go wherever I can be of service to the
people," the veteran guerrilla spoke toward the lamp. "But
Phu Quy is special to me. I have a small garden here and I can
grow all the vegetables I need-" Anh Thoc interrupted
himself, looked at Iliro's watch and announced he had to leave
to attend a meeting that would be held at the hamlet office.
lIe invited us to accompany him.
Anh Thoc led our trio walking single file through the
darkness, following the winding paths. After we had walked
about five minutes, we began to see glowing balls of light
bobbing along the tributary paths converging into the main
path that \cd to the hamlet office. When we arrived, a group of
perhaps forty or fifty people-it was too dark to see well-were
milling about on the path outside the office, which was a small
thatch building not unlike the village homes. In the courtyard
stood a bench behind a table, illuminated only by a single
lantern. Three men took their seats behind the table: a hamlet
representative, a man we understood to be a Party cadre, and
Anh Thoc. Iliro and I squatted on the ground with the other
villagers. We quietly declined Anh Thoc's invitation for us to
address the group. The Party man addressed the assembled
villagers for several minutes with a denunciation of American
imperialism and a platitudinous tribute to the "perceptive
leadership of the Party in the fight for independence and
freedom."
Then it was Anh Thoc's turn. His tall lean body took on
an impressive starkness in the light and shadows cast by the
flickering lantern. He spoke clearly and firmly, occasionally
cutting the air with his hand for emphasis. From his speech we
gathered that many of the assembled persons had just returned
to the hamlet within the last several days. Some were
apparently former ARVN soldiers. Thoc's purpose was to
welcome them back to the hamlet, to instruct them to register
with the authorities-"and make sure you are thorough and
honest on your declaration forms" -and to mobilize them for
the urgent work of rebuilding the hamlet.
"The kith and kin of Phu Quy who never fled to the
enemy zone during the war, but stuck it out here in the
countryside faced incredible hardships," Thoc declared to the
barely discernible faces in the group. "But we welcome those
of you who have just returned. There's a place for you in this
hamlet. There is also work for you in this hamlet. I know that
most of you will be busy building some kind of homes for
yourselves in the coming days. But eventually we will be
asking each family to provide one person for public services
job a day or two each week. There's lots to be done. Roads to
be repaired and waterways to be rebuilt. And the dike-we
expect full cooperation from everyone."
After the meeting we followed Anh Thoc home in
silence as a gigantic apricot moon hung suspended over the sea
cliff in the east. The path twisted and branched in a confusing
labyrinth through the grasses. Bu t to Anh Thoc who was
leading, the way was clear. He had, after all, walked this way
many times before.
Unexploded M-79 grenades in the Quang Ngai fields.
14
The Indochinese Communist Party and
Peasant Rebellion in Central Vietnam, 1930-1931
by Ngo Vinh Long
The years 1930-1931 in Vietnam marked the political
entrance of the Vietnamese working class and peasantry and
the emergence of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) as
the workers' and peasants' undisputed leader. Vietnamese
historians have generally claimed that this was a period of
"revolutionary upsurge" and that the struggles of the period
were full-dress rehearsals for the August Revolution of 1945.
1
Until very recently, however, English-speaking students
of Vietnam have largely ignored this period in their search for
the origins of the Vietnamese revolution. Of those who have
recently treated the period in their studies, most have chosen
to regard the events of 1930-1931 exclusively from a local or
regional perspective, ignoring overwhelming evidence of an
effort at national coordination. In fact, most of the studies
thus far have touched only on the situation elsewhere in
Annam, as well as in Cochinchina and Tonkin. Even worse is
the tendency of many students of the subject to treat
chronology lightly, to be uncritical of sources despite their
often questionable validity, and to misinterpret facts either
because of careless reading of the sources or simply because of
lack of background on the subject. In any case, every
English-language study has presented the movement of
1930-1931 as a spontaneous (or anarchic), local uprising. This
shortcoming has affected perception not only of this period
but also of later efforts by the peasants and their revolutionary
leaders to draw lessons from the 1930-1931 struggles.
Because of the above shortcomings and because most of
the misinterpretations have concerned the situation in Annam,
the primary aim of this essay is to describe the situation in this
region in some detail. We make use of many of the same
sources, but we have cross-checked them and compared them
with previously ignored Vietnamese sources. We will deal with
the situation in Tonkin and Cochinchina only by way of
introduction because of the problems of space and because we
have discussed the subject in some detail elsewhere already.
2
The Unification of the Communist Parties
and the "Revolutionary Upsurge"
On February 3, 19,30, at a unification meeting in
Kowloon, the three communist parties of Vietnam merged
into a single party under the name of the Vietnam Communist
Party (Dang Cong San Viet Nam).3 The meeting was convened
by Nguyen Ai Quoc (later President Ho Chi Minh). Their
unification under the same party ended a period of
competition and brought about the centralized coordination
needed for a successful revolutionary movement. The meeting
adopted a political program, rules, and strategy for the
development of mass organizations such as the Red Trade
Unions, Red Peasant Associations, Communist Youth League,
Women's Association fo.r Liberation, Red Relief Society, and
Anti-Imperialist Alliance.
4
Better prepared to meet the challenge ahead of them,
the delegates to the unification meeting returned to Vietnam
in high spirits to lead the fledgling revolutionary movement.
Members of the Vietnam Communist Party soon began
organizing peasants and workers to oppose "white terror"
(deliberate and systematic destruction of suspected persons
and villages) and to advance economic demands for improving
the livelihood of the people.
5
A month after the conclusion of the unification meeting,
Communist Party members near Saigon received a letter (rom
"Comrade Vuong" (Ho Chi Minh) which instructed them on
how they should respond to the new situation. The letter
stressed three key points: (1) the newly founded Party should
organize the masses to struggle against repression; (2) although
the Party did not approve of adventurism (the premature use
of violence), its members should nevertheless fully support the
Yen-bai "combatants" (these were members of the so-called
Nationalist Party who had been arrested after an aborted
armed attack on the French garrison at Yen-bai); and (3)Party
members should coordinate the struggle against repression
with the struggle for the basic rights of the population. From a
long-term perspective, according to Ho Chi Minh, the situation
at that time was advantageous to the Party because the
Yen-bai uprising helped to create a fervent revolutionary spirit
throughout the nation. Party members were instructed to take
advantage of the situation to carry out their activities; to use
all means, including newspapers, leaflets, meetings, speeches,
rallies, strikes, market shut downs, demonstrations, displays of
force, and so on, to mobilize and lead the masses in their
struggles, and to maintain in every way the "revolutionary fire
within the masses ...
6
Although pitted against a ruthless campaign of
repression at the time of their return from the unification
meeting, the delegates nevertheless were able to carry out the
unification process quickly and smoothly and at the same time
to provide the necessary leadership for the struggles of the
workers and the peasants. Thanks to the enthusiastic activities
of the members and the unified leadership, popular struggles
soon reached an unprecedented level over the entire country.
From April 1930 to November 1931, according to most
15
MOUVEMENT DES SOVIETS DU NGHE. TINH
DE 1930.1931 AU VIET- NAM
N
--+---"c-----1r1"..,..11/1.
L A
Ll!GEHDES
1. Manifestations
2. Greves
3. Drapeaux rouges arb ores
4. Lancees de tracts
5. Instauration des Soviets
6. Base revolutionnaire
7. Siege du Comit' de Nghe-an
8. Chef-lieu
9. Limites de provinces
10. Frontieres
11. Cours d'eau
12. Chemin de ler
G
II
P t.
,.
3
...
*
S

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7

, II
____ , 9
.___ :"0
'to
'f"ift
P
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...." . . I .II
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16
accounts, there were at least 129 workers' strikes and 535
peasant demonstrations,
7
not to mention hundreds of public
meetings and rallies which were also forms of political struggle.
Although the struggles broke out in the three regions of
Vietnam almost simultaneously and with coordination, local
conditions made the movements in each region distinctive with
regard to intensity, duration, and issues involved. In 1930 and
1931 Tonkin was the region with the smallest number of
peasant demonstrations. There were several reasons for this
including the recurrence of devastating floods and dike breaks
which caused widespread famine, the early arrest of many
revolutionary leaders, and the swift and brutal French
repression. Tonkin was the industrial and administrative center
of Indochina and French military power there was quite
strong.
8
Beginning in July 1929, hurricanes killed thousands of
persons in the provinces of Kien-an, Nam-dinh, Thai-binh,
Tuyen-quang, and Quang-yen. Resulting floods destroyed
several million piasters worth of rice crops.
9
Governor-General
Pierre Pasquier, however, was so nervous about the possibility
of increased revolutionary activities among the population that
he forbade any kind of fund-drives, including play
performances, to help the flood victims.
10
In addition, the
French stepped up their search for revolutionary leaders. In
mid-October 1929 they arrested a high member of the
Indochinese Communist Party who gave out, under torture,
revealing information about the party as well as locations of
party organizations in many provinces of Tonkin. The entire
organizational structure of the Party in Bac-ninh province-the
base of the Indochinese Communist Party-was eradicated by
the FrenchY
The situation in Tonkin by mid-May 1930 was
summarized by the Constitutionalist Party's newspaper, Duoc
Nha Nam:
. .. there have been searches, interrogations, arrests, and
imprisonments. Resides the number ofpeople killed, exiled,
and tortured, there are now one million persons who do not
have enough clothes to wear or food to eat.... The
provinces most devastated are Rae-giang, Hai-duong,
Hung-yen, Ninh-binh, and Ha-dong. 12
Because of the need to organize relief for the hungry
population and because of the already weakened Party
infrastructures, the Vietnam Communist Party chose only two
districts in Thai-binh province, Duyen-ha and Tien-hung, to
organize a test demonstration on May Day, 1930. The
well-organized demonstration involved 1,000 people and
caused the village and district officials to flee the area. It
finally ended in bloody repression. Soon afterwards,
Communists organized new demonstrations in several northern
provinces for the month of June,13 but decided to call them
off because they would have invited increased repression and
exposure of revolutionary leaders. Even so, by March 1931,
the French claimed that most of the revolutionary leaders in
Tonkin had been arrested and that only about 14 districts
were still active with Communist cadres. It was not until after
the lCP mounted its national appeal for support of the
Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement (discussed below) that another
significant test demonstration was mounted in the district of
Tien-hai, Thai-binh province. 14
During 1930 and 1931, Cochinchina witnessed the most
widespread peasant protest in all of Indochina. Tens of
thousands of peasants participated in fierce mass demonstra
tions in 13 of the 21 southern provinces. A tabulation of
reported cases in public newspapers reveals that there were at
least 125 mass demonstrations during the period from May
1930 to May 1931.
15
Provinces without demonstrations were
those which were seriously affected by floods and those in
which the ICP was still unable to establish their infrastructures
as a result of tight control by the large landlords and the
colonial administration. 16
The peasant struggles in Cochinchina during this period
were organized and coordinated by the ICP from beginning to
end and can be divided into three stages. The first and fiercest
stage began on May 1 and culminated quickly in August and
September when there were 66 large demonstrations involving
from several hundred to several thousand participants. In the
second stage, from October 1930 to January 1931, demonstra
tions diminished in number and intensity. There were 10
reported cases in October, eight in November, and none in
December. Possible reasons for this may be that the protest
movement had come too quickly for the communist
infrastructures to establish good coordination and also the
French response was quicker and more effective in Cochin
china than in the other two regions of the country. The third
stage lasted from February to May 1931 when there were
By thus staging the markets and by getting the workers
to return to the factories, the demonstration coordina
tors were able to get thousands of demonstrators to the
target areas without being detected. "This was a most
i
beautiful maneuver by the Communists," lamented the
French Resident.
t
I
i
again large-scale demonstrations in central provinces of
Cochinchina, which were organized to support the Nghe-Tinh
Movement in Annam. But these demonstrations were smaller
than those during the fall of 1930 and occurred mostly at
night. So while they presented the French administration with
considerable headaches, they neither brought about a general
uprising nor diverted French troops from Nghe-Tinh.17
Although peasant struggles in Annam were not as
widespread as in Co chinch ina, they were the most intense in
the provinces of Nghe-an and Ha-tinh where the peasants and
revolutionaries drove local authorities out of villages and
districts and established their own revolutionary power. The
intensity of the struggles in Nghe-an lay mainly in the fact that
peasant organization and revolutionary infrastructure were
quite developed there.
Nghe-an province, for example, had a considerable
revolutionary infrastructure before 1930. Through the mutual
aid societies and peasant associations, thC\Se who tilled the soil
had begun openly to oppose and organize against landlords,
officials, and other local despots. For example, through
mutual agreement, they set wages for plowing and rice
planting and any landowner who did not meet their wage
levels went with uncultivated paddy fields.
17
During the 1920s the peasants organized themselves into
"residents' leagues" (phe ho) in opposition to the "wealthy
clique" (phe hao). Formal complaints were filed against village
and canton officials for embezzling public funds, excessive
taxation, and usurpation of communal lands. In some districts,
the "residents' leagues" appointed their own tax collectors
who brought the taxes directly to the district headquarters,
circumventing the local officials. In others, the peasants tied
up corrupt village chiefs and carried them on poles (like pigs
on their way to market) to the district seats "to turn them in
to the government." Peasants rose up to fight against the
bureaucrats, local officials, and landlords who stole their lands.
By the end of 1926, the movement to get village officials to
divide communal lands fairly among the inhabitants had made
good progress in many villages of Nghe-an province. By 1929
there existed a province-wide Federation of Peasant Associa
tions.
In addition to these struggles, the peasants also fought
against pernicious social customs such as wasteful spending for
funerals, weddings, religious sacrifices and festivities, and
rain-making ceremonies. The peasants also formed weaving and
farming collectives. Twenty percent of the income from the
crops went into a common fund, with 30 percent going to the
individual tillers and 50 percent to production and land
improvement. According to a Vietnamese historian who has
done intensive research on this period, peasants who used to
think of nothing but their daily work were meeting in groups
to discuss revolutionary activities and politics. 18
Hevolutionary activity in the form of demonstrations
and leaflets were also on the increase. According to a
confidential report of the French Resident of the province to
the Resident-Superior of Annam, since 1928 there had been
endless small demonstrations at the district seat of Thanh
choung.
19
(Thanh-choung was the largest district of Nghe-an,
on the west bank of the Song-ca river.) The peasants were
influenced by factory workers from Vinh who came out at
night to talk with them and help them organize, as well as by
members of the various predecessors of the Viet Nam
Communist Party such as Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang
Dong Cbi Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary Youth Comrades
Association) and Tan Viet Cach Mang Dang (New Vietnam
Revolutionary Party).20 Another French internal report stated
that "communist tracts" were found in the city of Vinh and
the villages of the interior in July and August 1930.
21
The French reports stated that after a few months of
propaganda work through clandestine newspapers and the like,
the Communists moved into direct action, with a number of
"assassinations and attempts to create administrative inci
dents." 22 A partial listing of these incidents and assassinations
sho\\ot!d that from November 1929 to April 1930, there were
30 incidents at 12 "pagodas" and one "Confucian temple" as
well as three assassinations. Since September 1929 there had
been a "sense of panic" among the inhabitants of the province
because of increased revolutionary activities.
23
-By "pagodas" and "Confucian temple" was meant the village
communal houses (dinb) which served as village administrative
headquarters and as places of worship for all gods and deities' from
Buddha, Confucius, the Goddess of Mercy, and Kuan-yu to the Spirit- of
the Soil, the Spirit of the Hearth, and the Village Guardians.
The newly-founded Vietnam Communist Party sent one
of its Central Committee members, Nguyen Phong Sac, to
work with the worker's movement at Vinh and Ben-thuy. In
February 1930, the Party provincial committee of Nghe-an
came into being; it helped to increase the number of cells in
the cities and villages. Clandestine mass organizations such as
Red Workers' Unions and the Peasant Associations as well as
legal organizations such as mutual aid societies and sports
associations also blossomed.24
The Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement
The above actlvlUeS and infrastructure laid the
groundwork for the first outbreaks of mass protest that
eventually led to the establishment of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets in
September 1930. From the end of April to the end of August,
local demonstrations were staged almost daily in the districts
of Nghi-loc, Anh-xuan, Nam-dan, Do-luong, and Quynh-Iuu,
each involving up to several hundred persons. There were also
more massive demonstrations, which involved thousands of
participants, staged weekly or biweekly.2s Unlike most of the
earlier marches and demonstrations which had been held
within the confines of a village or district, the new wave of
protests involved participants who moved from one district to
another, from the countryside to the cities, and in good
coordination not only with each other but also with workers,
students, and people of other occupations. We will describe a
few of these demonstrations below to illustrate the nature of
the struggle.
The first wave of coordinated demonstrations occurred
on May 1, 1930, and involved 10,000 peasants and 1,200
workers from the two provinces of Nghe-an and Ha-tinh. The
peasants marched five abreast in a kilometer-long column to
the office of the French Resident of Nghe-an in the city of
Vinh. Workers marched as guards at the head, the tail, and on
both sides of the peasants. The demonstrators marched under
the red hammer-and-sickle banner of the Communist Party and
carried placards with slogans calling for pay raises, reduction
of working hours and of taxes, opposition to white terror, and
compensation for families whose relatives had been killed
during the Yen-bai uprising. 26
On the same day, nearly 400 workers marched to the
front of the sawmill at Ben-thuy. When soldiers killed four and
wounded seven, 1,500 peasants from the surrounding villages
arrived, which led to further violence. Seven more were killed,
18 wounded, and scores arrested. 27
About 50 kilometers northwest of the city of Vinh,
3,000 demonstrators gathered to attack the plantation
concession belonging to one Ky Vien, a former Vietnamese
secretary in the French administration. He had usurped most
of the lands in the area and had blocked the way to the forest
so that the peasants could no longer gather firewood.
The peasants of Hanh-lam and Yen-lac villages demanded
that their usurped lands be returned to them and that the
route to the forest be reopened. Ky Vien refused. The peasants
then ransacked the buildings, burned down defense instal
lations, and took away buffaloes, cows, and horses, sacks of
rice and coffee and farm implements. Then the demonstrators
planted a hammer-and-sickle flag on top of the main house.
The chief justice (an sat) of the province of Nghe-an later
testified, however, that "the Communists went to Ky Vien's
concession to destroy it and not to plunder it. They destroyed
18
the plantation and felled trees, but they did not commit any
theft.... " 28 The French Resident of Vinh ordered an
Inspector Petit to lead a military expedition to the area to
gather information because he was getting no information
from the provincial mandarins.
29
On May 4, Inspector Petit
and his soldiers fought their way into Hanh-lam village and
occupied the communal house. Petit later recounted that the
village notables were uncooperative. Then,
Without being called, 400 inhabitants of Hanh-lam gathered
in front of the communal house.... [Petit] had the
demonstrators come before him and asked them the
following question: "Would you tell me why you have
come in such large numbers without being summoned?"
Answer: "We have come, first of all, to complain about the
exactions made by the land concessionaire Ky Vien; and
secondly, about the arrest of the officials of our village."
When [Petit] asked who burned the concession, the reply
was: "All of us and the inhabitants of the village of Yen-lac
committed this act, and we all assume the responsibility for
it." Question: "Besides you, there were about 20
individuals who were strangers to the villages of Hanh-Iam
and Yen-lac." Answer: "That's not true. ,,30
Facing this hostile crowd, Petit waited for military
reinforcements. In the meantime, he released the village chief.
The next day the village notables were re-arrested. The
villagers again unanimously declared that they themselves and
the inhabitants of Yen-lac were responsible for the incident.
They stated they had lodged many complaints against Ky Vien
but the mandarins had rejected their claims out of hand. The
demonstrators demanded their village officials be released, Ky
Vien be ejected from the concession, and that the land be
returned to them. According to the chief justice of Nghe-an,
the peasants "were surging in front of us. They opened their
jackets and shouted 'Kill us! Release the village officials or else
arrest the 3,000 of us!'" According to the Resident, "the
crowd was getting bolder and bolder and about to engulf the
troops," so a warning salvo was fired. Then shots were directed
against "the leaders" who were enciting the crowd. "Only 16
persons were killed." A report from the chief of police and
Surete claimed that 20 persons had been killed and 20 others
wounded. A military outpost was immediately set up near-by
to maintain order in the two villages. 31
Within a week, collecting intelligence had become
difficult for the French because informers were being
intimidated. The police claimed that "the communist
organization in Nghe-an has become quite serious; and under
various labels, it is gathering many followers." 32
It should be noted that even before the events of May 1,
there was already massive support from the general population
for demonstrations as a plan of action. The Resident had
expected trouble since the beginning of March. Besides having
taken economic measures such as forbidding the export of rice
from the province and getting the directors of the Truong-thi
railway workshop and SIFA (Indochina Wood and Match
Company) to sell rice to their workers at the reduced price of
10 piasters per 100 kilograms, the Resident ordered military
reinforcements and searches of the population. On April 24
and 25, leaflets were distributed calling for demonstrations to
support the striking workers at Ben-thuy factory. The French
discovered two mimeograph machines and numerous printed
materials in a district in Ha-tinh province which foreshadowed
the coming events.
On April 28, the Resident was alerted to the comings
and going of a great number of people between Nghi-xuan and
Yen-dung districts to the northeast of Ben-thuy; he thought
that the moment had come. Patrols were sent out to search the
bamboo groves and paddyfields. A police captain, Phan Chau
(who was later discovered to be an agent of the
revolutionaries), came with his soldiers and guards and told the
patrols that he had been patrolling his sector and found
nothing unusual.
On April 29 the French received what was to them
reassuring information: A floating market was planned at
Yen-dinh on the 30th at Vinh on May 1. This helped explain
why there had been large movements of people. As a result,
the French relaxed their special alert, since the peasants were
obviously depending on these large markets to sell their rice
from the first harvest. In addition, the manager of the match
factory and the director of SIFA both assured the Resident
that the workers (who had been striking) had all come back to
work peacefully. The same good report also came from the
railway workshop at Truong-thi.
By thus staging the markets and by getting the workers
to return to the factories, the demonstration coordinators
I
I
J
were able to get thousands of demonstrators to the target areas
without being detected. "This was a most beautiful maneuver
by the Communists," lamented the French Resident. "Their
leaders were completely successful in distracting our
attention." What seemed to surprise the Resident most was
not only how the French and Vietnamese authorities were
fooled by the maneuver, but also how, with the extensive
network of spies and informers and the family ties of the
Vietnamese officials in the villages, the demonstrators could
have kept the news of the impending demonstrations a secret. I
The Resident himself ruefully admitted that "It was only on
,
May 1st that the provincial mandarins and myself realized that
we were kept completely in the dark about events occurring in
the province despite the ties and relationships some of us had
with it." 33 After a visit to many villages, the prefect of
Anh-son were also forced to declare: "Now that I have seen it,
I am overwhelmed Ibouleversel. Since we have to face the
disintegration of our family ties by force, I am starting a
crusade to arouse my villages against them Ithe Com
munistsI . ,,34 Most of the mandarins in the province told the
Resident that they were quite convinced that the demonstra
tions were not just jacqueries, but that they were clearly
organized by the Communists.
By the end of May a second wave of massive and
coordinated demonstrations shaped up. Plagued. by a number
of serious problems, the farmers and workers at Ben-thuy
submitted to the Vietnamese Governor of Ngre-an and Ha-tinh
a list of 24 demands which included reduction of various
taxes, abolition of the wedding and bicycle taxes, relief in time
of famine, abolition of preventive arrest and imprisonment
without trial, aid to the families of all those who had been
arrested and killed at Ben-thuy and Thanh-choung, and the
release of all those arrested at the two places. Workers at
Truong-thi presented the Governor with a list of nine demands
for themselves and six for "all the brothers and sisters in the
provinces." These demands were similar to those at
Ben-thuy.35
On May 30, Governor Ho Dac Khai answered the
peasant and worker petitioners. He said that the petitions
19
violated court and military law codes and hence the petitioners
could be severely punished. But since the Governor was a good
"father" and a kind "shepherd," he was willing to show his
leniency to his "children" this one time.
36
By posting such a condescending public notice and
ignoring the pressing needs of the population, the French and
Vietnamese authorities knew full well what to expect. They
assigned more soldiers to key areas of the city and sent more
patrols into the countryside. The Resident bragged that his
tough policy and better precautions had prevented demonstra
tions in the city on the night of June 1. Special surveillance of
the districts were carried out by the mandarins, resulting in
only one demonstration in the district of Thanh-choung.
37
This demonstration included 2,000 young men,
students, old folks, women, and notables, according to the
district chief's estimate. People in the more distant villages
filed in line first and marched to the district headquarters.
They demanded that six requests be transmitted to higher
authority:
1) postponement of all taxes because of the recent crop
failure;
2) reduction of all market, salt, alcohol, and tobacco
taxes;
3) equality in watch duty (up until then the poor were
forced to perform the task but the rich were spared);
4) compensation to families of the victims of recent
uprisings;
5) no foreign troops to suppress the people and no use
of Vietnamese recruits for military duties abroad; and
6) release of all students and revolutionaries incar
cerated on political charges.
After some tough talk, the district chief had to back down and
agreed to transmit the people's demands to his superiors. He
wanted "to avoid exciting the people needlessly." 38
On June 11 another demonstration (French estimate:
1,000 persons) occurred in Do-luong. The demonstrators
demanded the reduction of all taxes and compensation for the
families of the victims of the May 1 incidents. A Vietnamese
source states that there were more than 4,000 peasant
demonstrators who carried with them placards saying:
"Abolish all taxes and compensate the families of the victims
of May 1." On the same day more than 5,000 peasants
demonstrated in Anh-son.
39
These demonstrations were quickly followed by a
number of smaller demonstrations of about 600 each in other
districts and by a series of strikes in Vinh. In July a general
strike lasted 40 days and drew widespread peasant support.
The peasants provided the workers with food, money and
clothes, and the strikers in turn helped the peasants organize.
40
On August 1, about 500 peasants, commemorating the
International Day of Protest against Imperialist Wars, started a
second demonstration in Do-luong, and another 300 persons
from Ha-tinh province marched to the district seat. Political
slogans were chanted: "Down with French Imperialism!
Support the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution!
Solidarity with the colonized peoples! Down with arbitrary
arrests! Compensation to the families of victims of
repression!,,41 Due to French precautions and the presence of
airplanes overhead, however, the demonstrators failed to rally
more people.
Demonstrations continued throughout early August.
Several thousand persons marched to the district seat of
Nam-dan where they attacked the administrative office, the
post office, and the much-hated bureau of alcohol. They
forced the district chief to sign and affix his seal to the list of
their demands. More than 1,000 persons marched to Can-loc,
Ha-tinh province, and forced the district chief to accept a list
of their demands. On the same day, another group of
demonstrators in the district of Anh-son were bombarded a,nd
two were killed. On August 12, about 10,000 demonstrators
marched to the district seat at Thanh-choung with banners and
placards. After the demonstrators then broke open the jail and
released the prisoners and burned all the documents, the
French dispatched their airplanes over the area. The next day,
10,000 persons returned to read elegies for the dead.
42
frdn Phut pn:fHH.::<f s,u(.rehllre q(HH"e!1
du Porlt (OOHllt.HH'\tU Indu( hUH,)!\.
The Formation of the Soviets
An intense and decisive period of struggle began late in
August and continued through the month of September 1930.
Large demonstrations and attacks on governmental offices
caused the total disintegration of the governmental infra
structure in numerous districts and villages. Many mandarins
and officials fled, while others turned in their seals to the Red
Peasant Associations, the new administrative organs in these
areas. In the districts of Thanh-choung and Nam-dan over
seventy village chiefs turned in their seals.
43
Reporting on the demonstrations of this new period, the
September 6, 1930, issue of Nguo: Lao Kho (The Toiler), a
local clandestine newspaper, wrote:
20
In Nghe-An, on August 29, 500 peasants from the
district of Nghe-/oc carried red banners and marched on the
4istrict headquarters, nearly driving the district chief to
panic. On the 30th, 3,000 peasants from the district of
Nam-dan waved their flags and beat on their drums while
they marched to district headquarters, where they
destroyed the headquarters, released the prisoners, and
forced the district chief to sign an acknowledgement of
hllfling received the demands of the demonstrators. On the
31st, the peasants of the prefecture of Hung-nguyen staged
a demonstration. On September 1, 20,000 peasants from
the district of Thanh-chuong set fire to the district
headquarters, fought and chased the French garrison
commander away, thus totally dissolving the power of the
imperialists.
La President HQ chi Minh, qui nlililail <i
I ' ~ 'OUI Ie nom de Nquyen ai QuOe.
The workers of Ben-thuy have opened the way for
the struggle! Red banners are fluttering all over Nghe-an.
Other provinces are boiling with activity; a period of
intense struggle has arrived. 44
The situation afterward was described as follows:
In Thanh-choung and Nam-dan no one now has to
pay market taxes and nobody dares collect taxes. There is
no patrol, and the soldiers don't dare come back for guard
duty. When the imperialists order the soldiers to carry out
clear-and-destroy operations, none comply. The brothers
and sisters have released all the political prisoners and have
divided the Ky Vien plantation and the lands of the big
landlords among the poor peasant families. The inhabitants
can now demonstrate at will. The laws of the imperialists
have thus been destroyed. The inhabitants know that they
cannot place any trust in the capitalist government, a
government which harms the workers and the peasants.
Therefore, the brothers and sisters have struggled [tercely
and are solving their own pressing problems in their own
way . ...4S
The Resident-Superior and the Minister of the Board of
Punishment immediately arrived in Vinh to discuss how to
deal with the situation. Public notices were posted forbidding
any congregation of more than 50 persons. Police and military
were ordered to shoot to kill anyone who refused to disperse
when ordered. The Resident-Superior and the Minister also
ordered that demonstrators pay for any damages caused, that a
system of military forts be set up, and that more soldiers be
sent to the existing forts. 46
Protest in Ha-tinh and Nghe-an
Fierce struggles also broke out in Ha-tinh. There were a
series of massive simultaneous demonstrations and attacks in
four districts and the provincial capital of Ha-tinh in early
September. The Resident of Ha-tinh wrote that the
revolutionary leaders' plans were "carefully elaborated and
expertly executed." The objectives of the demonstrators, he
said, was "to destroy and occupy the centers of administra
tion, the headquarters of the pr"!fectures, and the districts. ,,47
In each of the various demonstrations, there were usually
several thousand peasant participants and fierce struggles with
the police and the soldiers. In the capital city of Ha-tinh, for
example, the demonstrators burned down the military
garrison. At Ky-anh, according to clandestine newspaper
accounts, they destroyed the district headquarters and releasec\
all the prisoners. The French posted notices in all the public
areas of Ha-tinh, ordering soldiers and police to shoot all
demonstrators who did not disperse immediately.48
While these events occurred in Ha-tinh, larger and fiercer
demonstrations broke out in Nghe-an. A typical demonstration
erupted in Do-luong. Demonstrators burned the houses
belonging to a Canton Chief, and then gathered on a river bank
near Do-luong. They marched to the prefect's headquarters
nearby; two planes arrived and dropped 16 bombs. About 15
people were killed. The spirit of the demonstrators was fired
by this bloody repression. The demonstrators returned to
Do-luong, this time in much large numbers and in a more
belligerent mood. Some estimates say there were 8,000
demonstrators. Again, planes flew overhead and dropped 10
bombs, killing 30.
49
Following the events in Do-luong, a demonstration in
late September mobilized 15,000 inhabitants of the district
who carried banners and sounded drums as they marched
through the district's villages. Demonstrators attacked the
Legionnaire post at Do-luong, cut the telegraph line, and
destroyed many colonial offices. 50
The struggle in Nam-dan district was just as fierce.
During the final week of September, 30,000 peasants held
rallies at five different locations. Three thousand peasants
from the village of Kim-lien (Ho Chi Minh's birthplace) staged
a demonstration to protest the destruction of trees, the killing
of buffalos and cattle, the burning of homes, the raping of
women, and the killing of an old man. A large number of
village chiefs in the district turned in their official seals to the
21
district chief to protest the beating and torturing of the village
chief of Kim-lien who had allowed his village to fall to the
revolutionaries. Two days later, 15,000 peasants marched to
the district headquarters. When they were lured inside under
false pretenses, 23 were killed and 40 arrested. 51
In Bung-nguyen district, the fiercest and largest struggle
occurred on September 12, a date that later became the
anniversary of the "Nghe-Tinh Soviet Movement." Twenty
thousand peasant demonstrators marched toward the city of
Vinh to support striking workers and to demand reply to their
demands. They marched four abreast under red banners,
surrounded by crudely armed red guards. They were
confronted with a detachment of colonial troops sent from
Vinh. The troops opened fire on the demonstrators but could
not force them to disperse. New participants joined in as the
demonstrators passed villages along the way. The crowd
stretched for four kilometers by the time it reached district
headquarters. Several hundred Legionnaires and colonial
troops were sent out. Planes were called in. The troops opened
fire on the demonstrators and the planes dropped bombs,
forcing the demonstrators to disperse. That evening they came
haek to retrieve the bodies of their dead. By most Vietnamese
The "soviets" thus did not materialize as a result of care
ful planning by the Communist Party but as a result of
the disintegration of the colonial administrative struc
tures caused by the peasant struggles led by local and re
gional communist cadres. But they were soon exposed to
concentrated raids and attacks by the French Legion
naire and other colonial troops. Despite this interference,
and despite a lack of uniformity because of different
local conditions, the villages carried out significant social,
economic, and political reforms.
accounts, 217 demonstrators were killed and 126 were
wounded. Freneh official sources claimed that only 150 were
killed. This was the single most bloody confrontation up until
that time. Fearful of possible retaliation from the peasant
demonstrators, the French sent a train-load of Legionnaires
from Tonkin to Vinh-Benthuy that night to deal with the
situation. A few days later, a warship also arrived and patrolled
the coastal waters. 52
The most active district in Nghe-an in the month of
September was Thanh-choung where there were an average of
one demonstration and several rallies a day. People also met to
divide up communal rice and to read elegies for their fallen
comrades. Some of these gatherings comprised more than
4,00<1 participants. 53
The activities in Thanh-choung also spread across the
provincial border to the adjoining district of Huong-son in
Ha-tinh province. Three hundred persons from Nghe-an
marched to the district of Huong-son, destroyed the telegraph
and the house of a mandarin on duty in Nghe-an, and were
dispersed only after the planes bombarded them. In
mid-September however, 300 persons again came from
Nghe-an to attack the Ferey concession in the district of
Huong-son and were dispersed after a fight with the colonial
guards. Soon afterwards 2,000 persons, armed with clubs,
spears, and knives, attacked the district headquarters of
Huong-son several times. According to French reports, seven
demonstrators were killed and two were wounded. 54
Colonial governmental authority disintegrated in many
areas throughout the month of September despite French
repression. The colonial administration in Thanh-choung and
Namdan districts totally ceased to function. In Anh-son,
Hung-nguyen, and Nghi-Ioc, over half of the area was in open
rebellion. In Yen-thanh, Quynh-Iuu, and Phu-dien, the
rebellion was less severe and in Ha-tinh the situation was less
critical; there was no area in total rebellion. In Huong-son,
Huong-khe, and Due-tho, half of the villages still acknowl
edged colonial authority to some extent. In Can-Ioc,
Cam-xuyen, and Ky-anh, the estimate was two-thirds; and in
Thach-ha and Nghi-xuan, about three-quarters. 55
In early October, a clandestine newspaper noted that in
Nghe-an and Ha-tinh:
Since September 1st, the peasant brothers and sisters have
struggle most fiercely and have gained much power. In the
villages, all governmental power has passed into the hands
of the Peasant Associations. Whenever the local despots
[former officials} want to do anything, they have to ask for
permission first from the Peasant Associations. In some
villages, women also participated in the planning of village
affairs.
