De Morgan, Formal Logic, Or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (1847)

FORMAL LOGIC
OR,
The Calculus of inference^

Neceflary and Probable.
BY
AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN
Of Trinity
College Cambridge,
Fellow of the Cambridge Philofophical Society, Secretary of the Royal Aftronomical Society, Profeflbr of Mathematics in
Univerfity College London.
ia
nq arw
LONDON:
TAYLOR AND WALTON,
Bookiellers and Publifhers to Univerfity College,
28, Upper Gower Street. M DCCC XLVII
PREFACE.
r I
-*-
^HE
fyftem given in this
work extends beyond
that
commonly
received, in feveral directions.

is
brief
ftatement of what
now
fubmitted for adoption into
the theory of inference will be the matter of this preface. In the form of the proportion, the copula is made as
abftracl: as
the terms
or
is
considered as obeying only
thofe conditions which are neceflary to inference.
Every name
or contradictory
is
treated in connection with

;
its
contrary
name
the diftinction between thefe words
not being made,
and
others fupplied in confequence.
Eight
really feparable
tained, between any two names
forms of predication are thus ob the eight of the common

:
fyftem amounting only to fix, when, as throughout my work, the two forms of a convertible proportion are
confidered as identical.
proportion is introduced, confirming in the coexiftence of two fimple ones. The theory of the fyllogifm of complex propofitions is made to precede
that of the fimple or ordinary fyllogifm
;
The complex
which
laft is
deduced from
/^
it.
have only ufed the word complex,

(fee
was already appropriated
page 85).
iv
Preface.
By
the introduction of contraries, the
number of valid
fyllogiftic
forms
is
increafed to thirty-two, connected to
gether by
many
rules of relation, but all

its
each with reference to

contraries, only
fhewn to contain, own difpofition of names and

is
one form of inference. of figure
avoided from the beginning by introducing into every proportion an order of refer ence to its terms.
distinction
The
Simple notation, which includes the common one, gives the means of reprefenting every fyllogifm by three letters, each accented above or below. By inspection of
one of thefe fymbols

fyllogifm
valid, 3.
is
it
is
feen immediately,
i.
What
reprefented, 2.
Whether
it
be valid or in
How it is at once to be written down, 4. What axiom the inference contains, or what is the act of the mind when it makes that inference (chapter XIV).
fubordinate notation
is
ufed (page 60) in abbrevia
tion of the proposition at length.
Compound names
poSItion
is
are considered, both
when
the
com-
conjunctive, and
when
it is
disjunctive.
Diftinct
notation and rules of transformation are given, and the
compound
fyllogifms are treated as reducible to ordinary
ones, by invention of compound names. The theory of the numerical fyllogifm

in
is
investigated,
which, upon the hypothesis of numerical quantity in both terms of every proportion, a numerical inference
is
made.
But,
when
is
the numerical relations of the feveral terms

all
are fully
known,
that
is
unufual in the quantity of the
predicate
mown
it,
to be either fuperfluous, or elfe, as I
have called
fpurious.
Preface.
v
made
I
The
old doctrine of modals
is
to give place to
will object
the numerical theory of probability.

to this theory as extralogical.
definition,
Many
But
cannot fee on what
founded on
real diftindtion, the exclufion

I
of
it
can be maintained.
When
am
told that logic confiders
the validity of the inference, independently of the truth
or falfehood of the matter, or fupplies the conditions
under which the hypothetical truth of the matter of the premifes gives hypothetical truth to the matter of the
conclufion, I fee a real definition,
consideration the forms
which propounds for

inferential thought.
and laws of
But when
it
is
further added that the only hypothetical
truth mall be abfolute truth, certain knowledge, I begin to fee arbitrary diftinction, wanting the reality of that
which preceded.
Without pretending
that logic can take
cognizance of the probability of any given matter, I cannot underfland why the ftudy of the effect which the premifes produces with refpect to the partial belief of
conclufion, fhould be feparated
from that of the confe-
quences of fuppofing the former to be abfolutely true.
Not however
to difpute
fhould maintain, againft
upon names, I mean that I thofe who would exclude the
theory of probability from logic, that, call it by what name they like, it fhould accompany logic as a fludy.
have, of courfe, been obliged to exprefs, in my own manner, my own convictions on points of mental philoI
fophy.
But any one
will fee that, in all
which
have
propofed for adoption, it matters nothing whether my views of the phenomena of thought, or others, be made the bafis of the explanation. So far therefore, as I am
vi
Preface.
confidered as propofing forms of fyllogifm, &c. to the and not giving inftruclion to the ftudent of the logician, to do with my choice of the reader has
fcience,
nothing
the terms in which mental operations are fpoken of.
In the appendix will be found fome remarks on the between Sir W. Hamilton of Edin perfonal controverfy the celebrity of my I burgh and myfelf, of which fuppofe
of part of opponent, and the appearance

fo
it
in a journal
has caufed widely circulated as the Athenaum, ftudents of logic to hear or read fomething.
many
the end of the contents of fome chapters in the additions and corrections, to following table, are a few which I requeft the reader s attention.
At
A.
London, Univerfity College^
DE MORGAN
O&ober
14, 1847.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
%*
The
articles entered in Italic, are thofe, the contents of to the peculiar fyftem prefented in this work.
which belong
CHAPTER
Firft
I.
Flrft Notions (pages

I
;
125).
Reduction of proportions to iimple affirmation and negation, 2, 3 ; Diftinction between negation and affirmation requiring a negative, 3 ; how two negatives make an affirmative, 4 ; proportions, 4 ; their relations, contraries and contra dictories, 5 ; Quantity of fubjedt and predicate, 6 ; Converfes, 7 ; fundamental notion of inference, 8 ; Material reprefentation, 8, 9 ; fyllogifm, 9 ; its elements, 9 ; fyllogifms of different kinds of conclufion, 10, 11, 12 ; collection of refults, 12 ; rules of fyllogifm, 13, 14;
notion of Logic,
weakened conclulions and ftrengtbened premifes,

17,
1
1 5 ; the figures, 1 6, collection ofeffentially different fyllogifms y 18, 19 ; examples,
23
19, 20; a fortiori fyllogifm, 20, 21, 22; hypothetical fyllogifm, 22, ; demonftration, direct and indirect, 23, 24; converfion of a di
lemma, 25.
* * This # chapter may be omitted by thofe who have fome know ledge of the ordinary definitions and phrafeology of logic. It is ftrictly confined to the Ariftotelian forms and fyllogifms, and is the reprint of a traft publifhed in 1839, under the title of Firft Notions of Logic 1 the only alterations are ; (preparatory to the ftudy of Geometry) the change of phrafeology, as altering fome is into fome Xs are Ys, &c. ; the corre6lion of a faulty demonftration ; and a few omiffions, particularly of fome infufficient remarks on the probability of arguments.
:
CHAPTER
11.
On Objettsjdeas.and Names
(pages 26
46).
Definition of Logic, 26 ; our pofition with refpect to mind, 26, 27 ; Doubt on the uniformity of procefs in all minds, 27 ; exiftence of things external to the perceiving mind, 28, 29 ; fubject and objecT:,
ideal
why
and objective, 29, 30 ; idea the fole knowledge, 30 ; object, then introduced, 30 ; extent of its meaning, 30, 31 ; abftraction, qualities, relations, 31, 32; innate ideas, 32 ; diftinction of neceffary,
viii
Contents.
and not necefTary, 33, 34; names, 34; aflitmption of their correct ufe a poftulate, 35 ; frequent vaguenefs of names, 35 ; the tendency offcience to correct it, 35 ; definition, nominal and real, 36 ; the latter
to every idea or object, either as dire ft or contrary (i. e. contradictory], 37 ; the univerfe of a Notation for con proportion, limitation of the term univerfe, 37, 38 ; 8 ; remarks on the manner in which language furnimes con traries,
name purely objective, 36; reference of every
invention of 38, 39 ; converfion ofparticular into univerfal by not more than an accident of fpecies, 39 ; the diftinttion of A, E, I, O, a limit ed uni language in any particular cafe, 40; the introduction of
traries,
verfe gives pojitive meaning to contraries originally defned by negation, in the forms of Logic, 40, 41 ; inference 41, 42 ; qualities, how ufed
formal Logic deals with names only, 42, 43 ; conclufion, ideal remarks on the diftindlion of, 43, 44; AiTertions fometimes made on the ftudy of neceffary confequences, 44, 45 ; vir
42
and
objective,
tual inclufion
on, 45
Humble
of the neceffary confequence in the premifes, remark pofition of the logic treated in this work, 46.
CHAPTER
(pages
III.
On
the
abftratt
Form of
the
Proportion
4654).
necef Separation of logic from metaphyfics, 46, 47 ; particularly mode of reprefary as to the import of the proportion, 47 ; Ufual or objec fenting abftradt terms, 47 ; the term may be nominal, ideal, tive, 47 ; objection to quantitative expreffions, as diflinguijhed from cumulation as an ade quantuplicitative, 48 ; objection to the notion of
copula
the quate reprefentation of combination, 48, 49 ; Various meanings of is, 49 ; Abftraction of the logical characters of the word by right of which all thofe meanings are properfor all inference, 50, 51 ; meanings which only fatisfy fome charakteriftics may be adapted to
fome
51, 52; pojfibility of new meanings, 52; inadmiffome of exifting meanings, 52, 53 ; fome cafes in which the fibility meanings may be Jhifted, 53, 54,
inferences,
CHAPTER
Formal
verfe
IV.
On
;
Proportions (pages
5476).
ufe of names,
54; proportion defined, 54; Limited uni
introduced, 5 5
this univerfe,
55
ExpreJJed ftipulation that no name ufed Jills diftinRion of fimple and complex proportion, 56 ;
and negative, 56; relative quantity, univerfal and ; particular, 56 Only relative quantity or ratio, definite in univerfals, 57 ; fubject and predicate, 57 ; predicate always quantified by pofition, 57 ; Diftinction to be taken as to this quantification, 57 ; definite and indefinite, ideal poffibility ofperfect definitenefs throughout, 58 ; order, 58; convertibles and inconvertibles, 58, 59; remark on the alter natives of logic, 59 ; ufual diflinction of contrary and contradictory, not made in this work, 60 ; fubcontrary and fuper contrary proportions, 60 ftandard order of reference, which, as to clarification, renders
fign, affirmative
;
Contents.
ix
figure unnecessary , 60; A, E, I, O, and their contranominals, 60; thefe and their contranominals denoted by the fub-fy mbo Is and fuperf 1 f I , 4, , E , , 60 ; Meanings of X)Y, X.Y, fymbols A,, Ei, I.,
eight ft andard forms ; reduclion of all others to them ; and reprefentation by i?iftances, 6j; new term, contranominal, and exprejfion by means of it, 62; meaning of the new forms ofajjer-
XY, and X:Y, 60
The
tion,
ties
and
of the dire ft
62 reprefentations of the eight forms, 62; Quanti and contrary terms, 6 3 ; Table of relations of inclufion,
;
&c., 63; Concomitants, 63 ; Reduction of the forms to one another, by the orders of reference, XY, Xy, xy, xY, 63, 64; Inveftigation of equivalences obtained by change of one or more of the four, fuband weak jecJ, predicate, copula, and order, 64, 65 ; ftrengthened ened forms, 65 ; complex proportions, 65 ; P, the complex particular,
66; D, the identical, 66; D , the fubidentica I, D , the fuperidentica I, C, the contrary, C|, the fubcontrary, C , the fuper contrary, 67; fub and fuper affirmation and negation, 68 ; Table of relations between the fimple and complex, 69 ; Table of connexion offimple and complex propofitions by change of terms and orders, 70 ; Laws of this table,
f 4 1
70; Continuous interchange of complex relation, 70, 71, 72; its 72; necejfary,fufficient, actually pofjible, contingent, and their contraries ; laws of connexion of thefe relations with the fimple and
laws,
complex forms, 72, 73, 74; nomenclature in conjuncJion with, or amendment of, that of fub affirmative, c., 75 ; fiatement of the evi dent laws to which all fyllogifm might be reduced, 75, 76. Additions and cor reel ions. Page 56, line 7, infer t except only one which confifts of four fimple propofitions. Page 62, line 23; and Y are not complements (inftead of contraries] that is, Say do not together either fill, or more than fill, the univerfe. Page
&
predication as having X for fubjecl:, Y for predicate, with the copulae, cannot be without, can be without, cannot be with, can be with, cannot fail without, can fail without, cannot fail with, can fail with.
72, lines 4 and 3, from the bottom , The oppositions are incorrect. ought to be cannot do without and cannot fail with : muft precede, and muft follow. The reader may eafily identify the eight forms of
It
CHAPTER V.On
Diftintlion offimple with the latter, 76,
the Syllogifm (pages
76106).
Definition of fyllogifm, premifes, middle term, concluding terms,
76 ; and complex fyllogifm, 76 ; Reafons for beginning 77 ; The common a fortiori fyllogifm is com plex, 76; Diftinttion of fundamental and ftrengthened fyllogifm, 77 Standard order of reference, the fubftitute for figure, 77; The forms of the complex affirmatory and negatory fyllogifm, in fymbols and in
;
language, 78 ; its limiting forms, 79 ; its rules, 79 ; the demonftration of the affirmatory forms, by help of a diagram, 79, 80; their a for tiori chara tier, 81 ; the demonftration of the negatory forms, 81, 82 ; reduclion of all the forms of each kind to any one, and rules, 82, 83,
84; Complex forms
in
which P
enters, 84,
85
doubt on the goodnefs
Contents.
of the terms fimple and complex, 85 ; Denial of the fanplicity of the Jimple proportion, 85, 86; Are not disjunctive and conjunctive the proper words ? 86 ; The denial of a conclufion, coupled with one of the premifes, denies the other, 86 ; The fimple fyllogifm, 86 ; Demonftration that a particular cannot lead to a univerfal, and that two particulars are inconclulive, by help of the complex fyllogifm, 86, 87 ;
Opponent
fyllogifms,
87, 88
Rules for the fymbols of opponent
fundamental fyllogifms, there muft be fyllogifms, 87, 88 ; twice as many particular as univerfal, 88; Deduction of the fun
Of
from
damental Jimple fyllogijms, eight univerfal, and fixteen particular, the eight affirmatory complex fyllogifms, 88, 89 ; Deduction of the eight ftrengthenedfyllogifms from the limiting forms of the affirm atory complex ones, 90, 9 1 ; Connexion ofthe two modes offtrengthening a premife, go, 91 ; The conclufion is never ftrengthened by ftrengthening the middle term, nor only weakened by weakening it, 9 1 ; Table of connexion of the ftrengthened fyllogifms with the reft, 91 ; deduction
of the ftrengthened fyllogifms from the negatory complex ones, and difmiffal of the latter as of no more logical effect than the former, 92 ; Direct rule of notation, applying to fyllogifms which begin and conclude with like quantity, 92 ; Inverfe rule of notation, [N.B. the word inverfe mould have been contrary^ applying to fyllogifms which begin and conclude with unlike quantity, 93 ; Rules for all the retainedfyllo gifms, 93 ; Sub-rules for the particular fyllogifms [they would have done as remarks, but are needlefs as rules] 94 ; Remarks, partly reca pitulatory, 94, 95, 96; In all fundamental fyllogifms, the middle term is univerfal in one premife, and particular in the other, 95 ; diftinction thence arifing, 9 5 ; rule for connecting the fyllogifms which are formed by interchanging the concluding terms, 96; converjion of a
particular into a univerfal,
96 ; diftinction of the particular quantity in a conclufion into intrinfic and extrinfic, 97 ; the quantity of one ter?n always intrinfic, and hence the fyllogifm can always be made uni
verfal, 97 ; Nominal mode of notation for, and reprefentation of, a fundamental fyllogifm, 98 ; connexion of the nominal fyft em with the former (or proponent) fyft em, 99 ; mode of deriving concomitants and weakened forms, 100; more abftract mode of reprefentation derived
from the nominal, i oo ; nominal fyftem of ftrengthened fyllogifms, 101 ; mixed complex fyllogifm, 101 ; opponent forms, 102; verbal
defcription of the fimple fyllogif?n, 103 ; new view of the fyllogifm, in which all is referred to the middle term, \ 04 ; rules thence derived,
compound names, and expulfion of quantity by reference of the to or impojfibility of a compound name, 105 ; poffibiliiy fyftem offyllogifm thence arifing, 106.
105
;
proportion
Additions and corrections.
page 88, line 23, inftead of has the other two for its opponents, read has its opponents in the fet ; page 90, line 4, from the bottom, for premifs read premife the firft fpelling has been common enough, but it feems ftrange that the cognate words promife, furmife, demife, &c. mould not have dictated the fecond. Page 96 ;
DjD D,
4
read
D D|D|
4
Page 79,
in
the
firft
diagram, for
Contents.
xi
:
The
inverted forms of the llrengthened of fyllogifms are omitted ! thefe, four are their own inverfions, I4 , E E A,A I ,
:
and EjEjI of the remainder, O and E A Oi are inverfions ; and alfo A EjOj and EjA,O Page 100, line 12, from the bottom; for on read on), the firft time it occurs. Page 101 Read the fymbols of the ftrengthened fyllogifms fo as to begin from the middle in both premifes thus, Xyz! is y)X+y)z=Xz. Page 101. I might have faid a word or two on the cafe in which a complex particular is combined with a univerfal ; to form the refults will be an
A^
namely,
AA
lj,
eafy exercife for the reader.
Page 102,
line 7,
from
the bottom, for
IiA
I,
read IjAJj.
CHAPTER
VI.
On
the Syllogifm (pages
107126).
Remarks connected with the exiftence of the terms, 107, 108, 109, 1 10, in, 112, 113. The conclujion not feparable from the premifes except as to truth, 107, 108; conditions, and conditional fyllogifm, 109; incompletenefs of reduction of conditional to categorical, 109,
pofition,
no; exiftence of the terms of a proajumption in fyllogifm, particularly as to the middle term, 112, 113; poftulate more extenfive than the dictum de omni et nullo, involved as well in the formation of premifes as in fyllogifm, 114, 115; Invention of names, 115; notation for conjunctive and disjunctive names, 115, 1 16 ; exprejjion of complex relations and their contraries, 1 1 6 ; copulative and disjunctive fyllogifms and dilemma,
univerfe of proportions,
no;
in;
its
117; Conjunctive poftulate, 117; deduction of other evident propojifrom it, 118, 119; The collective and, as conjunctive, oppofed to the disjunctives and and or diftributively ufed in univerfals, and or disjunctive (in the common fenfe) in particulars, 119; Disjunctives may be rejectedfrom univerfals, and conjunctives from particulars, 119; Tranfpojition, introduction of, and rules for, 120 ; Table of the tranfpofed forms of A and E with compound names, 121 ; Examples of diftions
junctive fyllogifms, dilemmas, &c. treated by the above method, 122, 123, 124; Sorites, 124; Extended rules for the formation of the various claffes of Sorites, 125, 126.
Additions and corrections. Page 121, For [x,y][p,q])u read [X,Y][p,q])u.
line
8,
from
the bottom.
CHAPTER
VII.
On
the Arijlotelian Syllogifm
(127141).
Limitations impofed either by Ariftotle or his followers, 127; Dictum de omni et nullo, 127 ; defefi of this, 128 ; exclufion of
contraries, 128 ; Standard forms, 129; Major and minor terms, and diftinftion of figure, 129 ; Selection of the Ariflotelian fyllogifms from among thofe of this work, 130 131 ; Symbolic words, and meaning of their letters, 131; Reduction to the firft Old form of
figure,
131,132;
the fourth figure, 132, 133; Suggejlion as to two fgures fubdivided, 133; Poflible ufe of the diftindtion of figure, 133, 134; Collection of
xii
the figures in detail,
1
Contents.
Aldrich 134, 135, 136;
rules,
s verfes on the rules, and fubftitutesfor thefyjtem in which what contraries are allowed, 137, 138, 139; Method of determining what and ; ft 140 dire contrariwije. terms are taken from thepremifes,
36; Explanation of thefe
Reafonfor the duplication of thefyjiem of chapter P., 140, 141.
CHAPTER
141170).
VIII.
On
the numerically definite Syllogifm (pages
numerical definitenefs, Reafonfor its introduction, 141 ; definition of between it and perfect definitenefs, 142, 143 ; 141, 142; difiinftion Notation for thefimple numerical proportion, 144; Forms of inference the dire ft middle term is numerically definite, 145, 146; when
Canon of the middle term, 145 ; Double inference in the cafe of one This double inference is true in the Arifpremife negative, 145, 146 ; the phrafeology of totelian fyllogifm Bokardo, 146; Application of to the relations of propofitions, 146, 147, 148, 149; names complex Identical propofitions, 146, 147 Nece/ary confequence, 147 ; Reafons the ufual diftinftion of Contrary and Contradiftory, and for rejecting andfup ercontrary, 148 ; Remarks on a unifor introducing fubcontrary Abolition of the numerical quantification of verfe of proportions, 149; I The cafes in which it appears either identical 1 1 the 5
;
only
with thofe in which it does not appear, orfpurious, 150, 151; numeri the cal forms of the ufual propofitions, 151; Modes of contradicting numericalforms, 152; Definition of fpurious propofitions : reafonsfor their introduction, and excluding them when they appear, 153,
refufing
predicate,
50,
the word fpurious, 153; Spurious conclufions 154; Note in defence of not fpurious, 153, 154; Law of inference, may refult from premifes Contranominal of numerical propofitions, partial, (which forms 154; When one is impojfible, the are fpurious) and complete, 155, 156 two other is fpurious, 157; Fundamental form of inference, 157; Of deduction of the contranominals, one is always partially fpurious, 158;
;
1 1 59 ; Equations of 5 8, remaining forms from the fundamental one, the connexion between the numerical quantities, 159; Enmneration of numerical hypothefis, 1 60; Exhibition of the ufefulfubdivifionsofthe numerical fyllogiftic inference, 161 ; Deduction of fixteen varieties of in which de all the ordinary fyllogifms from them, 161, 162; Cafes allow of inference by defcription with refpeft to the finite particulars middle term, 163 ; Double choice in the mode of exprejfing thefe fyllo to be what are mofl gifms, 163; Exceptional fyllogifms, averted are ufed, 1 64 ; Formation of ab when meant univerfals frequently their connexion with the ordinary ones, 165 ; For infirmiori fyllogifms, mation offyllogifms oftranfpofed quantity, 166 ; Enumeration of them, Rules for their formation, 167, 168; Example of their 1 66, 167; the 168 of an opponent numerical
occurrence,
fyllogifm,
68
formation Example of Remark on what becomes of the fecond

;
a inference in
partially definite fyft em, 169 plex fyllogifms, 169, 170.
com Nonexiftence of definite numerical
Contents.
Additions and corrections.
fitions
xiii
line
Page 143,
as
12
Supply the propo-
X)M,P
flances in
and Y)N,Q, the feveral names.

:
deducible from the numbers of inPage 148, line 10, from the bottom:
line
Page 152, for propofitions read prepofitions. m. Page 153, line 22 for will prefently mow
read have mown us in page 145. Page *54 ^ne 2 from the bottom, for ys read zs. read #7XY. P^g^ 162, Page 155, //# & from the bottom, for line 2, tf/hr table : for lail chapter read chapter V. Page 166, line ij,for m*xy read m xy. Page 167, line 24 for 62 read 92.
4: for
us, read
mXY
CHAPTER
IX.
old
On
and
Probability (pages
170191).
1
Remark on
new views of knowledge,

two
70
Neceflary
truths not always identities, inftance, two and degrees of belief or knowledge, 171; Degree of
a
are four, 171 ; knowledge treated as
magnitude, 172; Diftinftion of ideal and objective probability, 172, 173 ; Rejection of the latter, 173 ; Definition of probability as referring to degree of belief, 173 ; Illuftration of degree of belief as a
magnitude, 1 74 ; What is perception of magnitude, 1 74 ; Meafurement of magnitude, 175; Illuftration of various degrees of belief, 1 76 ; Difference of certain and probable, not that of magnitudes of various kinds, but that of finite and infinite of the fame kind, 176, 177 ; the real diftinftion not thereby abrogated, 178 ; Poftulate on the acceptance of which the theory of probabilities depends, 1 79 ; the aflumption of this poftulate, in other cafes, not always fo well founded as is fuppofed, 1 79, 1 80, 1 8 1 ; the difficulties of this poftu late intentionally introduced and infifted on, 181, 182 ; Meafure of
probability or credibility, and alfo of authority, 182, 183 ; Rule for the formation of this meafure, 1 84 ; Objective verification of a re
mote conclufion of
this rule, 1 84, 185; Probability of the joint hap pening of independent events, 1 86; Confequences of this rule, 187; Problem in which the primary cafes are unequally probable, 187, 1 88; Rule of inverfe probabilities, 1 8 8, 189, 190; this rule alfo
holds in calculating the probabilities of reftridled cafes from the unreftrifted ones, 190, 191.
CHAPTER
X.
On
probable Inference (pages 191
210).
Argument and teftitnony, 191, 192 ; argument never the only vehi cle of information except when demonftrative, 192 truth or falfehood
;
not the fimple iffue in argument, 192, 193 into the judgment of truth or falfehood,
difficulty
thereby introduced
193; entrance of teftimony, 194; remark on the precept to negleft authority, 194; Compofition of independent teftimonies, 195 ; on the majority of witnefles, 196 ; the fame problem, when the event aflerted has an antecedent proba
197; queftion of collufion, 198, 199 ; extenflon of the laft problem to more complicated events, 200 ; Compofition of indepenbility,
xiv
Contents.
dent arguments on the fame fide, 201 ; manner in which the weakbecome an argument or a teftimony, 202, 208 ; nefs of an argument may
the fame on fubconCompaction of arguments on contrary fides, 203 ; a 204 ; Compofition of argument and teftimony in queftion to argument than to teftimony due More ; weight of contrary fides, 205 what it of the fame probability, 206 ; Utter rejection of authority,
trary fides,
amounts
to,
207, 208
Effefts of the
fame
arguments on different
minds, 209 \Efeft of probable confequence upon an ajfertion, 209, 210; Old fuicidal ajfertion, explained by probability, 210. Additions and corrections. Page 199, line 4, from the bottom: m \} Page 201, line 14, from the bottom : for (i-\) read (\
.
for
read T
CHAPTER XL
On
Inclusion (pages
211226).
Explanation of induction, 211; Reduction of the procefs to a fyllogifm, 2ii ; Induction by connexion, and inftance, 212 ; Ordinary induction not a demonftrative procefs, 212, 213 ; Pure induction, incomplete, probability of it, 213, 214; Ordinary miftakes on this B. Macaulay s enumeration of fubject, 215 ; Examination of Mr. T.
which fcientific analyfis is ufelefs, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224; probability of fyllogifms with particular premifes, 224, 225, 226; Circumftantial evidence, 226.
initances in
CHAPTER
XII.
0;z old logical
Terms (pages
227237).
Dialectics, 227; fimple and complex terms, 227; apprehenfion, judgment, difcourfe, 227; Univerfal and fingular, 228; Individuals, 228 ; categories, predicaments, 228 ; fubftance, 228 ; firft and fecond fubftance, 229 ; quantity, continuous and difcrete, 229 ; Quality,
habit, difpolition, pamon, 229 ; Relation, 229 ; Action, paffion, imma nent, tranfient, univocal, equivocal, 229, 230; Remaining categories, 230; predicables, genus, fpecies, 230 ; difference, property, acci
dent, 231
tion,
caufe,
material, formal, efficient, final,

;
231
form,
mo
fubject, object, 231 modals, fubftitution of the
Subjective,
objective,
adjunct,
theory of probabilities for
232; them, 232 ;
Their ufe in the old philofophy, 232, 233 ; Notions of old logicians on quantity, 234; Intenfion or comprehenfion, and extenfion, ob jections to their oppofition as quantities, and references to places in this work where the diftinction has occurred, 234, 235, 236; Inftance, 236 ; Enthymeme, Ariftotle s, and modern, 236, 237. Additions and corrections. Page 230, lines 16 and 15, from the bottom; tranfpofe the words former and latter. Page 234 line ^ from
bottom, for after read before.
gifts
Page 237,
note y I find that etymolo-
are decidedly of opinion that prjo-ic, fpeech, and /OEM, flow, have different roots, and that the former is fpeech in its primitive meaning.
The
reader muft
make
the alteration,
which however does not
affeft
my
fuggeftion.
Contents.
xv
CHAPTER
No
XIIL
of
On
Fallacies (pages
237286).
derived from, 238 ; paradox, paralogifm, 238; Ariftotle s claffification, 240 ; Pofition of ancients and moderns as to fallacies, 240 ; Confequences of the neglect of logic, 241 ; Ariflotle s fpecies of
claffification
fallacies,
237
Amufcment
fallacy, fophifm,
fallacies
enumerated, 241; Equivocation, 241, 242; Change of meanings with time, 243 ; Importance once attached to fuccefsful
equivocation,
244
Government
fallacies,
244
Qualifications
of
meaning, 244, 245 ; Phrafes interpreted by their component words, 245 ; AiTumption of right over words, 246, 247 ; Equivocating forms of predication, 247 ; Amphibology, 247 ; Defects in the ftructure of language, 247 ; Compofition and divifion, 248 ; Accent, 248, 249; Fallacy of alteration of emphafis, 249, 250; diction, 250; Accident and a ditto fecundum quid, &c., 250, 251, 252; Examina tion of fome cafes of legal ftridtnefs, 252, 253, 254; Petitio prinoften wrongly imputed, 255; Ariftotle s meaning of it, cipii, 254;
256
Meaning of
the old logicians,
256
derivation from the fyllo"io
principii gifm of principle and example, 257; Charge of petit againft all fyllogifms, 257, 258, 259; Syllogifm fometimes only re quired for diminution of comprehenfion, 259; Imperfect dilemma, fophifm of Diodorus Cronus, 259, 260; Ignoratio elenchi, 260; proof of negative, and negative proof, 261, 262 ; aflertions of difpu-
favour, 262 ; Fallacy of tendencies and necefTary ; Fallacy of attributing refults of teftimony to ar 263 confequences, gument, 264 ; Argumentum ad hominem, 265 ; Parallel cafes, 265, 266 Fallacies of illuflration, 266, 267 ; Fallacia confequentis, 267 ; Incorrect logical forms, 267, 268 ; Non caufa pro caufa, 268, 269 ;
tants in their
:
own
Fallacia plurimum interroga tionum, 269, 270; Practices of barrifters, 270; Incorrect ufe of univerfal form, 270, 271 ; Fallacy of the extreme cafe, 271 ; Ufe of the extreme cafe, 271, 272 ; Carriage of
272 ; Ufe of the word general, 272 ; Confufion of logic and perfpedtive, 272, 273 ; General truths, 273 ; Implied univerfals not fairly flated, 273 ; Fallacies of quantity, 274; Proverbs, 275 ; Fallacies of probability, 275, 276; Fallacy of analogy, 276; Fallacy
principles,
of judging by
principles
refults,
276, 277; Equivocations of
ftyle,
277; Fal
lacy of fynonymes, 277,
278
and
rules,
279, 280,
Fallacies arifing out of connection of 281; Want of rule nifi va. common
;
language,
retaining
citation
280; Fallacy of importation of premifes, 281 conclufions after abandoning premifes, 282 ;
Fallacy of
Fallacies of
5 y for millenium read millennium, and for Newtonion read Newtonian.
and quotation, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286. Additions and corrections. Page 250, lines 3 and
CHAPTER
(pages 286
XIV.
296).
On
the verbal Defcription of the Syllogifm
Conditions to be
fatisfied,
287
Double mode of
defcription and
xvi
Contents.
288
;
;
reference of one to the other, 287, 288; Language propofed, Defcription of the cafes of fyllogifm in that language, 289,
290
Connexion of the univerfal and concomitant fyllogifm with the complex one, 291, 292; Quantitative formation of the fyllogifm, 293, 294, 295 ; Rules for the formation of the numericalfyllogifm, 295, 296.
APPENDIX
of this
final reply
to
I.
Work and
Account a Controverfy between the Author of^ Sir William Hamilton of Edinburgh ; and
the latter (pages
297
323).
APPENDIX
II.
On fome Forms
of Inference differing from

336).
thofe of the Ariflotelians (pages
323
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
CHAPTER
Firft Notions.
I.
THE
firft
viewing
it
notion which a reader can form of Logic is by as the examination of that part of reafoning
which depends upon the manner in which inferences are formed, and the investigation of general maxims and rules for conftru6ting arguments, fo that the conclufion
may
which was not previoufly
aflerted in the premifes.
contain no inaccuracy It has fo far
nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or prefumptions, from which an inference is derived ; but fimply takes care
that the inference (hall certainly be true, if the premifes be true. Thus, when we fay that all men will die, and that all men are
rational beings,
die,
and thence infer that fome rational beings will
the logical truth of this fentence is the fame whether it be true or falfe that men are mortal and rational. This logical truth
depends upon ihejtruflure of the fentence^ andjiotjjupon the par ticular matters fpoken of. Thus,
Inftead of
Write,
is X. Every is Z. Every Therefore fome Zs are Xs.
All
All
men
will die.
are rational beings. Therefore fome rational beings

will die.
men
Y Y
The
as the firft
is the fame propofition, logically confidered, the confequence in both is virtually contained in, and rightly inferred from, the premifes. Whether the premifes be true or falfe, is not a queftion of logic, but of morals, philofo;
fecond of thefe
phy, hiftory, or any other knowledge to which their
fubjecT:-
2
matter belongs certainly follow
:
Firji Notions of Logic.

the queftion of logic the premifes be true ?
is,
does the conclufion
if
Every act of reafoning muft mainly confift in comparing to gether different things, and either finding out, or recalling from previous knowledge, the points in which they refemble or differ
from each other.
called
That particular part in the comparifon inference^ confifts
of reafoning which is of feveral and different
things with one and the fame other thing ; and afcertaining the refemblances, or differences, of the feveral things, by means of the points in which they refemble, or differ from, the thing with
which all are compared. There muft then be fome proportions already obtained before any inference can be drawn. All propofitions are either affertions or denials, and are thus divided into affirmative and negative. is Y, and is not Y, are the two forms to which Thus,
Thefe are, for our prefent propofitions may be reduced. moil forms the ; fimple purpofe, though it will frequently hap that circumlocution is needed to reduce much pen propofitions
all
to them.
Thus, fuppofe the following

will
affertion,
till
?
If he fhould
come to-morrow, he
this
probably ftay
to be reduced to the
form
is
Monday;
There
is
how
is
evidently
fomething fpoken of, fomething faid of it, and an affirmative connection between them. Something, if it happen, that is, the of makes the happening of another fome fomething, happening or is one of the ; probable thing things which render the hap
pening of the fecond thing probable.
X
r~ u
is
Y
fan event from which
it
_
The
ru- 1 happening of his

u
_ _
may be
is
arrival
to-morrow
}*
inferred as probable that he
wm
ftay
till
Monday.
be varied
forms of language will allow the manner of afferting to in a great number of ways ; but the reduction to the preceding form is always poffible. Thus, fo he faid is an affir
mation, reducible as follows
:
The
What
faid
,
you have juft (or whatever

c
.
1
1S
the thing
which
elfe
fo
refers to)
Firjl Notions
tion
is into is not, negative propofibut care muft always be taken to afcertain whether a The principal proportion which appears negative be really fo.
By changing
j
of Logic. we make a
danger is that of confounding a propofition which is negative with another which is affirmative of fomething requiring a nega c tive to defcribe it. Thus, he refembles the man who was not
in the
4
4
room,
is
affirmative,
and muft not be confounded with
in the room. Again, he mould come to-morrow, it is probable he will not ftay till Monday, does not mean the fimple denial of the preceding pro pofition, but the affirmation of a directly oppofite propofition.
if
he does not refemble the
man who was
It is,
X
_,.
1
is
Y
f
he happening or
arrival
an event from which

.
his
J-
is
inferred to be /^probable that
11-
it
i_
i
may be
i
i_
to-morrow,
J
he will ftay
till
Monday
it
whereas the following,

,,
he happening or his
.
f ,.
"I
fan event from which

.
..
is
,
not
inferred as probable that he
...
may be
.
.
arrival
to-morrow,
j
{
c
fay
mould come to-morrow, that is till ftay Monday. Moreover, the negative words not, no, &c., have two kinds of meaning which muft be carefully diftinguifhed. Sometimes they deny, and nothing more fometimes they are ufed to affirm the direct: In cafes which offer but two alternatives, one contrary. of which is necefTary, thefe amount to the fame thing, fince the
would be exprelTed thus no reafon why he mould
:
If he
denial of one, and the affirmation of the other, are obvioufly In many idioms of converfation, the equivalent propofitions. negative implies affirmation of the contrary in cafes which offer not only alternatives, but degrees of alternatives. Thus, to the
4 queftion, Is he tall ? the fimple anfwer, No, moft frequently means that he is the contrary of tall, or confiderably under the But it muft be remembered, that, in all logical reafonaverage.
is fimply negation, and nothing more, never affirmation of the contrary. implying The common propofition that two negatives make an affirm ative, is true only upon the fuppofition that there are but two
ing, the negation
4
poffible things,
Firft Notions of Logic.

one of which
is
denied.
Grant
that a
man muft
be either able or unable to do a particular thing, and then not unable and able are the fame things. But if we fuppofe various
degrees of performance, and therefore degrees of ability, it is falfe, in the common fenfe of the words, that two negatives make an affirmative. Thus, it would be erroneous to fay, John is
able to tranflate Virgil, and
Thomas
is
not unable
it
therefore,
what John can do Thomas can do, for premifes mean that John is fo near to the
that an affirmation of his ability
is
evident that the
beft fort of tranflation
may be made, while Thomas is than but lower not fo near to abfolute defi John, confiderably that be his altogether denied. It will generally ciency ability may
be found that two negatives imply an affirmative of a weaker degree than the pofitive affirmation.
Each of the
propofitions,
X
:
is
Y,
and
is
not
Y,
may
be fubdivided into two fpecies the univerfal, in which every poffible cafe is included ; and the particular, in which it is not
The
to be afTerted that the affirmation or negation is univerfal. four fpecies of propofition are then as follows, each being marked with the letter by which writers on logic have always
it.
meant
diftinguifhed
A
E
I
Univerfal Affirmative
Every
O
In
Univerfal Negative Particular Affirmative
No
X X
is
is
Y Y
Ys Ys
Particular Negative
Some Xs Some Xs
are
are not
common
converfation the affirmation of a part

c
imply the denial of the remainder. Thus, by

are ripe,
is meant to fome of the apples
This
more.
is
it is always intended to fignify that fome are not ripe. not the cafe in logical language, but every propofition is
intended to
no more grammatically, Some Xs are Ys, we do not mean to imply that fome are not this may or may not be. Again, the word fome means, one or
its
make
amount of
affirmation or denial, and
When we
fay,
Some
is
Y,
or,
The following table will more, poffibly all. of each propofition on the reft.
Every Xis
l"affirms
mew
the bearing
Some Xs are Ts and denies
(.some
Xs are not is
5
Ver^
No Xis
7~affirms Some
Xs are not Ts and denies]

.
>
(.some
^ are Is As
~~
Some Xs are Ts does not contradift< [Some Xs are
but denies No
not Ts )
is
Some Xs are not Ts does not oontndim
v-
but denies Every XtsT
Contradictory propofitions are thofe in which one denies any thing that the other affirms ; contrary propofitions are thofe in which one denies every thing which the other affirms, or affirms
every thing which the other denies.

contraries,
The
following pair are
Every
X
is
is
Y
to to
and
No X
is
and the following are contradictories,
Every
No
X Y X Y
is
Some Xs are not Ys Some Xs are Ys
contrary, therefore, is a complete and total contradictory; little confideration will make it appear, that the decifive diftinction between contraries and contradictories lies in this,
and a
that contraries
may both be falfe, but of contradictories, one muft be true and the other falfe. may fay, Either P is true,
We
or fomethlng in contradiction of it is true ; but we cannot fay, Either P is true, or every thing in contradiction of it is true.
is a very common miftake to imagine that the denial of a proportion gives a right to affirm the contrary; whereas it (hould be, that the affirmation of a propofition gives a right to deny the
It
contrary. that
Thus,
is
if
No X
we deny
is
that
Every
is
Y, we do
not affirm
Y,
but only that
Some Xs
are not
is
Ys
while, if
alfo
affirm that
Xs
are
Every not Ys.
Y, we deny
No X
Y, and
we Some
other,
either
is
But, as to contradictories, affirmation of one is denial of the and denial of one is affirmation of the other. Thus,
Every
is
Y,
or
Some Xs
are not
Ys
affirmation of either
denial of the other,
and vice verfa. Let the ftudent now endeavour to
fatisfy
himfelf of the
fol
lowing. Taking the four preceding propofitions, A, E, I, O, let the fimple letter fignify the affirmation, the fame letter in parenthefes the denial, and the abfence of the letter, that there is
neither affirmation nor denial.
Fir/I Notions of Logic.
From A follow (E), I, (O) From E (A), (I), O From I (E) From O .... (A) Thefe may be thus fummed up
;
O From (A) follow. I From (E) From (I) (A),E,O From (O) ... A, (E), I The affirmation of a univerfal
. . .
.
enable us to affirm proportion, and the denial of a particular one, but the denial of a univerfal propoor deny all the other three of a particular one, leave us unable to fition, and the affirmation
affirm or deny two of the others. In fuch propofitions as Every
is
Y,
Some Xs
are not
Ys,
&c.,
c
X
or
is
c
called the /*>#,
and
is not/ is called the copula. words of the proportion point out whether the is
the predicate, while the verb the It is obvious

^that
fubjecl:
is
of univerfally or
partially,
but not
fo
fpoken of the predicate, which it is
therefore important to examine. Logical writers generally give the name of diflnbuted fubjefts or predicates to thofe which are
fpoken of univerfally
but as
this
word
is
rather technical, I fhall
or predicate enters wholly or partially, accord fay that a fubjecl: of. ing as it is univerfally or particularly fpoken
1.
In A, or
Every
is
Y,
the predicate only partially. Ys are all the Xs, c Every

that
all
the fubjecl: enters wholly, but c For it obvioufly fays, Among the of Ys, fo is part of the colleaion
the
Xs make
all
c
a part of the
is
Ys, the
it
may
be.
Thus,
2.
Every horfe
an animal, does not
wjtole
all
but ftates that
the horfes
wholly.
<
of all the Ys ; is any one out (hall be found and of fearch the whole collection every Ys, X. not is to be fomething which In or c Some Xs are Ys, both fubjecl: and predicate enter
In E, or
No X is No X whatfoever
make up a portionfff the animals. Y, both fubjecl: and predicate enter
fp^Pof
animals,
3.
I,
partially.
Some of
whole
the
Xs
are found
up a part (the of the Ys.
but not poffibly,
among the Ys, or make known from the preceding)
Some Xs are not Ys, the fubjecl: enters partially, 4. In O, or c Some Xs are none of them any and the predicate wholly. will be found to be no one out whatfoever of the Ys ; every of a certain portion of the Xs.
It appears then that, In affirmatives, the predicate enters
partially.
In negatives, the predicate enters wholly. In contradictory proportions, both fubjecl: and predicate enter differently in the two.
converfe of a propofition is that which changing the fubjecl: and predicate, as follows
The
is
:
made by
inter
The
propofition.
Its converfe.
A
E
I
Every
No
X X
is
is
Y Y
Every
No
Y Y
is
is
X X
Xs
Xs
O
Now,
mifes
;
Some Xs are Ys Some Xs are not Ys

it is
Some Ys Some Ys
are
are not
a fundamental and felf-evident propofition, that

to aflert
for inftance,
refult
confequence muft be allowed

fo that,
Ys
tion
can never lead to a
no more widely than its prean aflertion which is only of fome which is true of all Ys. But if a
propofition aflert
agreement or difagreement, any other propofi which aflerts the fame, to the fame extent and no further, muft be a legitimate confequence or, if you pleafe, muft amount to the whole, or part, of the original aflertion in another
;
form.
is
Thus, the converfe of
is
not true
for, in
Every
is X, Y, the predicate enters partially ; while in Every the fubjecl: enters wholly. All the Xs make up a part of the Ys, then a part of the Ys are among the Xs, or fome Ys are Xs/
c c Some is, Hence, the only legitimate converfe of Every X is Ys are Xs. But in No X is Y, both fubjecT: and predicate enter c No is X is, in fact, the fame propofition as wholly, and No X is Y. And Some Xs are Ys is alfo the fame as its con
J
verfe
Some Ys are Xs But here both terms enter partially. Some Xs are not Ys admits of no converfe whatever it is per
c
:
fectly confident
with
all
aflertions
upon
and
X X X
in
which
is
is
the fubjecl:.
fiftent
Thus
itfelf.
neither of the four following lines
incon-
with
Some Some Some Some
Xs Xs Xs Xs
are not
are not
are not
are not
Ys Ys Ys Ys
the
and and and

and
Every
No
Y Y
is
is
Some Ys Some Ys
are
Xs
are not Xs.
Having thus
difcufled the principal points

I pafs to
connected with the

aflertions
fimple aflertion,
manner of making two
8
give a third.
affertions
Every inftance of this is which form the bafis of the

itfelf
called ^fylloglfm^ third are called premlfes^
the
two
and the third

If
the conclufion.
third in
two things both agree with a
agree with each other in the fame ; as, if Y, and Z of the fame colour as Y, then
X be of the fame colour as X of the fame colour as

is
any
particular, they
Again, agrees with Y, then

then
Z.
if
differ
from and Z
in
any particular
in
which
If
Z
be
differ in that particular.
not of the fame colour as
Y, and
be of the fame colour as
Y,
X from Y
is
not of the colour of Z.
But
if
and
both
differ
in
either differ in the
Thus,
if
any particular, nothing can be inferred; they may fame way and to the fame extent, or not. and Z be both of different colours from Y, it neither
all in
follows that they agree, nor differ, in their own colours. The paragraph preceding contains the effential parts of
ference,
which confifts in comparing two things with a third, and from their agreement or difference with that third, their finding agreement or difference with one another. Thus, Every X is
Y,
every
is
Y,
allows us to infer that
and
have
all
thofe
qualities in
common which
Y. The reafoncommon preceding forms, however, though they reprefent com now are we to which ing better than the ordinary fyllogifm,
all
X is Y, and from one another in

every
No Z
are neceffary to Y. is Y, we infer that
Again, from and Z differ
particulars
which
are effential to
ing,
tity
do not conftitute the ultimate forms of inference. Simple iden

or non-Identity
is
the ultimate ftate to which every affertion
may
be reduced
and
we
mail, therefore,
firft
afk,
from what
identities, &c., be produced ? Again, identities, fmce we name objects in fpecies, each fpecies confifting of a number of individuals, and fmce our affertion may include all or
&c., can other
in every in only part of a fpecies, it is further neceffary to afk, is true, whether of drawn conclufion to the extent what ftance,
all,
or only of part
Let us take the fimple affertion, c Every living man refpires ; or every living man is one of the things (however varied they may be) which refpire. If we were to enclofe all living men in
a large triangle, and
all
ceding
angle
affertion, if true,
the pre refpiring objects in a large circle, would require that the whole of the tri
in the circle.
mould be contained
And
in the
fame way
we
Firjt Notions of Logic.
9
in a circle
may
reduce any aflertion to the expreflion of a coincidence, total
or partial, between
two
figures.
Thus, a point
:
may
reprefent an individual of one fpecies, and a point in a triangle an individual of another fpecies and we may exprefs that the
whole of one
in the other
fpecies
is
aflerted to be contained or not contained

as,
by fuch forms
in the
All the
is
in the
c
>
None
of the
is
and Z, each exprefling agreement Any two afTertions about or difagreement, total or partial, with or from Y, and leading to a conclufion with refpecT: to or Z, is called a fyllogifm, of which
is
called the middle term.
The
plaineft fyllogifm
is
the folio w-
Every Every Therefore Every

In order to find
X Y Y Z X Z
is
is is
All the
All the
is is
is
in the
in the in the
Q
D n
O
A
Therefore All the
all
the poflible forms of fyllogifm,
we muft
confift
;
make
a table of
all
the elements of
which they can
namely
X and Y Y Every X
is
Z A
E
Ys
Ys
Xs
I
and
is
Y
are
No
XisY
are
are not
Every
No
Z Y ZisY
Ys Ys
Zs
are not
is
Some Xs Some Xs
Every
O
A
Some Zs Some Zs
Every Y
is
Some Ys
are not
O
A
Some Ys
are not
Or
their
rynonymes,
A and O All the A is in the O None of the A is in the Q Some of the A is in the Q Some of the A is not in the Q All the O is in the A Some of the Q is not in the A
D and
All the
is
in the
is
Q Q
in the
E
I
O
A
None of the D Some of the D Some of the D

All the
in the
is is
Q Q O
n
not in the
is in
the
is
Some of the
not in the
and Y, Now, taking any one of the fix relations between and combining it with either of thofe between Z and Y, we have fix pairs of premifes, and the fame number repeated for
every different relation of
to
Y.
We
have then
thirty-fix
io
forms to confider
all but (A, A) : but, thirty of thefe (namely, of the other half. Thus, of them half are repetitions (E, E), &c.,)
<
and are of the fame form, and diftinft forms, There are then only 15+6, or 21 into X. fome of which give a neceffary conclufion, while others do not.
into
Every
is
Y, no
is
Y, and Every
is
Y, no
is
Y,
X only differ by changing

claffifying
We
(hall felea the

;
former of thefe,
them by
is
their
conclufions
that
is,
according as the inference
of the form
A, E, I, or O. conclufion be I. In what manner can a univerfal affirmative in the other ? contained is drawn ; namely, that one figure entirely one that know we affert when figure is entirely This we can
only contained in the circle, which
other figure.
itfelf is
in the entirely contained
Thus,
Every Every Every

is
X Y X
in
is is
is
Y
Z Z
All the All the All the
is
in the
Q
D D
O
A
is
is
in tne
in the
A A A
the only
II.
way
which a
univerfal affirmative conclufion can
be drawn. In what manner can a univerfal negative conclufion be

;
drawn
namely, that one figure
Only when we
to the other ? is entirely exterior is one that affert to able are entirely within, figure
circle.
and the other entirely without, the
Thus,
Every
X
Z
is
No No
is
is
is
Y Y
Z
All the
is
in the
is is
O O
D
A
E E
X
way
None of the n None of the A
in the in the
the only
III. In
in
which a
univerfal negative conclufion can be
drawn.
drawn
other
?
Only
a particular affirmative all of one figure is contained in the or that part namely, when we are able to affert that the whole circle is
what manner can
conclufion be
and that the whole, or part of the cir part of one of the figures, have then two forms. other the of is figure. cle, part
We
Every Every
Y Y
is
is
X
Z
Zs
All the All the
O O
is is
m tne A
in the
is
A A
a
I
Some Xs
are
Some of the A
in the

Every
is
X
Zs Zs
j
All the
is
in the
is is
A
the
A
D n
I I
Some Ys Some Xs
are are
Some of the Q Some of the A

all
in
in the
The
fecond of thefe contains

firft
that
is
ftriftly
neceflary to the
conclufion, and the
when an
aflertion
may be omitted. That which follows can be made as to fome, muft follow when the
negative propofition be inferred ; figure, is not contained in the
fight,
is
fame aflertion can be made of all. IV. How can a particular

namely, that part, or all of one other ? It would feem at firft
aflert that part or all
whenever we
are able to
and that part or all of the other figure is not. The weakeft fyllogifm from which fuch an inference can be drawn would then feem to be as follows.
in the circle,
of one figure
Some Xs are Ys Some Zs are not Ys .Some Zs are not Xs

But here
clufion
is
it
Some of the A Some of the D Some of the A
is
in the
Q
the
is
is
not
in
Q
n
not in the
will appear,
on a
;
only thus far true
little confederation, that the con that thofe Xs which are Ys cannot
;
be tbofe Zs which are not Ys but they may be other Zs, about which nothing is aflerted when we fay that fome Zs are not Ys.
And
further confideration will
make
it
evident, that a conclufion
of
form can only be arrived at when one of the figures is entirely within the circle, and the whole, or part of the other without ; or elfe when the whole of one of the figures is without the circle, and the whole or part of the other within ; or
this
when
laftly,
entirely within one of the figures, and not entirely within the other. That is, the following are the diftind
lies
it
the circle
forms which allow of a particular negative conclufion, in which fhould be remembered that a in the
particular propofition
pre-
mifes
may always be changed

"
For ing the conclufion. all." fome," follows from

"
into a univerfal one, without affect that which necefTarily follows from
Every
is
All the
is
in the
Some Zs are not Ys Some Zs are not Xs
Q
in
Some of Some of
the
the
D n
is
not in the not

the
A Q O
A
is
12

is
No X
Y
are
Some Zs /.Some Zs
Every
Ys
Xs
are not
is
None of the A Some of the D Some of the n

All the
is
in the
is is
in the
O O
E
I
not in the
O
A
D D
X
Zs not Zs
is
in tne
is
is
Some Ys Some Xs
are not are
Some of the O Some of the A
not
tne
not in the
O O
All It appears, then, that there are but fix diftint fyllogifms. others are made from them by ftrengthening one of the premifes, one or both of the premifes, where fuch converfion or
elfe by firft making the converfion, and then And the following arrange of the one premifes. ftrengthening ment will ftiow that two of them are univerfal, three of the others a being derived from them by weakening one of the premifes in
is
converting allowable ; or
manner which does not

fion.
i.
deftroy, but only weakens, the conclu-
Every
Every
X Y Every X
is
Y
Z
3.
Every
X
Z
is
is
is
No
No
Y Y
Z
is
is
2.
Some Xs
Every
are
is
Ys
4.
Some Xs are Ys
5.
Every
X Y
is
6.
Every
Y X
is
Z
Zs
fee
No
is
Y
not Zs
Some Zs Some Zs
are not
Ys
Some Ys are
Some Xs
not Zs
Some Xs
are
Some Xs are
are not
Xs
are not
Zs
is
We
AA
we
may
how
it
arifes that
one of the
partial fyllogifms
not immediately derived, like the others, from a univerfal one. In the preceding, A E E may be confidered as derived from
A, by changing the term
in
which
Y enters univerfally into

we cannot deduce a fome Zs are not Xs.
a univerfal negative. If this be done with the other term inftead,
have
No
Every
If
X Y
is
Y) from which
Z)
univerfal premifes
is
univerfal conclufion, but only
we weaken one and the ftand, we obtain Some Xs are not Ys

Every
other of thefe premifes, as they
No X
is
Y
Zs
is
and
Some Ys
Some Zs
are
No
conclufion
are not
Xs

but if equivalent to the fourth of the preceding firft premife, and proceed in the fame manner,
:
we
convert the
From No
Every
Y X Y Z
is is
we
Xs
obtain
Some Ys
Every
are not
is
Xs Xs
Some Zs
which
lift,
is
are not
Some Zs
are not
legitimate, and
is
the fame as the laft of the
with
X and Z
preceding
interchanged.
all
the ufual forms are con remark the following rules, which may be proved either by collecting them from the preceding cafes, or by independent reafoning. 1. The middle term muft enter univerfally into one or the other premife. If it were not fo, then one premife might fpeak of one part of the middle term, and the other of another ; fo that there is would, in fact, be no middle term. Thus, Every Y, Every Z is Y, gives no conclufion it may be thus ftated ;
tained in the preceding, let the reader
Before proceeding to fhow that
All the
All the
Xs make up a part of the Ys Zs make up a part of the Ys
that there is any common term of muft have fome means of fhowing that the two parts are to fome extent the fame ; or the preceding premifes
And, before we can know

all,
comparifon at
we
by themfelves are inconclufive. 2. No term muft enter the conclufion more generally than
is
it
found
in the premifes
it
thus, if
premifes,
muft enter
partially
be fpoken of partially in the into the conclufion. This is ob

aflert
vious, fmce the conclufion muft
no more than the premifes
imply.
premifes both negative no conclufion can be drawn. obvious, that the mere aflertion of difagreement between each of two things and a third, can be no reafon for inferring either agreement or It difagreement between thefe two
3.
From
For
it is
things.
will not
be
difficult to
reduce any cafe which

rule
:
falls
under
is
this rule
to a breach
of the
firft
thus,
No X
is
Y,
is
is
No Z
Y) Y)
Y,
gives
Every Every
X
Z
is
is
(fomething which
not
not
(fomething which
in
which the middle term is not fpoken of univerfally in either. Again, No Y is X, fome Ys are not Zs, may be converted into
Every
is
(a thing
which
are not
is
not
Some
in
(things which
Zs) are
Y) Ys
which there
4.
is
no middle term.
From
is
c
This
as in
premifes both particular no conclufion can be drawn. the firft or fecond rule is broken, fufficiently obvious when
are
obvious
Some Xs when
Ys, Some Zs are Ys.
But
it is
not immediately
verfally.
The
the middle term enters one of the premifes uni following reafoning will ferve for exercife in the
Since both premifes are particular in form, preceding refults. the middle term can only enter one of them univerfally by being the predicate of a negative proportion ; confequently (Rule 3)
the other premife muft be affirmative, and, being particular, nei ther of its terms is univerfal. Confequently both the terms as to
which the conclufion
is
to be
drawn enter
partially,
and the con
clufion (Rule 2) can only be a particular affirmative proportion. But if one of the premifes be negative, the conclufion muft be negative (as we mall immediately fee). This contradiction (hows
that the fuppofition of particular premifes producing a legitimate
refult is inadmiffible.
If one premife be negative, the conclufion, if any, muft be If one term agree with a fecond and difagree with a negative. third, no agreement can be inferred between the fecond and
5. third.
6.
ticular.
If one premife be particular, the conclufion muft be par This may be fhown as follows. If two propofitions
is plain that P and the P and Q^cannot be true let P (a particular) and Q Then P (particular) and
Q_, together prove a third, R, it denial of R, prove the denial of Q. For

together without R.
P and
Now
if poffible,
(a univerfal). (a univerfal) prove the denial of Q.. the denial of (particular) prove
But two
particulars can prove nothing. In the preceding fet of fyllogifms we obferve one form only which produces A, or E, or I, but three which produce O. Let an affertion be faid to be weakened when it is reduced
from univerfal
to particular,
and ftrengthened
in the contrary cafe.
Thus, Every
is
Z*
is
called ftronger than
Some Xs
are Zs.

Every
ufual
fult is either
form of fyllogifm which can give a legitimate reone of the preceding fix, or another formed from one of the fix, either by changing one of the aflertions into its
converfe, if that be allowable, or by ftrengthening one of the premifes, without altering the conclufion, or both. Thus,
Some Xs
Every
are
is
Ys
Some Ys
are
is
Xs
Y Z
may be
ftill
written
{ Every
""?
y
C Y
Z
Z
when
What
for all
c
follows will
follow from
{ 1 Every
is
which
is
true
when Some Ys
are
c Z, which yields Every X is Z, alfo yields Some Xs are Zs. But writers on logic have always confidered thefe fyllogifms as ufelefs, conceiving it better to draw from any premifes their In this they were undoubtedly right ; and ftrongeft conclufion. the only queftion is, whether it would not have been advifable
poflible alfo to form a legitimate fyllogifm by the conclufion, when it is univerfal, fmce that which weakening c is true of all is true of fome. is Y, Thus, Every Every
Every It would be
Xs,
is
not
lefs
true
is
X.
is
<
to
make
the premifes as
weak
as poffible,
and not to admit any

abfolutely neceflary
fyllogifms in
which more appeared than was
to the conclufion.
If fuch had been the practice, then
Every
is
X, Every
is
Z, therefore Some Xs
are
Zs
would have been confidered
as formed by a fpurious and unneof excefs afTertion. The minimum of aflertion would be ceflary contained in either of the following,
Every
is
X, Some Ys
Xs, Every
are Zs, therefore
Some Ys
In
firft,
are
is
Z,
therefore
Some Xs are Zs Some Xs are Zs

clafTes
:
this chapter, fyllogifms
have been divided into two

;
thofe
which prove a
univerfal conclufion
fecondly, thofe
which prove a partial conclufion, and which are (all but one) derived from the firft by weakening one of the premifes, in fuch manner as to produce a legitimate but weakened conclufion. Thofe of the firft clafs are placed in the firft column, and of the
other in the fecond.
i6

Univerfal.
Particular.
A A
Every X Every Y A Every X
is
Y
Z
Some Xs
Every Y
are
is
Ys
Zs
is
Z
Ys
Zs
A
I
I
is
Some Xs Some Xs
are are
is
No
Y
X
Every
E No
E No
X Y X
is
Y
Z
Z
Some Xs
Every
are not
is
O
A
is
Y
Ys Xs
Zs Zs
is
Some Zs Some Zs
Every
are not
are not
is
O O
A
Some Ys
are not
Some Xs
In
firft
all
are not
O O
works on logic, it is cuftomary to write that premife which contains the predicate of the conclufion. Thus,
is
is
Every Every
Y X Every X
Y
Z
would be written, and not
Every Every
is
X Y Y Z Z Every X
is is
is
The
jecl:
premifes thus arranged are called major and minor

the minor.
in the
dicate of the conclufion being called the
major term, and
the pre its fub-
Again,
preceding cafe
we
fee the various

:
; X, fubjecls coming in the order Y, ber of different orders which can appear
X,
and the
-
num
is
YZ XY XZ
four,
ZY XY XZ
YZ YX XZ
ZY YX XZ
namely
which
are called the four figures, and every kind of fyllogifm in each figure is called a mood. I now put down the various moods of each figure, the letters of which will be a guide to find out
thofe of the preceding lift from which Co they are derived. means that a premife of the preceding lift has been converted ;
-f-
that
it
has been ftrengthened
Co-f,
that both changes
have
taken place.
Thus^
17
is
A
I I
Every
is
Z
Ys
Zs
becomes
Some Xs
are
are
A Every Y Z A Every Y X
is
(Co
-f )
Some Xs
-{-
Some Xs
are
Zs
then
are
And Co
is is
fome Ys are
true
points out the following : If fome Xs (Co) ; and all that is true when
Xs be Ys,
Some Ys
Xs,
when Every
is
(-{-)
therefore the fecond fyllogifm
legitimate, if the
firft
be
fo.
A A
A
Every Every
Every
Y Z X Y
is is
Firft Figure.
A
I I
Every
is
Z
Ys
Zs
Some Xs Some Xs
are
X E No Y A Every X E No X
E No
is
is
Z Z
are
E No
I
is
Z
Ys
Zs
is
Y
Z
Some Xs Some Xs
are
is
O
Second Figure.
are not
Y (Co) A Every X Y
Z
is
E No
I
is
(Co)
is
Some Xs Some Xs
Every
are
Ys
Zs
E No
X
Z
is
Every
is
is
E No
E No
X X
Y Y (Co)
Z Z
is
O A O O
Third Figure.
are not
is
Y
Ys
Zs
Some Xs
Some Xs
are not
are not
A A
I
Every Y Every Y
is
is
E No
X (Co +)
Zs Zs (Co) Zs
Y Z X (Co 4.) Every Y

is is
Some Xs Some Ys
Every Y
are are
is
O O
A
Some Xs Some Ys
Every
are not
Zs
Zs
are not
A
I
X
Z
is
X
Zs
Some Xs
Every Y
are
is
O
I
Some Xs
are not
is
A
I I
E No
Xs (Co)
Zs
Z
Xs (Co)
Zs
Some Ys Some Xs
are are
Some Ys
Some Xs
are
are not
i8

Fourth Figure.
A A
I
Every Every
is is
Y
Z
Y (+) X
Zs
Some Zs
Every Y
are
is
Ys
Xs
A
I
Some Xs
Every
are
Some Zs
are
is
is is
E No E No
Y X
Y X
Z
E No
I
E No
Every Y
Y (Co)
X (Co +)
Zs
is
is
O
Z
is
Some Xs
are not
(Co)
Some Ys Some Xs
are
Xs (Co)
Zs
fyllogifms
;
O
The
above
is
are not
the ancient
it
method of dividing
be
but,
for the prefent purpofe,
will
fufficient to confider the fix
from which the reft can be obtained. And fmce fome of the fix have X in the predicate of the conclufion, and not Z, I fhall join to them the fix other fyllogifms which are found by tranfwith pofmg Z and X. The complete lift, therefore, of
fyllogifms
the weakeft premifes and the ftrongeft conclufions, in which a and is obtained comparifon of by comparifon of both with
X
:
Y,
is
as follows
In the lift of page 12, there was nothing but recapitulation of forms, each form admitting a variation by interchanging and Z. This interchange having been made, and the refults col
lected as above, if we take every cafe in which allowable cate, or can be made the predicate
is
the predi
by
converfion,
we
Flrjl Notions of Logic.

have a collection of
is
c
all
poflible weakeft forms
in
which the refult
one of the four c Every

are not
X
as
is
Z,
<
No X is
Z,
Some Xs are Zs,
Some Xs
Zs
follows.
The
premifes are written
in
what appeared the moft natural
order, without diftincSHon of
major or minor.
X Y Every X
Every Every
is is
Y
Z
is
Z
Some Zs
Every
are
is
Some Xs
Every
are
is
Ys
Zs
Ys
Zs
Y
Z
Some Xs
are
is
Some Xs
Every
are
is
Y Every X No ZisY
No
Some Xs
are
No
is
Z
Every
No
XisY X Z
is
Ys
Zs
is
Y
Ys
Zs
No
is
Y
affertion
Every
is
X
Zs
Some Xs Some Xs
are not
Some Ys Some Xs
are not
Some Xs
Every
are not
are not
are not
Zs
which can be made upon two things by com-
parifon with any third, that is, every fimple inference, can be reduced to one of the preceding forms. Generally fpeaking, one of the premifes is omitted, as obvious from the conclufion ; that
is, one premife being named and the conclufion, that premife is implied which is neceflary to make the conclufion good. Thus, if I That race muft have poflefTed fome of the arts of life, fay,
"
for they
came from
Afia,"
it
is
that
arts
all
races
life.
coming from Afia muft have
obvioufly meant to be aflerted, pofTefled fome of the

:
of
The
race
c
preceding
c
is
then a fyllogifm, as follows

:
That
is
a race of Afiatic origin
Every
race of Afiatic origin* is a race have pofleffed fome of the arts of life
which muft
Therefore, That race is a race which muft have pofleffed fome of the arts of life.
perfon who makes the preceding aiTertion either means to imply, antecedently to the conclufion, that all Afiatic races muft have poflefTed arts, or he talks nonfenfe if he aflert the conclu-
2O
fion pofitively.
C

c
when
Every
X muft be Z,for isY, can only be an inference Y Z. This latter propofition may be called
it
is
the fupprefled premife ; and it is in fuch fupprefled propofitions that the greateft danger of error lies. It is alfo in fuch propofi tions that men convey opinions which they would not willingly
exprefs.
Thus, the honeft witnefs who
faid,
always thought
him
a refpe&able
man
he kept his
gig,
would probably not
have admitted
be refpectable.
I mall
"
in direct
terms,
Every man who keeps a gig muft
now give
few detached
illuftrations
of what precedes.
his
His imbecility of character might have been inferred from pronenefs to favourites ; for all weak princes have this fail
ing."
The
many would pafs Written, however,

All
preceding would ftand very well in a hiftory, and it over as containing very good inference. in the form of a fyllogifm, it is,
weak
He
Therefore
princes are prone to favourites was prone to favourites
He
was
weak
prince
is palpably wrong. (Rule I.) The writer of fuch a fentence as the preceding might have meant to fay, for all who have this failing are weak princes ; in which cafe he would have
which
inferred rightly.
falfe
Every one mould be aware that there is much form of inference arifing out of badnefs of ftyle, which is
juft as injurious to the habits of the untrained reader as if the errors were miftakes of logic in the mind of the writer.
*
is lefs
than
Y Y
;
is lefs
than
therefore
X
;
is lefs
than
re
This, appears to be a fyllogifm it to the ufual form, we find it to be, ducing