* * *
The brothers and sisters have abolished market taxes
and ferry taxes. Landlords have to share their rice with the
suffering inhabitants because it is nothing more than the
stolen fruit of the sweat and tears of the peasants. In many
places, the landlords have to agree to share their land with
the poor people . ...
* * *
The brothers and sisters have abolished the patrol
duties, and in various villages have themselves organized
self-defense squads to watch out for secret agents and to
protect the peasant inhabitants. 56
French reports stated that a "Bolshevik regime" had
been set up in Nam-dan and Do-Iuong; "Soviets" were elected
by the popUlation, and market taxes were abolished.
Revolutionary tribunals tried government agents. Compensa
tion was given to the families of the victims killed in
demonstrations. Landlords seemed to have been required to
contribute ten piasters per mau (about an acre of land) to the
new village administrations, and appeals were made to
merchants, notables, and government employees to engage in
civil disobedience and non-cooperation. 57
The Red Peasant Associations Assume Power
With the disintegration of the colonial administration,
the Village Sections of the Red Peasant Associations assumed
power. They governed according to directives from the
Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Nghe-an.
The Village Section was headed by an executive committee
which
was elected by the representatives of a village-wide general
22
assembly. It ['Was] responsible to the entire village and to
the District Committee and [had] an official tenure of
three months. ... The Executive Committee of the Village
Section ['Was] usually composed of the follo'Wing
1) secretariat, 2) communication, 3)
organization, 4) finance, 5) control, 6) training, 7)
investigation, and 8) struggle. 58
The responsibilities of the Village Sections and the local
committees (chi bo) of the Communist Party, as defined in a
Directive from the Party Provincial Committee of Nghe-an,
included: (1) political administration in the village and the
organization of self-defense units to provide order and
security; (2) Abolishing all taxes imposed by the French
colonialists, such as the head tax, market tax, and salt tax; (3)
Seizing all public communal lands held by local officials and
landlords and redistributing them to the poor, reducing land
rents, suspending payment of all debts; (4) Making the
notables return all public funds to the people; (5) Taking rice
from wealthy households and distributing it to the poor and
hungry; (6) Opening schools to teach quocngu [the national
language] to the people; (7) Abolishing depraved customs and
superstitions, and reforming traditional practices concerning
ceremonies, weddings, mourning, and worship. 59
Although the peasants took over complete admini
strative power, and although the Party Provincial Committee
of Nghe-an told them how to organize their new village
administrations and how to carry out certain social and
economic reforms, they did not know they were establishing
"soviets." They called the villages under their control "red
villages," and the provinces of Nghe-an and Ha-tinh became
known as "Red Nghe-Tinh." 60
While these events were occurring in Nghe-Tinh, the
Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party was
meeting in Saigon. Most of the members of the Central
Committee attended the meeting, and hence were faced with a
fait accompli when local and regional cadres established the
"red villages." Soon after receiving the report from the
Regional Party Executive Committee of Central Vietnam, the
Central Committee responded in late September that the
establishment of red villages and the redistribution of land in
Thanh-chuong and Nam-dan
is not appropriate to the situation in our country because
the Party and the masses in the country have not yet
reached a sufficient level of preparedness and because 'We
still do not have the means for armed violence. Violence in
a few isolated areas at this time is premature and is an
q, . ! ,'1'1 \1;i i l'An!;.pr Le p.r-;! .t'af1s!J ;1["(>' 11f I ... ",,..... \(.It
1
t, .'-"i,.:J: -
Ii ml.,-fi"o. Ti,anl,.Hva
23
adventuristic action. 61
While criticizing the Regional Executive Committee for
its premature action, the Central Committee at the same time
pointed out the fundamental tasks which the newly created
"soviets" (this was the first official use of the term) should
carry out to strengthen and protect themselves:
... At the present time we must do whatever we can to
maintain and strengthen the influence of the Party and the
soviets among the population so that when the soviets are
dismantled by the French with their superior force, the
meaning of the soviets will nevertheless have made a deep
imprint on people and the forces of the Party and the
Peasant Associations will be maintained . ... The redistribu
tion of lan'd has to be carried out by the soviets and has to
be done on the basis of the number of laborers in all the
poor families and not by parcelling out equal amounts of
land to all families. After the land has been given out so
that every laborer has enough to work, the excess amount
should be turned over to the soviets to manage . ...
efforts should be made to get poor and middle
peasants to support the soviets and to consider the soviets
as their own government. All actions taken in the village
have to be in the name of the soviet and should never be in
the name of the Party or the Peasant Associations . ... 62
The "soviets" thus did not materialize as a result of
careful planning by the Communist Party but as a result of the
disintegration of the colonial administrative structures caused
by the peasant struggles led by local and regional communist
cadres. But they were soon exposed to concentrated raids and
attacks by the French Legionnaire and other colonial troops.
Despite this interference, and despite a lack of uniformity
because of different local conditions, the villages carried out
significant social, economic, and political reforms. 63 However,
in most villages, the Peasant Association was in charge of
keeping law and order. There was real solidarity among the
inhabitants, and special efforts were made to raise their
political consciousness. Frequent mass meetings were held.
Revolutionary books and clandestine newspapers were read
and discussed. Social, economic, and political issues as well as
the nuts and bolts of political struggles and village
administrative affairs were all discussed at these mass meetings.
Direct democracy was practiced, and village officials were
elected by an all-village assembly. Cadre development was
24
I
I
carried on by the Party and efforts were made to develop mass
organizations. Money associations, * mutual aid associations,
spOrt associations, anti-imperialist youth associations, student
associations, "red relief associations," women's associations,
and so on, were created.
Most popular of all were the peasant assocIations.
Villagers became members by attending mass meetings of the
association at which time association rules and regulations
were explained. This easy access to membership sometimes led
to undesired results. In some villages rich peasants and
members of the traditional elite not only easily became
members but also were elected to the Village Executive
Committees.
Economically, there was redistribution of land belonging
to landlords who supported the colonial government and of
communal land and public funds previously seized by these
landlords. (Land distributed at this time continued to remain
in the hands of the peasants in certain villages well into the
early 1950s.) Labor-exchange teams, planting and plowing
cooperatives, and other mutual assistance measures were
organized and instituted. In a number of villages, such as
Thanh-thuy in the district of Nam-dan, the entire village
population was mobilized to irrigate over 100 acres of
paddy fields in one day. Taxes were abolished and debt
payments suspended. Landlords were pressured to reduce their
rents to 30 or 40 percent of the crop, depending on the village.
Militarily, self-defense units, composed of young males
and females, were formed in every village. They were armed
with clubs,. knives, and spears, and were responsible for
protecting the villages, meetings, rallies, and other public
gatherings, as well as the peasants' crops.
In the social field, medicine, clothes, personal care, food,
and other forms of support were given to the poor, the sick,
and the families of all victims of French repression. Whenever
a village was burned down, the inhabitants of other villages
immediately brought building materials such as bamboo and
thatch to rebuild it. For example, the village of Phu-viet,
Ha-Tinh province, was completely burned down but within
three days it was rebuilt. Landlords were asked to contribute
rice to the poor. Women organized teams to assist pregnant
women. Work hours were reduced. Petty theft and gambling
were eliminated. Disagreements within families were solved
with the help of the various youth associations.
A literacy campaign was waged. Classes taught the
peasants to read and write. Sessions for reading and discussing
books and newspapers, were held in the early afternoons and
evenings. In addition, expensive and wasteful practices in
weddings, funerals, ceremonies, and other public festivities
were either curtailed or abolished.
Defense against French Pacification Efforts
Up until the beginning of September 1930, the size and
the frequency of the demonstrations put the French
administration on the defensive. Their only response was to
try to put down the demonstrations as they occurred. When
These were money-lending organizations created during times of
need, comprising twelve or more members. The pooled money was lent
out to each member on a monthly or weekly basis at low interest.
Resident-Superior Le Fol and Ton That Dam, Minister of the
Board of Punishment and Special Envoy of the Privy Council,
arrived in Vinh they found out that the situation had become
too critical for such an approach. Therefore, a systematic
pacification program which combined political and military
measures was carried out.
The French enlarged their network of new forts and
dispatched more Legionnaire and colonial troops to the two
provinces concerned. Soldiers were supposed to coordinate
patrol of the countryside with local forces, put down
demonstrations, and come to each other's aid.
Political measures included the creation of an anti
communist political party called Ly-nhan Dang (Propriety and
Benevolence Party), the publication of anti-communist books,
pictures, and pamphlets, the use of mandarins from the two
provinces to govern the local population, and the imposition
of collective responsibility on all family members, village
inhabitants, and local notables for the behavior of individuals
in the villages. 64
The peasants retaliated by refusing to sell food to the
colonial troops sent into the countryside. The villagers also
destroyed and burned down the houses of "loyalists." The
Governor-General claimed that the peasants had become a
crowd of "crazy people" under the influence of agents of the
Third International. He accused the Communists of method
ically "bolshevizing" Nghe-An, creating "complete social
confusion" and "crowd psychology" which propelled the
insurrectionary movement.
65
By early October, the French
were able to install a defense system of Legionnaires which
sought to prevent the population from moving from one area
to another. Police columns made search-and-destroy sweeps
into the "infested" areas.
66
French residents and provincial mandarins in the region
were instructed to inform the people that the destruction of
private property would be met with force, that notables
collaborating with the rebels would be held responsible, that
all villages must organize anti-communist defense forces, that
there would be collective punishment of villages taking part in
the rebellion, that all Communist leaders would be considered
outlaws, that villages must expel outsiders. 67
Legion-occupied villages were often deserted by their
village populations. The soldiers burned down villages,
destroyed houses of suspected peasant leaders, made arrests,
and forced the villages to submit to their authority. A system
of surveillance was set up in the "pacified" villages. 68
As this was happening (in October), the Central
Committee of the Communist Party held its first Plenary
Session in Saigon to discuss future strategy and to reorganize
the Party to better coordinate work between the Central
Committee and the local committees. The meeting also
decided to change the name of the Party back to the
Indochinese Communist Party (Dang Cong San Dong Duong)
from the "Vietnam Communist Party." 69
One of the most important topics under discussion at
the session was the Nghe-Tinh Soviets. The Central Committee
had sent a directive in early October to all party levels to
analyze the mistakes of the regional leadership in allowing the
soviets to be formed prematurely. The directive urged all party
members to rally support of the entire peasant-worker
population in the country to protect and save the lives of the
"peasant brothers and sisters of Nghe Tinh" who were in
critical danger. '70 To this end, the Indochinese Communist
2S
I
I
I
l
Party launched a nationwide campaign to "share the
fire-power" (chia lua) of the colonial administration by staging
demonstrations and protests elsewhere and diverting the attack
of the colonial administration on Nghe-an and Ha-tinh.
71
In order to minimize the damage caused by the French
military and political onslaught on Nghe-Tinh, the Party tried
to correct what it felt was leftist and rightist tendencies which
might weaken the soviets. The Central Committee was critical
of organizing,and staging continual demonstrations and attacks
against the French. A Party directive to the Regional
Committee in Annam in October stated that the continuous
mass actions caused the people to tire and be murdered by the
imperialists. They argued,
it is not necessary to demonstrate every day . ... Ordinarily
you should only organize conferences in the village to make
speeches, to propagandize, and to train the people, and not
to carry out unnecessary demonstrations. By doing thus
you will maintain the combative spirit (of the people J and
keep the struggle alive instead of dying out. 72
According to French colonial sources, the policies
suggested by the Central Committee were implemented to a
certain degree in Nghe-an and Ha-tinh. Demonstrations were
dated." Participants in attacks against military posts were
"well-trained and disciplined." Young recruits were being
trained by the Communists at military training centers in Bo-lu
and Xuan-trach, both in Hung-nguyen district, close to the city
of Vinh. Also "red leaders have been successful in getting the
Annamese [Vietnamese) still loyal to the government to
maintain a favorable neutraliry which hinders the policing
activities of our military posts." 73
Nguyen Duy Trinh, currently Foreign Minister of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, wrote that in his village in the
district of Nghi-Ioc (north of the city of Vinh) political
activity was still going strong after months of repression:
I can still remember Tet {Vietnamese New Year! of tbat
year. The inbabitants celebrated Tet only on tbe nigbt of
the 30th {February 16, 1931J and on the 1st {February
17, 1931/ and did not prolong tbe celebration as in
previous years. The {politicalJ life in the village which
usually had been quite active and enthusiastic became even
more so during Tet. At the communal bouse every night it
was as merry as if there were festivities. The population
Joyfully came out in large numbers to meetings to listen to
the reading of newspapers publisbed by tbe Party and
explanations of the party program, or to discuss communal
affairs. EverYi?QdJ{ had the
, ":;:: : : ' ~ : >
26
A French police commissioner estimated that 60 percent of
the villagers in Nghe-an and Ha-tinh had been enrolled in the
various communist organizations by February 1931. 75 In a
report on the overall situation in Ha-tinh, the Resident stated
that it was "quite evident that the situation must not be
judged according to the number of hostile demonstrators on
their way to attack headquarters of the phu [prefecture] and
the huyen [district] or the surveillance posts, but according to
the intensity of the underground activity which is gradually
spreading." The report added that from December 1930 to
April 1931, everything looked calm externally but intense
activity was manifested through leafletting, meetings, and
conferences, and intensive military preparations. The center of
the province was entirely "contaminated," and the districts of
Due-tho and Can-loc were in "latent turmoil." 76
Although the increased political activity did produce
some noticeable success in defense of the soviets, French
pacification made itself felt in many ways. Every day scores of
peasants were killed and wounded, a much larger number
arrested and tortured, houses and whole villages razed,
ricefields destroyed, and boats and sampans wrecked and
burned. This resulted in disruption of the economic life of the
population which in turn produced a worsening food shortage
by the end of 1930. 77
Coupled with their military operations, the French
colonial administration and the Vietnamese court also began
an amnesty program. Village populations were herded to
certain locations and forced to submit; or agents were sent out
to persuade people to give up and receive clemency. The
colonial administration announced that all "Communists" who
had not committed acts of violence would receive full and
complete amnesty once they had submitted and that those
who had committed acts of violence would still be able to
enjoy a generous reduction of punishment in case of
submission. Those who had never participated in any
demonstration were given yellow cards to serve as proof of
loyalty to the government, and others were given green cards
as proof of submission. As a result of these efforts, 60,000
persons in Nghe-an received their clemency at various public
ceremonies. A number of local leaders also surrendered. By the
end of January 1931, over 70,000 persons in the two
provinces publicly declared their loyalty. 78
A large number of peasants who were forced to accept
the cards tore them to pieces and threw them away. But in
quite a few villages ICP cadres took advantage of the amnesty
program and advised the people to keep the cards to avoid the
brunt of French repression against their area. The Permanent
Bureau of the Central Committee of the ICP quickly criticized
this "erroneous tendency" of keeping the cards which they
said could bring about the disintegration of the local struggle
movement. They issued a directive to cadres at all levels to
point out clearly the danger behind the amnesty scheme and
to organize the people to resist all attempts at forcible
submission.
The French also exploited the personal adventuristic acts
of some local cadres. The French administration called upon
the population to withdraw their support of the ICP who had
murdered French agents. The French also expanded the
"service de suret'::" in both provinces and created a local
militia system to continuously patrol local areas. Mandarins
constantly toured the two provinces and "delegations" were
established to coordinate military and administrative matters
Nguyen Huu Bai was the originator of the "Pacification Program"
against the peasants of Nghe'Tinh and elsewhere.
at the district and prefecture levels. 79
New methods of pacification were also carricd out. The
troops were bettcr equipped and coordinated and constantly
went out on patrol. They were aided by reconnaissance planes
during the daytime and by martial law and the curfew at night.
Second, the arrest of the leaders became a principal focus.
Regular troops surrounded suspect villages and set up barricrs,
while the police and colonial troops searched the villagc
thoroughly and madc arrests. Third, the suspected villages
would be "recovered administratively" with actual occupation
by military units led by French JX>st commanders. After the
initial occupation, the commanders tried to sift the bad from
the good elements through information provided by informers
or through direct interrogation, and then reestahlished the
former village au thorities (if they had not collaborated) or
ordcred the notables to organize new elections. People who
fled from the village were punishcd. Ilowever "sanctions"
against them were not carried out by the soldiers but by other
villagers who werc forccd to perform the punishment
themselves so that they would be "irreparably compromised
toward the ICP and would have a stake in defending
themselves against the ICP." Finally, a system of security was
27
set up in each "recovered" village with the villagers as "local
militia." It was their responsibility to defend the villages and
to take offensive action against the Communists operating in
their territory. 80
In connection with the pacification effort, Catholic
communities and groups (5,000-6,000 groups were listed
officially) were organized in Nghe-an into "self-defense" teams
to patrol the villages and provide information to the colonial
administration. French missionaries and Vietnamese priests
were used to lead the pacification teams. A French Catholic
missionary who acted as a team leader admitted that in a
period of only a few weeks he had ordered the arrest of two
hundred persons and, after a "regular trial," had ordered one
execution. The missionary admitted, however, that the
"Communists" in his district did not have firearms and had
not committed any atrocities. 81
Confronted with the new situation in Nghe-Tinh, the
ICP Central Committee held its Second Plenary Session in
Saigon in March 1931. It was concluded that the time was not
yet ripe for a seizure of power. The ICP strongly criticized
"leftist tendencies" within the Party and stressed that it was
necessary to combine political struggle with the struggle for
daily economic necessities. The Central Committee was
particularly critical in its denunciation of the terrorist
activities carried out against individuals. A number of cadres
were expelled from the Regional Committee of Annam for
"leftist" mistakes. 82
In a directive dated March 20, 1931, the Central
Committee ordered the renovation and consolidation of the
various regional Party and mass organizations in theNghe-Tinh
area so as to make them more effective.
83
With regard to the
Red Peasant Associations, the Central Party stressed that while
it opposed purging rich peasants from the Association, it
suggested that "explanatic,ns should be given to the rich
peasants to convince them to withdraw of their own free will
from the Red Peasant Associations and shift to the mutual aid
teams." 84 The reason given by the Central Committee for this
move was:
If we do not strengtben tbe position of the poor and
landless peasants and train them to assume roles of
proletarian [propertyless peasants and workers] leadership
in the countryside, tben tbe leadersbip of tbe Association
may fall into tbe bands of tbe bourgeoisie. 85
It was not until the end of April, however, that these
and other decisions by the Central Committee were
transmitted to the members of the Regional Committee of
Central Vietnam. As Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh later
related, the Regional Committee was
able to straigbten out many of tbe mistakes tbat the
movement bad previously committed. Altbougb tbere were
still no concrete plans to maintain our forces intact inface
of tbe wave of all-out repressioll by tbe enemy, tbe
resolutions nevertbeless stressed tbe immediate and urgent
tasks of consolidating Party and mass organizations as well
~ s tbe necessity for ideological struggle witbin tbe Party. In
implementing tbese resolutions in our district we increased
political educatioll and trainillg in order to maitltaill tbe
morale of tbe cadres and tbe population. Altbougb we were
being critically barassed by tbe enemy and tberefore bad to
spend most of our time alld strengtb ill dealing witb tbe
enemy, we still organized many short training courses for
loyal cadre and villagers on the Party's strategy, its
experiences in dealing witb repression, and its clandestine
work. I remember that at that time on the front page of tbe
journal Co Vo San [Proletarian Banner], a publication of
the Central Committee, there was the slogan: "Ours is the
Party of the proletariat. We must not be discouraged
because of temporary setbacks. A communist must be
resilient in his work until he has achieved his ultimate
goal." We often read that slogan to each other to nourish
our spirit for the struggle. 86
Decline of the Soviet Movement
Despite valiant efforts, it was extremely difficult for the
regional cadres to hold the movement together. First of all,
virtually the entire Central Committee of the ICP was seized
during March and April (1931) because one of its members
confessed to the French police. Second, famine worsened in
both provinces. In Ha-tinh, the Resident had reported serious
famine in the southern districts by the beginning of March. 87 A
French agricultural official acknowledged that "poverty is
quite profound in Ha-tinh province; and despite the low price
of rice, most of the inhabitants, especially in the southern
part, are unable to purchase any." 88
The famine hit Nghe-an the hardest. Most of the crop
since October 1930 had been lost, stocks were depleted, and
the peasants' diet consisted of potatoes, corn, and beans. The
worse off went to the forests to dig up roots. Peasants sold
their possessions to buy food. Their cry had changed from
"doi lam" ["we're extremely hungry") to "doi chet" ["we're
dying of hunger") . 89
Despite the worsening famine there is no record of any
kind of relief effort organized by the French administration or
the Vietnamese court. Furthermore, there were no rice loans
or public works projects instituted by the French. In fact, the
colonialists worsened the situation by moving up the date of
tax collection to coincide with the spring harvest (the end of
April to the end of May). The peasants in Nghe-an were forced
to sell their domestic cattle, agricultural implements, and
household objects.
In Ha-tinh, the situation was somewhat better. The
spring crop was average, but the peasants were forced to pay
their dues at harvest-time; which was a disaster for the
agricultural economy of the province. The peasants had to sell
their paddy or beans at the nearest market, for ridiculously
low prices, to pay their taxes. In some areas, peasants were
forced to sell their cattle. 90
The early tax collection was seen by French authorities
as a test of their strength, and as "a barometer with which to
measure the degree of social disintegration." They also felt
that if they could collect the tax, with military help, this
would help shore up the flagging notables. 91
As for the ICP, some cadres simply went underground or
left for other provinces. Others organized more demonstra
tions to demand an end to the collection of taxes, for relief, or
for an end to French colonial rule. There was still an average
of at least one large demonstration each day in one of the two
provinces. But they were disastrous in the face of brutal
French repression. Scores of people were killed, and hundreds
were arrested. When soldiers or government agents were killed
during the clashes, the French realiated with the destruction of
whole villages.92
28
To help alleviate the people's hunger, many cadres also
organized small teams of peasants who went to landlords'
houses to demand loans of rice and money. French colonial
records referred to these activities as "acts of piracy"; some
landlords lost from ten to SO tons of rice and sizable sums of
cash. The Resident of Ha-tinh reported in late April 1931,
however, that these activities were not acts of piracy "because
the ICP does not want to spread the idea that it hurts the
people." The Resident added that ICP groups located the
stocks of rice and then seized them "in a well-mannered way"
and distributed them. Sums of money were also taken and
contributions from others who were afraid to attend meetings
or participate in demonstrations. 93
Later on, during the fifth-month harvest the cadres also
organized the rice harvest and the allocation of rent to
landlords. In one district, the ICP distributed one-third of the
crop to landowners, keeping two-thirds for itself. (Landowners
usually took two-thirds of the crop.) The French feared the
consequences of these radical measures among the poor, and
sent in reinforcement to the affected areas. 94
Some cadres criticized "borrowing rice" from the
landlords feeling the ICP should have focused on the
anti-imperialist aspects of the struggle instead. Borrowing rice
from "rich and medium peasants" was said to push these
elements over to the side of the French. Villagers were often
sent to demand rice in another village, and not enough
explanation or persuasion was used before such activities were
carried out. For all these reasons, the critics later charged, the
French and the landlord class were able to exploit the
shortcomings of the movement to divide the people.
9s
In the
short run, however, the decision of some cadres to divide the
rice enjoyed the peasants' support and helped to increase their
credibility.
This resurgence of open activity in the spring of 1931,
and its resultant short-term success, engendered greater French
repression. Thc:re was a concerted effort by French and
Vietnamese officials to enlist the support of Vietnamese
intellectuals and the propertied class. The administration and
the court at Hue also ordered
all mandarins and scholar-gentry, in office or retired, who
originally come from the province of Ha-tinh, to go back
there under the protection of the military, to remain in
villages where they have families and property, and to
conduct anti-communist propaganda. 96
As a result of the mass arrests, the French held 3,000 to
4,000 political prisoners, many of whom were Party cadres
and members of the Red Peasant Associations.
97
The two top
regional ICP leaders (Le Viet Thuat and Nguyen Phong Sac).
The arrest and death of so many cadres caused the movement
to lose its focus and coordination. In March and April before
the arrests, for example, the demonstrators were careful to
appeal to the conscience of the officials and soldiers. Handbills
passed out during this period called upon the soldiers not to
carry out their repression against the peasants and workers
who had to demonstrate because soldiers were themselves once
peasants and workers. One leaflet said: "We're dying of
hunger! We have to demand food! Brother soldiers, you must
not kill us! You must support us." Another: "Listen, brother
soldiers! We can only put up with so much oppression! We
have to fight back! You must not kill us! You must support
us!" Appeals written in French and German were sneaked into
\
Legionnaire posts, presumably by Vietnamese women who
were living with the soldiers. 98
After the arrest of the cadres, the direction and many of
the tactics of the movement changed. Some of the leaflets
were written in provocative language and stated unrealistic
goals. Slogans were used which implied a general uprising was
imminent. In May a Catholic church was attacked and a
French priest and four Christians were killed, a number of tax
collectors and officials were executed, and a French sergeant
was hacked to death. The French reactions were swift and
harsh. Hundreds of villagers were killed, thousands were driven
into the woods where they either starved or had to come out
to surrender. Villages and paddyfields were destroyed. Tax
collection was stepped up as a tool of pacification. By the end
of the first week of June, the Resident of Ha-tinh reported
that despite resistance and "despite the economic situation
which was as bad as it could possibly be," the government
collected taxes in most of the villages. In his view, this success
impressed the population more than police operations. He
argued that the administration was correct in moving up the
date of tax collection. Although there may have been "a few
inconveniences, some even serious in a number of poor
districts, these were of less consequence than allowing native
taxpayers to default, since they consider taxes as the most
tangible sign of government power." 99
The tax collection and the> occupation and destruction
of the villages increased hunger, which in turn contributed to
the break-up of the movement. The situation in Nghe-an in
June 1931 was described as follows:
The people are extremely hungry. The inhabitants of
Quynh-luu and Phu-dien have to go up to the Quy-chau
area to dig for roots or to look for dried-up potato vines to
eat. In Da-phuc, Nguyet-tinh, and Hung-nguyen, nine or ten
families crowd into one or two houses and dismantle the
other houses to .sell as firewood . ... Because nobody will
lend them money, the peasants have had to sell tbeir
children.
The harvest has been bad, and yet during tax
collection time prices of rice and potatoes were drastically
lowered. Marketplaces are packed with hungry cattle and
buffaloes. Ordinarily each cow or buffalo would cost from
30 to 40 piasters, but during tax collection time they are
sold for only seven to eight piasters each. The streets are
filled with people carrying their cooper trays and pots"and
pans which usually would cost from three to four piasters
each, but are sold for only seven to eight hao during tax
collection days. The situation has become so bad that in the
village of Bo-duc, Nam-dan district, there are two men who
have been forced to sell their wives because tbey could not
find the money to pay their taxes . ... 100
The famine and the increasingly brutal repression made
the movement become less and less coordinated and the
defense of the soviets more and more difficult .. By the first
week of July, the rebellion was restricted to a few cantons and
even to a few villages within districts. It had become easier to
detect the presence of the Communist leaders. 101
A piaster (dong) consisted of ten bao or 100 xu.
29
By mid-July, the French also began to organize free food
distribution in certain villages to try to win the population
over. The food distribution, called "soupe populaire," was
supposed to be carried out in 20 locations and cost the French
administration a total of 70,000 piasters. Each ration consisted
of 000 grams of rice and beans, 100 grams of meat and fish,
and a spoonful of nuoc mam (a Vietnamcse condiment). The
earrot-and-stick strategy seemed to work. An increasing
numhn of soviets disintegrated and their leaders were arrested.
Although the Regional Committee of the ICP in Annam still
maintained its headquarters in Nghe-an and still tried to
coordinate the movement until November of that year, it was
already clear hy the end of July that the Nghe-TinhSoviet
Movement had, for all practical purposes, been defeated.
Revolutionary activities slowly withdrcw into secrccy, and the
remaining loyal cadres werc trained to protect the
infrastructure and maintain the support of the population
while waiting for better days. The relationship between the
cadres and the village inhabitants during this period is recalled
hy Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh:
I)espite fbe extremely brutal repression by the enemy, the
bearts of tbe people never left the banner of the Party. The
jisb-and-water relationsbip between the people and the
CommulIist combatants was already very warm and deep
during tbis period. 102
Other Struggles in Annam
After mid-Septcmber 1930, there were attempts to
organize demonstrations throughout Indochina to support the
Nghe-an comhatants and to win some breathing space in the
repression for them. Leaflets were distributed throughout
Indochina telling of the victory of the peasants and workers in
Nghe-an and Ila-tinh. They called upon people to demonstrate
their support for "the comrades of Nghe-Tinh.,,!03
The extent to which people elsewhere lent support to
Nghe-Tinh depended, however, on the state of the
anti-wlonial struggle in their own areas, the infrastructure
there, the nature of French repression, and their physical
proximity to the two embattlcd provinces. Most of the troops
used for the repression in Nghe-Tinh came from Annam or
Tonkin, so the potential for struggle in Annam or Tonkin to
"share the fire-power" (cbia lila) was presumably greater than
in Cochinchina. We will examine only the situation in the
other provinces of Annam.
Before the ICP mounted its "support" campaign, there
were already isolated struggles in other provinces in Annam.
For example, on July 16, 1930, a group of over 700 peasants
11larched to the district of Ninh-hoa, Khanh-hoa province, and
presented the district chief with a list of demands. He was
forced to accept the list and promised the demonstrators that
he would forward it to his superiors. On July 17, another
demonstration with over 1,000 male and female participants
carrying red banners surrounded district headquarters of
Tan-dinh (the district adjacent to Ninh-hoa) for three hours.
They presented the district chief with a list of demands,
including the release of political prisoners. French repression
was swift, as over 100 men and women were arrested. 104
In Quang-ngai province, a revolutionary infrastructure
was already in place. According to the French Resident there,
revolutionary organization and propaganda had been pro
moted by Communist leaders who had come to Quang-ngai
from Nghe-an early in 1930. A communist cell was founded in
the district of Duc-pho in March 1930. By the end of March,
three villages were won over to the fCP and there were 20
members in the Peasant Association. In April another cadre
arrived in Duc-pho, and soon communist cells were established
in several villages. A huyen bo (District Executive Committee)
was created. By this time (again according to French reports)
there were about 20 Party members and 200 members of the
Peasant Association in Quang Ngai. In July and August, an ICP
cadre carried out a province-wide inspection and concluded
thatthe situation was ripe for demonstrations. lOS
It was not until October, however, that the first
demonstrations occurred. By this time the French administra
tion was alerted to the possibility of rebellion in other
provinces of Annam, especially the southern provinces,
because they had discovered that large numbers of cadres were
moving into these areas and were planning demonstrations.
Although the French prevented demonstrations from occur
ring in some areas, in Quang-ngai the movement was
deep-rooted. The first large demonstrations broke out in early
October 1930, and continued steadily until the middle of May
1931.
106
The first demonstration, including about 1,000 people,
marched to Duc-pho district headquarters, broke down the
doors, and burned the archives. Although the demonstration
was well-planned and trees had been chopped down to block
the roads behind them, some 12 demonstrators were arrested.
In the district of Son-tinh in late October, about 1,000
demonstrators from various villages marched to the district
headquarters and demanded to see the Resident of Quang-ngai
to voice their grievances. The Resident ordered his troops to
fire into the air to disperse the demonstrators. Ten were
arrested. Farther to the south, in the district of Mo-duc, on
November 11, 500 persons marched to the district
headquarters and made demands similar to those posed in
Nghe-an. They were beaten back by soldiers and 19 were
arrested. A few days later, they came back again and again
were driven away. 107
Although the Resident of Quang-ngai claimed that the
fCP was badly disorganized by the repression and that the
remaining cadres were mostly uneducated peasants from the
districts of Mo-duc and Son-tinh, the struggle became more
intense in January 1931. The movement spread to other areas
such as Tu-nghia and Binh-son, the district of Nghia-hanh, and
the highland sector of Son-ha. People's tribunal were held in
many villages to mete out punishment to village chiefs who
supported the colonial administration. Although some village
chiefs were given death sentences, their sentences were later
reduced to flogging and their houses were burned. In the
district of Son-tinh, from mid-January on there were several
demonstrations daily. On January 16, a large group of
demonstrators tried to overrun the headquarters of the
prefecture of Binh-son but were repulsed. That night a group
of about 3,000 demonstrators met at the village of Ha-nhai to
listen to speeches and get instructions tefore attacking the
district headquarters, but they were dispersed by soldiers and
30 persons were arrested. On the same night, demonstrators
from the villages of An-ky and An-vinh marched to Ky-xuyen
and destroyed the official village archives. They also burned
down the houses of the village chief and another official. Early
in the morning of January 17, another group of demonstrators
30
burned down the house of the village chief of Sung-tich. On
the same morning, a group of more than 2,000 demonstrators
attacked the district headquarters of Son-tinh but were broken
up by the colonial troops, leaving six dead and 14 wounded.
The next day hundreds of demonstrators came back with
coffins containing the corpses of two of their dead comrades
and marched around the district headquarters. Again they
were shot at and were forced to withdraw. The following day,
January 19, 2,000 demonstrators surrounded the district
headquarters but were fired on and were forced back, leaving
one wounded. Meanwhile many other groups of demonstrators
were forming about five kilometers west of district
headquarters. One of the groups, estimated at about 300
persons, ran into a detachment of colonial infantry
commanded by a French lieutenant who ordered his troops to
shoot into the crowd. Four were killed, six wounded, and 3S
arrested. 108
Although demonstrations in other districts were less
frequent, the struggles were no less intense. For example, on
January 25, 1931, several thousand persons from the villages
of the area of Tu-nghia, the region east of the city of
Quang-ngai, marched to provincial headquarters. Two
kilometers from the citadelle (the Resident's office) they were
fired on by soldiers; six were killed, six were wounded, and
many arrested. On February 9, one demonstration marched to
a military post and burned down a guard post and the house of
a village chief.
By mid-February the demonstrations decreased in size,
but they occurred almost daily until the middle of May.
Houses of officials were razed, guard posts destroyed, official
buildings seized, and a number of officials were killed. Also
during this period, a number of officials gave open support to
the peasants. For example, when colonial troops stopped the
inhabitants of the village of Dai-Ioc (Nghia-hanh district) from
setting fire to the house of a school-teacher thought to be an
informer, the village chief and the commander of the village
guards refused to feed the troops. This forced the French to
send in reinforcements who arrested all the notables.
109
Just as in Nghe-Tinh, the French moved up tax
collection time to April to test the strength of the government.
The Resident-Superior of Annam made an inspection tour of
Quang-ngai in mid-April and concluded that the situation was
improving because taxes were being collected without any
problems. Tax collection had a deleterious effect on people's
nutrition, as in other areas. 110
But open struggles continued. There was another wave
of demonstrations, each involving from several hundred to
several thousand persons, in early May. The fact that
demonstrations could be organized at all meant that there was
still a good deal of support among the population. The
Resident of Quang-ngai complained that it was impossible for
the colonial administration to obtain any information in
Son-tinh district until the end of June 1931. Ninety percent of
the population in Binh-son were said to be "communist
sympathizers." A French missionary reported that European
troops had to be kept in the province to forestall the
outbreaks of violence. III
Plans for demonstrations in some areas were foiled
because the French found out before time. Twenty-five
persons were arrested in the vicinity of Hue for planning a
demonstration for December 20. In Phan-thiet, three cadres
were arrested for a similar purpose. Twenty-two cadres, most
of them from the northern provinces of Annam, were arrested
in Phan-rang; 20 persons in Nha-trang and Ninh-hoa were
discovered planning a large demonstration on October 20.
112
Nevertheless, leaflets continued to be distributed, red
banners hoisted, and posters put up in Phan-rang, Dalat,
Qui-nhon, Tuy-phuoc, Tourane, Song-cau, Thanh-hoa, and
elsewhere. They called on the people to support the Nghe-Tinh
Soviets .and to "do away with the barbarous French
imperialists and the Vietnamese court. 113 Isolated demonstra
tions oocurred from time to time. A group of demonstrators
attacked the French salt office in Bac-ha, (Khanh-hoa
province) in April 1931, injuring a French customs officer. A
large demonstration in Bong-son (Binh-dinh province) attacked
the Catholic mission, blocked the highway, destroyed French
motor vehicles, and punished pro-French village and canton
officials who had treated the population unjustly.1I4 On the
whole, however, these activities were uncoordinated and
isolated. Although they expressed the peasants' grievances
against the authorities, they were unable to divert the French
fron Nghe-an and Ha-tinh. "*
,,/
31
Notes
1. Tran Huy Lieu et aI . Tai Lieu Tham Khao Lieh Su: Caeh
Mang Can Dai Viet Nam (to be referred to as CMCDVN) (Hanoi: Ban
Nghien Cuu Van Su Dia xuat ban. 1956). Vol. V1. p. 51. Le Tan Tien.
Nhin lai nhung buoe duong lieh su eua Dang (Looking back at the
Historic Paths of the Party I (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That. 1965). p.
18. Tran Van Giau. Giai-eap Cong-nhan Viet Nam. Tap I. 1930-1935
(The Vietnamese Working Class. Vol. 1.1930-1935) (Hanoi: Nha Xuat
Ban Su Hoc. 1962). pp. 66-67. Thirty Years of Struggle of the Party,
Hook One (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1960).
pp. 31-32.
2. Ngo Vinh Long. Peasant Revolutionary Struggles in Vietnam
in the 1930's (Harvard Ph.D. thesis).
3. CMCDVN. Vol. VI. pp. 51-52; Le Tan Tien. pp. 12-15;
Thirty Years .. . pp. 24-25. The three communist parties were: The
Indochinese Communist Party (Dong Duong Cong San Dang). the
Annam Communist Party (An-nam Cong San Dang). and the Indochina
Communist Federation (Dong Duong Cong San Lien Doan.)
4. CMCDVN. Vol. VI, pp. 134-140 for the originals of these
documents.
5. Le Tan Tien. p. 18; Thirty Years . .. , p. 32.
6. Nghia. "Gop them mot ittai tieu ve to chuc va phat dong
phong trao dau tranh 0 Nam-ky sau khi Dang ta vua moi thong nhat ra
doi" IAdding a few more documents on the organization and
mobilization of the strusgle movement in the Southern Region after
our I'arty was newly unified and established) Nghicn Cuu Lieh Su
(journal of Historical Research, to be referred to as NCLS). no. 67.
October 1964, pp. 58-59.
7. Le Tan Tien, p. 19; Tran Van Giau, pp. 97-132; Vu Huy
Phuc, "Vai y nghi ve Giai-cap Cong-nhan Viet Nam Nhung nam dau
duoi su lanh dao cua Dang Cong San Dong Duong" (A few observations
on the Vietnamese Working Class during the first years under the
leadership of the Indochinese Communist Partyl. NCLS. no. 131.
March-April 1970. pp. 24 & 33.
8. Le Thanh Khoi. Le Viet Nam: histoire et Civilisation (Paris:
Editions de Minuit. 1955). p. 420 and Paul Bernard, Le probleme
eeot/Omique Indoehinois (Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines. 1934).
p. B.
9. Phu Nu Tan Van [Women's Newsl. August 22. August 29,
and October 17. 1929. This was the largest magazine in Indochina. It
was published in Saigon by a group of upper middle-class women.
10. Phu Nu Tan Van. October 24, 1929.
11. '/"bue Nghiep Dan Baa [Professional People's Newspaper.
Hanoil. January 17. 1930; CMCDVN. Vol. VI. pp. 108-110.
12. Duoe Nba Nam [The Torch of Vietnam). May 15, 1930.
This paper was published by a group of landlords who were French
citizens and members of the Colonial Council.
13. For details on the demonstration see: Duoe Nba Nam, May
14, 1930; NCLS. no. 50. pp. 46-46; Dem Ve Sang [Nights into Daysl
(Hanoi: Thanh Nien, 1975), pp. 1..37-145. (This is a book based on the
compilations of the Committee on the Research of Party History of
Thai-binh province on the history of revolutionary activities in the
province from 1925 to 1930.) Also: AOM: SLOTFOM (Fonds du
Service de liaison avec les originaires des territoires de la France
d'Outre-Mer, 27. rue Oudinot, 75007 Paris). Series III. Carton 48.
"Notes politiques" covering events from June 1 5 to July 30. 1930.
14. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III: Carton 48, "Notes politiques,"
March 1 5 to May 30, 1931; To Minh Trung, "Tai lieu tham khao ve lich
su dia phuong; Phong trao nong dan Tien-hai 1930" [Reference sources
on local history: The Peasant Movement in Tien Hai in 19301, NCLS.
no. 52, July 1963, pp. 60-62; Den Ve Sang, pp. 146-171.
15. This tabulation is made from Duoe Nba Nam, Lue Tinh Tan
Vall [News of the Six provinces. Official newspaper published by the
colonial government. I , COllg Luan [Public Discussion, Official
newspaper), and 'fie"g Dan [Voice of the People, a reformist
newspaper publishe.d in Huel from May 1930 to June 1931 by this
writer. Daniel Hemery, in Revolutiolltlaires Vietnamiens et Pouvoir
Colollial ell Indoebille: COli/illullistes, Trotskytes, Nationalistes J Saigon
de 1932 .i 1937 (Paris: Maspero, 1975), p. 22, states that he makes a
similar tabulation from La Depeebe d'IlIdoebille, L'Impartial, L 'Eebo
am/mite, and Le COIln-ier saigolltlais and comes up with 124 cases of
peasant demonstrations during the same period. It shoul<l be noted that
not all peasant demonstrations were recorded, and only a very small
number of the public meetings and rallies were ever reported.
16. Phu Nu Tan Van. August 22, August 29. October 15, and
October 24,1929.
17. Duoe Nba Nam and Lue Tinh Tan Van, August to October
1930; AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III: Carton 48. "Notes politiques ......
September 15 to October 31; Hemery. pp. 22-23. AOM: SLOTFOM,
Series III. Carton 48. "Notes politiques ...... September 15 to October
21 and November 1 to December 15; Duoc Nba Nam, September 30 to
December 29. 1930; and Luc Tinb Tan Van. October 1 to December
29, 1930.
18. Ngo Van Hoa. "Nhung tien de ... ," second part, NCLS. no.
153. November-December 1973. p. 49.
19. AOM: ICNF (Indochine Nouveau Fonds). Carton B4.
Dossier 2688, report of the Resident of Nghe-an of May 13, 1930, to
the Resident-Superior of Annam.
20. NCLS. no. 153, pp. 48-51.
21. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334. Dossier 2688, Report of the
Residence of Nghe-an at Vinh on the chronology of events in the
province from 1929 to 1931. August 1 was the International
Anti-Imperialist Wars Anniversary.
22. AOM: ICNF. Carton 334, Dossier 2688. report of the
Resident. May 13, 1930.
23. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334, Dossier 2688. report of the
Residence at Vinh on the chronology of events from 1929-1931.
24. Tran Huy Lieu, Les Soviets'du Ngbe-Tinb de 1930-1931 au
Viet-Nam (Hanoi: Editions en Langues Etrangeres, 1960), p. 19.
25. Tieng Dan [Voice of the People. Newspaper published in
Hue) April-September 1930; Trung Chinh. "Tinh Chat Doc Dao cua
Xu-Viet Nghe-Tinh" [The Unique Characteristics of the Nghe-Tinh
Soviets), NCLS, no. 32, November 1961, pp. 8-9.
26. Ibid., p. 9; Tbirty years . .. , pp. 32-33; CMCDVN, Vol. VI.
p. 62; NCLS, no. 32, p. 9; 131. 24-25; Tran Huy Lieu. Les Soviets . . ,
p.20.
27. Ibid. Tran HUy Lieu, Les Soviets . . , p. 20.
28. CMCDVN. Vol. VI, pp. 62-63; AOM: ICNF, Carton 333,
Dos. 2687, testimony of Ha Xuan HaL
29. AOM: ICNF. Carton B4. Dos. 2688, report of Resident of
Nghe-an of May 13, 1930.
30. Telegram included in report of the Resident cited above.
31. Ibid.; CMCDVN. Vol. VI, p. 63; AOM: ICNF, Carton 333.
Dos. 2687, testimony of Ha Xuan Hai; also Dos. 2688, May 8, 1930,
note on the general situation in Nghe-an and on the situation on May 1
in particular by the chief of police and Surete; also report of the
Resident of May 13.
32. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334, Dos. 2688.
B. Ibid.
34. AOM: ICNF, Dos. 2688, May 15, 1930, conclusion of the
Resident to his May 13 report.
35. See full translation in AOM: ICNF, Dos. 2688.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. See report of the district chief to the Vietnamese
Governor-General of the two provinces of Nghe-an and Ha-tinh on June
I, 1930, in AOM: ICNF. Dos. 2688. For a newspaper report of the
same incident and the list of demands see Tieng Dan, June 14. 1930.
This newspaper maintained that there were about 3.000 demonstrators,
including about 100 women.
39. AOM: SLOTFOM (Fonds du Service de liaison avec les
origin aires des territoires de la France d'outre-mer). Series III, Carton
48, "Notes politiques", June 15 to July 30. 1930; CMCDVN. Vol. VI,
p. 63; NCLS, no. 32, p. 9.
40. CMCDVN, p. 64; NCLS, no. 32, p. 9. no. 131. p. 28; Tran
Van Giau. Giai Cap . .. , Vol. I, p. 100-101; pp. 115-116.
41. Tran Huy Lieu. Les Soviets ... , pp. 21-22; AOM:
SLOTFOM, Series III. Carton 48, "Notes politiques ... "; Tieng Dan,
August 9 and 27. 1930.
42. CMCDVN. Vol. VI, pp. 64-{;5; Tran Huy Lieu. Les
Sovie ts ... , p. 22.
43. Le Si Toan. "Vai y kien gop vao tac pham 'Giai Cap Cong
Nhan Viet-nam' cua ong Tran Van Giau" [A few opinions contributing
to the manuscript "The Vietnamese Working Class" of Mr. Tran Van
Giaul, NCLS, no. 68, November 1964, p. 27.
44. Cited in Tran Van Giau, Giai Cap Cong Nban Viet-Nam: Su
Hinb tbanb va su pbat trien eua no tu giai cap "tu minb" den giai cap
32
"cbo minb." [The Vietnamese Working Class: Its fonnation and
development from a "by itself" class to a "for itself" class) (Hanoi:
Nha Xuat Ban Su That. 1957)
45. Cited in Trung Ching, "Tinh chat hien thuc cua Xo-Viet
Nghe-Tinh" [The Realistic Nature of the Nghe-Tinh Sovietsi, NCLS,
no. 30. September 1961, pp. 4-5.
46. Tieng Dan, September 10, 1930; Duoc Nba Nam, September
1. 1930; September 4, 5, 9. 11, and 15. 1930. Also see AOM:
SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton 48, "Notes politiques..... covering
events from August to September 15.
47. AOM: ICNF. Carton 335, Dos. 2690. Overall report on the
situation in Ha-tinh in the years 1930-1931 by the Residence of
Ha-tinh.
48. Vo San (Proletariat). issues of October and November 1930.
Cited in NCLS. no. 32. p. 11. Also see Tieng Dan. September 17. 1930;
Duoc Nba Nam, September 11. 1930; AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III.
Carton 48. "Notes politiques ..." covering events from August 1 to
September 15.
49. Tbanb-Ngbe-Tinb Tan Van, [News from Thanh-hoa.
Nghe-an. and Ha-tinh. This is an official newspaper published by the
French administration.) no. 8. September 9.1930. See similar report in
Duoc Nba Nam. September 26. 1930; also Tieng Dan, September 17.
1930.
SO. NCLS, no. 32, p. 11; AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton
48. "Notes politiques ..." covering events from September 15 to
October 30.1930.
51. NCLS, no. 32, p. 10.
52. Ibid.; Tran Huy Lieu, Les Soviets . .. , pp. 25-26; AOM:
SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton 48, "Notes politiques..." covering events
from September 15 to October 30, 1930; AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III,
Carton 42. telegram by Governor-General Pierte Pasquier of September
16.1930. Also Tieng Dan, September 7 and September 27.1930.
53. NCLS, no. 32, pp. 9-10. Tieng Dan. September 10-0ctober
,
18. 1930.
j
54. AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton 48. "Notes politiques
t
.."; Tieng Dan, September 27. 1930.
55. AOM: ICNF. Carton 334. Dos. 2688. reports of October 1-3
t
of the Inspector of Political and Administrative Affairs to the
I Resident-Superior of Annam.
56. Cited in NCLS. no. 30. p. S.
57. AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
I
I .." covering events from September to October 30. See section on
"observation on some general aspects of the rebellion."
58. NCLS, no. 32, p. 12.
59. Cited in Tran Huy Lieu, "Van de chinh quyen Xo-viet"
[The question of the Soviet government). NCLS, no. 33. December
1961. pp. 1-7.
60. NCLS. no. 32, p. 12.
61. Quoted in Trung Chinh. "Tinh chat tu phat cua Xo-viet
Nghe-Tinh" [The spontaneous nature of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets).
NCLS. no. 31. October 1961, p. 5.
62. Quoted in NCLS, no. 30, September 1931. p. 3.
63. NCLS. no. 32. pp. 15-16; CMCDVN. Vol. VI. pp. 69-71;
Nguyen Duy Trinh. "Tu Kham Tu Vi Thanh Nien den Truong Hoc
Xo-Viet-Nghe-Tinh" [From Jail to Juveniles to the Training Ground of
Nghe-Tinh Soviets). This is a memoir by the present Foreign Minister
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam published in Con Duong Cacb
Mang [The Revolutionary Path) (Hanoi: Thanh Nien xuat ban. 1969).
pp. 38-97. Details of the Soviets are located in pages 67-83. NCLS. no.
B. pp. 1-7.
64. AOM: ICNF. Carton 332, Dos. 2684. declaration of
Resident-Superior LeFol. Also see AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III, Carton
48, "Notes politiques ...... September 15 to October 30. section on
military actions.
65. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III. Carton 42. telegrams from the
Governor-General on September 13, 1930.
66. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III. Carton 48. "Notes politiques
..... September 15 to October 30.
67. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334, Dos. 2686.
68. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III. Carton 42; CMCDVN,
pp.76-77.
69. CMCDVN. pp. 53-56. 141-166.
70. NCLS. no. 30. pp. 2-3.
71. NCLS, no. 31. p. 5; AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton 48.
"Notes politiques ...... September 15 to October 31. 1930.
72. Tran Van Giau, Ciai Cap . .. Vol. I. pp. 144-145.
73. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
..... November 1 to December 15, 1930.
74. Con Duong CaelJ Mang, p. 72.
75. AOM: ICNF. Carton 333, Dos. 2686, declaration of the
special commissioner of the Surete at Vinh.
76. AOM: ICNF, Carton 335. Dos. 2690.
77. AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III, Carton 48, "Notes poli
tiques..."; AOM: ICNF. Cartons 333. Dos. 2687, and 334, Dos. 2688;
Con Duong Cacb Mang, p. 75.
78. AOM: ICNF. Carton 335. Dos. 2690. RI'port of the
Resident of Ha-tinh on March 9. 1931; AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III.
Carton 42, telegrams of acting Governor-General Robin, January 1931;
Carton 48. "Notes politiques ..."
79. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334, Dos. 2688.report of Lieutenant
Colonel Barbet: Carton 335, Dos. 2690. Report of March 9, 1931, by
the Resident of Ha-tinh; SLOTFOM. Carton 332. Dos. 2684,
declaration of Resident-Superior LeFol.
80. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334. Dos. 2688. report of Lieutenant
Colonel Barbet of May 1931; .
81. Ibid.; AOM: ICNF, Carton 335. Dos. 2689. declaration of
the French missionary of Ky-anh.
82. Con Duong Cacb Mang, p. 80.
83. Ibid.; NCLS, no. 33. pp. 5-7.
84. Tbirty years . .. , p. 35.
85. NCLS, no. 30. p. 3.
86. Con Duong Cacb Mang. p. 81.
87. AOM: SLOTFOM, Serie III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
.." covering events from April to May; ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2690,
report of March 17, 1931; NCLS. no. 33, pp. 6-7.
88. ICNF. Carton 334. Dos. 2688, report from the Chief of the
First Agricultural Sector of Annam.
89. AOM: ICNF, Carton 333. Dos. 2686, declaration of M.
Dulce, French Municipal Councilor of Vinh. Dos. 2687. testimony of
the Inspector of Agricultural Services.
90. AOM: ICNF. Carton 334. Dos. 2688, report of the Chief of
the First Agricultural Sector of Annam.
91. AOM: ICNF, Carton 335. Dos. 2690. report of May 12,
1931.
92. Con Duong Cacb Mang. p. 81; AOM: SLOTFOM, Series m.
Carton 48. "Notes politiques ..." covering events from March 15 to
May 1st; and Carton 49. "Notes politiques ..." covering events in May.
Also see AOM: ICNF. Carton 335. Dos. 2690. weekly reports from the
Resident up to June.
93. AOM: SLOTFOM. Serie III. Carton 48. "Notes politiques
..." covering events from March 15 to May 1. 1931; ICNF. Carton
335, Dos. 2690. report of April 20. 1930. by the Resident of Ha-tinh.
94. AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton 49, "Notes politiques
.. " covering events of May 1931 in Nghe-an and Ha-tinh. The report
of Lieutenant Colonel Barbet of May 1931 on the situation in North
Annam in AOM: ICNF, Carton 334, Dos. 2688 also stated that
communist bands forbade landlords and the Catholic missions to reap
their crops.
On tbe assigned day, tbe communist bands 'Would go 'Witb tbeir
leaders to barvest tbe paddy and 'Would carry out tbe sbaring of tbe
crops, banding over to tbe landlords only one-tbird.
95. Cited in CMCDVN, Vol. VI, pp. 81-82.
96. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III, Carton 42, telegram of acting
Governor-General Robin of May 12. 1931.
97. AOM: ICNF. Carton 333, Dos. 2686. statement by Depuy.
the Inspector of Political and Administrative Affairs of Annam.
98. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III. Carton 48 contains many
handbills, leaflets, and appeals of this period in the original Vietnamese
and in French translation. The French translations usually show
discrepancy when compared with the Vietnamese originals. Key
sentences were taken out and replaced with French sentences that do
not even show the most remote relationship to the originals. Also see
Carton 49, "Notes politiques ..." covering events of May 1931. See
section on communist propaganda.
99. Con Duong Cacb Mang, p. 82. CMCDVN. Vol. VI. pp.
87-91. This source (p. 87) documents that during this period the slogan
"root out all intellectuals, wealthy people, landlords, and notables" (tri.
phu. dia. hao, doa tan goc tan re) was also passed around by word of
mouth. Also see AOM: SLOTFOM. Series III. Carton 49. "Notes
33
politiques ..."; ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2690, reports of the Resident
of Ha-tinh on May 12, 17,24, and 31,1931.
100. Tieng Dan, June 27,1931.
101. AOM: ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2690, report of the Resident
of Ha-tinh on July 5, 1931.
102. AOM: ICNF, Carton 334, Dos. 2688, reports of the chief
physicians of Vinh hospital on visits in Nghe-an in July and August
1931. In AOM: ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2693, there is a report by the
Chief Physician in which he states he had never seen so much
destitution in his life, that at ~ h e "soupe populaire" there were
"thousands of emaciated people who did not have anything to eat; they
were really corpses whose ribs stuck out from under their skin." In only
one week "over 300 persons died of starvation in the districts of
Diem-chau, Anh-son, Yen-thanh, and Quynh-luu."
In the two provinces of Nghe-Tinh the hunger situation has reached
such proportions that people would sell anything they own in
exchange for a potato or a handful of rice. There is an old man who
owned 5 mau (about 5 acres) of paddy fields, 7 buffaloes, and five
houses. But he had to sell everything for 25 piasters to pay taxes;
and since there was nothing left for food, the whole househola of
five persons has separated, each going his or her own way to beg . ...
Tieng Dan, August 15,1931; September 16,1931. Also see Con Duong
Cach Mang, pp. 82-85.
103. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
. . . ", September 15 to October 31; "Notes politiques ...", November 1
to December 15,1930.
104. 'Fieng Dan, July 23, 1930; August 9,1930.
105. AOM: ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2691, declaration of the
Resident of Quang-ngai.
106. AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
...", September 15 to October 31, 1930; ICNF, Carton 335, Dos.
2692, "Liste chronologique des eventments."
107. AOM: ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2692, "Liste chronologique
..."; SLOTFOM, Serie III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques "
November 1 to December 12, 1930.
108. AOM: ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2691, declaration of the
Resident of Quang-ngai; SLOTFOM, Serie III, Carton 48, "Notes
politiques ...", December 15 to January 31, 1931; and ICNF, Carton
335, Dos. 2692, "Liste chronologique ..."
109. Ibid.; also see "Notes politiques ...", December 15 to
January 13, 1931; ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2692, "Liste chrono
logique ..."
110. AOM: SLOTFOM, Serie III, Dos. 116, telegram from acting
Governor-General Robin to the Ministry of Colonies on April 18, 1931;
and ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2693, report of the "Medecin general,
Inspecteur des services sanitaires et medicaux."
111. AOM: SLOTFOM, Serie III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
...", March 15 to May 1, 1931; ICNF, Carton 335, Dos. 2692, "Liste
chronologique ..."; Dos. 2691, declaration of the Resident of
Quang-ngai and reports from members of the "Chambre des
represantants du peuple" of Annam who were living in Quang-ngai; and
a report of French !Dissionary living in Son-tinh district.
112_ AOM: SLOTFOM, Series III, Carton 48, "Notes politiques
...", September 15 to October 31,1930.
113. Ibid., "Notes politiques ...", November 1 to December 15,
1930.
114. Ibid.; "Notes politiques ...", March 15 to May 1, 1931; and
SLOTFOM, Serie III, Carton 116; Depeche d'Indochine, July 31, 1931;
L 'Opinion, August 11, 1931. The editors of L 'Opinion, August 11,
1931. The editors of L 'Opinion advocated the construction of new
roads with tax monies to facilitate "control, and when need be,
repress" the rural population. As an afterthought, the paper added that
the construction of roads would provide work for the people.
Tht' treatment of sugar cane.
34
Ctmg-bba Xa-boi Cbu-ngbia Viet-Nam
New Admmistrative Divisions of
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
1. Lai Chau
2. Hoang Lien So'n
3. Hi Tuyen
4. Bac Thai
5. Cao Lang
6. Quang Ninh
7. Hi Bac
8. Vinh PhU
9. So'n La
10. Ha So'n Binh
11. Hai Hu'ng
12. Thai Binh
13. Hi Nam Ninh
14. Thanh Hoa
15. Nghe Tinh
16. Binh Tri Thien
17. Quang Nam-Da Nang
18. Gia Lai-COng Tum
19. Nghia Binh
20. Dic Lac
21. Phu Khanh
22. UmDong
23. Thulin Hai
24. Dong Nai
25. Song Be
26. Tiy-Ninh
27. Long An
28. Tien Giang
29. Ben Tre
30. Cu'u Long
31. DongThap
32. An Giang
33. Kien Giang
34. Hau-Giang
35. Minh Hai
a. Ha Noi
h. Hai Phong
e. Thimh-PhoHo-Cbi-Minh
d. Con So'n
e. Dao Phil Quoe
f. Dao Con Co
g. Vinh Bae Bo
Source: Nb/in [)Qn (People's Daily),
Hanoi, February 27,1976, p. 1.
Cam-Pu-Chia
Trung-Quoc
...
. g .--
-...I-----..:;#d ---------1
,
,
/35
Photographic Essay
Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam
by Christine White
We are accustomed to thinking of revolution as the proc
ess by which the old order is destroyed and new political insti
tutions and social relations arc created. Revolution is common
ly thought of as the enemy of tradition. And yet we know too
that no revolution, no matter how fundamental and thorough
going, transforms all dimensions of social and political reality.
Revolutions are made in human societies which have their own
history, and some aspects of the heritage of the past stay con
stant to serve as the framework within which other aspects of
the old order are shattered or transformed beyond recognition.
Every country, no matter how reactionary, has some
"revolutionary tr:iditions" to which progressive movements
can appeal. The French left evokes the spirit of the Commune;
American leftists recall the courageous struggle of abolitionists
and the historic strikes of the late 19th century. Australian
radicals find an alternative tradition and even an alternative
flag in the miners' rebellion at the Eureka stockade. Generally
speaking, successful revolutionary movements are those which
have been able to revive, or rechannel, strong progressive his
torical currents. The Vietnamese revolu tion, it has been argued,
owed the success of its surprising victory over French colonial
ism and American nea-colonialism to the skillful combination
of "revolution and tradition."Most importandy, Vietnam had
especially strong revolutionary traditions, in particular a heri
tage of wars of liberation against foreign invasion and repeated
peasant uprisings against exploitation by landlords and the im
perial court. The Vietnamese revolution involved rallying the
"traditional" popular forces for national and social revolution
behind a Marxist- Leninist leadership with an understanding of
the new forces of imperialism and capitalism.
In an important sense, a basic socio-political framework
survived the Vietnamese revolution. Nation, village, and family
ancient to this day the bedrock of
Vietnamese socia-political organization. But the laws and cus
toms governing these venerable human groupings were funda
mentally changed one after another. The August Revolution of
1945 swept aside the emperor. In northern Vietnam, the land
reform of 1953-1956 revolutionized economic and political
power within the villages and the family law of 1959 abolished
polygamy and child marriage, the most abhorrent aspects of
the traditional Vietnamese patriarchal family. Thus trans
formed, the ancient institutions of nation, village and family
found new strength. Under French colonialism, the nation had
been lost to the French. The village and family had been under
mined or dissolved as the poor were forced out'of their villages
in search of food and husbands "sold wife and children to pay
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The alliance between colonialism and feudalism, the two enemies
of the Vietnamese revolution. An early twentieth century photo of
Governor General Sarraut with Emperor Khai Dinh. In centuries past
feudal Chinese invaders had found some members of Vietnamese royal
lines willing to collaborate with them. Emperor Khai Dinh was carrying
on this "tradition" of collaborating with a foreign invader. When the
Indochinese Communist Party was formed in 1930, its main tasks were
defined as "anti-colonial and anti-feudal struggle." (photo from Indo
chine Francaise, 1919)
36
taxes to the French." No wonder Vietnamese revolutionary
leaders have stressed the element of tradition in their movement
more than most revolutionaries. They succeeded in mobilizing
those who wanted to preserve Vietnamese .society from a
devastating foreign onslaught as well as those'who wanted to
revolutionize Vietnamese society from the bottom up.
However, "tradition and revolution" is only one half of
the stoty; the other half is entitled "tradition and counter
revolution." From the late nineteenth century to 1975 the
forces of imperialism and capitalism profoundly changed Viet
nam while trying to manipulate a traditional facade. French
colonial rulers tried to use Vietnamese imperial traditions and
the mandarinal hierarchy for their own very untraditional ends.
The fiction of indirect rule over the "protectorates" of north
ern and central Vietnam (Tonkin and Annam), nominally un
der the rule of the emperor at Hue, was maintained throughout
French colonial rule. In 1945 the Emperor Bao Dai abdicated
in the face of the popular upsurge of the August Revolution,
but within a few years the French renegotiated a new colonial
feudal alliance with him.
The Americans replaced the French as the patrons of an
anti-communist state in South Vietnam after 1954 and neo
colonialism rapidly replaced colonialism. First, Emperor Bao
Dai was forced to accept an American protegee, Ngo Dinh
Diem, as premier. In 1955 Diem, in a parody of the 1945 Com
munist-led nationalist and anti-feudal movement, reabolished
imperial rule and set up a republic under American aegis. This
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was hailed in the Saigon press as an anti-feudal revolution, but
in fact Ngo Dinh Diem had family roots in Vietnam's feudal
mandarinal elite and ruled as "the last Confucian," conferring
quasi-feudal fiefdoms on family members. This was no acci
dent. Diem had been chosen by his American sponsors- for his
upper class origins and reputation among upper class anti-com
munists and by anti-colonial elements for his right-wing, elitist
nationalism. Diem's version of elitist rule failed and U.S.
troops were sent to try to prevent the victory of the revolution.
The attempt to shore up the elitist anti-revolurionary tradition
was transferred to the village level: the C. LA. set up a training
camp in Vung Tau under a Viet Minh renegade named Nguyen
Be to train "cadres" to strengthen the traditional village elite,
the council of notables. At the national level, a faceless neo
colonial military bureaucrat, Nguyen Van Thieu, whose main
political characteristic was that he was a good administrator
(i.e., unlike Ngo Dinh Diem he was relatively docile in follow
ing orders), presided over the last years of the fated Vietna
mese counter-revolution.
In a grotesque parody of imperial tradition, Thieu gave
himself feudal airs at his daughter's wedding and erected an
elaborate burial monument to his parents. In 1975, after the
"fall of Saigon," angry ARVN soldiers whose superiors had
fled abroad with their ill-gotten wealth desecrated this pom
pous pseudo-imperial grave. This echo of the fate of the graves
of the imperial family when a dynasty had fallen to a peasant
rebellion marked a fitting end to the counter-revolutionary
attempt to continue pseudo-imperial traditions of rule.
37
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Above
A neo-colonial military ruler enjoying a feudal ritual: the prostration of
Nguyen Van Thieu's son-in-law to his parents-in-law during the marriage
ceremony. (photo from Newsweek, circa 1973)
The Photos
These photographs, which I also have in the form of
slides, are some I use to illustrate lectures on Vietnam. I have
found that terms like "feudalism," the "colonial-feudal al
liance" can seem merely abstract and ideological to people not
familiar with tbe reality tbat these words summarized in the
Vietnamese context. These photos were chosen to try to give
more concrete meaning to abstract terms and theoretical lines
of argument.
c. w.