Z.*
at firft fight,
but, on
Therefore
X Y X
is
(a (a
(a
magnitude magnitude
magnitude
lefs lefs
lefs
than
Y)
is
is
than Z) than Z)
which is not a fyllogifm, fmce there is no middle term. Evident as the preceding is, the following additional propofition muft be formed before it can be made explicitly logical. l If be a mag
nitude
lefs
than Z.
than Z, then every magnitude lefs than is alfo lefs There is, then, before the preceding can be reduced
Y Y
to a fyllogiftic form, the neceffity of a deduction from the fecond
Firfl Notions
of Logic.
premife, and the fubftitution of the refult inftead of that premife.
Thus,
Lefs than
Therefore
X Y X
is lefs is lefs
than
than
Y
Z
:
following from
is lefs
than Z.
is lefs
than
Z
if
lefs
But, if the additional argument be examined namely, is lefs than Z than Z, then that which is lefs than
Y be
will
it
be found to require precifely the fame confiderations repeated ; In fact, it may for the original inference was nothing more.
eafily
more than any fimple

is
of
would match a part of Y, and there would be parts of Y But when we fay, Every X is Y, meaning remaining over.
be feen as follows, that the proportion before us involves When we fay that fyllogifm can exprefs. were applied to Y, every part lefs than Y, we fay that if
the premife of a common fyllogifm, we fay that every inftance of is an inftance of Y, without faying any thing as to whether
there are or are not inftances of

are alfo
ftill left,,
after thofe
which
are taken away. If, then, we wifh to write an ordi in a manner which mall correfpond with c is lefs nary fyllogifm is lefs than is lefs than Z, therefore than Y, muft we Z,
introduce a
more
definite
amount of aflertion than was made
in
the preceding forms.
Thus,
is is
Therefore
Every X Every Y Every X
Y, and
there are
are are
Ys which
Zs which Zs which
more more
more
are not are not
Z, and there
Z, and there
all
all
Xs Ys
Xs
is
are not
Or
thus
The Ys The Zs
The Zs
The
From
contain contain
contain
the Xs, and the Ys, and

the Xs, and
is,
all
moft technical form, however,
Every Every Follows Every

This
fort
X Y X
is
is
is
Y
Z Z
is
[Some Ys [Some Zs [Some Zs
are not
are not
are
Xs] Ys] not Xs]
of argument
called a fortiori
premifes are
more than
fufficient to
is
extent of the conclufion
argument, becaufe the prove the conclufion, and the thereby greater than its mere form
is
would
indicate.
Thus,
lefs
than
Y,
is
lefs
than Z,
22
which
therefore, a fortiori^
X
Z
is
lefs
muft be greater than that to which X is In the fyllogifm laft written, either lefs than Y, or than Z. of the bracketted premifes might be ftruck out without deftroying As the conclusion ; which laft would, however, be weakened.
than Z, means that the extent to
is lefs
than
it
ftands,
Xs,
then, the part of the conclufion, follows a fortiori.
Some Zs
are not
The argument a fortiori may then be defined as a univerfally affirmative fyllogifm, in which both of the premifes are fhewn to
be
lefs
Thus, in Every X is X is Z, we do not certainly therefore Y is Y, Every Z, Every more Zs than Ys, fo imply that there are more Ys than Xs, or But if that we do not know that there are more Zs than Xs.
than the whole truth, or greater.
c
we
be
at liberty to ftate the fyllogifm as follows,
All the
Every
then
Xs make up
is
part (and part only) of the
Ys
we
are certain that
All the
Xs make up
Xs make up Ys make up
Zs. part (and part only) of the
But
if
we
be
at liberty further to fay that
All the
All the
part (and part only) of the part (and part only) of the
Ys
Zs
then
we
conclude that
All the
Xs make up part
of part (only) of the
Zs
and the words in Italics mark that quality of the conclufion from which the argument is called a fortiori. Moft fyllogifms which give an affirmative conclufion are gene a fortiori arguments, except only in mathe rally meant to imply matics. It is feldom, except in the exacl: fciences, that we meet
is Z, which with a propofition, Every c couple with fome Zs are not Xs.
we
cannot immediately
with the excep
When
an argument
is
completely
eftabliftied,
tion of one aiTertion only, fo that the inference may be drawn as foon as that one aflertion is eftablifhed, the refult is ftated in a
form which bears the name of an hypothetical fyllogifm. The word hypothefis means nothing but fuppofition ; and the fpecies of fyllogifm juft mentioned firft lays down the aflertion that a confequence will be true if a certain condition be fulfilled, and
23
then either aflerts the fulfilment of the condition, and thence the confequence, or elfe denies the confequence, and thence denies
the fulfilment of the condition.
Thus,
if
we know
P
is
that
When X
is
Z,
it
follows that
then, as foon as we can afcertain that that P is ; or, if we can fhew that P
X
X
is
not Z.
;
But
if
we
find that
is
Z, we can conclude is not Q, we know that not Z, we can infer no

is
for the preceding does not aflert that thing is Z. And if we find out that P is Qjwe
is Qônfy when can infer nothing. This conditional fyllogifm may be converted into an ordinary be any c cafe in which is Z/ and fyllogifm, as follows. Let then the preceding afTertion amounts ; V, a cafe in which P is
Let L be a particular inftance, the X of Every K is V. which may or may not be Z. If X be Z in the inftance under difcuflion, or if X be not Z, we have, in the one cafe and the
to
other,
Every
Therefore
K
L L
is is
V
a
is
K a V
Every
is
L is not a K No conclufion
is
Similarly, according as a particular cafe
(M)
or
is
not V,
we
have
Every
is
V
a
is
Every
No conclufion
That
its
is
M M
is is
V
not a
is
not a
the aflertion of an hypothefis is the afTertion of neceflary confequence, and the denial of the necefTary confe quence is the denial of the hypothefis but the aflertion of the
to fay
: :
neceflary confequence gives no right to aflert the hypothefis, nor does the denial of the hypothefis give any right to deny the truth
of that which would (were the hypothefis true) be

confequence.
its
neceflary
this, that
Demonftration
is
of two kinds
which
arifes
from
every propofition has a contradictory ; and of thefe two, one muft be true and the other muft be falfe. may then either
We
prove a propofition to be true, or x It is true that is Z, and every
its
*
it is
contradictory to be falfe. falfe that there are fome

;
Xs which
of either
is
are not Zs,* are the fame propofition called the indirect proof of the other.
and the proof
24
But how
is
Firft Notions
of Logic.
any propofition to be proved falfe, except by prov a contradiction to be true ? ing By proving a necefTary confe-
quence of the propofition to be falfe. But this is not a complete anfwer, fmce it involves the neceflity of doing the fame thing ; or, fo far as this anfwer goes, one propofition cannot be proved falfe unlefs by proving another to be falfe. But it may happen, that a neceffary confequence can be obtained which is obvioufly and felf-evidently falfe, in which cafe no further proof of the
falfehood of the hypothecs is Thus the proof which neceflary. Euclid gives that all equiangular triangles are equilateral is of the
following ftructure, logically confidered. (i.) If there be an equiangular triangle not equilateral, it fol lows that a whole can be found which is not greater than its
part.*
(2.) It
is falfe
that there can be any
whole which
is
not greater
than
its
part (felf evident).

it is falfe
;
(3.)
Therefore
is
that there
all
which
teral.
not equilateral
a propofition
or
is any equiangular triangle equiangular triangles are equila
When
matters
it
is eftabliflied
contains, the demonftration is called direfl ; when proving the falfehood of every contradictory propofition, it
called indireft.
by proving the truth of the by

is
is
it
The
latter fpecies
of demonftration
as the former, but not
of
fo
ble to ufe the former
whenever
fimple a kind ; whence it can be obtained.
as logical is defira-
The
is
ufe
of indirect demonftration in the Elements of Euclid

It frequently
almoft entirely confined to thofe propofitions in which the con-
verfes of fimple propofitions are proved. that an eftabliflied aflertion of the form
happens
Every
is
Z
Z
(i)
may
be
eafily
made the means of deducing,

Every (thing not X)
is
not
(2)
which
laft
gives
Every
* This
is
is
(3)
the propofition in proof of

is
which nearly the whole of the de
monftration of Euclid
fpent.
Fir/I Notions of Logic.
25
converfion of the fecond propofition into the third is made ufually by an indirect demonftration, in the following manner : If poflible, let there be one Z, which is not X, (2) being true.
The
Then
and
is
there
is is
:
thing not
one thing which

not
is
not
therefore there
is
is
not
and is Z ; but every one thing which is Z
which
abfurd.
is
It
is
;
then abfurd that there

or, Every Z is X. method which is of
fhould be one fingle
which
not
The
quent
following propofition contains a
fre
ufe.
Let there be any number of propofitions or three for inftance, X, Y, and Z, of which it is the that one or the other muft be and one only. Let true, property there be three other propofitions, P, and of which it is R, Q,
HYPOTHESIS.
afTertions,
alfo the
alfo
property that one, and one only, muft be true. be a connexion of thofe afTertions, that
Let
it
When X When Y When Z

CONSEQUENCE
:
is
true,
true,
true,
is
true
true
is
is
QJs
is
true
then
it
follows that
When P is true, X is true When QJs true, Y is true When R is true, Z is true
For,
when P
is
can be true, for then Q_ or R would be true. But either X, Y, or Z muft be true, therefore muft be true ; P is when is In a true. fimilar the or, true, way remaining afTertions may be proved.
neither
true, then
Q,and
muft be
falfe
nor
confequently,
When P is Q, X is Z When P is not Q, X is not Z It follows that When X is Z, P is Q^ When X is not Z, P is not Q_ rWhen X is greater than Z, P is greater than Q Cafe 2. If When X is equal to Z, P is equal to Q C When X is lefs than Z, P is lefs than Q f When P is greater than Q, X is greater than Z It follows that When P is equal to Z Q, X is equal to I When P is lefs than X is lefs than Z Q,
Cafe
i.
If
<
<
26
CHAPTER
On
is
II.
Objefts, Ideas,
and Names.
which
derived from a
Greek word
It is the of thought, ufually by fpeech. name which is generally given to the branch of inquiry (be it called fcience or art), in which the act of the mind in reafoning is con-
communication LOGIC
(to yof)
fignifies
fidered, particularly
and language. been found fatisfactory to any confiderable number of thinking

perfons.
with reference to the connection of thought But no definition yet given in few words has
All exifting things upon this earth, which have knowledge of

their
exiftence, poffefs, fome in one degree and fome in another, the power of thought, accompanied by perception, which is the awakening of thought by the effect of external objects
fenfes.
own
upon the
By
thought
I here
mean,
all
mental action, not
only that comparatively high ftate of it which is peculiar to man, but alfo that lower degree of the fame thing which appears to be
poffeffed
by brutes.
refpect to the mind, confidered as a complicated ap
With
even fo well off as paratus which is to be ftudied, we are not thofe would be who had to examine and decide upon the mechanifm of a watch, merely by obfervation of the functions of mechani the hands, without being allowed to fee the infide. firft time, would be for the was a watch whom to prefented cian,
good guefs as to its ftructure, from his knowledge of other pieces of contrivance. As foon as he had examined the law of the motion of the hands, he might conceivably invent an inftrument with fimilar properties, in fifty different ways. But in the
able to give a
cafe fmalleft
knowledge derived from

to thofe
of the mind, we have manifeftations only, without the power of reference to other fimilar things, or the leaft of ftructure or procefs, other than what may be
thofe manifeftations.
who
It is the problem of the watch have never feen any mechanifm at all.
On
ObjeEls, Ideas,
and Names.
27
We
have nothing more to do with the fcience of mind,
diftinctions,
than to draw a very few neceflary which, whatever names we ufe to denote them, are Some modes of matters of fact connected with our fubjedT:.
ufually called metaphyfics,*
them favor one fyflem of metaphyfics, and fome another; but flill they are matters of obferved fad!:. Our words muft be very imperfect fymbols, drawn from comparifon of the manifeftations of thought with thofe of things in corporeal exexpreffing
For inftance, I juft now fpoke of the mind as an apparatus, or piece of mechanifm. It is a ftructure of fome fort, which has the means of fulfilling various purpofes ; and fo far it
iftence.
refembles the hand, which by the difpofition of bone and mufcle,
and grafps.
can be made to perform an immenfe variety of different motions Where the refemblance begins to be imperfect, and
why,
need
ing,
lize,
In all probability we fhould is what we cannot know. new modes of perception, other fenfes befides fight, hear and touch, in order to know thought as we know colour,
But the purpofe of the prefent treatife is only or motion. the examination of fome of the manifeftations of thinking power in their relation to the language in which they are expreiTed.
Knowledge of thought and knowledge of
the refults of thought,
* All fyftems make an affumption of the uniformity of procefs in all minds, carried to an extent the propriety of which ought to be a matter of There are no writers who give us fo much muft with fo fpecial difcuflion.
little
ivfiy, as the
metaphyficians.
If perfons
who had
its
only feen the outfide

purpofe, they might ufe the pendulum
of the timepiece, were to invent machines to anfwer

arrive at their objeft in very different ways.
One might
:
and weight, another the fprings and the balance one might difcover the combination of toothed wheels, another a more complicated a6lion of lever
upon
lever.
Are we fare
that there are not differences in our minds, fuch
as the preceding inftance may fuggeft by analogy ; if fo, ho f are we fure ? Again, if our minds be as tables with many legs, do we know that a weight
put upon different tables will be fupported in the fame manner in all. May not the fame leg fupport much or all of a certain weight in one mind, and
little
this,
or nothing in another ? I have feen ftriking inftances of fomething like among thofe who have examined for themfelves the grounds of the
mathematical fciences.
would not diffuade a ftudent from metaphyfical inquiry j on the con fuch trary, I would rather endeavour to promote the defire of entering upon but I would warn him, when he tries to look down his own throat fubjefts
I
:
with a candle
in his
hand, to take care that he does not
fet his
head on
fire.
28
On
Objetts, Ideas,
and Names.
The watch abovementioned might hands difcovered, might be ufed in find ing longitude (and even latitude) all over the world, without the parties ufmg it having the fmalleft idea of its interior ftrudture.
are very different things.
its
have the functions of
That our minds,
we may)
exift,
is
fouls, or thinking powers (ufe what name the thing of all others of which we are moft
Next to this, nothing can be more certain, each for himfelf. certain to us, each for himfelf, than that other things alfo exift ;
But other minds, our own bodies, the whole world of matter. between the character of thefe two certainties there is a vaft dif ference. Any one who mould deny his own exiftence would, he does not know the if ferious, be held beneath argument But if the fame or he is falfe or mad. of his words, meaning
:
man mould deny that any thing exifts except himfelf, that is, if he mould affirm the whole creation to be a dream of his own If I (who know he mind, he would be abfolutely unanfwerable.
wrong, for 7 am certain of my own exiftence) argue with him, and reduce him to filence, it is no more than might* happen in A celebrated metaphyfician, Berkeley, maintained his dream. that with regard to matter, the above is the ftate of the cafe
is
:
that our impreffions of matter are only impreffions, cated by the Creator without any intervening caufe of
cation.
communi communi
convincing communicable proof of the exiftence of other things, is, not the appearance of objects, but the neceffity of admitting that there are other minds befides our own. The external inanimate objects might be creations of our own
Our moft
and perceptive fun&ion they are fo fomethought, or thinking in which the mind has frequently of cafe in the infanity, times, as
:
the appearance of making the whole or part of its own external But when we fee other beings, performing fimilar func world.
tions to thofe
which
we ourfelves
perform,
we come
fo irrefiftibly
to the conclufion that there that
muft be other
fentients like ourfelves,
denied his
we mould rather compare a perfon who doubted it to one who own exiftence, than to one who fimply denied the real
external exiftence of the material world.

* It is not in a real dream of deep, fome one may have impoflible that created an antagonift who beat him in an argument to prove that he was
awake.
On
When
once
Objetts, Ideas ,
and Names.
29
we
have admitted different and independent
minds, the reality of external objects (external to

follows as of courfe.
For
different
any impreffions, one in each of two different minds, can be known to be fimilar. There muft be zfomewhat independent of thofe minds, which thus acts upon
the fame time, which their them to know are fimilar, fo far as
all thofe minds) minds receive impreflions at power of communication enables
them
all
at
is
once, and without any choice of their own.
fomewhat
arife in
what we
s
call
an external object
This and whether it
Berkeley
mode, or
in any other, matters nothing to us
here.
We
exift,
mall then, take it for granted that external objetts actually independently of the mind which perceives them. And this
brings us to an important diftinction, which we muft carry with us throughout the whole of this work. Befides the actual exter nal object, there is alfo the mind which and what perceives
it,
want of better words or rather for want of knowing whether they be good words or not) we muft call the image of that objett in the mind, or the idea which it communicates. The termfub(for
jeft
thus
and applied by metaphyficians to the perceiving mind faid that a thing may be confidered fubjetfivety (with re ference to what it is in the mind) or objectively (with reference
is
:
it is
to
what
it is
ufe the
word fubject bread is wholefome

language
fo
independently of any particular mind). But logicians in another fenfe. In a proportion fuch as the thing fpoken of, c bread , is called the ,
:
fubject of the propofition
and
in fact the
wordfubjetf
is
in
com
frequently confounded with objeft, that it is almoft hopelefs to fpeak clearly to beginners about themfelves as I mall therefore adopt the words ideal and objective, filbjtft$.
idea
mon
and
:
objeft^ as being,
under explanations, as good as any
others
and better than fubjeft and

idea>
The word
in
objeft for a work on logic. as here ufed, does not enter in that vague fenfe
it is generally ufed, as if it were an opinion that might be or It is that which the right wrong. object: gives to the mind, or the ftate of the mind produced by the object. Thus the idea
which
of a horfe
mind : and we know no other horfe. objeft^ a horfe, which may a in the mind to different but no one give horfe twenty perfons of thefe twenty knows the object ; each one knows his idea. only
is
We
the horfe in the

is
admit that there
an external
30
On
Objefts, Ideas,
and Names.
:
There is an object, becaufe each of the twenty perfons receives an idea without communicating with the others fo that there is talk about fomething external to give it them. But when they
it,
under the name of a horfe, they talk about their
ideas.
They
refer to the object, as being the thing they are talking about, until the moment they begin to differ: and then they begin to fpeak,
all
not of external horfes, but of impreflions on their minds ; at leaft is the cafe with thofe who know what knowledge is ; the pofiAnd tive and the unthinking part of them ft ill talk of the horfe.
this
the latter have a great advantage* over the former with thofe who are like themfelves.
Why
then do
knowledge lies term matter into natural philofophy, when all we know is form, nor even all fize, colour, weight, &c., no one of which is matter,
It is convenient to have a word for that external together. fource from which fenfible ideas are produced : and it is juft as
introduce the term object at all, fince all our in ideas ? For the fame reafon as we introduce the
we
convenient to have a word for the external fource, material or not, from which any idea is produced. Again, why do we fpeak
of our power of confidering things either ideally or objectively, as we can know nothing but ideas, we can have no right to fpeak of any thing elfe ? The anfwer is that, juft as in other of the idea of an things, when we fpeak of an object, we fpeak
when
objetf.
We learn to fpeak of the

who
:
are others like ourfelves
external world, becaufe there fame evidently draw ideas from the
fources as ourfelves
hence
we come
to
have the idea of thofe
fources, the idea of external objects, as we call them. But we do not know thofe fources ; we know only our ideas of them.
can even ufe the terms ideal and objective in what may appear a metaphorical fenfe. When we fpeak of ourfelves in the manner of this chapter, we put ourfelves, as it were, in the pofiwe fpeak and think of our tion of fpectators of our own minds
:
We
aflerts a faEl on his own knowledge, another aflerts his full of the contrary fa6l. Both ufe the evidence of their fenfes but The firft the fecond knows that full conviftion is all that man can have. will carry it hollow in a court of juftice, in which perfons are conftantly compelled to fwear, not only that they have an impreflion, but that the imcon<vition
:
One man
preffion
is
correft
that
is
to fay,
is
would have, and muft have, and ought
the impreffion which to have.
mankind
in general
On
own minds
word
Objeffs, Ideas,
and Names.
And it muft be remembered that by the The mind not mean material object only. do object, of another, any one of its thoughts or feelings, any relation of minds to one another, a treaty of peace, a battle, a difcuffion
objectively.
we
upon
are
in
a controverted queftion, the right of conveying a freehold,

all
them.
objects, independently of the perfons or things engaged They are things external to our minds, of which we
have
ideas.
An
object communicates an idea

is
but
it
does not follow that
every idea
ideas in
communicated by an object. The mind can create various ways ; or at leaft can derive, by combinations
which
ideas.
are not found in external exiftence,
new
collections of
We
:
dragon
have a perfectly diftinct idea of a unicorn, or a flying when we fay there are no fuch things, we fpeak ob
:
a horfe or ideally, they have as much exiftence as jectively only a fheep ; to a herald, more. Add to this, that the mind can
feparate ideas into parts, in fuch manner that the parts alone are not ideas of any exifting feparate material objects, any more than the letters of a word are conftituent parts of the meaning of the
whole.
ball
Hence we
get
what
are called qualities and relations.
may be hard and round, or may have hardnefs and roundnefs but we can not fay that hardnefs and roundnefs are feparate external material objects, though they are objects the ideas of
:
which Thefe
neceflarily accompany our perception of certain objects. ideas are called abftratt as being removed or abftracted from
:
the complex idea which gives them the abftraction is made by or obfervation of If a perfon had never refemblances. comparifon
feen any thing round except an apple, he would perhaps never think of roundnefs as a diftinct object of thought. he faw
When
another round body, which was evidently not an apple, he would immediately, by perception of the refemblance, acquire a feparate
idea of the thing in
Abftraction
only. a number of actions, performed by a number of perfons, we get the ideas of goodnefs, wickednefs, talent, courage. But we muft
which they refemble one another. not performed upon the ideas of material objects For inftance, from conduct of one kind, running through
is
not imagine that we can thefe words. They are
make
:
ideally external reprefentation
of
objefls^ that is to fay, the
mind confiders
them
as
external
to itfelf
but they are not material objects.
32
Some
abftracl:
On
Objetts, Ideas,
and Names.
them as only people deny their exiftence, and look upon or we which under or words fpeak of minds words, more than one of the ideas pro bodies without
fpecifying
duced by
thefe
fay
any minds or bodies.
For
when we
knowledge gives power
inftance, they aflert that it is really that perfons
with knowledge are therefore able, or have power, to produce, This is a queftion or to do, what perfons without it cannot. which it does not concern me here to difcufs. of originating new Seeing that the mind poflefles a power combinations of ideas, and alfo of abftracling from complex ideas
the
more fimple ones of which,
it
feems natural to
fay,
they are
compofed, it has long been a queftion among metaphyficians whether the mind has any ideas of its own which it poflefles in It is not external objects. dependently of all fuggeftion from to ftudent the lead that I mould attempt to any conneceflary clufion* on this fubject: for our purpofe, the diftinction between
ideas
and objects, though it were falfe, is of more importance than that between innate and acquired ideas, though it be true. But one of thefe two things muft be true either we have ideas from or by means of communication which we do not
:
acquire
with the external world (experience, trial of our fenfes) or there is a power in the mind of acquiring a certainty and a generality
which experience alone could not properly
we
are fatisfied as of our
own
For inftance, give. exiftence that feven and three col
lected are the fame as five and five, whatever the oljeRs
* It has always appeared to
may
be
me much
fuch a queftion as the following.

;
hooks which certainly catch fifh if put into the water and moft into the water. There are then fifh upon them. certainly they have been put But thefe fifh might have been on fome of them when they were put into the It is to no purpofe to inquire whether it was fo or not, unlefs there water. be fome diftin&ion between the fifties which may make it a queftion whether fome of them could have been bred in the river into which the hooks were The mind has certainly a power of acquiring and retaining ideas, put. which power, when put into communication with the external world, it muft There is no mind to experiment upon, except thofe which have exercife.
There
are
had fuch communication.
Are
there found
any ideas which we have reafon
to think could not have been acquired by this communication ? any fifhes which could not have come out of the river ? Metaphyficians feem to admit
that if any ideas be innate, they are thofe of fpace, time, and of caufe and if there be any ideas, which, not being effeft they feem alfo to admit, that
:
are thefe very ones. innate, are fure to be acquired, they
On
Objects, Ideas,
is
and Names.
33
which are counted: the thing fheep, trees, &c. &c. &c.
this
We
true of fingers, pebbles, counters, cannot have allured ourfelves of
by experience
bles at the
are as fure
for example, we know it to be true of peb North Pole, though we have never been there ; we of it as of our own exiftence. I do not mean that we
:
have a rational conviction only,
fit
to act upon, that
it is
fo at the
North Pole, becaufe

tried
:
it
is
fo in
elfe,
every
place in
which
this
;
it
has been
if
we had
nothing
we
ftiould
have
but
we
feel
that this lefler conviction
is
fwallowed up by a greater.
We have
the lefler conviction that the pebbles at the pole fall to the ground when they are let go we are very fure of this, without afferting that it cannot be otherwife we fee no impoffibility in thofe peb
: :
bles
being fuch as always to remain in air wherever they are But that feven and three are no other than five and placed.*
five is a matter which we are prepared to affirm as pofitively of the pebbles at the North Pole as of our own that it fingers, both is fo, and that it muft be fo. Whence arifes this actual difference in
point of fact, between our
mode of viewing and knowing
* Metaphyficians, in their fyftems, have often taken this diftinftion to be one of fyftem only, treating it as a thing to be accepted or rejefted with the fyftem, inftead of an aftual and which re Jndifputable phenomenon
the faft, as a faft, per vade his writings, fometimes attached to a fyftem, fometimes not. The It is following remarks on the general fubjeft are worth confideration
on natural
quires explanation under any fyftem. fcience I know, is the one
Dr. Whewell, of
all
Englifh writers
who
has
made
"
indeed, extremely difficult to find, in fpeaking of this fubjeft, expreflions which are fatisfaftory. The reality of the objeils which we perceive is a
exiftence
exifts,
cannot but fuppofe that profound, apparently an infoluble problem. that what is fomething different from our knowledge of exiftence
:
We
truth is truth merely in our knowing that it does whether we know it or not. Yet how can we conceive truth, otherwife than as fomething known ? How can we conceive things as exifting, without
does not
exift
conceiving them as objefts of perception
Ideas and Things are conftantly
oppofed, yet necefTarily coexiftent. How they are thus oppofite and yet iden tical, is the ultimate problem of all philofophy. The fucceffive phafes of
philofophy have confifted in feparating and again uniting thefe two oppofite elements ; in dwelling fometimes upon the one and fometimes upon the other, that as the principal or original or only element ; and then in difcovering
fuch an account of the
ideas.
ftate
of the cafe was
infufficient.
Knowledge
requires
Reality requires things.
known.
our
Truth is, and is Ideas and things coexift. But the complete explanation of thefe points appears to be beyond
reach."
34
tion
is
On
Objects, Ideas,
?
and Names.
laft
different fpecies
of affertions
the truth of the
named
affer-
not born with us, for children are without it, and learn it by experience, as we know. The mufl be fa cannot be acquired from experience in the common way, for that fame experience
on which we
rely tells us that
however often a thing may have
been found true, whatever rule may have been eftablifhed by re There feems peated inftances, an exception may at laft occur. then to be in the mind a power of developing, from the ideas
which experience gives, a real and true diftinction of necefTary and not neceffary, poffible and impoffible. The things which
how we
to fay.
but : are without us always confirm our neceffary propofitions derive that complete aflurance that they will do fo as
faithfully as hitherto they
have done
fo, is
not within our power
Connected with
ideas are the
or written founds by which with others about them.
we
To
names we give them ; the fpoken think of them, and communicate have an idea, and to make it the
:
diftinct things fubjedt of thought as an idea, are two perfectly I doubt whether we the idea of an idea is not the idea itfelf. could have made thought itfelf the fubjedt of thought without
As it is, we give names to our ideas, meaning by language. name not merely a fingle word, but any collection of words which Thus a-man-in-aconveys to one mind the idea in another.
a
lack-coat-riding-along-the high-road-on-a-bay-horfe the name of an idea as man, black, or horfe.

I
is
as
much
We
can coin
words
fingle
at pleafure
and, were
it
worth while, might invent a
to ftand for the preceding phrafe. Names are ufed indifferently, both for the objects which pro duce ideas, and for the ideas produced by them. This is a dif-
word
be neceffary to fpecify whether we fpeak ideally or objectively. In common converfation we for granted fpeak ideally and think we fpeak objectively we take and will to fit to that our own ideas are others, convey to pafs
advantage, and
it
will frequently
them the fame ideas as the objects themfelves would have done. That this may be the cafe, it is neceffary firft, that the object
fhould really give us the fame ideas as to others ; fecondly, that our words fhould carry from us to our correfpondents the fame ideas as thofe which we intended to exprefs by them. How, and in what cafes, the firft or the fecond condition is not ful-
On
filled,
it
Objects, Ideas,
and Names.
we
35
But we have
is
impoflible to
know
or to enumerate.
nothing to
do here except
to obferve* that
are only incidentally
concerned with
this queftion in a
work of logic.
We
prefume
fixed and, if objective, objectively true ideas, with certain attached : fo that it is never in doubt whether a name be or
names
be not
in properly attached to any idea. This method muft be followed all works of fcience a conceivably attainable end is firft prefumed to be attained, and the confequences of its attainment are
:
comes the queftion whether this end is always attained, and if not, why. The way to mend bad roads muft come at the end, not at the beginning, of a treatife on the
ftudied.
Then,
afterwards,
art
of making good ones.
Every name has a reference to every idea, either affirmative or negative. The term horfe applies to every thing, either pofitively or negatively. This (no matter what I am fpeaking of) either is
or
is
is
not a horfe.
not precife, or the term horfe
If there be any doubt about it, either the idea name ought is ill underftood.
to be like a boundary, which clearly and undeniably either {huts It is the im in, or fhuts out, every idea that can be fuggefted.
perfection of our minds, our language, and our knowledge of external things, that this clear and undeniable inclufion or exclufion is feldom attainable, except as to ideas which are well within
the boundary : at and near the boundary itfelf all is vague. There are decided greens and decided blues but between the two colours there are (hades of which it muft be unfettled by uni:
verfal agreement to which of the two colours they belong. the eye, green pafles into blue by imperceptible gradations
To
:
our
is
fenfes will fuggeft no place to end and the other to
on which
all
agree, at
which one
begin.
But the advance of knowledge has a tendency to fupply means of precife definition. Thus, in the inftance above cited, Wollafton and Fraunhofer have difcovered the black lines which al
ways
fpe&rum of folar colours given by a glafs prifm, fame relative places. There are definite places in the fpectrum,by the help of which the place of any {hade of colour therein
exift in the
in the
exifting
may*
a
When
* It
is
name
be afcertained, and means of definition given. is complex, it frequently admits of definition,
quite within the portabilities of the application of fcience to the
36
nominal or
On
real.
Objefts, Ideas y
and Names.
when we can of
name may be faid to be defined nominally In fuch a right fubftitute for it other terms. a of the word cafe, perfon may be made to know the meaning
without accefs to the object of which it is to give the idea. Thus, an ijland is completely defined in c land furrounded by water. In definition, we do not mean that we are necefTarily to have
very precife terms in which to explain the name defined but, as the terms of the definition fo is the name which is defined ; ac
:
cording as the
fecond.
firft
Thus
there
are precife or vague, clear or obfcure, fo is the may be a queftion as to the meaning of
is a marfh Some flicking up out of the water an ifland ? will fay that, as oppofed to water, a marfh is land, others may
land:
confider marfh as intermediate between

[dry] land and water.
:
what
is
commonly
called
muft partake of it water, whether this phrafe be vague or precife. This fort of de finition is nominal^ being the fubftitution of names for names. It
is
If there be any vaguenefs, the term ifland for ifland is but fhort for ( land furrounded by
as fuch,
complete, for it gives all that the name is to mean. An ifland, can have nothing neceflarily belonging to it except what
c
neceflarily belongs to
finition, I
mean fuch an
land furrounded by water/ explanation of the word, be
By
it
real de
the whole
of the meaning or only part, as will be fufficient to feparate the Thus the things contained under that word from all others.
c following, I believe, is a complete definition of an elephant-, an animal which naturally drinks by drawing the water into its nofe, and then fpirting it into its mouth. As it happens, the animal
which does
the earth
:
this is the
fo
long as this
;
elephant only, of all which are known upon is the cafe, fo long the above definition
anfwers every purpofe
but
it is
far
from involving
all
the ideas
which
Neither fagacity, nor utility, nor the of are production neceflarily connected with drinking by ivory, of the nofe. And this definition is purely objective ; we do help
arife
from the word.
not
is
mean
that every idea
we
could form of an animal

If a
fo
drinking
to be called an elephant.
new
animal were to be difco-
vered, having the fame mode of drinking, it would be a matter of pure choice whether it fhould be called elephant or not. It
arts that the
time fhould come when the fpe6lrum, and the lines in be ufed for matching colours in every linen-draper s mop.
it,
will
On
muft then be
Objefts, Ideas,
whether
it
and Names*
37
fettled
fhall
that race of animals fhall be divided into

tive definitions
;
be called an elephant, and two fpecies, with diftinc-
or whether
it
fhall
have another name, and the
above given fhall be incomplete, as not ferving to draw an entire diftinc~tion between the elephant and all other things. It will be obferved that the nominal definition includes the real,
definition
as foon as the terms
real definition
of fubftitution are really defined
while the
may fall fhort of the nominal. When a name is clearly underftood, by which we mean when of every objecl: of thought we can diftinclly fay, this name does or does not, contain that objecl: we have faid that the name ap to in one or the other. The word man plies everything, way
has an application both to Alexander and Bucephalus the firft a man, the fecond was not. In the formation of language, a great many names are, as to their original fignification, of a
:
was
purely negative character

not meet, aliens are
men who
thus y parallels are only lines which do are not Britons (that is, in our
If language were as perfecT: and as copious as we country). could imagine it to be, we ftiould have, for every name which has a pofitive fignification, another which implies all other
merely
things
thus, as
we
have a name for a
tree,
we
fhould have an
other to fignify every thing that is not a tree. As it is, we have fometimes a name for the pofitive, and none for the negative, as
in tree
:
in -parallels
fometimes for the negative and none for the pofitive, as : fometimes for both, as in a frequent ufe of perfon
logic,
it is
and thing. In
defirable to confider
:
names of
inclufion
with the correfponding names of exclufion do to a much greater extent than is ufual
and
this I intend to
inventing names of exclufion by the prefix not, as in tree and not-tree, man and notman. Let thefe be called contrary ,* or contradictory^ names.
:
Let us take a pair of contrary names, as man and not-man. plain that between them they reprefent everything imaginable or real, in the univerfe. But the contraries of common language ufually embrace, not the whole univerfe, but fome one gene
It
is
ral idea.
man muft
Thus, of men, Briton and alien are contraries every be one of the two, no man can be both. Not-Briton
:
and alien are identical names, and

*
fo
are not-alien and Briton.
intend to draw no diftin&ion between thefe words.
On ObjeEts, Ideas , and Names. 38 The fame may be faid of integer and fraction among numbers, fe peer and commoner among fubje&s of the realm, male and
fay that the
male among animals, and fo on. In order to exprefs this, let us whole idea under confideration is the univerfe (mean and let ing merely the whole of which we are confidering parts) them between names which have nothing in common, but which contraries called be contain the whole idea under confideration,
that univerfe. Thus, the univerfe being refpeft to, are Briton and alien contraries, as are foldier and civi mankind, univerfe being animal, man and the male and &c. : female, lian,
/,
or
with
brute are contraries, &c.
Names maybe reprefented by the letters of the alphabet: thus A, B, &c., may ftand for any names we are confidering, fimple or complex. The contraries may be reprefented by not- A, not-B,
&c., but I
#,
,
fliall
&c.
them by the fmall letters ufually prefer to denote in the univerfe Thus, (whatever that uni
everything
is
verfe
may embrace)
&c.
either
or not- A, either
-,
or a, either
, Nothing can be both B and b every not-B is , and fo on. and every not-/ is B No language, as may well be fuppofed, has been conftructed
or
beforehand with any intention of providing for the wants of any In moft, it is feen that the neceflity of metaphyfical fyftem. of contrary terms has been obeyed. formation for the providing
language has borrowed from the Latin as well as from agree able, as well as un parent thus we have imperfeft, dif There is a choice of contraries without very and witlefs. formed
its
:
Our own
modes of appropriation ftanding for different de Thus we have not perfeft which is not fo grees of contrariety. of a ftrong a term as imperfett ; and not imperfetf, the contrary
well fettled
:
The wants of com contrary, which is not fo ftrong as perfefl. mon converfation have fometimes retained a term and allowed
the contrary to fink into difufe and neglected the original term
; ;
fometimes retained the contrary fometimes have even introduced
the contrary without introducing any term for the original no tion, and allowed no means of expreiling the original notion
except as the contrary of a contrary.
If
we
could imagine a
fuppofe perfect language, this indeed our own lan Signifying the contrary of every name : in an awkward and be faid to have, fometimes guage may though
we mould
it
would contain a mode of
On
Objects, Ideas y
and Names.
:
39
inflexion, or one additional word, ferve to a thus not man is may fignify contrary of any kind But there is a effective to denote all that is other than man.
unidiomatic manner.
One
wider want, which can only be

fatisfaction
:
for its partially fupplied,
complete
would require words almoft beyond the power of arithmetic to count and all that has been done to make it lefs in our confifts, language and in every other, moftly in the forma tion of compound terms, be they fubftantive and adjective, dou
ble fubftantives, or
contained within
from them
rated,
all
clafs of objects has a fub-clafs of which are diftinguifhed the individuals it, others of the clafs by fomething common to them and
any others.
only. and a
word formed
If the diftinguifhing characteriftic have been fepato fignify the abftract idea, that word,
or an adjective formed from it (if it be not an adjective) is joined with the general name of the clafs. Thus we have ftrong men, white horfes, &c. Or it may happen that the individuals of the
fub-clafs take, in right
of the diftinguiming characteriftic, a per

varied rules.
fectly
new name, and by the moft

is
A corn-grinding
from the implement he ufes, a miller ; a meathe fupplies, a butcher^ (if the killing man from the organ which firft idea of the etymology of this word be correct). Other men ftill cuftom has fet ufe mills and other trades feed the mouth
called
:
man
though the firft is only connected with its origin and the fecond by a derivation which muft be the fpelling, by But again, it will more often hap in another language. fought diftinctive that a characteriftic, belonging to fome only, gives pen
tled thefe terms,
name to thofefome, which ftill remain an unnamed of the out whole, to be feparated by the defcription of their feme characteriftic when wanted, inftead of being the all of a name invented to exprefs them, and them alone of their clafs. In fuch
no
distinctive
a predicament, for inftance, are men who have never feen the Hence it ap fea, as diftinguifhed from thofe who have feen it.
verfal
pears that particular propofitions are not fo diftinct from uniones in real character as they are generally made to be.
If I fay c fome As are Bs the reader may well fuppofe that it is not often neceflary to advert to this fact had it been fo, a name
:
would have been invented

If this
fpecially to fignify
As which
are Bs.
c
name had been C,
the proportion would have been
every
is
B.
40
for
On
one
fub-clafs
Objetts, Ideas,
and Names.
name
in the
The fame convenience which
dilates the formation of a
and not for another, rules
formation of
contrary terms, as already noted. And thefe caprices of language their for for logically confidered they are nothing elfe, though
mation
is
far
mal
treatife the
from lawlefs make it defirable to include in a for moft complete confideration of all propofitions,
with reference not only to their terms, but alfo to the contraries of thofe terms. Every negative proportion is affirmative, and Whatever completely does one of every affirmative is
negative.
If I fay that the two, include or exclude, alfo does the other. c B in the not of name no the b is B, then, every thing being
univerfe of the propofition, I fay that c no is B, I fay that fay that
every
is
and
if I
every
is b.
Whether
a lan
guage will happen to poflefs the name B, or , or both, depends on circumftances of which logical preference is never one, ex The Englifh may poflefs a term for cept in treatifes of fcience. that the fame idea muft be prefented fo for b French the B, only
:
an affirmative form to an Englimman, as in and in a negative one to a Frenchman, as c no

in
all this it
every
is
B,
is b.
From
follows that
is
it is
an accident of language whether a pro
univerfal or particular, pofitive or negative. We, pofition c is B : able to be and names the B, every fay may having which only names the contrary of B, muft fay another
A third language, in which As have not a feparate ( name, but are only individuals of the clafs C, muft fay fome Cs are Bs ; while a fourth, which is in the further predicament of c When we naming only , muft have it fome Cs are not s.
<
language,
3
no
is b.
come
to confider the fyllogifm,
we
ftiall
have
full
confirmation of
the correctnefs and completenefs of this view. It may be objected that the introduction of terms
which are
merely negations of the politive ideas contained in other terms I anfwer, that, firft, the fiction, if it be a is a fpecies of fiction.
fiction, exifts in
eafily
be proved more
language, and produces its effects : nor will it fictitious than the invention of founds to
ftand for things.
But, fecondly, there
is
much more
effective
anfwer, which
will require a little
development.
When
traries as
writers
on logic, up to the prefent time, ufe fuch con man and not-man, they mean by the alternative, man
elfe.
and everything
There can be
little
effective
meaning, and
On
no
Objects, Ideas,
and Names.
41
which, becaufe they are not men, in cludes in one word, not-man, a planet and a pin, a rock and a But featherbed, bodies and ideas, wifhes and things wimed for.
ufe, in a claflification
if
we remember
fo
that in
is
many, perhaps moil, proportions, the
range of thought
commonly
much lefs extenfive than the whole univerfe, called, we begin to find that the whole extent of a
fubje6t of difcuflion is, for the purpofe of difcuflion, what I have called a univerfe, that is to fay, a range of ideas which is either
exprefTed or underilood as containing the whole matter under In fuch univerfes, contraries are very common : confideration. that is, terms each of which excludes every cafe of the other,
while both together contain the whole. And, it muft be obferved that the contraries of a limited univerfe, though it be a fufficient real definition of either that it is not the other, are fre
obtained.
quently both of them the objects from which pofitive ideas are Thus, in the univerfe of property, perfonal and real are contraries, and a definition of either is a definition of the
other.
the other,
of a
But though each be a negative term as compared with no one will fay that the idea conveyed by either is that mere negation. Money is not land, but it is fomething. And
even when the contrary term is originally invented merely as a Thus negation, it may and does acquire pofitive properties.
but fuppofe a man taken in arms ftriclly not-Briton the crown on fome fpot within its dominions, and claim againft to be a of war. The anfwer that he is a Britiih fubprifoner ing is a to eftabliih his pofitive claim he firft muft jecT: negation
alien
is
:
prove himfelf an
alien,
and moreover that he
is
in
another pofitive
predicament, namely, that he is the fubjecl: of a power at war with Great Britain. Accordingly, of two contraries, neither muft be confidered as only the negation of the other except when
:
the univerfe in queftion is fo wide, and the pofitive term fo li mited, that the things contained under the contrary name have nothing but the negative quality in common.
of
to
Perception of agreements and difagreements is the foundation all affertion : the acquirement of fuch perception with refpecl:
any two ideas by the comparifon of both with a third, is the procefs of all Inference. To infer, by comparifon of abftract ideas, is the peculiar privilege of man j to need inference is his imper
fection.
To what
point
man would
carry inference
if
he wanted
42
language,
On
if
Objetts, Ideas,
and Names.
how much
they have of it
further the lower animals could carry what they had language, are queftions on which it is
vain to fpeculate. The words is and is not, which imply the or agreement difagreement of two ideas, muft exift, explicitly or
And what we call agreement or When be reduced to difagreement, may identity or non-identity. we fay John is a man, we have the firft and moft objective form of
implicitly, in every afTertion.
afTertion.
Looked
is
at in the
moft objective point of view
it is
only
this,
man.
idea of
John Looked
one of the individual objects

proportion
is
who
are called
at ideally, the
more
general.
The
man, gathered from inftances, prefents itfelf as a collective mafs of ideas, of which we can figure to ourfelves an inftance
ifted.
without neceflarily calling up the idea of any man that ever exIn the ideal conception of man, Achilles is a man as
much
as the
Duke of Wellington, whether

no
:
the former ever ex-
ifted objectively or
of
all
the ideas of
man which
the
mind
ideas, and by means of them, prefents nothing, for our purpofe, which differs from the former cafe. If we fay this picture is c beautiful, the mere phrafe is incomplete, for beautiful is only an
can imagine, the former is one as well as the latter. The feparation of ideas, or formation of abftract
afTertion
attribute, a purely ideal reference to a claffification
which the
mind makes,
dictated by
its
own judgment.
The
picture being
a material object, cannot be anything but an object, cannot be long to any clafs of notions, unlefs that clafs contain objects.
the propofition may mean is to a certain extent dependent the that implied fubftantive to which beautiful belongs upon to the clafs of objects which the propofition implies the mind to
:
is>
What
have feparated into beautiful and not beautiful. or a beautiful the picture is a beautiful picture
:
It
may be
that
work of art,
tak
place in that divifion by which not only pictures, but ftatues, buildings, reliefs, &c. are feparated into beautiful and otherwife or a beautiful creation of human thought, placed among
ing
its
works of art, imagination, or

tiful
:
fcience,
&c.
in the fubdivifion
beau
or finally,
it
may
be a beautiful thing, placed with
all
ob
in a fimilar fubdivifion. jects of perception In all aiTertions, however, it is to be noted, once for all, that formal logic, the object of this treatife, deals with names and not
with either the ideas or things to which thefe names belong.
We
On
Objetts, Ideas,
of
and Names.
<
are concerned with the properties fo far as they prefent an idea
is
and
is
not
43 B
of what
and
B mean
reality
independently of any fpecification with fuch ideas upon propofitions as
common to all forms of the of logic is the examination of the ufe of is and is not : the tracing of the confequences of the application of thefe words. The argument when the fun mines it is day
are prefented hy their forms, and are
fame kind.
The
not day, therefore the fun does not mine, contains a and two facts, the latter of which is made to follow from theory the former by the theory. That inference is made is feen in the
it
but
is
word
trial
therefore : and the fentence is capable of being put upon its for truth or falfehood by logical examination. But this exa-
mination rejects the meaning of fun and day, the truth of the and of the facts and only inquires into the ; theory right which the fentence, of its own us to introduce the word ftructure,
gives
c merely enters upon when A is, B is ; but B is A is not: and decides that this is a correct junc tion of precedents and confequent, an exhibition of necefTary con nexion between what goes before and after therefore, and a de velopment, in the latter, of what is virtually, though not actually, What A and B may mean is of no exprefled in the former.
It therefore. not ; therefore
confequence to the inference, or right to bring In A is not. Thus A and B, diverted of all fpecific meaning, are
names
really
or at leaft may be fo names, independently of things confidered. For the truth of the propofition, under all mean
:
as
ings, gives us a right to fuppofe, if meanings- that is to fay, that we
we
like, that
it
names are the

c
name name
It
A A
is,
the
not.
name B
is:
but the
may put name B is
thus,
When
the
not; therefore the
is
not therefore the object of logic to determine whether conclufions be true or falfe ; but whether what are aflerted to be conclufions are a is meant that which conclufions.
is
By
conclufion
is
and muft be Jhut

:
firft
it is
with certain other preceding things put in that which muft have been put into a fentence becaufe
in
certain other things were put in. Infer a conclufion is to bring in, as it were, the direft ftatement of that which has been virtu
ally ftated already
To
has been Jhut in.
When we
.
B
(
is
C we
;
conclude
is
is
B,
would be more correct to fay we have concluded A is C We mould never

is
;
fay
is
B,
it
44
On
Objects y Ideas y
and Names.
think of faying we have put into a box a man s upper drefs of the colour of the trees ; therefore we muft put In a green coat ; we fhould fay c we have put in To infer the conclufion then
is
to bring in a ftatement that
we have
concluded.
:
Inference does not give us more than there was before but it may make us fee more than we faw before ideally fpeaking,
:
then, it does give us (in the mind) more than there was before. But the homely truth that no more can come out than was in,
as to all material objects even by metaphyficians are generally well pleafed to find the key of a box which contains what they want, though fure that it will put in no more
though accepted
who
than was there already
has been applied to logic, and even to
mathematics, in depreciation
ledge.
of their rank as branches of

this ftrangeft
know
errors
Thofe who have made
of
human
at
muft have aflumed an
ideal omnifcience,
and looked
human
Omnifcience need neither compare imperfection objectively. nor draw inferences the conclufion which we deduce : ideas,
from
is always prefent with them ; truths are concomi When we fay that one affertion follows not tants^ conferences. from another, we fpeak purely ideally, and defcribe an imperfec
premifes,
tion of our
own minds it is not that the confequence follows from the premifes, but that our perception of the confequence fol
:
:
lows our perception of the premifes the confequence, objectively fpeak wrongly fpeaking, is in, and with, and of, the premifes.
We
if
we
is
fpeak ideally,
when we
fay that
is
C,
is in
<
is
and
in fact,
it is
argument, that
we
only by giving an objective view to the can even aflert that it will be feen. To un
is
cultivated minds, this fimple conclufion
never concomitant
confequence.
with the premifes, and only with fome
difficulty a
the certainty that a confequence may be made to come out, which is an allegorical ufe of the word o/, we afliime a right The to declare, by the fame fort of allegory,* that it was in.
From
premifes therefore contain the conclufion and hence fome have fpoken as if in ftudying how to draw the conclufion, we were
:
ftudying to
know what we knew
before.
of pure geometry, which multiply

* I
fo faft that
All the propofitions it is only a fmall
am
of opinion that
is
it is
hypothecs
contained in
the latter.
its
mer contains
My
more confiftent with analogy to fay that the neceflary confequence, than to fay that the for reafon will appear in the courfe of the work.
On
and
ifolated clafs
Objetfsy Ideas,
and Names.
45
who know all that has been done in that fcience, are certainly contained in, that is neceflarily deducible from, a very few fimple notions. But to be
even among mathematicians
known from
them.
thefe premifes
is
very different from being known with

is
Another form of the
aflertion
that confequences are virtually
contained in the premifes, or (I fuppofe) as good as contained in the premifes. Perfons not fpoiled by fophiftry will fmile when
they are told that knowing two ftraight lines cannot enclofe a whole is greater than its part, &c. they as good as knew that the three interfe&ions of oppofite fides of a hexagon infcribed in a circle muft be in the fame flraight line.
fpace, the
of
Many
com
my
readers will learn this
now
for the firft time
it
will
fort
them much
to be aflured,
on many high
virtually knew it ever fmce their childhood. They can now pon der upon the diftinclion, as to the ftate of their own minds, be
authorities, that they
tween
virtual
knowledge and abfolute ignorance.

as to the relative value
There muft always be fome contention
of their knowledge between the ftudents of the things which we can fee muft have been, and of the things which, for what we can fee, might have been otherwife. How much of the diftinclion is due to our In the mean ignorance, no one can tell. time, it is of more ufe to point out the as
advantage,
things are,
themfelves, * which taken ing their argument, phrafes literally, mean perhaps than they intended.
of ftudying both kinds of knowledge, than to attempt to inftitute a rivalry between them. Thofe who have undervalued the ftudy of neceflary confequences, have allowed in illuftrat-
more
* might fometimes take them to mean that the ftudy of necefTary connexion in logic, mathematics, &c., is at leaft ufelefs, if not pernicious. Now we mould fuppofe, if this be what they mean, that clofe connexion, fhort of abfolute necefllty, muft partake fomewhat of the fame charaaer. If
the abfolute mathematical neceflity that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is therefore to be avoided, the ftudy of phyfics, in which there are the neceffities which we exprefs by the term laws of nature, muft
We
do fome harm. Hiftory, in which we may fo often count upon the aftions which motives will produce, cannot be quite faultlefs and there are laws of formation in language which for might as well be kept out of
:
aft almoft
confift in
fight, they with the uniformity of laws of nature. True knowledge muft the ftudy of the aftions of madmen that a certain man imagined
:
46
The
On
Objects, Ideas,
and Names.
know ftudy of logic, then, confidered relatively to human of rules of the humble {lands in as a as that low place ledge, and mathematics extent of reference to the vaft with arithmetic,
their phyfical applications. Neither is the lefs important for lowlinefs but it is not every one who can fee that. Writers
:
its
on
the fubject frequently take a fcope which entitles them to claim for logic one of the higheft places they do not confine themfelves to the connexion of premifes and conclufion, but enter
:
upon the periculum

themfelves.
et
commodum of the formation of the premifes
In the hands of Mr. Mill, for example (and to fome extent in thofe of Dr. Whateley) logic is the fcience of diftinguifhing truth from falfehood, fo as both to judge the premifes and draw the conclufion, to compare name with name, not only as to identity or difference, but in all the varied affociations of
thought which
arife
out of this comparifon.
CHAPTER
On
the Abflraft
III.
Form of the
Proportion.
IN
We
the preceding chapter, I have endeavoured to put together fuch notions on the actual fources of our knowledge as may
give the reader the
means of thinking upon points which any however of reftricted, muft neceffarily fuggeft. logic, fyftem cannot attempt to connect our ufe of words with our notions of things, without the occurrence of a great many difficulties, a
great
putes.
many
fources of adverfe theories, and of never-ending
dif-
We
except in
one.
cannot even reprefent phenomena, as phaenomena, the language of fome fyftem, and it may be of a wrong
confidence which the favourers of thefe feveral the
is
The
ories place in their corredtnefs
a fufficient reafon for keeping
the account of the procefs of the underftanding, fo far as it can be made an exact fcience, as diftinct as poflible from all of them
:
for they differ widely,
and
if
they agree in anything which can
himfelf to be Csefar, when he might juft as well have been Newton or Ne buchadnezzar, muft be a real bit of knowledge, not virtually contained in
anything
elfe,
wholly or
partially.
On
the Abftratt
Form of the
it
Proposition.
47
be diftincSHy apprehended,
is
only in having names of great
authority enrolled among the partifans of every one. In order to examine the laws of inference, of the
way of dif(
whence fo manner which may far as we make this mufl feparation very complete. go, by all, we All admit propofitions, as man is animal, ( no man is faultlefs; all are, after a little thought, agreed upon the modes of inference
tin&ly perceiving the right to fay
it
*
therefore,
fo that,
muft be, &c., &c.,
in a
be admitted,
but upon the import of a fimple proportion, there of difference. How much we mean, when we fay
mal, and how we arrive at our meaning, on different fides of unfettled queftions.
is
is
c
every kind
man
is
ani
matter for volumes
In order properly to examine the laws of inference, or of any thing elfe, we muft firft endeavour to arrive at a diftincl: abftraction of fo
much of the
if it
idea
we
are concerned with, as
is itfelf
the
be right fo to fpeak, of the law in queftion. precedent reafon, do not give This is an eafy procefs upon familiar things.
We
the carriers of goods much credit for profundity, in feeing that, on a given road, there is only the difference of weight by which
they are concerned to
know how one
parcel differs
from another ;
and further that, as long as they have to carry a pound, it matters nothing whether it be of fugar or iron. It is this procefs which we want to perform to the utmoft, upon the fimple propofition. Writers on logic, from Ariftotle downwards, have made a large
and important ftep in fubftituting for fpecific names, with all their fuggeftions about them, the mere letters of the alphabet, A, B,
C, &c. Thefe letters arefymbols, and general iymbols each of them ftands for any one we pleafe of its clafs. But what are they iymbols of, names, ideas,* or the objects which give thofe
:
ideas
The
anfwer
is,
that this
is
derations
which we may leave behind,
precifely one of thofe confiin abftra&ing what is
neceffary to an examination of the laws of inference. The only condition is, that we are to confine ourfelves to one or the other.
When we
in that
contained in the
man is animal, it may be that the name man is name animal, that the idea of man is contained of animal, or that the object man is in the object animal.
fay
Or
if
there
were twenty more
different appropriations
of the
Meaning of
courfe (page 30) ideas of ideas, and ideas of objefts.
48
On
the AbJlraSl
Form
fymbols, the fame thing might be faid of each. This is, I believe, the firft ufe of the general fymbol in order of time ; the algebrai both cal ufe of letter or other fymbol, to defignate number, being
fubfequent and derived. When therefore we fay
c
a fymbol which reprefents an inftance of a name, idea, ob There may be more or fewer of ject, &c., as the cafe may be. fuch inftances ; they may be numerable or innumerable. And the
is
Every
is
we
underftand that
fame of Y.
The
vourable to the
diftincl:
language of logicians has generally been unfa perception of their terms being diftribu-
tively applicable to clafles of inftances.
They have
rather been
quantitative than quantvpllcitative : expreffing themfelves as if, in would faying that animal is a larger or wider term than man, they rather draw their language from the idea of two areas, one of
which
is
vifible units,
indilarger than the other, than from two collections of one of which is in number more than the other.
They have even carried this fo far as to make it doubtful, except from context, whether their diftincT:ion between univerfal and par If their ticular is that of all and fome, or of the whole and part. c c inftances had been white fquares ^ their all A is B and fome A c All the fquare is white and is B might have applied as well to c Some of the fquare is white as to All the fquares are white and
I fhall take particular care Some of the fquares are white. to ufe numerical language, as diftinguifhed from magnitudinal,
c
throughout this work, introducing of courfe, the plurals Xs, Ys, Zs, &c. I may mention here another mode of fpeaking, which will, I
think, appear objectionable to all who are much ufed to confia compound idea contains two or deration of quantity.
When
more fimpler ones, fome logicians have fpoken as if the com bination were legitimately reprefented by arithmetical addition.
Thus
the combination of the ideas of animal and rational muft
give the idea of

elfe that
man
of.
we know
nal
= man.
it
two notions co-exift in nothing ratio Accordingly, fome write animal

for the
If this be intended as an abftraclion of the notation of
arithmetic, for the purpofe of fitting to it entirely different mean courfe no objection which I need confider here ing, there is of
but
feems to
me
that
more
ufed this notation imagine a
meant, and that thofe who have great refemblance between combining
is
of the Proportion.
ideas,
49
and cumulating them. What the difference is, I cannot dif pretend to fay, any more than I can pretend to fay what the ference is between chemically combining volumes of oxygen and
of them hydrogen, fo as to produce water, and fimple cumulation in the fame veflel, fo as to produce a mixed gas every beginner knows that the electric fpark, or fome other inexplicable agency,
:
is
tion.
neceffary to turn the mixed gas into a new chemical combina But that the difference exifts in the former cafe alfo, feems
any thing I can imagine. Even in chemiftry the cumulative notation, which was once thought an all-fufficient mode of expreffing the refults of the atomic theory, has failed with the
to
as clear as
me
progrefs of knowledge.
tion
To
a confiderable extent, the introduc

:
of modes of cumulation as yet anfwers the purpofe but there ftill remain ifomeric compounds, differing in properties, but
of the fame compofition. acids: of which Profeffor
For example, the
tartaric
and racemic
p.
Graham
fays {Elements
of Chemiftry
158), "A nearer approach to identity could fcarcely be con ceived than is exhibited by thefe bodies, which are, indeed, the
fame both
in form and compofition ment can the one acid be tranfmuted
But by no
into the
other."
treat
If the
above mode of confounding cumulation and combination be admiffible, I fuppofe
we might
2
-f-
that eafily give ourfelves a right to fay
+ addition =
an equation at which the mathematician would flare. So much for the characleriftics of the terms of a proportion,
as
wanted
for the abftracl:
forms of inference.
is
It
remains to
confider thofe of the connecting copulae
and
is
not.
is
The
complete attempt to deal with the term
would go
to
the form and matter of every thing in exiftence^ at leaft, if not to the poflible form and matter of all that does not exift, but might.
As
and
it could be done, it would give the grand Cyclopaedia, yearly fupplement would be the hiftory of the human race for the time. That logic exifts as a treated fcience, arifes from
far as
its
the characlieriftics of the word, requifite to be abftra6ted in ftudying inference, being few and eafily apprehended. It may be ufed
in
many fenfes, all having a common property. Names, ideas, and objects, require it in three different fenfes. Speak of names^ and fay c man is animal to the is is here an is of applicability
:
50
On
the
Abftratt
Form
whatfoever (idea, object, &c.) man is a name to be applied, to that fame (idea, object, &c.) animal is a name to be applied. As
to ideas, the
is is
an
is
of pofTeffion of
all
efTential characteriftics
is
man
is is
is
an idea which
poflefies, contains, prefents, all that
con-
ftitutive
an
is
of the idea animal. As to abfolute external objects, the of identity, the moft common and pofitive ufe of the
Every man is one of the animals ; touch him, you touch an animal, deftroy him, you deftroy an animal. Thefe fenfes are not all interchangeable. Take the is of iden tity, and the name man is not, as a name, the name ani?nal : the
word.
idea
man
is
not, as an idea, the idea animal.
Now we muft
afk,
what common property is poiTeiTed by each of thefe three notions of is y on which the common laws of inference depend. Common
laws of inference there If the applicability of the certainly are. name be always accompanied by that of B, and that of B
that of
C, then that of
the idea
A contain
to
all
by always accompanied by that of C. If that is eiTential to the idea B, and B all that
is
is eflential
C, then
contains
all
that
is
effential to
C.
If the
object
be actually the object B, and
if
be actually C, then
is
actually C.
A is B/ To make the ftatement diftinct, let the proportion be doubly fingular, or refer to one inftance of each, one A and one B let it be c this one A is this one B.
*
:
word is which, exany propofed meaning of it, make that meaning fatisfy the requirements of logicians when they lay down the proportion
following are the characteriftics of the
ifting in
The
Firft, the
double fingular proportion above mentioned, and

:
every fuch double-fingular, muft be indifferent to converfion the c is B, and the B is A* muft have the fame and be
meaning,
both true or both
falfe.
Secondly, the connexion /j, exifting between one term and each of two others, muft therefore exift between thofe two others ; fo A is B and A is C muft give c B is C.
Thirdly, the effential diftinction of the term

not are contradictory alternatives, cannot, be true.
is
that
and
is
is not is merely one muft, both
Every connexion which can be invented and

terms
all
fignified by the as to fatisfy thefe three conditions, makes the rules of logic true. doubt abfolute identity was the fugis
and
is not, fo
No
of the Propojition.
getting connexion from which
all
51
:
the others arofe
juft as arith
which the forms and laws of algebra were fuggefted. But, as now we Invent algebras by abftractthe forms and laws of and new ing operation, fitting meanings to fo we have to invent new them, power meanings for all the forms of inference, in in which we have power to every way make meanings of is and is not which fatisfy the above condi For inftance, let X, Y, Z, each be the tions. attached
in
metic was the
medium
fymbol
let is
to every inftance of a clafs
tween two,
fay
tied to
as in
<
X
let
is
by a cord, and
Y mean that the two are tied together, X be confidered as tied to Z when
Z, &c.
of material objects,
placed be
it is
which
is
tied to
There
is
no
fyllogifm but
what remains
true under thefe meanings.
Thus
The
fyllogifm
Is true in the fenfe
Every
/.
is
Y
Ys Xs
.
Every
is
tied to a
Y
Ys Xs
Some Zs Some Zs
are not are not
Some Zs .Some Zs
are not tied to are not tied to
laft inftance might be confidered as a material reprefenof attachment together of ideas in the mind. muft diftinctly obferve that it is not every cafe of infe rence which demands all the characteriftics to be fatisfied. Thus in the moft common cafe of all, c Every A is B, every B is C, therefore every A is C, of all the three conditions only the fecond is wanted to fecure the validity of this cafe. Though it be feldom thought worth while to make this obfervation, it is uni-
This
tation
We
verfal practice to act
upon
it,
and
its
fo as to
yet introduce into formal
logic apparent contradictions
of
own
rules.
For example,th
following are allowed to pafs for fyllogifms, in the ordinary defi

nition of that
1
word.
is
Every greater than fome one B j every B is greater than fome one C, therefore every A is greater than fome one C. And the fame when inftead of greater than is read equal to or than. The form which moft commonly appears is the lefs
pair of doubly fingular
than
propofitions, (one thing) is greater than C therefore is ; greater greater than C. Here c greater than greater is greater, the fecond rule is fatisfied, and no other is wanted. But this for is this fubfti-
is
tute for
it,
if
the reader like
it
meaning (or better) will not fatisfy all the con-
52
ditions,
On
the Abjlratt
Form
the forms of inference.
and therefore will not apply to
all
But is in the fenfe is equal to does fatisfy all the conditions. This fenfe of / j, namely agreement in magnitude, is the copula of
the mathematician
only.
It will
s
fyllogifm,
when he
is
reafoning on quantity
or
mown
probably be affirmed that the generalization thus made, to be poffible, in the conception of the word is for
purpofes of inference, amounts only to a very frequent, if not moft ufual, ufe of the word, namely, as fignifying a certain mode, not of identity, but of agreement in quality. As when we fay
thefe
two
the other
things are the fame in colour that the

:
in colour
or
is
the one thing
is
name man
the
name
animal,
:
in a certain refpect,
that the idea

teriftics
:
man
is
namely, in what the latter can be applied to animal, in both pofleffing certain charac-
fubftance
that every object man is an object animal, in actual that is B in magnitude, when we fay equals and fo on. But I admit only the converfe, namely, that all
:
thefe ufes fatisfy the conditions.
It
is
to fay, that every poffible ufe of

ple
would hardly be for any one which fatisfies three fuch fim-
requirements, has been or can be exhausted.
Even
the
material example
tified
which was
ufe,
juft
now
with any
verb.
common
But
if
or eafily
given, cannot be iden imaginable one, of the

to fatisfy
common
no invented meaning, proper
the conditions,, can be found, other than already exifts in more or lefs of ufe, ftill, thefe conditions are the laws to which the
word muft fubmit in its logical acceptation. There are common ufes of the word which
in logic
:
are not admitted and among them, one of the moft common, connection of an object with its quality, and of an idea with one of its conftituent or aflbciated ideas.
As when we
fay, the rofe is
red,
prudence
fied.
is
defirable.
c
Here the
red
is
logical conditions are not fatis-
For example,
firft
of the
afTertion,
is
not logically true.
the rofe, though a poetical inverfion It is ufual to confider
fuch propofitions, in logic, as elliptical ; thus c the rofe is red is confidered as c the rofe is a red object, or an object of red colour ; in which the is now takes one of the fenfes which allows of converfion.
are
made
Similarly, in all other cafes, the fubject and predicate to take the fame character ; both names, both ideas, or
both objects. This reduction renders unneceiTary both the ftudy
of the Proportion.
of the
varieties
53
of meaning of the word is (meaning varieties out of the pale of the conditions above enumerated), and alfo that of the tranfitions of meaning within the circle of which the infe rence remains good.
The
moft
c
common
ufes
of the verb are
firft
abfolute iden
:
the thing he fold you is the one I fold him fecondly, agreement in a certain particular or particulars underftood, as in He is a negro* faid of a European in reference to his colour
tity, as in
:
thirdly, pofTeflion
of a quality, as in
the rofe
is
red
fourthly,
c reference of a fpecies to its genus, as in man is an animal. All thefe ufes are independent of the ufe of the verb alone, denoting c man is [i. e. exifts]. In all thefe fenfes, and in which might be added confidently with the conditions in page 50, fome proportions fometimes admit of having the fenfe of is
exiftence, as in
all
fhifted, and fome do not. Thus, in negative propofitions, the is of agreement in particulars may be lawfully converted into that of identity if c No A is B in colour/ then No A is
:
abfolutely
B.
is
But c Every A is B in colour, does not prove Every B. But the firft pair might be connected by a fyllogifm.
The
the
is
is
is
of
of agreement in particulars may always be reduced to identity, by alteration of the predicate ; thus Every A
is
in colour
Every
is
a thing having the colour of
of the Bs. J
When
is,
a fyllogifm has a negative conclufion,
one and
the middle term

mifes, then the
or can be made, the predicate of both pre-
fyllogifm can be transformed from one in which there is only the is of agreement to one in which there is no is but that of identity. For example, fuppofe the premifes to
whole
be
No X
c
is
meaning
it
as
No X
neceflarily that
is
is colour) ; every (in colour), not all the Ys are of one colour, but reading of the colour of any one of the Ys ; every is
(in
of the colour of one of the Ys.

is
The
conclufion
is
that
no
(in colour),
Xs.
were
*
abfolutely
of the colour of any one of the But from this it follows that no Z is X, for if any one Z it would have * the colour of that X. This
or
is
no
X,
The
fenfe in
reader muft not paint any of the letters during the procefs. The which we fay a door is the fame door as before, after it has been
:
it is the painted of a different colour, is not the fenfe of logical identity fame in all but colour and colouring matter j and the is is one of agreement. Except as a joke in fufficient anfvver to a captious objeftion or a trap, no
54
laft
On
Proportions.
:
conclufion can be brought directly from altered premifes
thus, is being that of identity, we have ing the colour of one of the Ys] ; every
No X
is
[a thing hav
Z
no
is
[a thing having
is
the colour of one of the

pofe
Ys]
therefore
X.
it
But fup-
we
;
take the following premifes,
colour)
fome Zs not Xs. But

the
laft
every are not
is
(in colour).
Some Ys From this
are not
Xs
(in
follows that
we
and thence that fome Zs are (in colour), cannot now alter the premifes, fo as to produce
Xs
conclufion from
X, Z, and
a middle term.
CHAPTER
On
IV.
Proportions.
which is attached to one or more account of fome refemblance, or objects of thought, on elfe it is a fymbol attached to Or community of properties. from of fome one or more objects thought, to diftinguifh them fame name of the the fame others having properties. Objects
is
NAME
a fymbol
are, fo far as that
name
is
one object may have many names, clafles of objects of thought.
concerned, undiftinguimable. as being one in each of
And
many
Names,
jects of formal logic.
as explained in chapter II, are exclufively the ob The identity and difference of things is
defcribed by aflerting the right to aflert, or the right to deny, the And names, whether fimple or complex, application of names. will be reprefented by letters of the alphabet, as X, Y, Z.
proportion
is
the aflertion of agreement,

lefs,
more
or
lefs,
or
difagreement, more or
between two names.
It exprefTes
that of the objects of thought called Xs, there are fome which of thought called Ys : are, or are not, found among the objects
afked how calculating boy, Zerah Colburn, was which he very many black beans it would take to make ten white ones to but the ten fkinned beans would anfwered Ten, if you fkin em
rence.
change whatever muft take place
in the terms of conclufion,
during infe
The American
properly not be the

white.
fame beans
as before
except, indeed, to thofe to
whom
black
is
On
that there are objects
Propojitions.
55
which have both names, or which have one but not the other, or which have neither. For the moft part, the objects of thought which enter into a proportion are fuppofed to be taken, not from the whole univerfe of poffible objects, but from fome more definite collection of
them.
the
Thus when we fay name requiring air belongs