Previous Page
Hierarchical traditions of elite rule: Mandarins in the yearly
ritual of prostrating themselves before the emperor. 1=his tradition con
tinued for a while under colonial rule, but was abolished in the early
20th century. (photo from Sarraut, Indochine)
3'8
Right Top
Nghe-an, Central Vietnam: 1930: a "red self-defense unit" during the
Nghe-Tinh Soviet movement of 1930-1931. The weapons are typical of
hundreds of years of peasant revoluts; only the red flag flying on the
right is new, (photo from Vietnam dan chu cong hoa 1945-1960)
Right Bottom
Although his father served as a mandarin before being dismissed for
anti-colonialism, Ho Chi Minh fundamentally rejected Vietnamese tradi
tions of social hierarchy. Here he is during a meeting, with an informal
ity which would shock modern as well as traditional Asian elites, offer
ing something to nibble to labor heroes and heroines. (photo from Viet
nam dan chu cong hoa 1945-1960)
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Below
Young peasant women practicing the traditional sword dance in the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (196051. According to an ancient
Vietnamese proverb, "when the enemy comes, even the women must
fight." (photo by Marc Riboud)
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Above
During the decades of French rule, the tradition of fighting foreign in
vaders lived on in the popular consciousness. This tradition was not just
limited to history books, but was embedded in popular religion. Here,
in a photo taken while the French ruled supreme in Vietnam, a peasant
visits, near Hanoi, a temple to a hero of a past war of national liberation.
(photo from Sarraut, Indochine)
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40
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In Revolutionary Vietnam, it is ordinary men and women who emerge
as larger-than-Iife heroes and heroines: here, a young woman in front of
a poster during the air war on North Vietnam. (photo by Marc Riboud) f
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A Review Essay
New Light on Vietnamese Marxism
by Jayne Werner
The historical roots of Vietnamese Marx-sm and its
popular appeal are well-known, but the history of the Marxist
movement, especially before World War II, has been, up to
now, obscure and difficult to pinpoint. Most students of Asia
recall that the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) was the first
communist party to come to power in Asia (in 1945, with the
establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam),
although the Korean Communist Party has the distinction of
being the first Asian communist party. The reasons for the
early success of the ICP (founded formally in 1930) and
information about its early history are largely obscure in
Western scholarship on Vietnam. The sources are In
Vietnamese (published in Vietnam) and in French in the
colonial archives in France . This is not likely to be rectified in
the near future in the United States, at least, because Vietnam
scholarship no longer enjoys the academic and research
support it once had and there is no sign of any rush of support
to help fill the gap. 1
Daniel Hemery's book helps fill in some of the gaps. It
is a history of Marxism in the southern tier of Vietnam
(Cochinchina) from 1932 to 1937, drawn from the newspaper
collection and documents in the French colonial archives. The
book focuses mainly on the alliance between the Trotskyists,
members of the ICP, and radical nationalists during this time
and their common endeavor in writing articles for and
publishing a newspaper, La Lutte (The Struggle). Hemery has
carefully consulted three years of publication of La Lutte,
which he uscs as his primary source material to describe the
Marxist movement in Saigon during the five-year period. These
were critical years for' Vietnamese Marxism, since they
immediately preceded the establishment of the Viet Minh
(1941). In many ways these years influenced the strategies to
be used by and the options available to Vietnamese
Communists in later years.
From 1932 to 1939, certain forms of Marxist political
activity were legal under colonial law in Cochinchina, which
enjoyed a more liberal political atmosphere than Tonkin or
Annam (northern and central Vietnam, respectively). The
Popular Front government in France (l936) subsequently
helped guarantee access to limited democratic rights (free
Revolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial en
lndochine; communistes, trotskystes, nationalistes II
Saigon de 1932 a 1937, by Daniel Hemery. Paris:
Maspero, 1975. 525 pp.
press, elections, meetings) for Vietnamese Marxists. The
influence of Marxism touched many sectors of the population
during these years, and Marxism emerged as the dominant
tendency in the nationalist movement. The strength of the
political party of the national-reformists (the urban elite), the
Constitutionalist Party (its slogan was "French-Vietnamese
collaboration"), was definitely reduced during this period,
with the political initiative passing to the Communists.
This flowering of legal activity occurred on the heels of
what seemed like the permanent crushing of the underground
Marxist movement. Peasant uprisings (organized in large part
by the ICP) erupted allover Vietnam from 1930-31, and they
were ruthlessly repressed. The apogee of these uprisings
occurred in the central provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh
where peasant "soviets" had been momentarily established. By
1932, the ICP was virtually destroyed by the French secret
police. And yet, Marxism was able to revive and indeed to
recover from these losses. The communist base of operation
was located again in the south, and by 1936 Vietnamese
communism had re-extended its influence and support
throughout all the provinces.
Thus, during the 1930s, Marxism in Vietnam was already
demonstrating its remarkable capacity for adaptation and
survival. The experience gained in this period prepared
Marxists for their eventual assumption of power in 1945 and
ultimately for their final re-liberation of the south in 1975.
Through its various stages and forms of struggle, the Marxist
movement in the 1930s was already proving its ability to adapt
to new colonial circumstances, to make a transition from rural
to urban struggle, to adapt from underground methods of
struggle to legal and overt political activity, and to adapt
regionally.
42
The period of 1932-37 in the history of Vietnamese
Marxism, as Hemery's study shows, was the time of the
greatest ideological diversity of Marxism in Vietnam. The ICP,
adhering to the 3rd Int!!rnational (the Comintern), and the
Trotskyists of the 4th International were both prominent
forces in the communist movement. Hemery lucidly explains
the positions and the nature of both and clarifies the points of
contention between them. He focuses on their unusual
collaboration in publishing the French-language La Lutte
(Vietnamese-language newspapers were subject to censorship
under colonial law). This collaboration between adherents of
the 3rd and 4th Internationals is unique in the history of the
colonial period in Asia. It is interesting as a study in its own,
not to mention the broader issues involved.
La Lutte was founded in Saigon in late 1934. It
publicized the plight of the little people-both workers and
;
peasants-who suffered the daily repressive actions of the
,
colonial state and the exactions of reactionary notables in the
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villages. It defended workers' and peasants' rights (without
assigning a priority to either), sought to raise the political
1
consciousness of workers, peasants, and anti-colonial intel
I
lectuals (and seemed to have success in this domain),
disseminated Marxist thought, and struggled against the
colonial state and its Constitutionalist allies. The Lutteurs, as
)
they were called, also very successfully contested colonial
elections to further disseminate their ideas.
The La Lutte alliance was not the only aspect of Marxist
political activity during the 1930s but Hemery argues it
involved a kind of "frontism" that came to be a prime
characteristic of Vietnamese communism. The basis for shared
t
action between Trotskyists and members of the ICP in Saigon
1
in these years was the complementary nature of their strengths
and weaknesses. The Trotskyists lacked a rural base (the ICP
still retained a following in the provinces) and the ICP was
marked by a sparseness of intellectual cadres (many had been
killed or arrested during the "white terror" of 1930-31). Also,
young Vietnamese Marxists shared a common background.
Many had gone to France for their education, where they
developed Marxist sympathies and contacts with French
,
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communist groups. They returned to Vietnam in the late
1920s and early 1930s. La Lutte was established by a group of
Vietnamese Marxists who had not been arrested by the French
I
during the purges of 1930-31. La Lutte also marked the
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confluence of three paths of Vietnamese Marxism which up to
then had remained separate: the Thanh Nien of Nguyen Ai
f Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) and the Thanh Nien Cao Vong of Nguyen
An Ninh, which led to the founding of the ICP; the group of
J
French emigre communists including Duong Bach Mai and
Nguyen Van Tao, who joined the French Communist Party;
and the emigre Trotskyist Marxism of Ta Thu Thau. These
t three paths never merged during the 1930s; they merely
r
formed an association during the years of La Lutte.
Afterwards, their paths parted again.
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1 Hemery perceptively analyzes point-counterpoint in the
debate between the Trotskyists and the ICP in Vietnam in
t
these years, which echoed the fundamental quarrels between
1
the Third and Fourth Internationals. In La Lutte, the ICPers
and the Trotskyists had to agree not to give priority to one
side or the other's analysis, but to stick to their more limited
common objectives. This does not mean, however, that there
were no ideological or strategic differences between them.
From 1932-34, t:he ICP and the Trotskyists engaged in a
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vigorous debate about the role of nationalism in the
revolution, an evaluation of the 1930-31 uprisings, world
revolution, class struggle, and workers' vs. peasant priorities.
From 1934-36, the ICP drew closer to the Trotskyists, as they
came to downplay the role of patriotism in the revolution, and
emphasized proletarianization and class struggle. Both these
phases occurred within the context of the general party line
which had been laid down in 1930 in the "Political Theses" of
the Party. In the "Theses" equal emphasis was placed on
"anti-imperialism" and "anti-feudalism" (struggle against the
landlord class through land reform).
The Trotskyists had criticized the ICP for its role in the
1930-31 uprisings. They accused the ICP of relying on the
"autonomous capacities of the peasantry" because the Party
had refused to condemn the spontaneous actions and uprisings
of the peasants in the establishment of the soviets. The
Trotskyists faulted the ICP for "immature" conspiratorial
tendencies and for its "Stalinist" opportunism. But the Party
I
Pham Gian Giang: Ie Bonheur. A lacquer painting.
never rejected its role in guiding peasant discontent and
helping to establish the soviets, despite their being doomed to
failure, even during the 1934-36 period' of the La Lutte
collaboration. (Aspects of party policy during the uprisings
were, however, subject to strong criticism.) An ICP publication
argued in 1933 that the role of the Party during the uprisings
was not to advise against rebellion (which would have occurred
anyway), but to guide it along the right channels, to minimize
losses and to maintain revolutionary power for as long as
possible. (Similar to Marx's reaction to the Paris Commune.)
The ICP countered the Trotskyist criticism by charging that
the Trotskyists failed to appreciate the revolutionary potential
of the peasantry. They also put too much stock in an "abstract
revolutionarianism." A year later the ICP started to emphasize
worker's struggles over the peasant struggle, but the Party
never abandoned peasant struggles.
The Trotskyists, on the other hand, were consistently
persuaded that the only path for the revolution lay in class
struggle and the organization of a workers' movement to take
power. The question of colonialism was almost incidental to
this, since the workers' struggle in the metropolitan countries
(in Europe) would dismantle the colonial state once the
workers came to power. Hence the colonial question was
linked to the international workers' movement and to world
revolution. In concrete terms, this meant that for Indochina,
national liberation could only be achieved through solidarity
with the workers' movcment in France, presumably the
French Communist Party, and that independence would
follow when the FCP, or a French Trotskyist party, came to
power. National independence was really incidental to the
Vietnamese Trotskyists' concerns. They were interested in
social revolution. They saw nationalism as the ideology of the
bourgeoisie. and hence reactionary.
The lCP vacillated in its view of the role of nationalism
or patriotism in the revolution. This came to be the central
question facing the revolution, and the ICP and the Trotskyists
would later (aftt.T 1936 and especially after 1941) sharply
disagree on this point. The Trotskyists held firm to the stand
that it was necessary to sharpen the class struggle and to
extirpate nationalist ideology from the revolutionary move
ment. They thought pandering to nationalism was a sign of
ideological immaturity. The "historical development of the
nation" was above all determined by the course of the class
struggle. Nationalist opposition to the colonial state was a
closed chapter as far as the Trotskyists were concerned, having
ended with the defeat of the nationalist party's last uprising in
Vietnam. at Yen Bay (1930). Besides being reactionary,
nationalism was the ideology of the dying landlord Confucian
class.
From 1934-36, the ICP similarly rejected a role for
"nationalism" in the revolution, and put "anti-imperialism" in
its place. The ICP also included for the first time a notion of
class in the independence struggle and assigned a role to urban
Nghe An province
legal struggle and workers' actions (giving them priority).
Before 1934. the ICP had criticized the Trotskyists for
ignoring the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and the
question of land reform. Even during its 1934-36 rapproche
ment with the Trotskyists, the ICP did not abandon the
peasantry. In fact the reorganization of the Party in 1932-34
had been predicated upon rural reorganization. There was a
degree of anti-Trotskyist bias in the underground organization
since the rural cells, as they were reconstituted, defined
themselves in opposition to Trotskyism.
These point-counterpoints in the debates between the
Trotskyists and the ICP reflected some of the divergences
between Trotskyists and "Stalinists" worldwide. Why then the
La Lutte alliance? At first one might suspect that the alliance
represented a regional aberration. something peculiar to
Saigon. Not so, since it had the blessing of the Central
Committee of the ICP and the full support of the Trotskyist
group whose leaders were involved with La Lutte. It might
then be supposed that the alliance represented a secession of
Vietnamese Trotskyists and the ICP from their international
affiliates. Also not so. The alliance was condoned by the
Comintern and the 4th International was aware of its
existence. The alliance was possible because of the ICP
rapprochement with the Trotskyist position. The ICP line
from 1930-36-even in the 1934-36 period-diverged from the
national-revolution first position of Nguyen A ~ Quoc (who,
incidentally, was one of the ICP's links with the Comintern).
ICP participation in the La Lutte endeavor followed the Party
line (according to the ICP itself). Thus. from 1930-32, and
especially from 1934-36, the Party occupied a position further
to the left than during any other period in its pre-indepen
dence history. In mid-1936. the Party line was changed in
accordance with the new line adopted by the 7th Congress of
the Comintern. Henceforth, the ICP would de-emphasize
anti-feudalism and give primary emphasis to "anti
imperialism" (re-defined as the fight against fascism), lend its
44
support to the French Popular Front (shelving the question of
independence for the time being), and adopt a multi-class and
multi-party front program. This change pushed the ICP closer
to the position of Nguyen Ai Quoc. Before 1936 in fact
Nguyen Ai Quoc was criticized in local ICP party publications
for having advocated "reformist and collaborationist tactics"
in the Nghe-Tinh soviets. (He was abroad during this period.)
Numerous party texts in 1934-36 also criticized the
"conspirational" and "terroristic" tendencies in the Party.
Cadres were excoriated for using cliches like "weeping for the
loss of the country (mat nuoc)," and admonished to put world
revolution before national revolution.
Was the La Lutte alliance a "deviatioo" for the ICP? In
later years, the ICP seems to have been embarrassed by the
alliance, as is indicated by the scant attention party histories
of Vietnamese Marxism have given to this period. Vietnamese
historians certainly have yet to come to terms with this part of
their history, or to assess the contribution the Trotskyists may
have made to the advancement of Marxism and indeed to the
national movement.
The ICP from 1932-36 certainly seems to have started to
emphasize the urban aspect of their struggle for the first time,
which occurred in the context of their rapprochement with
the Trotskyists. As mentioned, this was not at the expense of
their rural strategy although many ICP rural cells did not fully
recover until 1936. The ICP realized its need to build the party
and gain more support in the urban arena and among the
working class. It did not need an alliance with the Trotskyists
to point that out. But the ICP never made the initial mistake
of the Chinese Communist Party of putting all their eggs into
one basket by advocating the absolute primacy of the urban
struggle, leaving partisans of rural organization to virtually
fend for themselves.
I
Also during the La Lutte period, ties between
Vietnamese communism and European communism were
strengthened. The connection with the CCP was momentarily
broken, following the Long March retreat from the South to
Yenan. Asian factors (primarily China) did not playa decisive
influence on Vietnamese Marxism during the 1930s, a loss
compensated in part by the rise of the Popular Front in France
and the opportunities for international support from Europe.
French Communists in fact provided the principal contact for
the ICP with the Com intern during the period.
Hemery's book also brings out a rich and absorbing

I
account of Vietnamese colonial society during the 1930s. This
is based on articles and editorials in La Lutte by its staff. Up
to now, we have had only scanty information on this subject.
Hemery summarizes La Lutte's findings on the working and
living conditions of the urban proletariat, the mechanisms of
colonial control and exploitation, and peasants' and workers'
r
movements. The authors of articles in La Lutte analyzed the
colonial administration and its electoral system, the operations
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of the secret police, the jails, and the ambivalent nature of the
Popular Front government's colonial policies with regard to
Marxism in Vietnam.
Hemery further has some insights on the "ecology" of
peasant communism. In 1936, La Lutte and the ICP launched
f
the organization of an "Indochina Congress" which would
I
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convene in Saigon to prescnt grievances to a visiting French
official delegation. Representatives to the Congress were to be
elected by "action committees" located in the villages. These
committees were supposed to compile a list of their most
pressing grievances. The action committees were legal until the
police suppressed them. (The delegation from France did not
come and the idea for the Congress collapsed.) However, the
police kept records of villages which established committees,
although unfortunately the records are incomplete. However,
if a village had an action committee, it very likely also had an
underground ICP cell. On the basis of this presumption and
data from the policy records, Hemery mapped out the location
of the villages. He found they were concentrated in the
suburbs of Saigon and the major market towns in the delta.
This pattern strongly suggests that communism found its
greatest support among peasants who were most affected by
capitalist and colonialist intrusions into their daily lives (those
who lived near towns and market areas). Here they could see
the direct workings of capitalism, had direct contact with
French officials, and saw the dependence and subservience of
Vietnamese "notables" on the colonial power. Further, these
areas had a more differentiated economy than in hinterland
areas. Commercial agriculture was already the main feature of
the local economy around Saigon by the 1930s. There were
more salaried workers in this area, and some villages relied
exclusively on the sale of handicraft items (such as baskets) for
their livelihood. In Hemery's view, the peasantry in the area
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45
around Saigon perceived social and political antagonisms more
clearly than the peasantry in other areas. They were dependent
upon landowners cum landlords and moneylenders" and as
small producers and artisans, the depression deprived them of
their income. As wage-earners, they were likewise robbed ,of
work and income as a result of the depression and fixed taxes.
Hemery concludes that the daily wage earner and the poor
peasant in these areas were in a semi-permanent state of
conflict with the law, which made the Marxist militant their
natural ally.
The action committees were forcibly disbanded in 1937,
in line with a general crackdown on legal Marxism. The offices
of La Lutte were raided and closed. But the closure of La
Lutte was c.aused, in Hemery's view, not by repression but by
the ICP's growing disenchantment with the alliance. The
change in the Comintern line in 1'936 and the new priorities of
the ICP made collaboration less desirable. It appears that the
Com intern had also ordered the ICP to withdraw from La
Lutte, but Hemery feels that the ICP decided to end the
association. before receiving the directive.
If there was ever a "legal" and non-violent road to
power open to Vietnamese Marxists, Hemery feels it was the
time of the collaboration of La Lutte. The possibilities for this
option, however, were very slim. Communist political
organization among workers and peasants was not legal, and
the status of the French Communist Party within the Popular
Front was fragile, as was the Front itself.
But "legal communism" in Vietnam accomplished a
great deal: it enabled the clandestine apparati of both the ICP
and the Trotskyists to recover (much more so in the case ot
the ICP). The recovery of the underground organizations in
turn strengthened the legal movement. The ICP became the
leading political organization among the peasantry. The
political consciousness of communist sympathizers was raised.
The experience of Marxist leaders was widened for the
struggles that lay in the future.
This period also served, in retrospect, to bring into much
sharper focus the contradictory natures of Marxism of the 3rd
International and Trotskyism, especially after 1936. Which
strategy would lead to the liberation of the Indochinese
peoples-the "opportunistic" and "nationalist" position of the
ICP or the "class struggle" position of the Trotskyists? Could
liberation be accomplished through a multi-class front and
struggle against the colonial power or through class struggle?
This became the most important question facing the
Vietnamese revolutionary movement as World War II
approached. Although Hemery does not explicitly say so, it is
clear from his account that the Trotskyist vision came to be
erroneous and their analysis rigid in the face of changing times.
The ICP strategy was far more attuned to political possibilities
and probabilities. Vietnamese Communists subsequendy have
elevated the strategy of the "opportune moment" (developed
by Ho Chi Minh) to the level of ideological sanctity.
Hemery tends to see Trotskyism as "classical Marxism"
and seems to judge a line of class struggle and urban strikes as
being "ideologically mature" (as do Trotskyists). But the
strength of the ICP was that it was able to change its strategy
when political conditions changed. Linked to this was the
ICP's continued ability to make a more accurate analysis of
international events and how they would affect Indochina
than the Trotskyists. Hemery could have developed this point
more fully or clarified the nature of the Trotskyists'
unchanging position. The view that the liberation of Vietnam
was contingent upon the class struggle in Europe and the
strategy of placing national liberation behind class struggle in
Vietnam turned out to be inappropriate to Vietnamese
conditions.
The widening differences between the Trotskyists and
the ICP, which had their roots in the 1932-37 period, rater
developed into bitter animosity between the ICP and the
Trotskyists. The ICP probably became more anti-Trotskyist
than vice versa, especially as it drew closer in the late 1930s to
the influence of Ho Chi Minh (who regarded Trotskyism as a
dangerous threat) and in 1941 to the establishment of the Viet
Minh.2
In 1945, at the time of the August Revolution, the
Vietnamese Trotskyists became the ICP's most bitter internal
foe. To oppose the Viet Minh in power, the Trotskyists joined
with right-wing groups and religious sects. They sought to
sabotage the Viet Minh government in Saigon and by doing so
helped to hasten the French reoccupation of Saigon. The
Trotskyists' rivalry with the Viet Minh was so intense that
they were willing to side with the most reactionary groups in
the south to unseat the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh responded
with superior force and virtually destroyed the Trotskyist
movement. (Its main leaders were killed or forced to leave the
country.) H ~ m e r y of course cannot be faulted for not going
into this later period, but it is the denouement of the
Stalinist-Trotskyist relationship and the ideological differences
involved in their confrontation which stem from the 1932-37
period.
As for this period Hemery assigns himself, 1932-37, can
these years be properly considered a "period" in Vietnamese
history? Probably not. Vietnamese party historians argue they
cannot.
3
Hemery does not specifically claim that the years
1932-37 were a "historical period" but he certainly lumps
these years together as if they were. What constitutes a
historical period? It is a group of events and processes which
are qualitatively different from the period preceding it and
immediately following it. Tran Van Giau, a North Vietnamese
historian and a member of the Central Committee of the ICP
in the south in 1935, has argued in response to Hemery's
periodization that the years 1932-37 were not characterized
by something qualitatively different in Vietnamese history.
The ICP in its party history sees the years 1932-36 as a link
between periods, with a new historical period beginning in
1936. They argue that the years 1930-31 marked a period
which was characterized by widespread and mass uprisings.
These uprisings were repressed, their leaders jailed and their
apparati destroyed. The mass movement ebbed between 1932
and 1936. Then in 1936, according to this view, another
historical period begins, ending in 1939. The liberalization of
the Popular Front government in Paris permitted the regrowth
of legal and underground mass organizati(ms. According to
the ICP La Lutte was only one aspect of this liberalization.
Hemery, by lumping the years 1932-37 together because these
are the years of the La Lutte collaboration, implies that these
years constituted a historical period on their own and that
their distinguishing characteristic was the La Lutte alliance.
Party historians on the other hand see 1936 as initiating'what
they call the "high democratic tide." The main events here
were the change in party policy to conform with the
Comintern's line, the advent of the French Popular Front, and
the organization of a front in Indochina against imperialism
46
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f
and fascism. The ICP, like other colonial panies, momentarily
set aside the nationalist struggle at this time, and joined the
international movement for "democracy" and unity in the
face of fascism.
In this debate, the party historians seem to be more
persuasive then Hemery. Hemery tends to ignore the influence
of the rise and fall of mass movements in his periodization.
The change in ICP policy in 1936 is also implicitly ignored in
his account,
consequences.
liberalizations,
foreshadowed
primary focus

and yet this change was to have significant
It was linked, along with the Popular Front
to the reemergence of mass organizations. It
the emergence of the Viet Minh. Hemery's
on the activities of La Lutte and his relating
historical events to the lifetime of a journal seems to reverse
the historical relationships. If the salient feature of the 1930s
,
I
were the mass movements and uprisings, then the phenomenon
,
of La Lutte and the urban Marxist alliance would have been
secondary to these, and should be treated accordingly in the
periodization of the decade.
Third, Hemery implies throughout the book that
J
clandestine political action was somehow not as "evolved" (his
word) as urban struggle and demonstrations. He sees the years
1932-37 leading to an increased sophistication of political
f
methods in comparison to the peasant uprisings of 1930-3l.
Between 1932 and 1937, there was a definite transition
from the conspiratorial type to the militant, from the
I
i
explosion of secret societies to political and trade union
struggle, from urban outbreaks to demonstrations and
strikes.
4
I
The ICP did not have the option of choosing to operate
I above ground or underground. It was forced to operate in
clandestineness during periods of intense repression. This
(
t
necessity gave the party invaluable discipline and experience
and prepared it for the seizure of power in 1945 and for the
war against the French 1945-54 . The strength of the ICP lay
in its rural organizations and its clandestine structure which
\
made it a much tougher political organization than the
Trotskyists and better prepared to engage in combat. The ICP
I
did not rule out open and legal forms of struggle (its "Political
l
Theses" of 1930 argued that these should be used if conditions
permitted) but its strength lay in clandestineness rather than
J
the open arena. Hemery implies that the "conspiratorial

types" in the Party were not mature Marxists, and that the
pany was, no more than a secret society if it could not engage
1
in forms of trade union struggle and support of workers'
demands. This view underrates the significance of the 1930-31
I
uprisings. It implies the movement was "immature," the
consequence of which was failure. It also implicitly underrates
the impact of the second united front strategy under the Viet
Minh during World War II. It is unlikely that the ICP would
have come to power if either the 1930-31 movement or the
1939-45 underground movement had not occurred. * As Tran
f
Van Giau points out:
With only "plots" or "secret societies," how could the
j
revolution have succeeded? It did succeed, and it certainly
\
Whether either represented "political immaturity" or were "conspira
torial" is beside the point. They enabled the Party to extend its
1
influence among the peasant masses and laid the groundwork for its
coming to power.
I
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By Lo Kuan-chung
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47
was not because of plotting. What about the "militants"
who waited for open elections and a free press to bring
forth their demands instead of conCf!ntrating on under
ground organization? In the end, they had to look through
halfopened windows to observe tbe General Armed
Uprising in August 1945. Afterwards, tbey put grit in tbe
bearings. S
Hcmery's work lays the foundation for a study of
Vietnamese Marxism in the 1930s. It is the definitive study of
the La Lutte group and the alliance the Lutteurs forged in the
urban arena. It also has the great merit of opening up debate
and analysis of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement as a
whole before World War II - its ideological dimensions, the
dialectic between its above ground and underground
organizations, etc. Hemery has also reopened ,the debate,
which has long remained closed, about Trotskyism and
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Communism in Vietnam. He does this from the perspective of
a scholar and political activist sympathetic to the Vietnamese
revolution. The Vietnamese "Lutteurs" of the 1930s and the
Fi-ench activists of the 1960s had much in common, and both
worked at a time when shared goals seemed to take precedence
over internecine quarrels in the Marxist movement. .*
Notes
I want to thank Bruce Cumings and Christine White for their helpful
comments on this essay.
1. This dearth of support for scholarly research on Vietnam is
regrettable since it is difficult to see how the U.S. can deal adequately
with the historical experience of the war without investigating why the
Communist movement (rather than the U.S.) won in Vietnam. In
addition, the current tendency of academic and intellectual circles to
treat Vietnam as passe and the media to resuscitate Vietnam like an old
World War II movie does not augur well for imminent change. This
"neglect" can also be traced to a conscious/unconscious effort on the
part of U.S. policy-makers and research foundations to discourage
investigation of subjects that would question their legitimacy.
2. In 1939, Ho Chi Minh condemned Trotskyism in the
following terms:
Witb regard to tbe Trotskyites tbere can be no compromise, no
concession. We must do everything possible to unmask them as
agents offascism and annibilate tbem politically.
("The Party's Line in the Period of the Democratic Front, 1936-39,"
Selected Works, Hanoi, 1973.)
3. Tran Van Giau, "Nhung Nguoi Cach Mang Viet Nam va Chinh
Quyen Thuc Dan 0 Dong-Duong cua Daniel Hemery," Ngbien-Cuu
Licb-su (Ha Noi) January 1976.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
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48
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" Memoirs"
by Thich Minh Nguyet
translated by Paul Quinn-Judge
Part I
In 1921, having just turned 13 and received my father's
permissIOn, I set off with my uncle to study for the
priesthood. I went to the Thien Thai pagoda in Ba Ria. Too
much time has passed for me to remember everything that
happened then. A number of memories are, however, still
imprinted in my heart. The transition from the life of a
layman to that of a monk is a perplexing one, but I gradually
became used to it thanks to the affection and support of my
teacher and my fellow monks. Time passed: with the duties of
the novice, through each stroke of a character taught to me by
my teacher, through every page of the scriptures, through
every period of meditation.
My master, the Venerable Hue Dang, was by then over
forty. In his youth he had just passed his degree in Confucian
studies when the French invaded our country. He joined the
Scholars' movement to resist the French. The movement
failed and disintegrated, the French tracked down and
terrorized its remnants, and my teacher was obliged to hide in
the South. He put on the brown robes of a monk, and
borrowed the sanctum, the phrases of the scriptures and the
sounds of the chants in quest of spiritual liberation. In
addition to imparting to us his profound religious knowledge,
Hue Dang also made us aware of the shame of a people which
had lost its country and of the hardships which our people had
had to bear under the yoke of the French invaders. Thinking
back to those times it is only now that I realize that the seeds
of my nationalism and my devotion to my fellow countrymen
were planted and developed in me during this period ...
One smali incident I still remember is this. One day
while I was a student at the Thien Thai pagoda, my master
received a guest, a layman who had travelled a long way to
visit him. To the great surprise of us monks, our master was
very cordial and showed great respect for his visitor. The guest
stayed at the pagoda for several days. Day and night the two
The Scholars' movement, led by Tran Tan and Dau Nhu Mai, rose in
revolt in 1874. Hue Dang would therefore have had to be several
decades "over forty years of age" to have participated in that uprising.
Huynh Kim Khanh, however, notes that the same appellation is
sometimes used in referring to the Can Vuong movement which finally
petered out in 1896-97.
men would discussion religion while I was in charge of keeping
them supplied with tea, and would cast furtive glances at the
guest, trying to make out who he was. Later I found out that
he was a Mr. Nguyen Sinh Huy, and only after that did I find
out that this man who had come to visit my master was the
father of Chairman Ho Chi Minh. Nguyen Sinh I-Iuy was then
in exile in the South.
In the latter part of '43 and the early part of '44 the
Viet Minh movement was expanding and growing in the South.
It was at this time that my master sent me to take over the
Buu Long pagoda, Trung Luong, My Tho, a pagoda recently
endowed by a local Buddhist. For the first time since I had
become a monk I found myself forced to be far away from my
master and fellow monks, and to undertake a new and
important task. At my new pagoda I constantly kept in mind
the synthesis of spiritual and temporal duties taught to me by
Hue Dang. The better I understood theology, the less I was
able to ignore the realities of daily life.
Religious and secular reasons both compelled me to take
part in the great effort to save our people from hardship. I still
felt worried and uneasy, though, and badly needed a close
friend, someone I could confide in. At that time I composed a
poem:
How many weary times have I searched?
Now, in the sanctum, who will tell my kindred spirit?
Our nation is being trampled by enemy soldiers
The peoples' sufferings are piling up one on the other
If I am prepared to sacrifice myselffor the Fatherland,
Why should the remoteness of my retreat house worry me?
On the road to religion I and my friend
Will lead the brethren away from the wrong path.
A short time after this, a friend of Le Van Hue (my
spiritual brother by virtue of the fact that we shared the same
master) came from Saigon to see me with a letter of
introduction from Hue. He said to me:
The French and the Japanese are terrorizing the people and
pillaging our country. Our people are suffering unspeak
ably. The Viet Minh Front has been set up and is
developing strongly, but to achieve total victory we must
constantly rEinforce and develop the unity of our people.
We in the Saigon-Cia Dinh Viet Minh Front would like you
49
to work among the monks, nuns and Buddhist laity of this
province, so as to unite them with the Viet Minh, to save
our country, and liberate our nation.
After meeting Hue's friend felt excited and
enthusiastic, but also slightly uneasy about the religious
aspects of the affair. I laving just been given one responsibility
by my master, herc I was faced with the call of my country.
Not daring to make a decision myself, I mounted my bicycle
and pedaled off to Ba Ria to ask the advice of the Venerable
Ilue Dang.
At that March Japanese had
begun their bombing, and I didn't dare go straight through
Saigon. Instead, at Phu Lam I turned off towards Hoc Mon,
through Thu Dau Mot and then down to Ba Ria. I pedaled
furiously without feeling any closer I got to the
pagoda, the more enthusiastically I pedaled. When I reached
the pagoda I stopped my bike and fell flat on my face from
exhaustion.
The pagoda turned out to greet me, and my fellow
monks whom I had not seen for so long greeted me noisily.
That night, however, I brought up the question of Hue's
Translator's Note
II mon}!, tbe prisollers released from Can Son island at
Ibe end of Ibe Indocbilla war was Thicb Minh Nguyh, one
of Ibe most active organizers of tbe Vietnamese Patriotic
BlIddbists. IIged 67 at tbe time, Minh Nguyh had spent the
last jiji an years in various goals of the old Saigon regime.
Ill' is IIOW cbairmall of tbe Patriotic Buddbist Liaison
Commit/C', but bis lime in prison seems to bave taken its
lOll. l."orei}!,11 visitors wbo bave met bim recently describe
bini as illjirm alld deaf, and it is unlikely that be plays an
aClivc part ill Bliddbist affairs. lie does, however, seem to
I}c takcli Oil all important role as a symbol for Vietnamese
BlIddbisls. 'I],e carly edition of Giac Ngo (Enlightenment),
tbc orgall of tbe Patriotic Buddbist Liaison Committee,
COIII"ill a IIl1mlJCr of writings by Minb Nguyh, dealing
lIIaillly wi//.! bis prison experiellces. Tbese include a long
{IOCIII cOli/posed by !Jim in 1970-71 during a period when
be was, ill bis OWII words, "manacled night and day for
Ibrl'e wbole I/lOlItbs," and several sbort autobiographical
skelches, two ofwhicb arc translated bere.
'/],/' essays, fragmelltary tbough tbey are, are
illl('l'CSlilig jl}r sever,li reasolls. Firstly tbey introduce the
Vel/cr,,"le /lIIC Dal/g, Minb Nguyh's master, a resistance
jigbtcr IUriled 1I101lk wbo took great paills to instill in bis
lIoviccs " stl'OlIg sellse of lIatiollalism. Hue Dang seems to
bavc bad cOl/sidera"le inj7uellce 011 at least two of bis
pupils: <llIotb"r oj'tbem (most probably Tbicb Tbien Hlw)
is <llso Ol/(' oj' tbe lcadil/g spirits oj' tbe Patriotic Buddhist
Liaisol/ CO/ll/llittee. *
* See Nguoi phat tu mien nam d()i voi H() chu tich, Guu Quoc, August
31, 1973, reprinted in Giac Ngo of May 21,1976. The article is signed
by H()ng Phu, which seems to be a nom-de-plume of Thien Hao.
friend's request with my master. He said very movingly:
You all know about my life and my younger days. Now I
am old, my strength is failing: "Old age comes, ability
goes." You must all try to join with the people in defeating
the French and Japanese, and regaining our country's
independence. This has always been my wish.
These were the last words of instruction I ever received
from my master. I was deeply moved and felt greater love for
him than ever. The task before me was now clear. Enthusiasm
would not let me remain long at the pagoda; after staying one
more day to regain my strength I set off again on my bicycle
back to My Tho. In the Buu Long pagoda at that time were
ten novice monks who had come from all parts of the country
to study for the priesthood. As soon as I got back to the
pagoda I started to work. I put the affairs of the pagoda in
order so that I could try to mobilize my co-religionists. I
recounted all the stories of the patriotic anti-French
movements that my teacher had told me, I talked about the
present situation and our responsibilities as explained to me by
Hue's friend.
Also of interest is Minh Nguyh's account of his first
years of imprisonment, and his active resistance against all
aspects of the Saigon prison regime. Tbe behavior of a
resistance fighter in prison was and is considered to be one
of the supreme tests of their commitment to the revolution.
Party cadre, of course, were expected to uphold
revolutionary pride by resisting the prison authorities at all
times, thereby setting an example to other NLF prisoners,
and if possible winning the support of non-communist
prisoners. Once the war ended, released political prisoners
organized review sessions where they assessed their own and
their comrades' behavior during imprisonment. Such
sessions were reportedly extremely rigorous. It seems likely,
however, that those who were singled out for praise during
these review sessions are now the ones who are being held
up to the country as an example of the Vietnamese fighter's
heroism and indomitability.
Now, with the publication of Minh Nguyh's
memoirs, we see a monk being held up as an exemplary
resistance fighter. Throughout his fifteen years in prison it
would seem that Minh Nguyh opposed the prison
authorities at all turns, and suffered for it. The extracts
published in Gfac Ngo therefore serve the purpose not only
of showing Vietnamese Buddhists their own resistance bero,
but underlining once again the role played by Buddhist
faithful in the war of liberation.
The two extracts translated here were the first and
the third installments of Minh Nguyh's memoirs, and were
published in Giic Ngo Nos. 5 and 13; these were the only
two extracts available to me. An intervening piece
J
presumably covered Minh Nguyh's years in the Plain of
Reeds during the first war, wbile the third extract ended
witb a promise of more to come.
Minh Nguyh's writing has struck several Vietnamese
readers as in place extremely elegant, in other places highly
obscure. I do not consider myself particularly qualified to
translate such complicated Vietnamese but feel it is useful
to bring Minh Nguyh's reminiscences to the attention of
others.
50
I
At that time in My Tho there was a police chief who
specialized in arresting political prisoners, Viet Minh and
communists. This Commissioner received a report on me from
the district chief and so decided to search the pagoda and
arrest me. He mentioned this to his sister: "Today I'm going to
arrest that monk at the Buu Long pagoda." The woman had
previously been a disciple of the venerable Thien Thai, and
advised him against it. "Arresting monks is a sin; you will lose
all your merit, so you'd better watch out." After that she
came and warned me of his plans. I made preparations, and a
r
few days later two secret policemen came to search the
pagoda, but only did so perfunctorily.
Part II
From the moment the u.s. and Diem refused to
implement the Geneva Agreements, conspired to occupy the
South and cut the country in two, they put into operation a
number of policies of denunciation and eradication of
communists. Law 10/59 placed all patriots struggling for
peace, independence and unification outside the ambit of the
law. They cracked down on grass-roots organizations,
revolutionary fighters and patriots. A number of these
gradually fell into the hands of the enemy.
The situation during the years 1958-60, years of fierce
terrorism by the enemy, demonstrated the weakness of the
u.s. and Diem. At the same time, however, the secret police
network rendered revolutionary activity extremely difficult.
The responsibilities placed on us were great: every patriot was
asked to carry through any task requested of him, and be
prepared to go to prison if necessary. I thought about this
problem so much that many were the nights I dreamed I had
been arrested already.
Special Combat 1, also known as Ba Hoa post, was the
first step on the long road of imprisonment and exile. They
began tortuing me immediately. The form of torture I was
subjected to most was the airplane ride. My hands were tied
and then I was hoisted up to the ceiling on a bar and they beat
me with a stick as I swung back and forth. I would only say
that I knew nothing about the Vietcong. Then the traitor
Hoang Nhu Hoa who was collaborating with the secret police
reported to them on my activities during the nine years he
knew me in the Plain of Reeds. They stepped up the torture.
For one long month I lived on my nerves as I tried to work out
how to deal with the physical abuse and subterfuges of these
demons. Sometimes they would use harsh, extreme torture, at
other times they would try to coax, wheedle things out of me.
Three months later I was transferred to Gia Dinh prison,
where I actively spread the word of my treatment so that
everyone would know about the savagery of the enemy. Owing
to my lack of experience I was discovered. They took me back
to Special Combat 1 (Ba Hoa), locked me in a cell and beat me
for a week as punishment. Then they took me back to Gia
Dinh.
Before going to Chi Boa prison I was taken to Police
Headquarters and kept there for over three months. On
entering Chi Hoa or any of the U.S.-Diem prisons, political
prisoners had to go through a period where they resolved for
themselves the problem of "to denounce or not to denounce
Communism." I answered this in no uncertain terms: "I don't
know what Communists are, whether they're good or bad, so
I'm not going to denounce them." The chief warder, "Cat's
Eyes," and Xung, who was in charge of Security, kept asking
me if I would denounce Communism. I refused point blank.
In these cases there was a special room reserved for those
who opposed prison regulations: the "movie room." Having
chosen the path of struggle for the sake of humanity, I decided
that I would have to be faithful to that ideal whatever the
situation. Prison life during the U.S.-Diem period was a life of
a hundred thousand hardships and bitterness. The official
ration was already too small to begin with, but then it had to
pass through the various levels of prison authorities: prison
chiefs, contractors, warders. By the time it reached the
prisoners it consisted of a few handfuls of rice-just enough to
send them to their graves. On top of this, the demons did their
best to make our lives a misery. When I was put in room IGl,
I joined with a number of brother prisoners in setting up a
group to struggle for the improvement of prison conditions.
When the struggle erupted, the authorities took me back to the
"movie room."
On the 21st August, 1962, the authorities implemented
a policy of "using prisoners to punish prisoners." They set up
a general representative committee, consisting of common
criminals and Hoa Hao: these replaced the warders, and were
authorized to beat prisoners whenever they felt like it. When
three political prisoners were beaten to the ground as they
went to wash we all started yelling, and took over the
corridors. From three o'clock in the afternoon until nine at
night we refused to go back to our room. All this was to
express our opposition to the creation of the general
representative committee and the barbaric policy of using
prisoners to punish prisoners. Finally at nine in the evening a
major from the Ministry of the Interior had to come and sort
things out. The committee was dissolved, and we political
prisoners set up our own representative committee. Our
struggle had been crowned with an important victory: we had
removed a part of the enemy's tight control over us, and made
a step in the direction of organizing our own living conditions
and activities, and had created an atmosphere of enthusiasm
among the prisoners.
51
The political prisoners of Chi Hoa organized a big
celebration for Tet of 1962. Each room set up a fatherland
altar and organized a program for New Year's Eve. The
programs consisted of homage to the flag, meditation in
memory of the soldiers who had fallen and a cultural
celebration of poems and revolutionary songs, songs in praise
of patriotism or the war of resistance. On New Year's morning
we had a lion dance (the lion's head was made out of a basket
covered in papier mach c), then visited each other, exchanged
greetings, and the whole prison sang together "Solidarity."
After all the prisoners had gone upstairs with arms linked
singing "Solidarity," the enemy went on the counter-offensive
and started taking us down to the "movie room." By the
second day of Tet there were over 500 of us in there. On the
third day they took a number of us to Phu Lam prison. They
tried hard to find out who was the ringleader of the
movement. Those remalnmg in Chi Hoa were taken down to
the basement and placed in fetters in cells with their fronts
blocked up so one couldn't see the courtyard.
In Chi Hoa the authorities put into use new plots and
methods of torture: the prisoners' heads were fastened to the
wall, their hands were secured behind their backs and their
feet positioned some distance away from the foot of the
wall-but they had agreed that when they couldn't stand it any
longer they would wiggle their fingers as a signal to begin
shouting denunciations of the regime.
After three months at Phu Loi I was taken back to Chi
Hoa, put on trial and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for
rebellion. For another two weeks I was locked up in a
darkened cell before being taken to Con Son island. I had
spent over three years in prisons on the mainland; now I began
my spell of fighting the cruel enemy on the island in the sea.
52
f
1
J "March in the Tay Nguyen" (Central Highlands): an excerpt
I
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I
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f
by Nguyen Khai
~
translated by John Spragens
In Saigon I know a family of teachers. The wife was a
teacher of English and the husband was a law professor. They
were both about my age, yet still seemed quite young and
attractive. If you were to scribe a line around that family,
limiting your consideration to their home, without considering
anything having to do with a land and its people, then you
would have to believe it was a small paradise. They have an
older daughter and a younger son, so they did not have to
worry about the military, about the war. The war was taking
place in the newspapers, on TV, through stories people
told-in other words "out there" somewhere. Within this
house no one thought much about the war, no one talked
much about the war. Nor did their work have anything to do
J with the Americans, with the government, with the war. "All
we know is our love, our friends and our relations," the
J
wife said to me. And I believe that is really the way things
J were.
,
i
Translator's Note
These two selections outline, from two different
I
perspectives, one of the more contrary problems which the
revolutionary regime has had to contend with in southern
Vietnam since the end of the war - the attitudes of people
conditioned over the years of American presence to a false
sense of prosperity and "freedom."
Nguyen van Trung was a professor at Saigon
/ University, an historian associated with "Third Force"
opponents of the U.S.-backed regimes. His remarks
abridged here were originally made in seminars at the law
faculty of Can Tho University and at the Cao Dai
University in Tay Ninh in May 1974. Tiley were published
in a mimeographed underground symposium on national
reconciliation in mid1974.
Nguyen Kbai is a journalist who writes regularly for
the Vietnamese army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan. The
selection presented here is an excerpt from his reportage
March in the Central Highlands, which deals with the first
stage of the victorious 1975 offensive by the revolutionary
armies.
They also had a driver and a cook. When I first Illet
them, I thought that the cook was the younger sister of the
woman teacher. And the cook herself tried to give me that
impression, too. She was beautiful and well-mannered. Overly
well-mannered. More polite than the woman of the house. In
the morning when she went to market, she asked permission to
use the car. The teachers arose late, and it would he eight or
nine o'clock before they went anywhere. After parking the car
on the street, the cook and driver led eaeh other by the hand
as they went about their shopping. 1 Ie held one handle of the
shopping basket and she held the other. They wore
wide-legged trousers and colorful shirts, let their hair grow
long and wore large-lensed spectaeles. Who would have
thought they were servants? They must he a young man and
wife, or a pair of lovers, who worked for no one, whose only
concern was to eat, drink and make merry-gourmets when
they ate and elegant at play. Only I knew that they were
servants, were workers-that they were reprimanded hy their
masters, quietly, but pointedly all the same. "I don't dare use
the car any more, but you take any excuse to go galavanting
around in it. It must be that when it comes time for someone
to reach into their pocket for gas money, it's my money." I
once heard the mistress gently scold the pair of make-helieve
lovers thus. But that day the cook got angry. Normally she
would simply bow her head and say pitifully, "Yes ma'am, I'm
sorry." But that day she thrust her jaw out, glared, and stalked
from the room. Her mistress said awkwardly to me, "The child
must be sick or something. I suppose I shall have to ask her to
go back home. I don't see how we can possibly afford two
servants on our budget any more."
"She is very honest with you," I responded. "It's just
that you scolded her in front of me. I am a stranger in the
house." At mealtime I went out and said to the girl in my
most proper tone of voice, "Would you care to come into the
house for dinner?" She arched her eyebrows and stared at me,
grateful, it seemed, and moved. "Won't you please go ahead.
I'll be busy a while longer."
Tease that I am, I related the story of my invitation to
the master and mistress of the house. fie said nothing, but she
told me, "You're making it up. Who ever heard of extending
an invitation to a servant." I simply chuckled to myself,
because I had noticed a most curious comparison. An outsider
could not possibly know that that beautiful, well-mannered
girl was a servant. She must surely be the younger sister of the
53
teacher. She must be a sister, a member of the family, a person
with blood ties to the master and mistress, not a servant. Only
I, because I was a friend of theirs, knew that the girl was a
servant. Just as-yes, the comparison begins here-just as my
teacher friends did not suspect that they, too, were servants of
some master. In the old days, the more fortunate servants
presented themselves as members of the master's family,
related at least distantly to their master. People who took such
names as Albert At, Paul Giap and Andre Binh, for example.
Among the distinguished slaves of the present era, no
one took the name John or William. Nor did anyone claim to
be related to the Americans. All opposed them, mocked them,
cursed them. They were patriots! They were free men and
women! (Just like that pitiable girl when she returned to her
village to visit her family. If anyone asked, "What do you do
for a living in Saigon?" she would answer proudly, "I've
opened a seamstress shop." Or perhaps, "I'm working as a
secretary in a private office." And who wouldn't believe her?
Dressed so expensively, speaking in such a refined manner,
how could she possibly be a servant?) But the Americans
might still reprimand these free people. "Here we are having to
economize on gas and you run around using it like it grew on
trees. Is the money for it coming out of your pocket? ..."
And these free people would timidly take the blame. "Yes .. .
it's our fault ... we ... "
Then imagine someone like me telling these dis
tinguished gentlemen-sitting about in their top hats and tails
drinking whisky in their elegantly decorated rooms and cursing
the Americans-that they are slaves of the Americans. They
would burst their sides laughing. They would point their soft,
white fingers at my face and rebuke me angrily, "Us? Slaves?
And you are our liberators?" Liberators in rubber sandals,
wearing baggy trousers, sometimes letting your shirttails hang
out, sitting with one foot in the chair, laughing and shouting
out loud, without the least bit of sophistication and breeding?
You don't even know a foreign language, or how to open a
bottle of champagne, and besides, your pronunciation is odd!
The likes of you are going to liberate us! Ha! Ha! You are
coming to liberate us, but we can't see how we've been
liberated! Ha! Ha!
They would be astounded indeed! They would jeer!
They would have no sense of covering up the fact that they
were servants like Sen the cook or Boi the driver. Because the
distance between the master and mistress and their servants
was no greater than the length of their house, from the kitchen
to the dining room. But the distance between them and their
master was quite far, passing as it did through a government, a
constitution, houses of parliament, with so many twists and
turns that they fancied themselves free citizens of a free
country. That was the difference.
Still their master knew they were servants. The master's
friends knew they were servants. Just as I knew the cook and
driver were servants. If I called the graceful girl "Mademoiselle
..." it was not out of genuine deference. I said it for her
pleasure and my own. But if she should defy me, I might glare
at her and say, "I don't like that. I want ..." That's the way
things are, if you think about it. But these two teachers whom
I have had the pleasure of knowing surely had never thought
that they were enslaved. They were free people with very free
ideas. Perhaps the whole of South Viet Nam was enslaved, but
this wife and husband and their children were free people.
They asked me very credulously, very sincerely, "You say you
are bringing us freedom, and we do welcome that, but do you
have anything we can use? No? So how are we to live? What
are we supposed to do for a living now?" And that is the
question of a slave! How long will it be before they are
ashamed of that question? How long? '*
.'
54
"The Bicycle" (abridged).
by Nguyen van Trung
Translated by John Spragens
First of all, I want to introduce a few pictures and
newspaper clippings to set the scene for our thoughts and
analysis.
To start, here is a photograph of the premier of Holland
on a bicycle, from Paris Match no. 1283, August 1973.
And here is a scene of bicycle repair in the streets of
Saigon from the 11 December 1973 issue of the paper Hoa
Binh, with the following explanation by the editors:
"Regaining their old position. Ever since millions of Japanese
motorcycles roared into Viet Nam, the bicycle has been nearly
wiped out, and motorcycle repair stands have sprung up
everywhere. Now bicycles are making a comeback, and bicycle
repair stands are again appearing."
Again in Hoa Binh, in the issue of 16 December 1973,
there is a photo of rows of bicycles taken at the exhibition of
domestic products with the following caption by the paper:
"The bicycle: beauty queen of the domestic products
exhibition. Prime Minister Khiem opened the exhibition the
morning of 14 December. In the current situation of hardship,
bicycles were the products which gained the greatest
attention. "
And these are a few photographs taken in the streets of
Hanoi, where we see only bicycle riders and pedestrians, taken
by Major Phan Huan when he went as a representative of the
RVN [Republic of Viet Nam, the old Saigon regime] in the
4-party joint military delegation for the prisoner exchange.
They were published in the booklet One Day in Hanoi, 18
February 1973. In this booklet of photographs the major, an
officer in the office of political warfare, dwelt at great length
"
on the bicycles, as in this example.
I don't mean that we should judge the prosperity of a
society solely by the number of automobiles, but the fact is
that in a whole day in Hanoi we hardly saw a dozen cars,
and the entire population of Hanoi got about on bicycles,
on streetcars or on foot. In 1954 there was no small
number of automobiles in Hanoi. (9)
Along Bo Ho Street, one of the most beautiful, most
bustling thoroughfares in Hanoi 19 years ago, now one sees
not a single automobile, only bicycles, only working girls
dressed in black . ...
Imagine a day in Hanoi. About five or six 0 'clock I
went out in the street and could only count twelve or
thirteen small touring cars wbich, according to the North
Vietnamese officers, almost all belonged to the Hanoi
authorities. And I saw not a single girl wearing an ao dai.
The only girl I saw wearing an ao dai during my day in
Hanoi was a reporter at Gia Lam Airport. All the otbers
were dressed in black slacks, peasant blouses, and coarse
gray or ofFwhite cloth. It was just like Hanoi's present
'civilized' mode of transportation, those ancient and
outmoded bicycles. (13)
And finally, here are a few lines which open a long
report by R. Guillain published in Le Monde in November
1971 titled "China after the Cultural Revolution."
One of the greatest surprises for the Western tourist
visiting China is the appearance of the cities of China, for
example Shanghai, with a population of six million in 1971.
Shanghai is six million people on foot. I exaggerate, for the
truth is that the masses in Shanghai have an important bus
network which runs 24 hours a day and hundreds of
thousands of bicycles. But the strange image which the
streets project is ofgreat crowds of prople walking.
Six mil/ion people on foot without automobiles . .. ,
especially private cars. I knew Shanghai in 1937 and this
was my sixth return visit. On the boulevards named for
SS
Nanking and joffre 1 had once driven my car in traffic as
crowded as that in London or New York.
When 1 returned to Shanghai in 1955, I thought the
absence of autos was evidence of China's deC/ine, for which
the new regime must bear responsibility.
In 1964 1 thought that it was a matter of uneven
development, with rapid progress in some areas and slow in
others.
Returning this time in 1971 a new realization takes
shape before my eyes like a revelation. It was not a matter
of backwardness. It was not because progress was slow. It
was the result of a denial. Shanghai had said 'No' to
Western-style development, even though in the past this was
tbe most westernized city in all of China. It was not merely
tbat tbe automobile, the princess of our Western cities, had
been swept from tbe cities of China. Swept out with it had
been many other aspects of urban life.
This city witbout autos was also a city without
commercial advertising in neon lights. It was also a city
witbout bars and coffee sbops, without money and banks.
Naturally people still buy and sell, but the feverish pursuit
of money is gone. The disease of pornographic pictures in
tbe news was also gone; it was only when I returned to
JIang Kong a month later that I could see the great gulf
between a world which is very strict about sex and one
geared to tbe satisfaction of every carnal desire.
The Bicycle in South Viet Nam
The oil crisis of 1973 really made no impact on South
Viet Nam until after the attack on the Nha Be oil depot, which
led to the imposition of restrictions and increased prices for
gasoline. The results of these measures were:
1. The use of certain tools of production and means of
transport were curtailed. These included tillers, water pumps,
and shrimp-tailed motors for fishing boats. The price of
transporting goods by boat and by truck rose, pushing up the
price of those goods.
2. Certain luxury items - such as air conditioners,
electricity, refrigerators, washing machines, and gas and
electric stoves - were abandoned or restricted.
3. The bicycle returned. On city streets all manner of
bicycles appeared. There were girls on expensive mini-bikes,
which seemed more recreational and symbolic than practical.
There were old and new men's style bikes for going to school
and to work. The bicycle had returned to the streets, but it
was only a beginning. It had not yet cut into the numbers of
motorcycles and automobiles which still crowded the streets.
Previously, even in the most terrible years of the war,
foreign visitors to Saigon were amazed at the scenes of
prosperity in the cities of the South: the bright lights, the
crowded streets. That also provided a common theme for
propaganda about the advantages of the "free" regime, in
..
Hon Gai, Quang Ninh province. This coal mining town was
bombed so intensively during the Nixon administration that
no building. escaped damage. This photograph of the rebuilt
town was taken in 1974.
56
I
contrast to the regime on the other side which was bereft of revolutionary war, it thus follows, is a war against the rural
cars-in other words poor and suffering, as the political areas, aiming to destroy the milieu which shelters and
warfare officer said again and again about his day in Hanoi.
1
I
But the question which this poses is: Why does this
prosperity exist, and is it real?
i
The war in Viet Nam is a special case. In the classical
forms of warfare, the cities were usually destroyed while the
I
rural areas were relatively peaceful. Besides, the whole
I
, country, without distinction between urban and rural areas,
endured a common situation of suffering and privation .... In
i

I
Viet Nam the situation was just the opposite. The cities were
peaceful and prosperous; the countryside faced destruction
and suffering. It is the very nature of a revolutionary war for
the weak to oppose the strong, for the small to oppose the
large. Thus the rural areas are an appropriate battleground, for
the terrain is filled with jungles, mountains and fields in which
t
to hide. And at the same time the rural areas are seen as a
1
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I
nourishes the revolution, using policies of land clearing and
free fire zones. The common folk have been forced to flee
their fields and orchards, leaving their homes as refugees from
"Communism" to live in areas surrounding large military bases
or on the fringes of the cities to seek security and prosperity.
After 1964-65, American soldiers poured into South
Viet Nam until their numbers reached half a million. Over the
years these troops rotated in and out of the country and the
total number of American soldiers who had come to Viet Nam
rose to more than three million. The presence of such a large
military force, bringing with it so much military aid, created
an unknown number of commercial relationships between
people, providing a livelihood for people from all classes
those in power and the masses as well, manual laborers as well
as specialists.
These commercial relationships of all kinds enabled
many to eke out a living and others to become rich overnight.
If you have money, you must use it. American goods flooded
the market, either imported legally or supplied by the black
market, or even spilling out from the stores intended for the
exclusive use of the Americans. The purpose of it all was to
develop the habit of using American products, from toilet
paper to more expensive items like TVs and air condi
tioners....
Just imagine that each American soldier during his tour
in Viet Nam came into contact at least once with a Vietnamese
family, and that he sold, bartered or gave away one tin of
meat, one bottle of beer, one box of matches.... That would
have been three million commercials, exercises familiarizing
people with the use of American goods. Along with this
campaign of poisonous training were the campaigns of
monopolization, destruction and control which reached into
every class, every institution. After all these plans had been
implemented, the American soldiers might withdraw ...
leaving behind a nation dependent on aid for 90 percent of its
budget and a people beginning to grow used to - even
addicted to - American goods ....
Then the Paris treaty to end the war and restore peace
was signed .... This meant an end to the war-time aid ... and
also an end to that false prosperity .... Now the aid is being
cut gradually and the prosperity is thus gradually being lost.
Those who had enough to live on before are now feeling the
shortage; those who did not have enough to live on before are
now starving. Those who previously had a surplus now find
themselves with just enough to eat, and are having to
economize. This situation of economic hardship and decline is
only beginning.
Everyone sees the need to return to production and is
calculating and hoping for some way to find a parcel of land to
plow in Long-khanh or Binh-tuy. Those who have been
producers see the need to reconsider their modes of
production which have grown dependent on foreigners, such as
using imported feed for their pigs and chickens or raising
miracle rice with imported fertilizers. People also see the need
to return to a more appropriate lifestyle .... As inflation
makes life more expensive, people are also beginning to return
to the bicycle. But what does this return mean? Is it a matter
of necessity, forced by the lack of money to buy gas, or is it
1
57
freely chosen? Considering the dolled-up mini-bikes which
have become so fashionable, this return to bicycles as a means
of transportation is surely an inconvenience forced on these
people, representing to them a step backwards, a misfortune
which has brought a decline in status.
"We Return to Bathe in our Own Pond ..."
Our standard of living is increasingly difficult, and is on
a course toward virtually complete collapse, with no hope of
rescue, for the simple reason that the regime depends for 90
percent of its support on foreign aid. When foreign aid is cut,
life becomes more difficult and the extent of hardship and
crisis rises in proportion to the level of cuts.
The missions to seek aid or, as some "great intellectuals"
have done, crying out to the Americans not to abandon Viet
Nam, not to flee their responsibility because the interests of
America are bound up with the interests of South Viet Nam,
are all to no avail once the policy has been changed. Their
argument is that we must feed on the aid or die, when the fact
is that feeding on the aid is death. Only when we dispense with
it can we live ....
The life of hardship is only beginning. The time will
certainly come when the shadows of automobiles and
motorcycles no longer fall on the city streets, when there are
only pedestrians and bus or bicycle riders. When that time
comes, our Major Phan Huan will look back in sorrow on the
gilded age of Saigon as he now looks back on the old Hanoi,
though even now it may well be that the major no longer has a
jeep and must hang on the back of someone else's motorcycle
or ride a bike. It is not even certain that he would have a
bicycle. A major or colonel only makes 30,000$ or 40,000$ a
month [less than US$60], and if he does not take some other
employment, legal or illegal, and depends only on his salary,
how can he be sure of having enough to buy a bicycle?
But he ~ a y continue to live in a world of daydreams,
consoling himself with the song "We return to bathe in our
own pond" which reflects the situation of a person who has
lost his standing and been defeated, who must return to the
past and console himself by contemplating his lot and
accepting his poverty and suffering.
Or he could awaken and realize that what he had done in
the past was a matter for shame. The extravagant, prostituted
city, center of a regime dependent on foreign powers, a
parasite begging for its very survival could not possibly stand
as the pride of a nation. The departure of foreign troops, the
cutoff of foreign aid was not a terrible misfortune; on the
contrary, it brought about the conditions for an awakening, an
enlightenment. It is an opportunity for us to return to our true
roots. We can reach an understanding that true prosperity is
that which we create with our own hands using those things
which we possess, and that we can take pride only in those
things which we make, not in those which others give us or
which we beg from them.
What we have in the beginning will be only a bit of
orchard, a corner of farmland, two hands, two feet and a
bicycle. We must begin our development there. After a time
we may travel on motorcycles and in automobiles-not a few
individuals or a single class, but everyone, advancing together
because of the progress of a society no longer dependent or
acting as overseer, playing the role of interJ'flediary to divide
and pass out aid dollars. No longer would we be dependent on
trickery and deception, growing wealthy through crooked
devices. Instead, reliance on labor and production, on struggle
and initiative would be seen as the root of every material and
social value.
That would also be returning to bathe in our own pond,
but in a self-reliant, enlightened way, seeing clearly the road to
life, to escape, to progress, to a true pride rooted in that which
we possess and produce ourselves, a prosperity grounded in
those things which are our own.
This return to our true roots, to our actual abilities, is
symbqlized by the image of the bicycle (taking pride in riding
the bicycle, not feeling unfortunate and ashamed at having to
go by bicycle), and it also creates conditions to bring about
national reconciliation and concord.
The divisions and conflicts which have occurred usually
have not been because of political, religious or ideological
differences, but because of personal interests; or the political,
religious and philosophical differences have reflected contra
dictory interests. There is no Catholic-Buddhist contradiction
between a Catholic who pedals a cyclo and a Buddhist who
pedals a cyclo because they share the same lot in life. And the
same situation is found (contrariness or hatred) when a
Catholic or Buddhist of the upper classes is driving a car and
collides with them.... There cannot be any feeling of
sympathy between the person who sits driving a car and the
one who pedals the cyclo or bicycle or walks. Those who drive
cars and those who ride bicycles or walk have certain attitudes,
certain reactions of a class nature, according to whether they
drive or cycle or walk, in spite of themselves. When we sit
riding in a car, we are easily provoked to curse cyclists riding
every which way down the road; likewise when we cycle or
walk, it is very easy for us to hate automobile drivers. This
jealousy and hatred break out most clearly when there is a
collision. In Viet Nam there is no question of right or wrong in
the situation. If a larger vehicle strikes a smaller one, then the
larger vehicle is at fault ... and naturally the people
sympathize with the person on the smaller vehicle or afoot,
even though that person may have broken the rules of the
road. On occasion they may even attack and kill the car driver.
What is that feeling if not a class hatred which springs from
their class differences?
Thus there can be no true reconciliation so long as those
differences persist in society, especially when those social
differences arise from dishonest ways of making a living and
social-political arrangements which favor a minority with the
means to control others.
The return to the bicycle, which represents a return to
our true roots, is also a means for automobile drivers to
reconcile themselves with pedestrians and cyclists; because
based on our true abilities,. the true abilities of our country at
this time, we must all walk or ride bicycles. We cannot yet
have automobiles. . . . *
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BULLETIN
58
A NOTE TO bUR MANY
NEW SUBSCRIBERS AND FRIENDS
As a result of our first-ever direct mailing campaign, the
Bulletin has a great many new readers, a large percentage of
whom were probably not involved in the early debates within
Asian Studies to which the supporters of the Bulletin
addressed themselves. Those debates are still relevant and
compelling, as you can discover by reading some of the
following essays from back issues. The issues listed here cost
$20 when purchased as a set. Individual copies are also
available.
Vol. 3 #3-4 SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: HOW THE FOUNDATIONS
BOUGHT A FIELD.
(1971) Columbia CCAS: "The American Asian Studies
Establishment."
John King Fairbank: "Comment."
Moss Roberts: "The Structure and Direction of
Contemporary China Studies."
David Horowitz: "Politics and Knowledge: An Un
orthodox History of Modern China Studies."
Vol. 4 #4 SPECIAL SECTION: IMPERIAUSM IN CHINA
(1972) The Editors: "Introduction."
Andrew Nathan: "Imperialism's Effects on China."
Joseph Esherick: "Harvard on China: The Apologetics of
Imperialism. "
Vol. 5 #1 R. Kagan & N. Diamond: "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost:
(1973) Pye, Solomon and the 'Spirit of Chinese Politics.' "
CCAS: "Resolution (1972) on Funding."
Ezra Vogel: "Communication."
CCAS: "Resolution (1973) on the joint Committee on
Contemporary China (JCCC)."
Vol. 5 #2 John K. Fairbank, Joseph Esherick, Marilyn Young: "An
(1973) Exchange on Imperialism in China."
Vol. 5 #3 Frank Baldwin: "The jason Project: Academic Freedom
(1973) and Moral Responsibility" (about Columbia professors
working for the Institute for Defense Analyses).
Vol. 5 #4 Richard Pfeffer: "Revolting: An Essay on Mao's
(1973) Revolution by Richard Solomon."
Vol. 6 #2
(1974)
Vol. 6 #4
(1974)
Vol. 7 #3
(1975)
Vol. 8 #2
(1976)
Vol. 8 #3
(1976)
Vol. 8 #4
(1976)
SPECIAL SECTION: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE
STUDY OF MODERN CHINA: A DEBATE.
Roger Boardman: "Chinese Foreign Policy: Towards
Authentic Social Science."
Edward Friedman: "Chinese Foreign Policy and American
Social Science."
Cheryl Payer: "Harvard on China II: Logic, Evidence and
Ideology."
Elinor Lerner: "The Chinese Peasantry and Imperialism: A
Critique of johnson's Peasant Nationalism."
Don Roden: "Forays into Japanese Cultural Psychology"
/ review essay of George DeVos.
Gordon Bennett: "The Academy on Japanese Foreign
Policy" / review essay of nine books.
Bryant Avery: "Teaching China in College" / review essay
of nine texts.
Herbert Bix: "Imagistic Historiography and the Reinter
pretation of Japanese Imperialism" / review essay of A.
Iriye's books.
J onatban Marshall: "The Institute of Pacific Relations:
Politics and Polemics."
Herbert Bix: "On Jon Halliday's Contribution to Under
standing Japan."
Douglas Allen: "Universities and the Vietnam War: A Case
Study of a Successful Struggle."
Thomas Breslin: "Mystifying the Past: Establishment His
torians and the Origins of the Pacific War."
A REVmW SYMPOSIUM.
William" A. Williams: "Schurmann's Logic of World
.Power.
M. Blecher & T. Thompson: "Looking for Imperialism" /
review essay of Schurmann and BarnetIMuller.