:
"
All animals require
air,"
or that
the planets, &c., of which we know no By the univerfe of a propofition, I mean the whole range of names in which it is exprefTed or underftood that the names in the propofition are found. If there
thing, not being included.
animal belongs, we things on this earth
to every thing to which the name fhould underftand that we are fpeaking of
be no fuch expreilion nor underftanding, then the univerfe of the propofition is the whole range of poffible names. If, the uni
name U, we have a right to fay every is Y, can only extend the univerfe fo as to make it include all which is is one of the Ys poffible names, by faying Every
verfe being the
then
we
which are Us, or fomething equivalent. Contrary names, with reference to any one univerfe, are thofe which cannot both apply at once, but one or other of which al ways applies. Thus, the univerfe being man, Briton and alien
are contraries
contraries.
;
Names which
the univerfe being property, real and perfonal are are contraries in one univerfe, are
not necefTarily
univerfe
is
fo in a Thus in geometry, when the larger one. one plane, pairs of ftraight lines are either parallels or
interfectors,
and never both

is
parallels
and interfectors are then

to folid geometry, in
contraries.
But when the ftudent comes
the univerfe, there are lines which are neither fpace nor interfectors and thefe words are then not contra ; parallels But names which are contraries in the larger and contain ries.
all
which
ing univerfe, are neceflarily contraries in the fmaller and contained, unlefs the fmaller univerfe abfolutely exclude one name, and then the other
name
I
all
is
the univerfe.
In future,
in
which
always underftand fome one univerfe as being that names ufed are wholly contained and alfo (which
:
it is
very important to bear in mind) that no one

fills
name mentioned
everything in
it.
in a propofition
this univerfe, or applies to
eafy than to treat the fuppofition of a name the univerfe as an extreme cafe. And I (hall denote conbeing
Nothing
is
more
56
traries
On
Proportions.
:
by large and fmall letters thus, being a name, x is the And everything (in the univerfe underftood) is contrary name. either or x and nothing is both.
may be either Jlmple and incomplete, or complex and complete. The fimple propofition only afTerts that Xs are Ys, or are not Ys the complex propofition, which always confifts of two fimple ones, difpofes in one manner or the other of
propofition
:
and every Y. Thus c Every X is is a fimple pro but it forms a part of two complex propofitions. It pofition is and every is X/ or to may belong either to * every c is and fome Ys are not Xs. Every
every
:
The
propofitions advanced in
common
life
are ufually
com
:
plex, with one fimple propofition expreffed and one underflood but books of logic have hitherto confidered only the fimple pro And this laft fhould be confidered before the complex pofition. form.
The
fimple propofition mufl
be confidered with refpect to
ftgn, relative quantity,

It
and
order.
Simple propofitions are oftwofigns: affirmative and negative. is either Xs are Ys, or Xs are not Ys. The phrafes are and are not, or is and is not, which mark the diftinftion, are
called copultz. The relative quantity
numbers of
diftincliions
of a propofition has reference to the inftances of the different names which enter it. The
of quantity ufually recognized are all and leading to the diftincliion of universal and particular.
fome*
Thus
Every
c
is
and
Every
(
is
:
not
are the univerfal affir

is
mative and negative propofitions
the latter
are
No X
ufually ftated as
is
Y.
And fome Xs
Ys
and
fome Xs are not
Ys
when
*
are the particular affirmative and negative propofitions. And the proportions are reduced frri&ly to thefe four forms,
fome are
Some, in logic, means one or more, it may be all. is not to be held to mean that the , reft are
He who
not.
f
fays that
Some men
fome horfes are diftinguifhable by fhape from their riders would breathe, be held falfe in common language. The reafon is, as above noted, that
common language ufually adopts the complex particular propofition, and The ftudent cannot be implies that fome are not in faying that fome are. too careful to remember this diftinclion. particular propofition is only a
may
be particular.
On
the
firft
Proportions
fubjeft,
57
named, X,
is
called the
and the fecond named,
the predicate. It has been propofed to confider the univerfal proportions as to quantity : but this is not quite correct. definite with refpect
Y,
The phrafe all Xs are Ys does not tell us how many Xs there are, but that, be the unknown number of Xs in exiftence what it may, the unknown number mentioned in the proportion
is
the fame.
That which
is
definite
is
the ratio of the
number
of
Xs
of the proportion to the
Xs
of the univerfe.
So under-
ftood,
faid to
however, the
definite quantity, as
belong to univerfals.
And
an abbreviation, may be the indefinitenefs of the parti
cular proportion is only hypothetical. It is in our power to fuppofe the feme to be one half of the whole, or two-thirds, or any
other fraction.
The
quantity of the fubject

is
is
expreiTed
though not exprefTed,

language.
neceflarily implied
that of the predicate, by the meaning of
The predicate of an affirmative is particular : the If I fay Xs are Ys/ even predicate of a negative is univerfal. though I fpeak of all the Xs, I only really fpeak of fo many Ys
as are
not be
compared with Xs and found to agree and thefe need c all the Ys. Every horfe is an animal, declares that fo
:
many
of
:
horfes as there are to fpeak of, fo

it
and leaves
wholly unfettled
many animals are fpoken whether there be or be not

c
more animals
it
left.
But
if I
fhould fay
this
Xs
c
are not
fhould be only one
X,
as in
Ys, though
is
is
not a
this
Y,
which exifts. every whatfoever of all the
The Ys in
aflertion
yet I fpeak of is not any one
exiftence.
perfon
who
fhould
wifh to verify by actual infpection, thefe 20 Xs are Ys might, perchance, be enabled to affirm the refult upon the examination of only 20 Ys, if he came rrft upon the right ones. But he
could not verify every
this
one
is is
not a
the
until
he had examined
doctrine, but though of that the courfe affirmative propofition only enables admitting us to infer of fome inftances of the predicate, yet I think it more
in exiftence.
This
common
correct to fay that the predicate itfelf is fpoken of univerfally, but indivifibly^ and that in the negative propofition the predicate is
c Some Xs are Ys tells fpoken of univerfally and divifibly. us that each mentioned is either the rrft Y, or the fecond Y,
or the third
Y, &c., no
being excluded from comparifon.
But
58
Some Xs
are not
On
Ys
Proportions.
us that each
tells
mentioned
is
abfo-
lutely not the firft Y, nor the fecond, nor the third, &c ; is not, in fact, any one of all the Ys. Still, however, the predicate of
an affirmative yields no more than

accepted as
only
it
would do
if
the
Ys
finally
Xs were
fpecially feparated,
and confidered as the
Ys fpoken of. The relation of the
inftances in exiftence
is
univerfal quantity to the whole quantity of itfelf. definite^ being that whole quantity
But the
Ys
Some Xs are particular quantity is wholly indefinite : no clue to the fraction of all the Xs fpoken of, nor to gives
which they make of all the Ys. Common language makes a certain conventional approach to definitenefs, which has been thrown away in works of logic. Some, ufually means a rather fmall fraction of the whole ; a larger fraction would be c exprefTed by a good many ; and fomewhat more than half by moft ; while a ftill larger proportion would be a great majo
the fraction
or nearly all A perfectly definite particular, as to quan how would exprefs many Xs are in exiftence, how many tity, of the Xs are or are not Ys as in 70 out and how Ys, many In this chapter I mail of the 100 Xs are among the 200 Ys
rity
. :
.
treat only the Indefinite particular^ leaving the definite particular for future confideration.
The
order of a propofition has relation to the choice of fub-
and every is is Thus Every ject and predicate. though O both eftablifh a univerfal affirmative relation between
X X
different propofitions. They are called the fubjedt and predicate are of the fame fort of quantity, both univerfal or both particular, the converfe is and c forms give the fame propofition. Thus
in fact
and Y, yet are
two
converfe forms.
When
No X
No
is
are the fame
is
of emphafis, which the fame as Some
neither has any meaning, except perhaps And Some Xs are Ys the other has not.
;
Ys
are
Xs
The
univerfal negative, then,
which both terms are univerfal, and the particular affirmative, are neceflarify convertible propofi in which both are particular But the univerfal affirmative, in which the fubjedt is uni tions. verfal and the predicate particular, and the particular negative, in which the fubject is particular, and the predicate univerfal âre
in
not neceffarily convertible, and are generally called inconvertible. They may be convertible, in one cafe, and inconvertible in an-
On
other.
Propo/itions.
is
59
fol
But the term
inconvertible
not incorrect, for the
lowing reafon.
The
there
are of this character
agreements and difagreements which are treated in logic be agreement with one, but ; there can only
difagreement with
it
one
may be
only
:
all.
If
this
be a
it is
is
this
is
either the
firft
Y,
or the fecond
Y,
or the third
Y, &c.
it,
:
who
can
know
If there be 100 Ys, there is, to thofe times as much negation as affirmation in 99
the proportion and yet moft afluredly it is properly called affir this is mative. But if it be this is not a Y, we have
not the
firft
Y, and
it is
not the fecond

is
Y, &c. The
propofition at
affirmation
what
is
Y, and it is not the third commonly called disjunctive,
disjunctive negation would be no except that one and the fame thing cannot or not be two different things is either not the firft any
the negation conjunctive.

all,
the fecond
Y.
And
in like
:
would be an
or
more
muft be prepared, then, to confider cafes of oppofition in which on the one fide there is fixed neceffity, and on the other fide of alternatives and we muft be prepared to de poffibility
:
We
impoffibility different things.
it
manner a conjunctive affirmation would ftate that one thing is two
note thefe by oppofite terms, which, looking to etymology only, denote fixed neceffities of oppofite characters. This happens in
the cafe above
:
convertible
vertible, inconvertible
cafe
means abfolutely and neceflarily con means convertible or inconvertible as the

order,
may
be.
Taking the four forms of one
we
find that
each of the univerfals cannot exift with either propofition of op Thus Every is cannot be true if either pofite form.
No X
is
or
Some Xs
is
are not
Ys
while
or
No X
is
cannot be true
if either
Every
is
Some Xs
are Ys.
But each of the
particulars
but the univerfal of oppofite form. cannot be true if No is but it
neceffarily inconfiftent with nothing That Some Xs are Ys
may be
true if
Some Xs
if
are not
Ys.
And
is
Some Xs
but
it
are not
Ys
cannot be true
Every Ys.
X
pair
Y,
Every
may
be true though
Some Xs
are
The
X Y
is
and fome
Xs
are not
is
Ys
are called
contradictory are Ys.
and
fo are the pair
No X
and
Some Xs
Of each
pair of contradictories,
one muft be true and
60
one muft be
:
On
Proportions.
falfe fo that the affirmation of either is the denial of the other, and the denial of either is the affirmation of the other. The pair Every is is and c No are ufually
called contraries;
contrariety implying the utmoil extreme of
contradiction.
true.
Contraries
may both
are
be
falfe,
c
but cannot both be

are not
The
pair
Some Xs
Ys, and
Some Xs
Ys,
which may both be
true, but
cannot both be
falfe,
are ufually
called fub contraries. But, for reafons hereafter to be given, I intend to abandon the diftin6lion between the words contrary
and contradiftory^ and to
treat
them
as
c
fynonymous.
And
and
c
the
propofitions ufually called contraries ,

is
Every
is
No
I fhall
(
contrarles
call
Some Xs
czllfubcontraries : while thofe ufually called fubare Ys and Some Xs are not Ys I fhall
fupercontraries
now proceed to an enlarged view of the propofition, and to the ftruclure of a notation proper to reprefent its different
I fhall
cafes.
As
ufual, let the univerfal affirmative
ticular affirmative
ticular negative bolic expreffion
by by O.
I,
be denoted by A, the par the univerfal negative by E, and the par This is the extent of the common fym-
of propofitions : I propofe to make the following Let one particular choice of order, as additions for this work. to fubject and predicate, be fuppofed eftablifhed as a flandard of
reference.
As
to the letters
X, Y, Z,
let
that of the alphabet,
XY, YZ, XZ.
Let
the order be always x, y, z, be the con
and let the fame order be adopted ; trary names of X, Y, Let the four forms, when choice in the ftandard of reference.
is
the choice
1 1
A E O Thus, with reference to Y and Z, Every Y Z the Ai of that pair and order while Every y z the A I mould recommend AI and A to be called the fub-A and
1
made out of X, Y, Z, be denoted by A E, L, Oi but when is made from the contraries, let them be denoted by
4
is
is
is
is
the helps which And the be will this will give memory prefently very apparent. f and I of &c. fame the L ,
the fuper-A of the pair and order
in queftion
:
Let the following abbreviations be employed
X) Y means
<E
very
is
X. Y means
No X
is
Y
are
X:Y
<
Some Xs
are not Ys
XY
Some Xs
Ys
On
Proportions.
There are eight diftinft modes, independent of contraries, in which a fimple propofition may be made means of and Y. by Thefe eight modes are X)Y and Y)X, X:Y and Y:X, X.Y and Y. X, and and YX. But the eight are equivalent to
XY
fix.:
for
X.Y
and Y.
fix
are the fame, and fo are
XY and
only
YX.
Again, there are tween and y,
fimple proportions between x and y, fix be
fix
between x and Y.
there are then twenty-four apparent
and but thefe are not propofition from of them contain all the reft thefe eight
:
Taking in contraries, modes of forming a fimple

all diftincl:.
Eight
A E
1
table,
above defcribed. This is feen in the following the ftudy of which fhould be carefully made,
,
being the
E,, L,
A,
O,
E,
I.
= X.y = y)x = Xy =y:x = X)y = Y)x XY =X:y = Y:x

X)Y X:Y X.Y
moft readers
:
A
E
I
x)y
!
x:y
!
x.y
f
xy
= Y)X = xY = Y:X = x)Y = y)X = x:Y = y:X

=x.Y
illuftration
I fuppofe
will
readily fee the truth of the identities
here affirmed
will be
tried.
if
not, the following
mode of
(which
fition
very ufeful when I come to treat of the fyllogifm) may be Let be the name which is the univerfe of the propo and write down in a line as Us as there are diftin6t
many
objects to
which
this
name
applies.
illuftration as a million.
down
and x, of courfe, under all the reft. Follow the fame The occurrence of letters in the fame column mows that they are names of the fame object. The following are fpecimens of the to which eight ftandard varieties of
:
Under every
dozen will do as well for U which is an X write
plan with Y.
affertion,
all
the reft
may
be referred.
A,
UUUUUUUUUUUU XXXXX x x x x x x x YYYYYYYYyyyy UUUUUUUUUUUU XXXXXXX xxxxx yyyy YYYYYYyy UUUUUUUUUUUU XXXX xxxxxxxx y y y y y y y YYYYY
UUUUUUUUUUUU XXXXXXXX xxxx YYYYYyyyyyyy UUUUUUUUUUUU XXXXX xxxxxxx YYyy yyyy YYYY UUUUUUUUUUUU XXXXXXXXxxxx yyyyyYY YYYYY
62
In the
firft
On
Propo/itions.
which
true,
fcheme, Ai, there exift twelve Us, the firft five of are both Xs and Ys, the next three Ys but not Xs, the laft
four neither
Xs nor Ys. This cafe, fo conftru&ed that X)Y is mows X.y and y)x. The proportions AI and A X)Y and x)y, may be called con1
tranominal, as having each
names contrary of
thofe in the other.
It appears, then, that as to inconvertibles, contranominal and conand y)x are the verfe are terms of the fame meaning, for
X)Y
And fmce it is more natural to fpeak fame, and x:y and Y:X. of direft names than of their contraries, it will be beft to attach the ideas of Y)X and Y:X ; but not fo as to forget and to
their derivation
from x)y and
x:y.
Obferve
alfo that
each uni-
verfal propofition has converted contranominals for its affirmative and though X.Y is not y.x, yet if Thus X)Y forms. y)x
we make
Y)x. fame property. fitions Ei and

never
till
take the affirmative form X)y, it is equivalent to In particular propofitions, the negative forms have the
X.Y
The
now
L are of totally different meaning. been introduced into logic, and a
contranominals of the convertible propo They have
few words of
explanation are wanted. 1 Firft as to I or xy.
here exprefs that fome not-Xs are which are neither are or that there not-Ys, things in the univerfe Next as to are not contraries. and Xs nor Ys. That is,
We
here exprefs that no not-X is not-Y, or that Thefe laft or Y, or both. is either in univerfe the everything words are important by omitting them, we mould imagine that are contraries ; which is not necefand x.y fignifies that
f
or x.y.
We
true. farily
of expreffion, with re Accordingly, the eight ftandard forms

ference to the order
will
Y, and exhibited in the form in which it be moft convenient to think and fpeak of them, are as
follows,
or
O, or
E, or
I,
X) Y Every X is Y X: Y Some Xs are not Ys
A
O
E
or
f
orY)X Every Y is X Y:X Some Ys are not Xs

or x.y
X.Y No
is
Y
Ys
Everything
is
either
X or Y
or
XY
Some Xs
are
I or
xy
Some things are neither Xs norYs.
laws. Returning to the table, we now fee the following general I. Each triad of equivalents contains two inconvertibles and one 2. Of the four, X, Y, x, y, each of the eight forms convertible.
On
Proportions.
3.
its
63
fpeaks univerfally of two, and particularly of two. pofition fpeaks in different ways of each name and
univerfally of fitions called
pro;
contrary
one and particularly of the other. 4. The propocontradictory, from the common meaning of this word, may be fo called in another fenfe for they fpeak in the fame manner of contraries. Thus X) fpeaks univerfally of X, and particularly of its X: or
:
denial,
Y Y
of x, and particularly of y. Any two of the eight forms being taken, it is clear either that they cannot exift together, or that one muft exift when the other exifts, or that one may exift either with or without the other.
y:x, fpeaks univerfally
The alternatives
of each cafe are prefented
in the
following table.
Let the concomitants of a proportion be thofe
to
which
it
is
Then it appears that each univerfal has for wholly indifferent. concomitants its contranominal and the contradictory of the laft but each particular has all for concomitants except only its own
:
contradictory.
dictory, the
two
univerfal denies, befides its own contra univerfals of oppofite name ; and contains the The two concomitants of a particulars of the fame name.
Each
two
univerfal
may be
is
defcribed as
its
univerfal
and
its
particular
con
comitant.
There
a certain fort of repetition in our choice of the four
forms, combined with the four felections 1 E be any one of the four forms A, EI
XY, Xy,
XY.
applied to
all
xy, xY. If the above,
it
will give the four
forms derived from
Thus
T
the
!
A
T
of
;
XY,
Xy,
and the
xY, are feverally the E of X Y, Xy, xy, and xY

xy,
and AI of
and fo on. verify the above, and ftill more the cafes contained in the following. There are four things in a proportion, each of which may be
:
XY
, feverally It will ferve for exercife to
A,, E,, are
and
E of XY the E A E,,
f
changed into its contrary fubject, predicate, order, and copula. Let S be the direction to P change the fubject into its
:
contrary
64
:
On
Proportions.
:
be the direction to transform the fame for the predicate let and F the direction to change the form, from affirma the order tive to negative, or from negative to affirmative. When enters,
let it
be done
laft,
to avoid confufion.
Thus SPT performed
j upon X)Y gives x)Y from S, x)y, from P, and y)x from which is X)Y, fo that in this cafe alteration of fubject, predicate, and order, is no alteration at all. Let L be the reprefentation of no alteration at all. To inveftigate equivalent alterations, obthus F performed ferve, firft, that F and P, fingly, are identical X.Y And X)Y = and P on on X.Y gives X)Y, gives X.y. F P in of and This perfect identity effect, remains in X.y. But when does not enter. all combinations into which ST identical. Thus it is S and F are which enters, performed on Y)X gives X)y or X .Y and FT performed on Y)X gives
:
T
;
X.Y. The reafon

after
is,
that
T interchanges
fubjecl:
and predicate
fo that F, T, makes a change which is counterbalanced by a change in what was the fubjecl:. Accordingly, remembering that each operation performed twice is no operation at all (thus
PP
is
L, and
TT
is
L),
we
have
in all cafes
P = F, SP = SF, PF=L, SPF=S
ST=FT, SPT = FPT, SFT^T, SPFT=PT

all
which fhould be
tried
for exercife.
Again,
its
in a convertible
:
propofition, transformation is no alteration or vertible one, transformation changes it into
T=L
in
an incon
;
contranominal
or
T = SP. Now out as follows; L, in convertible propoT which in inconvertible*, SP which, in convertibles fitions
fet
is
;
is
again, Put thefe
is
SPT
which,
in inconvertibles
again,
is
TT,
or L.
down
as follows, writing
under them the operations
which
are always equivalent to them, as
fhewn above,
T [SP SPT L L SFT SF PFT PF PF

The
fame
effect
in effect
combinations written under one another are always the thofe feparated by double lines have the fame
: :
on convertibles thofe fame effecl: on inconvertibles.

fame
S
;
feparated by fmgle lines, have the Again P, for convertibles, is the
as PT ; which, for inconvertibles is the fame as PSP, or which, for convertibles again, is the fame as ST ; which, for
is
inconvertibles, table
SSP
or P.
Thefe
treated as before, give the
On
Proportions.
!
65
PT S ST SPFT SPF FT
In thefe two cycles there are L and all the fifteen feleclions which can be made out of S, P, F, T. And every poflible cafe of equivalent changes is contained in thefe two tables. Thus
PT
is
P and
to
in all cafes equivalent to in convertible cafes, to ; in no inconvertible to S and to SPF. ; ones,
SPFT
And
any cafe equivalent to PT. In verifica tion of thefe tables, obferve that the operation F always occurs
other combination
is
in
in the
lower
line,
and never
in the
upper
and that
this
opera
tion changes convertibles into inconvertibles, and vice verfa. ought then to expect, that the equivalences which, con
We
taining F, apply to inconvertibles, will be thofe which when F is ftruck out, apply to convertibles ; and vice And fo we (hall verfa. find it : for inftance, and SPF are equivalent when per
SPFT
formed on inconvertibles ; ftrike out F and we have SPT and SP, which are equivalent when performed on convertibles.
It
appears, then, that any change
which can be made on
propofition, amounts in effecl to L, P, S, or PS. This is another verification of the for all our forms may be de preceding table
:
rived from applying thofe
which
relate to
XY
in the cafes
of
Xy, xY, and xy. have seen that
We
and
and
both contain
! .
L and
and that
untverfals
both contain
and
Hence each of the
may be faid to be the Jlrengtkened form of either of its particulars of the fame fign and each of the particulars the weakened form of its univerfals of the fame fign. The only diftinction which
:
appears between the
XY and
from
convertible particulars, that the ftrengthened forms derived Thus xy gives x)y or extending the fubje6ls are different.
two forms of the

is
YX,
xy and yx,
but yx gives y)x or X)Y. ; complex propofition is one which involves within itfelf the afTertion or denial of each and all of the eight fimple propofitions. If thefe eight propofitions were all concomitants, or if any num
Y)X
ber of them might be true, and the reft falfe, there would be 256 poflible cafes of the complex propofition. As it is, owing
to the connexion eftablifhed in the table
of page 63, there are
butfeven.
66
Firft, let
On
the
Proportions.
names
and
Y
it
be
all
fo related that neither
of the
:
four univerfals are true.
Then
Let
and
this is the firft cafe.
the four particulars are true be called a complex particular^
and denoted by P.
pofitions
Then, denoting coexiftence of fimple protheir feveral letters,
by writing + between
f
we have
p=o +o,+r+i,
This
cafe
is
of the
leaft
frequent mention in the theory of the
fyllogifm.
Next, let one of the univerfal propofitions be true. Then five of the other propofitions are fettled, either by affirmation or de nial. There remain the two concomitants, which are contra
dictory ; fo that only one is true. Accordingly, with the excep tion of the complex particular defcribed, juft every complex propofition muft confift of the coexiftence of a univerfal and one of
its
concomitants.
:
But
1
propofitions
for
f
A + Ai
there are not therefore eight more fuch and are the fame, and fo are 4
A +A
Ei
+E
and
E + Ei.
Ai +
E.
1
The
remaining number
is
then reduced
to fix,
which are
,
f
A +A
t
+I
Ei
+E
E + L,
Thefe muft be
Firft, take
feparately examined.
Ai-f (the order have then X)Y and Y)X. That
XY
is,
always underftood). there is no object whatfo-
We
ever which has one of thefe names, but what alfo has the other. The names and are then identical^ not as names, but as
fubjects of application.
Where
in
either
can be applied, there can
the other
geometry (the univerfe being plane rectilinear figure) equilateral and equiangular are identical names. Not that they agree in etymology nor in meaning more than this, a few words would explain the firft to many who could not
alfo.
Thus,
that
comprehend the fecond without difficulty. But they agree in what figure foever has a right to either name, it has the fame
It will tend to right to the other. uniformity call X, in this cafe, an identical of Y, and
Y an
of language,
identical
if
we
of X.
Let the fymbol of an
identical
be
then
we
have
On
Next, take A, + is Y, and fo far there
f
.
Propofitiom.
then
67
and
We have
is
X)Y
Y:X.
a character of identity.
Every X But fome Ys
Xs ; there are more Ys than Xs, and ftops fhort of a be called zfubidencomplete claim of identity with Y. Let tical of (thus man is a fubidentical of animal], and let Di de note this cafe. Then
are not
Let A + O exift. have then Y)X and X: Y. Every Y X, and fo far there is identity. But fome Xs are not Ys, there are more Xs than Ys, or X goes beyond a claim of identity with Y. Let X be now called a f up er identical of Y, and let it be
1 4
We
is
denoted by
f
.
Then
The terms
tive.
If
fuperidentical and fubidentical are obvioufly correla

is
f .
be either of
confider
E +E
is
thing which
X and Confequently X and Y are

both
the other of X. Now let us Y, Y We have then X.Y and x.y. There no
is
Y,
there
is
contraries,
Let
nothing which is neither. or juft fill up the univerfe.
be the mark of
this relation.
Then
have then Y and xy. Nothing is Next, take E, + I both X and Y, but there are which X and are neither. things are clear of one another, but do not amount to contraries, for Let them be called they do not fill up the univerfe.
f .
.
We
fubcon-
trarles, (thus in the univerfe metal, gold

ries,
and filver are fubcontra-
and
let
denote the relation.
Then
c,=E,+r
L. Laftly, take E the univerfe ; for there
f
+
;
But they
is
overfill
it
have x.y and XY. The names fill or Y. nothing but what is either for fome things are both Xs and Ys. There
is
We
then
all
Y be called fupercontraries,* and let C

we
*
the completenefs of a Let contrary and more. denote the relation.

!
X and
Then
have
The fupercontrary
is
relation,
though
eflential to a
fyllogifm,
not frequently met with.
The
complete fyftem of other extreme of the fupercon-
68
order
On
Proportions.
1
Let the particulars L, I , and O|, O names. This extenfion of our language
ative.
1
To complete our language, let Ai or X)Y, with reference to the XY, be called fub-qffirmathe and A or Y)X,fuperaffirma tive. Let EI or X.Y be called fubnegatfoe and E or x.j,fuperneg;
have
alfo thefe feveral

little
will require a
ex
planation.
When
fay that
is
a fubidentical of
Y,
mean
that the
etymological fuggeftions are actually fatisfied.
The whole name

I
X, and more,
univerfal
is
contained in
Y.
But when
fay that
is
we
âffirmative of Y, or X)Y, I mean no more than that have the proportion whofe form is not fuperaffirmative, ac
An algebraift would cording to the etymology of that word. well underftand the diftinclion at a He has often to glance.
diftinguifh the cafe in
which a
is lefs
than b from that in which
than or equal to b : the cafe in which the extreme limit of the afTertion is not included from that in which it is included.
is lefs
Again, the word negative had better be viewed as not fo much prefenting exclufion for its firft idea, as indufion in the contrary.
a fubnegative, when univerfal, is to fuggeft complete inclufion in the contrary, meaning the extreme cafe, poffibly ; namely, that the fubnegative names may be contraries. Again,
Thus
fupernegative is to fuggeft the idea of fupercontrary, with the loweft extreme, the relation of contrary, poffibly included. For exercife in this language, and in the ideas which it is
prefent, I now ftate the following refults. Univerfal affirmation, though as a general term, it is to include fuper and fub affirmation, yet looked at as one of the three, and
meant
to
from the reft, it means identity. The fame of ne and gation contrariety. Subidentity requires univerfal fubaffirmation and particular fupernegation. Identity is univerfal fub
diftinguifhed
and fuper affirmation, both. Superidentity requires univerfal and fuperaffirmation particular fubnegation. Subcontrariety re univerfal and quires particular fuperaffirmation. Con fubnegation
trary, or the fubidentical, is fo much the eafieft of all that the latter rarely allows the former to appear.
our complex relations,
The
firft
inftance that
fuggefted itfelf to me was man and irrational (as defcriptive of the quality of the individual and not of the fpecies) in the univerfe animal. Thefe more
than
fill that univerfe, idiot being to fay that rational (in this fenfe)
common
is
to both.
fubidentical of
But man.
it is
more natural
On
is
Proportions.
69
and fuper negation, both. Supercontratrariety univerfal requires riety fupernegation and particular fubaffirma
univerfal fub
tion.
tity
:
Again, univerfal fubaffirmation

particular fubaffirmation
is
is
either fubidentity or iden
contrariety.
identity
:
a denial of contrariety and fubUniverfal fuperaffirmation is either fuperidentity or
contrariety.
particular fuperaffirmation denies contrariety and fuperUniverfal fubnegation is either fubcontrariety or

:
particular fubnegation denies fubidentity and iden Univerfal fupernegation is either fupercontrariety or con particular fupernegation denies fuperidentity and iden trariety
contrariety
tity.
tity.
All this
is
exprefled in the following table,
Denial of
C c
name is the fubcontrary of its contrary ; the fubidentical of the contrary. Treat the word contrary as negative, the word identical as pofitive ;. and the two as of different Then the algebraical rule like figns.
Every
fubidentical of a
is
every fubcontrary
figns give a pofitive, unlike figns a negative, holds in every cafe : c including the variety of it fo well known as two negatives make
an affirmative/
When
the modifying prepofition

it
comes
:
firft it
muft be changed. ; Thus the fubcontrary of a contrary is a fubidentical but the con In putting two rela trary of a fubcontrary is a fuperidentical.
it
muft be retained
when
comes fecond,
tions together,
however,
we
have got into iyllogifm,
as
we
mall
prefently fee.
The
following tables will
mow
and
a connexion
preffions, for different orders
felections,
between the exwhich it may be ufeful
to verify.
7o
On
Proportions.
This
of
table only contains
fome of the
rules already laid
down
in pp. 64, 65.
It exprefles that, for inftance, the AI,
and Di
XY,
table
ibles,
are feverally the fame as the Ei, I , and of yX. This be exhibited the identicals counting as inconvertthus, may
the contraries as convertibles.

Change of
Subjeft Predicate
Subjeft and Predicate
Order
Subject and Order Predicate and Order
Subject, Predicate,
and Order
In
pofition
jedT:
change of fubjecl: is change both of fign and prechange of predicate is change of fign ; change of fuband predicate is change of prepofition. Thefe three cafes
all
cafes,
are of great importance in the iyllogifm do well to connect in his mind
and the reader would
Subjeft
Subjefl
with
Sign and prepofitlon

Prepofition
and Predicate
Predicate
It
is
Sign
defirable to confider the feveral
complex
:
relations as to
the continuous tranfition from one into another
the growth of names concerns not only the etymologift, but the logician alfo. With the analogies and affinities by which the dominion of
one name
clafs
is
extended to inftance after inftance, and
clafs
after
and fometimes, in fcientific language at leaft, deprived of I have here nothing to do. It is a part of what it has held as the the exift defcribed that which be phenomena enough may
gradual transformation of one relation into another. The words butt and bottle, for example, are now fubcontraries in the univerfe receptacle
:
but the etymology of the fecond word fhows
On
that
if
it
Proportions.
firft,
was
a fubidentical of the
to take the
being a diminutive.
71 And
we were
boat, bottle, pottle,
whole clafs butt, bufs, boot, bufhel, box, &c, which are all of one origin, the number
of tranfitions would be found to be very large. I afliime that all the inftances of a name are counted and
univerfe a conceivable, though not attainable, Alfo, that the inftances of the name are arranged Whatever the reafon may be contiguoufly, as in page 61. which dictates the particular arrangement chofen, it will generally
arranged in
fuppofition.
its
happen that the inftances near

ra&eriftics of the
to the
boundary
poflefs the cha-
degree than thofe nearer the Let the contiguous arrangement be made of all the in middle. ftances of the name Y, the univerfe being U. Let another name
in a fmaller
name
begin to grow, commencing with one inftance, that is, being or not; applied to one of the objects in the univerfe U, be it a then to another contiguous, and fo on. are to enumerate the
We
which fuch changes, whether of increafe or diminu tion, may caufe one name to change its relation to another. According as the change is made by acceffion or retrenchment, it may be denoted by ( + ) or ( ). Let the name X begin within the limits of the name its
ways
in
initial
relation to
is
then Di
is
And
:
the poflibility of the
following continuous changes
obvious
or P, but C or through either without the limits of only through P. Next, let begin the initial relation is Ci. have then may
Hence
may become
X We
Let
begin both within and without then P. And we have
its
initial relation
is
But when
except
follows
Di or D,
or C,
we have
nothing
J2
If
On
f
Proportions.
we
begin at the other extreme, with the
name U, we have
1
U (-) D Beginning from D and C D (-)D(-)Di D (-)P(-)D,

1
U
we
have
f
(-) C
C (-) C
f
(-)
D (-)P(-)C, D (-)P( + )C
C (-)
?
P (-) Di
have only
But when
+)
follows
or
D,
or C,
we
C
From the above lift it appears that the tranfition which is ac companied by a change of prepofition only can be made either and in all through the letter without prepofition or through P cafes with one continued mode of alteration. But when the tranf
:
ition involves
change of letter, it can only be made through P with continuation of the mode of alteration when the prepofi:
tions are different,
fame.
refults.
The
and change in the mode when they are the following fuccefiions contain the arrangement of the
With one
altera-
With one
tion
(
1
altera)
With two
tions
(-J
altera
)
tion (-J-)
Di Di
Ci
DD P D
f
D D Di D P Di
1
Di P Ci Ci P Di
CC
C|PC
Di
Ci
C C Ci C PCi
1 !
PC D
P Ci
D.
(-+) P C C PD
C P
1
The
following confiderations will further ferve to illuftrate the

in
want of the extenfion of the doctrine of proportions made

this chapter,
the completenefs of it. Among our moft fundamental diftincl:ions is that of necejjlty and fufficlency ; of what we cannot do without^ and what we can do with ; of that
alfo
and
which muft
of thefe are
precede^
non-necejjtty
applied to both
and that which can follow. The contraries and non-fufficiency. In thefe four words,
y,
and
we
have the defcription of the eight re-
On
lations
Proportions.
73
of
to
Y.
For inftance A, or
take a
X)Y
X,
tells
us that to
have an X,
we muft
all
Y,
or to be
it is
neceffary to
be
Y.
Treating
in the
fame way,
we
have
A.
f
X Y To
)
take an
it is
A Y)X
E,
1
neceffary to take a
X.Y
XY
xy
Y Y
y y y
E x.y
L r
O,
X:Y O Y:X
Y Y
And the convertibility of the ordinary mode of defcription with new one may be eafily mown in any cafe. For example, what can we mean by faying that to take a X, it is not fufficient
this
to take
may at
? Clearly that by taking not the fame time take a x, or that there are xs
what
on
is
not
Y,
or y,
we
ys.
which are
And
fo
for the reft.
Xy, xy, xY, we know that each propofition may be exprefled by three, and refufes to be exprefled by one. If we now admit the two words impojjible and contingent^ meaning by the latter that which, as the cafe may be, is poffible or impoffible, we mail eafily fee the following table for the uni-
Of
the four pairs
XY,
verfals
XY
A.
E,
Xy
xy
xY
X)Y X.Y A Y)X

1
The letters N, I, we read in the firft

fary to be
ficient to
S,
C, are the
it is
initials
)
line, that if
of neceffary, &c.
And
necef
fuf
Y,
then to be
;
it is
to be
;
X,
impoffible to be y
to be
it is
be y
and
to be x,
it is
contingently poffible or impoffible
to be
Y.
,
fufficient
its
own
:
Again, if by n and s we mean not neceffary and not by P, aftually poffible ; and by C, as before (C being contrary), we have the following table for the parti
culars
74
0,
1,
On
Proportions.
XY
O
I
1
Xy
xy
xY
X:Y X Y Y:X
xy
s,
Of the
four contrary pairs, n, P,
C,
ticulars precifely as
N,
I, S,
C,
are to the univerfals.
are related to the par The inter
and y is always accompanied by the interchange of change of and I, S and C, n and P, s and C ; the interchange of and C, S and I, n and C, s and P ; of both and x is that of and S, C and I, n and s, C and y, is that of and x,
and P.
The complex
relations
may be
thus defcribed.
According
as
it is of Y, to be or not ne and not and fufficient, fufficient, necefTary neceflary is fubcontrary, to be according as ceflary and fufficient, it is of Y, to be or neceflary and not
is
fubidentical, identical, or fuperidentical
contrary,
fupercontrary
fufficient, neceflary
and
fufficient,
or not neceflary and fufficient,

:
to be y.
Or,
as in the following table
XY
Xy
xy
xY
Inftead of
1C and PC,
write I and
for
is
"
impoffible, and
"
poflible or impoffible as the cafe
may be
"
"
impoffible
&c.
The names of the complex relations, fubidentity, identity, &c thofe of the fimple I fuppofe will be held tolerably fatisfa&ory relations fuggefted in page 68, fubaffirmative &c. have nothing in
:
their favor except analogy with the former, and clofe connexion little practice in their ufe might ren with the notation. der thefe laft names available but it will be advifable to con-
On
necl
Propofitions.
defcriptive of the
75
meaning, and to
them with names more

laft,
)
adopt thefe
whether we
When X Y,
extreme cafe
:
reject or maintain their fynonymes. the relation of to is well underftood as
that of the fpecies to the genus. with the understanding that the
in
X Y We may
word
is
adopt thefe words,

includes
fpecies
the
which the
.
of X.
When
than
an exdufive or excludent of of X. When XY, we Y, or elfe a non-participant-, and alfo that each is or non-ex may fay participant, clufive^ of the other.
call
When X Y, we may call X When X Y we may

x
fpecies
as extenfive as the genus. a non-fpecies of Y, and a non-genus
y,
which means
that
X and Y together
fill
up, or
more
fill
up, the univere,
When x y, which tween them contain the univerfe, mental. have then
names.
we may
fay that they are complement al means that and do not be only
We
we may
call
them
non-comple-
Inconvertibles.
Name
of
with refpeft to Y.
AI
d
A
f
O
Ei
X)Y X:Y Y)X Y:X

X.Y
fpecies, or fubaffirmative.
non-fpecies, or particular fubnegative. genus, or fuperaffirmative.
non-genus, or particular fupernegative.
Convertibles.
Name
of
and
Y with
refpeft to each other.
XY
f
E
I
1
Exclufives, or non-participants, or fubnegatives. Non-exclufives, or participants, or particular fubaffir-
x.y
xy
Complements, or fupernegatives. [matives. Non-complements, or particular fuperaffirmatives.
fcription
following exercifes in thefe terms, really contain the deof all the fyllogifms in the next chapter. Inclufion in the fpecies is inclufion in the genus ; and inclufion of the genus is inclufion of its or
parts (fpecies
The
not).
Exclufion from the genus is exclufion from the fpecies ; and exclufion of the or genus is exclufion of its
Inclufion or exclufion of the fpecies fion of the genus.
parts (fpecies not). is part inclufion or exclu
When
the genus
the fpecies
is
is complemental, fo is the genus not complemental, neither is the fpecies.
and when
Exclufion from one complement is inclufion in the other. Complements of the fame are participants.
76
On
fpecies of
the Syllogifm.
;
Two
two
one genus, are not complements
neither are
exclufions from the fame.
The complement
plement
is
of a genus is a non-fpecies ; and the a non-fpecies of the non-complement.
com
CHAPTER
On
A
V.
the Syllogifm.
the inference of the relation between
SYLLOGISM
is
two names from the relation of each of thofe names to a third. Three names therefore are involved, the two which ap in the conclufion, and the third or middle term, with which pear
_\_
the names, or terms, of the conclufion are feverally compared. The ftatements expreffing the relations of the two concluding
no
terms to the middle term, are the two premifes. In this chapter, ratio of quantities is confidered except the definite all and the
indefinite feme.
fyllogifm is fyllogifm may be either Jimple or complex. affirmation the fimple when in it two fimple propofitions produce a we of or denial of a third or the affirmation third, may fay,
:
fmce every denial of one fimple propofition is the affirmation of another. A complex fyllogifm is one in which two complex
propofitions produce the affirmation or denial of a third
propofition.
It
complex
might be fuppofed that we ought to begin with the fimple On this to the complex. fyllogifm, and from thence proceed of in unification I fome to remarks have offer, following point j
precifely the reverfe plan.
Hitherto the complex fyllogifm has never made

in a
its
appearance
it is
work on
not
is
allowed to be
it is
c
fo.
which logic, except treated as a fimple fyllogifm, though moft obvioufly a fortiori argument, as in I allude to the
in
one particular
cafe, in
common
greater than B,
than C.
firft
There
is
is
greater than C, therefore A is greater no middle term here the predicate of the
is
propofition
a thing greater
is
than B, the
fubjecT:
of the
fecond propofition
B.
Admitting
fully that the quality
of the premifes,
that
which
On
entitles the conclufion to
this
the Syllogifm.
be made,
as
it is
77
a fortiori
faid,
marks
argument out
as, if
anything, ftronger, clearer, and (could
fuch a thing be) truer, than a fimple fyllogifm ; yet it is plain that the very additional circumflance on which this additional
clearnefs depends, takes the
fined by
all
writers.
argument out of a fyllogifm, as de By beginning with the complex fyllogifm,
and thence defcending to the fimple one, it will be feen that we this a fortiori and clearer charac begin with cafes which prefent
ter.
think I mall (hew that the complex fyllogifm
is
eafier
than the fimple one.
Next, the fyllogifm hitherto confidered has never involved any contrary terms ; the confequence of which has been that various of inference have been neglected. Moreover, legitimate modes
feveral
of the ufual fyllogifms are more ftrong than need be in the premifes, in order to produce the conclufion. Thus Y)X and Y)Z being admitted as premifes, the neceffary conclufion is XZ. But if Y)X be weakened into YX, the fame conclufion
If we call a fyllogifm fundamental^ when neither of its are premifes ftronger than is necefTary to produce the conclufion, it is obvious that every fundamental fyllogifm which has a parti
follows.
cular premife, gives

particular
is
at leaft as
ftrong a conclufion
ftrengthened into a univerfal.

cafe
But,
when that except when

it
ftrengthening the premife alfo enables us to ftrengthen the con

clufion, in
which
we have
new and
different fyllogifm,
feems hardly fyftematic to mix with fundamental arguments fyl logifms which have quality or quantity more than is necefTary for
the conclufion.
The
ufe of the
complex
fyllogifm will, as
we
fhall fee, give
an independent and fyftematic derivation to thefe ftrengthened

fyllogifms, as well as to the reft.
Let
and
the middle term.
pared come firft cafe be that of the alphabet
and let be ; Let the premife in which X and are com of the two. Let the order of reference in each
be the terms of the conclufion
XY
So that by ftating what
YZ
X
is
XZ
Y, and what
with refpect to
is
with refpedt to Z, our fyllogifm involves the ftatement of what therefore muft be, or therefore cannot be, with refpecl: to Z.
We can, in every cafe, exprefs the refult in
fimple words.
Thus,
78
On
the Syllogjfm.
one of our fyllogifms being what I fhall reprefent by DDjDi is a fubidentical of If X be a fubidentical of Y, and as follows. But all this Z, then X is a fubidentical of Z. merely amounts
to the following
A fubidentical of a fubidentical
is
a fubidentical.
or or C have then to examine every way in which f or Ci or C , giving fixteen or C can be combined with Di or Inftead cafes in all, and all conclufive in one way or the other.
1
t
We
of taking an accidental order, and afterwards claffifying the rewill give claflifults, it will be better to predial the order which
fication.
That order
will
be to take
I.
followed by another
followed by another of different of a different prepofition. another a followed by prepofition 3. of a like This arrange C followed another a 4. prepofition. by ment gives us
of the fame prepofition
2. a
1.
D.D.
DD
DiC,
DC
f
3.
DiD
2.
C,D
C D,
in
CiC
cafes will
C C,
4.
C,D,
D D, D C D Ci C D C,C, C C
?
4
be examined by a method fimilar to that But a clear perception of the meaning of propofed the words will at once dictate the fixteen refults, which are as follows, preceded by the mode in which the fyllogifms are to
page 61.
Each of thefe
be exprefTed.
DiDiDi
Subidentical of fubidentical
is
fubidentical.
DDD
DiCiCi
Superidentical of fuperidentical is fuperidentical. Subidentical of fubcontrary is fubcontrary.

Superidentical of fupercontrary
is
DCC
C Di C
fupercontrary.
CD Ci
CC Di
C CiD
DiD :C
Subcontrary of fuperidentical is fubcontrary. Supercontrary of fubidentical is fupercontrary.
Subcontrary of fupercontrary Supercontrary of fubcontrary

Subidentical of fuperidentical Superidentical of fubidentical
Subidentical of fupercontrary Superidentical of fubcontrary
is
fubidentical.
is
is
fuperidentical.
not fupercontrary.
D Dr. Ci
DiC :D
!
is is is
not fubcontrary. not fuperidentical. not fubidentical.
Ci:Di
CiDr.D
CD C C
1
iDj
Subcontrary of fubidentical is not fuperidentical. Supercontrary of fuperidentical is not fubidentical.

Subcontrary of fubcontrary is not fupercontrary. Supercontrary of fupercontrary is not fubcontrary.
CiCr.C
:
Ci
On
tions
the Sylloglfm.
:
79
in the affirma
In the denials, the extreme limit is included Thus not fuperidentical and not fubidentical* it is not.
not identical
J ;
both include
and the fame of contraries.
In the
affirmations, extreme limitation of one premife does not alter the conclufion but that of both reduces the conclufion to its extreme
:
limit.
Thus
Subcontrary of identical is fubcontrary. Contrary of fuperidentical is fubcontrary.
Contrary of identical
and
fo
is
contrary.
of fyllogifm are as follows. Like names in the premifes give (i.) conclufions ; in the conclufion, and unlike names C. in the firft (2.) of C in the fame the firft premife requires premifes prepofition ; of different The premife, prepofitions. (3.) prepofition of the
on.
rules
The
of
this fpecies
For affirmatory
conclufion agrees with that of the firft premife. For negatory the rules are Thefe reverfed. rules will do conclufionS) preceding
for the prefent, but they afterwards
merge
in others.
complex conclufion above given are of the clearnefs of axioms, as foon as the terms are diftincSHy appre hended. The following diagrams will affift, and fhould be ufed
fixteen forms of
until the propofitions fuggeft their own meaning. be four, yet thefe four are really but one, as will
The
be
Though there mown.
X
If
DDD
YDCC
X
C.D
Ci
Y C D.C
}
X
C.C
D.Y
Y C C.D
f
8o
thefe are
On
the Syllogifm.
:
In each diagram are three lines, partly thick and partly open meant to be laid over one another, but are kept feparate or a x ; for diftin&nefs. A point on the firft line fignifies a
or a y, and a Z or a z. and one on the fecond or third, a The univerfe of the propofitions is fuppofed to be the whole Points which come under one another are fuppofed to breadth. Thus reprefent the fame object of thought, varioufly named.
when the thick lines contain the points named X, Y, and Z, it is fhown that we mean to fay there are
in
the
firft
diagram,
objects to
for there are points all the three names apply three lines. of all the in the thick another under one part
which
When we
meant
be placed
:
to reprefent the parts in
read by the letters on the left, the thick lines are which the Xs, Ys, and Zs muft
right,
and when by thofe on the

at the third
the open lines.
we fee Accordingly, looking fubconis a is clear that it in the while Ci Ci diagram, is a fuperidentical and x y ; and that trary of Y, or that Z. And the conclufion is equally and of Z, or that Z )
diagram, and
at the left,
of Z. But, looking at manifeft, the take we the left, and feeing C Di , open parts to reprefent the fpaces in which Xs, Ys, and Zs are found, and the thick then we parts for thofe in which xs, ys, and zs are found. Here
is
1
X Y Y Y X that a fubcontrary namely,

. :
fee that
is
a fupercontrary of
Y,
that
is
a fubidentical of
Z,
and
is a that, consequently^ fupercontrary of Z. Some attempts at laying down the premifes fo as to
evade the
conclufions, will be inftructive to any one who does not imme And formal demonstration is always prac diately fee the latter.
ticable.
Thus
fill
do not
and be a fubcontrary of Y, that is, if the univerfe, and have nothing in common ; and if
if
:
Y Y
be a fuperidentical of Z, or entirely contain Z, without being muft be more a fubcontrary then it is clear that filled by it
of
than of
Y, by
all
the inftances which there are of a

is
Y not
being a
fort
diagram, however, of demonftration, that the reader, until he has great com mand of the language, may as well look to the former to fee that
Z.
The
fo
much
clearer than this
he
is
right in the latter.
It
may be
name
thus
as a kind
we
convenient, as a matter of language, to fpeak of a of collective whole, confiding of inftances. And talk of one name being entirely in another, or may
partly in and partly out
&c,
as in
fact:
we
have already done.
On
the Syllogifm.
All the complex are fyllogifms which conclude by affirmation thofe of the a I rather character fhould obvioufly fay, fortiori
:
of the
three diagrams properly and obvioufly, thofe of the fourth by an eafy extenfion of language. The marks I 2 3 in the middle of the diagrams fhow how this is. In the firft, on the
firft
left,
is
more of
which
its
a fubidentical of
than
it is
of
all
the in
ftances in
^-identity
appears confift
of
thofe
which
prove the fubidentity of prove the fubidentity of

right,
thofe which X to Y, together with Y to Z. In the third, read from the

all
is
more fupercontrary
to
than
it
is
to
inftances
which {how the fubidentity of
Y, by
all
the
to
Z.
In the fourth
is more fubidentical diagram (from the left) we cannot fay that of Z than of fomething elfe, becaufe there is no previous fimply
fubidentity
among
the relations.
But
its
chara&eriftic of the conclufion takes

tion of thofe of both the premifes. If either of the premifes be
rates
it
the diftinguifhing quantity from the addi

flill
brought to the limit which fepa;
from the
relation of an oppofite prepofition
that
is,
if
or Ci be changed into C, or elfe the nature or 4 into of the conclufion is not altered, except by the lofs of the a for tiori character. One of the quantities which have hitherto con
:
tributed to the quantity of the conclufion, Ci and ; gives Ci as well as
now
1
difappears.
Thus
D Ci D
fite
C D
CD
gives
as well as
C C
t
Let one
to give
let
prepofition.
it,
oppo which gives Ci, and continues though weakened, when the firft Ci becomes C. Then
Choofe Ci
fo that
. gives Di as well as of the premifes pafs over the limit, and take the
C C
Ci become
is
our premifes are
C D
f
1 .
The
dia
gram
then as follows
ence
quantity of the conclufion now depends upon the differ between the number of inftances in (12) and (23) and its quality upon whether (12) has fewer inftances than (23), or the fame number, or more. As I have drawn it, C is the conclufion,
t
The
ftill
ftrengthen the
firft
premife
ftill
more, and the conclufion
82
will pafs through cafe may pafs into
On
C
into
1
the Syllogifm
or
elfe into
P, and in the fecond
as in the following
diagram
X
CT)
T
Y Z
1
enables Nothing is impoffible except DI or D. Hence C us only to deny DI and its limit D. Treat the other cafes in the fame manner, and, remembering that denial is to include denial
1
up
to the limit (while affirmation only affirms to
any thing fhort
of the limit)
we
have
denies
.
DI
DiC
1 .
C, D, Ci C,
D D
C
1
D D D C, C D
1
denies
. .
C
DI D,
Ci
C C
in
The
As
rules given
above
page 79
may be
collected
from the
inftances.
long as
we
;
ment of inference
keep contraries out of view, the ultimate ele is of a twofold character. It is either and
are both
;
Y
;
therefore
is
X
:
is
or
elfe
is
and
is
not
therefore
not
three
names
and
X, Y, Z, being fingle inftances of the fame inftance in both premifes. But the
ufe of contraries enables us to give an affirmative form to the latter It is is Y, and not-Z is therefore c is not-Z . cafe. ;
Connected with this change of expreffion is the following theorem that all the eight affirmatory complex fyllogifms are and the fame of the negatory reducible to any one among them The reader may trace this theorem to the order of the ones. figures i, 2, 3, being the fame in all the four diagrams. Taking DiDiDj as the moft fimple and natural form, and looking at the
:
:
diagram of CiD d, we fee the laft as DiDiDi dentical of y ; y is fubidentical of z ; therefore

of
z.
in
is
is
fubi
fubidentical
If
we
letters, as in
DiDiDi
write the terms of the fyllogifm after its defcriptive (XYZ) we have the following refults ;
(XYZ) = DiD,D, (XYZ) D D D (XYZ) = D,DiD. (xyz) D C C (XYZ) = D.D.D, (xyZ) C D,C (XYZ) = D DiD, (xYZ) C!D C!(XYZ) = D,D,D, (Xyz) C CiD (XYZ) = D,DiD, (xYz) C.C D, (XYZ) = D,DiDi (XyZ)
DiD.Di
1 ! 4
On
Thinking of the
firft
firft
the
Syllogifm.
83
defcription only as to relations, and of the fecond only as to terms, we fee the following rules of connexion.
In the
and fecond premifes and terms, there are
and
in the terms, or their contraries, according as there
are
fub-
accents or fuperaccents in the relations. But in the conclufion, f f the term is for and C , z for and C. And we may
thus reduce any fyllogifm involving any one of the eight varieties of relation combined with any one of the varieties of terms,
either to
DiD
or to
XYZ. Thus C,D C, (XyZ)

Not
letter are
is
D.DiD,
(XYz),
to load the fubjeft with demonftration of forms, I will give at once the general rules by
or DiCiC,
(XYZ).
which changes of accent and
governed
fyftem.
remarking
that they apply throughout the whole of The varieties in queftion are eight :
my
XYZ,
xyz
xYZ, Xyz
XyZ, xYz
XYz, xyZ.
in which (thinking of XYZ) all are kept; or all changed; or one only kept or one only Learn to connect each changed. letter with the proportions in which it occurs ; marking the proand as Connect with pofitions, premifes conclufion, I, 2, 3. J witn J ?2 ; Z with 2,3. Keeping all, or changing all, makes no alteration of letters keeping only one, or changing alters the letters in the one, only premifes in which that one occurs. we Thus, be the accents what they may, if in the firft letter into its the becomes change only contrary, fyllogifm and the fame if we keep ; only the firft letter unchanged. As to accents, remember that change of Z produces no effecT: look then only at and Y. When either letter is changed into its the accents to the contrary, change belonging premifes in which that letter comes firft ; 13 for X, 2 for Y, 123 for XY. For example, what is CiC D, as to letters, (Xyz). Here,
;
>3
DDD
CDC
alone (1,3)
accents,
into
is
unchanged: then
CCD
Xyz
becomes
only
DCC.
:
As
to
is
C.
Hence CiC D, (Xyz) = DiCC (XYZ).

to the
changed, which comes
firft
in 2
change
Here we
have parted from a fyllogifm in

valent in
XYZ
and for
into
all
correfponding equi the rules equally hold for the inverfe procefs, combinations of letters. For the change of
:
XYZ
Xyz, and
firft
that of
Xyz
into
the
only
left
unchanged.
XYZ, have only one defcription Now fuppofe required to know

:
it
84
what fyllogifm
firft
!
On
in
the Syllogifm.
xYz anfwers to DiCCi(Xyz).

Alter then
all
The
are, the third only unchanged.

rule,
T
DCC into DDD
key words
independent rules are that change of fubletter jec~t only, changes both letter and accent ; predicate only, C C and find Thus to what (xYz) predicate, accent. fubjecl:
;
D D D (xYz).
and change
the accents.
Thus DiCid(Xyz) =
by the
The
is,
exprefled in
XYz,
!
neither, S, table may be verified for exercife
and
D C C (xYz) = C,CT>i(XYz).
T
:
the changes are, in the three premifes S,
The
following
it
fhows the
efFecl
of
all
changes except that of the middle term.
XYZ
DDiDi
xYZ C DiC
XYz
1
xYz
D,CiC
C C,D
D,C,C,
C DiC
D,CiCi
DDD
t
COD
C DiC
C C,D
DiD.Di
1
C D,C
T
? f
C CiD
Similarly,
aC.C,
DiDiD,
&c.
DDD
would have
is
QD Ci D C C
may
DiCiC,
When
;
the middle term only
changed, the table
ftand thus
XYZ XyZ
It will
DiD.D, CiC Di
C ^C DCC
C
f
dD
CiD
C,
DDD
go
in pairs,
of courfe have been obferved that the eight fyllogifms each one of a pair differing from the other in accen
tuation, and nothing elfe. put together mould be thofe in
When we
take
fets
of four, the ones
which the
fecond, or the conclufion (whichever f or elfe has and Ci* has Di and ,
we
premife, or the take for a ftandard)

firft
fame rules of transformation apply to negatory complex ? D:Ci(XYZ) is C :Di(Xyz). In fed* thefe fyllogifms ; thus rules do not depend upon the character of the inference, nor even upon its validity, but merely on the efFe&s produced in the
The
propofitions
by changes of term.
is
Thus
the flatement
D DiCi
fingle
(XYZ),
valid
an invalid inference,
the fame flatement (equally in
mow that when this relation exifts between X and

between x and Y,
of courfe) as is exprefled in DjC (xyZ). An examination of the complex particular relation P L + I + Oj + , whether by the diagram or by unaflifted thought, will
and
y,
x and
y.
Y, it alfo exifts Hence PC, CP, PD, DP,
On
give P.
the Sylloglfm.
particulars give
85
no
poffibility
Moreover, two complex

all
1
of any conclufion, Ci or C or C , or
being equally poflible. or or
Thus PP may give

:
Now combine one

and DiP.
identical
It
of the others, as Di, with P examine PD will be found that the complex particular of a fubeither
may be
;
complex
or fuperparticular, fubidentical,
may be either P, contrary the cafes, and the rules will be found in
or that
PD
D
!
or
1 .
Examine
all
(D,C,)P
(D C
)P
P(D,C P(CiD
)
)
Either premife from between the parenthefes, thus interpreted. with P, in order as written, may have either, and muft have one,
P muft give either Di of the three for its conclufion. That Ci or P, and fo muft C P but PC muft have either P, Ci, or Before proceeding to the fimple fyllogifm, as I have called it, I will ftate that I much doubt the propriety of the terms fimple
t
t :
for and complex. Undoubtedly the phrafes are hiftorically juft, call to I each of the fyllogifms which complex is, as propofe which are thofe of three of we mail fee, neceflarily compofed the of in But another phrafeview, point always called fimple. the fimple fyllogifm is the affirma ology ought to be reverfed ; tion of the exiftence of one out of feveral of the complex ones.
Thus X)Y+Y)Z=X)Z, or A.AiAi, is really (D known which) (D or D, not known which) (Di known which) and aflerts that there is either DiDiDi or DDiDi or DDD.
4
or
or
or
D, not D, not
D DD,
4
be faid, furely the complex propofition requires the ? and is of two fimple ones Di=A exiftence ; conjunctive I anfwer that, on the other hand, therefore compound at leaft.
But
it
will
+O
the fimple propofition requires the disjunctive exiftence of two =Di or D. Which is moft fimple, both, or complex ones as one or the other ? to me, I think, the firft. Certainly the fyllo
:
gifm DiDiDi
Indeed, to
than AiAA. is one which I more readily apprehend moft minds, the latter is the former, if they are left and the cafes DiDDi, &c. are only admitted when to themfelves on. infifted and produced
:
But
further,
it
Is there in
the fimple propofition properly called fimple ? Is but one but one afTertion to deny or admit ?
is
86
queftion anfwered
i.
On
the Syllogifm.
When I affirm Every X is Y, I affirm ? Comparifon of X and Y. 2. Coincidences. 3. The greateft poffible amount of them. 4. That every X has been ufed in ob In c Some Xs are Ys the firft two of the preced taining them.
ing are employed.
In
No X
is
Y, we
have,
of
Xs and Ys.
2.
Exclufions.
3.
The
greateft
I. Comparifon amount. 4. The
And Some Xs are not with every Y. comparifon of every in the fourth. Ys omits the third, and fubftitutes Xs for every
is
the fubidentical, for inftance, only contains, befides what in the fubaffirmative, the notion that there are more Ys than
in exiftence.
in the
Now
Xs
is
The fubcontrary confifts, over and above what fubnegative, in that Xs and Ys are not every thing that the propofition might have applied to thefe and fo on.
:
On
confiderations, I think
ple
it
may be
allowed to treat the words fim-
and complex
firft
as
the
as
as disjunctively
only of hiftorical reference, and to confider connected with the fecond, the fecond
conjunctively connected with the firft, in the manner above noted. I think I fhall make it clear enough, that the paflage
from the conjunctions to the disjunctions is better fuited to a demonstrative fyftem than the converfe. If the plan which I fhould I fhould propofe imagine that disjunc gain any reception,
which
and conjunctive would be the names given to the claffes I have called fimple and complex the conjunctive comof feveral of the the pofed disjunctive confifting of disjunctive,
tive
:
one or the other out of
When
others,
a propofition
it
P and Q,
of the conjunctive. the R, neceflary confequence of two that the denial of R, muft follows neceflarily
feveral
is
be the denial of one at
leaft
of
P and Q.
:
For every propofition
admits but of affirmation or denial
and he
who
affirms both
and Q^muft affirm R. If then P be affirmed and denial of Q_ muft follow if be affirmed and denial of P muft follow.
:
R R
denied, the denied, the
PL fimple
which
T
4
O A E
, ,
of fyllogifm is one, the two premifes and conclufion are to be found among the fimple propofitions A, Ei, L,
,
1 .
Thus we have AjEiEi
or
X.Z,
as
an inftance.
The
order of reference
X)Y + Y.Z = is always XY,
YZ, XZ.
following theorems will beneceflary; cannot be followed by a univerfal conclufion. premife
The
I.
A particular
On
Take
is
the Syllogifm.
87
If poffible, let AJi for example, have a univerfal conclufion. r + Oi + 1 ). P or (Ai + the complex premifes )(Ii +
All that can be inferred

valid,
is
that
one of three conclufions (page 85)

:
and neither
nor
either
or
or
C.
But
if
univerfal be true,
one of two conclufions muft be valid (page 69) and one of them or C. If then Ai and L alone yielded a or a form which univerfal conclufion, quite as much muft DiP
nor C, is neand not having one of which is of of one two conclufions, ceflarily productive or C. This contradiction cannot exift or AJi cannot yield
is
indifferent to three conclufions,
a univerfal conclufion. no condujion can follow. IJi yield a conclufion ; which by the laft the PP or (Ii I f H-Oi-fO ) orem, muft be only particular. 1 1 is indifferent to all Oi complex conclufions quite (Ii )
2.
From two particular premifes

let
If poffible,
Now
+ +
1
+O
as
much
is
Ui.
cannot
But
fion,
two complex
premifes yield a particular conclu This con conclufions are denied (page 69).
if thefe
tradiction
exift
or particular
premifes
can yield no
all
conclufion.
Let a fimple
fyllogifm with premifes and conclufion
univer
either premife (and therefore fal, be called univerfal: and with Then every the conclufion) particular, be called particular.
univerfal fyllogifm has
two
particular fyllogifms deducible
from
it.
AtEiEi be valid, then AI joined with the denial of EI But the altera denial of EI or AHiIifeems to be valid. the gives tion of the places of the propofitions requires us to fay that it is
if
:
Thus
A Ui
which
is
valid
and
Take AiEEi
denial of
or
X)Y + Y.Z = X.Z.
this point requires clofe attention.
Then X)Y
Y.Z(or
with the
;
X.Z(or
XZ)
of gives the denial
YZ)
and
we have
This
valid, if the firft
is
be (as
it
is)
valid
but
its
fymbol
is
not
For the middle term is, in our notation, made middle in and the order of reference, which is therefore YX, XZ, YZ the fyllogifm is A Ui. Similarly we have
AJiL.
XZ + Y.Z=X:Y
But this is produced by coupling the denial of X.Z with Y.Z. LEOj for the order of reference is now XZ, ZY, XY, and
:
88
Ei
is
On
the Syllogifm.
When
not changed by change of order. The rule is as follows. the denials of the conclufion and of a premife are made to
take the places of that premife and the conclufion, the order of reference remains undifturbed as to the tranfpofed terms, and is
changed as to the ftanding term. This laft muft therefore have the prepofition of the inconvertible propofition changed ; but not that of the convertible propofition.
Thus E AiE
fimilar
if valid,
way
it
may
and I AT. Again, in a gives be fhown that from each particular fyllogifm
ETOi
1
follows a univerfal
thus
LE O
E
if valid,
{hows that denial of

this cafe neither is
and
valid.
give denial of L or And ETOi, befides AiE

,
A E Ei.
,
In
alfo gives
A.IT.
is
Such
fently
clarification
of thefe opponent forms as
ufeful, will pre-
be given.
of the orders
Since there are eight forms of afTertion, with reference to each YZ, it follows that there are fixty-four com
XY
binations of a pair of premifes each. But of thefe the only ones which have a chance of yielding a conclufion are, I. fixteen
with premifes both univerfal ; 2. thirty-two with one univerfal and one particular. If, for a moment, ftand for univerfal and P for particular, the form of a fyllogifm is either UUU, PUP,
UPP,
or
UUP.
its
Of
thefe, the
firft,
related that each
form has the other two
fecond, and third are fo for its opponents but

:
the fourth has
own form
in
each of
its
opponents.
fyllogifms, fay
1
Now
examine one of the complex affirmative

1
DiDiDi, by the diagram in page 79. The premifes are Ai + O and AI + O , giving the four combinations AiAi, A|O , O Ai and The conclufion is Ai -f- O but it is not merely twofold,
OO
but threefold
for the
is
(hows
fum,
that
it
a fortiori character explained in page 81, obtainable on two different grounds, and is the
as
clufion.
were, of two different and neceffary parts of the con That every X is Z, follows from X)Y and Y)Z, or
we
have the fyllogifm.
AiAiAi
X)Y + Y)Z=X)Z
But
as far as the
follows that they are not not Xs : or we have
Zs which are below (12) are concerned, it Xs becaufe they are the Ys which are
O AO
On
not Ys,
the Syllogifm.
89
and as to the Zs below (23) they are not Xs becaufe they are among which are all the Xs. Accordingly we have
AiO
or
X)Y + Z:Y = Z:X
DiDiDi
of AiAiAi, requires the coexiftence
O AiO
AiO
Apply
this reafoning to the contraries x, y, z, or elfe
examine
DDD
By
in the
coexiftence of
A A A OiA O,, A OiOi.

f
fame way, and

,
we
find that
DDD
requires the
as in
to x, applying the preceding refults

is
Y, Z, &c.
page
82, or, as
better at
firft,
by examining
all
the cafes of the dia
gram
in
page 79,
we
from get the following table of derivations
The firft the eight affirmatory complex fyllogifms. deduce to all from muft be mews the terms which ufed,
column DiD Di
4
XYZ
xyz
x
DiDiD,
A
.
rAiAiAi
A,0 lA.O O
DDD
C DiC
C.D
-f
X)Y + Y)Z=X)Z Y:X + Y)Z=Z:X X)Y + Z:Y=Z:X A A + Z)Y = Z)X Y)X f-A OiA Oi X:Y + Z)Y = X:Z UVOiOi Y)X + Y:Z = X:Z
rE A,E
!
I2 )
(23)
(12)
(23)
YZ
LA.L OL TT JLi/\ IL| rTTA
LE
-A.. I
+Y)Z= x.z XY +Y)Z=XZ x.y+Z:Y = XZ Y V L V V =^V.Zy YV

x.y
^ -\- Z-j )
(12)
(23)
Xyz
Ci
TAT
TT IT
zi.iJlrlll/i
1
xy
j\.
]
+Z)Y=xz
L
(12) (23)
lEiOJ
O EJ (A
lA,IT
rA E E
xyZ
x
DCC
C CiD
OiE L
E.A
1
LA IiI,
X.Y + Y:Z=xz Y\V V V yv.^L/ YV I -p I Y:X + Y.Z=xz X)Y+yz =xz Y)X+y.z =x.z X:Y+y.z =XZ Y)X + YZ =XZ
./.j zzz.
(12)
(23)
(12) (23)
Yz
(-E
. .
<(
LEiOi Oi rE.E Ai
lE I
I
XyZ
CiC Di
+Y.Z=Z)X XY +Y.Z=X:Z x.y +yz =X:Z X.Y+y.z =X)Z +y.z=Z:X xy

x.y
(12)
(23)
LE.1,0
X.Y + YZ=Z:X
I
(12) (23)
Before forming any rule, or making any remark,
proceed to
90
On
the Syllogifm.
collet the refults of the remaining cafes. And firft, let a premife be brought to its limit, or C fay that DiDiDi becomes
but the conclufion of O AiO is AiAiAi remains, and AiO O But this very circumftance creates, not a new conclu nullified. fion, for it is only a part of one already exifting, but a new form
1 1
:
In the diagram it immediately appears that one of the for particular conclufions is loft ; not contradicted, but nullified That is, and are identical names. (12) difappears, becaufe
DDiDi.
and Ai + and , and the conclufion is AiO fyllogifms A,AAi but there is now the are as before, and for the fame reafons combination A Ai among the premifes, which produces the con clufion L, and we have
of deduction.
The
t
premifes are
.
now
Ai
+A
A +O
The
A AJi Y)X + Y)Z=XZ

though new as far only a ftrengthened form of LAJi,
This
fyllogifm,
as
DiDi is concerned, is concomitant of E AjE

4 1 .
cludes
For (page 65) L is LAi and its necefTary confequence L.

true
whenever
is
true, fo that
A Ai
in
But
if
L had been
A* which though perfectly

ftrengthened into
fion, as feen in
inftead of
we
fhould have had AiAJj
valid, yet
admits of a ftronger conclu
AiAiAj.
1
Of
(as
the
into
firft
two modes of ftrengthening a particular propofition AI or A ) there is one which ftrengthens the quantity
form of the propofition, and another that of the fecond. or L becomes X)Y or AI when the firft form, and
1
of the
Thus
XY
or
Y)X
Oi or
A X:Y
when
the form
or y:x. The prepofition remains the fame, or changes, according as the firft or fecond form is If the firft form of the fecond premife of a fyllo ftrengthened.
X.Y ftrengthened is X:Y

becomes
the fecond form, is ftrengthened. Similarly or E, and y.x or E , according as

1
of the firft premife, be ftrengthened, no gifm, or the fecond form is added to the conclufion. Thus, as far as the fyllo ftrength
as much as Ai, gifms in this chapter are concerned, LAi gives and E Oi as EtE. But if the firft form of the firft premifs, or
t
the fecond form of the fecond, be ftrengthened, the conclufion
has
its firft
A
The
form ftrengthened. and obvious theorem contains all thefe refults. fimple very the firft concluding terms are, in our order of reference,
On
term of the
conclufion
firft
is
the Syllogifm.
91
weakening more by itfelf give more comparifons nor can of the number arife things except by augmenting comparifons Since the conclufion can obvioufly compared in that field. in the premifes, no term of that con of more than was no fpeak clufion can be augmented in quantity, until the fame thing has But no ftrengthening of a propofitaken place in its premife.
ftroyed) by
parifon does not
:
The premife and the fecond term of the fecond. never ftrengthened by augmenting the quantity of the middle term, nor only weakened (it may be altogether deA wider field of comthe middle term.
tion ftrengthens both terms

effective,
it
confequently, to
make
fuch a thing
muft be the concluding, and not the middle, term

a
which
is
ftrengthened.
as collection following table is only worth inferting the The fourth column (hows exercifes. eightjtrengthened par
The
of
them, having univerfal premifes but not ftronger than might have been only a particular conclufion,
ticular fyllogifms^ as I will call
inferred
from the particular fyllogifm
itfelf.
I will now examine the negatory complex fyllogifms, premifing however than we cannot get any new conclufions from them.
92
mifes are univerfal
:
On
all
the Syllogifm.
the fixteen cafes in which both prethat there can be
For we have now got
and
we know
it
with a particular premife, except

verfal premifes for its
no fyllogifm of thofe with uni one have
together deny E + L, E1 and that the of E coexiftence is, deny either L, is, deny or L, that is, affert either I or E t This fyllogifm then may be
Take
DD :C
f
opponents.
or A,
+O
1
and
A + Oi
f
.
that
written thus,
(Ai
+O
is
(A
+ Oi)
E
(either Ei or I
Now
which
is
1
.
the fact
that this disjunction

4
is
fuperfluous
it
is
never a neceffary confequence of DiD For AjA gives I as already mown, and "Aid and And the rationale A are inconclufive (and of courfe).
is
1
always afferted, and
Od
:
of the inference
is
as follows
fince
is
a fubidentical of
is
Y, and
Y a fuperidentical
X
and
of Z,
it
follows that
fuperidentical both of
not rilling the univerfe (our fuppoconfequently, it follows that there are things which are nei throughout) ther Xs nor Zs, namely, all which are not Ys. Again, in
;
Z
1
fition
CiCiiC , which the fame reafoning mows to be only CiCiI , none either of X or of Z is in Y, therefore every inftance in Y
And thus it will appear that in every negatory the whole middle term, or the whole of its conclufion complex makes the contrary, fubject matter of the ftrengthened particular
is
both x and z.
fyllogifm
which
is all
is
that can be collected.
that no negatory complex fyllogifm is of effect than the ftrengthened particular derived more logical any from it. Thus we may fay that, fo far as the extent and cha
Our
conclufion
racter of the inference

I will
is
now
;
pafs to the general rules
concerned, the former is the latter. of the complete fyftem of
fyllogifms
reader muft take pains to remember two rules of forma tion, perfect contraries of each other, for the dependence of the accents (or prepofitions] on the fign (affirmative or negative cha
racter) of the
poffible.
firft
The
premife.
I exprefs
them
in the briefeft
way
Direfl Rule. Affirmation (in the firft premife) makes the fecond both the other propofitions, or ifolates no premife agree with makes the fecond premife differ from both the negation thing
:
On
Ifolates
the Syllogifm.
93
others, or ifolates the fecond premife.

the firft premife,
Inverfe rule. Affirmation
premife differ from both the others in prepofition negation ifolates the conclufion, makes the conclufion differ from both the others. Thefe rules might
makes the
:
firft
be expreffed
fo as n
"
to
make
their
contrariety
more complete.
,., unlike
Thus
in the
r mverie
rule, affirmative
commencement mows
,9
prepofitions in the
two
premifes, and the conclufion
the
firft
premife in prepofition
prepofitions in the
but negative
commence
ment (hows
clufion
two
premifes, and the con
g
j"
the
firft
premife in prepofition.
The
1.
fubjecls of the following rules are,
The eight affirmatory complex fyllogifms. The eight univerfal fimple fyllogifms. 3. The eight ftrengthened particular fimple fyllogifms. 4 The fixteen particular fimple fyllogifms.
2.
Omit
the negatory complex fyllogifms, as fully contained
in
the third of this enumeration, and the complex fyllogifms which contain the unaccented or C, as carrying a momentary accent
D
f
be expunged when the formation is completed. Confider DI, D, A , L, I , as of the affirmative figns, and , Ai,
for the rule, to
1
Ci,
C, C , Ei, E , Oi, , as negative. Rule i. In the complex fyllogifm all parts are complex;
1
in
the univerfal fimple fyllogifm all parts are univerfal ; ftrengthened particular only the conclufion is particular particular only a premife is univerfal.
in
;
the
in the
Rule Rule
2.
Premifes of like fign have an affirmative conclufion

fign, a negative.
of unlike
3. The complex, the univerfal, the particulars which with a particular, follow the direcl: rule ; the begin ftrengthened particulars, and the particulars which begin with a univerfal
(all
that
commence with
a univerfal, and conclude with a particular)
follow the inverfe rule.

alike, follow the the inverfe.]
[Or
;
thus
direcl: rule
all
all which ; begin and end which begin and end differently,
The complex
fyllogifms and univerfals are eafily
remembered
94
by
rule
:
On
may
be noted, as
the Syllogifm.
the particulars almoft as eafily.

far as thefe laft are
The
following Tub-
rules
concerned.
I. Firft and fecond premifes. A and O in the firft E and unlike prepofitions in the two premifes demand premife I demand like prepofitions. Thus AiOi muft be inconclufive A O muft be conclufive. But E Oi muft be conclufive and
Sub-rule
EiO muft
be inconclufive.
univerfal in the firft Sub-rule 2. Firft premife and conclufion. a par conclufion in the unlike an demands prepofition premife ticular firft premife, a like prepofition in the conclufion.
:
Sub-rule 3. Second premife
and
conclufion.
Every fecond pre

of
like fign
:
mife demands
its
own
prepofition in a conclufion
in a conclufion
and the other prepofition
of unlike
fign.
As
far
as
the four fpecies are concerned, every fyllogifm

;
and every one formed according to the three rules is valid The following remarks are partly not fo formed is invalid.
recapitulatory, partly
new.
Every complex fyllogifm gives one univerfal fyllo * and two and the con particular ones, its concomitants gifm comitants are formed by changing one of the premifes of the
I.
:
Remark
univerfal and the conclufion, into their particular concomitant
propofitions (page 63.)
Remark
recl:
2.
Every
fyllogifm has
its
of the contraries
terms
:
in the
fame manner
contranominal, which afTerts as the firft does of the diall
and contranominals have

1
as in
O AiO
and
OiA
d (page
their accents different,
62.)
Remark
3.
Every
fyllogifm has
two opponents, made by
inter
changing the contradictories of one premife and of the conclufion, and altering the accent of the remaining premife, if inconverti ble (A or O) (page 88.)
Every complex fyllogifm has two fuch opponents fame way, the Ds being the inconvertibles, the Cs Thus (:) meaning denial of, the opponents of the convertibles. CiD C. are C.iCiiD and :C,Di:Ci. The firft of thefe is
4.
Remark
formed
in the
(E,
+ r)(WE )(0
or A.)
containing the valid fyllogifms

*
Syllogifnty
EE Ai,
EJiO
EO
being
not preceded by complex, means fimple fyllogifm.
On
the Syllogifm.
95
gives
EiE Ai and its concomitants. contranominal of EiA Ei) and

of the
reft.
And :CDr.C
its
E AiE
concomitants.
And
(the the fame
Remark 5. Each univerfal fyllogifm has two weakened forms, made by weakening one premife and the conclufion. When the
firft
premife
is
weakened,
!
it
is
without change of prepofition

1 .
when the fecond, with change. Thus the weakened forms of EiA Ei are O,A Oi and EJiO Remark 6. Each particular fyllogifm has two ftrengthened
but
forms, one of which is a univerfaj, the other only a ftrengthened Thus the ftrengthened forms of OiA Oi are EiA Ei particular.
and
EA
f
Oi.
7.
Remark
lar,
In every fyllogifm except the ftrengthened particu

is
the middle term

:
univerfal in
is
the other
contrary ftrengthened particular, the middle term is univerfal in both premifes, or particular in both. This affords a complete crite rion of fyllogifm, as will be noticed hereafter in facl:, the com:
and
its
one premife, and particular in therefore the fame. But in the
pletenefs of this fyftem
crowds us with
relations,
from many of
which general
might be deduced, though they need only appear here by cafual remark. In A.O , EJ , LL, I.EiO,, 0,0,, LA.L, E.O.I ,
rules
O
,
the middle term enters univerfally in the univerfal, and In all the others it enters particu particularly in the particular. In the larly in the univerfal, and univerfally in the particular.
firft fet, the convertible premifes are all fubs, the inconvertibles are fubs in the fecond premife, and fupers in the firft. In the fecond fet, thefe rules are inverted.
EJiO
Remark
AI,
8. Of the twelve poffible pairs of premifes AA, AE, AO, EA, EE, El, EO, IA, IE, OA, OE, which can give
a conclufion, each one wlll^ in two ways, which two inverted in their accents. Thus appears in E
ways are
EO
OL
and
the
EtOJ
reft
:
The two
I
premife-letters and one accent dictate

1
all
thus
fyftem is than I A, for the fymbol of I AT. I now fpeak only of funda mental fyllogifms the ftrengthened fyllogifm might be
1
can belong to nothing but I AT. When the well learnt, it will be found unneceffary to write more
:
AAT
fignified
by
AA
1
1 .
Remark
9.
The
fyllogifms of the three
firft clafles
are
all
really
96
On
XYZ,
the Syllogifm.
fpecimens of one, thofe of the fourth of two, among them, with the eight variations xYZ, XYz, xYz, XyZ, xyZ, Xyz, The for rules xyz. conducing thefe changes are
Change of fubjecl: is change of both accent and Change of predicate is change of accent. Change of both is change of
thus to pafs from
fubjecl:, in
letter. letter.
YZ
xYZ
therefore
to AiEEi we note in change of in of of neither, change change fubjecT: muft be is the fet of terms into which
E EjA
XY
is
XZ
XYZ
changed
and the
E EjA
fyllogifm of either fet
the
AiE
Ei
fyllogifm of the other.
The 24
allowed.
fyllogifms,
which
are
24 with reference
to the order
XY, YZ, XZ,

Thus
Thefe
AJT
are only 12 if the order of the firft is the
ZY, YX, ZX,
be
TAT
of the fecond.
the fyllogifms are eflentially
fame
in the
mode of inference
change a fyllogifm into another of the fame mode they of inference, invert the premifes and change the prepofition of all the inconvertibles. Thus AiO are of the fame OiOi and
afford.
To
inference.
The
! !
pairs
which
in this point
of view are identical are

!
A.AiA,
=A A A
I
f
E,A
IiAJ,
?
Ei=A E E E EiA
1
4
=EE A.
f
!
?
O A.OÂ OiOi
A,0
T
=A
1
I.
f
=OiA O, E
L=0 E
L L
PAT =AJT
!
LEiOi =EJ,O E,0.r=0 Eir ETOi =rE O
The ninth remark admits of confiderable extenfion. The fame of a logical proportion may have a much more definite character It may be a felecled, or at leaft a in fome cafes than in others. nominal diftin&ion diftinguimabley^?, which want nothing but a and to make the particular proportion eafily ufefully univerfal. and more or lefs ufe or lefs Whether it can be done more eafily,
fully,
is
no queftion of formal
is
logic.
If
it
be fuppofed done, the

In
is
particular
if
converted into a univerfal.

a
we make
Every
it
name
is
.
then
cal, or
M Y
not.
for every
which
fome Xs are Ys, Y, fay M, we have

c
which
Y, then our univerfal is only Every be conferred from any But if the name other circumftance, which diftinguifhes the Xs that are Ys from
it is
M merely becaufe
is
may
If
we
This proportion may be purely identi call every X which is Y by the name
Tis
other Xs, then the change from the particular to the univerfal by
On
expreffion of
the Syllogifm.
is
97
the
means of the new reftri&ion impofed by the new name,
new knowledge.
two
kinds.
The
thofe
quantities in the conclufion are of

in
There
are
with the terms, and which continue in the conclufion fuch as they were introduced in the premifes and there are thofe which depend on the union of the premifes,
:
which are brought
and which are what they are only in virtue of the joint exiftence of the premifes. For example, in LAJi we have 4 fome Xs are but if we afk, is Z, therefore fome Xs are Zs Ys, every what Xs are Zs, the anfwer is, thofe which are Ys, and no others,
fo far as this conclufion affirms.
But when we look
at
O AiO
or
fome
are not
Ys are Xs and
:
if
not Xs, and every we then afk what
is
therefore fome
Zs
Zs
are not
Xs
the anfwer
is, that this quantity does not enter with Z, but depends upon the other premife, namely, upon the number of Ys which are not Xs. In a particular fyllogifm, let us call the quantity of the fubjet
in the conclufion
Intrinfic or extrlnfic
according as
it is
that of
the premife which introduces that or of the other premife. fubjecl:,
Examination
concludes in
will
fhow
I
1
or
in
that in every particular fyllogifm which which both terms are particular, the
quantities of the terms are, of the

trinfic
:
one
intrinfic,
is
of the other exor
but that where the conclufion
in
either the
quantity of the fubjecl: is intrinfic and that of the contrary of the predicate extrinfic, or vice verfa.
the quantity of a particular term in the conclufion is invention of a name will convert the syllogifm into a univerfal. be taken Thus LA,A, or Y)Z XZ, if
intrinfic, the
When
XY +
are
to reprefent
all
thofe
Xs which
M)Y + Y)Z = M)Y,

Y:X-f Y)Z = Z:X,
Ys, and nothing elfe, becomes of the form AiA.A,. A.O or Again, thrown into the form x:y + z)y=x:z, be
comes m.y-fz)y=m.z, of the form EiAiEi, when the xs which

are ys are diftinguifhed from the reft of the univerfe by the name m. There is nothing either illegitimate or uncommon in diftin-
name certain fome (or even uncertain fome, the certainly always fame fome] of another name. Again, fince we know that every univerfal fyllogifm is reducible to the form
guifhing by a peculiar
if
AiAtAj by ufe of contraries, we have now reafon to know that is no fundamental inference, of the kind treated in this chap ter, which is any other than that in AiAiAi, or, the contained
there
98
On
the Syllogifm.
of the contained is contained. And there is no better exercife than learning to read off each of the fyllogifms, univerfal and particu rules. lar, into this one form, by perception, and without ufe of
Take
what
as
is
an inftance
X:Y+y.z=XZ
what
is
the container,
the contained, and what is the middle container of one and contained of the other. It is a parcel of Xs which are con tained in y, all y in Z, and therefore that parcel of Xs in Z.
This general
principle fuggefts a notation for
all
the complex,
univerfal, and fundamental particular, fyllogifms. viate X)Y + Y)Z X)Z into XYZ), and if
If
we
abbre
we
denote by
without ), that it is only a parcel of Xs (all or fome, defined or undefined, but always the fame), we have the fol
XYZ,
lowing,
For A.AiA, read
_ Q A.O
_ A,0
1
XYZ) or zyx) xYZ

Zyx
For
__
AAA
O,A Oi
!
read xyz) or
ZYX)
Xyz
A OiOi
For
zYX
Xyz)
xyz
or
For E A.E read

LAiIi
xYZ) or zyX)
EA E
TAT
EiOJ
read
XYZ
ZyX
read
ZYx)
EOL
For
zYx
read
_ O EJ
_ AJT
A,EE
1
X Yz) or Zyx)
xYz
zyx
For A
_ QiE L
A lJi
T
EE
xyZ)
or
zYX)
XyZ
ZYX
For
E E,A
read
xYz)
or
LEiO,
XYz
zyX
ETOi
ZyX) For EiE A, read XyZ) or zYx) _I E O xyZ ZYx EiLO

?
1
Here, ufmg P,Q,R, as general terms, PQR) denotes that all Ps are Qs, and all Qs are Rs, whence all Ps are Rs while PQR only denotes that there is a parcel of Ps among the Qs,
:
and
all
Qs
are
among
the Rs,
whence
that parcel of Ps
is
among
the Rs.
The rules for the connection of thefe fyftems are not compli include. cated, confidering the extent of the cafes they are to Let the letters A,E, &c. be called proponents ; X,Y,Z, nominals:
and by the order of the nominals we always mean that X is firfl^ The nominals being direft &c. both in XYZ, and ZYX.
(X,Y,Z) and
contrary (x,y,z),
remember
that,/r/?,
On
t firft
the Syllogifm.
99
r an d Second {fi ft
third
firft
An affirmative?/^?^/ proponent denotes that \L\\t\fecond and

(
third
third and
nominals agree (are both direct or both contrary).
(fir ft an d Second {firft nega,tive\fecond proponent denotes that t\\Q\ fecond and third (third third and firft
differ (are
nominals
one
direct,
one contrary).
or
Thus EIO muft
give
Xyz
xYZ
xyZ
or or
IEO
muft give
XYz or
zyX or ZYx zYX or Zyx
or y depends only on Secondly^ whether the middle term be the accent of the middle proponent a fub-accent gives Y, a In the univerfal lyllogifm however, either fuper-accent gives y.
:
gives either. Thirdly^ the
XYZ
:
with a particular and the which begin with a univerfal.
fyllogifms are the particulars which begin fyllogifms are the particulars
ZYX
.
Seeing the particular Oi, at the 1 the take order beginning, feeing the fuperaccent in E make it XyZ. Seeing the negative Oi , let the exifting difagreement of the firft and fecond nominals continue and the fame of
For example, required OiE L
XYZ,
the fecond and third from the negative E. is the fyllogifm exprefTed in nominals.
Confequently
XyZ
the inference in
becaufe
OiE L is that a parcel of the among ys which are all among the Zs. Again, required the nominal mode of expreffing
Or the rationale of Xs are among the Zs
ET Oi
;
See
ing the univerfal
E
1
at the beginning, write
down
ZYX
:
for the
1 fuperaccent in I , write down ZyX ; for the negative in E , 1 continue yX ; for the affirmative in I , write zy hence zyX is
the nominal form of
ETOi.
Yz, (how
Required the proponent mode of exprefling xYz. Here xY, us that the premifes are negative forms, and the direc
tion of the order x,
Y, z, that the firft premife is particular. the And tells are premifes, and I the conclufion. us that the middle proponent has a fubaccent. Whence
Then
OE
OEJ
is, fo
goes, the proponent expreffion. And, by the laws f of form, the other accents muft be as in EJ , fince the fyllo the follows direcl: rule gifm (page 93).
far as
it
ioo
On
the Syllogifm.
Required the proponent mode of expreffing note in fucceffion univerfal commencement

gative of the inverfe rule, or
ZYx.
firft
Here we
fecond, affirmative
premife ne middle accent fub. This gives

.
ELO
EJjO
Required the proponent notation for the univerfal xYZ) or fee at once EAiE, or E AiE zyX). The concomitants of a univerfal are found by changing the
We
firft
ing
away the
or
nominal into the contrary, in each of the forms, and throw Thus the concomitants fign of univerfality [ ) ]
.
of
forms of a univerfal are found by merely throwing away the fymbol of univerfality [ ) ] from the two Thus the weakened forms of XYZ) forms of the univerfal. and zyx. which is alfo zyx) are
XyZ) The weakened

zYx)
are
xyZ and ZYx.
XYZ
in
But we have not yet reached the climax of fymbolic fimplicity An algebraift would the mere reprefentation of fyllogifms.
of the inference, as now confidered, does not depend upon the names ; but only upon their reference to He would there the names in the fundamental form XYZ).
the ftrucSture fay that
fore propofe a fimple iymbol to reprefent letting alone, and another to reprefent changing Into the contrary. Thefe, with a and another of inverfion of order, fign of complete univerfality,
are
all
that he
would
find necefTary.
:
Let o and
fignify letting
alone and changing into the contrary let the terminal parenthefis denote complete univerfality, as before, and let inverfion of order
Thus or LAJi, be denoted by a negative fign prefixed. would be denoted by ooo ; Zyx or AiO O by on ; AiE Ei on. Thus on tells us or XYz) by ooi) or its equivalent that fome of the Zs are ys, all the ys are xs, whence fome of the
4
XYZ
Zs
are xs.
To write its
proponent form, obferve that

;
inftrucl:s
;
us to write a univerfal
firft
1 1
to
make
it
affirmative
in the
middle to fuperaccent the middle propofition ; 01 to make the have then AiO O or X)Y + fecond premife negative.
We
Z Y = Z:X
:
which
is
Zy + y)x = Zx,
as aflerted.
All that relates to univerfals in the preceding, applies to the complex fyllogifms. Let a couple of parenthefes imply a complex
fyllogifm
or
thus DiDiDi may be (XYZ) or (ooo). Then in (oio) (XyZ), we are to fee that X is a fubidentical of y, and y of Z, whence X is the fame of Z. But Xy and yZ warn us to write
:
On
contraries for the
firft
:
the Syllogifm.
101
and fecond premifes and y to fuperaccent

is
the middle letter
whence CjC Di
equivalent forms it z that is a fubidentical of prefs by faying z is a fubidentical of x.

the
I
names
XYZ. The
the fyllogifm expreffed by (101) and (zYx) ex-
Y and Y
of x, whence
All in
now
look
at the
is
ftrengthened particular fyllogifms.

is,
ference which
fundamental, that
which
will
come from
nothing weaker than the premifes given, has been reduced to the one eafy cafe of the contained of the contained is contained.
The ftrengthened particular, the type of which is AJi, obeying the inverfe rule of formation, and written at more length in Y)Z XZ, may be ftated thus all names are common as to
Y)X
what they contain in common. If we denote this ftrengthened fyllogifm by XYZI, a fymbol intended to imply fomething be tween and XYZ) in the amounts of quantity introduced, we (hall find that the eight ftrengthened fyllogifms muft be re-
XYZ
prefented by
A AJi =XYZI A E,Oi=XYzI

?
E A O, = Xyzl E E L = XyZI
!
= = AiE O E,A O = EiEJ =

AiAT
t
xyzl
xyZI
xYZJ
xYzl
The
rules
:
of connexion are precifely thofe for the particular

is
fyllogifms
and inverfion
abfolutely ineffective.
Thus
XYZI
=ZYXI.
few words will ferve to difpofe of the mixed complex fyllo gifms in which a complex premife is combined with a fimple one, univerfal or particular. Firft, when a complex and a univerfal are premifed, and figns and accents are as in the dire ft rule (page 92), the conclufion is as it would be if the A were heightened into D, or E into C. Thus EiD gives Ci, the fame as CiD For Ei is C or C , and both CD and CiD give Ci, but with
1 f
.
different quantities.
But
if
the premifes be conftru&ed on the
inverfe rule, there is no more inference than can be obtained when the complex premife is lowered into a univerfal or we
:
have only a ftrengthened particular.
Thus
O )E
is
gives the ftrengthened particular And when the complex premife inconclufive.
,
AiE
DiE or (A A,E O , and O E

in
4
-f1
is
combined
the
t
with a particular,
we have
only what would follow
if
com
f
plex premife were lowered into a univerfal.
Thus
Dl
or
IO2
(A,
On
f
the Sylloglfm.
+O
)I
can only give
AJT
and
DT or (A
+ Oi)I
gives
no
conclufion, for
AT
is
inconclufive.
The
claflification
We
know
that
1
of opponent forms may be thus treated. opponent forms of AEE, for inftance, be it A
EiEi or
AEE
muft be
or
IEO
1
and All.
Now
whether
AE E.
4
mail have
LEiOi
the introdu&ion
EJiO whether A lJi orLAJi, depends upon of a new and arbitrary notion of the order to be
,
Our firft fyllogifm being defcribed by XY, YZ, XZ, adopted. the opponent which ends in the contradiction of the firft premife
is
in
XZ, YZ,
in
XY
which, keeping
defcribed with reference to
XZ, ZY, XY,
middle, is either to be or to YZ, ZX, YX.

is
Now
adopting the
firft
of thefe three orders, there
nothing
which compels us therefore

vice verfa. The effect of the
to prefer the fecond to the third, or
change of order which confifts in the inter is as follows. The premifes change places ; change of Z and A and with altered accents, altered alfo in the conclufion, E
and
with unaltered accents.

.
Thus
LEiOi
AJT
it
becomes
1
FAT
new
ar
EOL
becomes OiE L rangement whether for
Accordingly,
inftance,
is
matter of
{hall
or
EJiO
be called
the opponent of AiEiEj ; and I prefer to give the name to both. The confequence is, the following diftribution of opponents ;
EE
The
mifes
EO OE
fets
firft
AT TA AE EA AI IA
AT>
T-
TT EI
three
:
the
reprefent letters combined in reprefentation of pre two containing fix fyllogifms each, the third
The third muft be divided into two fets of fix each, in one of which the fubaccents are in greater number, in the other
twelve.
two out of
the fuperaccents. There are then four fets in all. a fet, which only differ in change of order
f
Pick any
:
thefe
two
have the fame opponent forms, namely, the other four of the For inftance, A IJ and LA L, in which fubaccents predo fet. Take AE, EA, EI, IE, and complete fyllogifms in minate.
fuch
manner
Ei,
as to
make
EiA
firft
EJiO LEiOi.
fubaccents predominate giving AiEiEi, The laft four are the opponents of the
:
two.
fet of ftrengthened particulars the opponent forms will be found to be univerfals weakened in the conclufion without
In the
On
:
the Syllogifm.
1
1
103
for E Thus AiA ! has being weakened in the premifes. E 1 may produce the univerfal conone of its opponents but
1
clufion
as well as
its
weaker form
1
.
Some
are
readers, particularly thofe
who have
a tincture of algebra,
:
more helped by fymbolic notation than by language

it is
with
others
the converfe.
To
fuit
the latter, obferve that the
language of page 78
may
eafily
Thus Ai
may may
being fubaffirmation, be fome fupernegation ; and fo on. Thus inftead of ETOi we fome fay that fupernegation of fome fuperaffirmation gives
L may
be adapted to fimple fyllogifms. be fome fubaffirmation,
fubnegation.
Practice in this language would make the phrafe fuggeft fomething more than the notation it is derived from. there is a term partially fuperaffirmed The phrafe refers to
of Z, namely
The
partial
and a complete fubnegative of Y, namely X. nor Z ; fubaffirmation declares fome things neither
;
the complete fupernegation declares that whatever is not Confequently there are fome Xs which are not Zs or
:
Y X
is
X.
a
is
partial fubnegative
of Z.
This
fubject will
be refumed.
In what precedes are two views of the deduction of all the of fyllogifm. The firft, taking the complex fyllogifm as the fource, connects the ftrengthened fyllogifms and the parti
varieties
cular ones with the univerfals, and thus in fact reduces every thing to the conftituents of DiDiDi or DDiDi. The fecond pro
A AJi, AJT, and LAJ, and forms the clafTes of univerfal, ftrengthened, and particular, fyllogifms by fubftiThefe tuting contraries in every way in which it can be done.
ceeds from AiAjAj,
two fyftems have
clofe connexion, but not fo clofe as might be for LAJi is not one of thofe which are perhaps thought connected with AjAjAi in the formation of a complex fyllo
:
gifm.
views which I now proceed to give are alfo and different from the former ones, in which connected, clofely we held it equally admiffible to refer one of the concluding terms
The two new
to the middle, as in
terms, as in
X)Y, or the middle to one of the concluding Y)X. But now I afk whether it be not poflible fo
104
On
the
Syllogifm.
to conftruct the fyftem, that we may firft lay down the middle term and its contrary, as conftituting the univerfe of the fyllogifm, and then complete the premifes and their conclufion, by
properly laying
down
may
fucceed,
if,
in the firft inftance,
the concluding terms in their places. we confider none but con
We
vertible propofitions. And this we can do; for univerfal exThus clufion and particular inclufion comprehend all aflertion.
univerfal inclufion
is
and particular exclufion

trary.
only univerfal exclufion from the contrary, is only particular inclufion in the con
Setting out then with the middle term and its contrary, and reftri&ing ourfelves to E and I, let E fignify (univerfal) exclu fion from the middle term, and e from its contrary ; let I fignify
(particular) inclufion in the middle term,
and
in
its
contrary.
Choofmg
a pair of concluding terms,
we
rejecT: II, li,
and
ii
on
grounds already demonftrated, and very eafily feen in this view, and proceed to confider Ee, EE and ee, El and ei, Ei and el. Ee. From this a univerfal conclufion muft follow. If one term be completely excluded from the middle and the other from
its
contrary, the terms are completely excluded each The fundamental forms are, other.
from the
E,A E,,X.Y + Z.y=X.Z

and by ufe of
verfal fyllogifms.
A EiEi,
4
X.y + Z.Y = X.Z
XZ, Xz, xZ, xz, we

From
thus bring out the eight uni
EE
and
ee.
thefe a particular inclufion
muft follow.
Exclufion of both terms from a third, gives partial inclufion of their contraries in each other for all that third term belongs
:
to the contraries of the other two.

are,
The
fundamental forms
EiEJ
X.Y + Z.Y=xz
A^TX.y + Z.y^xz
de
from which,
duced.
as before, the eight ftrengthened fyllogifms are
EI and
ei.
From
thefe a particular inclufion
muft follow.
exclufion of one term from a third, and the inclufion of part of a fecond term in that third, tell us that part of the par ticularized term is in the contrary of the univerfalized term.
The
The
fundamental forms are,
On
E.I.O
1
the Sylloglfm.
;
105
LEiOi,
X.Y-f ZY =Zx XY +Z.Y = Xz
A.O O X.y + Zy =Zx O.A O,, Xy + Z.y=Xz

,
from which the fixteen particular fyllogifms are deduced. All that Ei and el. From thefe no conclufion can be drawn. term is that one is excluded is from concluding fignified wholly
a third, and the fecond partially excluded (or included in the
contrary).
It thus
valid
when
appears that a fyllogifm with one particular premife is the premifes reduced to convertible forms, fhow the
middle term in both or the contrary of it in both ; otherwife, Alfo, that the conclufion in its convertible form, takes from the particular premife and contrariwife from the directly
invalid.
univerfal.
It alfo appears that a fyllogifm
with both premifes univerfal
is
always valid
with a univerfal conclufion
(made convertible)
;
mow
the premifes one the middle term and the other its
when
contrary with a particular conclufion when both mow the mid And the convertible form of the dle term or both its contrary.
riwife
conclufion takes directly from both in the from both in the fecond.
firft cafe,
and contra
different
The
other view which I here propofe
is
really a
mode of looking at that juft given. By the time we have made every name carry its contrary, as a matter of courfe, we become
tion.
prepared to take the following view of the nature of a propofiname by itfelf is a found or a fymbol its relation to
There may be in things (be they objects or ideas) is twofold. or the name there may not. rerum natura that to which applies,
do not here fpeak of how many things there may be to which it is not effential to know whether a name applies they be more
I
:
The introduction of or fewer, either abfolutely or relatively. of With refer be made the contraries may expulfion quantity. ence to application, then, let a name be called pojjible or impoffible
according as the thing to which
it
applies can be found or
not.
name may be compounded of others
the
compound name
being that of everything to which all the components apply. Thus wild animal is the name of all things to which both the
names wild and animal
apply.
To
call
this
compound name
io6
impoffible
to call
it
On
is
the Syllogifm.
:
to fay that there is not fuch a thing as a wild animal poffible is to fay that there is fuch a thing.
and
being two names, the
prefented by poffible, and by XY) when impoffible. This does not alter the meaning of our fymbol XY, as hitherto ufed as yet it has been there are Xs which are Ys and now
XY
compound name may be
re-
when
it
is
XY,
the
name of
that
;
which
is
both
and Y,
is
the
in
name of fome
meaning,
thing or things
and thefe two are the fame

concerned.
as a departure
fo far as their ufe in inference is
Nor need
XY),
that
as juft defined,
be treated
from, otherwife
than as an extenfiori of, the ufe of
in fomething, namely whatever. The proper notation, however, for indicating that has no application, is X)u, u being the contrary of the name laft includes everything in the univerfe fpoken of; fo which U, that u may denote nonexiftence.
is
:
X)Y. In X)Y, we aflert X) we aflert that X is nothing
The proportion Every is aflerts that Xy is the name No is of nothing, or X)Y aflerts that Similarly Xy). c or X.Y But Some Xs is the name of XY). nothing,
c
XY
are
Ys
and
Some Xs
is
are not
Ys
of the names
X Y and Xy.
merely
aflert the poffibility
A Z
fyllogifm, then,
the aflertion that from the poffibility or
or x, impoffibility of the names produced by compounding or z, each with or y, may be inferred the poffibility or im
poffibility
of a
name compounded of
or x with
or z.
The
ftate
rules of the laft fyftem are now fo eafily guage of the prefent one, that it is hardly
changed worth while to
into the lan
compounded with Y, and Z compounded with y, both give impoffible names, then compounded with Z gives an impoffible name. This is XY) +
for example.
more than one
Thus,
if
Zy)=ZX)
The
or
X.Y + Z.y=Z.X,
or
EiA
E.
will be extended
view here taken of compound names
in the next chapter.
On
the Syllogifm.
107
CHAPTER
On
VI.
the Syllogifm.
WHEN
is
alfo true,
the premifes of a fyllogifm are true, the conclufion and when the conclufion is falfe, one or
tions
both of the premifes are falfe. There are two kinds of modifica which it may be ufeful to confider thofe which concern
:
the entrance of the proportion into the argument ; and thofe which affect the connexion of the fubject and predicate.
As
or
it
to the
proportion
itfelf, it
may be
true or falfe abfolutely,
degree of truth, credibility, or probability. This relation will be hereafter confidered ; and, according to the
it is
may have any
Chapter IX. fo far as the proportion is probable and fo far as it is credible, it is true. But as to credible, other modes of looking at the fyllogifm, are we entitled to fay that every thing which can be announced as to the premifes may
be announced in the fame fenfe as to the conclufion
fwer
that
?
principles of
The
an-
cannot make fuch announcement abfolutely ; but is, of the premifes as derived from that conclufion we can make it. In what manner foever two premifes are applicable, their conclu
fion as
fion
is
we
from thofe premifes

in the premifes.
is
alfo applicable
becaufe the conclu

all
For
inftance, in the fyllogifm
men
are
trees, all
trees are rational, therefore all
men
are rational,
the
premifes are abfurd and falfe, and the conclufion taken indepen but that conclufion, as from thofe dently is rational and true c premifes, is as abfurd as the premifes themfelves. Again, in all
:
all convicts are punifhed, therefore all the premifes are deferable, and fo is the conclufion with thofe premifes. But the conclufion is not de-
pirates are
convicted,
pirates are punifhed,
firable in itfelf:
as that pirates fhould be punifhed with or with
out
trial.
Neither
to be
Z, therefore
we
affirm
ought ought to be Z
may we
fay to be
X
Z
ought to be
and
ought
is Z it follows ought to be Y, and that ought to be Z, for it may be that ought not to be Z. Thus a royalift, in 1655, would fay that the hundred excluded
even
fay that
when
except in this manner, that in a particular way. may not
We
lo8
their feats,
On
s
the Syllogifm.
members of Cromwell
and
;
were
rebels
parliament ought to be allowed to take who took any feats in that parliament but he would not infer that the hundred members
alfo that all
ought to be rebels. There is nothing which, being the property of the premifes, is necefTarily the independent property of the It mould be noted that in conclufion, except abfolute truth. common language and writing, the ufual meaning of conclufions
is
that they are ftated as of their premifes and to ftand or fall with them, even as to truth. Though a conclufion may be true when its premifes are falfe, the proponent does not mean, for the
moft
part, to claim
any thing mould
Next,
fition to
we
more than his premifes will give, nor that ftand longer than the premifes ftand. are not to argue from what we may fay of a propofay of the inftances it contains, except as truth of thofe inftances, or elfe to what
what we may
to
what concerns the
If I fay Every concerns the inftances as parts of a whole. I afTert, no doubt, of each is independently of the reft that is, the truth of Every is involves the truth of c this
Y
is
X Y
Y.
is
to take fomething elfe, I maintain to be a defirable rule, I do not therefore aflert

if,
But
Every
this
is
Y
and
to be a defirable cafe, except
upon an implied
fay that
this
neceffity that
there
mould be
a rule.
And
if I
unintelligible, I
fo on.
s
do not fay that

his caftle
is
is
every
is
X
is
is
is
unintelligible;
Thus, where there muft be

is
c
a rule, as in law,
man
may
houfe
defirable, becaufe there
every but one
alternative
no man s houfe, &c. But the proportion, by itfelf, not be defirable as to the inftance of a generally reputed
is
thief or receiver.
There
one
cafe,
however,
in
which
a term cannot be ap
plied to the general propofition, unlefs it can be applied in a c is higher degree to the inftances. The propofition Every
cannot be announced as of any degree of probability, unlefs each inftance has a much higher degree of probability. If ^, &c. ^, be the probabilities of the feveral inftances, fuppofed independent,
:/,
that of the propofition (Chapter IX.) ... which product muft be lefs than that of any one of the fraHons of which it is formed.
is/n^>
now come
to the confideration of circumftances
which
mo
firft
dify the internal ftruclure of the premifes themfelves. of conditions.
And
On
A
the Syllogifm.
109
conditional propofition is only a grammatical variation of the ordinary one ; as in If it be X, then it is Y. The common
form of
this,
Every
is
Y,
is
called categorical^ or predicative.
Of the two
forms, categorical and conditional, either may always

;
be reduced to the other
as follows,
Every
4
No
X X
is
is
Y Y
or or
If If
X, then X, then
it is it is
not
The particular propofitions might be given conditionally in various ways, but the transformation is not fo common. Thus 4 fome Xs are Ys might be if X, then it may be or c if X,
then
muft not therefore be denied of
Of
the
the
two common
it is
&c. fubject-matters of names,

it,
:
ideas
and
propofitions,
firft,
and
to apply the categorical form to the conditional form to the fecond in truth we
moft
common
might
call
the conditional form a grammatical convenience for
the expreflion of dependence of propofitions on one another,
and of names which require complicated forms of expreflion. Thus in pages 2 and 3, the conditional forms, containing //*, are
more fimple than the correfponding
categorical forms.
o>\
may be either necejjary^ fufficient, or both. condition is that without which the thing cannot be ; a neceflary fufficient condition is one with which the thing muft be. In
condition
pages 73, 74, I have fufficiently pointed out the completenefs of the connexion between the conditional and the categorical forms. In any one cafe the fufficient muft contain all that is neceflary,
and may contain more.

After what is faid in page 23, it is not neceflary to dwell on the reduction of a conditional* fyllogifm to a categorical one. The premifes contain the conclufion whatever gives us the But I think that the reduc premifes, gives us the conclufion.
:
tion of conditional to categorical forms,
ference, complete,
is
though juft, and, for in not the reprefentation of the whole of what
I
pafles in our minds.
As an example
rical
of what
mean, look forward

Precedent to
all
to the
nume
fyftem of Chapter VIII.
propofitions,
are, or
Wallis, as far as I know, was the firft who aflerted that all fyllogifms can be made, categorical. He did this in the fecond thefis attached
to his logic,
headed Syllogifmi Hypot hetici, aliique Compojiti, referendi funt

Categoricorum Modos.
omnes ad
Ariftotclicos
io
On
the Syllogifm.
prefcribe the limits of there are 250 inftances in Say condition. Of thefe 100 are Xs and
there are the numerical conditions
which
the univerfe under confideration.

that univerfe
:
this
is
the
firft
If we take a giving a fecond and third condition. proportion, as 2oXY, and afk whether it be fpurious or not, we have reference to the three conditions underftood. But this is not
200
are
Ys
for it would be poffible categorically to exprefs thefe neceflary conditions by c 2oXs out of 100 in a univerfe of 250 inftances
:
containing 200 Ys are to be found
among
thofe
200 Ys
It
is
of courfe the rule of brevity not to drag about thefe conditions with every proportion which is employed, but rather to ftate them once for all. There is however fomething more. The
conditions are a reftriclion
upon the arguments intended

:
to be
The attachment of introduced, and a reftri&ion throughout. them to each individual propofition does not exprefs this if they be feen in twenty confecutive proportions, there is no more than
a prefumption that they are to be feen in the twenty-firft.
better that the limits allowed fhould be
It
is
marked out by one boun
dary than that the feveral arguments fhould each have a defcription of the boundary to itfelf.
Juft as a univerfe of
names
is
more names
one
to conftitute collectively
defined by fpecifying one or thefammum genus ^ or unidefined by ftating propofito be contradicted, as
of proportions verfe, fo tions which are to be true, or

the cafe
be.
may be
which are not
Thefe propofitions may be conditions preced may or fome ing all, only, of the premifes which are ufed in argu ment ; or fome may precede fome, and others others. In it would be found that analyfing arguments, many propofitions which enter as premifes, enter each with a condition underftood,
and well underftood, to be granted.
Whatever
the conditions
may be, fo long as the confequent propofitions acl logically toge ther to produce the final refult, then that fame refult depends at
laft
ditions,
only on the conditions, and muft be affirmed when the con and their connexion with their confequents, are affirmed.
it
But then
muft be underftood that the
refult alfo ftands
upon
the conditions, and may fall with them. Let us now examine the common fyllogifm, and fee whether there be any preceding conditions, on which the refult depends.
On
looking into any writer on logic,
we
fhall fee that existence
On
is
the Syllogifm.
all
1 1 1
claimed for the fignifications of
the names.
Never,
in the
ftatement of a proportion, do
we
find
any room left
for the alter
Exiftence as ob native, fuppofe there Jhould be no fuck things. or exiftence as is claimed for the terms of ideas, jects, tacitly
The exiftence of an idea we muft grant when every fyllogifm. ever it is diftinclly apprehended, and (therefore) not felf-contradiclory
:
we
which
is
both metal and not metal
cannot for inftance admit the notion of a lamp ; but, as an idea, we are at
liberty to figure to ourfelves fuch a
lamp
as that
with which
Aladdin made
idea
is
his fortune.
;
no
idea
:
we
attempt at a felf-contradi&ing have not that apprehenfion of it in which an

It
An
idea confifts
to
but in no other
fails.
produce an idea
way can we fay that the attempt may then be more convenient here
on objective definition of terms, as more eafily con ceived with relation to exiftence and non-exiftence. Accordingly,
to dwell
X)Y and X.Y, of the character of muft particulars partake, as to the point before us. the of in relation to Y, it follows that By meaning y, every thing is either or y if we fay that does not exift, then every thing is If then do not, the propofition X)Y, or exift, and y. is falfe, and or is true. If neither X.Y nor X.y X)y,
let
us take the propofitions
which the
exift, I will
not
fo far imitate
fome of the queftions of the fchools
as to
If
attempt to fettle what nonexifting things agree or difagree. exift, but not X, then y)x is certainly true, but not thence
for
X)Y,
when x
fails
is,
as here, the
y)x = X)Y
proof. If all
whole univerfe, the proof of

is, fails
But
to prefent intelligible ideas, that is true. Y)x or Y.
to
be a
my
readers were mathematicians, I might purfue thefe
as having intereft on account of their analogy with the extreme cafes which the entrance of zero and of infinite
extreme
cafes,
But as thofe who are not magnitude oblige him to confider. mathematicians would not be interefted in the analogy, and thofe
who
are can purfue the fubjecl: for themfelves, I will
cannot, fay that the preceding order is not the natural one. to ufeful purpofe, down the truth of the propofition,
laying
firfl,
We
go on to
then proceed to enquire how the non-exiftence of one or both terms afFe&s the propofition. The exiftence of the terms muft
be
firft fettled,
The
and then the truth or falfehood of the propofition. affirmative propofition requires the exiftence of both terms
ii2
On
the Syllogifm.
the negative propofition, of one ; being necefTarily true if the other term do not exift, and depending upon the matter, as
ufual, if
it do exift. Let us make the exiftence of the terms
to be preceding
con
ditions of the propofitions.
The
fyllogifm
AiAjAi
is
then as
follows,
If If
X
Z
and
Y
Z
both
exift,
alfo exift
all exift
Therefore If X, Y,
Every Every Every
X Y X
is
is
Y
Z
Z.
is
As
to
tell
and Z, they remain, as it were, to the concluding terms, their own ftory. Whatever conditions accompany their
introduction unto the premifes, thefe fame conditions may be conceived to accompany them in the conclufion. But the middle
term difappears and, not fhowing itfelf in the conclufion, the conditions which accompany it muft be exprefsly preferved.
:
The
conclufion then
into
is
every
is
Z,
if
Y exift
thrown
theform of a dilemma,
.
Either every
which may be X is Z, or
does not exift
But taking
logifm, as
it
and
to exift, let us confider the following
fyl
appears
to be^ if
Every X is (Y, Every (Y, if Y Therefore Every X is Z.
exift)
is
exift)
nary
If this be not a valid fyllogifm, what expreffed law of the ordi treatifes does it break ? The middle term, a curious one, is
:
middle but there is no rule for excluding middle terms ftriclly of a certain degree of fingularity. That it does break, and very And as to this work, the obvioufly, an implied rule, I grant.
rule laid
down
is
in
Chapter
ufes
III.
is
broken
is
in its
fecond condition
to
(conditionally) which is (on the fame condition) Z, gives that is (on the fame condition) Z. Accordingly, the abfolute conclufion is only true upon fuch conditions as give the middle term abfolute ex
(page 50). fuch ufe as
The two
made
of the word
do not amount
one
in the conclufion.
That
is
iftence.
But
it
muft be
particularly noted that
it
is
enough
if this
ex-
On
iftence be given
the Syllogifm.
to the middle
term by the fulfilment of the
conditions which precede the entrance of one of the concluding terms. The condition of the act of inference is, that the comparifon
muft be
really
made,
if
the terms to be
compared with
the middle term really exift, or, which is the fame, if the condi tions under which they are to enter be fatisfied. The other terms
will be, if the
and there being ready, there muft then be a real middle term mere entrance of one of the concluding terms be proof of the exiftence of a middle term ; while, if the other terms
:
cannot be brought in, from nonexiftence, there inquire about a middle term, for it is otherwife
is
no occafion to
that the
known
I will take two concrete comparifon cannot be completed. the firft in of one of which the concluding terms, if inftances, is held to furnifh a middle term as real as itfelf, and in exifting,
the fecond of which
no fuch fuppofition occurs.
Of courfe
have
nothing here to do with the truth of the premifes. Philip Francis, (if the author of Junius), was an accufer whofe
filence
was fimultaneous with a government appointment
an
accufer &c. reflects difgrace upon the government (if they knew that their nominee was the accufer): therefore Francis (if &c.)
upon government (if &c.). were fuch a perfon) was a perfect poet a perfect poet (if &c.) is faultlefs ever there were one) morals therefore Homer (if &c.) was faultlefs in morals.
reflects difgrace
Homer
:
(if
there
(if
in
The
firft
inference
is
good, even though

:
only poffible
mode of knowing of the
we grant that our exiftence of an accufer Sec.
is by eftabliftiing that Francis was Junius it is even good againft one who mould aflert that the accufer &c. is a contradiction in
terms in every actual and imaginable cafe except that of Junius. In the fecond cafe, we put it that the man Homer (if he ever exifted ; fome critics having contended for the contrary) was a
perfect poet, if ever there
were one.
been one
and then
Homer
(exiftent or nonexiftent)
is
There is no condition perfect poet. held to amount to an aflertion that the middle term
:
There may never have was not a here, which being fulfilled,
muft have
is
exifted
but the condition of the exiftence of the middle term

:
it independent. Accordingly, the fecond inference is not good mould be Homer (if &c.) was a perfect poet, if ever there were
one
that
is,
or
elfe
there never
was
a perfect poet.
H4
There
tion
to
is
On
the Syllogifm.
Thefe points refer to the matter of a fyllogifm, and not to the form ; or rather, perhaps, hold a kind of intermediate relation.
another procefs which
is
often necefTary, in the
formation of the premifes of a fyllogifm, involving a transforma
which
It
is
is
neither done by fyllogifm, nor immediately reducible
the fubftitution, in a compound phrafe, of the of the genus for that of the fpecies, when the ufe of the
it.
name name
is
For example, man is animal, therefore the head man is the head of an animal is inference, but not fyllo c gifm. And it is not mere fubftitution of identity, as would be the head of a man is the head of a rational animal* but a fubftitution
particular.
of a
of a larger term in a particular
fenfe.
Perhaps fome readers may think they can reduce the above to a fyllogifm. If man and bead were connected in a manner which
could be made
of the fort might fubjecl: and predicate, fomething be done, but in appearance only. For example, Every man is an animal, therefore he who kills a man kills an animal. It
may be faid that this is equivalent to a ftatement that in Every man is an animal fome one kills a man therefore fome one
; ;
premife, and the fecond premife condi This I admit involve the conclufion as conditionally. tionally^ but the laft is not a fyllogifm and involves the very difficulty in
kills
firft
: :
an animal, the
queftion. Every man is an animal a man here is no middle term.

c
:
fome one
is
the killer of
firft
is
To
bring the
into
Every
killer
of a
man
is
the killer of an animal
premife juft the
thing wanted. By the principles of chapter III, undoubtedly the copula is might in certain inferences be combined with the But fo fimple a cafe as the pre copula kills^ or with any verb.
If any one mould think he have yet given, let him try the c Certain men, upon the report of certain other men following. to a third fet of men, put a fourth fet of men at variance with a fifth fet of men. Now every man is an animal and therefore
ceding
is
not the whole
difficulty.
can fyllogize
as to the inftances I
Certain animals, upon the report of certain other animals, &c. Let the firft defcription be turned into the fecond, by any num
1
ber of fyllogifms, and by help of c Every man is an animal. The truth is, that in the formation of premifes, as well as in
their ufe, there
is
a poftulate
which
is
conftantly applied, and there
fore of courfe conftantly demanded. And it mould be demanded openly. It contains the dictum de omni ct nu/Io (fee the next chap-
On
ter),
the Syllogifm.
1 1
For every term ufed univerfally lefs and for every term ufed particularly, more. The fpecies may take the place of the genus, when all the genus is fpoken of: the genus may take the place of the fpecies when fome of the fpecies is mentioned, or the ufed
it
and
is
as follows.
may be
fubftituted,
genus,
particularly,
take the place of the fpecies ufed Not only in univerfally. fyllogifms, but in all the ramifications of the defcription of a com
may
plex term.
fubftituted
c
Thus
animals
for
men who
are not
Europeans
may be
are not Englifh. If this poftulate be to the forms of the Ariftotelian Syllogifm, applied unftrengthened
who
(page 17)
it
will
be feen that
all
which contain
are immediate
the others eafily derived. it, I now pafs to the confideration of the invention of names, and of the distinctions which are made to exift for the want of it.
all
applications of
and
invent a name, that is, may choofe a found or which is to to of clafs or of objects. The ideas fymbol apply any clafs mould, no doubt, be well defined but fmall caution is here
:
Any one may
necefTary, for invented than thofe which have
the coiner
hand
as
words are generally much more definite undergone public ufage. They come from fharp at the edge as a new halfpenny and in
:
look in vain for any edge at all. The right of invention being unlimited, and the actual ftock having been got together without any uniform rule of formation, there can
procefs of time
be no reafon why we jhould admit any diftinttion which can be ab rogated by the invention of a name^ fo far as inference is con cerned. I do not difpute that the modes of fupplying the want of names may be of importance in points of view : what
we
many
deny
is,
The
any peculiar modes of inference. invention of names muft either be by actually pointing
that they create
out objects named, or by defcription in terms of other names. With the former mode of invention, as let this, that, &c (mow
ing them) be called
latter,
we
can have nothing to do.
As
to the
a fymbolic defcription of the procefs by join the names to be ufed, with a ing together fymbol indicative of
we may make
the
mode of
Thus,
if
ufing them, in extenfion of the fyftem in page 106. P, Q, R, being certain names, if we wifh to give a name
is all
to everything which we wifh to give a
three,
name
is
we may join them thus, : to every thing which is either of the
PQR
three (one or
to fignify
more of them) we may write P,Q,R

thing that
either both
any
P and Q,
or
we want R, we have
if
1 1
On
The
contrary of
is
:
the Syllogifm.
PO,R.
that of
PQR
is
p,q,r; that of
P,Q,R
is
pqr
conjunction and disjunc PQ,R (p,q)r tion change places. This notation would enable us to exprefs
in contraries,
any complication of the preceding conditions thus, to name that which is one and one only of the three, we have Pqr, Qrp, Rpq ; for that which is two and two only, PQr, QRp, RPq.
:
Thus,
XY
includes the inftances

all
common
to
X
is
and
but
X,Y
than
includes
and
all
XY, except when X and Y are identical. As in page 106, XY, the term, fuppofed to exift, is XY, the propofition of chapter IV if we wifh to diftinguim, we may make X-Y the term, and
;
accordingly X,Y
a wider term
XY the propofition, the hyphen

Thus,
having
its
common
grammatical
ufe.
X-Y P-Q
tells
us the fame as
XYP-Q, both mean
ing, for Inference, to which the four
thus,
fome
XYs
no more than that there exift objects or ideas names are applicable. But the firft tells it are POs ; and the fecond thus, fome things are
Xs, Ys, and POs.

as they
and other cafes of notation, repulfive appear, the reader who refufes them is in one of two Either he wants to give his aflent or diflent to circumftances.
refpecl: to this
With
may
faid
what
the difficulty by avoiding
of the form by means of the matter, which is eafmg out of logic or elfe he it, and ftepping defires to have it in a fhape in which he may get that moft futile
is
:
of
is all truly, to ufe acquifitions, called a general idea* which the contrary adjective term as colloquially, nothing particular^ a
whole without
parts.
If the difficulty of abftract afTertion be to be got over, the eafieft way is by firft conquering that of abftracl: expreffion, to the extent of becoming able to make a little ufe of it.
This and one of the two R or S. Both X, and either P, or He was rich, and for inftance, is no impoffible complication if not abfolutely mad, was weaknefs itfelf fubje&ed either to bad
c
Suppofe
we
afk for the alternative of the following fuppofition,
advice or to moft unfavourable circumftances.

tation of the
*
je n
"
The
reprefen-
complex term
.
.
is
{P,
O(R,S)}
of the contrary,
Je vous avoue, dit
ai
c etait
ai cru en deviner quelque chofe, et que ., que j a ce difcours, fit reflexion que de I/abbe le refte. entendu pas ainfi que lui-meme avait toujours lu, et que la plupart des homines
. .
. . .
ne lifaient omere
autrement."
On
the Syllogjfm.
1 1
x, p(q,rs) or x,pq,prs. If not the above, he was either not rich, or both not mad and not very weak, or neither mad nor badly advifed, nor unfavourably circumftanced.
a name thus formed, whether conjunctively or disjunc enters a fimple inference, it tively, gives rife to what have been called the copulative fyllogifm, the disjunctive fyllogifm, and the dilemma. The two laft are not well diftinguimed by their defi
nitions as given
:
When
the disjunctive fyllogifm feems to be that in

that in
which names are confidered disjunctively, the dilemma which proportions are fo ufed. But a propofition
ufually only true or fa Ij*, or tion enter for its
entering as part
of a propofition, enters merely as a name, the predicates being
may only
truth
fome equivalent terms. propofi matter, or it may enter in fuch a way

in this laft cafe
it is
that
its
is
the matter
only as a
name
was
that
the fubject of inference. fired at is the aflertion (that he

it is
Thus, was fired

to
It
at)
is
true that he
is
a true aflertion.
apply the term disjunctive argument fo as to include the dilemma, marking by the latter word (as a term rather of rhetoric than of logic) every argument
in
I believe
the beft
way would be
which the disjunctive propofition is meant to be a difficulty opponent on every cafe, or horn^ of it. Whatever has right to the name P, and alfo to the name Q, has right to the compound name PQ^ This is an abfolute identity, for by the name PQ_ we fignify nothing but what has
for the
names. According X)P + X)Q==X)PQ> not a nor even an inference, but only the aflertion of our fyllogifm, to ufe at our pleafure either one of two of the right
right to both
ways
faying
fame thing inftead of the other. But can we not effect the re duction fyllogiftically ? Let be identical with PO ; we have then PQ)Y and Y)PQ, and alfo Y)P and Y)Q. Add to thefe
X)P and X)Q, and we have all the propofitions aflerted. But we cannot deduce from them alone X)Y, the refult wanted, by any fyllogiftic combination of the fix. Nor muft it be thought furprifing that we cannot, by a train of argument, arrive at demonftration of
it
right to two names, a third that which has fuch right.
being allowable to give to anything which has name invented exprefsly to fignify might as well attempt to fyllo-
We
gize into the refult, that a perfon is a butcher.
who
fells
the meat he has killed
n8
I
On
upon
the Syllogifm.
an extent which may
in a mill
lay ftrefs
this, to
for a
moment
which might be better employed, for two reafons. Firft, the young mathema tician is very apt to in algebra, to make one principle deduce try, another by mere force of fymbols and the above attempt may {how him what he is liable to. Secondly, I am inclined to fuppofe that the diftinction drawn between the clafles of fyllogifms to which I prefently come, and the ordinary categorical ones, is due to what muft be defcribed in my language as a want of per
appear like diligently grinding nothing
:
ception of the abfolute,
lefs
than inferential
ofX)P + X)Q_and XJPQi

kind,
if
But
if
all
both Q_and S
P be R, and Q^bc S, then X is X)P + P)R = X)R, and X)Q_ is and + Q)S=X)S, X)R + X)S X)RS. Even P)R + Q)R =
however fimple, may be made

be both
(fo to fpeak) identity other proportions of the For inftance, deductions.
P and Q, and
is
thus deduced:
P,O)R
P,Q)R.
late
is
is
deducible;
it is
being
P)R + Q)R=r)p+r)q=r)pq=
Thus
laid
down,
feen that, as foon as the conjunctive poftuthe identity of the correfponding disjunctive
muft be either P poftulate with it may be mown. Next, if or O, or X)P,O, and if P be always R, and Q_be always S, then X)R,S may be deduced from the preceding.
Firft, that
X)P
be,
and Y)Q_give
it
XY )PQ_can be deduced
evi
dent as
it
may
is
a fucceflion of applications.
XY)X-f
X)P
and
gives
XY)P,and
r)p, and
XY)Y + Y)Q_gives XY)Q, and XY)P

is
+ XY)Q_is
is
XY)PQ>y the poftulate.
O)S s)q, P)R Now, rs)pq + pq)x = rs)x, which
Next, X)P,Q^ is pq)x, whence, as juft proved rs)pq.

is
X)R,S.
It will
be a good
exercife for the reader to tranflate this proof into ordinary lan
guage.
I
may now
proceed to extend
this idea
and notation
relative
The complexity confifts in to proportions of complex terms. the terms being conjunctively or disjunctively formed from other
terms, as in
the
PQ,
that to
conjunctively;
and
as in
which both the names P and Q_belong P,Q_that to which one (or both) of
names P and Q_ belong

is
is p,q; that of P,O other, or not either.
pq.
Not
PQ_ contrary disjunctively. both is either not one or not the
The
of
Not
is
either
P nor j^(which we
c
by :P,Q_or .P,Q)
this
is
logically
not
P and
not
might denote Qj or pq and

:
then the contrary of P,Q.
On
The
disjunctive
it
the Syllogifm.
is
name
appears in names in the two cafes, it has really different I here throw away This diftinction and disjunctive. copulative more of the names) to or one oppofmg disjunctive, (having
cording as
of two very different characters, ac fo very the univerfal or particular form

:
different
that
The disjunctive particle all the names). has the fame meaning with the diftributive copulative and, when * is ufed in a univerfal. Thus, Every thing which is P or
conjunctive, (having
or
or S
means
both
Every P and every

one.
is
or S.
But PQ_
is
always
P and QJn
P QR
Accordingly
collectively.
Conjunctive
Disjunctive
ufes
and
and diftributively, P,O,R or disjunctively, ufes in a P,O,R particular the common fenfe of that word.
in a univerfal ufes
in
Either
or
or
Q^
is
true,
is
nn ambiguous phrafe, which
is
name enters, whe ther conjunctively or disjunctively, is to pafs as it were for a part Thus the contrary of P (con of the quality of the name itfelf.
abfence of the comma) is ,p (dis junctive, as indicated by the teft this affertion about the indicated as comma). by junctive,
T)P,O according to the context. P,O)T The manner in which the component of a
To
mode of making contraries, let us afk what is that of one We know it of courfe to be both or only of the two P or QJ* The name propofed is Pq, Qp and its contrary is neither. of the two p,O, and one of the two q,P. (p,Q)(q,P), that is, one
the
It is
then either pq, pP,

exift, therefore
it is
qQ,
pq,
or
PQj
the fecond and third can

I
not
PQ,
as already feen.
need hardly
have remarked that (P,O)(R,S) is PR, PS, OR, OS. Obferve that though X)PO gives X)P, and that gives XP, we may not fay that XY)P gives X)P, nor that X)P,Q_ But any disjunctive element may be rejected from gives X)P. a univerfal term, and any conjunctive element from a par
XPO
ticular one.
Thus P)QR
gives
gives
P)Q_and P,O)R
gives
P)R.
P.Q_and PO:R,S gives P:R. All thefe rules are really one, namely that PO is of the fame extent at leaft as POR. This will appear from our rules of tranfpofition prefently
Alfo
P.O,R
given.
]2o
On
the Syllogifm.
Let change from one member of the propofition to the other be called tranfpofition. I proceed to inquire how many tranfpofitions the various forms will bear, and what It will they are.
however be necefTary to complete our forms by the recognition, as

a propofition,
By
the
XU we
name
of the fimple afTertion of exiftence or non-exiftence.

that there are in the univerfe things to
mean
which
fpeak only of fuch things under the name. Accordingly X)U and do not differ in meaning. the of can we u, U, By contrary only denote non-exiftence ; thus X.U or X)u throws the name out of confideration.
applies, and
we
XU
Thus Y)X = U)X,y; Y.X = YX)u, &c.

ftance, that
To
fignify,
for in-
traries,
complements (contraries or fubconpage 75) we have U)X,Y, which our rules will tranfand
are
dif-
pofe into xy)u, or x.y. Having to confider fubject and predicate, conjunctive and junctive, affirmative and negative, univerfal and particular,
we
muft think of fixteen
different forms.
Thus
the four forms of
the univerfal affirmative are
XY)PQ
It will
X,Y)PQ_; XY)P,Q
X,Y)?,Q_
and
be beft here to neglect the contranominal converfes of thus converfes of E and I equally with the fimple
:
may be read as identical with p,q)x,y. There is alfo one obvious tranfpofition which we muft not merely neglecl: but throw out ; fmce it does not give a refult identical with its prede-
XY)PQ
ceflbr.
mean
the tranfpofition of
firft
M)PQJnto MP)Q;.
firft
the
fecond follows from the
but not the
from the fecond.

for the
Alfo the correfponding change of
M.P,Qjnto Mp.O,
;
fame reafon.
This being premifed, the following are the rules Dlreft tranfpofition is the change from one member
other without alteration of
alteration
to the
name
or junction
contrary, with
of both.
(E,I) allow direct tranfpofition of conjunctive elements either way, from fubject to predicate, or from predicate and thefe are the only direct tranfpofitions. Thus to fubjecl: X.YZ XY.Z, and X-YZ XY-Z. The inconvertibles (A,O) allow contrary tranfpofition of con
:
The convertibles
junctive elements from fubject to predicate, and of disjunctive
On
the Syllogijm.
:
121
elements from predicate to fubjecl beft remembered by allow ing SP to ftand for conjunctive and PS for disjunctive. And thefe
are the only contrary tranfpofitions.
Thus
XY)M = X)M,y
and
vice
M)X,Y=My)X.
element that can be rejected cannot be tranfpofed, and Thus X,Y)M gives X)M, and cannot be tranf verfa.
An
pofed.
The following table exhibits the varieties of the forms A and E, equivalents being written under one another, and converfions,
contranominal or fimple, oppofite.
X.YJPQ.
[x,y][p,q])u
P ,q)xy
U)xy,PQ
(:) in
X,Y.P,Q. P,Q.X,Y [X,Y][P,Q].UU.[X,Y][P,Q]

left
If for
we
write
the
hand
divifions,
and erafe the(.)

the tranf
and ufe the hyphens of page and I. And pofitions of
15,
on the
right, we have
if
we
write p and q for
P and Q_on
the
left,
the forms of
and change the form X)Y into X.y, we thereby change A into thofe of E. If more than two elements
were
It
ufed, the tranfpofitions appears that there are
would now be perfectly eafy. no lefs than fixteen A forms
into
122
which
On
XY)P,Q_may
the Syllogifm.
:
be varied
the reafon
is
that both fubjeft
and predicate are tranfpofibly conftru&ed.