Bruce Cumings: "Reflections on Schurmann's Theory of
the State."
* * * * * *
WRITE TO: B.C.A.S., P.O. BOX W
CHARLEMONT, MA. 01339 USA
Revolution and
History
Origins of Marxist
Historiography in China,
1919-1937
Arif Dirlik
Dirlik examines the application of the
materialist conception of history to
the analysis of Chinese history in
a period when Marxist ideas first
gained currency in Chinese intellec
tual circles.
309 pages, 2 ta bles, $17.50
"
(J) The Urban
: 1 ~ Origins of
Rural Revolution
Elites and the Masses in Hunan
Province, China, 1911-1927
Angus W. McDonald, Jr.
"A masterful blending of political.
economic, social. and intellectual his
tory.... with much new information
on the early development of Mao
Tse-tung." -Maurice Mei5ner
384 pages, 4 maps, 2 tables, $17.50
Selected Works of
Peter A. Boodberg
Edited by Alvin P. Cohen
Peter A. Boodberg was a scholar of
outstanding creative imagination.
This volume includes his most im
portant essays, together with selec
tions from his rare privately-pub
lished serials and an unpublished lec
ture.
400 pages, $20.00
University of California Press Berkeley 94720
59
A Review Essay
Current Research on Vietnam
by Serge Thion
1975 marks the end of an era for Indochina. This fact
perhaps justifies our attempt to assess (albeit provisionally)
the present situation of research, so as to see what
contribution this research has made to the knowledge and
outcome of these distressing events. The thoughts which
follow deal exclusively with Vietnam, and concern publica
tions which came out between 1974 and 1975. They cover the
broad spectrum of the humanities, but go no further. By
nature they are critical, and, some will think, polemical. I
hope they will provoke discussion.
Political History
We shall begin with an important book, an historical
work without parallel in French works on contemporary
Vietnam. The author, Daniel Hemery, assistant lecturer at the
University of Paris, sets out to analyze the formation and
activities of the group which published the weekly newspaper
La Lutte in Saigon in the 1930s. This unique political
experiment set up jointly by the Communists, Trotskyists,
and Nationalists is often mentioned in works on Vietnam but
it had not before been studied in this detail, nor carefully
substantiated with documents such as those sought out by D.
Hemery in the archives of the Colonial Administration and
Surete. We will only discuss it briefly here since an account of
it is given elsewhere. But the book seems illuminating
nonetheless.
The book starts off with an account of Cochinchina in
1931. (The entire account, in fact, concerns Nam Bo, the
South. The events of Annam and Tonkin are mentioned only
in passing.) The period was one of uncertainty: the mutiny of
Yen Bai, the peasant councils of Nghe-Tinh ended in violent
repressions as did rural agitation in Cochinchina. The
administration's efforts to "stabilize" the situation-avoiding
reforms-were undermined by the initial effects of the
world-wide economic crisis.
The author also sketches a picture of colonization as the
newspaper understood it. The striking thing here is the new
tone of the analyses. The assimilation of Marxism allows a
viewpoint which goes beyond nationalist resentment.
-Translated by Barbara Mason and Laura Summers.
Revolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonwl en
Indochine: communistes, trotskyists, nationalistes a
Saigon de 1932 a 1937 by Daniel Hemery. Paris:
Maspero, 1975. 526 pages.
Le parti communiste vietnamien by Pierre Rousset.
Paris: Maspero, premiere edition, 1973.142 pages. 2me.
edition, 1975. 363 pages.
Histoire du Vietnam by Nguyen Khac Vien. Paris:
Editions sociales, 1974. 288 pages.
Bains de Sang by Noam Chomsky et E. S. Herman. Paris:
Seghers-Laffont, 1974. 196 pages.
Femmes du Vietnam by Arlene Eisen Bergman. Paris:
Ed. des Femmes, 1975. 399 pages.
Dynamics of the Vietnam War; A Quantitative Analysis
and Predictive Computer Simulation by Jeffrey S.
Milstein. Columbia: Ohio State University Press, 1974.
XV-254 pages.
Revolutionary Organization; Institution-Building Within
the People's Liberation Armed Forces by Paul Berman.
Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Health, 1974. XVI-249 pages.
A Peace Denied; The United States, Vietnam and the
Rlris Agreement by Gareth Porter. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1975. 357 pages.
The Peasant Question (1937-1938) by Truong Chinh
and Vo Nguyen Giap. Edited, translated and introduced
by Christine Pelzer White. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
S o u t ~ s t Asia Program Data Papers, 1974. 102 pages.
The Land-to-the-Tiller Program and Rural Resource
Mobilization in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam by
Stuart C. Callison. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974.
41 pages.
Towards Large-Scale Socwlist Agricultural Production
by Le Dulin and Pham Van Dong. Hanoi: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1975. 114 pages.
60
Capitalist relations are henceforth presented as hegemonic,
the truths of the colonial situation lie in the mechanics of
the market, wage earning and surplus value. "Feudal"
relations are supra-determined [why "supra"?] by the
capitalist structure with which they are bound up and by
which they are superceded; they do offer active and passive
resistance, conferring upon the capitalist structure the
semblance of primitive accumulation without structuring
determinism of it. They no longer function except as its
particular modalities. (85)
The situation necessitates this type of analysis, especially since
Indochina was severely affected by the depression and since
political struggles between large interest groups occurred more
frequently afterwards.
1935-36 saw the renewal of local peasant and worker
strife after a subsidence in 1932-34. The newspaper is highly
valuable for the variety and insight of its sociological analyses.
Those who supported the newspaper were actively engaged in
several movements. One cannot help but be struck by the
influence the newspaper had in the countryside, even though it
was in French (Vietnamese-language newspapers being subject
to stricter censorship) and by the combative spirit prevalent in
some regions. It is noted that the communists were already
well established there (although this was not the case among
the plantation workers );1 nothing could wrench them away.
The author then goes on to describe the emergence of the
group on the Indochinese scene and notes that "the advent of
the Lutte movement to the position of electoral force re.sulted
not only in increasing the means of action of legal and illegal
organizations, but also in destablizing the colonial political
superstructure" (263).
The third and final part, "From Popular Front to Schism
(June '36-July '37)," is damning for the Popular Front and
the socialist ministers led by Marius Moutet who, as Minister
of Colonies, controlled the purse-strings.
La Lutte scarcely created any illusions where the
Popular Front was concerned. It saw there the opportunity to
relax the stronghold of police repression so as to allow greater
popular mobilization. The newspaper continued to stress that
nothing would be obtained without struggle. In actual fact, the
socialists allied to the radicals (who were colonialists par
excellence) envisaged nothing more than a renovated,
modernized colony where improvement of the economic
infrastructure would permit growth in production and
exchange while enabling the peasantry to escape from its
abject poverty.
With this momentum, social agitation spread and
intensified. The newspaper takes account of a whole host of
strikes, highly revealing of what has come to be known as the
"social climate." We might have hoped that D. Hemery would
pause at this point and recapitulate contemporary material so
as to bring out the established facts and underlying indications
in a clear manner. In the newspaper they are too confused
with tactical considerations for the reader not to feel swamped
by the accumulation of anecdotal facts.
This is perhaps just the criticism which could be raised
against this excellent work: it is not what we might have
wanted, i.e., a confrontation between the analysis made by the
revolutionary Vietnamese of colonial society and a synthetic
vision of the social problems of the period; an exchange
between the militant then and the historian of today.
Although this was not the aim of the book, the reader is
corifused because slhe does not have the means to create an
independent and sufficiently precise overview which would
allow herlhim to tell whether comments by the authors of La
Lutte and the underground militants were perceptive or
illusory.
The end is common knowledge. Poulo Condor, the war,
the proclamation of 31 August 1945. A little after, the Viet
Minh executed Ta Thu Thau who had just been acquitted by a
people's tribunal. The following year, Daniel Guerin alluded to
this liquidation to Ho Chi Minh: " 'He was a great patriot, and
we will mourn him,' Ho Chi Minh said (to me) with real
emotion, but then added resolutely, 'But all those who do not
follow the line drawn by me will be crushed.' ,,2 We can at
least add that Ta Thu Thau was not a "patriot" and that it is
this sort of refusal to "follow the line" which caused
Vietnamese Trotskyists to be violently eliminated.
Even when we have closed the book, we cannot help but
remember the interesting discussions held by Vietnamesc
Marxists at the time of La Lutte. These show a remarkable
intellectual vitality, coupled with great finesse in sociological
observation. The later period, marked by the two wars of
resistance and the emergence of the state, saw this vitality
restrained by a form of bureaucratic rigidity. In North
Vietnam, it also saw an experiment inspired by the Hundred
Flowers Campaign and with the same results. It was perhaps in
the South, in the heat of combat, that this vitality in the
observation and discussions of social phenomena was renewed.
Many internal documents of the N.L.F. (National Front for
the Liberation of South Vietnam) carried the mark of it. Let
us hope, there again, that the historians dig them out of the
archives. D. Hemery has given us the beginnings of this history.
In the article cited above, Pierre Brochcux draws several
interesting conclusions of which the following is particularly
worthy of note. "In work and outside of work, the plantation
is a place of identification between national and class
membership." Can we therefore speak of the proletariat in the
nineteenth-century sense of the term, poles apart from the
nationalism characteristic of the bourgeoisie? This debate was
of current interest between 192 5 and 1940 as Daniel Hemery's
book shows. Simplifying, it would be tempting to see in the
book the opposition of two lines: that of Nguyen Ai Quoc
holding out for the primacy of nationalism and that of Ta Thu
Than, proletarian internationalist. This rift sometimes made
itself felt even inside the I.c.P. (Indochina Communist Party).
The world war, rather than the proletarian revolution,
came to Europe. Thus, events were more favorable to the old
prescribed doctrine. The reply given by the Marxists of Hanoi
was predictable. The class struggle, momentarily subordinated
to the imperative of national unity necessary for the (local)
overthrow of imperialism, reaffirms its rights and gives rise to a
new form of state which assumes the hegemony of the most
disfavored classes. It will be remarked nonetheless that
national unity is maintained after the victory against
imperialism, that the social revolution is then taken over by
the state, which gives a role to each class, inserting its
bureaucracy at the heart of class relations. The problem is
unquestionably worth a closer examination which we shall
undertake later.
Among the numerous issues which can be raised about
these historical studies, the following could be considered:
61
Popular Front and Proletarian Front (Stalin and Trotsky) in
the colonies. Whereas in many other contexts popular front
policies have on the whole failed, in Vietnam they have been
remarkably successful. We can ask what the results of policies
of a worker and peasant front would have been if repression
had not so severely decimated the Trotskyists (doubtless
unable to find refuge in the countryside). From there springs
the later embarrassment of the Trotskyists. In 1947, the
Fourth International published a text entitled "National
movements and class struggles in Vietnam" which argues that
the Viet Minh could only betray the workers. In 1949, Pierre
Naville did not go into the tactical problems. He saw the Viet
Minh as a popular, national emancipation movement and
accepted the extremely moderate declarations of the
president, Ho Chi Minh. "Communism will perhaps come in
fifty years ... but not now. The Vietnamese economic
programme is reformist and barely socialist, anti-imperialist
but not anticapitalist."
3
The discussion is taken up much more
systematically by Pierre Rousset in his work on the
Vietnamese Communist Party, in particular in the section
entitled "The Programmatic Originality of the V.c.P."
The first edition of the' book, published in 1973,
unleashed a controversy in the American Trotskyist Journal
International Socialist Review (July-August 1973; April 1974
and February 1975). We will not go into that here since the
new edition of P. Roussel's book may well give it new
impetus. This is, in fact, a new publication, enlarged and
restructured. It is the only work in French to treat such a
subject so fully.
Although it is not explicitly stated, it may well be useful
to know that the author is a leader of the Revolutionary
Communist League, one of the Trotskyist movements in
France. He is the expert on Indochinese affairs for the
newspaper of the movement. From the outset we are warned
that the work attempts to answer an "apparent paradox": the
Vietnamese c.P. is directing an exemplary revolution while at
til: same time accepting "praise and compliments from the
representatives of the Stalinist parties." "Neither a systematic
study of Vietnamese social reality nor a detailed history of the
V.c.P.," this work looks for an interpretation of the "line" of
the V.C.P. and attempts to "open a discussion" on it. It turns
out to be well and truly a history of the c.P. but social reality
is effectivcly absent from the analysis, something which
doesn't seem to embarrass this Marxist. Even the concrete
~ a t u r e of the party, its organization, members, real life and
workings are ignored. The subject of this study boils down to
the different stances taken by the leadership and imposed
upon its apparatus. The reader is for the most part unaware of
the problems leading up to the application of party decisions
and the more or less salutary consequences of adopting such
positions.
The criteria for the justness of these stances are not their
actual result but their compliance with a doctrine. The
proposed discussion belongs to the realm of the abstract
strategy of a struggle enacted in the empyrean of eternal
political truths. Thus the book must be put into the category
of political theology and it is hardly surprising that critical
observations do not go beyond those which the Vietnamese
Communists formulate about themselves.
The narrowness of the prescribed objective is accentu
ated by the documents used. These are limited to texts
published in French in Hanoi and then only comprise a small
number of these, The rare exceptions to this rule concern
some standard French works. Foreign studies are ignored. On
more delicate questions, this lack of perspective does not allow
the author to escape from rationalizations of the bureaucracy
in power, so as to deprecate the real issues concealed by
doctrinaire speeches. P. Rousset has not given himself enough
scope to avoid "tagging along" which is a little surprising
coming from the pen of a follower of Trotsky, the terrible old
man of Coyoacan. To be sure, the elimination- of the
Trotskyist militants is denounced as a "crime against the
revolution," but a crime for which liabilities are imprecisely
attributed, perhaps only local. We cannot, he says, reasonably
impute these trifles to the Political Bureau of the Party at the
time. The image of good Uncle Ho obviously inspires more
indulgence than Joseph Vissarionovitch's.
Before reviewing some of the problems raised by the
book, let us mention some details, such as the map on p. 10,
riddled with errors, the curious obstinacy in distorting the
name of Ngo Van Chieu (the author of Journal d'un
Combattant Viet-Minh [Paris, Le Seuil, 1955), not to mention
Gandhi or gandhism. What is more serious, and a clear
indication of the gaps in documentation, is that the southern
branch of the V.C.P., the People's Revolutionary Party (Dong
Nhan Cach Mang Viet Nam), is mentioned only twice, very
briefly, and then with a strange set of initials (P.P.R., p. 206
and 292). A book on the Vietnamese c.P. should at least raise
the question of and the significance of its southern branch
during the war just ended, speculate on the meaning of the
disappearance from Hanoi in September 1969 of the number
four of the party, the first vice-premier, Pham Hung, and his
reappearance in 1975 as the principal leader of the South.
In the list of peculiarities we can include false erudition
(for example, mixing up the pseudonyms of the militants who
studied in Moscow, p. 33), the religion jargon (the
"transgrowth," p. 53 et. passim), activist obscurantism (the
C.I.A. using psychoanalysis to torture, p. 175), the dream (the
occupation of the American Embassy at the time of Tet, 1968,
p. 207), and most often, dogmatic assertion (for example, on
the proletarian character of the C.V.P., p. 162). Without fail,
he falls energetically into line: "The fundamental feature of
Vietnamese military strategy is probably its eminently political
nature. This, for example, accounts for the place assigned to
self-defense and to the mass uprising in the theory of warfare"
(210). He does not see that this is a political discourse on the
subject of war and that theories cannot replace good tanks.
It is obvious that real logistic problems which clearly
have a decisive place in practice are seriously devalued in this
kind of discourse. How do we arrange for the concentration of
a dozen or so divisions around Saigon at a moment's notice,
with trucks or with concepts? A major part of what has
happened in Vietnam is taken at least as much from the classic
schools of warfare as from political theory. Marx and Engels,
who did not have the chance to possess the "ready-made"
theory, were very interested in military questions and
especially the matter of supplies. As for the popular uprisings,
it must be noted that they did not occur anywhere, either in
Tet of 1968 or in April 1975, in spite of the theory forecasting
them and the speeches which attempted to bring them about.
It is this gulf between observable facts and self-congratulation
which still makes it difficult today to judge, for example, the
success or failure of the Tet offensive. We probably need
insights which we cannot formulate because of our ignorance
62
concerning the real ojectives of the offensive. The version
given by the Front will no doubt be put into history
textbooks, but it is difficult to see what P. Rousset has to gain
by blindly adhering to it.
It is amusing to find the Trotskyist good old days in his
emphatic statement: "A worker-state is awakening in South
Vietnam" (46). He then goes on:
The determination of the optimum rhythms of socialisation
[we shall pass over this strange language] of the economy
depends on political chance, thus, on concrete analysis. But
it does not, for all that, authorize us to avoid character
izing the current State in South Viet-Nam (247).
What better proof of dogmatism? The inspired page which
follows proves that the Vietnamese C.P. has correctly applied
Trotsky's ideas on the Permanent Revolution. We can then
"characterize" freely. We find in the end the classic delirium
over the rise of regional class struggles (261) where the
Philippine guerrillas (no distinction of color is made), the
South Korean repression, the agitations of Indonesian
students, etc., are all lumped together.
P. Rousset holds back as a delicacy the chapter on
bureaucracy near the end of his book. From October 1945
(Ho Chi Minh) to April 1976 (Pham Van Dong), the
Vietnamese Communist leaders never ceased hammering away
at the bureaucratic outlook in their speeches. The author
subtly weighs up the components: a taste of Stalinism here, a
pinch of Soviet democracy there. His disquiet increases:
The problem is not so much the attainment of Soviet-style
democracy, but the goals which Vietnamese leaders have set
in this domain. The disturbing factor in the analyses of
Truong Chinh who limits his study to the "three forms" of
the dictatorship of the proletariat which the state has
experienced, is that nowhere does he put forth an overall
strategy for the creation of a Soviet system of power,
unlike the Bolshevik Party before Stalinisation. (329-30)
If only nostalgically, P. Rousset does see the problem:
"The worker's party must, to some extent, take the place of
the class party in order to lead a revolutionary peasant army
on the struggle for socialism." This assertion, which some
people might consider critical and powerful enough to call into
question all the analyses preceding it, is treated only in passing
at the end of the work (331). It is true that Leninism itself and
not only its exotic variations deserve this pointed criticism,
but P. Rousset prefers to stop there.
Having made these criticisms, it remains to be said that
the book is interesting in that it presents a skillful synthesis of
the ideas of leading Vietnamese Communists. We cannot go
into detail about these important points except to say that
anyone interested in this subject will enjoy it. There is also an
account of some essential aspc;cts of Vietnamese policy,
complemented by a judicious choice of texts which allows us
to judge Party documents with a certain economy of means.
However, the author's interpretation is doubtful and will be
cause for debate.
From Hanoi, we have a History of Vietnam. This book
comprises essays from Vietnamese Studies and is written by
Vietnamese Studies' editor, Nguyen Khac Vien. His wide
education, political involvement and long-standing familiarity
with Parisian life make Nguyen Khac Vien the best possible
intermediary between Western intellectuals and Socialist
Vietnam. We cannot forget his film on people and the land on
French television, his excellent collection of rich and
penetrating essays, Experiences Vietnamiel1lleS (Paris: Editions
Sociales, 1970),4 his Vietllam, patrie retrouvee (Paris: Editions
Sociales, 1977), and above all, his extraordinary translation of
Kim Van Kieu (Hanoi: 2nd edition, 1974). His astonishing
combination of mandarinal culture, Marxist materialism and
the spark of a richly poetic sensitivity is well and truly
Vietnamese, but Nguyen Khac Vien brings it to a level rarely
equalled.
The title is thus very promising, since apart from Le
Thanh KhOi's book Le Vietnam (Paris: Editions de Minuit,
1955), which has long been impossible to find, there is,
curiously enough, no good textbook on Vietnamese history in
French or English. One was published in Hanoi in 1975 in
Vietnamese, but it is not likely to come up to our
expectations. And, unfortunately, Nguyen Khac Vien's book
can hardly meet them either. He offers in eleven pages a short
resume of prehistory in which we sense the urge to exaggerate
the present territory of (North) Viet Nam more clearly than,
all things considered, accepted regional archeology does. (Let
Can we draw any common elements out of such diverse
works? We will mention-but we would wear ourselves
out criticizing-the overwhelming predominance of
political ideology and scientism. Both of these bear wit
ness to the dark depths in which the quest for knowl
edge stilI stirs, perhaps forever. Impressionism and
poetry often accord better with the lived experience of a
society such as that of Vietnam than all the powerful,
often hollow, constructs derived from manifestly usurp
ing sciences.
us mention here a special issue of the review Arts Asiatiques,
no. xxxi, on Vietnamese archeology.)
Next, the Chinese period is totally ignored. We are
simply told that "the Vietnamese people succeeded in
reconquering their independence in the 10th Century" (25).
Isn't it an insult to Vietnamese nationalism to simply ask
whether something like a nation existed before the thousand
years of Chinese domination or whether it was not more
precisely forged in the process of assimilation and then the
rejection of it (i.e., a dialectic movement)? Another proof of
the narrowness of the outlook which determines this method
of presenting history is the total absence of the Chams,
Khmers and Montagnards. This is important, not because some
of them are to be found in contemporary Vietnamese frontier
regions, but because they have obviously contributed in
different ways to the molding of the society of the Kinh, an
untranslatable term (like han for the Chinese), designating
Vietnamese/mongoloids/sinicized rice-growers of the plain
(but meaning "higher place, residence of the court"). Let us
hope that the revival of the ethnographical studies taking place
in the North will be transferred into the field of history.
63
The account of the "feudal" period suffers a little from
over-simplification_ A movement led by "x" is constantly set
against a movement led by "y," without either of the
movements being clearly defined. They are implicitly treated
as simple precursors of contemporary "movements," deemed
imperfect because they do not combine all the characteristics
of orthodoxy which alone ensures a lasting success. This is
about as simple as saying that Spartacus is the precursor of
Jesus Christ. Thus, history is easy to write. He pauses at the
Tay Son episode, better treated than other movements, and
the first part of the nineteenth century is entirely summed up
in the following sentence: "With Gia Long, Vietnam enters a
gloomy period" (93). This is why the work does not justify its
title.
The merit in the book lies in the last part dealing with
the colonial period and what follows it. The account is more
complex and more vigorous, even if it only makes use of the
most well-known facts. When he turns to the political
problems linked with the emergence of the communist
movcmcnt, he skillful1y avoids difficult questions. The episode
of La Lutte only takes up a few lines and he does not mention
the role of the Trotskyists. Nguyen Khac Vien everywhere
proves himself a shrewd rationalizer and his conclusion is
remarkably concise and elegant in its resume of the political
goals of the revolutionary movement. For its last and longest
Paul Berman and Jeffrey Milstein signal the turn of
American sociology. It is particularly American, not
only because of the authors' nationality, but because it
bears the stamp of a university tradition which reveres
bchavioralism and quantification and is unable to do
anything without a computer.
part, this book is worth reading because it fits itself into the
wake of history in the making.
The American Presence
More than Vietnam itself, the presence of the Amercans
has provoked a flood of literature of every description. In the
first place we can note the publication in French of a
pamphlet by Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman (author
of Atrocities in Vietnam, Boston, 1970), entitled Bains de
Sang, which deals for the most part with American policy in
Vietnam. The book is a co-production of Marie-Odile Faye,
the translator, and Jcan-Pierre Faye, who, apart from helping
with the translation, has written a foreword and appendices
and published the whole in his series, CiJange. The foreword,
entitled "L'Archipei Bloodbath," is unbelievably cultish. For
example, it informs us that Noam Chomsky "is the decisive
manifestation of an altogether different dimension-to the
train of thought which is coming into being and which
undoubtedly can only exist in a collective situation
synthesizing the Kant and the Marx or the Rousseau and the
Nietzsche of the age in the making and coming, and from
which forms and change will take shape arid crystallis.e
instantaneously" (19). What better way to congratulate
yourself than to tell the credulous that the edited book is
extraordinarily important and that the silence of the press
concerning the original edition (Warner Modular Publication,
1973) makes the French publication "practically the first
edition ... in the contemporary world"! (194).
To support this pretension, the translation at least
should have been correct. But it is absolutely deplorable and
often falls off into nonsense. The reader has to wade through
weighty and hyperbolic phrases from the translator's pen. As
we might expect, the mountain turns out to be a molehill. We
learn that there are massacres in history and that governments
do not all see these in the same way, either because they do
not know about them or because they condemn them, or
because they provoke them. Press files, more or less substantial
(but very poor on Indonesia, for example), are used to support
this tremendously naive and mechanical thesis. We are
accustomed to more subtlety from Chomsky. * He makes good
use of D. Gareth Porter's study, TiJe Myth of the Bloodbath;
North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered,s which certainly
deserves to be better known. Some stock phrases which are
found absolutely everywhere are carefully scrutinized and
reduced to nothing. In Chomsky's text, the only point of some
interest is the discussion of the realities of the Hue massacres
in 1968 attributed to the N.L.F. (l08-15). But this debate is
doubtless not elosed. As regards the rest, the references are
very well known and very incomplete. If he is attempting to
show that American policy can be both brutal and
hypocritical, it is too much. If he wishes to say that all
violence is not the same, it is not enough.
The book Femmes du Vietnam, poorly translated by
lona Wilder and Claude Lefevre, comes from American
"Women's Lib," from the California meeting ground between
the University and the Vietnamese anti-war movement.
Published in the U.s. in 1974, it is a vast collection of
humorous and serious anecdotes, short stories, little peeks at
customs, linked one to the other without any precise order.
Employing snatches of eyewitness information and press
cuttings, the work attempts to give an account of the position
of women in Vietnam. Such as it is, it would be called a work
of propaganda: it selects tiny bits of history which all have the
same significance. In this way, the oppression of women seems
to have remained the same from "feudal" times to those of the
American presence. This kind of study inevitably carries with
it a fair number of inaccuracies, the misspelling of proper
names, and, above all, naive statements, some of which are
delightful, others stupid, such as: "the experience of shooting
down a B-52 or an F-l11 makes a woman feel less inferior"
[original English: "... helps her to overcome the sense of
inferiority a woman felt"] (194). The idea is amusing, except
for the fact that F-i 11s were not shot down in Vietnam; a few
prototypes simply crashed. Sometimes the book engages in
ridiculous exaggeration, such as the story of a commando of
women who "occupied five of the seven floors of the
(American) Embassy, [during the Tet offensive] killed 2000
We remember American Power and the New Mandarins and At War
with Asia, both translated into French, and For Reasons of State.
Chomsky is the only one trying to bridge American and European
political thought on these subjects.
64
U.S. personnel and forced the Ambassador to flee in a
helicopter" (254). True, the U.S. edition mentions only 200
U.S. personnel, but all the same the story is sheer invention.
Mythology enthusiasts could observe there various stages in
the launching of a modern myth.
Apart from these faults which make the work totally
useless as a source of new information, some parts deal with
agonizing atrocities-who can get accustomed to the horrors of
the war?-and there is a very brief conclusion which leads us to
think that even in the North everything is not settled. Equality
in law is still not equality in practice. One senses a more
flexible reality away from naive and rigid imageries. There is
no doubt that the second war of resistance allowed women to
expand their economic and social roles very quickly. War has
this effect, as can be seen in Europe after 1918. Peace and the
demobilizations which will follow it should create an
interesting situation in this respect. But what can be gained by
heaping up outlandish over-simplifications?
Paul Berman and Jeffrey Milstein signal the turn of
American sociology. It is particularly American, not only
because of the authors' nationality, but because it bears the
stamp of a university tradition which reveres behavioral ism
and quantification and is unable to do anything without a
computer. They are two products of similar molds which
might well be regarded as complementary: Rand Corporation,
M.LT. and Yale in Berman's case; Michigan, Stanford and Yale
in Milstein's. Milstein analyzes the American side and Berman
the Vietnamese.
J. Milstein sets out to study the dynamics of the war,
i.e., the factors which affect its development. He is writing at
the beginning of 1973. The essential fact of the problem lies in
the confrontation between the theory of the "doves" and that
of the "hawks." Once involved in a limited war, the "hawk"
. theory predicts that escalation will reduce the hQstile
actions of an enemy. The "dove" theory predicts that
escalating one's own hostile actions will increase those of the
enemy (4). Then he delineates the psychological make-up of
these theories and finds that they rest on three fundamental
elements, the theoretical foundations of which he reiterates:
stress, learning and exchange.
Upon this, Milstein attempts to construct the two models of
alternative policy. To do it, he first has to formulate the
indices and variables which are representative of his theoretical
concepts. These fall into several groups: military effort,
consequences of military actions, political support, public
declarations (of American policy), not to mention an index of
seasonal variations. These indices are affected by co-efficients
which, we are told (28), are to be the object of a "subjective"
choice made by the researchers. We will only take one example
of this surprising "subjectivity." American losses are measured
by the number of people killed, multiplied by ten, to which
are added the nUlI!berof hospitalized wounded and half of the
number of wounded who were not hospitalized. The North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong losses represent twice the number
of arms seized, plus the number of communists taken prisoner.
South Vietnamese losses are indicated by four times the total
soldiers killed, plus the number seriously wounded. No
explanation of the rationality of these indices is offered.
In the political domain, the approach is even more
outrageous. It is indeed quite difficult to quantify the
confidence citizens have i ~ the Saigon government. But their
confidence can be measured in their currency, thanks to the
black market rate for the piastre. We have only to take this
rate and to weigh it against the index of retail prices and
money in circulation. The trick works. The author admits that
these indexes probably do not mean much; but it was to them
that American public opinion "reacted."
We will pass over the way these models are manipulated, the
explanations being accessible only to experienced statisticians.
The evolution of each variable is presented in a series of
diagrams which undoubtedly make up the most interesting
part of the book.
Using the initial values of January, February and March
1965, the simulation ofthe model made predictions for the
month from April 1965 on. In general, the simulation
predicted the major trends of the escalation of the war
from April 1965 through December 1967. (81)
Clearly the forecast was predictable, American policies being
constant. The model did not anticipate the unforeseeable, such
as the Tet offensive of January-February, 1968. After this the
. . . :de;a-fJu: the chief characteristic of the Viemamese
peasant is fatalism (but a pragmatic fatalism): for them,
to die is just to enter a different state. The feeling of
Vietnamese identity borders on xenophobia; the family
more than the individual is the basis for society, etc ..
These, applied just as readily to the Arabs and Africans,
are all old colonialist cliches which emerge completely
clad in the shining armor of scientific theory. Let us say
simply that this is fraudulent. The pretentious jargon
only serves to camouflage a total poverty of thought.
I
model then allows the simulation of a totally "dove" policy
I
and a totally "hawk" policy. The conclusion is expressed as
follows:
t
More dovish policies would have achieved fewer military
casualties and greater political support for the President at a
cost of a greater risk that South Vietnam would be "lost"
to the Communists. More hawkish policies, on the other
I
hand, would have been more likely to defeat the
Communists, but at a cost of more American casualties and I
political disaster for the President of the United
I
States. (111)
I
One wonders if a close reading of the Pentagon Papers did not
!
show us that much and more.
The same type of proof is then applied to the period dating
from Tet 1968 to the invasion of Cambodia (May 1970). The
book ends with the question of whether American policy was
the product of a true or false calculation. And he
concludes-that it was a bit of both (185).
I
65
I
P. Berman studies the People's Liberation Armed Forces
(PLF), which is the military apparatus of the NLF. He wanted
to analyze the process of institutionalization: how and why
individuals join an organization which becomes an institution
and in turn transforms its members into working elements of
that same institution. That at least seems to me the probable
interpretation of the term used by the author. He gives his
own interpretations: why do peasants submit to a new
authority? His response makes use of the mass of interviews
conducted by the Rand Corporation with approximately
1,200 prisoners and with Viet Cong deserters. These comprise
some 40,000 pages of which Berman uses only a selection.
Drumming up different theoretists of psychology, the
author draws out three aspects of institutionalization:
mobilization, integration, maintenance. This is called a
"microstructural approach." In order to establish the
"dimensions of receptivity" of the Vietnamese peasantry to
recruitment, a "model Vietnamese peasant personality" must
be constructed. We mu'st admit that this conceptual arsenal is
impressive. Such reliance upon sound general theories, rigor in
the articulation and definition of essential concepts makes us
reconceive our somewhat philistine perception of these
political processes. As this new image is progressively revealed
it surprisingly gives the impression of deja-vu: the chief
characteristic of the Vietnamese peasant is fatalism (but a
pragmatic fatalism): for them, to die is just to enter a different
state. The feeling of Vietnamese identity borders on
xenophobia; the family more than the individual is the basis
for society, etc .... These, applied just as readily to the Arabs
and Africans, are all old colonialist cliches which emerge
completely clad in the shining armor of scientific theory. Let
us say simply that this is fraudulent. The pretentious jargon
only serves to camouflage a total poverty of thought. Instead
of producing meaning from the internal organization of the
sentence, words and phrases totally devoid of any general
sense are created (pragmatic fatalism, purposive behavior).
The pretense of science continues with the selection of 344
interviews, according to mysterious criteria, and with a
maximum of statistical guarantees, attempts are made to draw
from these something other than what the interviewees said.