:
But
XY)PQ
fhows
having
a tranfpofible predi only a tranfpofible fubjecl: 5 X,Y)P,Q only and thefe have only four forms each. cate Laftly, X,Y)PQ, has only two forms. neither By tranfpofi
tranfpofible,
I bly conftrufted,
mean
capable of having the elements feparated
that is, always tranfpofible looked be the complete fubjeft, or the complete predicate, may
by
tranfpofition.
The whole
term
is
on
we
Thus in X)Y, if as conjunctive or disjunctive, at pleafure. this confider this as XU)Y,u, we may make yU)x,u or y)x.
ber, 5,
as
I
So that the ordinary contranominal converfion may be confidered a num as a cafe of the more general rule. Juft as, in arithmetic, of ab or as b a of + 5, + be made to obey the laws
may
5.
complex Syllogifms chofe to confider only each

fundamental.
of
terms might be widely varied, even if we firft cafe of the preceding table as
Thus
A, A
1
1
XY)P,Q + VW)P,Q=(x,y)-(v,w)
would give fixty-four varieties of premifes. I now proceed forms are {how that the ordinary disjunftive and dilemmatic to ordi reducible common fyllogifms with complex terms, really
invention of names. nary fyllogifms by Example I. Every S is either P, Q,
to
no P
is
no
Q>
Let S reprefent the true propofiS ; therefore every S is of proportions, and tiorT (fmgular), and let P, O, R be names would be exwhich common a form, this then
R.
preffed thus
reprefents either
very
is
B, or
C
F.
is
D,
or
is
but
is
not
B,
is
not
therefore
E
;
is
I fay that,
where the necefby
fary
names exift, the final from a common fyllogifm

vention of names.
could not be diftinguifhed ftep of this in it becomes which

accordingly
But S.P and S.Q_or S)p And combined which gives S)pqS. and S)q give S)po~with S)S P not be the name of what is S and Let S)pqS + pqS)R S)R. is a fyllogifm and not O, and the thing required is done. Here then are led by a we of which one to of the ordinary kind, premife the neceffity for which 1
We have S)P,O,R, whence Spq)R.
ufe of the conjunctive populate (page
16) are confidering and others. we clafs the between diftinaion the is are here that two of the terms of our final fyllogifm It
:
happens
On
identical
:
the
Syllogifm.
S.
123
But the
ufe
for
is
Spq
<
is
of no greater extent than

if
made of S)S
either
perfe&ly legitimate. Example 2. If A be B, E is F ; and
is
or
is
be D,
is
but
re
therefore
is
F.
This can be
duced to
P)R + O)R + S)P,Q=S)R

which
is immediately made a common iyllogifm by changing P)R + O)RintoP,O)R. Example 3. From P follows Q_; and from R follows S but Q_and S cannot both be true therefore P and R cannot both
;
be true.
This may be reduced
to
P)Q+R)S + T.QS=T.PR + T.QS=T.PR orPR)QS Example 4. Every X is either P, O, or R but M, every O is M, every R is M therefore every
;
;
every
is
is
M.
This
ble to
is
Example 5. Every X is either P or Q, and every This is wholly inconclufive, and leads to an identical
follows
;
common form of the dilemma P,Q,R)M + X)P,O,R = X)M.

a
it is
obvioufly reduci
is
X.
refult, as
X)P,Q
gives
Xp)O, which
with
Q)X
gives
Xp)X,
a neceflary proportion.
Example 6. If we throw X)R into the form X)R,R, we have Xr)R, or Every X which is not R is R, a contradiction in terms. But it evidently implies that there can be no Xs which
return to X)R. Take c every X P is is and every Q, every every Q is R. Here X)P,Q,R = Xr)P,O, whicrTwith P,Q)M gives Xr)M, which with M)R gives Xr)R or X)R. Example 7. Every X is either P or Q, and only one. This
are not
is
Rs
and thus
or
alfo
we
either P,
gives
two proportions, X)P,Q + X.PQ.

with
Now X)XP,XO
is
identical
X)P,Q, and
this
may
be looked on as an extreme
cafe of
X)P,Q + X)Y=X)PY,QY
but
X.PQ
gives
XP)q and XQ)p, from which we
can obtain
Hence X)P,Q_+X)p,q = X)[P,Q,][p,q.]
=X)P P ,P q) Q P ,g q =X)P q ,Q P
fincc
Pp and
Qq
arc fubjcil to
X.Pp and X.Qq.
All this being
124
worked out
c
On
the Syllogifm.
fhows us that the
tranfition
is
giftically.
capable of being made fyllomay thus acquire the idea, which fo foon becomes familiar to the ftudent of mathematics,
is
Every X is P or Q, and no P and not Q, or and not P
in fyllogiftic detail,
from
X
J
is
both
to
Every X
either
The
ftudent of logic
of perfectly felf-evident propofitions which are deducible from
one another,
from thofe which are not. one only of the two, P or is both P and every Q, except when P is M, and then it is neither therefore no is Y. Here is a cafe in which it is the fact of the exception and not its nature which determines the
as diftinguifhed
Example
8.
Y
;
Every
is
inference
reduction
be anything. This ought to appear in our does appear in this way. From X)P,Q it is obvious that X)P,Q,R,S, and fyllogifUcally demonftrable from
:
may
it
and
X)P,O, and Xrs)X.
Now
in the
fecond premife
we have
Y)PQm,pqM,
r
or
[p,q,M][P,Q,m])y
pQ,Pq,PM,QM,pm,qm)y
And
the
firft
from which, by rejection, follows pO,Pq)y.

mife
It
is
pre
X)Pq,Qp.
Whence X)y oTx.Y.

:
I will conclude this is not neceflary to multiply examples of the the out that part fubjecl: by pointing ordinary propofitions X)Y, &c. are, with reference to their inftances, disjunctively compofed the difference between the univerfal and particular
:
lying in the latter

if
being indefinite in the number of its inftances. Xs and four Ys, the four propofitions Thus, the name to each inftance, as feen written at length in are, applying
there be three
X,X,X)Y,Y,Y,Y; X,X,X.Y,Y,Y,Y; (X,X,X)(Y,Y,Y,Y);

and (X,X,X):Y,Y,Y,Y.
The
{lightly
I
propofition in page 25,
is
I leave the reader to
mow
it,
and
a cafe of the preceding method. alfo that the hypothefis is
overrated.
to the forties, the heap or chain of fyllogifms, in firft is a premife of the fecond, and
now come
Take
which the conclufion of the

fo on.
a fet of terms, P,
of reference be
forites,
PQ, QR,
RS, &c.
Q, R, S, &c. and let the order Then A AiAAi &c. is a

t
:
and the only one ufually confidered
thus,
R)S + S)T=P)T
On
The
firft
the Syllogifm.
125
third gives P)S, have links, inter
two
links give
P)R, which with the
which with the fourth gives P)T.
Thus we
may be
mediate conclufions^ and a final conclufion.
great
number of different
forites
formed, under the
following conditions,
firft particular propofition which occurs, be it link or for conclufion, prevents any future link from being particular all the conclufions thence become particular.
:
The
cafes of fyllogifm rule of accentuation (page 92), that

in a forites,
Examine
the
is,
which proceed by the firft which have beginning and

:
thefe only can occur except at the end, or in the place where a particular It will be found that the propofition firft enters. conclufion,
ending both univerfal, or both particular
when
the argument goes on, muft come after fomething con nected with that which comes after it by the firft rule of ac centuation at the where a conclufion except place
:
particular
1
comes
ftill
in for the firft time.
For
inftance,
EiE
which follow E by the firft rule. Again, take O E , which gives L this muft be followed either by A or Ei, which follow E by the fame rule and fo on. Accordingly,
1
keeping conclufions univerfal, muft be followed by

T t 4
gives Aj, which, t or EI,
chain of univerfals, in which affirmation is followed by a ! like prepofition, and a different as AiEiA negation by one, E AiEiE , &c. may be part of the chain of a forites. And the chain muft be either of this kind wholly, or once only broken in one of two ways either the direct entrance of a particular by
Any
a breach of the rule. In a chain of this kind, unbroken, the conclufions are affirmative or negative, according as an even or odd number of negatives goes to the formation of
propofition, or
by
them.
All the conclufions have the fame accent as the

a
firft
link.
Let
particular premife be introduced, as in
AiEiET &c.
accent of the particular introduced muft be the fame as or contrary to that of the firft link, according as the preceding number of negatives is odd or even. For the accent of the firft
link remains as long as the conclufion is univerfal, and a fyllo with the fecond premife particular follows the fecond gifm
rule.
The
Thus,
firft
inferting the intermediate conclufions, the

1
above
or
is
A^Ê.jEÂi)!^!
that the
rule
).
And
after (I
muft come
fo
ftill
continues.
But the accent of the conclu
fions changes.
126
On
let
ftill
the Syllogifm.
Now
EiE
!
the rule of accentuation be broken.

requires the
firft
The
accent of
the conclufion
(rule
rule to be refumed.
Thus,
1
unbroken) gives Ai, and EiEi (rule broken) gives I , and Ai requires Ai or EI to follow E , while I requires A or E to follow Et. This one breach of rule only changes the con The accent of the conclu clufion from univerfal to particular.
fion changes as before. The links of a forites, then, are either a chain of univerfals the firft rule of accentuation, or fuch a chain with one
following
breach of the rule, or fuch a chain with one particular inferted, of the fame or contrary accent to the firft link, according as the
preceding negatives are odd or even, and made the ment of the refumption of the rule (if broken). In
the conclufion
is
commence
all
the cafes
affirmative or negative according as the preced are even or odd in number the unbroken chain ing negatives has a univerfal conclufion with the accent of the firft link, and
:
the broken one a particular with the contrary accent.
AE
Here
EiA E
E.A AiEiE A,
EAAE
EiOTO O
EiEJTO
The
chain
are examples of the three kinds.
is
in the
firft row, the intermediate and final conclufions in the fecond. f Thus the fecond example prefents the fyllogifms EiA Ei, EiAtO ,
1
O EJ FE O O AiO
1
and
at length
is
The
forites
AA
A* .....
To
are only AiA t A. . . . and ufually confidered thefe might be added without abandoning
the Ariftotelian fyllogifm, fuch as

it
AiEiA
AA
---- ,
AiEjA AiAi
.... But thought without introducing the intermediate conclufions, and thus dethe fpecific character of the procefs.
ftroying
univerfal fyllogifm can be reduced to juft as the ordinary forites can always be reduced to a chain univerfal the fo AAjAi,
would not be very
chain in eafy to follow the
And
of A,.
Thus
A E E.A E
or
is
u)T +T)S + S)r +r)0
127
CHAPTER
On
been FROM
has
VII.
the Ariftotelian Syllogifm.
the time of Ariftotle until

a matter of ftudy.
now,
the formal inference
philofopher, and in materials out of which
In the writings of the great a fomewhat fcattered manner, are found the
was conftructed the fyftem of

:
fyllogifm
now
and always prevalent and two diftinct principles of exclufion appear to be acted on. Perhaps it would be more correct to fay that the followers collected two diftinct principles of ex-
clufion from the writings of the mafter, by help of the afltimption that everything not ufed by the teacher was forbidden to the learner. I cannot find that Ariftotle either limits his reader in
this
all
manner, or that he anywhere implies that he has exhaufted But whether thefe exclufions poffible modes of fyllogizing.
whether thofe
fix
are to be attributed to the followers alone, or
who
have more knowledge of
his writings
than myfelf can
them
upon the
and have
much is certain, that they were adopted, time dictated the limits of the fyllogifm. Of all Ariftotle is the one of his followers have whom men, worfhipped his defects as well as his excellencies which is what he himfelf
leader, this
in all
:
never did to any man living or dead of the contrary fault.
indeed, he has been accufed
The
firft
of thefe exclufions
et nullo,
is
connected with the celebrated
diftum de omni
or denied of
namely, that
what
is
diftributively affirmed
all, is
which
that
all
diftributively affirmed or denied of every fome It is there faid that in contains. every fyllogifm
the middle term muft be univerfal in one of the premifes, in order that we may be fure that the affirmation or denial in the other
premife
may be made of fome

fee, is
or
all
of the things about which

in
affirmation or denial has been
made
the
firft.
:
This law,
it
as
we
mail
that the
two
only a particular cafe of the truth premifes together affirm or deny of
is
enough
all
more than
the inftances of the middle term.

into
which a hundred and
If there be a hundred boxes, one articles of two different kinds are
128
to be put, not
On
the Arlftotelian Syllogifm.
fome one box,

kind, put into
more than one of each kind into any one box, if not more, will have two articles, one of each
it.
The common
doctrine has
it,
that an article
of one particular kind mud be put into every box, and then fome one or more of another kind into one or more of the boxes, be fore it may be affirmed that one or more of different kinds are
found together.
rence can
exift,
is
fubftitution of the aflertion that
This exclufion is a fimple miftake, the mere none but a certain law of infe for the determination that no other Jhall exift.
he will
ufe, in
Any
trary
one
at liberty to limit the inferences
any
manner he
pleafes
but he
may
err if he declare his

limit
own
arbi
boundary to be a natural
impofed by the laws of
thought. The other exclufion
of the fame kind

will: but there
it.
or
may involve, on the fame terms, an error may equally be the expreffion of arbitrary
:
Ariftotle
what is more reafonably matter of opinion about will have no contrary terms not-man, he fays, is not
is
the
name of
anything.
becaufe, as
He
he
afterwards calls
it is
it
an indefinite or
name of exifting aflerts, aorlft name, and non-exifting things. If he had here made the diftinction between ideal and objective, he would have feen that man and
both the
not-man equally belong to both (objectively) exifting and nonas a name to Achilles exifting things man, for example, belongs and the feven champions of Chriftendom, whether they ever ex:
ifted in objective reality or not
cafe, to their horfes.
and not-man belongs, in either think, however, that the exclufion was
:
probably dictated by the want of a definite notion of the extent of the field of argument, which I have called the univerfe of the
propofitions. fliown, there
is
Adopt fuch a definite notion, and, as no more reafon to attach the mere
fufficiently
idea of ne
x.y=x)Y = y)X, and xy=x:Y = y:X, or refe X and Y, as in Every thing is Some things are neither Xs nor Ys/ the either X or Y* and moft natural readings of No not-Xs are not-Ys, and Some notXs are not-Ys. There remain then fix modes of connexion of X and Y, namely X)Y and Y)X, X:Y and Y:X, and XY( =
contraries, as in
gation to the contrary, than to the direct term. The exclufion of contraries throws out the propofitions E ? and I , or x.y and xy, which cannot be exprefled without either
rence to things not named by

c
On
YX)
and
four
tion.
the Arijlotelian Syllogifm.
129
and
X.Y( = Y.X).
fyftem,
Thefe
common
alfo
:
XY
and
YX
is
fix are made eight ; for in the are confidered as diftincl in form,
X.Y
and Y.X.
But
for reference to order
Thus
by
I,
by O. But by itfelf, is adopted in the fyllogifm in the following manner. The predicate of the conclufion is called the major term, and E, and
and
the ftandard of order which
is
YX
X)Y and Y)X X.Y and Y.X by
thefe eight are only treated not made in the fimple propofiand are both denoted by A,
as
XY
X:Y
Y:X
neglected as to the proportion
This language is the fubjecT: of the conclufion the minor term. fafhioned upon the idea of an affirmative propofition, in which
is Z major and minor have reference to magnitude. In every at is and therefore is a name which leajl entirely contains
as great as X, greater than or equal to X. Here is, before it was introduced into mathematics, the idea now fo familiar to the
limit
mathematician, of allowing his language to include the extreme of its meaning. When the fame terms are applied to
is
negative proportions, the notion of magnitudinal inclufion

loft
;
and major and minor, being
ftill
retained, muft be pre-
fumed
to refer to real or fuppofed importance.
The
premifes
are called major and minor, according as they contain the major or minor term of the conclufion : and the major premife is always
written
firft.
Accordingly,
and
X being the major and

order.
minor
terms, there are four poffible arrangements, which are called the four figures. Ariftotle gives three, and tradition has it that
Galen fupplied the fourth

i.
in
number and
3.
YZ
2.
XY
XZ
off"
ZY XY
XZ
YZ YX
XZ
:
4.
ZY YX
XZ
To me, the moft fimple arrangement is that which takes up what was left with, as in the fourth figure and X is in Y, Y is in Z, is in Z, therefore X is in Z is more natural than X is in Y, therefore X is in Z. It is now plain, that whenever one only of the three propofitions is convertible, there are two diftincl: ways in which the when two only, four and when all fyllogifm may be written three (if there were fuch a thing), eight.
<
fyftem rejeas thus when ftronger

:
130 The
On

all
.
conclufions
follows,
it
X Z
which may be made

does not allow
X Z
:
to
make
a diftina form.
But when
X)Z
is
the conclufion,
it
does
it it
not rejea ZX, for, not confidering as identical with does not confider X)Z as a ftrengthened form of ZX.
:
ZX
XZ,
But
does not rejea fyllogifms in which as ftrong a conclufion can be

for Ariftotelian
deduced from a weaker premife accordingly, we muft fearch forms among the ftrengthened fyllogifms of
chapter
taking
V,
as well as
among
the fundamental ones.
Now,
us write
all
the forms which ftiow neither
or I
let
down
expea from
makes no
the fymbols of them, and the number of cafes we may each. Moreover, fince transformation of order
difference
here, I put the fyllogifms together as in
page 96, into twelve pairs. Fundamental AiAiAi,
AiO
O ,OiA O
AAA E AiE A E E
1
i
,
O A,O A OiOi,
T
rejeaed; LAJi,
4
A LL,
4;
E O L, OiE L,
jeaed; EiOJ , O EJ , rejeaed; E EiA , LEiOi, EJiO , 4; ETO,, I E O , rejeaed. Weakened A A Ji, I
4
.
rejeaed
EiA
E.,
AiE
Ei,
4;
I AT, AJT, re E E Ai, rejeaed;

t
Strengthened
A AJ, I A AT, rejeaed A EiO,, EiAiO E O A AiE Oi, rejeaed E E L, rejeaed EiEJ rejeaed.
;
t
one weakened, and three in of the received fyftem. I now forms fyllogifm ftrengthened, their them with derivations, forms of expreffion in down, put
are then fifteen fundamental,
full, ordinary fymbols, figures into which they fall, and the magic words by which they have been denoted for many centuries, words which I take to be more full of meaning than any that ever were made.
There
Fundamental.
A A A Y)Z+X)Y=X)Z AAA O AiO A OiOi Y:Z + Y)X = X:Z OAO AiO O O.A Oi Z)Y + X:Y = X:Z AGO LAJ A LL Y)Z + XY =XZ All Y)Z + YX =XZ All ZY + Y)X=XZ IAI YZ +Y)X = XZ IAI
AiAiA,
Barbara
III Bokardo
II
I
Banks
Darn
III Datlfi
IV Dimaris
III Difamls
On
E.A
E,

Fundamental.
A.EE
E.1,0
LE,0
Y.X = X.Z Z)Y + X.Y = X.Z Y.Z + XY=X:Z Z.Y + XY=X:Z Y.Z + YX=X:Z
Weakened.
X)Y = X.Z X)Y = X.Z
A,A,I,
AAL
Y)X=XZ AAI
Strengthened.
IV Bramantip
A AJ,
A AJi
Y)Z + Y)X = XZ
:X:Z ;X:Z
AAI
EAO EAO
III Darapti III Felapton
IV
Fefapo
The words which

lines.
called) are ufually collected
reprefent the different moods (as they are under their figures in the following
Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris.

Cefare, Cameftres, Feftino, Baroko, fecundse.
Tertia Darapti, Difamis, Datifi, Felapton,
Bokardo, Ferifon habet. Qûarta infuper addit Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fefapo, Frefifon.
The
every mood of every figure can (with two exceptions) in one way or another, be reduced to a mood of the firft figure and the letters mow the of
:
fpecial figures every confonant except phonic) has its meaning as follows ;
fyllogifm ; thus A,A,A, are feen in in the firft figure have no
vowels of the different words give the fymbol of the Barbara. The confonants
and
but in the other meaning (which are only eu

:
it.
The
way
doing
:
initial tells
is
to
which mood the reduction brings us
reduced to Celarent, and alfo Cameftres ; Feftino is reduced to The two exceptions are denoted Ferio, and fo on. the letter (as in Baroko and Bokardo) ; we (hall by
thus Cefare
prefently
notice
them
further.
And S means that the preceding
be fimply converted.
premife is to P, that what was called converfion per acci-
132
dens
is
On
to be
made,
ZX
for
X)Z,
or
X)Z
for
ZX
accordingly,
only occurs in the weakened or ftrengthened fyllogifms. means that the premifes are to be tranfpofed. Thus the meaning of
There is a nothing lefs than what follows. is the fubject of both pre term middle the in which fyllogifm Darn : mifes, and when reduced to the firft figure it becomes
the
word
D ifamis
is
the major premife, which muft be converted in reduction, is a the minor premife, which muft become particular affirmative and the the major one in reduction, is a univerfal affirmative
:
conclusion, which muft be converted affirmative. Thus,
in reduction,
is
a particular
becomes
YZ + Y)X = XZ Y)X + ZY =ZX
Difamis Darii
The moods
the
firft
Baroko and Bokardo do not admit of reduction to but the logicians figure, by any fair ufe of the phrafe
:
were determined they fhould do fo, and they accordingly hit upon the following plan, which they called reduction per impoffiand bile. being the opponent forms (pages 88, and 102) of AAA, the two moods in queftion were connected with Barbara (whence their letter B) by fhowing that the latter would make the denial of their conclufions force one premife to then contradict the other. Thus, Baroko, or if Z)Y and X X:Z was proved in the firft figure as follows. If under thefe
AOO
OAO
premifes,
X:Z
be not true, then
X)Z
is
true
but
and
Z)Y + X)Z,
fore, if
by Barbara, gives X)Y. Baroko be not a legitimate form, X)Y and

:
But
Z)Y is true X:Y: there
X:Y are both

ufed,
figure
true at once,
Z) Y + X
as y)z
Had contraries been which is abfurd. Y = X Z would have been thrown into the firft
:
+ Xy=:Xz, "Darn, or y.Z + Xy = X :Z, Ferio. And Y:Z + Y)X = X:Z, Bokardo, is feen reduced to the firft figure in Y)X + zY = zX, Darn.
Ariftotle did not ufe the fourth figure, confidering it, as be only an inverfion of the firft. The introduction of
is
it
faid, to
among
the figures
is
attributed to Galen,
and
it
does not often
appear in ordinary works of logic before the beginning of the laft If the order of the premifes be inverted, fo as to make century.
the
firft
wrongly placed
figure appear, the major and minor terms will appear in the conclusion. The words ufed for thefe
On
indirect
the Arijhtelian Syllogifm.

the
firft
133
fifth
moods of
figure
were
ufually the
and
fol
lowing ones in
Barbara^ Celarent, Dari i, Ferio, Baralip-/0 Celantes, Dabitis, Fapefmo, Frifefom-orum

the final fyllables in Italics being only euphonic (Frifefmo-orum would have been more correct). Some ufed the words Farefmo
and Firefmo. In calling the moods of the fourth figure by the name of in direct moods of the firft figure, notice was taken of the circumftance that a tranfpofition of the premifes
would give the
ar
rangement of the firft figure, in every thing but the proper A arrangement of major and minor terms, which is inverted.
little
confideration will
mow
later
the reader that the earlier Ariftote-
lians
were wifer than the

firft
ones
in this matter.
Confider the
fourth and
and the arbitrary notion of and minor It was not till this vanimes. arrangement by major mere matter of difcipline was made an article of faith that the
figures as coincident,
fourth figure had any ground of feceffion from the firft. It might feem as if the union of the firft and fourth figures would demand that of the fecond and third : the firft pair con
moods in which the middle term occupies different two premifes, the fecond pair thofe in which it has the fame place in both. If this were done, each of the two main fubdivifions muft be itfelf fubdivided into two. And this would have been the more fkilful mode of divifion. perhaps The diftinction of figures has been condemned by many, and
taining
all
the
places in the
tial
particularly by Kant. Whether attacked or defended, it is eflenthat the true grounds of the fide taken fhould be more ex
plicitly
ftated than
is
often done.
The
root of the diftinction of
undoubtedly the diftinction between the two forms and Y. X. It would be and YX, equally abfurd, either to
figure
is
XY
X Y
.
deny the identity of

view.
XY
I
and
YX,
confidered as material of
inference, or to deny their difference in
many other points of concerned only with what can be inferred, and to what extent of quantity, and accordingly the diftindtion is to me immaterial. But if I had not merely to ftudy the way of ufing premifes, but alfo that of arriving at them, it
In
this
work
am
might very well happen that the afpects under which the fame
134
inference
is
On
the Arlftotelian Syllogifm.

it
(hades of character.
feen in different figures would give fimple inftance will
very different
that though
mow
the comparifon, and its extent, are all that can be attended to in forming the conclufion, thefe points of meaning are not the only ones. perfon who wifhed to conteft the old ufe of the word
green y
would fay that fome green he wanted ripe/ fpecially to {how the mifapplication of the word. But if he rather wanted to mow the badnefs of
as applied to unripe fruit,
if
fruits are
the method of denying ripenefs, he would fay
fome
ripe fruits
are green. and The proportions are endlefs in which, for which is brought to being the terms, it is at one time
tion
to X. The fubjecl: of a propoficomparifon, and at another is always the objecl: of examination ; whether the form be
X)Y, X.Y, XY, or X:Y, we examine and report upon the Xs. If we arrange the four figures fee feparately, we mail better
their feveral peculiarities.
Flrft Figure.
Barbara Darll
Y)Z + X)Y = X)Z Y)Z + XY =XZ

here declared,
is
Celarent
Ferlo
Y.Z + X)Y=X.Z Y.Z + XY=X:Z
What
is
in every cafe the ditfum de omni et
manner which juftifies the prefe form, rence given to this figure. The middle term being completely contained in, or completely excluded from, the major term \ fuch inclufion or exclufion then follows of all fuch part of the minor
nullo in its fimplefr.
in a
term
term.
as
is
The
declared in the fecond premife to be in the middle inference then is in this fentence c What is true of
the whole middle term, is true of its part/ And it is obvious that in this figure the major premife mutt be univerfal, the minor
The four forms are all found among the premife affirmative. I think that the inverfion of the premifes which conclufions.
which
the lyftem of chapter V. employs will be found to give the forms are mod eafily tranflated into language independent of the
middle term. The fentence All (or fome) of the Xs are what muft be Zs, therefore all (or fome) of the Xs are Zs* includes Barbara and Darn: and All (or fome) of the Xs are what can not be Zs, and therefore cannot be Zs, contains Celarent and
Ferio.
On

Second Figure.
135
Cefare
FtftifM
Z.Y + X)Y = X.Z Z.Y + XY =X:Z
Came/Ires
Baroko
Z)Y + X.Y = X.Z Z)Y + X:Y = X:Z
which only negatives can be proved) the ap The terms of the dictum is not fo direct. of the pearance conclufion are both objects of examination, and one is wholly included, and the whole or part of the other excluded (Cefare,
In
this figure (in
Cameftres, and Baroko) or one is wholly excluded, and the whole or part of the other included (Cefare, Cameftres, and Feftino). Or rather, to juftify the diftinction, we fhould fay that the whole
of the major term
mc
is
Ul
and the whole of the minor

in
which S ives
is
Cfare
which the
;
wh
f the
therefore excluded from the major
or elfe the whole of the
5a
Feftino
y.
in
which
it is
that part of the
minor
is
excluded from the
major.
And
evident enough
why
the premifes muft be of
different figns.
figure, though all the forms be efTentially one, reduction of either to the form Barbara requires the (page 98,) either the explicit ufe of contraries, or invention of a name fub-
In the
firft
identical to
X. Accordingly, no mood of that
figure
is
reducible
by the ufually admitted reductions. But this cannot be faid of any of the other figures. In the one before us, Cefare and Cameftres are identical, even without changing the figure. That which is Cefare when X is major and Z minor, is Camef In the firft figure, the tres when X is minor and Z major. on or made Celarent fame attempt Darll^ removes them into
to any other
another figure.
Third Figure.
Daraptl
Difamis
Datifi
Y)Z + Y)X = XZ YZ + Y)X=XZ
Felapton
Y.Z-f Y)X = X:Z
Bokardo
Ferlfon
Y)Z + YX =XZ
Y:Z + Y)X=X:Z Y.Z + YX =X:Z
The
firft
and fecond figures contain a pair of univerfals each,
136
On
the Arijlotelian Syllogifm.
with one particular derived from each, by a legitimate weakening of one premife and the conclufion at the fame time but in no in:
And all the quantity of the middle term weakened. the fyllogifms in thefe two figures are fundamental (page 77).
ftance
is
In the cafe
now
before us, both the leading fyllogifms are not
fundamental, but ftrengthened, and capable of being weakened in two different ways. The middle term is here examined in both if it be wholly included in, or excluded from, one of premifes the concluding terms, and wholly or partly included in, or ex cluded from, the other (but not fo that there ftiall be exclu:
fion
from both)
is
we
have
one cafe
is
included in,
whole or part mentioned in or excluded from, that which the whole

it
that the
included in, or excluded from, in the other. none but particular conclufions.
There can be
Fefapo
Frefifon
Z.Y + Y)X = X:Z Z.Y + YX =X:Z

form which does not
We
have
now one
univerfal fyllogifm in a
admit of being weakened in this figure, and two ftrengthened of which has one weakened form, one of them, fyllogifms, each Bramantip) admitting a ftronger conclufion in another figure.
Every conclufion except

the three
firft
fyllogifms has
appears. The mode of inference of been defcribed in the other figures.
In Fefapo and Frefifon, the perfect exclufion of the major term from the middle, accompanied by the total or partial inclufion of the middle in the minor, fecures the exclufion from the major,
of as
rules ufually given, and to fome I in which on the remarks they apply to the more general degree Aldrich gives them as follows in chapter V.
much of the minor as it mall now proceed to the
has in
common
with the middle.
fyftem
Diftribuas
medium
nee quartus terminus
adfit
:
Utraque nee praemifTa negans, nee particularis Se&etur partem conclufio deteriorem j Et non diftribuat, nifi cum praemifTa, negetve.
On
137
Thefe rules, I need hardly fay, are perfectly correct, when the contraries of the terms are excluded, and alfo all notion of quan
tity
except
all,
or the indefinite fome.

a
Taking them
difturbed,
in the
natu
,
ral order,
1.
which verification has
little
we
have
There
in
are to be but three terms, of

in the conclufion, the
which
it is
underftood
two only appear
excluded or middle term
This is true in my fyftem, both of the premiies. appearing when by terms are underftood alfo contraries of terms. I fhould
fuppofe that there can be no objection to the admiffion of con traries, unlefs there be one to the conception of a contrary. Any one may, with Ariftotle, object to the word not-man, as not the
name of anything
him
to call
it
an
be affirmed that
on the grounds which immediately induced But it can hardly aorift, or indefinite, name. not-man a name, mould as one admitting any
:
thereupon refufe to recognife the identity of with c horfe is not-man.

2.
horfe
is
not
man,
The
middle term
is
to
be dijlributed in one or the other of

is
the premifes.
I
By
this
diftributed
do not ufe
in
term
in the prefent
here meant univerfally fpoken of. work, becaufe I do not fee

diftributed,
it
why,
any deducible meaning of the word
can be
In ufing a applied to univerfal as diftinguifhed from particular. diftribute that it feems to me that we always is, fcatter name,
:
as
it
were, the general
name
over the inftances to which
it is
to
I diftribute certain apply. fay fome horfes are animals, horfes among the animals ; and when all, all. Leaving the word, the principle is one which clearly muft be true whenever we are reftricted in quantity to all or fome (indefinite), and when con traries are not admitted. In the former cafe we have, in one
I
When
form or another, to make m-\-n greater than y when we cannot know what relation either m or
one of them, or both, be equal to then, but to require that m or n fhall be there is apparently no dependence on the next chapter.
.
(chapter VIII.) n has to 17, unlefs

cafes in
We
u.
y\
have no alternative
The
will
which
in
be
difcufled
But when contraries are introduced,

true.
this rule is
not univerfally
The
exception
is
feen in
AATorX)Y + Z)Y=xz.
If
all
the
Xs
be Ys, and
are neither
alfo all the
things
which
Xs
Zs, it follows that there are nor Zs, namely, all which are not
138
On
Ys. It is here, as elfewhere, implied that the middle term is not the univerfe of the proportion. When we come, then, to ufe contraries, the fimple rule of the
middle term
is
no longer
?
we
courfe, that every fylloplace Ariftotelian fyllogifm, and even to one an be reduced to can gifm or other of two among them, AiA 4 Ai or LAJi, or to the firft of
to put in
its
We know, of
univerfally true.
What
other rule are
thefe, if
we
be at liberty to ufe invention of names (page 97).

its
Again, each term, or

:
contrary,
is
mentioned univerfally in
every proportion fo that there is certainly one way in which every pair of premifes may be made to exhibit a middle term The rule to be fubftituted for univerfally ufed in one of them.
the diflribuas medium is, that all pairs of univerfals are conclufive, but a univerfal and a particular require that the middle
term mould alfo be a univerfal and a particular, that is, univerfal in one and particular in the other. Thus, in X)Y-f Z)Y, as it both middle in the is ftands, particular tranfpofe into y)x + y)z
;
by which we fee the X)Y + ZY, which is of the Again, fame kind, the tranfpofition gives y)x + Z y, which is faulty, becaufe, though there be a particular premife, there is not any where a particular middle term. The cafes in which the middle
and the middle
is
now
univerfal in both,
in
Ariftotelian concluflon.
is
of the fame
name
in
both places (univerfal in four, particular
in four), are the
to be furprifed at in
ftrengthened fyllogifms only. There is nothing its thus appearing that the particularity of
juft as
the middle term

:
is
much
a teft of a good fyllogifm as
its
of every name and its contrary, one enters univer univerfality one and particularly, in every proportion which contains fally, it ; and the fyftem in chapter V. is as much concerned with con
direct terms. It is thence vifible beforehand, to the trary as with mathematician at leaft, that any teft muft be defective, unlefs
univerfal and particular enter into it in the fame manner. The above contains a complete canon of validity, as foon as
the law of the three terms

definition.
is
underftood, which
:
We may ftate
it
;
it
as follows
Two
is only a law of premifes conclude
when both
fo often as
are univerfal, always ; when one only is univerfal, or y) is once happens that the middle term (be it
only univerfal
when
neither
is
univerfal, never.
By
this rule
alone the thirty-two conclufive cafes can be diftinguimed from the thirty-two inconclufive ones.
On
3.
139
When
fyllogifm.
both premifes are negative, there is no Ariftotelian In the fyftem completed by contraries, there are eight
fuch fyllogifms, as
affirmative.
many
in
fa<5t,
as there are
with premifes both
a pair of negative premifes never conclude with both terms of the premifes, but with the contrary of one or
But
both
and
this
muft be
fubftituted, as a rule
of conclufion, for
the one juft named.
Both premifes muft not be particular. This rule, which wholly to quantity, muft be preferved in every fyftem which admits no definite ratio, except that of one to one, or I cannot learn that any writer on logic all (pages 56, 57).
4.
relates
ever propounded even the very fimple cafe of c Moft Ys are Xs, moft Ys are Zs, therefore fome Xs are Zs, as a legiti
mate inference.
to
And
this,
though
it is
tative prefix moft (plurimi) has before
now
certain that the quanti excited difcuffion as
whether
5.
it
By fettetur
is
belonged to a univerfal or a particular. part em conclufio deteriorem it is underftood that

called
the negative
weaker or lower
(deter lor) than the affir
mative, and the particular than the univerfal ; and that the con clufion is to be as weak as negative, or as particular, if there be
a premife
preferved,
which
is
negative or particular.
This rule muft be
when
But
particulars.
contraries are introduced, fo far as relates to fo far as negatives are concerned, the rule muft
be that one negative premife gives a negative conclufion, and two an affirmative one.
laft line, et non dlflrlbuat^ nifi cum premljfa^ negetve^ to the The conclufion is not procure a verfe. fpoils fymmetry that is, affirmative to be negative without a negative premife
7.
The
Alfo, no term is to be premifes give an affirmative conclufion. e. in taken the conclufion, unlefs it univerfally) diftributively, (/.
were
fo taken in its premife. breach of this rule would be equivalent to drawing a conclufion about what was not (or about more than was) introduced into the premifes.
When
tive
and negative
contraries are introduced, the diftinclrion between pofiis made to appear, what it really is, one of
language, or rather one of choice of names. But the diftin&ion of form is not abolifhed, but is exactly what it was before. cannot lay down any rules for the formation of the conclufion
unlefs, in
We
our eight ftandard forms,
we
preferve the
mode of
140
On
to the fundamental derivation of the forms (page 61). Thus, the order being XY, A is x)y and not is Y)X, and x:y and not Y:X. This method of writing when being reftored, neceflary, in pages 89 and 91, it follows
writing which belongs
immediately that the rule of accentuation in the notation gives the rule by which we determine whether the conclufion takes
the terms from the premifes, or prefers contraries. According as the prepofition of the conclufion agrees with or differs from that of
a premife, fo does the conclufion take a term from that premife, or its contrary. Thus, AiAiAi takes both terms from the pre 1 mifes, but AjA ! takes a contrary from the firft premife only.
1
This
laft
we
Accordingly,
fee if we we have
write the fyllogifm as
X)Y+y)z=xz.
Syllogifms taking both concluding terms direct from the premifes. I : Univerfals which begin with ; particulars which begin with eight in number ; being all which ifolate no accent.
Taking the fir/} term

ning with
being
all
only from the premife.
Univerfals begin
:
particulars beginning
ifolate
with
eight in
number ;
which
the middle accent.
Taking the fecond term only from the premife. Strengthened forms and particulars which begin with A eight in number,
:
being D
all
which
ifolate
the
firft
accent.
Taking neither term from the premifes. Strengthened forms and particulars which begin with E eight in number, being all
:
which ifolate the third accent. This is a new mode of ftating the law of accentuation (pages for fear of overload 92-3) which I have preferred to place here, I have not ftated one half of thofe rules. V. with ing chapter which fuggefted themfelves. This multiplicity of relations is a
prefumption of the completenefs of the fyftem. In the Ariftotelian fyftem, there is multiplication of the fame modes of inference, under the varieties of figure. In that which
I propofe, there is a reduplication of moft of the effential cafes and for whatever cafe is found, the fame is alfo found with
;
interchanged, and alfo the order of the premifes. Again, whatever cafe is found, it is found contranominally ; or with all the accents
There are other ways (and many of (or prepofitions) altered. them) in which the fyftem is only in one half a duplicate of what
it is
in the other.
If
all
thefe
modes of
dividing the fyftem into
On
41
two correlative parts divided it into the fame two parts, there can be no queftion that one alone of thofe parts fhould have been prefented as the object of confideration. But this does not hap
pen in any inftance fo that it is impoflible to difpenfe with the whole of the thirty-two cafes. The Ariftotelian cafes do not form or include any half whatever of this
:
fyftem.
CHAPTER
On
VIII.
the numerically definite Syllogifm.
no other quantity in names meaning one or more, it To this extent of quantity we are limited in moft may be all. kinds of reafoning, by want of knowledge of the definite extent of our propofitions and the few phrafes (page 58), as moft, a good many, &c. by which we endeavour to eftablifh differ
IN except
the laft chapter I confidered all and fome the latter

:
ences of extent in ordinary converfation, have been hitherto held inadmiffible into logic. In this fcience it feems to have been intended that the bafes on which its forms are conftructed always
fhall be nothing but the fuppofition of the moft imperfect and inaccurate knowledge. Though in geometry we are permitted to aflume as the object of reafoning the ideal ftraight line, the 4 length without breadth of Euclid, which has no objective pro totype, and though we fee the advantage of reafoning upon ideas, and allowing the efTential inaccuracies of material application to
produce no effect except in material application, yet in the con of the pure forms of thought, the learner has always been denied the advantage of ftudying the more perfect fyftem of
fideration
which
his inferences are the imperfect imitation.
ordinary univerfal propofitions are of a certain approach to definite character, both of them with refpedt to their fubjects, and the negative one with refpect to its In X) predicate alfo. for example, what is known is as much known of one as
The
any
of any other. Perfect definitenefs would confift of degree defcription, and would require a
ledge.
in a
more exact
higher degree of know But in this chapter I fpeak only of numerical definite-
142
nefs,
On
the numerically
of the fuppofition that we know bow many things we are talking about. may be well content to examine what we
We
we were a ftep or two higher in the fcale of creation, if fo by doing we can manage to add fomething to our methods of inference in the higheft to which we have as yet attained.
fhould do
if
Suppofe numerically definite propofition is of this kind. the whole number of Xs and Ys to be known fay there are
:
100
Xs
and 200
Ys
in exiftence.
Then
an affirmative propo
fition
of the
each of them one of 70

*
45 Xs 70 Ys. But it muft be
45 Xs (or more*) are and a negative propofition in (or more) are no one of them to be found among
fort in queftion is feen in
Ys
ber of Xs, as 45 Xs, I do not
of a num particularly noticed that in fpeaking mean certain 45 Xs which can

it is poffible the reft, fo that of any belong to the 45 of the propofition, or to This degree of definitenefs is one ftep higher
be diftinguifhed from to be known whether
all
it
the remaining 55. than that which I here propofe to confider, and which is defcribed c by there are 45 Xs which are contained among 70 Ys, it not the being known which Xs are the 45 Xs, nor which Ys are
70
Ys
or
elfe
identical with
c by there are 45 Xs which are not any of them any one of 70 Ys, the precife Xs and Ys in
queftion being
It
unknown.
cannot of courfe be difputed that if any thing fhould neceffollow from any 45 Xs being found among any 70 Ys, it farily
from our knowing which are the Xs and But this laft fuppofition only brings us to univerfal propofitions. If, there being 100 Xs, 45 of really them can be fpecifically feparated from the reft, fo as to be known, the procefs of feparation is equivalent to putting them
will not the lefs follow
which are the Ys.
* Thefe words (or more)

to the
mow
that the
word
definite
has reference only

"
courfe nothing can be fhown in right of 45 It is defirable or more, perhaps except what is true in right of the 45. that as the premifes, fo fhould be the conclufion, of a fyllogifm this would
lower boundary.
"
Of
not be the cafe
if
weufed premifes
it
definite
both ways.
For example, there
being 100
Ys
in exiftence,
Xs and
exaflly 60
Ys
are Zs,
to fay
f will prefently appear that Exaftly 55 15 though it enable us to fay that
Zs does not allow us

more) are Zs.
Exaftly
Xs
are Zs,
but only
Ys Xs Xs
are
are
(or
definite Syllogifm.
143
under a feparate name, fubidentical to X, and the reft, which are equally diftinguifhable, under another name, alfo fubidentical to X, and contrary of the firft name, when the univerfe is X. Whether the name be long or fhort, does not matter, nor whether it carry the feparating diftinclion in its etymology or not. To feparate in any way inftance from inftance by lan
guage, is to name. If then 45 definite
Xs were known
to be contained
among
Ys, and if thefe Xs were each named M, and thofe Ys each N, and if the reft of the Xs and Ys were named P
70
definite
and
Q, we
fhould have the following propofitions,
M)X, P)X, N)Y, Q)Y, M)N, M.P, N.Q,

and
total
all
inferences.
Moreover,
in
each cafe,
we
fhould have the
number of inftances which are contained under each name ; the numbers carrying with them evidence that every X is either
M)N
or P, and either or Q. Subftitute every and we have the correfponding negative propofition.
if
M.N
for
45 unfeparated and infeparable Xs be fuppofed known among 70 fimilarly fituated Ys, there is no immediate method of making any other propofition out of the terms and except its converfe, that 45 of thefe 70 Ys are 45 Xs, and (if the whole number of Ys be known, fay 200) that there are 45 Xs which are not any one among 200 70, or 130 Ys. This is then a fimple propofition, which becomes of a highly complex chara&er, when the Xs and Ys named in it are taken as defi nitely feparable from the reft. I fhall call it the/tmple numerical
each to be
But
propofition.
All the planets but one is a fome particular propofition ; it is there is no one planet of planets But right included in it. c all the planets except Neptune is a univerfal propofition aof &c. ; planet-not-Neptune is a name of
"
The
diftin&ion
may be
eafily illuftrated
by example.
and of every planet

or not.
Venus, Mercury, can be ftated whether it be in the name That which is true inferentially of all the planets but
it
one
left particular, is
is
true of
all
is
but that which

former.
true of the latter
the planets but Neptune: not neceflarily true of the
Taking X, Y,
as the terms
of the fyllogifm, | the number
44
Xs
in exiftence,
v
On
>j
the numerically
of
the
number of Ys, and
the
number of
inftances in the univerfe, there are of courfe fixteen poffible cafes of knowledge, more or lefs, of thefe Of thefe primary quantities, from all unknown to all known.
Zs, and
the
number of
fixteen cafes,
it
will
be requifite to confider two only.
Firft,
when the extent of the middle term is known, and all the reft unknown fecondly, when all are known. The algebraical formulae of the latter cafe will enable us to point out how the
;
fuppofition of any power of inference.
lefs
degree of knowledge would affect our
I propofe the following notation. Let denote either of the equivalent propofitions, that m Xs are to be found among the Ys, or that m Ys are to be found among the Xs. Let
mXY
mK :Y
denote either of the equivalent propofitions, that there are m Xs which are not any one among Ys, or n Ys which are not any
one among
Xs.
loX is the algebraical fymbol for ten equal Xs added together, being a magnitude it is then a collective In this work, fymbol. being a name, it implies every one out of ten inftances of that name, diftributively^ but not collec
fymbol
The
This diftin&ion is very material, not only in this chap c but is is ter, Every throughout every part of logic. c X* mean each one we diftributively true, when, by Every
tively.
fo that the propofition is

is
The
firft
is
Y, and the fecond
X X
:
Y, and
the third
is
Y, &c.
In
this cafe the fubjecl: is
X,
and the word every belongs to the quantity of the propofition. is is But c every collectively true, when we do not mean
that
any one
all
:
X X
is
that
the
Xs make
is
Y, nor a Y.
that any
number of Xs
fubjecl:
all
are
Ys, but
is
In
this cafe
the propofition
fin-
gular
ten
there
but one inftance of the

the collection
c
fubjecl: being,
men men are

If,
I
are
a
X, but members of
is
not
mentioned, that the Xs. Thus s the

c
:
a committee*
collective.
is
distributive
the ten
committee
in fuch a propofition as fpecifically feparated
loXY, we were
reft,
to fuppofe the
being certain affignable ten individuals from among all the Xs, then loX becomes a name for each of the ten, as much as X, and may be confidered as a
univerfal term.
things.
Xs
from the
And now loXY
and
{ioX})Ymean
the fame
definite Syllogifm.
145
.
be known, and only of the four, y, |, ?, The only collections of premifes which it is neceflary to confider are
Let
>j
mXY+nYZ
Without fome knowledge of the number of
of which by
ys,
fuppofition we have none, it would be ufelefs to attempt to draw an inference from a pair in which and y enter together, par
tially quantified, as in
mX Y + nL
all
ry.
And nZy
:
merely amounts
to
nZ:*Y.
The
above three are

is
we need
confider
and even of thefe
incapable of inference, fmce both premifes are nega tive, and moreover, not reducible to a pofitive form by ufe of contraries, the only way in which negative premifes really acquire
the third
a conclufion in chapter V. Let us firft confider the premifes -\-nYZ. They tell us that among the Xs and n Zs accordingly, Ys we find
mXY
neither
nor n exceeds
:
>?.
nothing can be inferred are inflances enough of
Y)
If m and n together fall fhort of 17, is extenfive enough (that is, there to hold the m Xs and the n Zs with
out any coincidence of an with a Z. we do not know whether they exift ; or,
As
if
to other
they
if
Xs we exift,
or Zs, do not
know
exceed
that
any one of them

it
is
Y.
But
and n together
and n Zs can find place w, Xs or two Zs, or an either two Ys, except by putting among and a Z, with one of the Ys. Now as by the nature of the
is
impoffible that
m Xs
fuppofitions, there cannot be
two Xs, nor two Zs,

is,
to
one Y,
we
muft have the inference

excefs of m-}- n over
rj.
iXZ
That
as often as there are units in the
XZ
sY. There may be two in from each other, the connexion of ferences, perfectly which can only be explained in the more general fyftem to which we fhall prefently come. Firft, let m and s together exceed
Next,
let
us take
mXY + nZ
diftincl:
Then m + s
of the
Ys
have the
common
s
property of being
Xs, and of being
clear of the n Zs.

:
Accordingly,
we have
mX Y + nZ Y = (m +
s
*)X nZ
:
146
On
the numerically
*j.
Take the s Ys among which Next, let n -f- s be greater than w no one of the n Zs is found. Becaufe n + s is greater than left. of Ys number is than the Accordingly, j, greater
>i,
(-n
s}
of the n
be any of the
wXs
Zs cannot be any Ys, and therefore cannot which are Ys. Hence we have
In the appendix to this chapter (at the end of the work) will be feen the manner in which all the Ariftotelian fyllogifms can be brought under the firft cafe, and the firft* inference of the fecond cafe. No Ariftotelian fyllogifm can be deduced from the
fecond inference except the firft. For, when s
gifm, have
^2=>?,
when
is
YI,
in
which
cafe
it
not
>?,
we
muft, to
make
agrees with fuch a fyllo
being
and then, to make Z:iY Ariftotelian, s not thus get we muft have all the Zs in w, or But the conclufion is of Bokardo. the :Z, premifes
We
And this will u)Z, that of Bokardo being jX:Z. be found to be the only Ariftotelian fyllogifm which has this fecond and numerically quantified inference, depending upon the
number of Zs exceeding
ticular premife.
the
number of Ys unnamed
all
in the par
now
proceed to fuppofe that
the quantities are taken into
account.
follows.
Some
preliminary confiderations will
be ufeful, as
Let two propofitions be called identical, when, either of them being true, the other muft be true alfo fo that nothing can be inferred from the one, which does not equally follow from the Such propofitions are X.Y and Y.X, fuch are X)Y other. and y)x, and fo on. Again, two propofitions may be identical
:
relatively to a third
thus,
;
P being
true,
Q_ and
may
either
follow from the other

that
accordingly, as long as
it is
underftood
is
true,
Q_ and
may,
relatively to that fuppofition,
be
treated as identical.
The word identical^ as applied to propofitions^ is here made to mean more than ufual, but not with more licenfe than when the word is applied to names. Thus, man and rational animal are
* I was not in pofleflion of the fecond inference
in
till
had written what
is
page 157.
definite Sylloglfm.
147
alike
not identical names, qua names, for they neither fpell nor found the identity understood is that of meaning ; where one
:
applies, there (hall the other apply alfo.

fitions
(of which
fubjecT:, predicate,
of parts, nor in reducibility to famenefs, but in fimultaneous truth or falfehood, fo that what either is, be it true
or
falfe,
not confift
parts, juft as fpelling in famenefs
Similarly, as to propoand copula are the material and found are thofe of names), identity does
the other
one of which
are identical.
Thus two propofitions, every cafe. that an end has been fignifies gained, and the other
is
alfo, in
that the fole and fufficient
means of gaining
it
have been ufed,
All the theory of names, their application or non-application, may be applied to propofitions , their truth or falfehood. To fay
that a propofition is true in a certain cafe, is to fay that a certain name applies to a certain cafe : to fay that it is falfe, is to fay that a certain name does not apply, but that its contrary does.
That contrary is what logicians ufually call contradictory : and the name is not fimply true or falfe, but the adjective attached to
the propofition.
limit us to a
call,
The
conditions under which

conftitute
we
are to fpeak
number of cafes which
what we may now
which the name U applies, but of all in which the propofition U is true, or in which the name true U A cafe in applies. which a propofition P is true may be marked P, one in which it is falfe, p. may now apply the names fubidentical, &c. and
not the univerfe of the names in the propofitions, but the Thus we univerfe of the truth or falfehood of the propofitions. fhall fuppofe ourfelves now to be fpeaking, not of all inftances to
We
the fymbols, together with
all
the iyllogifms,
complex and fimple
but on each a remark
may be neceflary. If P be a propo Subidentical, identical, and fuper identical. P is true be if in which fition fubidentical of that cafe is, every Q,
in
one
is
which
is
true, but fo that
Q
;
is
fometimes true
when P
is not, the propofition ufually mentioned as ejfential to P, and as a necejfary confequence of it. Whenever P is true, is
O
1
true true
Q Q
necefTarily follows from

is
if
be
falfe,
P cannot be
Accord
are
eflential to
P
1
are
all
*-
mere fynonymes.
ingly
necejfary
confequent"
:
and
fup er identical
or identical
fynonymous terms
fuperaffirmative.
(page 68), necejfary confequent and Identity of courfe confifts in each propofition
that
is
48
when
it
On
the numerically
is
being true
the other
true.
general notions,
fition contains its
would be held more
think that, according to juft to fay that a propo-
but a
moment
it
neceflary confequence than that it is contained: confideration will that the latter analogy is
mow
:
at leaft as found.
If the fecond be true

in other cafes alfo
firft,
whenever the
firft is
true,
may
be true
fo that
we
is
only fay the

ufual to call
fecond contains the
and
it
may
be more.
It
No X
and to
true.
Subcontrary^ contrary^ and fuper contrary. is and c Every is by the
name of
:
contraries,
fay that
contraries
may
be both
falfe,
but cannot be both

in
This
is
a technical ufe of the
word
common
lan
guage we mould fay that either a propofition or its contrary muft be true ; c have you any thing to fay to the contrary generally
means what
a logician would exprefs I tradictory in the place of contrary.
words contrary and contradictory

pulfion I
as
by putting the word con compelled to ufe the fynonymous at which com-
am
why,
well pleafed, never having feen any good reafon in the fcience which confiders the relations of difta^ the
am
contrarla
mould be any thing but the contra difta. The proper word for contrary, commonly ufed to exprefs the relation of X) Y and X. Y, is fubcontrary. Here are two propofitions P and
which cannot both be true, but may both be falfe here is a pair which can never be atferted of the fame inftance, and of which, in many inftances, neither can In the fame manner, the apply. and X called propofitions Y, ufually fubcontrary (for no
:
XY
reafon that I can find except that they are written under the fo called contraries in a fcheme or diagram very common in books
of logic) mould be called fupercontrary : they are never both and be both true. This is a falfe, may complete inverfion of
the ufual propofitions
imperatively required, IV. be allowed.
:
an inverfion which feems to

only
me
to be
if
my
ufe offub and fuper in
Chapter
In applying thefe names to propofitions, it muft be bered that we make the fame fort of afcent which we
remem
make
in
pafling from fpecific to univerfal arithmetic, in ufmg a fymbol to ftand for any number at pleafure. For inftance ;
it
Perhaps be thought that and X:Y may fometimes be only be names contraries, and not fupercontraries, becaufe there
may
XY
may
is
which make one only true and not both.
But this
not correct
definite Syllogifm.
for
149
we
propofitions^
are considering the proportion itfelf as an in/lance among not the propofition as fubdivifible into inftances, in
which name
fitions,
it is
is compared with name. In fpeaking of propo change from ufe of one name to ufe of another, or from ufe of one number to ufe of another, which is change of
inftance
not change from one inftance of
name
to another.
juft as in a univerfe of names, every name introduced is fuppofed to belong, or not to belong, to every inftance in that univerfe fo in a univerfe of propofitions, I fuppofe every propo
:
And
fition, or
which
neither
contrary, to apply (whether it be or be not known have never confidered applies) in every inftance.
its
We
fuch a thing as the univerfe

applies declaring that the name to each inftance. In like
:
U,
in
which there
is
are cafes in
which
X nor x
now
we
fuppofe there
always a
power of
either belong or not belong manner, all the propofitions in each

all
muft
univerfe
confidered, are fuppofed to be connected with

:
the
names
in queftion
1
fo that
X, Y, being two of them
in their
f
order of reference, AI or Oi is true in each cafe, and or , f if we pleafed, enter upon a EI or L, and E or I . might,
We
wider ryftem. For though we cannot imagine of any object of but that it is either or not X, be what name it thought, we can of may, yet imagine propofitions that they may be wholly The firft aflertion inapplicable, as being neither true nor falfe. is all the more that it could be true, exemplified without hardly as I fhould do if I reminded the reader that a exciting laughter
book
is
either a cornfield or not a cornfield.
We
have never
names under more predicaments than two ; never, for inftance, as if we were to fuppofe three names X 15 X 2 , X , of 3 which everything muft be one or the other, and nothing can be more than one. But we fhould be led to extend our fyftem if
confidered
we
falfe,
confidered propofitions under three points of view, as true, or inapplicable. may confine ourfelves to fingle alter
We
natives either by introducing not-true (including both falfe and or elfe con inapplicable) as the recognized contrary of true
:
by
fining our refults to univerfes in which there bility, fo that true or falfe holds in every cafe.
thefis will beft fuit
is
always applica
The latter hypohere, but I have

it.
my
is
prefent purpofe.
This
digreflion
fomewhat out of place

it
preferred to retain the matter of
until I
had occafion to ufe
50
On
the numerically
I now proceed to aflert that the fimple numerical proportion Let us has no occafion for a numerically definite predicate.
confider
is
firft
an affirmative proportion, fay
Of
10 Xs, each
it
among fome 15 Ys/ there are 15 or more Ys in exiftence.

to be found
Of
courfe
is
fuppofed
With
this let us
compare
among the Ys/ Thefe two proportions Xs be among 15 Ys, there are 10 Xs among the Ys and if 10 Xs be among the Ys they are certainly 10 Ys put on 5 more Ys at pleafure, and they can be faid to be among 15 Ys in juft as many ways as we can choofe 5 more Ys to make up the 15. Note, that if the 10 Xs were among certain
10
are to be found
:
Xs
are identical
:
if
10
Ys, then, though the firft propofition would give the But we fecond, the fecond would not neceflarily give the firft. are now fuppofing that numerical fele6tion is only numerically definite definite as to the number, not as to the inftances which
fpecified 15
:
make up that number. When therefore we fay 10 Xs are among 15 Ys we fay neither more nor lefs than when we fay 10 Xs are among the Ys. It is in fact 10 of the Xs are 10
of the
Ys
and the converfe
10 of the
Ys
are 10 of the
Xs
is
the fame proportion. let us take a negative propofition,
Now
10 of the
Xs
are not
to be found, any one of them^ among fome 15 Ys, abbreviated If there be 25 Ys in exiftence into c 10 Xs are not in 15 Ys. and this propofition muft be true ; mean what they
It
is
as true as that the
which
:
is
one
may.
is
not any other
Y.
Say there are 25 or more Ys take any 10 Xs you choofe, and Then certainly put them down on any 10 Ys you choofe. there are 15 Ys left, no one of which is any of thofe 10 Xs. Again, if there be 25 Xs in exiftence, ftill the propofition muft be true. For if the 15 Ys were all there are, and they were all
Xs, there
ftill
remain 10
Accordingly, the ever either the whole number of Xs, or the whole number of Ys, exceeds m + n^ fays no more than is conveyed in our perma
Xs which are not any one in the 15 Ys. c propofition m Xs are all clear of Ys, when
nent underftanding that no object of thought can be more than one or one Y. But let it be otherwife ; let neither Xs nor
Ys
be as
many
let
as
m+n
Xs
23 Ys
at leaft
leaft
and
10
in number. Say there are 20 be clear of 15 Ys. There muft
Xs and now be
and at
it is
15 +
20, or 5 Ys which are no Xs at 15 + 10 10 23, or 2 Xs which are no Ys at all.
all^
Firft,
definite Syllogifm.
plain that there are
:
151
no 10 Xs among thofe Ys which are clear of Ys for there are but 23 Ys in all. Therefore, 2 at leaft 15 of thefe 10 Xs muft be Xs which are not Ys which with 8 Xs that may be Ys, will be clear of the remaining 15 Ys. Therefore 2 Xs at leaft are not Ys. Again, there are no 15 Ys among thofe Xs which are clear of 10 Xs, for there are but 20 Xs in all. Five Ys which are not Xs muft exift, which with 10 that may be Xs, will be clear of the remaining IO Xs. Accordingly, if the whole number of Xs be , and the whole number of Ys be there are m Xs which are the proportion no one to be found among n Ys is eflentially true of every cafe of But or u. that univerfe, whenever m + n is lefs than either
:
>?,
when m + n
is
greater than both
and
>?,
there are
eflentials
two propoof
all
fitions, neceflarily involved,
which are not
cafes
of that univerfe
namely, that there are
m+n
Ys which
are
not any Xs, and m + n u Xs which are not any Ys. But, it may be afked, if y fhould be lefs than , and m + n , greater than 17, but ftill lefs than may we not affirm that
m+n
d^
"ot
Xs
are not
Ys ?
Undoubtedly we may, but then

u,
we
affirm fo
much
left
as already belongs to every cafe of the
univerfe.
For
if
be greater than
>j
no more than
cannot be
y.
y
:
Xs
can be
n
Ys, and there are

is,
Xs which
Ys
and
in the cafe fuppofed,
more than
m+n
Let
the
v be the number of inftances in the univerfe, and being number of Xs and of Ys. The following ufes of the notation
will be readily feen to exprefs preceding refults, or others
imme
diately deducible.
greater than u greater than
>j)X
:Y
or
)Xy
g)Y:|X
n
or
(u-)Yx
m+n
A.
greater than
and than
gives
O.
A Y)X=,XY
=my:(u
=(i/-
E,
Y.X=Xy XY =
x.y
E
I
1
=( y -
xy
=mxy
and mX wY. examine the modes of contradicting it is obvious that firft, (m always meaning that m are, but that more may be) either m or more Xs are Ys, or elfe m-fi or more Xs are not Ys. The contradiction then is either of the equivalents
:
152 I now
On
the numerically
wXY
As
to the
It will
be fatisfactory to evolve the contradiction of
mX n Y
:
by a method which will again demonftrate the cafes in which no contradiction exifts ; or in which the proportion is always true.
Let us put the two names in the leaft favourable pofition for then be the number of Xs which making mX:nY true. are not Ys, all the reft Ys. Take the p Xs which are not being Ys (p muft not be fo great as w, for then the proportion is made good by the Xs which are not any Ys) and m p from thofe which are Ys. All the m Xs thus obtained are clear of or y (m p) m+p Ys. Let this juft be n that is, let Then the number of Xs which are Ys, is + n-n. p=zm or m Let but one more X be Y, n. n + (m-\-n )
Let/>
YJ :
/>,
and the proportion begins to be contradicted for now m-\-n n of thofe which are I Xs are not Ys, we muft take up y + I v
:
Ys Ys
to
make
clear
m Xs, and there only remain u (+ n) or n do it cannot of the m Xs. And it is plain that if we
I
by
be
ufmg
firft all
the
Xs which
are not
Ys
at all,
ftill
lefs
can
it
done by ufmg thofe which
are.
Accordingly the contradiction of
is
have a proportion which can be contra I at leaft, muft be dicted, greater than , or equal to + than be m n i would for otherwife M + + u, or more greater Ys than u muft be Xs, which is abfurd and fimilarly m + n
Then,
in order to
m+n
muft be greater than

or
u.
Otherwife,
all
contradiction
is
abfurd,
77zX:Y
AfTuming
:
is
always
true.
thefe laft conditions,
however, the contradiction of
mX n Y
amount
is
made
earer.
To be
: Y\
to (m-\-n
j)X
Y.
-w
Now
n
capable of contradiction, it muft when m-\-n u Xs are not
Ys, and no more,
-M
Xs
are Ys.
One
or
more
definite Syllogifm.
153
above
true.
this,
or let
>j
-m
n-\-
i)XY, and
mX:nY
cannot be
for I contradictory or contrary propofitions. prefently confider the contranominal proportions . muft guard ourfelves from prefcribing the ufe of any premife which neceflarily belongs to all cafes in the univerfe (of propo
fhall
Thus much
We
Let P be a proportion which may or may not be true, as a premife, and a propofition which is true in Let R cafe. be their every neceflary confequence, or legitimate inference then it is not whenever P and are true, R is c but whenever P is R So is true. far as R is a con true/ true,
fitions).
laid
down
a confequence of every thing which it is a neceflarily gives confequence of the fuppofed conftitution of the univerfe from which the propofitions are
fequence of
Q,
fo far
it
is
and thus
taken.
Now
this conftitution is
a convenience that
it
always underftood
firft
is
mould be deduced by
conftitution, not of
cannot be a necefiity. And P and Q.
may be deducing Q, but confequence of P and this

;
it
For example, let the univerfe of propofitions be all that can be formed out of the fuppofitions of the exiftence of 20 Xs, and
and 40 Zs, in one univerfe of names. Let us join to gether I5XY and loZ 2oY. Our rules of inference will pre loZ is the neceflary confequence of fently mow us, that 5X
30
\ s,
thefe premifes
true,
but this refult

elfe,
without anything 10 falls fhort of 40.
is not only true when but even without that;
I5XY
is
becaufe
Again, we muft guard ourfelves from adopting the conclufion which follows from premifes, when that conclufion is true in all
cafes
by the conftitution of the univerfe

as
it
is
then a
fort
of
an inference, but of a jpitrious* conclufion, legitimate enough diftincl: character from inferences which would bear perfectly
*
To this word, as here ufed, I have heard much objeftion

it, it
took
was unwillingly, and
for
want of a
better.
and when I firft But on further confi;
it. The objection arifes from the idea of being generally attached to the word. But, though it may be ufual for fpurious things to be worthlefs, it is not neceflary. If a London maker of razors mould put the name of a great Sheffield houfe upon them, thofe razors would be fpurious. Suppofe them as good as thofe of the Shef
deration I
am
well fatisfied with
falfe or worthlefs
field
maker, or
better, they are
ftill
fpurious
though
it
may
be true enough
54
On
the numerically
doubt but for the premifes, or would bear contradiction under other premifes. Say that in the above univerfe we join the pro-
I5XY and 3oZ 20 Y. Both thefe proportions are of contradiction the fecond is 2oZ uY ( means 30, capable Z but the fymbol reminds the reader that 30 is all) or loY 2oY of laws + Now, by inference, I5XY ( 3OZ being 40).
pofitions
: : : : :
yields
3oZ, which is always true in that univerfe. which premifes capable of contradiction conclufion which is not.
5X
Here
is
a cafe in
give
The
fhow
rule of inference
is
obvioufly as follows.
We
cannot
Zs by comparifon of both with a third name, unlefs we can affign a number of inftances of that third name, more than filed up by Xs and Zs that is to fay, fuch that the very leaft number of Xs and Zs which it can contain are together more in number than there are feparate places to put them in.
that
Xs
are
If our premifes, for example, feparate fome 30 Ys, and dictate among thofe 30 Ys there muft be 20 Xs and 15 Zs, it is For if we clear that there muft be at leaft 5 Zs which are Xs.
that
put
down
the 20
Zs
into feparate
Xs which are to go in, and try to put the places, we are flopped as foon as we have filled
up the 10 remaining out of the 30 Ys, and mult put the otrier made Xs. Accordingly, 5 Zs among the Ys which have been there are units in the number Zs as muft be at leaft Xs fo many be to and Zs Xs the placed, together exceed the num by which All the other rules of inference are ber of places for them.
to prove that 10 Xs are not inftances of (be they Ys or ys, Zs, or part one and part the other) overfull (in the above fenfe) of Xs and zs, to the amount of 10 at leaft ; fo that 10 Xs are zs,
modifications of this.
For example,
we muft fhow fome number
or are not Zs.
To
prove that fome xs are ys,
number of
inftances in
which the
leaft
we muft fhow a numbers of xs and zs
that the chances are rather in favour of their refembling the ware of Peter Pindar s hero. In this work, a fpurious inference is that which paffes for
the confequence of certain premifes, but does not in reality follow from thofe premifes any more than from an infinity of others being true by the
:
conftitution of the univerfe.
when
until
in truth
we cannot know whether

firft
we have
premifes, thofe premifes be poffible or not, examined a conftitution which virtually contains our con
It
is
made
to have the
mark of thofe
clufion.
definite Sylloglfm.
155
greatefl
which
of
it
can contain,
overfill
it
it,
or in
which the
number
can contain underfill it, or do not fill it, though made completely feparate. In examining the fundamental laws of fyllogiftic inference, it
is
Xs and Zs which
For
not neceflary to confider any thing but the pofitive forms. wXiwY, when not fpurious (and we fhall fee that the
fpurious cafes
may be
or
:
reje&ed)
is
(z
>j)X:>jY,
which
is
(m + n
one
in
>?)Xy
(m + n
|)xY.
There
are,
then, but
two
fundamental cafes
confider
one in which the predicates are the fame, which they are contraries. fhall accordingly have to
We
m X Y + nZ Y
and
it
and
mX Y + wZy
will
is
prefently appear that not
abfolutely neceflary. collective inftances of or of
thefe,
In each cafe
y,
more than one, even of we muft afk, what or partly of one and partly of
:
the other, receive any dilation as to how they are to be filled with Xs, with xs, with Zs, or with zs and what is the leaft
number of each which can be allowed But there is yet fomething to do,
remarks.
to
every fuch collection.
have to
leaft
fuggefted by the preceding Let us take one proportion, a type of all we fhall This means that confider, fay mXY. is true to at
XY
inftances.
Now,
this propofition
xY, or xy. among the

If
all
Firft, as to
Xy.
To
may
involve
get the leaft
Xy, or number of Xs
the Ys.
ys,
we muft
will
put the greateft
the
Xs
number among
:
equal to |)
n
go among the Ys (or if there need be no Xs among the

|)
be
lefs
than
be greater than or but if not (or if ys

the ys, in every
then !
Xs muft
be
among
cafe.
Accordingly
m XY
where by
|
gives
(twhen
|
is
when
underftand o, not only
it is lefs.
This
refult
is
fpurious, fince
it is
equal to true or
>,,
but
by the mere conftitution of the univerfe, independently of

Secondly, as to
falfe,
xY.
Since
mXY
mX Y.
is
equally
mYX,
the fame
reafoning fhows that
mXY gives
where
jj
(u-|)xY
fame way.
is
to be underftood in the
This
refult is
alfo fpurious for a like reafon.
156
On
the numerically
Thirdly, as to xy. Since there muft be m Xs among the Ys, the greateft poflible number of xs is y m. If this be as great as v |, the whole number of xs, there need be no xs among
the ys
u
:
but
if
be
lefs
than
there muft then be at leaft

f
.
|(>j
m) xs
among
the ys, or u + m
Y[
Confequently
xy.
I here
put the fign

it
valents.
duced
Treat the fecond in the fame way from the firft, and we have
u
becaufe thefe proportions are really equi as that which de
(v-\-m
|)xy=(y + u + m
>j
|)XY
If y
+m
be not greater than

is
rj
+ |,
the equivalent does not exift.
We are already well acquainted with one cafe of this proportion. Let m = %: then mXY X)Y and the equivalent becomes
the whole number of ys, is y)x. two names have a certain number of inftances at leaft in common, to the whole number in the univerfe add that number of inftances, and fee if the fum exceed the whole number of inftances of both names together. If it do fo, the excefs fhows the leaft number of inftances which the contraries Follow this rule, of thefe two names muft have in common.
(u
The
)xy, which, rule is, if
as v
v is
and
we
have
n
|)xy
>j)Xy
mXy =(y + m |)xY mxy =(% + y + m y)XY

Here
are exhibited the
following refults
Firft, thefe
may
equivalent contranominal now be deduced.
forms.
The
contranominals being formed in the fame way, each from the other, in any one pair, whatever we prove of the fecond from the firft. firft from the fecond, we alfo prove of the
mathematician would call them conjugate pairs. Next, fmce with difference of all the four pairs are but verfions of the firft, firft of the we pair, we prove prove univerfally names, whatever and of firft the making it poflible, of all. any pair Now, taking number of either the exceed to not m done is which by allowing be fecond the names poflible or impofliof the may mentioned,
The
definite Syllogifm.
157
ble, according as the fubtraction indicated can be done or not. But whenever the fecond Is impojpble^ the Take fir/} is fpurious.
raXY, and let (u + m more u] lefs than f +
|
.
Now
+ TW
n)xy be impoflible, or as all the | Xs and
u
>j
+m
(and
ftill
Ys muft
find
place in the v inftances of the univerfe, and | exceeds y, we muft, in every cafe of the univerfe of propofitions, have at leaft
>j
(|
>j
v)XY.
But
I/
is lefs
than
confequently,
wXY
is
U Y\ % greater a fpurious, larger propofition
than | +
or
making prefence of the fymbols of all necefTary fubtra&ions will remind the reader of the fuppofitions which muft be to infure a
made,
legiti
being always true. As we are not to admit fpurious propofitions among our premifes, we had better write all premifes double, putting down each of the forms, and double forms of inference. The
mate
fyllogifm.
now
take the feveral forms.
m
(u
XY
|
>,)
+m
xy ^(u + n
Zv)
tells
ZY =
zy
The
law of inference here

>,,
greater than (m n u)XZ, be the upper premifes. The lower

if
(u
us (page 154,) that m n being it fpurious or not, follows from
premifes alfo give their inference
+m
|
>,)
+ (:,-{-__>,)
ys.
be greater than
laft is
.
being the
number of the
is
This
>?
Firft, remark that one fpurious premife necefTarily gives a fpurious conclufion. Say
ing that u
+m +n
equivalent to fay
greater than !
+ +
that u
fmce
that
+ m is lefs than + or that mXY is fpurious. Then, u + m is lefs than | + it follows u, and n does not exceed u + m + n is lefs than !+ + whence the contranominal
,
>!
of the conclufion does not

afTerted.
exift, or
the conclufion
is
fpurious, as
neither of the premifes be

l
Next, obferve that the conclufion may be fpurious, though fo. For though v + m be greater than + *, and u + n than + , and therefore zu + m + n than
^+2>j,
or
means follows
is
+ m + n + (uYi) greater than n4-l + ^ by that u + m + n alone is greater than + | +

it
*j .
greater
no
It
alfo vifible in
the
mode of formation of
j,
that to fay u
+m
the fecond inference,

,
exceeds | +
and
+ n exceeds +
only gives
158
the
On
:
the numerically
to give
exiftence to the premifes
them conclufion,
v
n,
the
two
ys.
excefles
muft
itfelf
exceed
the whole
fum of number
of
Thirdly,
we muft
is
which
a premife
not omit to examine the poffible cafe in partially fpurious. For example, there are 10
Xs
20
and 20
8XY
I
Ys in a univerfe of 25 inftances ; accordingly, 10 + 25, or 5, of the Xs muji be Ys. Let one of the premifes be this is not then all contingent, and capable of contra
:
diction
we
call this
:
trouble
only learn fomething about 3 out of the 8 Xs. And But it will give no propofition partially fpurious. for we muft deal with the premifes and their contra-
nominal equivalents before we can pronounce for a conclufion ; and of two proportions which are contranominal equivalents of each other, one muft be partially fpurious. To fhow this, obferve
that if
mXY
;
be not
partially fpurious,
j
it is
becaufe
(i/
->j)
v is
greater
v.
than| +
or 2u than | +
i/
or (v
|)
than
But
then the numbers of xs and ys together exceed the whole num ber of inftances in the univerfe ; whence fome xs muft be ys, or is the contranominal equivalent of partially fpurious.
wXY
Now,
to write
down
the various forms of inference.