Two decisive questions are left unanswered: why not publish,
in part at least, the Rand interviews? Why not go and question
the Vit:tnamese peasants directly if you are asking about their
attitudes? When this book was written there were several tens
(or hundreds) of thousands of prisoners and deserters. If they
had been asked the right questions they would have given the
right answers. Mathematical reduction and a computer
produce only the most unspeakable trivialities. We have but to
refer to the conclusions to prove the point:
Broadly speaking, tbe communist revolution in Vietnam is a
special and extreme type of institution-building by wbat
we call a mobilizing organization-a modernizing political
system that seeks a new order based upon high levels of
mass participation and bigh levels of integration of people
into a centralized organizational structure. (197)
And further on:
In short tbe bonds tying tbe conforming individual to the
revolutionary organization in Vietnam were based upon tbe
satisfaction of personal needs witbin ah institutional
framework t}.rat was accepted as legitimate and
correct. (202)
Undoubtedly, there is a lesson to be drawn from these
trivialities. The Indochinese conflict could be described as two
different applications of sociology. The NLF cadres in their
villages could only act in accordance with ~ o r e or less
extended knowledge of the mechanisms of their society. Any
error of judgment quickly became for them a matter of life or
death. On their side, the Americans based their action on an
extensive use of the social sciences: from 1954 onwards the
big batallions from Michigan State University descended on
Saigon. Many others were to follow. On the one hand are the
practitioners of group psychology buried in their shelter, on
the other the quantifier analysts of the institutions mopping
their brows in air-conditioned offices. Arms and soldiers on
both sides. The judgment has been made in favor of those who
were closer to reality.6
One last word on Berman-he claims an intellectual debt to
Paul Mus, yet he does not seem to know his French-language
works (210). There you have an assertion totally devoid of
foundation.
Some books are premature. Gareth Porter's work, written to
prove that the American authorities did not seek to apply the
Paris Accords and continue to engage in a policy of force,
sticks far too much to the events of the years 1968-74 to be
capable of responding to all the questions one could ask. The
fall of Saigon appears only as an epilogue which Porter's thesis
did not foresee. To be sure, he shows how to write an
American book, relying for most of his sources on American
facts and figures, which strictly follows the Hanoi line. But
when he says that the Vietnamese Communists were still ready
to apply the Paris Accords in April 1975, he leaves out an
essential point. There obviously was a moment in time when
Hanoi changed policy and prepared for a decisive military
confrontation to secure American disengagement. Hanoi's
policy cannot be judged solely by what is published in Hanoi.
There are considerations which are clearly lodged in the
secrecy of deliberations, and we must often imagine what
these were, even at the risk of making a mistake. The
Vietnamese would be welcome to erase these uncertainties and
to elaborate upon the choices they made. But the volcano is
still active and it may well be a long time before the lava cools.
The treatment of the Tet offensive is thus much too brief.
So, too, is the one on the Geneva negotiations, which after all
form the base supPQ;ting all subsequent Indochinese events. It
seems to me from this essential turning point and up to the
Paris Accords, we can ask whether the strategy of the
Vietnamese leaders was the only possible one, and if not,
whether it was the best one. That would be a true contribution
to political understanding of our time. Porter's description is
too close to the events to allow for any evaluative, still less,
critical judgment to be made of them. American policy, for
example, is barely analyzed, not even characterized in its
integrity. We can perhaps hope that Porter will back up and
return to these problems with greater force of synthesis.
The Problems of the Peasantry
There exists an interesting document entitled The Peasant
Question to be studied from the dossier of the discussions of
Vietnamese Marxists between the two world wars. This book
was written by two Vietnamese activists of the '30s. They
were young nationalists who converted to Marxism and trailed
between clandestine politics and prison. Having changed their
66
names, they subsequently acquired some fame under the
names of Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap. They are friends
of long standing although public rumors attribute differences
of opinion to them. Their study of the Vietnamese peasantry
was originally published in two parts in 1937 and 1938. A
third part was lost before it was edited. The text apparently
was not well known, so Su That Editions of Hanoi reissued it
in 1959, using a unique copy with pages missing. Unfortunately
the Vietnamese editors indicate that "at our request," the
authors reread their text and made some revisions "on
essential points" which are not indicated. We know that this is
a current practice (cf. the Peking edition of the Selected Works
of Mao Zedong and Stuart Schram's "restorations"), but it
seems that the original cannot be found. There remains a hope
perhaps in certain archives of the Colonial Surete which have
not-and one wonders why not-been placed at the disposal of
the researchers.
The English-language translation, from the expert pen of
Christine Pelzer White, is divided into two parts: the first deals
with the position of the peasants in society (and this is the
most interesting part, since from this analysis we can deduce
the revolutionaries' position towards them). The second is a
detailed description of the conditions of peasants and their
technical, social and intellectual backwardness. Many of the
facts used in this work seem to be taken from the classic works
of Yves Henry and Pierre Gourou.
How can we define the peasants as a class? To begin with, it
can be said that the peasants are members of the rural petty
bourgeoisie, i.e., a class of people who possess the means of
production to ensure their own subsistence. From a general
point of view, the peasants are not members of the proletariat
because they always have some land, farming implements,
draft animals, buildings, orchards, vegetable gardens, etc. Only
the workers who possess nothing but their bare hands and who
sell their labor power to the capitalists in order to live are truly
proletarian. The peasants do not belong to the bourgeoisie
either, because they work for their living; they do not sit
around and do nothing, exploiting the labor of the workers as
the factory owners do. The peasants are a class between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie (16). This "neither one nor the
other" view fails to resemble, we note, Lenin's belated analysis
which argues that peasants are "both."
i
This class is divided into several strata according to the
system originating in the Soviet Union which the Chinese
Communists have adopted: peasants without land, poor
peasants, middle peasants, rich peasants.
7
This last stratum is
divided into rich peasants and landlords. The criterion for
classification is the relationship between the land owned and
the degree to which family needs are satisfied by the
application of individual labor on that area of land. The strata
are differentiated by their place in the process of production
rather than by wealth. Therein lies an ambiguity. In this text,
l there are clearly different strata because of the attempt to
! characterize the peasant class as a whole. But twenty years
later, at the time of the land reform in the North, these are
viewed as classes, and their conflicting interests are' seen as
class struggles. And, in fact, the authors conclude:
I
The peasants belong to the petite bourgeoisie, between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As the interests of the rich
peasants are quite similar to those of the bourgeoisie, they
I
tend to align themselves with the bourgeoisie. The interests
of poor and landless peasants are rather similar to those of
I
the proletariat, and tbey tend, therefore, to align
themselves with that class. In so far as tbe interests of the
different strata of tbe peasants diverge, peasant opinion is
not unified. Its attitude is unstable, particularly in the case
of middle peasants. Looking at history we see that at
different times, peasants joined one class or another.
Issuing from interesting changes in the peasant mentality
which lead to the following conclusion, the practical validity is
measurable:
When they become aware that they are organized and have
a leader, they are an invincible force. When they are
prepared, they can cast aside any obstacle to their progress
and the nation's progress. Tbe problem is one of
consciousness, organization and leadership. (22)
Thus, the main positions are already laid out. In spite of
the detailed account in the second part, there is no thorough
analysis of the economic structure of agricultural production.
Fairly superficial notations are presented in what is a truly
gripping view of rural poverty. No attempt is made at a proper
economic analysis, as the authors are well aware:
Although the peasants live off the land, the land does not
provide an adequate subsistence. This problem which is
crucial in the discussion of the peasant question is vast and
complex. As we ha.ve not collected enougb evidence, we
will only deal with the question of land distribution, and in
particular, communal lands. We regard this as the key to the
present-day agrarian question. (66)
This was a mistaken point of view as events have subsequently
proven.
The value of this text, even in revised form, is that it
gives a rather primitive version of the doctrine which explains
what party impact on the peasantry should be. This is a very
difficult problem now coming up in a new way in the south
and which continually presents proble'ms in the North, as we
shall see later.
8
I
Few problems have found such wide unanimity among
the American actors in the Vietnamese drama-politicians,
sociologists, servicemen, newspaper reporters-as has the need
I
I
for agrarian reform. The idea is simple: abolish landed estates
and you will have a class of small rural landowners devoted to
order and stability who will uphold an anticommunist
government. Also from 1954 onwards, experts in agrarian
67
I
I
reform were dispatched to meet President Diem and help him
set up a coherent program. Resistance and opposition within
the regime were soon to dash the hopes of successive experts
in Saigon. It was not until 1970 that a law called "Land to the
Tiller" essentially abolished tenant farming and reallocated
property and land of up to 15 hectares to those who worked
it. The American press heralded- this event as the beginning of
a new era which could well lead to the political and military
defeat of the Communists.
The political results were not easy to detect. Officials at
USAID asked Control Data in 1972 for a report on the impact
of the law in the Delta
9
while one of its attaches, Stuart
Callison, carried out a more intensive survey in four villages.
This work, which was the subject of a Ph.D. thesis (Cornell
University, August 1976), yielded an initial summary
publication. It records that in three years, one million hectares
were allotted, or approximately one-half of the Delta land.
The effect of this was to alter the ratio of tenants to
cultivators from 60 to 15 percent, most of the latter working
on land belonging to religious institutions. The abolition of
tenancy meant an increase in peasant income and a possibility
of new investments. Callison's survey allows him to say that
"the title-recipient group enjoyed a 30% growth in gross paddy
production between 1969-70 and 1971-72, compared with an
18% increase in production by the tenants and a 36% growth
rate for the owner-cultivators." (19) The author goes on to
consider the other data he has collected and concludes that
although the reform allowed many cultivators to try new
technology, it was not always available and the reform alone
could not prevent the quantity of rice being put on the market
from diminishing. This measurable amount was certainly a
valid indication of the political situation in the Delta.
We will conclude with a text looking toward the future.
The pamphlet entitled Towards Large-Scale Socialist Agricul
tural Production from Hanoi brings together several statements
made at a national conference held in August 1974 on the
problems of agricultural development. It comprises three texts
by Le Dilan, Pham Van Dong and Hoang Anh, secretary of the
Central Committee and deputy prime-minister. This last text,
included as an appendix, lists the tasks to be undertaken to
improve production, a viewpoint that is rather conventional:
we must do better and ways of doing this will be published.
The conclusion reflects the best bureaucratic style:
The above policies, once decreed and seriously observed.
will effectively encourage the peasants and production
establishments to engage enthusiastically in labour and
practise economy and will also help everybody realize the
need to work with technical skill and in a planned way and
to ensure proper management of production. (114)
The first two texts clearly present the problem of the
transition of North Vietnamese agriculture to a new stage in its
development. The prime minister's speech emphasizes the
inadequacy of the point of view which has always prevailed,
that of irrigated rice cultivation: modern stock farming and
industrial crops could play, a large part in exportation. Thus,
he offers as a universal law the idea that the value of the
production provided by stock farming must equal, and do
better than, agricultural production which is continually on
the increase. How can production be increased? By
concentration, mechanization, electrification, "chemicaliza
tion," etc. A new administrative unit, the district, will playa
crucial role in the coordination of tasks involving an increasing
complexity.
The most important questions are raised in the
contribution by the First Secretary, Le Duan. His are also the
clearest criticisms:
At this conference you have said that the price problem is
one of the causes for the cooperatives' lack of enthusiasm
un production. It is true that some State purchasing prices
of agricultural products are irrational. The State must
resolutely readjust them. (11)
In certain rural cells a good proportion of activists are
"average" or even "mediocre," i.e., inactive.
However, in the movement of cooperation and agricultural
production there now appear negative manifestations as
illegal encroachment and wasteful use ofland, failure to put
into practice the principles and system of socialist
management and to carry out distribution in a just and
rational way, according to the work done. (23)
His assessment is severe, and, without actually pointing it out,
reveals stubborn resistance to collectivism. Nonetheless we can
see that things have come a long way if comparisC'ns are made
with the account of the Tonkinese countryside given by
Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap.
Further on, the First Secretary notes that for Marx,
socialism can only be conceived as resting on a powerful
industrial base. Lenin took the question further by giving the
cooperatives the role of "leading the peasants toward
socialism" until heavy industry could consolidate them in
turn. Le Duan states that the "brother countries" had "a
certain industrial infrastructure bequeathed by capitalism" and
that it was possible for them to "accelerate the development
of heavy industry." Now this was not the case in Vietnam, he
says:
It seems that no country so far in history has been in a
situation such as ours. We must lead the peasantry and
agriculture immediately to socialism, without waiting for a
developed industry, though we know very well that without
the strong impact of industry, agriculture cannot achieve
large-scale production and new relations of agricultural
production cannot be considered. (29)
But is this consistent with economic laws? To know these
laws, action and study must go hand in hand, for "One cannot
grasp all problems at a time." (30) The way forward is "The
68
I
f
j
system of socialist collective ownership, the science of labour
organisation, economic management, water control, the use of
fertilizers, seeds, new implements and so on." (31) According
to the author it would be enough to progressively master what
he calls the "heights" of contemporary progress.
To sum up, we see that the law of transition from one
economic stage to another springs at one and the same time
from a social system and a level of technology. The party view
is clarified in the following lines:
Thus, the above-mentioned social relations (proletarian
dictatorship and collective ownership) which are normally
the products of large-scale industry, in our country are the
natural outcome of the process of national democratic
revolution and of the initial stage of socialist transforma
tion in the absence of large-scale industry. We therefore
cannot sit idly by waiting for the creation of heavy industry
before establishing these relations. History enables and
compels us to go forward to these relations immediately.
What Engels felt was very difficult to realize in many
countries [hence his recommendation to "wait"] can be
done in ours. We cannot miss this historic opportunity, we
must seize it, carry out agricultural cooperation without
delay, and use the worker-peasant power and the
cooperative regime as a motive force to push ahead with
other evolutionary transformation in agriculture and
quicken the birth of a large-scale production and industry.
To start the process of socialist construction by establishing
the system of collective ownership-this is a peculiarity of
our country's historical development, and an important
theoretical point of social sciences in VietNam. (32)
This could not be put more clearly. The contradiction
with classic theory is recognized and dismissed as an historical
"peculiarity." But contrary to what Le Duan says, this does
not yield any theory. Despite its light Marxist attire, the point
of issue emerges from the purest form of political pragmatism.
Whether good or bad, this fact is not without consequences in
practice. Since those who produce do not seem able to give
themselves any momentum, the district level of administration
has to be reinforced-approximately 10,000 hectares, 40,000
workers-and bureaucracy takes the place once more, ad
infinitum, of the defaulting class. Thus we can foresee that it
will soon be necessary to denounce bureaucracy, squandering
and corruption in certain districts. It is an economic system of
some real but poor
There are no reasons to believe that the new directives
will be much modified by reunification. For a while a sort of
imperviousness will remain between production zones in the
North and South. It remains to be seen how the desire for
homogenization will manifest itself.
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Conclusion
Can we draw any common elements out of such diverse
works? We will mention-but we would wear ourselves out
criticizing-the overwhelming predominance of political
ideology and scientism. Both of these bear witness to the dark
depths in which the quest for knowledge still stirs, perhaps
forever. Impressionism and poetry often accord better with
the lived experience of a society such as that of Vietnam than
all the powerful, often hollow, constructs derived from
manifestly usurping sciences. It must be recognized that some
of the ideas presented here only appear self-evident and
acceptable because of the pattern of historical events. Let us
think of all the unfortunate ones who have erected grand
theories in the course of the years, and who, in the secrecy of
their study, have seen them swept away by the debacle of
April 1975-the debacle, that is, for those who threw their
lot in the American war effort. Their writings remain. To
my knowledge, not one of these hundreds of scholars has
yet publicly asked, Why were we mistaken? For science to
deserve the title of "social," it should seize this kind of oppor
tunity to question itself. *
Notes
1. Pierre Brocheux, "Le Proletariat des plantations d'hevea du
Vietnam meridional: aspirations sociales et politiques (1927-1937)," in
Le Mouvement SOCial, n. 90, Janvier-Mars, 1975, pp. 55-86.
2. Au Service des Colonises (Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1954), p. 22.
3. New York Times, July 6, 1946. Quoted in Pierre Naville, La
Guerre de Viet-Nam (Paris: Ed. de la Revue Internationale), pp.
199-200.
4. Excerpts were published in Tradition and Revolution in
Vietnam, edited by David G. Marr and Jayne Werner (Washington,
D.C.: Indochina Resource Center, 1974).
5. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972.59 pages.
6. See also Georges Boudarel, "Sciences Sociales et contre
insurrection au Vietnam," in Le Mal de voir, Cahiers Jussieu, no. 7,
Union Generale d'Editions, 1976, pp. 136-97.
7. See Serge Thion, "The Social Classification of Peasants in
Vietnam," in Asian Thought and Society. Ill, 7, April 1978, 328-38.
8. Important texts on the land reform by these two authors
have recently been published: Truong Chinh, "Pour la realisation de la
reform agtaire" (November 1953), in Truong Chinh, Ecnts, 194675
(Hanoi: Editions en Langues Etrangeres, 1977), pp. 497593; and Vo
Nguyen Giap, "Les Commises dans la RCforme Agraire et Leur
Source" (October 1956), in the very useful study by Le Thanh Khoi,
Socialisme et developpement au Viet Nam (Paris: PUF, 1978), pp.
6()'68.
9. Henry C. Bush, Gordon H. Messegee, Roger V. Russell, The
Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta (Saigon:
Control Data, December 1972), 136 pages.
A

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69
The State of the Social Sciences in Vietnam
by David Marr
The Context
On the side of a building in Hanoi, in bold red letters,
are the words Ve Sinh La Yeu Nuoe, which can translate as "To
be hygenic is to love your country." I think that slogan tells us
a lot about contemporary Vietnam. First of all, it
demonstrates how patriotic imagery, so crucial to success over
French colonialists and American imperialists, is still being
given top emphasis in the post-1975 era of reconstruction and
of development toward a modern socialist economy. The same
sort of slogans can be found urging citizens to diversify crops,
to improve factory management, to expand exports or even to
heighten archaeological research.
However, it will take more than patriotism to achieve
goals set by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the next
twenty years. In the current era there is no single enemy
comparable to the French or the Americans. Rather, there are
hundreds of problems to be overcome, all having different
causes. It is proving much more difficult to focus peoples'
energies on such things as capital accumulation, technological
innovation, administrative reorganization or curricular reform.
Even assuming that a majority of citizens came to understand
how all of these activities relate to building a new and truly
independent Vietnam, there is no dramatic objective to which
the leadership can point and say, "There. Once we achieve
that, we have truly arrived." "Building Socialism" is a process,
not a victory that can be declared on a certain date, as was the
case with 30 April 1975.
When I raised this issue on several occasions in
January-February 1978 with Vietnamese cadres they smiled
knowingly, agreed that the new era demanded new approaches
to life, yet insisted that the Vietnamese people, at this stage in
history, at least, still had to be motivated primarily by appeals
to patriotic pride. True, the equation "hygiene = love of
country" was not going to kill germs directly. Nevertheless,
the individual citizen who realized that a healthy populace
meant a stronger nation might well be moved to observe
certain rules that did serve to eliminate germs. Meanwhile, the
country's educational system could be improved to the point
where germ theory and other scientific concepts were
imparted to the majority of citizens, thus reducing overall
dependence on patriotic slogans and rote memorization of
rules. What was needed above all, the cadres said, was time to
be able to plan, to organize and to introduce a host of new
programs.
Although my heart is certainly with them, I must
confess that my mind remains somewhat skeptical. In the first
place, there are new problems that have surfaced since 1975
which make achievement of Vietnam's development goals even
more difficult. Most notably Vietnam is no longer able to
stand outside the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is engaged in a violent
if limited conflict with Kampuchea. And its expectations of
foreign aid have proved to be overly optimistic, at least so far.
Unfortunately none of these problems are really within the
power of Vietnam to resolve on its own initiative.
In the long run, however, Vietnam's success at building
socialism will depend more on domestic than international
factors. The heart of the issue was set forth some time ago by
Le Duan, General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party,
when he called for a triple revolution in production relations,
in science and technology (the "keystone"), and in ide.ology
and culture. While there has been progress on each of these
three fronts since 1975, I have the impression that the pace
has been short of revolutionary, and that Vietnam's leaders are
searching for ways to break through some very intractable
obstacles. Social scientists are being urged as never before to
put their disciplinary skills and their experience at the service
of the state. They are also being authorized to interact with
foreign social scientists to an unprecedented degree. It is
within this general context that I outline current social science
efforts in Vietnam, describe the activities of archaeologists and
historians in particular, and conclude with a few remarks on
methodological problems and potentialities.
Organization of the Social Sciences
The Vietnam Social Sciences Commission (Uy Ban Khoa
Hoe Xa Hoi) is chaired by a veteran revolutionary, Nguyen
Khanh Toan, who reports directly to the Prime Minister. In a
long and fruitful conversation with Nguyen Khanh Toan it
became obvious that he had lost none of his fervor bred of
student demonstrations in Saigon in the mid-1920s, training in
Moscow, and Indochinese Communist Party organizing in
South China. Although a product of French schooling and
involved in editing important French language newspapers of
the mid-1920s, he came to identify profoundly with Ho Chi
Minh's effort to make Vietnamese history and culture essential
components of communist revolutionary strategy. Perhaps
because I had raised questions on earlier discussions with
Vietnamese historians, Nguyen Khanh Toan vehemently
70
defended the idea that Vietnam had been victorious against
the French and Americans, and would overcome all future
difficulties, because it had learned how to "merge" (boa) its
unique national (dan toe) values with proletarian class values.
Among the four vice chairmen of the Social Sciences
Commission, I came to know Pham Huy Thong best, partly
because he is concurrently Director of the Archaeology
Institute and my partner in this trip, Helmut Loofs, was
apparently the first non-socialist country archaeologist to be
invited to Vietnam in many years. Pham Huy Thong, a
romantic lyric poet in the 1930s, went to study in France and
there became involved in anticolonial activities. After
returning to Saigon he was jailed first by the French and then
by the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. He fled to North Vietnam in
the late 1950s and became one of the leaders in efforts to pick
up where foreign archaeologists had left off in investigating
bronze-age (Dong Son) civilization. As we'll see below, the
finds have proven to be extraordinarily important.
First, however, a brief outline of the entire Commission
is in order. There are currently thirteen components, including
nine institutes, three groups and one special center. Eight of
the institutes have been in operation since the 1950s and, to
me, show signs of being both well established (individual elan,
solid journals, public prestige) and a bit too hidebound, too
jealous of their prerogatives, too reluctant to cooperate across
organizational boundaries.
The four largest institutes are those of Economics,
Archaeology, History and Linguistics. Each has between forty
dnd eighty full-time research scholars. As might be expected
the Economics Institute works closely with the State Planning
Commission in researching and preparing major five-year and
one-year plan proposals to the Party and the National
Assembly. With the government striving generally to increase
the breadth and sophistication of central planning, the
Economics Institute has heavy responsibilities indeed. The
History Institute (discussed further below) is almost entirely
concerned with Vietnam's past, but also does some survey
work on contemporary developments elsewhere. Although
involved in both theoretical and applied studies, the
Linguistics Institute is best known for its efforts in the area of
word coinage and, more recently, for tackling the confusion of
Vietnamese vocabulary brought about by two decades of
territorial division at the seventeenth parallel.
Four other institutes have been in operation since the
1950s and apparently have about twenty to forty research
scholars each. The Law Institute has been preoccupied with
researching and writing a new draft constitution, as well as a
codified law code for Vietnam. The Ethnology Institute
focuses on the 15 percent or so of Vietnam's population which
is not ethnically Vietnamese, in short, the many national
minorities. The Literature Institute seems to concentrate
largely on Vietnamese literature and broad trends in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, although there is growing public
awareness and interest in the literature of other countries as
well. Finally, the Philosophy Institute is concerned with the
application of Marxist-Leninist principles to problems of
human existence in general and contemporary Vietnamese life
in particular.
Several years ago a ninth institute was authorized-the
Social Sciences Information Institute. Here some sixty
specialists maintain the general social sciences library (there
are also separate institute and group libraries) and conduct
research in the library sciences as well as in communications
theory and practice.
A small Han Nom Group is engaged in the textual
analysis, codification and translation of significant historical
documents in Chinese and demotic characters. Recently it
completed and published an important catalogue of Han Nom
texts, organized by author.
1
There is also a new Sociology Group, of more than
passing interest, I think, because sociology is not exactly a
favored discipline in most socialist countries. It will be
intriguing to see if Vietnamese scholars attempt to relate
Marxist and Weberian perceptions of society to each other.
2
After the liberation of South Vietnam in April 1975 a
Social Sciences Research Center was established in Ho Chi
Minh City (Saigon). It is headed by a prominent historian,
Nguyen Cong Sinh, and currently employs as many as 140
specialists. The Center's primary function is to investigate the
complex southern legacy of direct French colonial rule,
The author is in the center. To his right are Pham Huy Thong
(archaeologist), Helmut Loofs, and Phan Gia Ben (historian).
American neo-colonialism, war and fratricide. It also serves to
screen and to integrate a number of researchers from the
pre-1975 academic system. The Center has its own large
library, based on the "Ancient Studies Institute" (Vien Kbao
Co) collection of earlier days as well as tens of thousands of
books brought down from Hanoi. There is a mood of
intellectual excitement at the Center, perhaps because it is so
new, perhaps because the range of educational traditions
among the members are somewhat broader than that which
can be found in Hanoi.
Last but not least there is the Southeast Asia Group,
approximately forty specialists devoted to the inter
disciplinary, comparative study of all of Vietnam's neighbors
excepting China. At the moment there are three sub-groups:
archaeology-history; geography; and language-culture. Al
though first priority understandably has been given to research
on Kampuchea, Laos and Thailand, serious efforts are now
71
being made to develop competence in the rest of the area as
well. This is no easy task, given very limited funds and the fact
that Vietnamese scholars are currently barred from traveling in
all Southeast Asian countries with the exception of Laos.
More than any other scholars that I met, members of the
Southeast Asia Group seemed committed to rejecting a sui
generis approach to understanding themselves as Vietnamese.
This is reflected in five hypotheses that they are trying to test.
First, they argue that Southeast Asia (mainland and islands
together) has been an important world center of cultural
growth from the bronze age forward, characterized by a
specific wet rice mode of production. Secondly, they see the
interaction with Indian and Chinese cultures as critical to the
formation of major states and nationalities in Southeast Asia.
Third, all of Southeast Asia can be said to share the experience
of colonialism in its old and neo-colonial varieties. Fourth, and
perhaps most provocatively, they theorize that as a result of
national liberation struggles in various Southeast Asian
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countries there is the growing realization that it is possible to
advance to without necessarily passing through a
capitalist phase. Finally, they suggest that as a result of all
these concrete historical and cultural interactions Vietnam has
more in common with Southeast Asia than with anywhere else
in the world. This is a clear challenge to those who might place
Vietnam within the Chinese cultural (and political?) sphere.
Whether or not it also implies that Vietnam's overall links with
Southeast Asia are potentially more important than those with
the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, is a
question I unfortunately neglected to ask.
There is more to the social sciences in Vietnam than the
Social Sciences Commission. Today Vietnam has two general
universities, in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, additional
tertiary institutions in Vinh, Hue and Can Tho, and
teacher-training schools in a number of other locations as well.
Despite 6-12 hours per week teaching loads (plus tutorials),
social scientists employed in these faculties manage to carry on
significant research and publishing activities. I have found
some circulation university textbooks to be consider
ably more stimulating and rewarding to read than the more
readily available titles issued by the main publishing houses.
Social scientists in the teaching farulties often complain that
the research institutes are too self-contained. Their only
leverage appears to be a right to recommend top graduates to
institute positions.
Museums also carry out research in the social sciences.
Their results, in the form of carefully organized 'displays and
mobile exhibits, probably have more public impact than all the
scholarly journals put together. Half of the History Museum's
display is drawn from its archaeological investigations, and it
has substantial reserve collections of bronze, iron, clay and
other artifacts. Its insistence, however, that all Vietnamese
history be placed in two categories, "building the country"
(dung nuDe) and "defending the country" (giu nuDe), is too
constraining. The Revolutionary Museum concentrates on the
French colonial period and the Protracted Resistance
(1945-54), but is now preparing exhibits on later events as
well. The Armed Forces Museum is well endowed with
artifacts and a huge automated tableau of the 1954 battle of
Dienbienphu (complete with recorded narration in five
languages), but I found the conceptual message much less
penetrating than that of the Revolutionary Museum .
No survey would be complete without mention of
archival and library sources. One of my most rewarding
experiences was a three-hour talk with the head of the Ho Chi
Minh City Archives. He described how archivists were only a
few steps behind the Army and the security forces when
Saigon was liberated in 1975. They were able to enter scores
of government offices and take possession of tons of
documents. As professional archivists they were also truly
shocked by the occasional public book and document burnings
that took place in the weeks immediately after liberation.
They continued to fret about valuable documents scattered in
provincial bureaus, often in piles on the floor or in unlocked
cabinets.
Unlike many Western archivists, this Vietnamese group is
under instructions to start organizing the most recent materials
first and then to work its way back in time. As of January
1978 all "Second Republic" (Nov. 1963-Apr. 1975) materials
had been inventoried and were accessible to appropriate
government agencies. Leafing through the elaborate inventory
I saw boxes listed on everything from oil negotiations and
psychological warfare to the personal correspondence of the
wife of President Thieu. Current work on the "First Republic"
(1955-1963) is proving more difficult, as it involves
consolidating materials from 160 different locations. So far
only twenty collections had been consolidated. Significant
colonial and Nguyen dynasty archival materials exist too, and
do not require as much preliminary organizing. It is my
impression that many Vietnamese social scientists remain
unaware of rich lodes to be mined in the Archives. It is also
not clear whether the Archives has already formulated a set of
regulations concerning scholarly accessibility, or is simply
responding on an ad hoe basis.
There are numerous libraries in Vietnam of importance
to social scientists. Mention has already been made of the
Social Sciences Library now attached to the Information
Institute in Hanoi, as well as the Library of the Ho Chi Minh
72


City Research Center. Each institute and research group also
has its own library. The same is true of the universities and
other tertiary institutions. Then there is the National Library.
The main National Library in Hanoi has an impressive and
constantly growing bound books collection, but its serials
section appears weak to me and it suffers from a lack of
equipment, especially photoduplication facilities. By contrast,
"National Library II," in Ho Chi Minh City, has a strong serials
section and abundant gadgetry left behind by the Americans,
but its bound books collection seemed to be in some disarray.
3
Finally, the Foreign Languages Publishing House has a small
but well catalogued and extensively utilized library of overseas
books and serials.
Despite Vietnam's need to conserve precious resources,
the overall library situation appeared to me deplorably
uncoordinated. There is no move to consolidate smaller
collections, no overall acquisitions strategy, no master
catalogue. As a result scholars often remain unaware of titles
important to their research that are housed in collections only
a few blocks away. Even when they know of the existence of a
particular book or journal in a different library, they often
]Xefer to wait until a duplicate has been acquired for their own
institute collection. To further complicate matters there are
separate "open" and "restricted" collections within some
libraries, especially in the south. One must obtain higher
administrative authorization to use "restricted" materials. 4
The main obstacle to more efficient scholarly inquiry is
not secrecy, however. It is institutional vanity. Everyone sees
the need for closer cooperation in principle, yet each
organization is very reluctant to concede prerogatives in
practice. At higher levels this is reflected by the fact that at
least four different government ministries are directly involved
in financing and administering social scientific research
activities. In archaeology, for example, the Archaeology
Institute reports to the Prime Minister's Office (via the
Commission), university archaeologists are responsible to the
Ministry of Higher Education, and museum archaeologists
come under the Ministry of Culture. While such bureaucratic
obstacles are depressingly familiar to scholars in larger and
more developed countries, they are luxuries that a small and
poor country like Vietnam can ill afford.
Archaeology
While visiting a new archaeological site in a rural area
north of Ho Chi Minh City, Dr. Helmut Loofs picked up a
stone axe and asked two small boys watching him to identify
the object. "A thunderbolt," came the answer from the
younger boy, about five. "You are utterly wrong," said the
other, slightly older boy, "This clearly is a tool used by
prehistoric man, our ancestors." When Dr. Loofs asked him
how he knew, the boy said his teacher had told him.
More than any other social science, archaeology fires the
imagination of millions of ordinary Vietnamese and provides a
critical link between the mythic past and socialist future.
There is something both magical and substantial about seeking,
discovering, touching and contemplating the actual remains of
long lost peoples. Both professional archaeologists and local
citizens willingly take considerable risks when they dig for
artifacts in contemporary Vietnam, as they know how many
individuals have already been killed or injured by unexploded
shells, mines and booby traps. Once recovered, artifacts are
not necessarily whisked off to some exclusive scientific
laboratory. Often the first step is to display materials in
villages adjacent to the discovery site. There are provincial
archaeological teams and exhibition halls, as well as mobile
exhibits that circulate to schools and to district information
centers. Daily newspapers give feature attention to new
discoveries. Ancient artistic motifs, for example the stylized
Me-linh bird found on bronze-age drums, are printed on wall
posters, magazine covers and greeting cards.
The ideological argument accompanying all artifacts is
that Vietnam possesses a proud heritage ofat least 4,000 years
of national development. This has long been a theme of
Vietnamese folklore and official history, but it is something
else indeed to have modern science provide detailed
substantiation. Even more important than longevity, however,
is the sheer complexity of the ancient society, and the
sophistication and beauty of bronze objects uncovered. The
fact that the Dong-son bronze civilization flourished in
northern and north-central Vietnam well prior to arrival of the
Han Chinese is perhaps the key to explaining why the area was
never completely assimilated by the Middle Kingdom.
Throughout one thousand years of Chinese rule the local
people remembered the golden age and retained some of the
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Dong-son cultural characteristics. After the Chinese were
driven away in the tenth century A.D., the ancient myths and
practices were given new political legitimization.
Today, however, the more that is uncovered the more
complicated the story becomes. For example, recent bronze
discoveries near Ho Chi Minh City show a marked resemblance
to those found far to the north in Thanh Hoa. Bronze sites in
northeastern Thailand appear very similar. In both cases the
context clearly indicates long-standing local development
spanning the neolithic, bronze and iron ages. In neither case
could Vietnamese people be said to be involved. In short,
while Dong-son civilization may well prove to be a rich and
important sub-stratum for many of the peoples of mainland
Southeast Asia, and indeed an influence on places as far away
as eastern it probably cannot be claimed as the
particular heritage of Vietnam or any other nation. What
ideological interpretation will be given to these findings is
unclear, but already there is intense debate.