:
There
are fixteen
ways of trying for an inference we may combine a Y, or xy, or xY, or Xy, with one in XZ, or xz, propofition in But thefe fixteen cafes really combine four and or xZ, or Xz.
four into only four
diftincl: cafes.
Thus
the one
we
have been
confidering, really contains the combinations of
XY
and
YZ,
XY and yz, xy and
and xy and yz. It is in our power to make either pair the principal pair, and to give the other pair as contranominals of the firft pair. Thus, we may write the cafe of inference we have been con
YZ,
fidering, as in the
firft
of the following
lift,
tained from the
firft,
by changing
into x, or
the others being ob into z, or both.
The
placed in the middle implies the coexiftence of the four propofitions and independent numeral letters are introduced
fign
:
be connected with the others by of them. equations, inftead of being exprefled in terms
as feen,
which
will prefently
m xy ~^Vyz
""
J>XZ
The
equations prefently given for
\p* xz
this cafe
apply with certain changes
to the other cafes.
definite Syllogifm.
159
:
+ nYZ} m Xyn yz, /

mXY
m xy
,
mxY
CpxZ
Xz
(/>
and x are made to change their former places in the equa tions, | and % muft change places.
Here
Yz)
f
-r
==
fpXz
xz
Here
muft
Z and z change places and in the equations.

f
as
mxY .nYz
m Xy+n yZf
r/>
j/XZ
Here and x, and alfo Z and change places ; as muft ! and and and in the equations.
<f,
z,
|
,
In the
new manner of writing
the form
fidered, being the firft
of the four,
we have already we have juft written
con-
for
p
f
/>
for
for
m+ n
y
rf for
Let us write | , , (\ and then, ys, and zs

>,
for w
|
|, v
f
>j,
^,
,
f
the
numbers of
all
xs,
+|
y
>,
>,
+
?
>,
each
is
u)
we may write
being
for |
| for |
the fame, (for and fo on. ,
is accented, we interchange the letters if we pleafe. The equations of con nection for the firft or ftandard cafe, are then
is,
That
in the difference
of two, one of which
may
or or
m + n + t?
write
For the fecond

and
fo
cafe
we muft
=w + |
^=772
+V
proceed to the feveral divifions into which our ufual modes of thinking make it convenient to feparate the cafes of this moft general form.
on.
now
160
On
the numerically
In this cafe, Firft, when every thing is numerically definite. as feen, every form requires an examination of the premifes and conclufion, as to whether they are or are not fpurious.
Secondly,
verfe of
when
is
u,
the
number of
inftances in the
f
whole uni-
names,
is
when
wholly unknown. In this cafe | is indefinite definite, and vice verfa ; and fimilarly one at leaft of
n
each two,
or
>/,
rious conclufions
known
to be fuch
There are then no fpu fame the or, thing, none which are for the fpurioufnefs of a premife or conclu
or
,
is
indefinite.
is
which
fion confifts in our
knowing that
are
all
it
muft be true of
its
two terms,
third.
u.
independently of
all
comparifon of thofe terms with a

>?,
In this , |, Thirdly, of no inference. can there is as here ftated, cafe, poffibility not tell whether m + n be or be not greater than , if we do not
indefinite, as well as
when
We
any manner, or to any extent. that degree of definitenefs by which we diftinguifh the univerfal from the particular (or pojjlble parti If we can know that either of cular, fee page 56) propofition.
u is, in
know what
But here we introduce
the two,
and
is
the fame as
>j
(greater neither can be) then
we know that m + n is greater than u. And at the fame time we make Y univerfal, in one or the other of the premifes. And the fame if we can know that either m* or w is y\ The following are the forms which may all be derived from
?
the firft, by ufing all the varieties of contrary names and contranominal equivalents. If we want, for inftance, to fhow the con nection of the fourteenth with the firft, we throw the firft into the form
then change x into X, and Z into z, changing and thus we get fame time | into | and into
We
at the
Now, for m + w and we have
write
m\
that
is,
for
write
+4
which
is
is
one of the forms of the fourteenth.

1
And
(n -\-m*
|)xz
of only the contranominal
(m
+n
)XZ.
definite Syllogifm.
161
J
4
<f)xz
mXY
2.
3.
m xy
mXY + n yz =
m xy mxY ai Xy
-Oxz
|)xz
4.
5.
6.
7-
8.
9-
11.
mXY
w xy
12.
13.
14.
mxY m Xy
w Xy
fyllogifms of chapter obtained as follows
15. TTZXY
1
6.
The
above
V
:
are
all
particular cafes
of the
lift,
3-
= =
4.
772
i6a
On
the numerically
have thus another mode of eftablifhing the completenefs that is, or the fyftem of fyllogifm, laid down in the laft chapter of the fyftem in which there is only the common univerfal and
:
We
Thefe fyllogifms of numerical quantity, in particular quantity. which conditions of inference belonging to every imaginable cafe are reprefented by the general forms which numerical fymbols muft of neceflity be the moft general of their take in
algebra,
kind.
And
examination makes
ing, there contraries.
can be no
clear that, except the preced between X, Y, Z, and their fyllogifm exifting
it
Many
fubordinate laws of connexion might be no

their particular cafes.
ticed
between the general forms and
Thus,
each univerfal occurs three times, each fundamental particular The firft form twice. twice, and each ftrengthened particular
in pages 158, 159, gives only affirmative, the fourth only negative, the fecond and third one of each kind, commencing with :
premifes
a negative in the fecond, and with an affirmative in the third. There are two remarkable fpecies of fyllogifm (or rather,
which ought
to
have been remarkable)
which
I (hall
now
pro
ceed to notice.
The
diftindion of larger and fmaller part,
when
divifion into
definite Syllogifm,
163
two
the
parts
is
made,
is
as
much
received into the
common
idiom
of language as the diftinction of whole and Moft of part itfelf. Xs are Ys, is nearly as common as All the Xs are Ys though feweft of the Xs are Ys, is only feen as moft of the
:
are not Ys/ The fyllogifms which can be made legitimate the ufe of this by language will do equally well for any fraction, provided we couple with it the fraction complemental to unity Let a and /3 (which in the cafe of one half is one half
itfelf).
Xs
ftand for
.
two
a
fractions
Let
XY and aX:Y
are or are not
which have unity

Ys.
for their
fum, as f and
indicate that lefs than the fraction
of the
that
Xs
Let
*XY
and
"X:Y
indicate
more than the

the
prefixed.
Then
numbers
i.
a of the Xs are or are not Ys. following fyllogifms arife from the cafes with the
fraction
YX
y:X
3
+<
9.
YX
y:X -f^yZ =Z:X Y X+?Y:Z=xz X + ?Z =XZ
:
4.
5.
"YtX+eYZ
8,
It will
= Z:X X + ?:Z =X:Z
y:Z =xz
12.
13.
1
6.
which the
be feen that here are but three really diftinct forms fimpleft examples are as follows,
are
of
Moft Ys Moft Ys Moft Ys

It
c
are
Xs Xs
Moft Ys Moft Ys
are
Zs
therefore fome
Xs
are Zs.
are not
z;
therefore fome
Xs
are
not Zs.
are not
Xs
things are neither

is
Moft Ys Zs nor Xs.

;
are not
Zs
therefore fome
hardly neceflary to obferve that in one of the premifes

:
more than may be reduced to as much as but not in both. Thus, if two-fevenths exactly of the Ys be Xs, and more than
Ys be Zs, it follows that fome Xs are Zs. The above fyllogifms admit a change of premife, as follows If we fay that more than ths of the Ys are Xs, we thereby fay that lefs than f ths of the Ys are xs or YX and ^Y X are the
five-fevenths of the
:
fame proportions. Thus, moft are

(none included) are not.
is
equivalent to
a minority
Hence we have
two forms,
and
fo on.
Or we may combine
the
as in
above are the only fyllogifms in which indefinite particu lars give conclufions, by reafon of that approach to definitenefs which confifts in defcribing what fractions of the middle term are
164 The
On
the numerically
But they are not the only fyllo fpoken of, at leaft, or at moft. In every cafe inference follows fame of the general fpecies. gifms when there is a certain preponderance ; and the largenefs of the
inference depends upon the extent of that preponderance. W + H exceeds in (12) there is an Xz inference when T/Z
Thus
fo
many
:
units as there are in this excefs, fo
are zs.
Now
and
ference
many Xs (at leaft) in every cafe, a pair of univerfal premifes give in in every cafe there muft be a degree of approach
which inference begins. The ordinary fyllo c Every and are meant to be, not fuch as
is
to univerfality at
gifms, I fufpedl:, are,
is
Y,
every
Z,
therefore every
c
fpeaking
is
Y, and
generally
X fpeaking Y
is
is
And by generally is Z. rally fpeaking the aflertion that an enormous majority of inftances make the of this fort is the oppofite of the a affertion true.
c Z, but generally therefore Z, gene fpeaking is meant
A
;
fyllogifm
fortiori fyllogifm
^p
and might be faid to be true ab infirmiori. If we have X)Y with p exceptions, and Y)Z with q exceptions ; m+n n q^ and then, in form (i.) we have m=l p^n of number the as As exceptions altogether then,
y)
q.
long,
of the number of Xs, there is inference if the total number of exceptions be very fmall, compared with the number c Ex inference. there is the of fpeaking kind of
fall fliort
:
generally Xs, amine all the univerfal cafes, and
it
will
be found that the fame
law prevails ; namely, that there is inference when the numbers amount of exceptional inftances in both premifes together do not the concluof term univerfal in the inftances of number the to
fion
;
and that there
is
exceptional univerfality (as
we may
call it)
is
in the conclufion,
whenever the whole amount of exception
with that very fmall, compared
number of inftances.
call
This leads us
to
what
particular fyllogifms.
We
the theory of exceptional have feen that the eight complex

will
all
affirmatory fyllogifms,
fions, afford
which are
each two particular fyllogifms. and the coexiftence of two proportions gives coexiftence by + more than either. Let us denote exceptive coexiftence by
;
:
a fortiori in their conclu have denoted
We
thus,
means
that the propofition
is
true except in the
definite Syllogifm.
inftances contained in
165
4
(with fome exceptions) only differs from L in the
O. Thus, X)Y X: Y means that every is Y. This is, of courfe, A O, and mode of expreffion not being fome
but
c
more than none

fion
at all
fome
lefs
than
all.
In the expref
(A,
0,)(Ar- 0.)(A
00
we have
fubjecT:
the fymbol of the ab Infirmlorl fyllogifm ftated above, to the poffibility of nonexiftence if the number of excep
tions in the
two premifes mould exceed the number of inftances

term of the conclufion.
If
in the univerfal
we
look at
Aid,
as
a fymbol defcriptive of premifes, we fee one of the inconclufive forms ; that is, a form from which we cannot draw an inference.
But
to
this is
aflertion
of
only becaufe our inferences are all pofitive, and imply in the premifes. There is no ufe (except fufficitncy
mow
the
manner
of
in
which the
:
in declarations
Infufficlency
for
parts of a fyftem hang together) we know that all collections

infufit
of premifes, whatever they may be fufficient for, will be ficient for an infinite number of different things. And
important to
muft
is
remember
that while fufficiency

be.
be, infufficiency
only allows may

:
clufion AI muft be true
cerned)
it
may be
falfe.
accompanied by the con from AOj (and as far as thefe are con Accordingly AidOj and OiAiOi may
is
From AiAi
ferve to exprefs the
Oi)(Ai O)(Ai ) ab Infirmlorl fyllogifm, and poflibly and AiO preventing conclufion altogether juft as AiO mow the additional conditions by the fulfilment of which AiAi AI is elevated into the a It is worth fortiori iyllogifm DiDiDi.
t
two
defects of (Ai
from AiAiAi, exifting
in the
while to dwell upon the varieties of this cafe. The ab Infirmlorl fyllogifms of the ftrengthened particulars were previoufly confidered.
In
all
the cafes yet treated,
we
have had, more or
lefs,
the
power of giving inftances in common language, without recourfe to numerical relation expreffed in unufual terms. This of courfe,
is
always the cafe in the fyllogifms of chapter V. ; and we have given one common Injlance (though never met with in books of logic) from each fet of ab Infirmlorl fyllogifms. But there are
ftill
cafes of the
fame
fort to
be confidered.
Though
in
our de
at
finite relation
(page 56) of
all,
we
ufually (in
books of logic
66
make
On
the numerically
leaft)
the relation exift, for each propofition, between the
terms of the propofition itfelf, yet it may be afked whether we cannot fometimes infer fuch a fpecies of univerfal as this, for Z being one of the names which is ; every Z there is an
of the fecond premife. If we examine the firft two cafes, which will be guide enough, we mail find the following refults from the
new
1.
fuppofitions
now
made.
m = ^n=^
gives
is
XY + YZ =
Y, and
>/xz
or
a
if for
there be an
which is Y, are neither which fo as there fo are, then, many things many ys X nor Z. This fyllogifm has little new meaning, and no new it application requires =, and therefore X)Y and Z)Y.
which
for every
every
2.
;?Z
=, gives
is
that
as
which
xy-f-w nor neither
YZ = wxz,
Y, and
or
if for
every
there be
if
many
2.
inftances
which
are neither
fome Ys be Zs, there are nor Z. This is a new and
effective form.
gives 77zVy4-J
if
YZ=w XZ, a new form.

m +
,
Thefe two
obferve that
cafes will be prefently further confidered. Now, n in the fecond, n in the firft form, or
m+
be
f
we no new fyllogifm
or and form gives , fince v is more than u, Ys which are Xs, and Ys which are Zs, to the number of i/, give the form (i.) by the main law of inference (page 154). In the fecond form, if m + n U) we diftribute among the Ys and ys, Zs and xs to the full number of both, fo that wherever there are not xs (that is, wherever there are Xs) there are Zs or X)Z as obtained from the form.
i/,
that is, if
and the pair m and n be have inference of the kind required.

:
or n and
>/,
The
firft
But everyway of conftructing m\y + YZ = (w + ;z | )XZ which gives rr? + n-=u^ is only a cafe of AîAi. For m can not
f
1
exceed y\ and n cannot exceed u and w + n being v or we muft have n? =n and u y ; whence the afTertion made.
!
:
>j
+1
con
The
forms
we
are
now
in fearch of, fo far as quite

;
new,
are
all
tained in the
is
two new ones above noted

firft.
and of
in
thefe, the fecond
but a transformation of the

ufe of contraries, or
The
eight varieties derived
from
from the forms
page 161, beginning
with the fimpleft, are
definite Syllogifm .
167
=Z:|X
Thefe are
fyllogifms,
which
nifm to the particular fyllogifms. Take the fyllogifm terms being M,Y,Z ; we have then + Z:
courfe the conclufion
exhibit a curious kind of antagoAiO 1 , the
alone
but
if
not legitimate from thefe premifes Z is have as many inftances as Z, then

:
M)Y
O Y = Z:M. Of
is
For if Ms, as many as there are Zs, be among the legitimate. Ys, and fome of the Zs be not among the Ys, though all the reft were, there would not be enough to match all the Ms, or fome Ms are not Zs. Now, let be a name given to an X which is Y, and let fuch Xs have as many inftances as Z, and the above becomes the firft of the fyllogifms in the laft lift. Thus, LO Oi is legitimate, if the quantity of the fubjecl: men
tioned in
Ii
be taken from the Zs.
The
fecond fyllogifm
is
EiLO
altered into
OJiOi
in the
fame manner.
the refults of the above cafe in the
The
reader
may
find
all
following rule, in which it is underftood that all the fuper-propofitions are to be written either is written x)y, way thus, T or Y)X, and is or wY: |X (page 62). Write down 7zx:>?y,
:
any pair of particulars, followed by I if the pair be of the fame if the pair be of different as in OOI or IOO. fign, and figns
pair in contradiction to either the direct rule (page far as as the words affirmative and negative are concerned : 62)
is, let a negative beginning ifolate nothing, and an affir mative beginning ifolate the middle propofition or elfe, ac cent the pair according to the inverfe rule. Thus, OiOJi
Accent the
that
and
O OT
contradift the direcl rule, and
OOL
and
OiOJ
preferve the inverfe rule.

in queftion)
To make
thefe fyllogifms
:
good
(in the
When the dlrett rule particular way proceed thus term is contradicted, take the of the quantity firft concluding from the total of thefecond^ if the fecond premife be affirmative,
and from
the inverfe rule is its contrary, if negative. preferved, take the quantity of the fecond from the total of the firft. the direft rule is contradicted Thus, in
When
O OT
1
and
it
ftands
m x:Jy + n y:Z z,=p xz,.

1 1
l
negative, the total of

trary
.
its
predicate
fecond premife is inftances, that of the con

f
The
l
Accordingly,
x:n y
y:
z=
xz,
or
Y:|X-f
168
w
On
is
the numerically
one of the forms already obtained. Again, f and is f/z x:v) y + Z:^Y
T
Z :Y = w xz, which O O L preferves the

The
total
inverfe rule,
firft
pXZ.
is
of the
term
is
inftances.
Hence,
derived from one of the forms given, by interchanging
and Z.
This clafs of fyllogifms with tranfpofed quantity naturally leads fuch fyllogifms occur in ordi to the queftion, Is it ufed ? If not, there is no reafon for fele&ing nary or in literary life ?
Do
them from
the infinite
number of
cafes
cally definite fyftem affords.
To
try this,
which the numeri fuppofe a perfon, on
reviewing his purchafes for the day, finds, by his countercheques, that he has certainly drawn as many cheques on his banker (and
may be more)
paid fome of
as
he has made purchafes.

in
But he knows
that he
his
cheques.
elfe
He
purchafes money, or otherwife than by infers then that he has drawn cheques for fome-
except that day s purchafes. He infers rightly enough ; thing but his inference cannot be reduced to a common fyllogifm, with
the
names
in queftion for terms.

:
It
is
really
a fyllogifm of tranf
pofed quantity, as follows
For every
is
memorandum of a purchafe a countercheque tranfa&ion involving the drawing of a cheque. Some purchafes are not c tranfaclions involving, &c.
Therefore fome countercheques are not memoranda of pur

chafes.
It
may be worth
while to give one inftance of the verification
of the contradictory form. is tradiction of (|
By
page 152
1
it
appears that the con

that
wXY
!
of
Xy To wXY
TTz
is
(!-w +
z+i)Xy, or (vj m + i)xY, and i)XY, or (vf-m + i)xy.

(m + n
t^)XZ, or
(1
join the contrary of
+^
+i)Xz: we
have then
^
n+
m
i)zX;
the inference of which

(^
is
(m + Z + y
n+ I
|)Yz, that
is,
the contrary of wYZ. obferved that we Returning to the forms in page 161, it will be made ufe of have In cafe we inferences. have no double every
+ i)Yz,
one form of inference

valent
;
or
elfe
it
is
be known, the other is a real equi then the impoffible, and as we have feen,
:
if u
definite Syllogifm.
firft is
169
be not known, then the fecond is either fpurious. or elfe identical with the one chofen. Ex perfectly indefinite, amination will fhow that in every one of the cafes cited in page
If
v
161, the neglected form of inference

indefinitenefs
is
only faved from perfect
when we are able to apply the word all to one or other of the terms the number being as indefinite as before the rela tion thus obtained being definite. Take the firft form, and make = by the firft inference we then get the fyllogifm LAJi by the fecond, we get (m + v indefinite both in number f ) xz and relation. We do not know what y, |, and are. If we knew as much as that m + u is lefs than ! + , we fhould know
: ;
v)
>
our inference to be fpurious,* Now, add the condition m f

definite relation
it
:
being not the

the
firft
lefs
an inference.
fyl
:
inference gives the

(u
logifm AiAiAi, the fecond inference

enters,
and
now becomes we have z)x, or X)Z,
)xz
or AI, as
before.
And
reader
this
the fame of the other forms.
perhaps fuppofe that I ought to have com chapter with the complex numerical fyllogifm, in imitation of the method which I followed in treating the ordinary
The
may
menced
But in truth there is no fyftem of complex fyllogifm fyllogifm. of per feel: numerical definitenefs both in premifes and conclusion. To fhow this, let w,XY with the comma, mean that there are
exactly
ingly
m Xs which are Ys, neither more nor fewer. Accord w,XY is a fynonyme for ;/zXY + (^ m)xY. Now com
,ZY,
or
bine
#z,XY and
We
then have
(r,
mXY + nZY
#z)xY-f(>i
= = #)zY
(r;
(n
OTXY + (n )zY=(z w)xY + ZY =(n
)Xz
* I muft again remind the reader, of the diftinftion between fpurious and The fpurious inference follows illegitimate, which exifts in my language.
from the premifes, and is perfe&ly good and true but from the conftitution of the univerfe, it will always be true, whatever premifes in that univerfe are The illegitimate inference is that which does not follow from the taken.
:
conclufion not known to be fpurious, that is, there not being premifes. the means of knowledge, is not fpurious but an illegitimate conclufion can
:
not be
made
legitimate, that
is,
following from the premifes, by any further
knowledge.
170
On
the numerically definite Syllogifm.

:
Two
ones.
to
We
lefs
2mis lefs
have meaning let them be the two upper only of thefe or z to (m + n ), or y) + (m can affign then for here Xs the But there are not all of of the Xs. v\ than lefs is + 1, or ^ and than f whence 2m than
vj,
of the Xs, | + ij for aught thefe premifes declare, be either may,
2m -vi
than
|.
The
reft
2i in number, Zs or zs.
CHAPTER
On
IX.
Probability.
THE
we do
moft
is
difficult
himfelf
to find
which any one can propofe to out what any thing is : in all probability
inquiry
are talking about when we afk fuch a of the middle ages were much con queftion. The philofophers cerned with the is, or effence, of things : they argued to their own if they could only find out what a minds, with great juftice, that
not
know what we
thing
is,
out they mould find
all
about
it
they tried, and
failed.
Their
the propofition
that
warning by and have fatisfied themfelves that the only way about it ; of finding what a thing is, lies in finding what we can of the know can we all are connexion and modes of relation
fucceflbrs, taking
;
their
example, have inverted
tell me effence of any thing ; in fhort, that the proverb what tell I will are with, and you are, applies as you
who you much to
are apt the nature of things as to the characters of men. of than of effence the of more know we objects that to think than ideas ; or rather, of ideas which have an objeftive fource, of thofe which are the confequence of the mind s adion upon
We
them.
when we
tions,
we
The
object
doubt whether the reverfe be not the cafe at any rate, content ourfelves with inquiry into properties and rela have certain knowledge upon our moft abftract ideas. is the confideration of the degrees of of this
:
chapter
knowledge are well affured nothing could perfuade us to tain, of which we and is the exiftence of our own minds, thoughts, the
contrary, perceptions, the
itfelf.
That which we know, of which we
are cer
two
knowledge,
this
This higheft a&ually prefent. no of admits abfolute certainty, imagination of

laft
when
the poflibility of falfehood.
We cannot,
by flopping
to confider,
On
make
ourfelves
Probability.
171
we exift, we can not but fay at laft we are as certain of them as of our own exiftence but of which, neverthelefs, we are obliged to fay that we arrive at them by procefs, by reflection. Thefe we call neceffary truths (page 33). The neceffity of admitting thefe things caufes
more
fure than
we
are already, that
think, fee,
&c. Next
to this,
come
the things of which
fome
to imagine that they are merely identities, that they

:
amount
to faying that when a but this is not correct. thing is, it is that two and two make four fay (which muft be), and that a certain man wears a black coat (when he does both involve
fo)
To
the pure identity that whatever the other. Nor is two and two
farily
fo.
is, is
and not one more than
identically four,
arife in
though necef-
Our
definitions
of number
the procefs of fim-
throw
three^
Throw a pebble into a bafket, and ple counting. in another, and we fay two ; yet one more,
and
fo on.
we
and
fay one
we
fay
The
full definitions
of the fuccefiive numbers
are feen in
That
three and one are four
is
definition
it
is is
our pleafure to
2
give the
name four
to
3+1.
But
It
is
that
3+1
is
neither
definition nor pure identity. two is four; that
not even true that
two and
two and two is four, in amount, true, no doubt, that &c. but in not value, form, conftruction, definition, &c. There is no further ufe in drawing diftinction between the knowledge which we have of our own exiftence, and that of two and two amounting to four. This abfolute and inaflailable feel
It
is
ing
we
fhall call certainty.
We have lower grades of knowledge,

of belief^ but they are
really degrees
which we
ufually call degrees
of knowledge.
A
did
make
fit
four
man knows at this moment that two and two he know it yefterday ? He feels perfectly certain
:
that he
it But he may have been feized with a yefterday. and yefterday, which kept him in unconfcioufnefs all day thofe about him may have been warned by the medical man not
knew
to give
him
the leaft hint of
what has taken

it
place.
He
fo
:
could
if
fwear, as oaths are ufually underftood, that
was not
he
172
could not fwear to
neceflary truths.
this,
On
Probability.
to anything except aflertion that it
it
no man could fwear
But he could not regard the

:
was not
fo, as
it
incapable of contradiction
he knows
well, but,
as long as
may he might know it better. It may feem a ftrange thing

in the
he cannot but fay that poflibly be contradicted,

to treat knowledge as a magnitude,
fame manner as length, or weight, or furface. This is what all writers do who treat of probability, and what all their readers have done, long before they ever faw a book on the fubject
But
it is
now By
not cuftomary to make the ftatement fo openly as I do and I confider that fome juftification of it is neceflary.
:
degree of probability
belief.
we
really
mean, or ought
if
to
mean,
order
It
degree of
It
is
true that
we may,
we
like, divide pro

fo, in
bability into ideal
and objective, and that
we muft do
It
We mean that than often more rain does foon follow much not, and that there this at of do exift the means knowledge. The thing is fo, arriving It is not remembered, be known. can and every one will fay,
ftate of the mind, a perhaps, that there is an ideal probability , pure been the that aflertion involved in this things which have namely, That be. to are which the of are correct reprefentatives things
:
language. It is is much more likely than not, whether you know rain will foon follow the fall of the barometer.
to reprefent
common
perfectly correct to fay
or not^ that
up
to this 2
1 ft
of June, 1847, tne above ftatement has been true,

:
ever fmce the barometer was ufed as a weather-glafs, is not de that the connexion of nied by any who have examined it natural phenomena will, for fome time to come, be what it has all have ftrong reabeen, cannot be fettled by examination we
:
fon to believe
from
objective.
our knowledge is ideal^ as diftinguifhed it, but And it will be found that, frame what circum-
cannot invent a cafe of purely objective pro white balls and ten black ones into an urn, ten put bability. and lock the door of the room. I may feel well aflured that,
ftances
I
we may, we
when
in
unlock the room again, and draw a ball, I am juftified If all it is an even chance that it will be a white one. faying
I
the metaphysicians who ever wrote on probability were to witnefs the trial, they would, each in his own fenfe and manner, hold me But how many things there are to be aflertion. in
right
my
taken for granted
Do my
eyes
ftill
as bediftinguifh colours
On
fore
?
Probability.
173
Has perfons never do, and eyes alter with age. the black paint melted, and blackened the white balls ? Has any one elfe pofTefTed a key of the room, or got in at the window,
and changed the
are
it
Some
balls
commonly may turn out (and
ufed, that
I
may be very fure^ as thofe words none of thefe things have happened, and have no doubt will do fo, if the reader try
But
for
all
We
the circumftances) that the ten white and ten black balls will be
found, as diftinguifhable as ever, and unchanged.

that, there
refult,
is
much
is
to be
fo
which
not
afTumed in reckoning upon fuch a objective (in the fenfe in which I have
ufed the word) as the knowledge of what the balls were when have to aflume all that is rethey were put into the urn.
We
quifite to
make our experience of
the paft the
means of judging
the future.
Having made this illuftration to draw a diftinction, I now preI throw away objective probability altogether, and confider the word as meaning the ftate of the mind with refpeft to an aflertion, a coming event, or any other matter on which abc It is more probable than im folute knowledge does not exift. probable means in this chapter I believe that it will happen more than I believe that it will not happen. Or rather c I ought for it may happen that the ftate of mind which to believe, &c. D Alembert be /j, is not the ftate of mind which fhould be. lieved that it was two to one that the firft head which the throw of a halfpenny was to give would occur before the third throw a jufter view of the mode of applying the theory would have But he believed it, and thought taught him it was three to one. he could (how reafon for his belief: to him the probability was two to one. But I (hall fay, for all that, that the probability is three to one meaning, that in the univerfal opinion of thofe who examine the fubjecl:, the ftate of mind to which a perfon ought
mife that
5
: :
to be able to bring himfelf is to look three times as confidently upon the arrival as upon the non-arrival.
Probability then, refers to and implies belief,

belief
is
more or
it
lefs,
and
be,
but another
name
for imperfect
knowledge, or
may
There is exprefles the mind in a ftate of imperfect knowledge. accurate meaning in the phrafe c to the beft of his knowledge and
firft word applying to the ftate of his circumftances with refpect to external objects, the fecond to the ftate of his
j the belief
1/4
mind with
On
Probability.
refpect to the circumftances.

:
any ufe of the diftinction here what we believe ; nor can we
we know,
except in
But we cannot make what we know is to regulate make any effective ufe of what and obtaining defcribing what we believe, or
:
ought According to common idiom, belief is often a lower degree of knowledge but it is imperative upon us to drop all the quantitative diftinctions of common life, or rather to remodel them, when we come to the construction of a
to believe.
fcience of quantity. I have faid that we treat

I will
now
it
(fuppofe
knowledge and belief as magnitudes know, put a broad illuftration of what I mean. known] that an urn contains nothing but two balls,
:
We
:
one white and one black, undiftinguimable by feeling and we know (fuppofe this alfo) that a ball is to be drawn. Disjunctively then we know white will be drawn black will be drawn, one
:
or the other muft be.
How
do
we
ftand as to
white will be
black will be drawn, feparately ? Clearly in no preponderance with refpect to either. May we then properly and reafonably fay that we divide our knowledge and belief of
drawn, and
the event
to
one or the other into two halves, and give one half can conceive much objection to this fuppofition whether but, they formally make it or not, I am fure writers on act upon it, and are accepted by their readers. probability Let us confider what magnitude is, that is to fay, how we
each.
I
:
know we are talking ever we can attach a
about a magnitude.
diftinct
We
know
that
when
conception of more and lefs to dif ferent inftances, fo as to fay this has more than that, we are fpeak of a quantity of talking of comparable magnitudes.
We
of prudence we fay one man has more talent than another, and one man more prudence than another but we never fay that one man has more talent than another has prudence. If
talent, or
: :
we
prudence,
occafionally fay he (the fame one man) has more talent than it is only as an abbreviation we mean that he has not
:
prudence enough to guide his talent. Juft as we might fay (though we do not) that there is more cart than horfe, when the horfe
cannot draw the cart juft as, fpeaking very loofely, we do fay, the prejfure of the atmofphere is not fifty Inches ; meaning that it is not enough to balance the prefTure of fifty inches of mercury
:
in the barometer.
And
thus, both
up
to,
and beyond our means
On
of meafurement,
Probability.
to ourfelves diftinct notions of
175
com
we form
parable magnitudes, and incomparable magnitudes, as well as of the meaning of the fomewhat incorrect, but amended,
eafily
figures
latter.
of fpeech by which
we
fometimes talk of comparing the
all quantitative fcience is not merely magni but the And when are we en tude, meafurement of magnitude. titled to As foon as we fay that we can meafure magnitude ?
But the object of
the greater, to take off a part equal to the lefs a procefs which neceflarily involves the teft of which is the greater, and which is the lefs, and, in certain cafes, as it may
:
know how, from
As to fome happen, of neither being the greater nor the lefs. the clear idea of meafurement comes foon in the magnitudes, cafe of length, for example. But let us take a more difficult
:
one, and trace the fteps by which

fay weight.
What
weight
is,
we acquire and we need not know
fix
the idea
the
Newto
the
nian,
who makes it depend on the earth s attraction, and Ariftotelian, who referred it to an impulfe which all bodies
fefs
pofto feek their natural places, are quite at one on their notions of the meafurable magnitude which their feveral philofophies difcufs. know it as a magnitude before we it a name
We
give
any child can difcover the more that there is that there is in a cork of twice its fize. lefs
in a bullet,
and the
Had
it
not been for
the fimple contrivance of the balance, which we are well aflured (how, it matters not here) enables us to poife equal weights againft one another, that is, to detect equality and
inequality,
times the greater contains the we not to this have had much clearer ideas on the lefs, might day of as a than we have on thofe of fubject weight, magnitude, or looked in at the fame light. All talent, prudence, felf-denial,
and thence to afcertain
how many
who
their notions
little of geometers will remember the time when of an angle, as a magnitude, were as vague as, per haps more fo than, thofe of a moral quality and they will alfo
are ever fo
remember the
and precifion.
fteps
by which
this
vaguenefs became clearnefs
Now a very little

we
called
confideration will
mow
s
us that, the
begin to talk of our belief (the mind ledge) of propofitions fet before us, we
meafure of our
moment know
recognize the relations
more and
lefs.
Does the
child feel that the bullet has
176
man
On
Probability.
bit better
more fomething than the cork one
than an educated
is
feels that his belief in the ftory
of the death of Caefar
more than his belief in that of the death of Remus. Let any one try whether he have not in his mind the means of arranging the following fet in order of magnitude of belief, including within
that
term all the range which comes between certain knowledge of the falfehood, and certain knowledge of the truth, of an afferLet them be I. Caefar invaded Britain with the fole view tion.
2.
of benefiting the natives.
Two and
two make
five.
3.
Two
and two make

founded Rome.
neceffary truth,
four.
5. Romulus 4. Caefar invaded Britain. He will probably difcover the gradations of reafonable prefumption, utter moral
neceflary incredibility, to different ftates of the mind

pofitions
afferted
;
and
certainty, falfehood.
and
fay they
Thefe are but names given with refpect to knowledge of proof exprefs different ftates
it
quantity.
The
only difficulty, and a ferious one
can be made,
may be
Are we to confider the fort ftated in the following queftion ; of belief which we have of a neceffary propofition (as two and two make four), that is, abfolute knowledge, to which contra as only a ftrengthened or augmented diction is glaring abfurdity
fpecimen of the
of knowledge which we have of any con as Caefar invaded Britain) which may tingent propofition (fuch have been, or might have been, falfe, and can be contradicted without abfurdity ? I anfwer, we can eafily (how that the dif ference of the two cafes is connected with the difference be
fort
tween
and
finite
and
infinite,
not between two magnitudes of dif

eafily
difficulties
ferent kinds.
will
The
mathematician will
look upon the various
apprehend this, which furround even
upon things to which he is well accuftomed, can underftands he and which by many parallel inftances. mall a under which circumftances invent contingent propofition make any degree of approach to neceffity which we pleafe, but If an urn con fo that no actual attainment mail be arrived at.
the explanation as
We
tain balls,
all
and
it
if
one
ball
muft be drawn, then, the
balls being
muft be drawn, as white, neceffary that a white ball in any place, there are four and two that as two being neceffary But let it for there are no degrees of neceffity. in that place
is
:
be that there are black
balls alfo, at the rate
of one to a thoufand
On
white ones
but there
will be
:
Probability.
177
is
ftill
the drawing of a white ball is no longer neceflary ; a ftrong degree of aflurance that a white ball
do not readily fee how much becaufe the But our ufual cafes of judgment. let it be made to reprefent the life of a youth of twenty and let the drawing of a white ball reprefent his living to come of age,
drawn.
:
We
urn has no
vifible relation to
and of a black one
his death in the interval.
feven black balls to the

parallel.
There ought to be thoufand white ones to make the cafes

that our aflurance of his furvival
is
it
And
it.
:
yet
we know
:
generally very ftrong
be
we
lion
acl:
upon
;
Now
wife aflurance or not, it exifts, and fuppofe the rate to be one black to a mil
is
of white
the aflurance
much
increafed, but
ftill
there
is
no
neceflity
the black ball
may
be drawn.
Take one
black to
a million of million of white, or a million of million of million, &c. long before we have arrived at fuch a point, we have loft all conception of the quantitative difference between our belief in
:
drawing a white
ball,
and our belief that two and two are four.
We
fay
:
it
is
ball
and
this
almofl impojfftble that one trial mould give a black very phrafe is a recognition of the famenefs for
I am Except on the fuppofition of fuch contending. Be famenefs, there is no almofl impojjtble^ nor nearly certain. tween the impoflible and the poflible, the certain and the not
which
muft be every imaginable difference, if we do not admit unlimited approach. For it will clearly not be contended that, reprefenting certainty, fay by 100, we can make an ap
certain, there
it by an uncertainty counting as, fay 90, but nothing Reprefenting the ftate of abfolute knowledge by 100, any one, with a little confideration, will fay that the laws of thought fix no numerical limit to our approach towards this ftate but
proach to
higher.
certainty are capable of being brought within of nearnefs to certainty. fuch confiderations, I any degree mail aflume that neceflity on the one hand, a certainty for, and
that things
mort of
On
impoflibility on the other, a certainty againft, are extreme limits, which being reprefented by quantities, may allow our knowledge of all contingent propofitions to be reprefented by intermediate
quantities.
It
muft be
in the
infifted on, that fully allowed, nay, imperatively
nothing
numerical view, tending to connect neceflary and

all
contingent propofitions, can at
leflen the diftinction
between
178
:
On
Probability.
them nor give the latter any refemblance to the former, except Though only in the quantities by which they are indicated. there be only one black ball to as many white ones as would fill the vifible univerfe, yet between that cafe and the one of no
black balls muft always exift the eflential difference, that in the former a black ball may be drawn, and in the latter it cannot.
But this very great diftinction between the necefTarily certain and the contingent, is it compatible with their being reprefented I ? by numerical quantities as near to one another as we pleafe anfwer that all who are acquainted with the relations of quantity are aware that nearnefs of value is no bar to any amount of dif
ference of properties.
A common
fraction, for inftance,
may
be made as near as
we
pleafe in value to
an integer
but there
do not
exift,
than thofe ftriking, differences, of integers and of fractions.
even among propofitions, more eflential, or more which exift between the properties There are crowds of theorems (I
fhould rather fay unlimited crowds of clafles of theorems) which

are always true when integers are ufed, and never true when Let any quantities be named, integer or frac fractions are ufed.
tional,
make clafles of theorems which are true not for any others, however near to them. and for thofe quantities, The reader who is not a mathematician muft rely upon the know
and
it is
eafy to
ledge of the one tities, no matter
who is, that the difference between two quan how nearly equal, may be connected with other
differences as complete, and
by practice as eafily recognized, as the difference between neceflary and contingent truth. I will take it then that all the grades of knowledge, from
impoflibility to
knowledge of
knowledge of
neceffity, are capable
of being quantitatively conceived. The next queftion is, are thefe quantities capable, in any cafe^ of meafurement, or of comAt prefent, we ftand as the child parifon with one another. ftands with refpect to the bullet and the cork perceptive of
:
more and
rifons.
let
lefs,
To
but without a balance by which to make compamow the poftulate on which our balance depends,
us fuppofe an urn, which, to our knowledge, contains white, black, red, green, and blue balls, one of each colour. It is within
our knowledge that a ball muft be drawn accordingly we have c no full knowledge (and of courfe entire belief] that the refult
:
balP
is
impoflible, and that
white, or black, or red, or green, or
On
blue
is
Probability.
c
179
drawn, may hold him ram, but we do not communication incredible let another tell us that c black, or red, or green, or blue will be drawn, and we hold him not fo rafh, and his communication more credible.
neceffary. probability, that is, a certain that white will be we

his
To
the refult
we accord a certain amount of belief. If a man tell us

white
:
pronounce
We
may
hold with either,

partial,
he will defcribe his knowledge and belief as and give them their proper amounts. Now, whether we
if
mall proceed, or flop fhort at this point, depends upon our ac ceptance or non-acceptance of the following POSTULATE When any number of events are poffible, fo that
:
disjunctively
one of them may happen, but not more than one, the meafure of our belief that one out of any fome of them will happen, ought to be the amount of the meafures of our feparate beliefs in each one of thofe fome.
I mean that any one mould fay, A, B, C, being things of which not more than one can happen, c my belief that one of the three will happen is the fum of my feparate beliefs in A, and in This is the poftulate on which the balance de B, and in C.
is a fimilar poftulate before we can ufe the balance. The difference phyfical only (and that but apparent) is that we are to of fpeak weights collectively, and of events dif-
pends
and there
junclively.
The weight of the (conjunftive) mafs is the fum of the of its weights parts the credibility of the (disjunctive) event is the fum of the credibilities of its components. There are feveral may-bes, any one of which may become a has-been : when we fpeak dlsjunftwelj) it is of the will-be, which cannot be faid of more than one the may-be of an event defcribed as contained in
: :
talking of phyfical weight, the weight of the whole is to the fum of the weights of the equal have learnt to admit this parts ? of which no
A, B, C, is to be reprefented as in in A, in B/ and in C. Is it matter of mere necefiity that,

< <
quantity the
fum of
thofe
We
poftulate,
but no one can fay that it was neceffary. laws of matter and mind both what they are, the con being nexion between phyfical colleftion and mental fummation is, I grant, neceffary : the fimpleft of manual, and the of
:
man The
ever doubted
fimpleft
mental, operations, are and, with us, muft be, concomitants. But, in the firft place, it is not true that the weight of the
So
On
Probability.
whole is equal to the fum of the weights of the parts, in the manner in which the reader probably imagines it to be true. Let the firft part we hang on the balance be the weight which is Then if we hang under it another meafured by W.
correctly
we think we are quite fure weight, as correctly reprefented by V, have a weight muft + mafs collective the that when we
fay
becaufe
its
parts have the weights
W and V.
V
But
not the weights
its
parts have and V. The
weight of
W+M
way
fal
diminimed by the of W, and is, attraction upward is the V weight of fay 5 as much increafed by the down ward attraction of V, and is and + M. And though V
is
W W
equality
added together do give + W, yet it was not in this The univerthat the reader made out his neceflary truth. of action and reaction did not exift in the thoughts of
:
the
firft perfon who formed a diftinct conception of the weight of the whole as compofed of the fum of that of the parts and he far as he was concerned) accidental was right by the (fo
only circumftance, that two things of which he Nor do terbalanced each other s effects.
as
knew
nothing, coun
at this
we know
mo
have of neceffity, that the propofition is correct. ment, much reafon to think that the law of equality of action and reac tion is mathematically true but, let it fail to the amount of only in a thoufand million of tons, and the propofition is one
:
We
grain
not true, but only nearly true. of thofe laws of mind and matter Again, the co-exiftence fit each other, and which make the phe fo to which
beft,
fpeak, external world, after due confideration, appear to be almoft what they muft have been, is not, to our apprehenfions,
nomena of the
a neceflary coexiftence. though we cannot trace
We
what the
can imagine the following refult, full confequences of it would
Conceive fentient be on the expreflion of the laws of thought. the fimpleft mode of arithmetical fucceffion is beings, to whom &c. but i, 10, 100, 1000, &c. their powers of not
o, i, 2, 3,
numeration being
fions
fo
constructed that the fecond of thefe fuccef-
has that character of fundamental fimplicity which we Of courfe, their primary fymbols would be attach to the firft.
On
fignificative
Probability.
&c.
It
of
I,
10, 100,
would be impoflible
any other
for us to
conceive any
third
mode by which
:
ten or
thus fundamentally attached to unity, in a
number could be manner fhared by no
number
but, I
am
not faying,
be, but,
Imagine that
it is.
There
Imagine how this could is no contradiction in the
itfelf, or, till we know much more of the mind than we now do, to anything elfe. Beings fo conftituted would have logarithmic brains and if, thus conftituted, they were placed among our material laws of exiftence, the manner in which the weight of the whole is to be inferred from thofe of the parts, would be a profound myftery for ages, only to be folved
fuppofition, either to
in
an advanced ftage of mathematical fcience.
recent
mode
of conftructing mathematical tables, which generally carries with it the name of its eminent inventor, Gaufs, would conftitute
one of
their principal neceffities
their only
mode
(except
a6r.ua!
they would have to ufe it as experiment) of finding out that

:
what we reprefent by 156 and 200, together make (and making would be a complicated procefs) 356.
thi-s
Inftead, then, of trying to eftablifh it as perfectly natural and * or B, when neceflary to fay that our belief of one of the two
both cannot happen, is, quantitatively fpeaking, the fum of our belief in A, and our belief in B, I have rather endeavoured to
fhow
that the analogous cafes with which we firft think of com paring this propofition, other kinds of compofition, are not fo natural and neceflary as is fuppofed. There are two ways of levelling ; by bringing up the lower, or bringing down the higher.
And
I particularly wifh in this chapter to prevent the reader from accepting the arithmetical doctrine of probability quite fo In furtherance of this object, I pro rapidly as is ufiially done.
ceed to the following poflible objection. It may be faid, you have, by thus formally identifying proba with belief, and ftating a poftulate which, in exprefs terms, bility has not the moft axiomatic degree of evidence, rendered fome-
what
is
difficult that
very eafy.
which in the ordinary view of fimple chances, This charge, I hope, is true fuch was my inten
:
tion, at leaft.
And my
the fubject, one of two is feparated by definition from ftate of belief, it be known that though the two words will afterwards be confounded without any per:
is, that in the ordinary occurs either probability things
reafon
view of
82
;
On
or
elfe
Probability
is
miffion
the poftulate
tacitly
affumed, and the difficulty
which
Take
five
is flurred over. fuppofe myfelf charged with introducing, balls and white two has An urn a common queftion ;
two equally likely drawings, a white of or white ; therefore the chance drawing probability But the chance of either particular ball is called two-fevenths.
black ones
:
there are feven
white
ball
is
is
one-feventh.
Now
firft,
if
any one mould

:
fay
that this
mere definition, I can, of courfe, allow it but it then remains to fhow what connexion this defined probability has with But if, probability mean any ordinary acceptation of the word.
of probability actually exifting in the ing belief, or fentiment &c. the the index of or proper degree of belief, &c. mind, above ftatement be made as fundamentally evident, I mould then of one or the other afk how it is known that the
probability
white
being drawn is properly fet white balls. probabilities of the feparate

ball
down
as the
I
fum of
the
And
cannot conceive
of the poftulate. any anfwer except that it is by an afTumption That fuch aflumption will finally be knowingly made, on the fulleft conviction, by every one who ftudies the theory, I have
no doubt whatever nor that it has been made, no matter in what words, nor with what clearnefs of avowal, by every one
:
who
And therefore I hold it defirable has ftudied that theory. what I have here told him. know that the beginner mould nu far as the It is indifferent, as theory is concerned, what
merical fcale of belief
we
take.
fet
We
might,
if
we
pleafed,
copy
Fahrenheit
bility
thermometer,
as
32,
perfect certainty
down knowledge of as 212, and other ftates
impoffi-
of mind
accordingly.
Thus, 122
:
belief inclining
would reprefent perfect But neither way, an even chance.
indecifion,
this
would
is to afcomplicate our formulae the ufual and preferable plan fume o as the index of knowledge of impoffibility, I as that of fractions for the intermediate ftates. certainty, and intermediate This mode of eftimation makes formulae and procefles fo much more eafy than any other, that it muft be adopted ; but there is as follows. a ftrong objection to it in one point of view
:
mean fpeak of belief in common life, we always the not that we confider the object of belief more likely than call we ftate of mind in which we rather reject than admit,
When we
wwbelief.
When
the mind
is
quite unbalanced either way,
we
On
have no word to exprefs
one.
it,
Probability.
becaufe the ftate
is
183
not a popular*
quantitative theory calls by the name of belief every admiflion of there is only one black ball to a poflibility.
The
When
million of white ones, there is fome belief that a black ball will be drawn ; a much It would be larger belief in a white one.
advantageous in fome refpech that o fhould reprefent the ftate of indifference, + i, that of I, knowledge of certainty, and that of of But this would complicate knowledge impoflibility.
formulae too much.
I confider
it
therefore defirable to ufe the
common
one
meafures and formulae, but to aflbciate them with the
When
we
juft propofed, in the following manner. a perfon tells us that his belief in an afTertion
it
is,
fay
W,
meaning that he confiders
3 for and 7 againft, or 7 to 3 againft,
fhould fay in common talk that he difbelieves, but not very In the language of this theory, we fay that he both ftrongly. believes and difbelieves, the latter more ftrongly than the former.
Let us add
that
it is
that his authority
is
in his
mind an even chance, or

let
againft the conclufion. If he fay that he has no opinion
one way or the other,

way.
i
us fay that he gives no authority either

-j-
adapt this definition to the fuppofition that reprefent the extremes of authority for and againft,
If
we
and
have
we
the following rules. The meafure of authority is twice the meaof belief diminifhed by unity, for, when pofitive, againft, when negative the meafure of belief is half of unity increafed
fure
:
by the meafure of authority. If a reprefent the meafure of belief, and A that of authority, then
(algebraically)
It
is
alfo advifable to
have a term to reprefent what are ufually

think
it
called the odds.

as
Some might
defirable to rid the fubjecl:

:
of words derived from gambling aftronomers have done the fame thing with the phrafes of aftrology, and chemifts with thofe of alchemy. When it is 7 for and 3 againft,
as poflible
*
much
uneducated ones, can hardly retain an comer, what he thinks on the queftion whether there be volcanoes on the unfeen fide of the moon larger than thofe on our fide. The odds are, that though he has never thought of the queftion, he has a pretty ftiff opinion in three feconds.
Many
minds, and almoft

ftate.
all
intermediate
Put
it
to the
firft
184
it
On
faid
Probability.
might be
But the brevity of the firft phrafe tinuance, let who will try to change it.
againft, \.
that the relative tefttmony for, is J, and that will infure its con
laid
ordinary rule is a confequence of the notions hereinbefore down, and of the particular mode of meafurement adopted. It is as follows ; When all the things that can happen can be
The
refolved into a
number of
equally probable (or credible) cafes,
fome favourable and fome unfavourable to the event under confideration, then the fraction which the favourable cafes are of all
the cafes, meafures the probability (or credibility) of the arrival of the event and the fraction which the unfavourable cafes are
:
the cafes, meafures the probability (or credibility) of the non-arrival. There are, for inftance, in an urn, 5 white, 4 black, and 3 red balls, 12 in all. It is aflumed that we know them to
of
all
be equally likely to be drawn

that
which here means no more than That one ball muft be drawn, is fuppofed certainly known. Accordingly, our belief in c one or another is reprefented by I which is, by the poftulate, the fum of the feveral credibilities of the balls ; which laft are all Therefore each ball has TV and by the fame poftulate, equal. the event c one or other of the white balls or the drawing of a
;
we know
nothing to the contrary.

:
white
ball,
has TV
of a black
ball
-?
of a red
invent
ball,
all
T\.
Inftances like the above, in which
we
the cafes and
have arbitrary power over their number, are the only ones on which we can employ a priori numerical reafoning. They are
alfo
the only ones on which
portant to
rically
trial.
know whether,
we can try experiments. It is im as a matter of fact, our belief, nume
And
way.
formed, will be approximately juftified by the refults of this juftification is found to exift, in the following It is a remote, but certain, conclufion from the theory,
requiring mathematical reafoning too complicated to introduce here, that events will, in the long run, happen in numbers pro portional to the objective probabilities under which the trials are
made. For inftance ; if a die be correctly formed, fo that no one face has more tendency than another to fall upwards, the -that of not throwing an ace ; probability of throwing an ace is
The theory tells us its own worthleflhefs, if in the long |.. If 60,000 run, not-ace do not occur five times as often as ace. trials were made, the theory would tell us to expect about 10,000
is
On
not, that I
Probability.
85
:
aces and about 50,000 not-aces. Practice confirms the theory know of, in the actual cafe juft cited, but in fimilar
ones.
I will ftate
an inftance.
a half-penny up, and if it give tall, repeat the throw, and fo on, till head arrives : and let this fucceffion be called zfet.
Throw
The
probability that a fet fhall confift of one throw, is {hewn by the theory to be ^ ; that it fhall have two throws, i ; three If a very large number of fets be tried, throws, |.; and fo on. we are to expect that about half will be of one throw, about a quarter of two throws, about an eighth of three throws ; and fo
number is large enough to give any profpect of fomething like an average. This experiment has been tried twice once by the celebrated Buffon, and once by a young pupil of mine, for his own fatisfaction ; both in 2,048 fets. The
on, as long as the
:
refults
were
as follows
the third
column fhowing the number

be moil probable.
of each kind which the theory
aflerts to
2048
In BufFon
heads, .and in
s
2048
2048
trials,
Mr. H s Inftances in which we can command
there were altogether 1992 tails to 2048 there were 2044 tails to 2048 heads.
all
the cafes are to the
86
On
Probability.
mind, in this theory, what acceflible lengths are to the eye. can meafure the latter by a rule, and fo train the organ to judge of lengths which cannot be approached, or cafes in which the
rule
is
We
not at hand.
I fhall
now
refer the reader to other
works on the
fubjecT:,
for
and proceed to juft as much as is neceflary for the particular purpofe of the next chapter, to namely, the application of the hypothecs of meafure of belief be will theorems Two queftions of argument and teftimony. enough the firft relating to independent events, the fecond to the probability of events which are neither wholly independent,
further details
on the operative
part,
is
The word event nor wholly confequent, either upon the other. it does not even neceflarily ufed in the wideft poffible fenfe mean future event. Unlefs our knowledge, either of the cir:
cumftances, or of the event itfelf, thereby undergo fome altera tion, it is nothing to us now whether it has happened, or is to
happen.
Let there be two events, P and Q, of which the probabilities are the fractions a and b ; and let them be wholly independent of
one another, the arrival or non-arrival of either being perfectly independent of that of the other. The probability that both and fimilarly for more fhall happen is the product of a and b
:
Suppofe, to take an inftance, that a is f and b is muft then confider P as an event which has 3 ways |. of failing to 4 of happening if we would have an urn from of drawing a white ball fhould be that of which the
events than two.
We
credibility
we muft put in 4 white balls and 3 not we muft have white (fay black) balls. Similarly to reprefent Q, an urn of 3 white and 2 black balls. Now to afcertain the profpect of drawing white from both urns, we muft count all
the happening of P,
the cafes.
from the urn of

the
in
firft
from the urn of 7 may be combined with one But a white ball from 5, in 7 x 5 or 35 ways. urn may be combined with a white ball from the fecond,
ball
:
4x 3 or 12 different ways. There are then 35 cafes in all, 12 of which are favourable hence the probability in favour of
is
white from both (which

ing)
is
that of the
two events both happen
H
35
or
i^
7X5
or
x 75
$-
or
ab.
On
Probability.
187
Similar reafoning may be applied to more events than two. This theorem has a large number of confequences, fome of which we may notice.
When
This
and
is
the probability for,

:
I (hall
always denote by #
the probability againft. will (land for I b; fimilarly

I
is
fo on.
Required the probability that of a number of independent & c be events, P,Q,R, &c one or more fhall happen. Let
#,,<:,
the feveral probabilities, then that of their all failing is the produel: # .... and that of their not all failing (or of one or more happening) is I a tfc* .... Accordingly, if there be
/>V
(i only two events, for one or both we have I which is a + b ab. If the number of events be
a)(i
,
b)
all
and
c b one or more we c, &c.) for equally probable (fo that a lw n have i or I (i a} . It is a confequence of this laft that, however unlikely an event it is fure the common fenfe of the (in may be, word) to happen,
= =
if
the
trial
fmall a
may
can be repeated as often as be, or however near to unity

i
we
i
pleafe.
However
n
a, n
may be taken
fo great that
i ( a] (i a} as near to unity as we pleafe, or the that the probability unlikely event will happen once or more in n times, as great as we pleafe.
fhall
be as fmall as
we
pleafe, or
Let a =!:(&+
i),
which means
trial
:
that the odds are k to
againft
the event on any one
(how what ftance or two when
the following rough deductions will kind of refults the formula gives, true within an ink
is
confiderable.
In
^k
inftances
;
it is
an
even chance that the event happens once or more
in 2 3/f,
it is
:
9 to i ; in 4 6, 99 to i ; 6 9/, 999 to i ; 9*2/, 9999 to i and in 23^, it is ten thoufand millions to i. Thus, fuppofe at each trial it is a hundred to one againft fuccefs. Then of thofe
who
try
70
efforts,
as
many
will fucceed
once or more
as will
altogether
Of thofe who try 6900 times, long run. perfon who will not only one of a thoufand will always fail. examine an afTertion that comes to him with ten to one againft
fail,
in the
it,
muft count
truths, if
it
an even chance that he throws away one or

his plan feven times.
more
he follow
Let us now fuppofe that there are reafons why the feveral in ftances which can arrive are not equally credible. Suppofe the urn to contain a white, a black, and a red ball, and ourfelves to
88
On
Probability.
have reafons
to think the balls not equally probable or credible, but that 6, 5, and 2 are the proportions of the degrees of belief
we
If then 6x reprefent the fhould accord to them feverally. will reprefent thofe of the and 2x of black a ball, 5* probability
other two feverally. By the poftulate, 1 3* reprefents that of one But this is certainty ; whence x muft be T y, and or the other. 2 6 5 T_, T _, and T T are the probabilities of the white, black, and red
the feveral inftances are unequally each inftance as though it occurred a number of times proportioned to its probability, and then proceed as in the cafe of equally probable inftances. Thus, in the above, inftead of faying (as we mould do if the balls were equally pro
balls.
is
That
to fay,
when
probable,
we muft count
bable) that the probability of the white ball

I
fay + i + i, would do, m being any

i
we
it is
6
all
is
6m
or
+ 5 + 2;
6m
and the other
number
or fraction whatfoever.
Now
of
all
fuppofe two
draw a ball, and find it white, we know that the urn chofen to draw from muft have been the But fup the fecond could not have given that drawing. firft and the pofe the firft urn to have 99 white balls to one black, If we now draw again, and fecond one white to 1000 black. draw a white one, not knowing from which we drew, we feel almoft certain, from the drawing, that we have chofen the firft urn. We ftill feel almoft certain that the fecond urn would have given a black ball. This inverfion of circumftances, this conclufion that the circumftances under which the event did happen, are moft probably thofe which would have been moft likely to minds bring about the event, is of the utmoft evidence to our
black ones.
:
urns, one of If we actually
white
balls,
but the queftion now before us is, are we to call late, or is it deducible from the other one ? It
it
a fecond poftu
.
is
fo
deducible,
not a fecond poftulate ; but it has not been ufual to give a diftincl: account of the deduction.* If it could not be made, very
and
is
* So well eftablifhed is this fpecies of inverfion in the mind, that both Laplace and Poiflbn, the two moft eminent mathematical writers on the fubhave in a certain cafe affumed that an equation jecl, of the prefent century, which gives the moft probable value of x in terms of j, is therefore the one
which gives the moft probable value ofy

the principle too far.
in terms
of x.
This
is
carrying
On
Probability.
:
189
the following procefs would, no doubt, be fufficient it has often been held fo. Let the urns have 6 white balls to i black, and 2 white balls to 9 black. Then the probabilities of drawing a
white
ball
from the two are

to 7.
If,
7-
and
^,
which are
in the
propor
when we choofe the firft urn, we have nearly five times as much chance of a white ball as the fecond one would give, we conclude that a known white ball from an unknown urn is in that proportion more likely to have come from the firft urn we (hall have J4 and * f r the proper
tion of
33
becaufe
For if 33* be that for the degrees of belief in the two urns. firft urn, then the 7* muft, by aflumption, be that for the fecond and for one or the other, we have 40*. But this is
:
certainty
To
whence x muft be ^.
this refult to
reduce
as
dependence upon the

probability that
firft
proceed
follows.
The
two events
poftulate, are con-
netted, our belief, that is, in the connexion, muft be the fame whether the two events, or either of them, have happened, or whether they be yet to happen unlefs there be fomething in the our which alters happening knowledge, and puts us in
:
a different ftate for Suppofe I make up forming a judgment. my mind, rightly or wrongly, as to how far I will believe that
An
a white ball, If drawn, will have been drawn from the firft urn. inftant after, I am told that the trial I anticipated has been
white
to
made, and the contingency which I fuppofed has occurred ; a ball has been drawn. I know no more than I took myfelf
know
in
my
hypothefis
and cannot therefore have any
altering portions in the urns,
means of
my
opinion. Now, without altering the pro change the numbers of the balls, fo that
there
may be
the fame total
number
in
each
let
them be
{66 white,
black}
(14 white, 63 black)

itfelf,
Now
put each ball in an urn by
154 urns
in
all.
This
But it gives T ^-T to any one ball, if I choofe an urn at hazard. was fo before : as to the firft of the two urns for inftance, \ was
the probability of choofing that urn, and X that of TT choofing one and ^-x 7V is j^. If we then remove particular ball from it
:
the urns with black balls, fo that a white ball muft be drawn, the chance of its being one of the 66 is -f| or |. If without
all
removing the black
balls,
we
think of the probability of a white
90
On
Probability.
the credibilities of ball, if drawn, being of the 66, or of the 14, we to as 66 are thofe fuppofitions 14. If, having chofen an urn, in ftill are fame the a white ball, find it contains probabilities
from fimilar reafoning, whether for judging of the probabilities of precedents from an obferved confequent, or for judging of the probabilities of events which reftricT: each If the probability of the fame, as follows. are
other, precifely the obferved event, fuppofed
ftill
that proportion. The rules derived
future,
from the
feveral poffible
to exift, precedents, feverally fuppofed actually
be #,,,
&c
then,
when
that
it
the event
is
known
happened from
for the
..
to have happened, the probabilities the feveral precedents are
a+b+c+.
firft,
--
for the fecond,
&c.
be feveral events, which are not all that could Again, if there have happened ; and if, by a new arrangement (or by additional that thefe feveral events are now knowledge of old ones) we find made all that can happen, without alteration of their relative cre
dibilities
r,
:
their probabilities are
found by the fame
rule.
If a,
&c. be the
probabilities
:
of the
feveral events, when not reftricted
to be the only ones
of the
firft is
a-r(a
+ +
the probability then, after the reftri&ion, b the b ...) fecond, b+(a ...), of
+ +
and
fo on.
We
may
obtain a very
let
diftincl:
notion of this
laft
theorem, as
follows.
are among Suppofe two events, which
thofe that can
happen, and
the other. This one, fay, be twice as probable as and the equally likely, cafes, independent, means, that among all favourable to the firft as to the fecond. there are twice as
many
Now, fuppofe by fome

of
new knowledge,
for inftance,
alteration of fuppofitions, the introduction it is found, all the cafes remain
from happening except thefe the cafes in of two events. things does not alter of the of the the probabilities number accordingly, proportion muft of them one now But one. to two as is events two before,
that ing as before,
all
are prevented
ftate
This new
happen
or the
fum of
thefe probabilities
them is f , and the other f. cafes. be applied to more complicated reafoning may
follows then that one of
It frequently
muft be unity. It The fame
happens,
when
different
problems are folved by
On
Probability.
191
the fame formula, that they may be confidered as the fame pro blem in two different points of view and alfo that one and the fame problem may be confidered as belonging to either clafs. For inftance ; Let there be two witnefles, whofe credibilities
:
(or the probabilities that in any given inftance they are correct) are a and b. As long as we do not know that they are talking
ab.
about the fame thing, the probability that both will tell truth is But the moment we know that they both aflert the fame
thing, the
problem
is
changed
they muft
now
be either both
right or both wrong ; before, one might have been right and the other wrong. To take the firft view of the problem, we
have
now
an obferved event, both
ftate that the
circumftance
the event did, or did ; If it the of the obferved event not, happen. did, probability is then that both are would ab ; if it did not, it be (which right)
did happen.
There
are
two precedents
would then be (ia)(i
b}.
the obferved event did happen, will be, divided by ab (i a}(i
Accordingly, the probability that by the rule above, ab
b).
take the fecond view, we have, before the reftriction, four poflible cafes, the probabilities of which are ah, #(1 After the reftri&ion, only the firft b(i a] and (i a)(i b}. and fourth are poflible whence the conclufion is as juft given. If
/>),
we
Full exemplifications of thefe methods will be found in the next

chapter.
CHAPTER
On probable
X.
Inference.
are two fources of conviction, argument and teftireafon mony, why the thing fhould be, ftatement that the When the argument is neceffarily good, we call it thing is. demonftratwn : when the ftatement can be abfolutely relied on, we call it authority. Both words are ufed in lower than their
THERE
; thus, very cogent arguments are often called demonftration, and very good evidence, authority. I fhall fuppofe all the arguments I fpeak of to be
abfolute fenfes
logically
192
valid
;
On
that
is,
Probability.
the premifes.
certainly true.
from having conclufions which certainly follow is the conclufion all be If then the premifes true, of the be &c. the If a, indepen c, probabilities
/>,
dent premifes, or the independent proportions from which pre is the mifes are deduced, then the product abc. probability that
. .
the argument
is
every
way
Argument being
offer
good. of proof,
its
failure
is
only failure of
is an proof: and the conclufion may yet be true. But teftimony affertion of the truth of the conclufion ; and its failure can only be failure of truth. If a proportion of Euclid turn out to be
need not therefore be falfe. badly demonftrated, the enunciation or neither prove nor difAn difprove, prove,
argument may
:
prove
falfe.
This
:
a teftimony cannot be true, falfe, or neither true nor diftinction generally gains no more than a one-fided
over-zealous bro perfons begin to fee it when fome ther writes weakly on their own fide of a queftion ; but they are other fide, that anfwering apt to think, with refpect to the
admiffion
very
the arguments
is
difproving the conclufion.

for the
above reafon, more eafily underftood than mode of conveying know argument. It is the moft effective not be fuppofed that, in muft it But ledge to the uneducated. be the can only vehicle of infor any ftage of reafon, argument This point is called on argumentative. mation, even fubjects
Teftimony
is,
one of great importance. When argument is demonftration,

all
it
eftablifhes
its
conclufion
idea of an infallible witnefs bearing teftimony. againft evidence againft a demonftrated conclufion, is a contradiction. That n confecutive numbers have a fum which is divifible by w,
The
whenever n
is
odd,
is
demonftrated.
If a thoufand of the beft
that ever lived, both for honefty and arith qualified witneffes that they had difcovered 101 very high fwear to were metic,
confecutive numbers, the
any mere beginner
in
fum of which is not divifible by 101, mathematics would be more fure that a
thoufand good witnefles had loft their wits or their characters, than any one elfe can be of anything not admitting of demon
ftration.
But when argument does not amount

only
is
to demonftration, not
bility,
the truth or falfehood of the conclufion matter of credi is not that mere truth or but the iffue of the
argument
On
telfehood.
is
Probability.
c
:
193
as this
It
does not ftand thus

fo
is
According
falfe,
argument
good or bad,
the conclufion true or
but
According
as this argument is good or bad, fo is the conclufion true in this way, or not true in this way, (that is, either falfe, or true in fome c other way). If we were to fay men are trees, and trees have
reafon, therefore
men have
argument,
falfe in
reafon, we have a perfectly logical the matter of both premifes but we cannot
:
deny the conclufion.