Perhaps Vietnamese historians have a thesis that can best
accommodate the new archaeological findings. Many historians
argue that, although there were clearly "states" formed in the
bronze age predating Chinese colonization, the Vietnamese
73
"people" can only be said to emerge much later, in the
10th-13th centuries A.D. This thesis has the advantage of
incorporating the very real cultural changes that took place
during the Chinese colonial millenium together with the
equally real (but not sufficient) continuities from the
Dong-son period.
5
Already a considerable amount of new work
is underway on the Ly (1010-1225 A.D.) and Tran
(1225-1400 A.D.) dynastic periods. However, to test these
ideas properly, Vietnamese scholars will have to devote more
attention to the millenium of Chinese domination.
Whatever the case, Vietnamese archaeologists realize that
the time has corne to make their findings available to the
international archaeological community. Dr. Loofs was able
to examine not only museum displays but also reserve
collections and excavation sites. He sat in on a number of
lectures and was invited to give lectures in turn. In the ensuing
discussions, over endless cups of tea until late at night, he
found his Vietnamese colleagues to be open-minded, eager to
analyze, ready to solicit critical appraisal by outsiders of their
work and their theories. Dr. Loofs was able to carry back
potsherds from various sites to be dated at the ANU*
Thermoluminescence Dating Laboratory. It is the first time
that this dating method has been applied to artifacts from
Vietnam and it is the first time too that Vietnam has
permitted any archaeological artifacts to be taken to a
non-socialist country. Plans are underway to establish a joint
publications project, beginning with discoveries at a large
bronze-age burial site on the outskirts of the industrial city of
Viet-tri in northern Vietnam. It will be fascinating'to see the
subsequent interplay of ideas and interpretations at the
international level.
History
Much of my time was spent in the amiable company of
Vietnamese historians of the modern period. As mentioned
earlier, the History Institute is one of the largest components
of the Social Sciences Commission. Its strong position sterns
from both a traditional Vietnamese preoccupation with the
past and the special role played by historiography in the
development of Marxism-Leninism worldwide. Not by co
incidence a number of early Communist Party intellectuals
were personally involved in historical research, teaching,
writing and editing.
6
Vietnamese Marxist historians have been
publishing a highly respected journal since 1954 without any
interruption due, for example, to ideological problems or
wartime deprivations.
7
The History Institute library appears
reasonably strong on French colonial publications, weak on
Vietnamese-language publications of the colonial period (these
are best consulted in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris), and
solidly endowed with DRVN materials (published and
unpublished) of the 1950s and beyond. It has surprisingly few
publications from the Soviet Union or China. English and
French titles about Vietnam published after 1950 are very
scarce. The most serious deficiency, however, is in studies
about other countries that would enable Vietnamese scholars
to place their own history in comparative perspective.
ANU is Australian National University, Canberra.
Generally speaking, an individual member of the History
Institute (or a small team of 2-5 specialists) defines a problem
area, conducts the primary research and prepares chapter
drafts for internal circulation.
8
Extensive discussion and
rewriting then occurs, until there is some Institute consensus
that a manuscript is worthy of publication. The manuscript
must then be reviewed by the Party and gain its imprimatur.
The final hurdle is permission for the paper to be allocated for
printing, which in today's austere economy may take a year or
more. All in all, there is often a lag time of four or five years
between original research and availability to the public.
Despite these conditions it is remarkable how many members
of the Institute retain a sense of excitement in their work.
Besides the History Institute there are many other
organizations involved in studying the past. Mention has
already been made of the university faculties and museums.
The Vietnam Communist Party, in addition to approving all
manuscripts for publication, maintains its own central
historical bureau and scores of provincial and city affiliates.
Although I have found Party historical publications quite
useful as sources, particularly for biographical or chronological
data, they tend to be thin on topical exposition or critical
analysis as compared with works from other groups. This
tendency was confirmed when I tried to engage two members
of the Party historical office of Ho Chi Minh City in
thoughtful discussion about the 1930s. It turned out that they
only wanted to analyze such questions as exactly which Party
cell had the honor of being the first established in Saigon, or
why the local French arsenal had corne to be called Ba-son.
The People's Armed Forces have an active program of
historical study and publication too. Expositions on Viet
namese military strategy and tactics probe back as far as the
13th-century Tran dynasty defeat of the Mongols. Because the
doctrine of people's war has important political, social and
cultural components, one can often learn more from these
books than is true of most classical Western military histories.
The Defense Ministry possesses important archival materials on
events of the past 35 years. It is said to have the vast majority
of surviving information on the 1945-1954 Resistance in
southern Vietnam. Non-militar.y hist dans have yet to be given
access, however.
74
I
The Literature Institute, in cooperation with various
publishing houses, has compiled and released a host of
materials of considerable historical value. So far I have tended
to focus on "revolutionary memoirs" (hoi ky each mang), of
which there are now at least one hundred. A common
procedure is for members of the Literature Institute to copy
down the narrative of individuals prominent in events of the
past half century or so. However, there is a problem of artistic
license, as literary cadres are encouraged to make stories as
appealing as possible to a large reading audience. Several
professional historians also commented that literary cadres
often lack the background information to be able to ask
critical questions. And they seldom cross-check dates, names
or episodes with other available sources. Despite these
limitations, "revolutionary memoirs" give us data and insights
not available in newspapers or books published during the
I
f
period, and they often retain enough feeling for the individual
personality to serve as a corrective to the more impersonal
studies done by today's professional historians. Recently the
collected works of prominent Vietnamese literary figures of
I
I
, both precolonial and colonial times have also been appearing
in increasing numbers, providing yet another means for making
one's acquaintance with individuals, and for understanding
particular hist"orical conditions.
Last but not least, there are hundreds of provincial and
district historical committees and cultural bureaus which carry
out research, identify and preserve local historical sites, brief
visitors and generally encourage pride in the native heritage.
While I was in Vietnam the first national conference of
curators was convened in Hue by the Ministry of Culture, to
review past performance and to set new goals. As might be
expected, a lot of attention was given to central and southern
areas previously under U.S.-Saigon administration. Cadres
from the highland province of Gai Lai-Kon Tum, for example,
were able to report selection of 21 major historical sites.
Quang Nam-Da Nang had selected 24 sites in three different
categories of significance. The conference approved recom
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mendations to the. government that 47 sites be given top
national priority for renovation during the next 15 year<;.9
From the point of view of historical research, provincial
and district organizations have proven to be particularly
helpful in locating old "family registers" (gai pha), in
identifying individuals for the Communist Party's ongoing oral
history project, and in collecting data on popular culture.
However, their work does not appear to be linked very
effectively with research at the national level. In fact,
historians in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City complained that it
was sometimes difficult for them even to acquire s p e ~ i f i c
books published in the provinces.
The Social Sciences and Ideology
Social scientists are both analysts and propagandists,
although the emphasis may vary from one country to another,
and from one period to another in a particular country. In
some countries they claim to be able to divorce scholarly
concerns from political beliefs-at best a self-deception, at
worst a conscious obfuscation. In other countries social
scientists are proud to put politics in command. However, if
ideology comes to be formulated with little or no regard for
ongoing scientific inquiry and discovery then the scholar may
as well become a party official.
Vietnamese social scientists must accept that the ideology
of the Vietnam Communist Party is in command. Most appear
to do so willingly. However, this does not prevent them from
pursuing certain lines of inquiry which, if substantiated, might
challenge pet ideological premises. Perhaps this has happened
most often in economics, for example, in the relative emphasis
to be given to industrial and agricultural development, or,
more recently, the question of entering into a range of
contractual relationships with the capitalist world.
Historians probably encounter more ideological problems
than economists. As suggested before, there is no Vietnamese
who does not have definite ideas on his nation's past. And
whereas most Communist Party leaders would think first
before launching into an impromptu exposition on fertilizer
production or private foreign investment, very few would be
reluctant to perorate on the late 18th-century Tay Son
rebellion, on anticolonial resistance to the French, or on the
formation of new social classes in the twentieth century.
Indeed, a number of top-level Party members have written
books dealing with precisely such matters, and there are very
few Vietnamese historical topics on which a public Party
position has not been in existence for some time.
Ironically, one result of this sincere concern of political
leaders for history is the development of a gap between what
Vietnamese historians say and what they write. For example,
although several specialists told me they believed that the
blanket condemnation of Vietnamese Trotskyism should be
re-assessed, especially in relation to political developments in
southern Vietnam from 1933 to 1936, none of their doubts
have come to be reflected in print. One historian did voice the
opinion that once all Communist Party participants in events
of the 1930s had died it might well be possible to publish on
this su bject.
As another test case, I questioned the consistent emphasis
in print to World War II in Asia having been ended by the
Soviet Red Army's sweep through Manchuria. I was informed
that ninth- or tenth-grade teachers were allowed to tell
75
students that the A-bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
of "equal significance" to the Red Army offensive. However,
to grant the American A-bombs more than that-especially
during the long Vietnamese struggle against French and U.S.
aggression-was to risk making technology superior to the
human will to resist. Although this interpretation of events
probably raises as many problems as it solves, I was struck by
the fact that historians had bothered to go beyond the public
line at all.
Perhaps because I have long been troubled by the "George
Washington cutting down the cherry tree" syndrome in
American historiography, I pursued this problem of historical
interpretation in Vietnam at every opportunity. Often
differences in interpretation had something to do with role
obligations. Thus, historians who were also administrators
were less likely to voice controversial opinions than those who
had no apparent official rank.
10
Individuals preoccupied with
"popular education" (giao due pho thong) often tended to
simplify what specialists had devoted years of effort to making
complex.
All popular presentations are not the same, however. For
example, the Revolutionary Museum tends to focus on leaders,
whereas the Armed Forces Museum concentrates on the role
of the ordinary hero in tandem with military equipment. 11
And the Revolutionary Museum's interpretation of leadership
is more subtle than what one sees in primary school texts. Ho
Chi Minh is indeed given the most attention, but not as sole
revolutionary progenitor in the manner of Mao Zedong in
China or Kim II Sung in Korea. Le Duan, current secretary
general of the party, is shown in several photographs of the
period 1939-1945, but not obtrusively. In fact, one picture of
Le Duan with a group of Rhade leaders, doesn't even bother to
identify him in the caption.
Some local history efforts are an exercise in theatre rather
than social science. At the Da Nang City District Two "House
of Tradition" (Nha Truyen Thong), for example, reality is
sacrificed in the interest of heroic revivalism. One is led to
believe that the entire population of District Two was
constantly plotting the downfall of the U. S. military
establishment, when in fact a high proportion was sucked in
by the grossly artificial wartime economy and patterns of
living. If the obvious energy and enthusiasm of the young
people who organized the District Two "House of Tradition"
could be directed towards analyzing the neocolonial system as
it actually existed, and then to proposing solutions to the
many residual effects, there might be less of a communications
problem between the local people and the new governing
authorities.
At the Social Sciences Research Center in Ho Chi Minh City
we were invited t.o view two films produced in the latter years
of the Thieu regime. This was t-he strangest experience of my
trip. Here I was, an American in liberated Saigon, looking at
slick pseudo-Western, escapist propaganda along with fifteen
Vietnamese specialists, two Russian historians and a German
archaeologist. Unfortunately, few viewers took the films
seriously. Yet it was clear from talking with Vietnamese
intellectuals who lived in Saigon in the early 1970s that the
films revealed a great deal about attitudes which had helped to
fuel neocolonialism. And not all of these attitudes had
vanished along with Ambassador Martin and Nguyen Van
Thieu. Back in Hanoi, we saw a brand new film designed to
serve as an antidote. The hero, a model of depravity
(motorcycle gang leader, tattooed chest, whisky drinker,
heroin user, admirer of nude women), demonstrated that even
he could be redeemed and serve the revolution. Northern
viewers were stunned by the Marlon Brando-style hero
weaving back and forth across the road on his motorcycle.
They gasped at the half-naked nightclub dancer bending over
backwards and shaking lasciviously. The overall effect on me,
however, was one of seeing far too many cliches, too much
sentimentality and posturing. If this was socialist realism it
owed much more to traditional morality plays than to modern
scientific analysis.
Conclusion
Towards the end of my trip to Vietnam I visited both the
birthplace of H-o Chi Minh in Nghe An province and the tomb
recently constructed in Hanoi to house his carefully preserved
body. The contrast could hardly have been more sharp. In
Nghe An the curator had gone to great pains to recreate the
unpretentious surroundings of 80 years ago. He apologized for
the muddy path, but said that it would have been historically
unrealistic to add gravel. He pointed out the most important
item of furniture in the home of the young Ho Chi Minh-a
medium-sized hardwood chest for storing grain away from the
rats and other pests. 12 On the other hand, the tomb in Hanoi is
patterned after Lenin's mausoleum, complete with massive
marble slabs, embalmed corpse and rigid military sentries. One
of the Vietnamese social scientists with me whispered that the
big letters spelling out "There Is Nothing More Precious Than
Independence and Freedom" were made of solid gold.
Thousands of Vietnamese citizens waited in line for hours to
get a thirty-second glimpse of Uncle Ho in eternal repose.
The night before I left Vietnam I worked up the courage to
tell a prominent historian that I thought the tomb was a
travesty on Hi Chi Minh's memory. From what I knew, Ho Chi
Minh was an intimate personality who disliked grand gestures
and would have been horrified to learn what was in store for
him after his death. Besides, it was rank superstition. A
revolutionary hero deserved to be remembered for his actions,
76
by means of books, songs, pictures, poems and anecdotes. To
pump his flesh full of chemicals, provide elaborate cosmetics
to hide the pallor, and preserve all in a crystal sarcophagus was
to pander to primordial human feelings that were ultimately
an obstacle to political and intellectual development.
. To my surprise the historian agreed with my assessment
in principle, but argued that at Vietnam's present stage of
development the people needed him as a unifying symbol
housed in an architectural monument reflecting all parts of the
country. 13 Ho Chi Minh had indeed quashed all such attempts
while he was alive. However, once he was dead there were
political considerations of greater importance than scrupu
lously respecting his wishes. The Party had given careful
attention to the manner in which people would approach his
casket. Thus, there would be no traditional obeisances, no gifts
(other than flower wreaths outside the tomb), no prayers.
Everyone would simply walk respectfully around three sides of
his casket and out the door. After an extended period of
reflection my Vietnamese historian friend summarized his
argument by saying, "Whatever serves the revolution at a given
point in time is correct."
This brings us back to where we started: What exactly is the
Vietnamese revolution in 1978? Clearly the central task is to
increase the scale, efficiency and sophistication of production.
Can this be done, however, without further transformations in
world view among the vast majority of people? If it cannot,
which attitudes need to be changed and which retained? How
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is this to be accomplished? I had the impression that a number
of Vietnam's social scientists had put a lot of time and energy
into dealing with one or another facet of this problem.
However, if there was a grand design, a revolutionary gestalt, it
eluded my attention.
It is certain that I was able to see only a small part of what
is happening in the social sciences in Vietnam today. I saw
enough, however, to be convinced $at social scientific
research is alive and well, and that many specialists are
endeavoring to deal with real problems of real significance to
Vietnam's future. I didn't agree with some of their
interpretations of modern Vietnamese history, and they made
it clear they didn't agree with some of mine. Nevertheless, we
had enough in common that it was possible to communicate
frankly and fruitfully. They expressed the hope that such
exchanges could continue and broaden in scope. I agreed
wholeheartedly. "/(
Notes
1. Tbu Muc Han Nom Muc Luc Tac Gia, Hanoi, 1977,427 pp.
2. No similar home exists for political science, it might be
added. However, some organ of the Vietnam Communist Party may
keep abreast of developments in this discipline, just as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has a new institute, headed by the former ambassador
to Australia, studying the theory and practice of international relations.
3. Further details on the National Library's structure and
functions can be found in George Miller, .. 'All for Reconstruction'
Library Service in a Reunified Vietnam," in International Library
Re'lliew, No. 10 (1978), pp. 109-18.
4. For example, the "Ancient Studies Institute" library of the
former Saigon regime, entirely restricted from May 1975, is now being
screened and divided into sensitive and non-sensitive components. The
sensitive materials (500 titles in early 1975 and expected to reach
5,000) are being shifted to another building several miles away, while
the non-sensitive materials, clearly the majority, are being integrated
with books and serials brought from Hanoi.
5. It may be that with obvious alterations in chronology,
external influence and internal events, the, same can be said of the
Khmer and Thai peoples.
6. The following individuals come immediately to mind: Ho
Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Truong Chinh, Tran Huy Lieu and Van
Tan.
7. From 1954 to early 1959 an interdisciplinary group
published 48 issues of Van Su Dia (Literature-History-Geography).
From March 1959 to June 1978 the History Institute had already
published 180 issues of Ngbien Cuu Licb SU (Historical Research). A
well indexed and annotated catalogue of the 1954-1973 issues was
published in 1975.
8. The same procedure is followed for translations to
Vietnamese of selected studies on Vietnam in Russian, Chinese, English
and French. Most of these translations are not published, but they do
often become the basis of long review articles in Ngbien Cuu Licb Suo
9. Nban Dan 26 Jan. 1978. Particular mention was made of
current work at the Hung King's Memorial (Vinh Phu province), Con
Son island, Dien Bien Phu and My Lai.
10. The most stimulating discussion I had during my four weeks
in Vietnam was with Tran Van Giau, once a top-level Party cadre, but
for several decades now an energetic and prolific historian. His most
ambitious project in recent years has been a three-volume intellectual
history of Vietnam. The third volume, focusing on "proletarian
consciousness" up to the August 1945 Revolution, is completed but yet
to be published.
11. The best example of the latter is a panorama devoted to a
young soldier at Dienbienphu who threw his body under a howitzer
wheel to keep it from slipping off a cliff and sacrificed himself in the
process.
12. Ho Chi Minh is said to have contemplated that chest and run
his hands over it lovingly when he returned to the village briefly 60
years later.
13. Tremendous effort was expended to obtain blocks of
marble, ornamental wood, trees and flowers from every province in
Vietnam. 77
Vietnam Rewrite
by Marilyn Young
The treatment of Indochina in the postwar period is a
vital part of the effort to create a new ideological consensus in
America, one that will preserve the possibility of counter
revolutionary interventions when and where they become
necessary. The fundamental institutions which gave rise to the
Vietnam war have hardly changed. What has changed is the
credibility of the imperialist ideology which justified that war.
The recent, intense campaign to get us involved in Zaire
was a depressing. and frightening illustration of this process of
ideological remolding. With the full cooperation of the press,
the country was subjected to a barrage of lies and half-truths.
The Cubans were presented as a foreign legion dispatched by
the Russians to do their dirty work in Africa. Indifferent to
the evidence, or twisting it in a fashion crass almost beyond
belief, both Cubans and Russians have been accused of inter
vening in Zaire. American-transported Belgian paratroopers,
French troops and, more recently, Moroccans and Egyptians
are presented as saviors and the entire incident construed, in
the words of a White House spokesman, as a Soviet effort to
"test our manhood."
The terms of the debate about American policy have
now been set: doves think Carter has sufficient power to re
spond to "crises" like this, hawks want to "untie" his hands.
Once again the question of why we are involved at all in
supporting an admittedly corrupt and vicious regime against an
apparently popular insurgency is buried, perhaps permanently.
From now on tactics will be the issue, and the careful
unearthing of the real nature of the situation by a new
generation of Noam Chomskys is unlikely to have any greater
impact than the last time around.
The shadQw of Vietnam lles over Africa and the
concerted effort to have the public learn all the wrong lessons
from it is picking up speed. The administration is determined
to overthrow what Kissinger calls America's "defeatist
consensus," and to this end history must be transcended.
Thus, while it may come as a surprise to readers of the
Bulletin, the latest word on Vietnam is that we won. Indeed,
we won not once, but twice-in 1968 and 1972. But the fruits
of victory in '68 were stolen by an irresponsible press corps
which persuaded a gullible public that Tet was a victory for
the other side. Nevertheless, by 1972, counterinsurgency had
eliminated the "Viet Cong" as a significant factor in the war
and the North Vietnamese Eastern Offensive was decisively
defeated. As a former AID official put it: "We Americans did
find the target, we did do the job: we put together Vietnamese
nationalism and American power to defeat the NV A and rally
mass support for the nationalist government in Saigon." In Sir
7s
Robert Thompson's words, after the Christmas bombing, the
U.S. "had won the war. It was over!" (emphasis original)
And then? Some revisionists argue that Congress, in its
mindless cowardice, handed South Vietnam to the Commu
nists on a silver platter by halting the bombing of Cambodia
and by placing limits on military aid. Others explain the lost
victory by referring to the sell-out in Paris in 1973, when
Nixon agreed to allow NVA units to remain in place in the
South and then failed to deliver necessary levels of support to
Thieu. More broadly, we lost because of the pressures of the
antiwar movement, the behavior of the liberal press and the
timidity of politicians unwilling to pay the domestic political
price for victory. The analysis carries with it, of course,
suggestions for solving these problems in a future crisis:
suppress dissent more effectively, control the press and replace
softhearted officials with tougher ones.
Without trying to refute the specific military analysis, ..
now being widely distributed at taxpayer expense in the form
of an official series on the military history of the war, the net
effect of the argument is clear. It renders popular insistence on
ending the war an exuaneous factor, something to be managed
rather than responded to. War and Its prosecution, in this view,
becomes the exclusive province of the military and those
civilians whose goal is total victory. By definition the United
States cannot lose a war. The positive desire to stop fighting is
understood as essentially illegitimate.
Although most revisionists will admit that April 1975
was indeed a defeat, the editors of the Economist disagree: "in
one important sense (if not in more obvious ways), America
won the Vietnam war after all." Its purpose had been to
prevent a quick communist victory. "When the communists
instead won slowly . . . a breathing space was being created
during which the peoples of south-east Asia could capture the
political will to build governments that would give them a
more secure and attractive way of life." And that, the editors
Details of this remarkable version of the history of the war can be
found in Frank Snepp's Decent Interval, Richard Nixon's memoirs and
the various essays and editorial summaries in D. D. Frizzell and
W. Scott Thompson's The Lessons of Vietnam. On Tet, see Peter
Braestrup's two volume "study" of media treatment, Big Story.
Someone probably should undertake a precise and informed
rebuttal, although it means accepting, for the sake of the argument at
least, that the premises of the military argument are correct. It once
more reduces the debate to a point of str tegy and tactics rather than
principle.
f
!
I
!
I
conclude, is just what happened. Speaking to the "south-east
i
l
Asians," the Economist appeals to them to be gentle with such
i
foolish Americans as Vice President Mondale, who urged
human rights and social welfare on his recent trip to the area:
"Be more patient with the United States, which destroyed its
own cohesion in the Vietnam war in order to give you the least
1
I
bad governments you ever had, but asks no thanks because it
still does not realise this has happened." Presumably, when we
realize it happened we can stop feeling so badly about
i1
j
Vietnam, overcome our "lost nerve" and go on to future such
I
subtle victories. t
i
More widespread than the claims of the military
I
revisionists is the effort to recast the general history of the war
for more comfortable current usage. This involves a frank
admission that we bungled in the field, even that the war was
I
"unwinnable." But it holds fast to the notion that the effort
itself was benevolent, a naive but honest effort to defend
South Vietnam from brutal Communist aggression. Somehow
our good intentions got lost in the shuffle. Out of
i
I misunderstanding and excusable ignorance, we were caught
defending a dubious and increasingly unattractive ally. In time
(a lot of time to be sure-it was the longest war in American
history) our tragic mistakes were realized and corrected.
Zbigmew Brzezinski sums it up in one sentence: "What started
off as an act of counterintervention against a foreign
intervention became a national-liberation struggle, and we got
bogged down in it." In President Carter's infamous phrase, the
"destruction was mutual" and we owe Vietnam nothing.
Seme commentators divide the war into pre-1965 (good)
and post-1965 (bad). Charles Peters, editor of the Washington
Monthly, wrote a particularly intriguing version for the op-ed
page of the New York Times. Calling on the country to heal
itself, Peters reminds us that things went bad only in 1965:
"We weren't wrong to try to help the South with supplies and
volunteers, any more than the American left was wrong to give
such help to the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War." The
comparison is breathtaking: the Green Berets and the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade! John Wayne would be distressed,
but what Peters preserves, in his own mad way, is the right of
military intervention short of conscription and "excessive"
bombing. His objection to the war, in short, is simply tactical.
Still, most Americans continue to feel badly about the
war. The bombing, the refugees, Mylai-all that. To resanctify
America's imperial will, something will have to be done to take
the bad taste away. There are academics equal to the task.
Guenter Lewy, a political scientist at U-Mass.-Amherst
confronts the problem directly. In a long essay in
Commentary, Lewy examines the issue of war guilt and dis
misses it. tt His purpose is clearly stated:
Examined dispassionately, American actions in Vietnam
lend no support to the accusations of criminality or ofgross
immorality with which America's conduct of the war is
t Which is precisely what Kissinger tried to do in Angola. Frank
Stockwell's fascinating In Search of Enemies describes the initial aim of
Angola policy to be the denial of a "quick victory" to the M P ~ A . He
also details the way in which this aim was rapidly transformed mto an
effort (thankfully unsuccessful) to gain victory for our side.
tt Lewy's book, America in Vietnam, has been published by Oxford
University Press.
charged . ... Today it is more urgent tban ever that this be
understood, for the simple reason that Vietnam continues
to haunt our minds and continues to exert a powerful
influence on our conception of ourselves as a nation and of
our role in the world. Tbe task of clearing away the
cobwebs of mythology wbich bave belped to create the
national trauma over Vietnam must begin-for the sake of
historical truth as much as for our own self-confidence, our
moral strengtb, and our future capacity to act responsibly
in world affairs.
It is important to reflect on how Lewy conceptualizes
his job: Vietnam was not a trauma because of what happened
there, but because of the alleged mythology that has grown up
about what happened. And Lewy will set the record straight so
that we may face forward with confidence and a full count of
moral fibers. Even the most 'presentist historian' would blush
at the overtly political intent of Lewy's analysis. Few have so
explicitly acknowledged the function of rewriting the past.
Lewy's overall interpretation of the war does not
emerge until the very end of the article. There, in the course
of criticizing American military policy on pragmatic grounds,
he asserts that "high technology warfare created a widespread
feeling of resignation, war weariness, and an unwillingness to
go on fighting against the resolute opponent from the North."
The destructiveness of the way the U.S. fought the war was
discouraging to "our" Vietnamese. So it was not a people's
war at all, but standard aggression from the North. And the
spirit of resistance in the South could not survive Northern
ferocity or, for that matter, American tactics. Furthermore,
domestic revulsion against those tactics "undercut the
willingness of America as a nation to prosecu te the fight...."
In a democracy, Lewy rather regretfully notes, reliance on
such weapons may be counterproductive.
Nowhere in the essay does Lewy approach a critical
appraisal of the purposes of the war-his harshest judgment is
that the U.S. was insensitive to political costs, too rigid in its
"doctrine" (which he never defines) and unwise in its choice
of tactics. Had we achieved what the Soviet Union did in
Czechoslovakia, a relatively bloodless, inexpensive repression
of a popular insurgency, everything would have been fine.
But bloody and expensive as it was, for Lewy Vietnam
was neither illegal nor immoral. His main effort is to
demonstrate that, under international laws governing the
conduct of war, the United States fought a good clean fight.
He admits that the existing body of laws was not really written
to deal with the sort of warfare which actually occurred in
Vietnam, but he makes do. There is something nightmarish
about arguing with the particulars of Lewy's case. As he goes
through the relevant laws of war one is not struck, as he wishes
us to be, with the legality of American conduct but with the
barbarity those rules allow. At all points he evades the central
question: can a war against an entire population (he
specifically condones drying up the water in which the
guerrilla fish swim) be anything but criminal and grossly
immoral.
A few examples will give the flavor of his whole
approach. Take napalm. The rules of land warfare prohibit the
use of weapons which cause "unnecessary suffering." The real
criterion, Lewy tells us, is whether the suffering is
disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained by its
use. On this basis, no militarily decisive weapon has ever been
ruled as causing unnecessary suffering. Then why continue the
79
discussion? The rule is obviously a ludicrous one and his time
might better be spent in thinking how to revise it. Instead,
Lewy proceeds to defend the use of napalm. Discussing the
400,000 tons of it dropped during the war, Lewy notes that
"fire as a weapon of war has a long history." Napalm, he
argues, is especially effective against bunkers and fortified
positions and not easily replaceable by other weapons. He does
not discuss its use against other targets, nor does he mention
the addition of white phosphorous to the basic mixture, or the
development of weapons like fiber-glass CBUs, whose specific
purpose was to cause maximum suffering and injury.
What about refugees and free-fire zones? Lewy argues
that neither violate the Geneva Convention of 1949. Under
that convention, the U.S. had the duty to remove the
population for its own security. Would it have been right to
leave them in a combat zone? Backhandedly, however, he
recognizes that the relocation had other ends-to deprive the
NLF of its base of support. This too seems reasonable to him,
though one wonders what he would have thought of the
removal to squalid refugee centers of, say, the population of
Paris, in order to deprive the maquis of its base.
Lewy defends the use of Agent Orange (no proof
positive it's toxic), the tiger cages (prisoners were not chained
all the time, he points out, but only between 5 p.m. and 6
a.m.-and that was just because it was an old jail and they
might have escaped), the tonnage used against north and
south, and so on. His refutation of the charge that the U.S.
was engaged in genocidal warfare is typical of his general logic:
medical care in Vietnam improved with various AID programs;
other programs worked to develop South Vietnam's economy;
and this, combined with a "substantial rise in the standard of
living," led to a population increase-so where's your
genocide? Thus not only was the war not wrong, its side
effects for the people of Vietnam were positively beneficial.
Another approach to defusing Vietnam is to wash its
specific evils in the general blood of War Itself. War, you must
remember, is hell-the generals are always the first to say it.
Legitimacy is sought by associating the horrors of Vietnam
with the horrors of such conflicts as World War II. If even
World War II has its moral ambiguities-as indeed it does-then
what can you expect of Vietnam?
Or consider the role of movies in the rewriting of
history. The movie "A Bridge Too Far," which purports to be
about the war in Europe is really giving us messages about
Vietnam: wars are full of individual heroism on both sides,
individual venality (especially among senior officers) on both
sides. Why these individuals, good, bad or indifferent, are
engaged in combat is not addressed. Two things are thereby
achieved. The U.S. need never face the concrete issue of war
guilt in Indochina, and war itself, as a hard but heroic arena, is
preserved.
"The Boys in Company C" is frankly about Vietnam,
and a more pornographic movie on the subject would be hard
to imagine-though Hollywood may yet deliver. A typical
Marine squad (updating the bomber crews of yesteryear)
consisting in part of one street-smart and heroic black, one
wimpy intellectual who writes it all down, one gung-ho country
boy, and one hippie, goes to Vietnam after being humiliated
and consequently toughened in boot camp. (The bad
treatment is explicitly for their own good and the drill
instructor has a heart of solid gold.) Their ship is
rocket-attacked as they disembark, and while neither they nor
the viewer ever see the enemy, we are treated to a scene of
civilian panic and terror. The Vietnamese in the film are as
typical as the Americans: lots of smiling prostitutes, one fat
and corrupt ARVN general, one ARVN soccer team comprised
of skinny and incompetent players and one village. The village
is Roman Catholic and after having destroyed it at the behest
of their incompetent and body-count crazy officer, the boys
enter to discover a) not one civilian casualty and b) a young
boy with a home-made bat. At once Company C drops its
weapons and gets a sandlot baseball game going. Everyone is
laughing and cheering amidst the smoking ruins of their
homes. And then the fat and vicious ARVN general arrives, the
Americans must leave, and while they are still within earshot,
the fat general shoots the good kid they'd just played ball
with. The boys are very depressed by this.
The point is that we lost the war because our good clean
baseball-playing soldiers were led by incompetent officers
allied with fat Vietnamese generals. Well-led, on our own or in
alliance with a more decent, and perhaps thinner, ARVN
officercorps, our boys would have cleaned up 'Nam in no time
flat.
Memoirs about the war, and the reviews they receive,
add to the war-is-brutal-but ... school. Philip Caputo's A
Rumor of War and Michael Herr's Dispatches received rave
notices from just about every magazine and newspaper
reviewer. Both focus sharply on how terrible it was: the heat,
the dying, the heat, the fear, the heat, the killing and so on.
There is real pain and anguish in both books and I do not wish
to denigrate them. But they are also more than half in love
with war itself. And for Caputo, at least, an American victory
in Vietnam would somehow have made acceptable the
atrocities he describes. War, Herr and Caputo tell us, is awful,
just awful-but boy you should have been there!
There are important cross-currents to the tide of
revisionism I have been describing. Among journalists, Gloria
Emerson's Winners and Losers, in memoirs, Ron Kovic's Born
on the Fourth of July, and Tim O'Brien's If 1 Die in a Combat
Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home, in fiction, O'Brien's
Going After Cacciato, in political analysis, Noam Chomsky's
most recent journal articles and his book, 'Human Rights' and
American Foreign Policy. It should come as no surprise that
they are minority voices. To grapple fully and honestly with
the deepest meanings of the Indochina war would be to
subject every institution in America to a corrosive scrutiny
which they could not possibly survive intact. Jane Kramer,
discussing post-war Germany, has remarked of Adenauer that
he was "someone who could protect the country from its
history.... He turned their evasions into something positive,
and persuaded them, with his stern calm, that rituals of guilt
and expiation could be undermining and indulgent." Allowing
for differences in political culture, Ford and Carter and what
Chomsky calls their "secular priesthood" of journalists and
academics are trying to achieve the same result here.
We cannot expect anything very different from those
whose chosen task it is to maintain the system. The job is ours,
as it was during the war itself. We must learn the right lessons
and get them heard: to oppose the war on the narrow ground
that it didn't work is to condemn us to repeat the past. The
lesson is not that you can't win against a people's war, but
what the hell are you doing trying? And there are other lessons
that must be remembered: aggressive military imperialism can
be successfully defeated-by the people it seeks to oppress and
by the citizens of its own country. To ensure that it stays
defeated is an ongoing struggle. *
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