Suppofe now that an argument is prefented to us of which we are fatisfied that the like will prove their conclufions to be true in the particular modes averted, in nine cafes out of ten. What are we to fay of the truth or falfehood of the conclufion ?
We
have T% of belief to
its
add for other poffible ways? Are we to reft in the conclufion as having 9 to i for it, or are we to allow more? cannot fay, let us confine ourfelves to the grounds we have and believe or difbelieve, not in the got, conclufion, but in the conclufion as obtained in that one way. I take it for granted that the mind muft have a {rate with
{hall
much
being true in one particular
we
way
how
We
refpecl: to
reafon.
Every
every aflertion prefented to it, with reafon, or without mean propofition, the terms of which convey
any
ing, at once,
degree
when brought forward, puts the hearer into fome of belief, or, if we ufe the common phrafe, of belief or
marked upon our
including, of courfe, the intermediate ftate, which is as fcale as Men who are any other.
unbelief:
clearly
known
preceding cafe, fuppofe granted to the conclufion from the argument alone, and any one wifhes to fufpend his opinion as to the Is he to remaining T grant half of that T^, and fay that 9 i <?-|-^r or g is what he would wifh to make the meafure of his
that 9 to i, or T
accuftomed to fufpend their opinion, as it is called, that is, to throw themfelves into the intermediate ftate when they have no definite reafon to think either way, are interefted in this queftion as much as any others. If there be fome ftate, though not in which their belief muft be, there numerically appreciable, is fome ftate, which they would rather know numerically than not, in which it ought to be. In the it
is
belief, if
he
knew how
others.
in
The
confideration of this queftion will
enter
among
The manner
which he
deals with the refult
of the argument
94
every
On
man
:
Probability.
the
muft depend upon

Firft,
teftimony^ ufmg has, as juft noticed,
word
in
its
wideft fenfe.
He may may have no reafon to lean either way, and an argument may know it ; that is to fay, he may have to apply have he Or of .^ to an exifting probability of 1. previous may
mind
as to every proportion.
ftate
a teftimony in his own fet out with the inter
mediate
he
makes him lean to the affergood reafon, or bad reafon, which of this leaning muft then be and the meafure tion or denial 9 have other teftimony to combine he combined with T o. Or may ftate. with that of his own previous Any way, he cannot have
;
a definite opinion on the bare truth or falfehood of the conclufion of the argument, without appeal to the previous ftate of his own
mind
It
at leaft, if
is
not to that of others.
that generally faid
we
are to
throw away authority, and
alone ; that our reafon is to be convinced, judge by argument the biafled and not opinion of others ; that no conclufions are by worth anything, except thofe which a man forms for himfelf. All the forms in which this frequent caution is exprefled, I take to be diftortions of the very needful warning not to allow authority more weight than is properly due to it a warning, by the way,
:
which
is
juft as
authority.
argument as to For every miftake which has been made by taking

refpecl: to
much wanted with
authorities on trufl (that is, taking bad witneiTes to prove the of afTerted good ones), one miftake at leaft has been
goodnefs
made by taking arguments on preponderance: that is, treating them as proving their conclufion, as foon as they (how it to be more likely than its contradiction.
form the habit of allowing authority no more weight than is is due to it, and the fame of argument, undoubtedly one great mental cultivation but it ought not to be forgotten object of that it is another and juft as great an object to form the habit of 9 Suppofe an argument of value T ^ is preallowing them no hfs. the have we teftimony of a fented, and that at the fame time
To
witnefs againft the conclufion, of whom we know that he leads IOOO times for each once that he mifleads us. Is there us
right
any fenfe in reducing this witnefs to one of no authority, or of an even chance, upon the principle of depending on argument only? to Except the argument be demonftration, we muft be prepared or better. an as be as a witnefs that admit argument, good may
On
I fhall
Probability.
problems which
this
195
fubjecl:
now
proceed to the feveral

firft
teftimony alone, next argument alone, and then the two in combination. Problem I. There are independent teftimonies to the truth of an aflertion, of the value u, f , &c. (one of them being the initial teftimony of the mind itfelf which is to form the
requires, confidering
i/,
judg
ment) Let
required the value of the united teftimony.
be
^,
&c.
as in
page 187.
;
Here
is
a problem of
the fame clafs as in page 190 teftimonies are right, or all
the reflections are, that all the wrong, the independent chances of
which are
^.
and /Ay.
Hence
the probabilities are
/Ay.
any numbers proportional to /*, // &c. will the produfts have a common denominator, (as generally they have) the numerators Se only need be ufed. condly, the eafieft way of exprefling the refult is by faying that it is to pv?. . /Ay. . for, or fjf. . to
Obferve,
as well
:
firft,
that
do
and
if
inftance, let it be in my mind 99 to one againft an afler tion, that is, I bear only the In favour of it. Let teftimony four witnefles, for whofe accuracy it is 2 to i, 3 to i, 4 to i, 5 to i, depofe in favour of it : I want to know how it ought to ftand in my mind. The teftimonies for and againft, are
For
/^.
againft.
^
*
JL
100
4
5*
5. 6
nH
^
99
i
J
;>
Hence, neglecling the
common
1x2x3x4x5
for the aflertion.
to
99x1x1x1x1,
denominator, it ought to be or 120 to 99, or 40 to 33,
Obferve that in faying the witnefs gives teftimony, fay f , it is of no confequence whether it be a queftion of judgment, or of I mean veracity, or of both together. come how it I
am
is
that,
fatisfied that
when he
may,
fays anything,
it is
2 to
he fays what
correcl.
An
eafy rule for the
fents itfelf thus.
of the feparate relative teftimonies. Thus, two witnefles of 6 truths to one error, and of 7 truths to one error, are equivalent
more common modes of expreflion preThe combined relative teftimony is the product
196
to
On
Probability.
error.
one witnefs of 42 (or 6x7) truths to one
Three
to
wit-
nefles of 8, 6, 5 truths to 7, 3, 1 1 errors are equivalent witnefs of 80 truths to 77 errors.
one
after conferring jury of twelve equally truftworthy perfons, on which previoufly I had no together, agree to an affertion fuch agreement gives leaning. Suppofmg me fully fatisfied that of the deliberate think to I what am 100 to i for their
refult,
of his opinion after he opinion of any one among them, that is, others. with has had the advantage of difcuffion Let p be the value of fuch teftimony from any one ; then by the queftion
^12
:
(i_
12
/yt )
:
100
i,
or
::
loo
if I
fay as 1-468 to i.
That
is, I
think inconfiftently
to
I I, unlefs
rely
on
the united verdift as
upon 100
am
prepared to
think
it
a majority m are for, and equally truftworthy jurors, of the teftimony of value be the n againft, a conclufion. OT as for, and taken being /* (i each, then the odds are to be
1468
to 1000, or about 3 to 2, for each juror alone.
Of m + n
If>
/*)"
^"(x
againft.
But
are exactly as if the majority unanimous. From the original formula
which
n had been
it
all,
and
on oppofite fides equally good teftimonies the refult. could If then, the unanimity of the jury box in this country we might fay that be confidered as that of deliberate conviction, the that majority mould exceed a larger jury, with the condition and often be would the minority by 12 at leaft, always as good, which confiderations prevent the But there are various
better.
two effect on no produce

will appear that
from being applicable. The neceffity of being unan lower the value of the verdict. On imous, as our law ftands, may find by a majority of 12, of a the other hand, jury 30, required to the matter before a vote to they had put would generally proceed the prewhich to defire real the with other to each gain opinion
above
refult
fent practice produces
of their verdicl: confequently, the value
would perhaps be lower than that of the majority only, required to be unanimous.
On
The
Probability.
97
theory thus appears to confirm the notion on which we often aft, that a given excefs of majority over minority, is of the fame value whatever the numbers in the two may be. And this might be the cafe, if the thing called deliberation in a large body, were as well adapted to the difcovery of truth as the fame thing in a fmaller one. The reader muft remember that this teft does
not compare the one witnefs on his

ber after
common
and
deliberation
is
but the
own judgment with a num firft, after common deli
beration with others,
compared with the whole.
the problems of this chapter, the diftinftion muft be carefully drawn between the credibility of a circumftance at one time and at another. For example, a witnefs enters with
all
But
in this,
his favour, and owing to combination with others, the comes out that it is 100 to i he is in error in the par ticular matter on which he We cannot believe gives evidence.
i
o to
i in
refult
both that
it is
10 to
is
he
is
right,
and 100 to
that he
is
the latter, for the cafe in queftion. As another inftance, fuppofe m independent witnefles of equal goodnefs O) unite in affirming that a certain ball was drawn from a lottery of n balls collufion being fuppofed impoffible. knowledge of the circumftances of the affirmation here alters the If n be confiderable, it is almoft problem. impoffible that the witnefles, by independent falfehood or error, fhould all pitch on the fame wrong ball. To find the bias this ought to give me to the conclufion that they have told the truth, I muft obferve that there being n I balls not one drawn, whichever of thefe
:
What we
wrong.
believe
My
any
choofes, by error, the chance of any one of the reft choofmg the fame is i~(w i {hall choofe i), the probability that all the m the fame is i-i-(_i)-i. the odds are as m
Hence,
to (i
"
"
/*)
one out of almoft an infinite number of equally poffible aflertions, and the agreement of even two witnefles (for when m is two or upwards, n appears in the formula) is certain conviftion, if, as
aflumed,
m m multiplied by the laft-named expreffion, or as ( n p to i) m i If n be ( -v} very great, the odds may be enormous for the aflertion, even though //, the credibility of each witnefs, may be fmall. In cafes of ordinary evidence, the thing aflerted is ufually
l .
we know
is
the
as
two
witnefles to be not in collufion.

as to
fay that the evidence of likely to have been the one
If
^=i-i- 5 which witnefs makes a
much
each
ball
no more
drawn,
198
becaufe he fays
it,
On
that
it
Probability.
that a ball
for the truth
was on our mere knowledge

I
aflerbad been drawn, it turns out I to n= let But the evidence. ^ (1 +)-r> tion, juft as it was before a being any fraftion, however fmall, that is, let each witnefs make the aflertion more probable than at firft, however little then the odds for its truth become
of the
which odds may be made

creafmg m.
as great as
we
pleafe,
by
fufficiently
m-
That
is
to fay,
however
little
each witnefs
may be
or in making it more good for, in real fupport of the aflertion, of witnefles, cer number probable than it is of itfelf, a fufficient what of will give it any degree credibility tainly independent,
ever.
The
of the problems of common life, or is confirmed by it, according to his ftate of mind with refpedt to the whole doctrine. It is impoffible to fay and that we have a theory made to explain common phenomena, hence affording no reafon for furprife that it does explain them. are too few and two fimple, the train of The firft
principles
ftudent of this fubjeft is always ftruck by the frequency in which the fcience confirms an ordinary notion
deduction ends in conclufions
far
too remote. I believe hundreds
of cafes might be cited in which the refults of this theory are in found already eftablifhed by the common fenfe of mankind were not powerful many of them, the mathematical fciences the modes of calculation, when the principles of to
:
enough
give the theory were firft digefted. There are problems, however, in
which we cannot
will agree.
is
eafily
come
into pofleffion of data
on which many
witnefles
The
:
fimple queftion of independent but the queftion of collufion is.

follows.
not one of them

is
One
of the difficulties
as
independent hypothefes upon of the witnefles and the probability of their having con goodnefs
We
cannot
inftitute
the
ferred
upon
their evidence.
They
fo
;
hood
ftill
have not done plication, that they in one part of their evidence
greater,
declare, expreffly or if have, there

:
by im
they
is falfe-
or,
which makes the
difficulty
there
may have been

:
general,
conference imply) not particular
but (as they aflert or been biafled by they may have
On
Probability.
199
firft
each other, without knowing how or to what extent. The ftep in one view of the problem is eafily made, as follows.
Let n be the value of the evidence of each witnefs, m their number, n the number of afTertions they have power to choofe Let A be the probability that there has been from, all as before. There are then four cafes particular conference between them. to which the problem is reftricted (i) they have conferred and agreed to fpeak truth ; (2) they have not conferred and all fpeak truth (3) they have conferred and agreed on a falfehood ; (4) have not conferred and have all lighted upon the fame falfe they
:
hood.
The
a priori probabilities of thefe four cafes are
and the odds that they fpeak the truth (fuppofing n
fo great that
//)
".
we may
comes
I*
m to reject the fourth cafe) are ^ A( the practical difficulty of this queftion ;
Now
How
are A and
to be connected ? Every cafe which is worth examining fuppofes that the greater the chance of there having been particular conference, the lefs is the witnefs worth from that very circum-
ftance. For it is to be remembered that we are not generally able to give the witnefs a character wholly independent of his evidence in the cafe before us ; in hiftorical queftions, for in-
ftance,
it
frequently happens that
we
have nothing but the wit
nefles to try* the cafe by, and nothing but the cafe to try the witnefles by. that a cafe very common occurrence is this ;
is
which no one would throw any doubt upon the wit nefles, except for fufpicion of conference, and juft as much doubt as there is fufpicion of conference. This makes ^=1 A, and
in
(
one
gives
A)
: A"^
for the odds in favour
of the
aflertion.
On this
fuppofition, it follows that whenever the chances are againft all the witnefles having conferred particularly, their number, if great enough, ought to give any degree of credibility to the aflertion.
two great tendencies, which very nearly divide the fettle the cafe in their own minds, and then try the witnefles fome fettle the witnefles and then try the cafe not a few bring their fecond refult back again to juftify their firft aflumption. When there are two unknown for thofe quantities with only one equation, it is
rife to
This gives
:
world
among them.
Some
who
eafy
will aflume either to find the other.
But the
difficulty
is
to find the
moft probable value of both.
200
Problem
2.
On
Probability.
Let there be any number of different aflertions, of which one muft be true, and only one or of which one may be or of which any given number true, and not more than one may be true, but not more required the probability of any one
: : :
poflible cafe.
The
folution of
all
thefe varieties depends
on one
principle,
explained in page 190 ; requiring the previous probabilities of all the confident cafes to be compared. As an inftance, fuppofe four aflertions, A,B,C,D, and fuppofe /^v,^, to be the probabi
lities
from teftimony,
for each
of them.
If either of
them have
muft be afcertained by the laft problem. it be that one of them muft be true, let Firft, and one only. The probabilities in favour of A,B,C,D, are in Either of the proportion of ^v /jV, v/u^V, ^//Vcr*, and oyAV. fum of divided the the thefe, all, reprefents by probability of its
feveral testimonies, their united force
cafe.
all
Secondly, may be falfe.

all
in
which
be that one of them only can be true, and Put on the fifth quantity /A^V, for the cafe For example, there are four diftincl: are falfe.
let it
aflertions,
not more than one of which can be true.
rate evidences
ties 7,
T T , ^. either of the
aflertion.
The fepafor thefe four aflertions give them the probabili There is a certain aflertion which is true if and
.
firft
three be true
required the probability of that
Here, neglecting the

in
common
is
7x11x8x5
every
cafe, the
denominator, which probabilities of the feveral
aflertions,
all being falfe, are as 2.8.7.1, 3.5.7.1, and 1.5.8.1, 4.5.8.7, 5.8.7.1, or as 112, 105, 40, 1120, and The odds for one of the firft three cafes againft one of 280.
and that of
the other
+ 105+40 to 1120 + 280 or as 257 to 257 againft the truth of the aflertion. Suppofe the condition were that two of the aflertions, but not more, may be true, and that one muft be true. Then the pof fible cafes, meaning by an accent that the aflertion is not true,
two
are
112
to
1400
or
it is
1400
are
AB C D BA C D CA B D DA B C ABC D ACB D ADB C BCA D BDA C CDA B Confequently, the pro

1 1 1
babilities of thefe cafes are in the proportion of //y ^V, v/^ pV, p/AV, &c. And the odds in favour of, fay A, being true, are as the fum of all the terms which contain //, to the fum of thofe which contain /A When we wifh to fignify that no evidence is offered either for
On
.
Probability.
201
or againft one of the afTertions, we muft put it down as having the teftimony To put down o in the place of ^ would be to
make an
only
:
infallible
witnefs declare that
it is
not true.
Suppofe
there are four affertions, one of
which muft be true and one

firft,
evidence of goodnefs
is
offered for the
and none
either
The
Required the probability of the firft. probabilities of the four affertions are in the proportion of
way
for the others.
4.1.1.1, 1.3.1.1, firft, or 9 to 4
1.3.1.1,
it.
and 1.3.1.1, and
it is
to
9 for the
againft
Problem
3.
probabilities
Arguments being fuppofed logically good, and the of their proving their conclusions (that is, of all
arguments prefented, Required the probability that the con
in a material
their premifes being true) being called their validities, let there be a conclufion for which a number of are
of
validities a,
is
r,
&c.
clufion
proved.
differs
This problem
point.
from thofe which precede

all
Teftimonies are
true together or
all
falfe
together
but one of the arguments may be perfectly found, though all the reft be prepofterous. The queftion then is, what is the chance that one or more of the That arguments proves its conclufion.
all
mail
fail,
is
the probability
i
is
fuppofe n equal arguments, each of validity a, the probability that the conclufion n is proved is I ( i a) And, as in page 1 8 7, if the odds againft each argument be k to i, then, the number of fuch
probability
*W
#W
that
if
all
mall not
fail,
the
Accordingly,
we
rendered as likely as not. to believe, having arguments againft the validity of each of which it is 10 to i, that feven fuch arguments make the conclufion about as likely to be true as not. If fuch be the cafe, the fo accordant with common
is
being as
much as k, But are we really
arguments
the conclufion
is
theory, ufually ftrangely at variance with them. further confideration.
notions,
This point
will require
fome
In this problem I confider only argument, and not teftimony, which, neverthelefs, cannot be finally excluded (fee page 194). If the conclufion be one on which our minds are
biaffed to
whollv un-
begin with,
refult.
the
preceding
may feem that we have no efcape from And to it we muft oppofe, for confidera
it
tion at leaft, the
common
ments are the prefumption of
opinion of mankind that ftrong argu truth, weak arguments of falfehood.
2O2
and
to
On
Probability.
If a controverfialift were to bring forward a hundred arguments, if his opponent were fo far to anfwer them as to make it ten
one againft each, there can be no doubt that the
latter
would
be confidered as having fairly contradicted the former. muft not forget that argument, in a great many cafes, in volves and produces the effect of teftimony, and this in an eafily
We
explicable and perfectly juftifmble manner. If I were to pick up a bit of paper in the ftreets, on which an argument is written,
for a conclufion
on which
unknown
writer, and if I
have no previous opinion, and by an could fay that that argument left on
to
my
mind the impreilion of ten

it
one againft
its
validity,
might
to ftand as giving TT of probability, and to that combine it with fuppofition upon previous opinion, | , But fuppofe it is on a queftion of as in the next problem.
be prepared to allow
my
phyfics, and
Newton
:
is
the propofer of
I
it,
and that
it is
his only
is
argument, and therefore,

entirely altered
conclude, his beft.

is
The
:
cafe
now
one on which the If this con have would great probability following argument clufion were true, it could be proved ; if it could be proved, Newton could have proved it therefore if it were true,
poffibly the conclufion
;
could have proved it but Newton cannot prove it ; If the cafe be fuch that the two pretherefore it is not true.
Newton
mifes of this laft argument have each 9 to i for it, or 7%- ; then, though the original argument give TV for the conclufion, the mere
circumftance of
againft
it.
If
Newton bringing this argument as his beft is T8o o Newton at the fame time declare his belief in the
conclufion, we have on one fide his argument and his authority, on the other fide the argument arifmg from his being reduced
to fuch
an argument.
:
and that fuch confiderations have weight, we know It is of courfe, they ought to have weight, v/e may eafily fee. dependent upon the particular conclufion what weight fhall be
That
if this conclufion were true it could attached to the afTertion, The courts of law conftantly act: upon this princi be proved.
They may good

ple.
it
confider (very juftly I think) that evidence, however be, is much lowered by not being the beft evidence
If a
that could be brought forward.
man
be
alive,
and capable
of being produced with fufficient eafe, they will not take any number of good witnefles to the fact of his having been very
On
recently alive.
Probability.
203
In enumerating the arguments, then, for or a againft proportion, thofe muft be included, if any, which arife out of the nature, mode of production, or producers, of any
among them. And until this has been properly done, we are not in a condition to apply the methods of the prefent chapter. Problem 4. A conclufion and its contradiction being produced, one or the other of which muft be true^ and arguments being
produced on both
fion
is
required the probability that the conclu proved, difproved (/. e. the contradiction proved), or left
fides,
neither proved nor difproved. Collect all the arguments for the conclufion, as in the laft problem, and let a be the probability that one or more of them
prove the conclufion. Similarly, let b be the probability that one or more of the oppofite arguments prove the contradiction. Both thefe cafes cannot be true, though both may be falfe. The pro
babilities
of the different cafes are thus derived.

is
Either the
proved, and the contradiction not proved, or the conclufion not proved and the contradiction proved, or both are
conclufion
left
unproved.
The
probabilities for thefe cafes are as a(i
b},
and the probability that the conclufion b(ia] and (i a}(i ), is proved is a(ib] divided by the fum of the three, and fo on. The fraction (ia}(ib] divided by this fum may be called the
incondufivenefs
which
thefis
this
incondufivenefs
of the combined arguments. The manner in is to be diftributed between the hypo-
of the truth and falfehood of the conclufion muft depend upon teftirnony, in the complete fenfe of the word. The predominance of one fide or the other, as far as argu
ments only are concerned, depends on which is the greateft, a(ib) or b(ia\ or fimply on which is the greateft, a or b. If the arguments on both fides be very ftrong, or a and b both very
near to unity, then, though a(i
yet (i
#)(!
to
b)
is
b)
and
b(ia)
are both fmall,
very fmall
ofa(i-b)
ever.
b(ia]
compared with either. The ratio on which the degree of predominance de
pends, may, confiftently with this fuppofition, be anything what But we cannot pretend that, when oppofite fides are thus
both nearly demonftrated, the mind can take cognizance of the predominance which depends upon the ratio of the fmall and
The neceflary imperceptible defects from abfolute certainty. confequence is, that the arguments are evenly balanced, and are
204
as if they
On
were equal
:
Probability.
is
there
no
fenfible notion
of predominance.
This
is
argument
the ftate to which moft well conducte d oppofitions of bring a good many of their followers. They are fairly
outwitted by both fides, and unable to anfwer either, and the conclufion to which they come is determined by their own pre vious impreffions, and by the authorities to which they attach
moft weight
and thefe
are,
fide
of courfe, thofe which favour their
own
of the queftion. previoufly adopted When no argument is produced on one fide of the queftion, the cafe is very different from the cafe of the preceding problems,
Here the queftion is, Has produced. the conclufion been proved or not proved 3 and when no argu ment is produced, we are certain it has not been proved. Ac
in
which no teftimony
is
cordingly,
If, in
if
no argument were urged

I
for the contradiction,
we
mould have
=i,
or b
= o.
the preceding problem, the
two
fides
of the queftion be
not contradictions, but fubcontradi&ions, of which neither need be true, but both cannot be, the problem is folved in the fame But we may introduce a for the cafes are juft the fame.
way,
diftinclion
which the former
cafe
would not admit.

is
When
one
muft be true, every argument againft one

the other
;
which
is
not the cafe
when
of equal force for neither need be true.
Let there, then, be arguments for the firft conclufion and againft let a and p be the probabilities that one or more of the it, and Let b and q be arguments for, prove it, or againft, difprove it. Then, there the fimilar probabilities for the fecond conclufion.
are thefe cafes
firft
are valid, againft

(it
invalid
arguments (or fome of them) for the are invalid, and thofe for the fecond matters nothing whether thofe againft the fecond be
:
I.
The
it
valid or invalid).
2.
The
arguments
for the
firft
are invalid,
thofe for the fecond valid, and againft it invalid. 3. The argu ments againft the firft are valid, and thofe for it invalid. 4. The fecond are valid, and thofe for it invalid. againft the
arguments
5.
All the arguments are invalid.

firft
is
it is
that the
proved, that
it
is
Accordingly, the probabilities difproved, that the fecond is

is
(
proved, that
nor difproved, are

*(i-?)(i-*)>
(
the two difproved, and that neither of in the proportion of a(ip}(ib}^

-%>
proved
!
#)/>,
and
(i- Xi-JJO-JX 1 -?)to both fides
Problem
5.
Given both teftimony and argument
On
Probability.
205
of a con tradition, one fide of which muft be true, required the probability of the truth of each fide.
the moft important of our cafes, as reprefcnting all all Collect the ordinary controverfy. teftimonies, and let their united force for the firft fide be and, from the nature of this
is
This
cafe,
(A
for the other fide.

fide
Let a and
fide are
b be the probabilities
proved by one or more of the arguments in their favour. Now, obferve that, for the truth of either fide, it is not efTential that the argument for it fhould be valid, but only that the argument againft it fhould be
firft
that the
and the fecond
invalid.
Accordingly, the probabilities of the two fides are in

#),
the proportion of ^(i b] and (i ^(i ties of the two fides are reprefented by
and the probabili
Firft, let there
A*=-a-=i
I
a.
let
be no teftimony either way we muft then have b to confequently, thefe probabilities are as I Let no argument have been offered for the fecond fide,
:
At;
or
= o.
is
Then we have
to
firft
Ia,
fide
for the odds,
or
argument be prefented of which the of the conclufion has alfo the probabi a. lity Probably the above was the cafe intended as to teftimony, &c., and the probability fhould then have been
probability
*, the truth
i-7-(2 a) for the probability of the been ufual to fay that if an
being true.
It has
or
2
which
is
poffibility
always greater than of the conclufion
Or, as we might expeft, the being true, though the argument

a.
:
fhould be invalid, always adds fomething to the probability of its being true. or Moreover, 1-^(2 0) is always greater than any argument, however weak, adds fomething to the force of the previous The fame thing is true in every cafe. probability. Suppofe a new argument to be produced for the firft fide, of the force k. The effeft upon the formula is to into
change
is
Ia
(i_rf)(i_^
ancl
he odds
in
i
favour of the conclufion are in-
creafed in the proportion of
to
ik.
But
this
to
be under-
206
On
Probability.
flood ftri&ly in the fenfe defcribed in page 202, namely, we are to fuppofe that the newly produced argument is Tingle, that is, the circumftances of its production caufe itfelf to be does not
by accompanied by an argument
firft.
for the fecond fide, or againft the
If this
laft
for the fecond fide
fhould happen, and the argument thus created have the force /, the odds are altered in the
k. /to i proportion of I From the above it appears that oppofite arguments of the force a and b are exactly equivalent to a teftimony the odds for b to I #. the truth of which are as I Thus, fuppofe we have
for a conclufion witnefTes
whofe teftimonies are worth

|, ii,
;
*,
T ^; arguments 2 againft of the forces f, T T ,
for
of the feveral forces,

.
i and arguments numerators only, we put Writing

4,
3,
down
For,
Againft,
2,
I,
2,
I,
9
I
7,
9,
I,
4,
3.
Hence
it is,
2. 2. 4. 9. 7. 9.
to
i.
i. 3.
i.
4. I. 3, or
252
to
for the conclufion.
is better than a argument, we fhould infer beforehand, force ; for the failure of the argument is fame of the teftimony the failure of the teftimony is nothing againft the conclufion, but the introduction of a the formula alfo So its overthrow.
An
fays
alters the exifting teftimony of the value /, not before received, k but the introduction of an odds in the proportion of k to I of the fame force alters them in the greater proportion
:
argument
of
i
Thus, the introduction of the teftimony of a alters the odds in the perfon who is as often wrong as right (-} them at all but the intro proportion of i to I, or does not alter duction of an argument which is as likely as not to prove the -, or of conclufion, alters them in the proportion of I to I
to
i
k.
2 to
i.
Are we not
in the habit, unconfcioufly,

?
of recognizing fome
to argu
fuch diftin&ion
Do we
not give
much more weight
ment than to teftimony ? I fufpect the anfwer fhould be in the that an argument of 3 to i does convince us much affirmative
:
I fufpecl: we fhow it, not in a teftimony of 3 to i. numerical appreciation, of courfe, but in liftening to and allow-
more than
On
ing weight to arguments,
the fame character.
It
Probability.
207
when we
fhould refufe teftimony of
may be
doubted, however, whether

it
we
for
experiment on the lower degrees

Perhaps
is
either of
fcope teftimony or argu
have
much
ment.
not often
we meet
a witnefs,
whether
as
bearing teftimony of veracity to a fact, or of judgment to a conclufion, whofe evidence is as low as 4 ; and the fame perhaps of an argument.
I have fpoken, in the previous part of this chapter, of the rejection of authority, that is, of teftimony, authority being only Let us now examine by the formula and fee high teftimony.
what
it
amounts
to.
:
Let a be the
probability that the
argument
and let us therefore perfift in faying that proves its conclufion a is the probability for the truth of the conclufion. In the for mula, b being=o, let ^ be made a+(i -f *), it will be found that
the probability for the conclufion,
//.
divided by
/n
+ (i
a)(i
tf),
comes out
a, as required.
total
argument, the
Confequently, in the cafe of a fingle rejection, as it would be thought, of all tefti
accompanying every argument by a It is to depending upon its own force. 7 declare that, by the laws of thought, an argument of T o- is of its own nature accompanied by a witnefs of vV, one of f. by a wit nefs of f , and fo on ; this is clearly not what was meant.
teftimony
lefs
mony,
is
really equivalent to
than
Nor,
I fuppofe,
can
,
it
be meant that
teftimony
and to reduce
others, to the fame.
evidence, and that of all If there be any fenfe in which the rejection
we are our own
arbitrarily to ftart
with the
of authority is defenfible, it muft be when we are required to proceed as if we were in perfect ignorance what the value of the cannot fuppofe it to be as to have one value authority is.
We
likely
Suppofe, for inftance, that the arguments have un known propofers we cannot treat their authorities as if they were juft as likely to be exceffively high or low as to be very near to none at all. 7 he more rational fuppofition is that the autho to be rity fhould be more likely to be fmall than great, as
:
as another.
likely
againft as for,
or againft.
and very unlikely to be exceffively great either for cannot here enter into the mode in which fuch an
:
but the refult of the hypothefis can be exprefTed or ufed fimpleft formula which fatisfies the above conditions, is as follows Let r=( i *~ ^ an d a meaning as above; then the
:
/>)"H
*)>
208
probability
that
its
On
argument, &c.
3
Probability.
is
the conclufion
is
true,
which has a
for the
of validity
r(r
6r 2 + 3r + 6rlogr + 2)-f-(r
i)
where logr means the Napertan logarithm (99-43^5 of the common logarithm will be near enough for the prefent purpofe). of no previous If, for inftance, r=2, which, on the fuppofition the i for to 2 balance of teftimony, would give conclufion, the
formula juft written gives -636, or 636 to 364, fomething lefs than 2 to i. In the cafe firft difcuiTed in page 202, it may be thought that
the weaknefs of a propofed argument, from one who fhould have confidered as a brought a better, if there had been one, may be
rather than an argument. Supteftimony againft the conclufion have only the probability TVto for his inftance, pofe argument,
us then, that after he has done his beft, it is 9 to i If we are very confident the propofition being proved. againft that it could be proved, if true, and that he could do it, if any
tells
He
one, he comes before us as a teftimony of 9 to i againft the If we take, then, all truth of the conclufion, or very nearly fo. wants of demonftration, as fo much evidence that his
argument from him againft the conclufion,
this
amounts
to
fuppofmg
that,
a being the validity of his argument, a is alfo his teftimony for a that againft it). If there be only argu the conclufion (and I ment for, and none againft, and if our minds be previoufly unbiafled,
we
and the odds
reprefent this cafe by putting a for //, in the formula, for the conclufion are then as a to (i a}*.
On
this fuppofition,
we mould
think well worthy of attention, not confider an unoppofed argument from an acute
which
I incline to
reafoner as giving the conclufion to be as likely as not, unlefs Were it not for or # a (i 382, a little more than |. cTf-
our peculiar introduction of teftimony, then, the conclufion being as likely as not to begin with, an argument which has any pro
bability
of proving
it,
would have made
it
more
likely than not,
as before feen.
But that the introduced teftimony fhould be exactly as above, If it were a mathematical propofition, is a mere fuppofition. to declare himfelf unable to give Euler were and for inftance, of more than a probability proof, I, for one, fhould confider him
On
Probability.
209
as giving a much higher rate of teftimony againft the truth of the affertion than is fuppofed in the But all this has
preceding.
reference to the queftion

lidities
how
to
meafure teftimonies and va
particular cafes, which is quite a diftincl: thing from the inveftigation of the way to ufe them when meafured. In cafes in which the number of arguments is multiplied, it generally happens that they ftand or fall together, in parcels
in
:
namely, that the
fame
failure
which makes one
invalid, neceiTarily
makes others
be
felec~red,
invalid.
In
this cafe,
independent arguments muft
and the
We fee
in this
(erved refult,
probabilities for them alone employed. problem an illuftration of the commonly obthat the fame argument produces very different
final conclufions in two different minds ; and this when, fo far as can be judged, both are difpofed to the fame probabilities to give the feveral premifes of the The initial odds, come argument.
how they may,
or
p
of
to
I
^, fhould be altered
b to
I
in the proportion
a.
by the arguments Accordingly, b and a being
the fame to both parties, their belief in the conclufion
may have
any kind of difference, if/* be not the fame thing to both. Problem 6. Given an affertion, A, which has the
probability
what does
is
that probability
become, when
that
?
it
is
made known
confequence
the probabi
that there
the probability
of A, B having the probability b of B then become ? lity

Firft, let
B is a neceffary And what does

The
true,
:
and
not be inconfiftent.
cafes are
now
as
Either follows, with refpecl: to A. that both the connexion exifts and B
is is
is
and
it is
not true
is falfe
or
is falfe.
This
too concife a ftatement for the beginner, except when it fuppofed left to him to verify it by collecting all the cafes. The
much
odds for the truth of A, either as above or by the collection, to As to either B is true, or B is m(i b)} B, falfe and it is not true that and the connexion are both true. Accordingly, the odds for B are as b to (ib)(ima).
are a{i
ia. A
The
is
reader muft
remember
that
when B
from A,
B
;
falfe
muft be true when A is true, but may be true when while A muft be falfe when B is falfe. And now we
neceffarily follows
fee that a
likely to lead to
bility.
proportion is not neceffarily unlikely, becaufe it is very an incredibility, or even to an absolute impoffiLet then the odds for A o, or let B be impoffible
2i o
are as
On
a(im]
to
I
Probability.
connec Say that it is 9 to I that the If a be a to are as tion exifts ; then thefe odds a). 10(1 when even than more ftill A remains not, likely greater than -J-, B. to the leads it it is abfurdity 9 to I that fo that both cannot be Secondly, let A and B be inconfiftent, the connexion does and B A is then Either true. falfe, true,
a.
not
exift
or
i
is
A
a.
is falfe.
The
odds for
are then as
a(ib)
(im)
falfe,
to
With
and
refpect to
or
falfe,
B is true and B, and the connexion are not both

either
is
true.
The odds for B are then as b(ia] to (ib)(ima). Among the early fophifms with which the Greeks tried
own
If a
the
was the power of logic, as a formal mode of detecting fallacies, conftruction of what we may cz\\ fuiddal proportions, aflertions
the truth of which
would be
their
falfehood.
man
he fpeaks neither truth nor falfehood ; for if he fay true, he lies, and if he lie, he fpeaks truth. Such a fpeech cannot be interpreted. Again, the Cretan, Epimenides, faid that ? all the Cretans were incredible liars ; is he to be believed or not
fhould fay
c
I lie,
If
we
believe him,
ftated
it
we
;
Some
liars,
thus
muft, he being a Cretan, difbelieve him. If we believe him, then the Cretans are
;
and
we
fhould not believe him
then there
is
no evidence
or we may believe him, fo that the evidence againft the Cretans, Refer fuch a propothe Cretans revives, &c. &c. &c.
againft fition to the theory of probabilities, and the difficulty immediately Whatever the credit of Epimenides as a witnefs difappears. be for his may be, that is, whatever, upon his word, the odds may
fame odds are there againft him from the propopropofition, the Thefe equal conflicting teftimonies balance one fition itfelf.
another (problem i) and leave the effect of other teftimonies to the fame point unaltered. The fophifm of Epimenides, as ftated, is but an extreme cafe of the fecond of the problems before us.
The
propofition
is
inconfiftent with
A, and the connexion

as
is
certain
(m=i): (!_)(! #) or
5
the odds for

as b to I
,
muft then be
b(ia)
to
exactly
what they
are independ
aflertion. ently of the previous
On
Induftion.
21
CHAPTER XL
On
Induction.
THE
which
theory of what
is
now
called induttlon
muft occupy a
large fpace in every

;
matter of arguments
work which profefles to treat of the but there is not much to fay upon the gen
uine meaning of the word, in any fyftem of formal logic. And that little would be lefs, if it were not for the miftaken oppofition
it has long been cuftomary to confider as exifting between the inductive procefs and the reft of our fubject. By induction (hrayurn) is meant the inference of a univerfal
proportion by the feparate inference of
all
the particulars of
which
it
is
compofed
whether thefe
particulars defcend fo
low
as fingle inftances or not. fo that every

P>2>R>
Thus
if
be a
is
name which
P
is
includes
thing which
muft be one of the
three
then
if it
be
mown
feparately that every
every
is
is
Y, and
Y.
And
that every is it follows that ; every this laft is faid to be proved by induftion. Thus
Y, and
that
(Chapter VI).
X)P,Q,R + P) Y + Q) Y + R)Y=X) Y
In form, it may be reduced as in page one ordinary fyllogifm. Complete induction is demonftration, and ftrictly fyllogiftic in its character. In the preceding procefs we have y)p, y)q, y)r, which give y)pqr and X)P,Q,R is pqr)x ; whence y)x, or X) Y. It is a the exiftence queftion of names, that is, it depends
is
an inductive procefs.
123, to
upon
or nonexiftence of names, whether a complete induction mall preferve that form, or lofe it in the appearance of a Barbara
fyllo
gifm, formed by help of the conjunctive poftulate of Chapter VI. But when the number of fpecies or inftances contained under
name is above enumeration, and it is therefore practically impoflible to collect and examine all the cafes, the final induc tion, that is, the ftatement of a univerfal from its particulars,
a
becomes impoflible, except as a probable ftatement: mould happen that we can detect fome law
unlefs
it
connecting the fpe cies or inftances, by which the refult, when obtained as to a certain number, may be inferred as to the reft.
212
This
laft
On
Induction.
induftion by connexion^
is
named kind of
common
other kind enough in mathematics, but can hardly occur in any of feries In innumerable an of knowledge. proportions, reprewill exift
P 15 P 2,P 3 ,P 4 , &c, it may and does happen that means of fhowing that when any confecutive number, fuppofe When this three, of them are true, the next muft be true. as the three as foon be induction a formal made, may happens,
fented by
firft
are eftablifhed.
eftablim
P4
is
but
P 2 ,P 3 , and P 4 ,
;
For by the law of connexion, Pi,P 2 , and P 3 , and then P 3 ,P 4 , eftablim P 5

;
and P 5 , eftablim P 6
that this
and
fo
:
on ad
there
infinitum.
is
It
is
to
be obferved
really induftion
no way,
in this procefs,
of
truth of P 100 without compelling an opponent to admit the it otherwife, admit to if he decline through all the forcing him,
previous cafes.
As an eafy inftance, obferve the proof that the fquare of any number is equal to the fum of as many confecutive odd numbers,
units in that number beginning with unity, as there are
:
as feen
in
Take any number,

a dot) in rank and we muft place n
file.
and write n ns (reprefenting a unit by

figure
into
(
To enlarge this
+I
) (
+ I )s,
and
more
dots at each of
two adjacent
is
fides,
one more
at the corner.
So that the fquare of n
turned into
the fquare of
+1
number.
Thus
the lOift odd number, true of n x , it is therefore true of (n

true of the
firft
which is the (n + i)th odd by adding ^n + I, loox 100 is turned into lOix 101 by adding If then the theorem alleged be or 201.
number,
and
being
i x (n ) therefore
+ i).
it is
But
it
is
true of the
fecond, or
3x3 = 1+3 + 5;
2x2=1+3;
fo
therefore
it
is
true of the third, or
on.
But when we can neither examine every cafe, nor frame a method of connecting one cafe with another, no abfolutely demonftrative induction can exift. That which is ufually called by the name is the declaration of a univerfal truth from the enumer
ation of
fome
the aflumption that the particulars, being
unex-
amined
amined, every another. agree with one
with thofe which particulars will agree in which thofe which have in point
have been ex
The
refult
thus obtained
been examined is one of
On
probability
;
Induction.
213
yet put the refultof fuch an induction in the fame clafs with that of a demonftration. There is no objection whatever to any one faying that the former refults are to his mind more certain than thofe of the latter the fact are fo. The difference may be that
:
and though a moral certainty, or an unimpeachably high degree of probability, can eafily be obtained, and actually is obtained, and though moft of our conclufions with refpect to the external world are it is an error to really thus obtained,
they
between neceffary and contingent propofitions lies in the quali ties from which they receive thofe adjectives, more than in
difference of credibility.
I
I
ground, when
equal to the
let
go
and
know that a ftone will fall to the know that a fquare number muft be
:
fum of the odd numbers, as above and though, when I flop to think, I do become fenfible of more affurance for the fecond than for the firft, yet it is only on reflection that I can diftinguim the certainty from that which is fo near to it.
The
rule of
probability of a pure induttlon
is
us think that any one is more than not to be or lefs Y, likely Thefe are the circumftances of what I call a likely than not.
is or Suppofmg the fimple queftion to be whether there being no previous circumftances whatfoever to
eafily given.
is
not
Y,
make
To begin with, it is I to pure induction. amined mall be a if this be done, and
that the
firft
ex
it is
2 to
I
that
mail be a
Xj be
Y,
then
it is
mould
it
fo
Generally, when the firft all been examined, and all turn out to be Ys, it is that the (m + i)th mail be a Y.
that
3
happen, then
3 to
mall be a
Y.
m Xs have m + I to I
this rule muft not lead the ftudent to fuppofe he can find a fimple reafon for it. Let 10 Xs have been exam ined and found to be Ys what do we affert when we it is
:
The
fimplicity of
I 1
to
that the
ith
mail be a
We affert that
fay
if
an in
finite
collected, each having white balls and black balls in infinite number but in a definite ratio, and fo that
number of urns were
if
every poffible ratio of white balls to black ones occurs once ; and every poffible way of drawing eleven balls, the firft ten of
felected and put afide
:
which are white, were

one
in
then, of thofe put

ball
is white, for reader will find
afide, there are eleven in
which the eleventh

ball is black.
which the eleventh
The
fome
difficulty in
forming a
diftinct
conception of
this,
and of
214
courfe will find
n Induction.
it impoflible to have any axiomatic perception of the truth or falfehood of the refult.
It
may be worth
while to {how that a fuppofition making fome
degree of approach to the preceding circumftances will give fome approach to the refult. Firft, in lieu of an infinite number of
balls in
definite
each box, which number may not
is
alter the ratio, let
fuppofed only that withdrawal of a each ball drawn be
put back again, which will anfwer the fame purpofe. Let there be only ten urns with ten balls in each, of which let the firft have one white, the fecond two white, &c. and the laft all white.
The number of ways of drawing eleven white balls fucceilively out of any one urn is the eleventh power of the number of white balls in the urn that of drawing ten white balls followed by one black one is the tenth power of the number of white balls mul
:
tiplied
all
the
by the number of black ones. If we were to put together firft, and then all the fecond, we fhould find about 21
times as many ways of arriving at the firft refult (ten white, fol lowed by a white) as the fecond (ten white followed by a black). But if we now increafed the number of urns, and took a hundred,
having one, two,

a
Sec.
white
to
balls,
;
we
fhould find inftead of 21,
number much nearer

Accordingly,
1 1
and
fo on.
when without any
previouily formed bias,
we
find that
ought
fucceffively examined, are each of them a Y, we I to I that the next, or then to believe it to be
Xs,
m+
(m-\- i)th
X,
will
be a Y.
And
further, a being a fraction lefs

1
^"H-
than unity,
that the
we Xs make
have a right to
fay there is the probability I the fraction a or more, of the Ys. up
Or
if
thus
if
10
are
firft
Xs
is
the fraction a be, fay , and if be all Ys, the probability that
juft that of drawing
in
be 10
or
then
the
more of
the
Xs
Ys
one or more black
balls in
drawings, from an urn
of the balls are always white. which the firft Xs for 100 were all Ys, it would be If, example, found to be 1000 to I that 93^ per cent, at leaft, of all the Xs are Ys. If as before, the firft m Xs obferved have all been Ys, and we afk what probability thence, and thence only, arifes that the next
n
Xs examined
it
fhall all
1
vour of
are m-}-
to w,
be Ys, the anfwer is that the odds in fa and againft it n to i. No induc
m+
tion then,
however
extenfive, can by
itfelf,
afford
much
probability
On
Induction.
to a univerfal conclufion, if the number of in fiances to be exam ined be very great compared with thofe which have been exam ined. If 100 inftances have been examined, and 1000 remain, it
is
the thoufand being as the hundred. with all our notions ; and yet it is demonftrably as rational as any other refult of the theory. The truth is, that our notions are not wholly formed on what I have
to 101 againft
all
1000 This
refult is at variance
called the pure induction. In this reafon to judge, except the mere
duced inftances.
above rules are
fuppofed that we know no mode of occurrence of the in Accordingly, the probabilities fhown by the merely minima, which may be augmented by
it is
other fources of knowledge. For inftance, the ftrong belief, founded upon the moft extenfive previous induction, that pheno
mena are regulated by uniform new cafe, by itfelf, furnifh as

ftances
laws,
makes the
firft
inftance of a
would
ftrong a prefumption as many in do, independently of fuch belief and reafon for it.
this however I have nothing farther to do, except to obferve that, in the language of many, induction is ufed in a fenfe It is made to very different from its original and logical one.
With
mean, not the collection of a
univerfal
from
particulars, but the
mode of arrival
nomena.
in
caufe for varied, but fimilar, phe great part of what is thus called induction confifts
at a
common
difcovery of differences, not refemblances. Under this confufed ufe of language, the ufual theory is introduced, namely, that
Ariftotle was oppofed to all induction, that Bacon was oppofed to every thing elfe, that the whole world up to the time of Bacon followed Ariftotle, that the former was the firft who fhowed the
way
&c.
to oppofe the latter, that each
had a logic of
his
own, &c.
The whole
admitted,
of
this
account abounds with miftatements.

ftriking difference
The
and
fufficiently
between the
philofophy of modern and ancient times, in all natural and mate rial branches of inquiry, is not fo eafily explained as by choofmg
two men, one
to bear
all
the blame, the other
all
the credit
nor
are Copernicus, Gilbert, Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and the other de predeceffbrs of the Novum Organum, deftined to be
always
prived of their proper rank.
What is now called induction, meaning the difcovery of laws from inftances, and higher laws from lower ones, is beyond the
province of formal logic.
Its
inftruments are induction properly
On
Induction.
fo called, feparation
ticulars (the neglect
of apparently related, but really diftin& par of which was far more hurtful to the old
philofophy than a neglect of indu&ion proper would have been,
even had
it
exifted) mathematical deduction, ordinary logic,

:
&c.
&c. &c. It is the ufe of the whole box of tools and it would be as abfurd to attempt it here, as to append a chapter on car
a faw. pentry to a defcription of the mode of cutting the teeth of The procefTes of Ariftotle and of Bacon are equally thofe which
we
are in the habit of performing every day of our lives.
But
fome perform them well, and fome ill. It is extraordinary that there mould be fuch divifion of opinion on the queftion whether a careful analyfis of them, and ftudy of the parts into which they On decompofe, is of any ufe towards performing them well. this point, and on the character of Bacon s office in philofophy,
a living writer, to
whom
their
mould think
firft
it
likely that
unborn would owe

preiTes himfelf in a
notions of
I
Bacon
of a
many yet writings, exat
manner which
quote, and
comment on
clafs
length, as the beft expofition I
can
which
is very prevalent, and, I fully fober thought and accurate knowledge.
of opinions find, the to believe, prejudice of
The
vulgar notion about Bacon

at truth,
we take
new method of arriving
which method
to be this, that he invented a is called Induction, and that
he detefted Tome fallacy in the fyllogiftic reafoning which had been in vogue before his time. This notion is about as well founded as that of the people
who,
who
in the middle ages, imagined that Virgil was a great conjuror. Many are far too well informed to talk fuch extravagant nonfenfe, entertain
what we think
matter.
incorrect notions as to
what Bacon
really effefted in this
The
induftive
method has been
pra<SHfed
ever fmce the beginning of the
conftantly pra&ifed by the moil igno rant clown, by the moft thoughtlefs fchoolboy, by the very child at the That method leads the clown to the conclufion that if he fows breaft.
world, by every
human
being.
It
is
By that barley, he mall not reap wheat. cloudy day is the beft for catching trout.
led
method a fchoolboy
learns that a
is
The
very infant,
we imagine,
by inclusion
is it
to expeft
milk from
his
mother or nurfe, and none from

but
his father.
Not only
it is
not true that Bacon invented the indu6Hve method

firft
correftly analyfed that method and explained its ufes. Ariftotle had long before pointed out the abfurdity of fuppofmg that fyllogiftic reafoning could ever condu61 men to the difco-
not true that he was the
perfon
who
very of any
new
principle,
had fhown that fuch
difcoveries muft be
made by
On
inclusion, and
Induction.
hiftory of the
217
induaive
by Inclusion alone, and had given the
procefs, concifely indeed, but with great perfpicuity and precifion. Again, we are not inclined to afcribe much praftical value to that analyfis of the induaive method which Bacon has given in the fecond book of
It is indeed an elaborate and correft But analyfis. an analyfis of that which we are all doing from morning to night, and which we continue to do even in our dreams. man
it is
the
Novum Organum.
mach out of order.

the
A plain
finds his fto-
never heard Lord Bacon s name. But he proceeds in the ftriaeft conformity with the rules laid down in the fecond book of
"
He
and fatisfies himfelf that minced Nojvum Organum, pies have done the I eat minced pies on Monday and Wednefday, and I was kept awake by indigeftion all This is the
mifchief.
night."
Jlantiarum convenientium.
comparentia ad intellettum innot eat any on Tuefday and Friday, and I was quite well." This is the comparentia injlantiarum in proximo natura dataprivantur. I ate very and was fparingly of them on
I did
qu<?
"
Sunday,
But on Chriftmas-day I almoft very nightly indifpofed in the evening. dined on them, and was fo ill that I was in
great
danger."
This
is
the
comparentia injlantiarum fecundum magis et minus. It cannot have been the brandy which I took with them for I have drunk ; brandy daily for This is the reje&io naturarum. Our years without being the worfe for invalid then proceeds to what is termed by Bacon the Vindemiatio, and pro nounces that minced pies do not agree with him. repeat that we difpute neither the ingenuity nor the accuracy of the theory contained in the fecond book of the Novum Organum but we think
"
it."
We
that
Bacon greatly overrated
its
utility.
is
procefs, like
many
other
procefles,
conceive that the induaive not likely to be better
We
merely becaufe men know have been one whit more

his
how
performed
they perform
likely to
William Tell would not cleave the apple if he had known that
it.
arrow would defcribe a parabola under the influence of the attraftion of the earth. Captain Barclay would not have been more likely to walk a thoufand miles in a thoufand hours, if he had known the place and name of Monfieur Jourdain every mufcle in his legs. probably did not pronounce D and F more correftly after he had been apprifed that D is pronounced by touching the teeth with the end of the tongue, and F by putting the cannot perceive that the upper teeth on the lower lip. ftudy of g rammar makes the fmalleft difference in the fpeech of people who have always lived in good Not one Londoner in ten thoufand can fociety. lay down the proper rules for the ufe of will and Yet not one Londoner in a flail.
We
Yet, work, he fometimes mifplaced them No man ufes ludicroufly. of with more propriety becaufe he knows that one figures fpeech figure of fpeech is called a metonymy, and another a fynecdoche. drayman in a paflion calls out You are a pretty fellow/ without fufpefting that he is uttering irony, and that irony is one of the four primary tropes. The old fyftems of rhetoric were never regarded by the moft experienced and difcernmg judges as of any ufe for the purpofe of forming an orator. O
his lateft
million ever mifplaces his w/// anclyM. Dr. Robertfon could, undoubtedly, have written a luminous differtation on the ufe of thefe words. even in
"
E<r
2i 8
hanc vim
intelligo"
On
"
Induction.
effe in praeceptis omnibus, non uteafecuti faid Cicero fua fponte homines eloquenTint laudem oratores eloquentiae adepti, fed quae fie efle non eloquentiam tes facerent, ea quofdam obfervafle, atque id egiffe
}
ex
muft own that we artificium ex eloquentia natum." of Logic, which Cicero entertain the fame opinion concerning the ftudy man of fenfe fyllogizes in of Rhetoric. the
artificio, fed
We
:
entertained concerning
celarent
he may and cefare all day long without fufpefting it and though in expofmg it when no has elenchl an what difficulty know not is, ignoratio ever he falls in with h.( Lord Bacon; in Critical and Hiftorical Efays contributed to the Edinburgh Review. By Thomas Babington Macaulay.)
ftudy
This
brilliant paflage has, I
have no doubt, appeared to many

it
which completely decifive of the queilion
affirms
and, as fo
often happens in like cafes, there is a certain exaggeration againft which it is of truth. It is good againft thofe who confound and recombination of exifting materials with introduction analyfis of them and who might profefs to fee in agriculture fomething
:
which would have benefited mankind, though plants and animals had not been natural produces of the foil. But I now proceed Bacon to examine it, againft thofe who affirm that Ariftotle and
are of no ufe, and
logical fallacy
is
who
very frequently
that their cafe
fall
is
:
into the
common
it
of fuppofmg made out that they are not of
proved,
as foon as
all the ufe
which Mr. Macau-
lay
himfelf has done, except as againft the exaggerators aforefaid. in reafon inductively from morning till night, and even do often we how and True it, particularly dreams. our badly
We
in fleep.
is then produced, to reafon on plain man better Mr. and Macaulay has imitated a plain principles Look over than he intended, by making him do it wrongly. out ; the indu&ion, and it will appear that the cafe is not made an exclufion is wanting it may have been the mixture of minced which did the mifchief. The plain man fhould pies and brandy without brandy ; but he had drunk the have tried minced
man
Bacon
pies
latter daily for years, and it one of the points in which
never ftruck him.
This
is
precifely
and
for
which we
are moft apt to deceive ourfelves, moft need to have recourfe to the complete;
we
nefs of a fyftem of rules
fomething is left taken for granted. The things of courfe, our daily habits, are neglected in the confideration of anything of a lefs ufual character the plain man
:
left oft
the minced pies upon
trial
but not the brandy
Chrift-
On
mas mifchief muft be
fare, if at
all.
Induction.
219
referred, he thinks, entirely to Chriflmas
But even
if this
to confirm the conclufion, yet the plain
omiffion had been fupplied, and the refult found man has flopped where
the plain man frequently does flop, at what Bacon calls the Vindemiatio prima, the rudiments of interpretation. Completenefs
is feldom anything but fludy and fyflem. Philofophy ought to bring him to the refult that daily brandy has made that fpirit ceafe to give the flimulus which, were its ufe only occafional,
would enable
fhort time.
his
flomach to bear an unufually rich
diet
for a
Our plain friend is precifely in the pofition of a bankrupt who curfes the times, on reafoning flrictly Baconian as far as it goes, and forgets that a cafual tightnefs in the money
market would never have upfet him, if it had not been previous years of extravagant living and ram fpeculation.
for the
But there are many procefTes which are not

becaufe
better performed
how they perform them." Mr. Macaulay here means becaufe men know the laws of that part of the That men mould not procefs which nature does for them." know better how to perform for knowing how they perform is almofl a contradiction in terms. William Tell knew how to
" "
men know
moot
accuflomed to
knowing which end of the arrow he was had he wanted this knowledge, his chance of the apple would have been much dimicleaving nifhed. But he would not have been improved by knowing that his arrow defcribed a parabola. True, becaufe it did not do fo. The centre of gravity of the arrow would defcribe a para or fomething fo bola, if it were not for the refiflance of the air
all
the better for

fit
to the firing
near
it
as to be undiflinguifhable.
But, taking the defcription
as roughly correct, William Tell did know, inductively, that the arrow defcribes a curve, concave to the earth and had made
:
thoufands of experiments in connexion of the two ends of that curve, which were all that he was concerned with. It is no ar
gument
againfl the fludy, as a fludy, of mduftion^ that the

refult
of ufeful
deduttlve
which
it
had recorded
in
the
amount mind of William
Tell in the fhape of habit, would not have been augmented by knowledge of an intermediate flatus with which he had
But let knowledge advance, under both modes nothing to do. of progrcfs, and Tell becomes an artillery officer, the rude arrow
22O
On
Induction.
a truly fhaped and balanced ball, means of meafurement are ap plied, the true curve is more correctly reprefented than by the parabola, and thirty pounds of iron are thrown to four times the
diftance
which an arrow ever reached, and with a certainty
al-
of the legend. But if Captain Barclay had known the places and names of the mufcles, he would not have been more likely to walk a thoumofr. equal to that
fand miles in a thoufand hours.
The
inftance
is
far fetched
becaufe the feat confided in the exhibition of power of endurance acquired by practice. If my denial feem as far fetched, it is the
of the propofer. Captain Barclay muft, by habit, by in duction, have acquired facility in varying his pace and gefture fo as to eafe the mufcles. Had he been well acquainted with the
fault
and ufes of thefe organs to begin with (towards which difpojition knowledge of their places and names would have contributed) he would have learnt this art more eafily. Though not altogether ad elenchum^ yet I may fay that in this cafe the effect of fuch knowledge would have been that he would have been lefs likely
Had he directed his attention to to have performed the feat. he of fcience fome would not have needed to have obfervation,
fought fame, or exhauftion of remarkable energy, in fuch a
fling purfuit.
tri
And
further, in a very
common
cafe,
mechanics
has taught what few ever learn by induction, though they have conftant opportunities of doing it namely, that in walking, the
:
and tiring ordinary practice of fwinging the arms is injurious that a very trifling amount of it tells ferioufly in a long journey.
which natural induction does not com and there may be many more of the fame kind monly teach, the queftion between it and regular ftudy requires the confideration, not only of what is done, and whether it might be done
Here
is
one
ufeful refult,
better, but
of what
is
not done.
Next,
M.
rectly after his attention
and F more cor Jourdain did not pronounce had been called to the details of the act
None but Moliere ever knew whether he did of pronunciation. or not but all who have watched the progrefs of inflruction
:
know
that the bad habits or natural imperfections of children are removed or alleviated by making them practice mechanical pro
In every one of nunciation, with perceptive adoption of rules. a few detached initances in which I have feen children at their
On
In duff ion.
221
reading lefTons in France, I have noticed that a return upon the

habits of pronunciation is always a part of the exercife: and that the letters are pronounced with that diftincl: effort which makes
the pupil fenfible of the action required. I have always attri buted to this practice the more uniform flandard of pronunciation which prevails among the educated French, as compared with
ourfelves.
of people
lay
But the fîdy of grammar makes no difference in the fpeech who have always lived in good fociety. If Mr. Macau-
mean merely
as to the ufe
of yfttf // and will, and the
like,
it
certainly be faid that the perpetual ufe of fpeech (which is not reafoning) does enable every one to form the habits of thofe
may
But that grammar, upon the fpeech of good fociety,

about him.
as a
is
whole, produces no effect one fide of a balanced matter
of opinion. Many contend that it has produced, in our gene ration and the one above it, a very unfortunate effecl: they aver that the purity and character of our Englifh has been deteriorated
:
by Lindley Murray and
his fchool,
and that we
much want
better
the fubject of Jhall and will, it is re teaching. markable that Mr. Macaulay, whom a vigorous faculty of illuftration, combined with immenfe reading, enables to ftrew his
grammar
On
treatife
path with inftances, has to invent his cafe, and to refer to a which Robertfon could have written. But it is not
if we grant that fuch a treatife would have been lumi be fafe we but would it have been corrett ? And nous, may muft abdicate at once, if we pronounce ufefurther, knowledge lefs all that has been clearly explained by thofe who have not
enough
Bacon himfelf rightly practifed. for his motto. fecandl

Next,
it
might have taken
exfors ipfa
no man ufes figures of fpeech more cor that one is metonymy and another fynecdocbe. True ; and in like manner no man confults his books more eafily becaufe he has a bookcafe. But, having the bookcafe, he arranges his books in it, and then he knows where to find them. Mr. Macaulay dwells throughout upon nomencla I ture. might infift upon its fuperftructure but even mere
is
faid that
rectly becaufe he
knows
naming
ftood.
is
ufeful,
when
the
A
itfelf
meaning of the name

in
is
clearly under-
mind well flocked with underftood names cannot

from being conftantly
the act of claflification,
keep
222
On
Induction.
which contains induction. The mere involuntary reference of inftance number two to inftance number one, which is made when we remember that the fecond muft have the fame name as the firft, is comparifon and induction, leads to reflection, culti
The drayman, who calls out in a vates tafte, and gives power. You are a pretty fellow without knowing that he paffion, there is omitted a is uttering irony, is an incomplete picture
"
!"
wifh relative to the eyes of his opponent, and an adjective which but feldom defcripis (in fuch quarrels) fometimes prophetically,
tively, true.
The
more
irony and the

defcription
value of the difference between this favage in the elegant form of it which is fo pleafmg
man s induction quoted above, is not the within comprehenfion of the drayman the foundation of a mode of expreilion than undifciplined rhetoric furnimes, fo better
of the plain
:
adoption is matter of tafte, was laid by thofe who placed tafte is a refult of comirony among the primary tropes. Good made been without nomenclature. not have could which parifons,
far as its
The
that fyftems of rhetoric are not of any ufe ? very quotation appears to mean that thefe fyftems, prcecepta, have their power ; that men get them by obfervation, and put
Did Cicero declare
them
done
into practice.
The
in the firft inftance,
ea fecuti oratores refers to what was by the firft eloquent men,fud fponte.
he fay that the art of rhetoric is derived from not vice verfa : moft falfely, as far as can be and eloquence, to infmuate that it was all done at one he feem does judged,
Moft
truly does
a ftep ; firft, fome one or more confummate orators, fecondly, Per finifhed fyftem, drawn from obfervation of their methods.
haps he intended a particular reference to a certain orator then the fentence, thus conftrued, contains nothing but namelefs matter which Tully is likely enough to have whifpered to
:
Cicero.
a tool, and it muft be employed upon materials which different men furnifh from their different means. But
fyftem
is
the coat muft be cut according to the cloth, both in fize and no reproach to the fciffors, nor prejudice to their fupequality the fharpened wood of the favage, even though prac over riority
:
tice will enable
him
to ufe the latter better than any civilized
man who
is
not a tailor can ufe the former.

is
tools, mental or material,
a cyclical procefs.
The formation of The firft iron
On
Inclusion.
;
223
was obtained by help of wood one of the firft ufes of it was to make better tools, to get more iron, with which better tools ftill were made, and fo on. And in this way we may trace back any art to natural tools, and to materials which are to be had for the The aflertion made by Mr. Macaulay, and many gathering.
others, that in logic only, of all the abftract fciences, our natural means are as good as thofe which refult from diligent analyfis, is
one which terminates
in
an
iflue
of
fact.
The
inftances given
are contained in the aflertion that a
man
in cefare offenfe fyllogizes
and celarent
day long without fufpefting it, and though he does not know what an ignoratio elencbi is, can always detect it when he meets with it.
all
and the claufe
indefinite term, offenfe : deficient in logical perfpicuity. Firft, what is a man offenfe ? I grant that I mould doubt the fenfe of a man who could not make the inferences defcribed by cefare and celarent.
is
?
Mr. Macaulay begins with an
man
But do men become men of fenfe by nature, without education

if
yes, I
cefare,
deny the aflertion that men of fenfe reafon (correctly) in &c. The man of fenfe who is not educated is as likely
to aflert that cefaro is all that can be obtained, or to invent the form fefape, as the plain man to forget to try the mince pies without brandy before he concludes. If no, then the aflertion
is itfelf
men of fenfe
fafter
: for the very queftion is how to make can not ceteris ; be, paribus, formed better and they with ftudy of logic than without it being agreed on all
ignoratio elencbi
hands that
this
Next, a
man of fenfe is always a practical logician. man of fenfe reafons, &c. without fufpecting
?
it.
reafoning, or that he is reafoning in ? I fuppofe the latter that is to fay, I take it to be meant cefare that a man of fenfe may (not muft, for fome Ariftotelians are men
is
:
Sufpecting what
that he
of
fenfe)
not
know
that the logicians call the

is
form of reafoning
is
it
he ufes
cefare.
This
eafily granted
but what
but the
celebrated Ignoratio elenchl of Locke, who fancied that he raifed an objection againft the pretenfions of the logicians, when he
declared he never could believe that
God
had made
men
only
No two-legged, and left it to Ariftotle to make them rational. one ever denied that men reafoned before Ariftotle, and would
have reafoned
ftill if
he had never
lived.
fo
Mr, Macaulay, probably without
much
as a
new
application
224
n Induction.
to the inkftand, after falling into the ignoratio elenchi, fmgles out this very fallacy as the one which a man of fenfe is fure to detect. But if there be a fallacy which is the ftaple of paralogifm, it is
this
one.
dinner)
tmpedit forts, is made up debate, from the Houfes of Parliament downwards, man who expofes it in converfation is confidered a of it.
is little
Dele ft at domi, for ordinary difcuffion (efpecially after for three fourths of public elfe ;
tirefome, and if he do
it
"
often, an uncourteous perfon
he
"
has
no
converfation,"
fpeak."
he
harps upon one
fubjea,"
he
"
won
t let
you
I
have made the above comments upon a very marked paflage of an eminent writer, in preference to introducing their fubftance as a diflertation of my own, that I might have the advan reader feeing that I meet real arguments, inftead of tage of the own verfion or fele&ion. It would probably be difficult to
my
find a better concentration
of the fubftance of the antagonift than is formal the ftudy of reafoning, views, with refpect to
contained in
my quotation from Mr. Macaulay
and
may
fafely
take his adoption of them as proof that thefe views yet require the notice of a writer on logic.
of the theory of probabilities, clofely con nected with induction proper, which it will be advifable to notice
There
is
one
refult
here.
When
the fyllogifm
is
both premifes being particular, admitted in many ftrength may be
declared illegitimate, on account of a probable conclufion of great

cafes.
This muft be the
moreînfifted on, becaufe it is too common to attend to nothing but the demonftrative fyllogifm, leaving all of which the conof clufions are only probable, however probable, entirely out
view.
I take as the inftance the fyllogifm,
c
or imperfect fyllogifm,
Some Xs
bability
fome pro Ys, fome Zs are Ys, therefore there is If the number of Xs and Zs that fome Xs are Zs.
are
is
is
of Ys (as in Chapter VIII) there together exceed the number Let us then fuppofe this a certainty that fome Xs are Zs.
not the
cafe.
Let the whole number of
Ys
in exiftence
be
u,
and
let
and
On
n be the numbers of
(hall
Induction.
225
I are among them. when the diftribution of the Xs and Zs among the Ys is utterly unknown fecondly, when their diftribution is that of contiguity, that is, when the Ys
Xs and Zs which
cafes
:
confider
two
diftincl:
Firft,
being for fome reafon arranged in a particular order, the Xs which are Ys are fucceffive Ys, and the fame of the Zs which are Ys. For the firft cafe a very rough notion will do, confined to the
fuppofition that few Xs and the whole number of Ys.
Zs
are mentioned,
compared with
together
When
the
Xs and Zs
make
a large proportion of the Ys in number, then, if we have no reafon for making them contiguous, or otherwife limiting the equally probable arrangements, it may be faid to be a moral cer
tainty that
fome Xs are Zs.
cafe, if we divide 43 times the product of m and n TOO times u, it gives us a fufficient notion (not large enough) by of the common logarithm of /, the odds in favour of fome
In the
firft
k to I. Say there are rooo Ys, and that and 100 Zs are Ys. Then 43 x loox 100 divided by loox iooo is 4-3, which is the logarithm of 20,000It is then more than 20,000 to I that, in this cafe, one or more Xs are Zs. A more exact rule is as follows. To ^mn
Xs
being
Zs being
100
Xs
are
Ys
divided by 100*7 add its hundredth part, and to the refult add fuch a fraction of itfelf as n is of 2j. Thus 43^2^-7- 100^
m+
being 4-3, which, with its hundredth part (200) being the tenth part of 2 (or 2000),
tenth part, giving 4*777, which is ftill under the mark. It is more than 60,000 to I that fome Xs are Zs. the fractions are very fmall, this rule is accurate
4*343, and m + n add to 4*343 its about the logarithm of 60,000,

is
we
When
and
if
enough,
if
be confiderable.
Its refult is, that if u
fiderable,
a perceptible fraction of the
Ys
be very conbe Xs, and a
perceptible fraction Zs, and if we really have no reafon to the limitation of contiguity or the like, then we are
it
make
juftified in
moral certainty that fome Xs are Zs. But I fuftreating the relation of to which I now pect proceed, better contiguity, the actual ftate of the in cafe reprefents ordinary argument.
as a
When the Xs which are Ys are contiguous, and alfo the Zs which are Ys, the probability that no Xs are Zs is the fraction m n -f i and u m n + 2 for nuhaving the product of y
226
nator.
On
Induction.
i and -f merator, and the product of u Thus in the example above propofed, 1000
Y\
m+
for
denomi
Ys
containing
among them 100 Xs and 100 Zs

80 1 x 802
fraction
is
(each
it
fet
contiguous)
we
4
have
for
numerator and 901 X 901 for denominator.

;
This
to i,
about 8-tenths
fo that
is
now
8 to 2, or
againft any
Xs
being Zs.
which
In order to find the probability againft the number of Xs are Zs exceeding /, add k to both the multipliers in the
v
numerator, which then become
+ k+i
and
>j
+ + 2.
/
For example, there

fet
60 Zs (each
number of Xs
Ys, containing contiguoufly) what is the chance againft the which are Zs exceeding 10? The numerator is
:
are 100
30 Xs
and
2iX22
the denominator
is
71x41.
This
fraction
is
462 by
291 1 ; whence it is 462 to 2449 againft, or 2449 to 462 (more than 5 to i] for, the number of Xs which are Zs exceeding 10. The chances, it is to be remembered, are all minima : ex
cept
when we mean may

is
that
m Xs,
queftions
ferve to give
and not more, are Ys, &c. Thefe fome notion of the manner in which
arguments not
What
this Y has the marks P,Q,R,S, &c. there is then amount of circumftantial evidence that this Y is the If it can be fhown that there is but one thing we want to find. which has all thefe marks, then the circumftantial evidence thing is demonftrative. But if there were, fay 100 Ys, of which 5 have the mark P, 5 the mark Q, &c., then having afcertained one Y which has all the marks, the queftion is, what chance is there againft another Y having them all the fame chance, at
:
by P,O,R,S, &c.
logically conclufive, may be morally fo. called circumftantial evidence is a fpecies of induction The thing required to be found has the marks probability.
:
a certain
leaft,
is
there that the
found
is
the one fought.
Inftead
how
ever, of attempting the problem in this way, which is never reforted to for want of data (I mean that the refemblance which
the rough procefles of our minds bear to thofe of the theory of If the probabilities does not here exift) I take it as follows.
pofleflion
of the mark P give a certain probability to the

it is
whofe teftimony has a certain credibility. Similarly for &c. Compound thefe Q,R,S, teftimonies, when known, by the rule in page 195, and the refult
as a witnefs
is
found being that fought,
the value of the circumftantial evidence.
227
CHAPTER
On
this
XII.
old Logical Terms.

to
propofe fay fomething IN the old Logic, which though they keep their places
chapter
on a few terms of in works
fubject, and have fome of them parted into common lan are guage, very little ufed. They relate generally to the fimple and the name by which it is exprefTed and have little of notion,
on the
fpecial reference, either to the propofition or fyllogifm. They are moftly derived from Ariftotle, whofe incidental expreffions
became or give were amplified
to technical terms, and whofe fingle fentences into chapters. And here, as in other places, I have nothing to do with the degree of correctnefs with which Ariftotle s meaning was apprehended, nor even with how much
rife
was drawn from
Ariftotle and
how much
added to him, but only
with the actual phrafes and their ufual meaning.
The words logic and dialectics* are now ufually taken as meaning the fame thing the old diftinction is that dialectics is the part of logic in which common and probable, but not necef:
fary, principles,
laid
are ufed.
faithfully
But
the diftinction
to,
is
neither clearly
down, nor
adhered
even by Ariftotle himfelf.
term (in this work always called name] was divided into and fimple complex : the fimple term was the mere name, the term was what all moderns call the affirmative propofi complex
The
Thus man and run were fimple terms man runs^ a com term. Later writers rejected this confufion and divided plex the acts of the mind confidered in logic into apprehenfion, judg
tion.
: :
ment^ and difcourfe^ taking cognizance of notions, propofitions, and arguments. The common meaning of the word difcourfe,
* Our language is capricious with regard to the ufe of angular and plural of words in ic : thus we have logic and dialectic/, arithmetic and mathema
tics,
phyfic and phyficj for medicine and natural philosophy. Some modern writers are beginning to adhere uniformly to the angular, in which I cannot follow them, for I am afraid an Englifh ear would not bear with mat/ieas a fubftantive. Would it not better confift with the genius of our language if the plurals were to be always ufed, and the fingulars made adjeilives without the termination /?
matic
228
On
old Logical Therms.
(which now generally applies to fomething fpoken) is derived from its place in this divifion. The word argument, which is
now
was
equivalent to reafoning againft opposition expreffed or implied, a fyllogifm. originally nothing but the middle term of
The
fimple term
was
univerfal or fingular
univerfal,
when
of more inflances than one, as man, horfe, ftar ; fingular, when of one inftance only, as the fun, the firft man, the pole-ftar, this book. Singular names were called individuals, from the etymo
logy of the word, as belonging to objects not divifible into I have inftances to each of which the name could be applied.
not dwelt upon the diftinction between fingular and univerfal, And moreover, a fingular becaufe it is ineffective in inference.
propofition is only objectively fingular, but ideally plural. Julius * in point of fact, there was but one Caefar. Caefar was a Roman
:
But take any imaginary

life
;
repetition of the circumftances of Caefar s
fuch, for inftance as occurs to thofe
who
have thought of
the poflibility of the fame courfe of events returning into exiftence after a certain cycle and then the term Caefar becomes
:
plural.
Or, even without
fo forced a fuppofition,
that, if
we
defcribe Caefar,
is
we muft
defcribe a
fit
definition of Caefar
lived,
fo clofe as
to
only
we may fay Roman that our one man that ever

:
makes no
effential difference in the character
of the pro
fingular
pofition.
But a
further diftinction
which was made divided
terms into fubjects of univerfal, and fubjects of particular, propodeterminate (or definite) individual, as Caefar, this fitions.
man, was the former a vague (or indefinite) individual, as The diftinction certain man, the firft comer, was the latter. c that of c fome man and this one man.
:
a
is
Certain notions of effence or relation, accompanying the apprehenfion of a name, were called categories, or predicaments, c meaning modes of affertion with refpedt to the object named.
Ariftotle gave ten categories, and might have given ten hundred. In their ufual Latin form they were fubflantia, quantitas, qualitas, relatio, aElio, pajjio, ubi, quando, fetus, habitus.
The word
and
It
its literal
tranflated
by fubftance,
xo-ia,
means mode of being:
which ftands under)

is
is called ejfentia, effence. fubftance (that as fupporting accidents, prefently explained. far too metaphyfical a term to come into common life with-
Latin
is
It
On
:
old Logical Terms.
229
that of
out fome degradation and accordingly it there means which a thing is compofed, whether material or not. Accordingly
we
have the material fubftance of a coat, the intellectual fub
ftance of an argument. But, as we ufe the word, its meaning to the other belongs predicaments. In fact, the fubftance of the
old logicians ftands, as to exiftence, in the fame fituation as mat ter (page 30) with refpect to our fenfible perceptions, or objeft with refpecl: to our ideas. The fubftance, it was faid, is per fe
fulfijlens,
while the accident could not be
faid
ejje,
but
inejfe.
The
diftin&ion between the fubftance
material fubftance (in

diftinction
firft
(mode of being) and the the modern fenfe) may be helped by the
between fubftantia prlma and fubjlantla fccunda, the
of]ohn,asjohn,wasfub/}antiaprima; man, fubftantia fecunda. All thefe very metaphyfical notions were the ftudent s firft introduction to logic, and were confidered
as
Thus
referring to the individual, the fecond to the general term. as the fubftance
of the utmoft importance.
The predicament of quantity,

and
part,
derived from the notion of whole
as either continuous or difcrete. In con tinuous quantity, the unit was divifible, in difcrete, indivifible. Thus ten feet is continuous, ten men difcrete. The diftinction
is
was conceived
precifely that
Duality was fubdivided
of magnitudinal and numerical. into I. Habit and difpofition, the
latter
term being ufed for the imperfect ftate of the former 2. Power and want of it 3. Patibilis qualitas and pajfio, applied to the ideas of that which is undergone, the firft permanently, the fecond
for a time. 4.
Form and figure. now,

referred to the fuggeftions derived
Relation then, as
from
It was divided into verbal comparifon of two things or ideas. and real (fecundum did andfecundum ejfe]. Thus the relation of
profit to profitable
was
to below, real.
The two
frbjefi and term : relations, the fubjecl: of either
that of father to fon, or of above things related, or correlatives, were called fo that of two correlatives, giving two oppofite
verbal
fundamentum of the relation was that when it had a beginning.
was the term of the other. The in which it took its rife,
Attion and pajfion, the production and reception of an effect, requiring the producing agent, and the receiving patient, were divided into immanent, or enduring in the agent, and tranfient,
230
On
old Logical Terms.

Actions were univocal^ or
or pafling out to another.
according as their effects were of the fame or different fpecies. few years before the publication of Newton s Principia, it was
taught in a work imported into Cambridge that when mice bred mice, the action was univocal, but when the sun bred mice (the writer muft have been thinking of Ariftotle and fome of the
fchoolmen) aequivocal. There was
alfo the
terminus a quo and the
terminus ad quern to reprefent the (late before and the ftate after the action. Thus, when all this nonfenfe was fent to Coventry,
the terminus a quo was an immenfe quantity of univocally bred of the the terminus ad quern was the kind ; learning preceding
rooting up of the wheat of logic with the tares. The where (as to abfolute pofition), the when^ and the fite
gave no peculiar terms of fubdivifion. The habitus (s%eiv) referring to poffejjion generally in the firft inftance, was materialized by fome of the old logicians till it related to
(relative pofition)
drefs only, or habit in the
thence acquired meaning.

category as well) has been introto fignify a fet of circumftances
It
is
is then no longer con there any occafion that it
The word predicament (and cuced into common language
under which any thing takes place. fined to the above predicaments, nor
mould
be.
predicables (xotTwopxpeva) are diflinguifhed from predica ments (xaryyopiai) in that the former belong to any fimple notion or name, and may be predicated of it the latter belong to the
:
The
connexion (when affirmative) between two names. They are laid to be five in number, genus, fpecies^ differentia^ proprium^ and accidens.
The words
If there be a
genus and fpecies have preferved their old meaning.

is
number of names of which each
fubidentical of
then of any two, fay the one which follows, fay V, X, Y, Here is is a the and X, genus containing fpecies
:
W,
W.
the
proximum of W, Y the genus remotum. In what is a fummum genus^ having for its infima fpecies univerfe^ which the individual inftance of any name in it, the fuperidentical is the
genus, the fubidentical the fpecies. Subcontraries (and contraries)
are oppofite fpecies
;
fummum
genus^ and
the infima fpecies
the genus I have called a

is
fupercontraries and
complex
particulars
have
no ancient name.
On
The
old Logical Terms.
23
it fpecies or differentia is that by which one clafs (be or the difference being accordingly termed fpecific generic) genus, is Thus the difference (or one differ diftinguifhed from another.
the ence) feparating the fpecies man from the other fpecies of the is rational. epithet genus animal,
the fpecies (or property) is that which belongs to to to thus all or to fome : ftudy, and only, only commentators old are But of man. the fpeak, equally proprla There are four as follows. give definitions of the
The proprium
whether
it
be to
property
all.
to the fpecies alone, but not to the the fpecies, but not to that alone. 3. the and all but times. to of not at all 4. fpecies only, it,
kinds.
I.
That which belongs

all
2.
To
To To
fpecies alone, to
all,
and always.
accident (or accident) is that which may fometimes be to the individual of a fpecies, but not neceffarily, nor to that long In modern the term is limited to what fpecies alone.
is
The
language, unufual and unexpected. The word caufe was ufed by the ancients in a wider fenfe
:
than by us
Italian cofa.
efficient,
more nearly in the fenfe of the Latin caufa, or the Caufes were diftinguifhed into material, formal, and final. The material caufe was the very matter of
a thing, confidered as a kind of giver of exiftence ; the formal caufe was its form, in the fame light ; the efficient caufe (our
common
exiftence
caufe, the ultimate
Englifh word) the agent or precedent ; and the final end or objet, confidered as a reafon for the
of the thing.
Sometimes writers
ftill
talk
if
of
final
caufes, and are as unintelligible to moft readers as talked of final beginnings.
they had
The word
arrangement.
form was ufed

it
or fhape, to mean, as
wider fenfe than that of figure law of exiftence, mode, difpofition, were, Mere figure or fhape was only one of the acci
in a
dental forms, as diftinguifhed from fubjlantlal forms, belonging to the fubftance. And motion was as widely ufed as form : it meant
any
ter.
alteration.
Thus,
local
Change from place was

original ufe
corruption was to place, to
one of the motions of matwhich the modern word is

objeft is to
confined,
motion.
The
of the terms fubjeft and
denote a
thing confidered as that which may have fomething inherent in it, or attached to it, or fpoken of it, &c. ; and as that which may
232
On
old Logical Terms.
be objetted to the mind or reafon, or made to come in its way. Thus it was faid that matter is the fubjeft of thofe properties of the mind in natural philofophy. The modern fenfe of objeff, namely, end propofed, is natural enough. In modern times, fubjeft and object are ufed* with refpet to knowledge : the fubjecl: being the mind in which it is, the object being the external fource from which it comes. For [ubjeflive and objeSfive I have in this work ufed ideal and obAdjunct was the technical term for that jeftive (page 29). which is in the fubjecl:. A modal proportion was one in which the affirmation or nega tion was exprefled as more or lefs probable including all that is
which are the
objefts
tranfition to the
from neceffity to technically under probability (Chapter IX) I to be the un of take The probabilities theory impoffibility.
known God which

they
fo dealt
the fchoolmen ignorantly worfhipped
when
with
beyond human
of enunciation, that it was faid to be determination whether they moft tortured the
this fpecies
modals, or the modals them.

;
Their gradations were
neceffary^
contingent meaning more likely contingent^ pojffible^ impojjible Thefe they connected than not, poffible lefs likely than not. with the four modes of enunciation, A, I, O, E, and when by
fame
is
meant more than
half, the
connexion
is
good.
The
con-
to this day among troverfy about modal forms continues up not mathematicians I mould fuppofe that the logicians who are
:
latter
a thought, except as a branch of the and except as to the confideration how theory of probabilities, non-mathematical the which the terms logician indicates his
would never give

by
it
the numerical fcale. In degrees of belief are to be placed upon like manner he reads the thermometer by graduation, and though he admits the freezing and boiling point, which have an origin
in nature, he leaves temperate, fummer heat, blood heat, &c. to the fancy of thofe who choofe to employ them. At the fame time it is clear that thefe modal forms were con-
fidered not merely as ufeful in expreflion of the nature and amount belief, but as fuggeftive of real branches of inquiry, fubfervient to that great a priori inquiry into the nature of things to which
of
* See a full account of thefe words in Sir
William Hamilton
notes to
Reid, p. 806, &c.
On
mediaeval logic
old Logical Terms.
233
was
applied.
We are not
fit
to judge of the in-
ftrumental part of this philofophy, unlefs we confider alfo the materials on which it was founded. In an age in which much
more
faith
much more
was demanded of the ftudent than now when he was frequently required to decide in one way or the
;
other upon a fmgle teftimony j when, in addition to the nonmythic wonders recorded in ancient writers, which there was no
mode of contradicting, all that was known of immenfe regions and countries refted upon very few accounts, and thofe filled with ftories quite as ftrange the abfence of other means of
:
diftinguifhing truth from falfehood obliged thofe who thought to It matters little to lay much ftrefs upon a priori confiderations.
us whether we infer the necejfity of man being a walking animal from the non-arrival of exceptions, and thence the univerfality of the rule, or the univerfality from the fuppofed perfect induction of inftances, and thence the neceflity. But it was of much more confequence to the old logician of more real confequence. He
:
but that any day of the week might bring from or Cathay Tartary an account of men who ran on four wheels of flefh and blood, or grew planted in the ground like Polydorus
did not
in the ./Eneid, as well
know
evidenced as a great
many
nearly as
mar
could not pretend to inductive and demonftrative univerfality, even upon the queftion of the form of his own race, he was obliged to combine with his argument the an
vellous ftories.
As he
tecedent teftimony of his own and other minds, in the manner which the real doctrine of modals (page 205) ftiows to be neceffary in all
non-demonftrated conclufions.
It
is
true that he fre
quently confounded the predifpofition of minds with the conftitution of objects ; the teftimony with the thing teftified about. fhall never have true knowledge of the fchools of the
We
middle ages, until thofe

their
who have
ftate
ftudied both their

tradition,
philofophy,
phyfics,
and their
of
will
look at their
weapons of controverfy as both ofFenfive and defenfive, and give a fair account of the amount of protection afforded by the firft,
exifting ftate of the fecond advifable to confider whether,
in the
and
third.
It
would
alfo
be
cation by land and fea, and

courfe,
it
all
looking at the power of communi the circumftances of literary inter-
the earth
would have been practicable to place the knowledge of and its details upon any better footing of evidence.
234
On
old Logical Terms.
One leading feature of the fchoolmen, acute as they were, and as to reprefentation of notions, inventive, and which is fhared by many more modern writers who have not difciplined themfelves
mathematically,
is
feen in their
are inftances of the ftrange ufe, the
employment of quantity wrong ufe, and the
there
no-ufe.
Moft of them arife from indiftincl: apprehenfion of which obliges them to accept fuch ftages of quantity
prefled
continuity, as are ex-
There
tity.
by exifling terms, without any effort to fill up gaps. alfo a flovenlinefs of definition in what relates to quan Thus dozens of inftances might be given in which the
is
fame of the particular propofition is fo defined that we might c fuppofe it is fome, not all, inftead of fome, it may be all, and the former is the exprefs definition of fome writers and it is only
:
when we
meaning.
find in rules that
XY
that
fays
does not allow us to infer
Y,
nor to contradict
"
X)Y,
we
Sir
afcertain
the
real
intended
"
Logicians,"
William Hamilton,
have
referred the quantifying predefignations plurimi^ and the like, to
fome making them univerfal, fome ; and between fome both." particular, They muft have had curi ous ideas of quantity who made the propofition c moft Xs are Ys either univerfal, or between the univerfal and particular I
the moft oppofite heads
:
fhould fuppofe that thofe who did the latter muft have imagined fome to refer to a minority.
There is a ftrange notion of quantity revived in modern times, which confifts in making plurality of attributes a part of the quan
of a notion. It is called its intenfive quantity, or its intenfion, or tity It is oppofed to extenfive quantity, or extenfion, comprebenfion. which is the more common notion of quantity, referring to the
number of
is
fpecies or of individuals
(it
may be
either, the individual
the real infma fpecies) contained under the name. Thus man is not fo extenfive as animal, but more intenfive ; the attribute ratio-
lefs
nal gives greater comprehenfion. But man refiding in Europe is It is faid that extenfive and more comprehenfive than either.
lefs
the greater the intenfive quantity the
the extenfive, but this
is
not true, unlefs no two of the figns of intenfion be properties of the fame fpecies. Thus, according to fuch ftatements as I have
c
feen,
man,
refiding in
equator, feeing the fun
rife after
Europe, drawing breath north of the thofe in America, would be a
more
intenfively quantified notion than
man
refiding in
Europe
On
old Logical Terms.
235
but certainly not more extenfive^ for the third and fourth elements of the notion muft belong to thofe men to whom the firft and fe-
cond belong. Thus, in the Port-Royal Logic, one of the earlieft modern works (according to Sir W. Hamilton), in which the diftin&ion is drawn, it is faid that the comprehenfion of the idea of a
triangle includes fpace, figure, three fides, three angles, But the idea equality of the angles to two right angles.
and the
of recti
linear three-fided figure has juft as much extenfion. The relation between comprehenfion and extenfion exifts,
is
and
ufeful
but not,
I think, as that
of different kinds of quantity.
In page 148, where I hold that the propofition is contained in its neceflary confequence, the view is one of extenfion the ordinary view is one of comprehenfion. c Every cafe in which P is true,
:
is
a cafe in
which
is
true,
tells
us that
all
the P-cafes are con
location of inftances), among the Q-cafes. But, as to comprehenfion, every P-cafe contains all that When, in diftinguifhes a O-cafe from other things.
tained, as to extent
(number and
page 47,
animal,
I
it is
faid that
the idea of
:
man
is
contained in that of
firft
fpeak of extenfion
all
the inftances to which the
idea applies are among thofe to which the fecond applies. But, as to comprehenfion, the idea of animal is contained in that of
man
all
other things befides.
that defines animal goes to the definition of man, and In page 50, the is of pofTeffion of all
"
efTential characteriftics," refers to
comprehenfion
the
"
is
of
both pofleffing equally the characters identity" under which the verb may occur in logic. There is no diftinction
to extenfion
:
which affecls inference for X)Y has exactly the fame proper ties whether we interpret it as expreffing that Y has all the ex tenfion of X, and may be more j or that X has all that Y has in comprehenfion, and may be more. In pages 115, &c. we have the mode of reprefenting names of more or lefs comprehenfion. Thus, P, Q, R, &c. being chara&eriftics, the obvious propofition PQ)P, illuftrates the theorem that where the comprehenfion of one name has all that of a fe cond (as PQ_has that of P) the extent of the fecond is at leaft
:
as great as that
of the
firft.
And
the felf-evident poftulate in page
115, by which we may diminifh the extent of a term univerfally ufed, or increafe that of one particularly ufed, may be exprefled in
language of comprehenfion.
That
is,
we may augment
the
com-
236
On
old Logical Terms.
prehenfion of a univerfal, or diminifh that of a particular. Thus, X)Y gives XP)Y, and X.Y gives XP.Y but X)YP gives
:
X)Y.
It will be the firft attribute eafily feen that comprehenfion has of quantity (page 174) there is more and lefs about it. But it is not of the meafurable kind (page 175). As to extent, 200 in:
flances bear a definite ratio to 100,
which we can
ufe, becaufe
our inftances are homogeneous. But different qualities or defcriptions can never be numerically fummed as attributes, to any purpofe arifing out of their number. Does the idea of rational animal, two defcriptive terms, fuggeft any ufeful idea of duplication^ when compared with that of animal alone. When we fay that
a chair and a table are
more
furniture than a chair,
which
is
true,
we
never can cumulate them to any purpofe, except by abftracT:To ing fome homogeneous idea, as of bulk, price, weight, &c. give equal quantitative weight to attributes, as attributes, feems
to
me
abfurd
to ufe
them numerically otherwife,
is
at prefent
impoffible.
The
terms, which are ufed
reader will have feen the origin of feveral very common in a fenfe coinciding with, or at leaft much
refembling, that put upon them by the fchoolmen. one which has diametrically changed its meaning ;
Inflance.
But
it is
there
is
the
word
The word inftantla (and alfo eWrau^) implied a cafe not againft, for ; the latter was exemplum : fo that inftance to the
contrary
I
is
would have been tautology.
have referred the word enthymeme to this chapter, though it always regularly explained in connexion with the fyllogifm.
tea}
According to Arifrotle, Ev^/^/xa scrn cruhhoyio-fAoi; drex^ If ELXOTCUV crÊ/wv, an enthymeme is an imperfect fyllogifm from probables and figns the modern critics reject the word arc?^, imperfeft^ as
:
interpolated.
The word fegn
feems to mean indication, fymptom,
or effect, which makes the caufe almoft necefTary or highly But the fchools took the word enthymeme to mean a probable. c fyllogifm with a fuppreffed and implied premife, fuch as He muft
be mortal, being a man.
cannot help fufpecting that Ariftotle*
He
fays all that
is
communicated
(\sysreu)
of the predicate, will be
of the fubjeft. Thefe two different tenfes of two different verbs are often both translated by dlcitur. did they
aflerted in
words
(jnQn<maC)
Why
On
made no
and
that
Fallacies.
237
difference
diftinctly received,
we might
as
between a fupprefTed premife, clearly intended and one formally given. It feems to me well diftinguifh a written from a fpoken fyllo-
gifm, as to the logical character of the two.
CHAPTER
On
is
XIII.
Fallacies.
which THERE
no fuch thing
as a clarification
of the ways
is
in
men may
arrive at an
error
it
much
:
to be
doubted whether there ever can be. As to mere inference, the main object of this work, it is reducible to rules thefe rules
being obeyed, an inference, as an inference, is good ; confea quently bad inference is a breach of one or more of thefe rules. Except, then, by the production of examples to exercife a be ginner in the detection of breaches of rule, there is nothing to do
all
in a chapter on fallacies, fo far as thofe of inference are con cerned. Neverthelefs, there are many points connected with the matter of premifes, to which it is very defirable to draw a reader s attention and above all to queftions in which it is not at firft
:
obvious whether the miftake be in the matter or in the form

in
or
may be the one or the other, according to the fenfe put upon the words. If there be anything ridentem dicere verum quod vetat^ writers
it
which
logic have in all ages moft grievoufly neglected the prohibition treating this fubject, and have given the ftudent a prefcriptive One reafon of this was, that the right to fome amufement.
in
on
occur
? For various reafons, I allow myfelf to fufpeft, though not fcholar enough to maintain, that Xo yo? generally meant communication, paflage from one mind to another by any means, as much at leaft with reference to
:
p?<n
the receiving, as to the ?, imparting, mind and that it is here oppofed to Throw the verbs back to their primary meanings, fpeech, in that fenfe.
and
the
is picked up of the predicate, mall /ow out about conjecture be correft, the modern enthymeme is here put on the fame footing as the fully exprefled fyllogifm.
it
fubjeft."
will be
That which
If
my
238
On
Fallacies.
Greeks endeavoured to try the new art by inventing inferences the falfehood of which could not be detected by its rules. Thefe, as may be fuppofed, were whimfical efforts of reafoning never:
thelefs,
they have been handed
down from book
to book, unfur-
Another reafon is, that jefts, puns, &c. are paffed in their way. for the moil part only fallacies fo obvious that they excite laugh
ter
;
and the greater number of them can be
mown
to break
one
or another of the rules of logic. Accordingly, they furnim of thefe rules the ; application of which, in feftriking examples rious terms, has itfelf a tafte of the ludicrous. Boccacio has, by
his inimitable mode of narration, made a good ftory the jeft of which could be defcribed as confifling in nothing more than the aflumption that what can be predicated of ftorks* in general can be predicated of roafted ftorks which is what logicians would call the fallacia accidentis^ or arguing a ditto Jimpltciter^ ad dictum fecundum quid.
:
terms fallacy^ fophifm, paradox^ and paralogifm^ are ap to offences againft logic ; but not with equal propriety, plied and Fallacy fophifm may technically have been firft applied to
The
arguments
in
common
and
to apply
fa<5t,
which there is a failure of logic but it is now very them alfo to arguments in which there is a
:
falfehood of
if this
it
laft ufe
or error of principle, though logically treated ; be not correct, writers on logic have fanc-
tioned
in their examples.
Many
the erroneous ftatement

habit of walking
fallacy.
itfelf
a fallacy
perfons go further, and call that men are in the :
on
A paradox
: :
general opinion
would fay is a very obvious properly fomething which is contrary to but it is frequently ufed to fignify fomething
their heads, they
is
felf-contradi6lory
thus the newfpaper which recently
avowed
A fervant
who was
roafting a ftork for his mafter
by
his fweetheart to cut off a leg for her to eat.
When
leg.
was prevailed upon the bird came upon
table, the mafter defired to
know what was become of
the other leg.
The
man
anfwered that ftorks had never more than one
The
mafter, very
angry, but determined to ftrike his fervant dumb before he punifhed him, took him next day into the fields where they faw ftorks, ftanding each on one leg, as ftorks do. The fervant turned triumphantly to his mafter on
:
and the birds put down their other legs and flew faid the fervant, Ah, away. you did not fhout to the ftork at din ner yefterday if you had done fo, he would have mown his other leg too."
which the
"
latter fhouted,
Sir,"
"
On
its
Fallacies.
239
opinion that the repeal of the corn laws would make food The both cheap and dear is faid to have maintained a paradox. modern ufe of the word implies difrefpect, but it was not fo for
merly. Thus in the fixteenth century the opinion of the earth s motion was ftyled the paradox of Copernicus by writers who meant neither praife nor blame, but only reference to the opinion of Copernicus as an unufual one. The more precife writers of
our day ufe the word paradox for an opinion fo very fingular and improbable, that the holder of it is chargeable with an undue
bias in favor
of fingularity or improbability for

its
is
its
own
fake.
beft fitted to fignify an offence Paralogifm^ by etymology, It has been frequently againft the formal rules of inference. abufed by mathematical writers, who have fignified by it errors
of ftatement, and undue affumptions but it is not completely fpoiled for the purpofe, and I (hall therefore ufe it to denote a
:
phifm, words which
formal error in inference, as a particular clafs of fallacy or foit would now be difficult to diftinguifh in Some have defined paraloglfm to be that by which a meaning.
man
deceives himfelf, and fophifm that by which he tries to de

:
ceive others
on what grounds
do not know.
queftion of a premife being right or wrong in fact or principle, unlefs indeed it contradict itfelf, does not belong to logic nor could it fo belong unlefs logic were made, in the wideft
:
The
fenfe, that
fome have defined
attempt at the attainment of the cognltto vert which All that relates to the collection of it to be.
true premifes with refpect to the vegetable world belongs to botany; with refpecl: to the heavenly bodies, to aftronomy; with
refpect to the relation of
were
lefs
man to his Creator, to theology. Even within the province of logic, it would be impoffible, in fpace than an encyclopaedia, to enter upon queftions con
it
With regard to paralogifms, or logical fallacies, (fo called, as an error about the meafure of fpace is called a geometrical error) the clarification under breach
nected with the matter of fyllogifms.
of rules would be good in form, but would afford no bafis for

the treatment of the fubject. Thofe who bring them forward feldom proceed in direct defiance of rule, but in various modes
of evafion.
fatis
Thefe it would be almoft impoffible to arrange in factory order. Ariftotle made a claffification of fallacies, which was of courfe
240
On
Fallacies.
adhered to by the writers of the middle ages. In this, as in other and his fyftem, I I Ariftotle when of place, fpeak every
it as underftood by thofe writers. How far they difcomprehended their mafter is a queftion into which I could not enter here, even if I were competent to write on the
fpeak of
tinctly
fubject.
Ariftotle
however, fufficiently apparent that the logic of not of the purely formal character which marked the dialectics of the middle there is a much more decided ages
It is,
is
:
introduction of the attempt to write on the matter of fyllogifm than many perfons think there is. The clarification of fallacies
feems to be one proof of this and the interpretation of that claffification by the middle writers feems to add their teftimony to the after tion in this part of the fubject they abandon techni
:
:
calities
almoft entirely.
ought to be efpecially remembered that we are very diffeently fituated from thofe writers, not as to what is fallacy, but as to what the fpecimens of it produced are likely to be. Out
It
of a world of general principles declared by authority, or declared to be felf-evident by authority, they had to produce logical de ductions ; and, of courfe, the pure fyllogifm and its rules were
as familiar as the alphabet. The idea of an abfolute and offence glaring againft the ftructure of the fyllogifm being fup-
to
them
ported one
fuggeft occur to
itfelf to
after it was challenged, would no more mind of a writer on logic than it would now a writer on aftronomy that the accidental errer (which
moment
the
in multiplying
might happen to any one) of affixing four ciphers inftead of five by a hundred thoufand would be maintained after
Accordingly, their formal chapters on
fallacies
expofure.
would
naturally relate, if not entirely to fallacies of matter, at leaft to thofe in which the fallacy of matter very clofely hinges upon that
of form.
ined.
And fo it is in all the old fyftems which I have exam The Ariftotelian divifion (or rather feledtion, for it is far
from including everything) lends itfelf eafily to this adaptation. We, on the contrary, live in an age in which formal logic has long been nearly banimed from education entirely, we may fay,
:
from the education of the

verfities
habits.
The
ftudents of
all
our uni-
(Cambridge excepted) may
have heard lectures and
learnt the forms of fyllogifm to this day : but the practice has been fmall : and out of the univerfities (and too often in them)
the very
name of logic
is
a bye-word.
On
The
philofophers
Fallacies.
the difcovery (or
241
what has been
who made
allowed to pafs for one) that Bacon invented a new fpecies of logic which was to fuperfede that of Ariftotle, and their fol
lowers, have fucceeded by ing out from our fyftem
falfe
all
hiftory and falfer theory, in driv ftudy of the connexion between
The growth of inaccurate expreflion has produced, gives us fwarms of legislators, preachers, and teachers of all kinds, who can only deal with their own meaning as bad fpellers deal with a hard word, put together letters which give a certain refemblance, more or lefs as the cafe
thought and language.
which
this
may
to
Hence, what have been aptly called the flipfhod judg ments and crippled arguments which every-day talkers are content
be.
"
ufe."
of
common
Offences againft the laws of fyllogifm (which are all laws not fenfe) are as common as any fpecies of fallacy
:
that they are always offences in the fpeaker s or writer s mind, but that they frequently originate in his attempt to fpeak his
mind.
he
at
as
And the excufe is, that he meant differently from what which is received becaufe no one can throw the firft ftone in the middle it, but which ages would have been regarded a plea of guilty. The current notions about what logic is, are
faid
:
beautiful
and wonderful.
have heard a difputant, an educated
from allowing himfelf to be convinced man, that he was arguing with a middle term particular in both premifes by declaring that faffs were better than fyllogifms : the form
a graduate, efcape
of
his
both require
argument would have proved that men are plants, becaufe air. he faid, produce you faff s, like Bacon
"
"
I"
you quibble about
their combination, like
Ariftotle."
The
In the
firft,
Ariftotelian fyftem of fallacies contains two fubdivifions. which are in diffione, or in voce, the miftake is faid
to confift in the ufe of

diffionem, or in re,
it is
words
in the fecond,
which are extra
faid to
be in the matter.
:
Of the
i.
firft fet fix
two the middle term no middle term ; giving really (if be in queftion) or a term in the conclufion which is not the fame name as that ufed in the premifes. For example, All criminal actions ought to be punifhed by law profecutions for theft are
Mquivocatio or Homonymia^ in which a
different fenfes
:
kinds were diftinguifhed, as follows word is ufed in
criminal actions
therefore, profecutions
for theft
is
ought to be
puniftied by law.
Here the middle term
doubly ambiguous,
242
mifes.
On
But
here, as in
Fallacies.
in
fenfes both criminal and atiion having different
the
two prelies
the fophift to bring the fallacy he means the fame It may pleafe him to affert that it or not. the in attion in both premifes ; in which cafe, thing by criminal denied be but one or the other premife muft ference is
logical,
choice many other cafes, the under the head to which
with
refer
we
as to the matter.
finis
Again,
Finis rei eft
illius
eft vite perfettio. ergo mors on finis or on perfeZto. The following either thrown may be books for three centuries. Every example can be traced through therefore Sirius (the dog-ftar) is a dog dog runs on four legs of defea the many old It has been Sirius runs on four legs. obvious that of been have works on logic that all their examples Such inftances. two or one is well enough in abfurdity, which is bet bread virtue and wifdom dry as Nothing is better than bread is better than wifdom and ter than nothing therefore, dry cheefe Some of the old examples are A moufe eats
vfce
perfeftio ; Here the ambiguity
mors
eft
<
<
virtue/
a moufe
again,
is
one
Ifte
eft
pannus
fyllable ; eft de
therefore one
Anglia
Anglia
fyllable eft terra
eats cheefe/
;
And
li
ergo,
pannus
de terra/
the fyllogifm is formally put, equivocation The moft difficult eafe. die term is generally feen with great the name in which old the giving fallacy, exception is, I think, of the fpecies, name the with giving of the genus is confounded name of the genus. As in and thereby, of courfe, giving the to call you an afs is to call truth ; to is an animal fpeak call
<
Where
of
you to call you an afs is to fpeak truth. you an animal therefore, as to its form, and the This equivocation will puzzle a beginner The middle the matter. more fo from the evident falfehood of
;
term
"
is
He who
fays
that
you are
one
among
all
animals,
fpeaks truth
and the one who calls ; all animals. The equivocation that you are one among tainly fays ufes of the word one ; in the firft premife, is in the two different one ; in the fecond it is a lefs indefinite it is an entirely indefinite to the quantity of the middle term, one This one is not attached and particular in the fe which is univerfal in the firft premife,
afs
you an
or a goofe, cer
cond
middle term itfelf. part of the moit The manner in which the ferious fallacy of equivocation of affociations old the of conneaion the is in frequently appears,
but
is
On
a
Fallacies.
the altered
243
meaning of
originally meaning no applied to a man, meant
lawful, refpefted the laws, and had not forfeited any right by mifbehaviour, now means attached to the Crown and to the title of the holder of it. In contefts for the winner
word which has fliifted its meaning with the fame. The word loyal, for inftance, more (and no lefs) than which, as
one
who
fucceffion,
of courfe, affiime that lawful men were on his recent times, the term was always
fide.
would, In more
who fupported the party which had Crown for the time being but on fuch
thofe
:
felf-applied, at elections,
by
the confidence of the

occafions, abftinence
is
from the fallacy which the French call the vote du fait utmoft which can be expeded of human nature.
the
communication, of recipients. Gradually, as printing became the eafieft and moft ufual mode of the one moft fre publication, and
confequently
its
has gradually changed its meaning, ex cept in the courts of law. It flood for communication to others, without reference to the mode of or the number
The word publication
quently reforted to, the
we
word acquired
fay a
man
modern meaning
that he writes
if
publifhes his travels,
we mean
and
prints a book defcriptive of them. I fufpecl: that many perfons have come within .the of the danger law, by not knowing that to write a letter which contains defamation,, and to fend it to another perfon to read, is ptiblijhing a libel-, that is, by imagining that they were fafe from the confequences of publifhing, as long as In the fame manner, the well-eftablimed they did not print. rule that the firft publifher of a difcovery is to be held the difco-
ought meaning, with the words in which they are exprefled. fimilar change has taken place in the meaning of the word to utter, the fenfe of which is to but which now give
in
verer, unlefs the contrary can be proved, is mifunderftood by many, who put the word printer in the place of publifher. I could almoft fancy that fome perfons think rules to travel
out,
means
charged with the utterance of counterfeit coin has pleaded that no one ever uttered coin except the princefs in the but there is no fairy tale faying to what we may come, with good example, and under high authority. It may almoft be a queftion whether, in the time of Ariftotle,
:
ufually to give out of the aware that any perfon
mouth
in
words.
As
yet, I
am
not
fuccefsful
equivocation, that
is,
undeteded
at the
moment, would
244
On
Fallacies.
not have been held binding on the difputant who had failed to dete6t it. The genius of uncultivated nations leads them to
place undue force in the verbal meaning of engagements and admiflions, independently of the underftanding with which they
are made.
though
it
Jacob kept the blefiing which he obtained by a was intended for Efau Lycurgus feems to have
:
trick,
fairly
bound the Spartans
to follow his laws
till
he returned, though he
:
and the only intimated a fhort abfence, and made it eternal Hindoo god who begged for three fteps of land in the fhape of a dwarf, and took earth, fea and Iky in that of a giant, feems to
have been held
great
ftrefs laid
as claiming
by Ariftotle
arifen
deception,
may have
difputants to be very ferious
no more than was granted. The on fo many different forms of verbal from a remaining tendency among about what we fhould now call play
upon words. Governments permit what would otherwife be equivocation to take a ftrong air of truth, by legiflating in detail againft the prin The window-tax is a fpecial inciples of their own meafures. A newfpaper calls it a tax upon the light which God s ftance. beneficence has given to all. The anfwer would be plain enough, namely, that it is an income tax levied upon a ufe of that light which (how truly matters not here) is afferted to be a fair criterion of income. But this anfwer is deftroyed by the permiffion to which is thus block up windows, and thereby evade the tax made to fall upon the light ufed, and not upon the means of
:
ufmg
it
which the
fize
of the houfe affords.
According to the
is as fair a crite principle of this import, the blocked window rion of the income of the occupant as the open one, and fhould have been fo confidered. Among the forms which the fallacy of equivocation frequently
affumes,
is
meaning of a word in his

party any notice
:
that of the fophift altering or qualifying the known own mind, without giving the other
fo that there
may
be, if not
one mind, yet
different
meanings
in the
two meanings in two minds concerned.
perfon afferts that
Nobody
denies,
&c.
&c/
Should
this
go
down, the point is gained ; what nobody denies muft be undeni But fhould it be contefted (and it will generally be found able. that the things which nobody denies are matters of fome diffe rence of opinion, while thofe which nobody can deny are quite
On
fure to be points
It
is
Fallacies.
is
245
of conftant controverfy) the evafion
no
fenfible perfon, or
nobody
:
ready. that underftands the fubject,
nobody
fettled
that
is
anybody,
in fhort
while perhaps
it
cannot be
does, or who does not, underftand the fubjedr., until, other among things, the very point in difpute is determined. There is a wide range of equivocations arifmg out of mean
who
which are fometimes implied and fometimes not. A large of them is made by the ufual, but not univerfal, practice, of giving to the thing the name of that which it is intended This is now to be, whether the attempt be fuccefsful or not.
ings
clafs
abbreviation or courtefy
definitions,
but it was the rule. According to old ; bad reafoning is reafoning, fyllogifmus fophifticus is a fyllogifm, and in an old book now before me, the fruits and effects of demonftration are fcience, opinion, and ignorance^ the latter
containing belief of falfehood derived from bad demonftration, which we mould now call no demonftration.
One fallacy of our time, and a very favourite one, is the fettlement of the merit of a perfon, or an opinion, not by arguing the place of that perfon or opinion in its fpecies, but by arbitrary
alteration of the
boundary of the
fpecies,
with the intent of ex
cluding the individual in queftion altogether. It is fomewhat analogous to the proceeding of the landlord
who
unroofs the houfe to get rid of a tenant.
Thus we have
had the controverfy whether Pope was a poet^ not whether he was a good poet or a bad one, but whether he was a poet at all.
The
be
difputants, or fome of them, claimed a right to define a poet, and decided that none but verfe-makers of a certain goodnefs (to
fettled by themfelves) were poets. They might juft as well have decided, on their own authority, that none but men of a certain amount of reafoning power were men. Had they done
this laft, as
long as they fixed the amount at a figure which in cluded themfelves under the name, nobody would have thought
it is not they materially altered the extent of the term eafy to have fo the over words why they rights objective arbitrary, definitions of which are nearly as well fixed as that of man.
:
fee
Another form of the
fallacy
of equivocation
is
the afluming,
without exprefs ftatement, that the meaning of a phrafe can be determined by joining the meanings of its feveral words which
:
is
not always true in any language.
When
two words come
to-
On
Fallacies.
that their diaionary meanings zether, it often happens therefc their known and ufual (and at never enable us to arrive e: help us in
would
proper)
compound meaning
laft
though they might

arofe.
meaning plaining how that time crofs a bridge in an incredibly fhort
A
:
to perfon undertakes his and redeems pledge

is,
by
as croffing the bridge
one would
crofs a ftreet, that

it
by
i
Now, though traverfmg the breadth. or fhorter dimenfion, yet to crofs is to go over the breadth,
be true
that, in general,
and figmfies croffing the cafe before us, the phrafe is elliptical, it be faid that this common can Nor the the river upon bridge. known is, that which is common and well is incorreft
meaning
a in reporting an army to be that a French newfpaper is wrong literal This horfe. a not becaufe a river is chevalfur la riviere, is adopted among rather unlettered) mode of interpretation
(or
in language,
always correft.
No
reafonable perfon
would
fay
gamblers in
fettling
bets
and
is
of
itfelf
is
enough
to raife a ftrong
preemption that men.

It
is
their occupation
not that of well-educated
common enough
meanings
to have fixed
in controverfy, for of words in his
one
fide or the other
own
mind, on which he
will as to whether thofe meanings proceeds without any inquiry or to the reader. be conveyed by the words to the other fide, without giving the of form this fallacy, is very difficult to avoid firft occafions the on effential moft terms, the meanings of the to meet with a write uncommon not is It of their occurrence.
_
who
the at leaft who certainly aas upon appears to believe, other that and refides in him, notion that the right over words I do not only mean him. from differ as far are wrong fo they
that there are
undue many who have an

:
belief in their
own
but I to words and things judgments, both as in refpeft to their own a modefty proper who, though mowing to unable to do the fame with refped conclufions, feem to be lan one of words. If all mankind had fpoken
their definitions
fpeak of
thofi
guage
lieved in the
a cannot doubt that there would have been powerful, have would who fchool of philofophers perhaps a univerfal, and names things ; inherent connexion between
we
who would
tincr
rcafon, cookery, bipedality,
of agitahave taken the found man to be the mode ideas of the of the air which is effentially communicative I fpeak, whom of The writers &c.
On
are
Fallacies.
;
247
words
fpell
more or
lefs
of
this
fchool
they treat
as abfolute
"
images of things by right of the

French," faid
letters
which
them.
the
it
failor,
"call
a cabbage njhoe; the fools
The why
?"
can
they
call
Equivocation
for inftance, in
a cabbage, when they muft know it is one be ufed in the form of a propofition may
as
throwing what ought
to
be an affirmative into
the form of a qualified negative, with the view of making the Thus a controverfial negative form produce an impreffion. writer will afTert that his opponent has not attempted to touch a
by the abfurd aflertion, &c. &c. &c. To which the other party Your own words might juftly reply, mow that I have made the attempt, though your phrafe has a tendency, perhaps intended, to make your reader think that there is none, or at leaft to blind him to the difference between none
certain point, except
"
and none that you approve

2.
of"
differs in nothing except in the equivocation being in the conftruction of a phrafe, and not in a as in fingle term confounding that which is Plato s (property) with that which is Plato s
Thefallacia amphibolic , or amphibologies ^

:
from
trte laft,
Or,
as in
Qui
funt domini fui funt
fui
juris
fervi
(writing). funt do-
mini fui ; ergo fervi funt fui The ambiguities of conjuris. ftru&ion in our language, from want of inflexions and arifmg are The dif genders tolerably (and intolerably) numerous. of the word often a doubt as ficulty determining emphatic
gives
But very often indeed there is a want of the diftin&ion which the algebraift makes when he writes three-andfour tens as diftinguimed from three and four-tens: (3 + 4).io
to the
meaning.
c and 34-4.10. It cannot, for inftance, be faid whether I intend do it and to go there to-morrow means that it will be done to-morrow or not. It may be either (I intend to do it and to
to
there) to-morrow, or
intend to do
it
prefumption may be for the firft conftruftion but only a prefumption, not a rule of the language. In an inftance cited by Dr. If this day happen to be Whateley
row).
:
The
go and (to go there to-mor
it is
this
form of prayer
following,"
Sunday, be ufed and the faft kept the next day the conftru&ion is ambiguous, and the intended mean
{hall
"
ing probably againft the prefumption. There is a book of the laft teacher of mathematics, and century, written by a writing
mafter to Eton
College."
Were
mathematics taught
at
Eton*
248
or not
?
On
Fallacies.
;
Punctuation may be an aSHStance
but
it
fo often
hap
pens that the author leaves that point to the printer, that it is Printers punctuate correctly when hardly fafe to rely upon it.
the meaning is clear but when it is ambiguous, they as apt to take the wrong meaning as any other readers.
:
may be
and fallacia divifionis, confiSt compofitlonts, or thofe Separating things which ought not to be joined joining is and B is Y, fo that or feparated. If we may fay that
3, 4,
in
The fallacia
and Y, we have no right to infer that we may form the compound and collective names A and B, and C X and Y, and fay that A and B is C .X and Y. Thus two and three are even and odd but five is not even and odd. Again, two and
and
is
:
five are four

It
and three
but neither
is
two
all, in
four, nor five three.
muft be remembered that the word
a proposition,
:
is
not
a
necefTarily fignificative of a univerfal propofition

c
it
may be
part of the defcription of the fubject. Thus in all the peers are a houfe of Parliament, we do not ufe the words all the peers in
the fame fenfe as
when we
fay
all
the peers derive their
titles
In the fecond cafe the fubjecl: of the propo from the Crown. fition is peer ; and the term all is distributive, fynonymous with each and every. In the firSt cafe the fubjecl: is all the peers, and the term all is collective, no more diftinguifhing one peer from another than one of John s fingers is distinguished from another
c John is a man. The fame remarks may be made on the word fame; as in fome peers are dukes, and fome peers The all and feme of the quan are the committee of privileges. distributive terms j the all and fome of are the of propofition tity
in the phrafe,
the fubjecl: are collective.
Again,
all
men
are a fpecies (of ani
All men mals) which no number of men are, wanting the reft. here make the one individual object of thought of a fmgular pro This amounts to an ambiguity of construction, an pofition. amphibologia, as do moft fources of fallacy falling under this head, which can therefore hardly be confidered as anything more than want another idiom or the algebraical a cafe of the laft. c All (peers) hold of the Crown ; (all peers) are distinction, as in
We
a houfe of Parliament.
or accentus was an ambiguity arifing and its introduction feems to lead to very from pronunciation, of the fubdivifion minute fubjecl, and to enfure the entrance of
5.
The fallacia
profodite
On
Fallacies.
249
it
none but ludicrous examples.
Burgerfdicius does not think
c unworthy of himfelf to defcend to the following, Omnis equus omnis omnis eft eft beftia ; aequus, ergo juftus eft beftia. juftus
An
older writer has
Tu
es qui es
es requies.
Thefe are mere puns
quies eft requies ; ergo, tu and the makers of them ;
were
men eat oyfters for beaten by the contriver of fairly a wager, one eat ninety-nine, the other eat two more, for he eat But more ferious fallacies may be referred a hundred and won.
to this head.
Two
cording to ufual notions, fuggeft falfe
very forced emphafis upon one word may, ac c meanings. Thus, thou
(halt not bear falfe witnefs againft thy neighbour,
is frequently read from the pulpit either fo as to convey the oppofite of a pro hibition, or to fuggeft that fubornation is not forbidden, or that anything falfe except evidence is permitted, or that it may be
given for him, or that it nefs may not be borne.
is
only againft neighbours that
falfe
wit
ftatement of what was
faid,
with the fuppreilion of fuch
tone as was meant to accompany it, is thefallacia accentus. Gefture and manner often make the difference between irony or
farcafm, and ordinary aflertion. omitting anything which ferves to
perfon
who
quotes another,
mow the animus of the meaning;

make them imply more than
or notes of exclamation, or
or one
who
in italics, fo as to alter its
without notice puts any word of the author he cites emphafis ; or one who attempts to
heighten his
otherwife,
is
own
afTertions, fo as to
fay,
he would openly
by
italics,
To
accentus. guilty of the fa Ha da this fallacy I mould refer one of very
common
occurrence,
it
the alteration of an opponent s proportion fo as to prefent a manner which is logically equivalent, but which alters the
phafis, either as noticed in
is
in
em
page 134, or in any other manner. It but not retort, which is the object of the reafoning, generally for inference cannot be altered by changing a propoalteration
:
fition into a logical equivalent,
effective againft
Ys
are Xs.
but a fmart repartee may be very Some Xs are Ys, but flat enough againft fome And even when the proponent miftakes his own
c
meaning, and mifcalculates his own emphafis, ftill, if the miftake be obvious, there is fallacy in taking advantage of it ; for he who communicates in fuch incorrect terms as mow what the correct
ones are, does,
in fact,
communicate
in correct terms, to all
who
250
fee the
On
Fallacies.
{bowing. Of courfe, refpect for logic never flood in the a fuccefsful retort from the time of Ariftotle till now, nor of way A fpeculator once wrote to will on this fide of the millenium.
a fcientific fociety, to challenge them to an (on his part) antiNewtonion controverfy, relying on it that he could contend in
He was mechanics, though avowedly ignorant of geometry. anfwered by a recommendation to ftudy mathematics and dyna mics. His rejoinder was an angry pamphlet, in which, indignant
recommendation, he exclaimed, my ignorance of dynamics. Had he been worth the anfwering, it would have been impoffible to refift the Had he written, as he reply No, but you fhowed it. meant It was not dynamics of which I confeffed ignorance,
at the unfairnefs, as
I did
it
he took
to be, of the
not confefs
and had an opponent written, as many would have done, You fay, fir, that you did not confefs your ignorance of dynamics indeed you did not, you contented yourfelf with an ample difplay
:
he would have ufed thefal/acia accentus. Nor would he, in he had only taken advan tage of a wrong, but evidently wrong, placement of emphafis on The ufe of fuch a weapon, as to its the part of the afTailant.
of
it,
my opinion, have been clear of it though
legitimacy, depends entirely upon the manner in which the queftion mall be fettled how far irony is allowable. Where the anfwer
is
in the affirmative, a
permitted.
But
may
very obvious fallacy, as a farcafm, may be here obferve, that irony itfelf is generally
accompanied by \he fallacla accentus \ perhaps cannot be afTumed without it. A writer difclaims attempting a certain tafk as above
his
powers, or doubts about deciding a proportion as beyond his
knowledge.
ing him
fied
6.
felf-fufficient
is
that his diffidence
opponent is very effective in aflurhighly commendable, and fully jufti-
by the circumftances.
The fa Hada
it
a miftake in
is
aqua
is
figurte dittionls^ as explained, means literally grammar and nothing elfe ; as that becaufe Jluvius humidA, or that becaufe aqua is feminine, fo is poeta.
come under the head of ambiguous to amount and nothing but giving the iyllogifm four language, The fallacies extra terms, two of them under the fame name.
All thefe fallacies in diflione
dittionem are fet
I.
down
as follows.
;
Thefallada ad diftum fwipllciter.
accident is
and
The
firft
2. That a ditto fecundum quid of thefe ought to be called that
On
correlative in the
Fallacies.
quid, for the
phrafes.
251
two
are
firft
of a ditto fimpliciter ad dittum fecundum
manner
defcribed in
the two
The
confifts in inferring
of the fubjeft with an accident that which of the was premifed of the fubjeft only the fecond in inferring acci an with the of which was premifed fubjeft fubjea only that What be needs muft fecond the of you dent. The firft
:
example
bought yefterday,
day
;
therefore,
raw meat yefteryou eat to-day ; you bought This piece of meat eat raw meat to-day/ you
It has remained uncooked, as frefh as ever, a prodigious time. the in it mentioned Reifch Margarita Pkilofowas raw when and Dr. Whateley found it in juft the fame ftate pblca in 1496 the inftance Wine is per the Of in 1826. firft, we may give The expreffed forbidden. be to it nicious ; therefore, ought the conclufion is to wine ufed immoderately refers premife
: :
wine however ufed. This fpecies of fallacy occurs whenever more or lefs ftrefs is laid upon an accident, or upon any view of the fubjec~t, in the conclufion, than was
meant
to refer to
done
All that leads to As in the following in the premifes. muft fuch philofophy as that of the fchoolmen, with their logic,
:
be unworthy to be ftudied, except hiftorically/ fuch a fentence is not formally to propofe the
The
intent of
fyllogifm,
falfe
fchoolmen had that which led them to a falfe philofophy ; the fchoolmen had logic ; therefore, logic led them to a falfe phi to take the chance of the ftrefs thus laid upon but
The
lofophy,
only a difpofition to fuppofe that the logic was in producing logic
fault.
The
premifes are really
The philofophy of the fchool-1 men (who paid particular attention to logic)
f
is
|
falfe
philofophy.
*]
fthat the guides to
which
Every
falfe
philofophy
I is \ J
fhould be neglefted, except
[as hiftory.
whence
ufe.
it is
as that of the
the guides to fuch a philofophy rightly inferred that fchoolmen (who ftudied logic) are only of hiftorical
And the fame thing might equally be inferred of the fchool men who ate mutton, a practice to which moft of them were as much addidted, no doubt, as to making fyllogifms. The art of
252
On
Fallacies.
the fophift confifts in making the accident which is either un or withdrawn, or fubftituted, have an apparently fairly introduced, relevant relation to the fubjecl itfelf. Undoubtedly, the fchool-
men s logic has a connexion with their philofophy which the mutton they ate has not but as long as it is not the connexion which permits the inference, it is abfolutely irrelevant. All the fallacies which attempt the fubftitution of a thing in one form for the fame thing (as it is called) in another, belong to this head fuch as that of the man who claimed to have had one
:
:
knife twenty years, giving it fometimes a new handle, and fometimes a new blade. The anfwer given by the calculating boy (page 54, note) was, relatively to the queftion, a worthy anfwer,
and took advantage of the

being fkinned,
is ftill
common
notion that a bean, after
a bean, as before.
More
ferious difficulties
have
arifen
from the attempt to feparate the
ejfcntial
from the
accidental^ particularly with regard to material objects. Cartefians denied weight, hardnefs, &c. to be eflential to
ter, until at laft
The
mat
they made
it
that a cubic foot of iron contained
nothing but fpace, and contended no more matter than a cubic
foot of
air.
law, in criminal cafes, demands a degree of accuracy in the ftatement of the fecundum quid which many people think is abfurd and it appears to me that the lawyers often help the
:
The
popular mifapprehenfion, and give it excufe, by confounding errors of things with errors of words, after the example of the world at large. Any error of any kind, provided it be fmall in
amount,
nefs.
pafTes for a miftake in
words only, by virtue of
its
fmall-
By
a miftake in words, I
mean
the addition or omiffion

ftate
of words which, whatever they might do under another things, do not, as matters ftand, affect the meaning.
of
Take two
inftances, as follows
Some
years ago, a
man was
tried for ftealing a
ham, and was acquitted upon the ground that what was proved againft him was that he had ftolen a portion of a ham. Very recently, a man was convicted of perjury, in the
year 1846, and an objection (which the judge thought of impor tance enough to referve) was taken, on the ground that it ought
in the year of our Lord 1846. There may, of acknowledged rules, which, as long as they are rules, muft be obeyed, and which may make the fecond miftake as ne-
to
have been
courfe, be
On
ceffarily
vitiate
Fallacies.
firft.
253
But, in difcufling the
that the
reft
an indictment as the
it
policy of the rules,

entirely
different.
would feem to me In both, no doubt, the
two
cafes are
of the indictment
but might, by implication, make good the meaning required : there feems a great difference between allowing the remainder to correct an error, and allowing it to make good an infufficiency
(fuppofing the date, in the fecond cafe, to be really inefficient). In the fecond cafe, the accufed may fee the omiffion as well as
another, and in the tive
:
may
confider of his defence againft every alterna led to appear in court firft, he may be actually
with a defence not relevant to what will be brought againft him. The fecond may be a hardfhip, the firft is an injuftice. And this,
even on the fuppofition that the

allowed in explanation
:
reft
of the indictment
is
to be
for
we
have no more right to fuppofe
that the true parts will correct the erroneous ones, than that the erroneous parts will affect the conftrudtion of the true ones. But
there
is
good reafon
to think that the fufficient defcription

is
of one
fentence
may fupply what

when
wanted
is all.
in the inefficient defcription
of another,
infufficiency
But, perhaps, it will be held to be the better rule, that the re mainder of the indictment mould not be allowed in explanation.
It will
infufficiency,
then be admitted by all that a material error, or a material mould be allowed to nullify the charge. The dif
ference between the law and

to
common
opinion entirely relates
what
it is
conftitutes a material
here
impoffible to
amount of one or the other. And for the law muft bring the two together
:
judge fpecies, while the common opinion will never rife above the cafe before it. In the two inftances, which by many will be
held equally abfurd, a great difference will be feen by any
who
will imagine the two defcriptions, in each cafe, to be put before two different perfons. One is told that a man has ftolen a ham ;
The firft will think another that he has ftolen a part of a ham. he has robbed a provifion warehoufe, and is a deliberate thief:
may fuppofe that he has pilfered from a cook-mop, from As things ftand, the two defcriptions hunger. pofiibly of criminality, and different mo different amounts may fuggeft But put the fecond pair of defcriptions in the fame way. tives.
the fecond
One
perfon
is
told that a
man
and another, that he perjured himfelf
perjured himfelf in the year 1846 ; in the year of our Lord
254
1846.
there
tions
is
On
As
mean
Fallacies.
is
things ftand, there
no imaginable
difference
for
only one era from which

:
we
reckon.
The two
defcrip-
the fame thing nor can it even be faid that one is and the other incomplete ; but complete only that one is lefs incomplete than the other. The next queftion might have been, what lord was meant, our Lord Jefus Chrift, or our Lord the King ? both being phrafes of law. The anfwer will be, that the
number 1846
*
leaves
anfwer, certainly ; in the year 1846.
no doubt which was meant. very good but equally conclufive as to the fimple phrafe
The
firft
cafe
is
one
in
:
which the two deit is
fcriptions have a
real difference
of meaning
not
fo in
the
fecond.
3.
The petitio principle

its
is
one of the
life.
logical
terms which has
way ordinary by the phrafe begging the queftion, that is, afluming the thing which is
It is tranflated
alfo called reafoning in a circle, coming conclufion, to what has been already for mally affumed, in a manner exprefled or implied. I (hall referve what I have to fay on the juftice of this tranflation, and take it
is
almoft found
into
be proved. round, in the

to
This
way of
for the prefent as good.
Every colle&ive
fions
;
fet
of premifes contains
all
its
valid conclu-
and
we may
fairly fay that,
premifes, the affumption of them is clufion ; though, ideally fpeaking, the prefence of the premifes in the mind is not neceflarily the prefence of the conclufion. But
fpeaking objectively of the the aflumption of the con
by
this
fallacy
clufion, or a conclufion be
is meant the abfolute aflumption of the fmgle con mere equivalent to it, as a fmgle premife. If the
c
and
Every
even
is and if it be formally known that Every are identical names, and alfo B and Z, then to aflume is B as a premife in proving is would
Every
be a manifeft
this
petitio principii, or begging of the queftion.

faid
But
muft be
hypothetically
it
is
fuppofed fully agreed
between the difputants that the two identities are granted. Let it be otherwife, and there is no petitio principii : it is then fair to
propound A)B, which,
to reafon as in
A)B + B)Z = A)Z, X)A + A)Z = X)Z.

is
if difputed, is
to be proved, and afterwards

Striftly
fpeaking, there
no formal petitio
proportion to be proved, aflumed. This of courfe, rarely occurs
principii except when the very and not a mere fynonyme of it, is
:
fo that
the fallacy to
On
be guarded againft
is
Fallacies.
is
255
too nearly
the aflumption of that which
then the fallacy is amounts to putting forward nothing diftinct in itfelf but merely ftiould not be granted. that which and claiming to have granted
the fame as the conclufion required.
:
And
When
fallacy,
is
this
is
done,
it
matters
little
as to the character
of the
whether the undue claim be made
for a propofition
which
nearer to, or further from, the conclufion to be proved. When proof is offered, the advancement of the conclufion in other words
is
when proof is not offered, the petitio principii other which of that (with things proved) would prove aflumption the conclufion, is a fallacy of the fame character in all cafes.
of courfe not
:
an opponent fallacy to the petitlo principii which, I fufit is the habit of the more frequent occurrence of many pecl, to treat an advanced propofition as a begging of the queftion the
is
is
:
There
moment
tion.
they fee that, if eftablifhed, it would eftablifti the quef Before the advancer has more than ftated his thefis, and
before he has time to add that he propofes to prove it, he is treated as a fophifl on his opponent s perception of the relevancy
(if
proved) of his
firft
ftep.
Are there not perfons who think
any previous propofition, which neceflarily leads to the conclufion adverfe to them, is taking an unfair advantage ? There is another cafe in which begging the queftion may be
that to prove
It fhould be remembered that demonstrative unjuftly imputed. not the there is elucidatory is inference only kind of inference
:
inference, recapitulatory inference, &c.

its
propofition
may have
aflerted explanation prefented as a fyllogifm, the inference of which, as demonftration, might well be called a refult of petitio
principii.
Say
it
never could have been doubted that
men would
apply fcience to the production of food/ If there fhould be any hefitation about this, the explanation of man under the phrafe
which is exclufively characleriftic of him, rational animal, would remove it the animal muft have food, the rational being will have fcience. But it would be begging the queftion to aflert that
:
the fyllogifm of elucidation &c ; therefore man is, &c.

arifes the fallacy
A
is
rational animal
is,
&c.
man
is,
a demonftration.
And
out of this
when he can
of prefuming that an author meant demonstration, only be fairly conftrued to have attempted elucida tion of what he fuppofed would, upon that elucidation, be granted.
The
forms of language are
much
the fame in the
two
cafes.
256
It has
f
On
Fallacies.
amicr&z/, prlnclpium petere : it is TO if f %ij? and TO iv that which is (ought to come) out of, or is in, the principle.
v
been obferved that Ariftotle hardly ever ufes the phrafe

a/?%>i5
By
means that which can be known He lays down five ways of ajjuming that which ought ofltfelf. to come out of a felf-known principle, of which begging the quefthe
word prlnclpium he
diftin&ly
tion
is
the
firft.
;
the particular
verfal
;
others are affuming the univerfal to prove affirming a particular to help to prove the uni
The
affuming all the particulars of which the univerfal may be compofed ; and afTuming fomething which obvioufly demonftrates the conclufion.
Among
there
is
the earlier
modern
writers, as far as I
have feen them,

petltlo prlnclpll.
fome
diverfity in their defcription
of the
That
the
the prlnclpium
f%>7
was meant
to be the thing
known of itfelf,
of Ariftotle, as far as the introduction of the word is concerned, feems clear enough. Was it not then by a mere cor
ruption that it was frequently confounded with the conclufion, the quod in principle quaefitum fuit ? Did not the fame in
TO ev agxy of Ariftotle with the govern the change of the word ? Moft writers take the fallacy of the petltlo prlnclpll as meaning that in which the conclufion is deduced either from itfelf, or from fomething which
accuracy,
a^XYi
* which confounds the
itfelf,
requires proof more, or at leaft as

turn.
much,
and
But fome,
in their definitions,
Ignatius aut aque Ignoftill more in their ex
amples, fupport the following meaning, which I ftrongly fufpecl: to be the true derivation of the phrafe, however the prlnclpium
and quod In prlnclplo might afterwards have been confounded with one another. The philofophy of the time confifted in a large
variety of general propofitions (principles) deduced from autho and fuppofed to be ultimately derived from intrinfic evidence, rity,
Thefe were
felf-known, or elfe by logical derivation from fuch principles. at the command of the difputant, his opponent could
not but admit each and
manded f
*
Sir
the aflent
all of them the laws of which the geometer requires

:
difputation de for his poftu-
prlnclpium
Hamilton of Edinburgh (notes on Reid, p. 761,) fays that always ufed for that on which fomething elfe depends. f Does a traditional remnant of this convention ftill linger in the not unis
W.
We
frequent notion that a difputant is entitled to the conceflion of his principia ? ufed to hear You muft grant me my firft principles, elfe I cannot
On
lates.
Fallacies.
and then,
literary fociety
257
was fhaken
Except when,
now
very foundations by a difpute which affected any of them, as a nominalift The controverfy or the like moral earthquake.
its
to
had a principium for

as in
mofl frequent fyllogifm was one which, having the form Barbara^ its and an major, exemplum for its minor
:
are mortal (principium] ; Socrates is a man (ex therefore Socrates is mortal. The petitio principii, ; emplum} then, occurred, when any one, to prove his cafe, made it an ex
All
men
ample of a principle which was not among thofe received, with

out offering to bring the former under the logical empire of the
latter.
And fome
writers define
the fallacy as occurring ft
contingent in fyllogifmo principium petere
they
where by prlnclplum ; the principle which in the major preoccurs generally mife, and by their inftances they clearly fhow that they mean to include nothing but the fimple of principle and example.
mean
fyllogifm
leave us to infer that if any one fhould happen to conftruct a fyllogifm in which both premifes are principles, one
They would
or both not received, the inference, though denied by fimple denial of one or both premifes, would not be confidered as tech
nically the petitio principii,
petitio principii
It
which with them was,

is
as
it
were,
exemplum continentis. has often been afferted that all fyllogifm
a begging of the
queflion, or a petitio principii in the of the conclufion. That all
modern
fenfe,
an affumption
premifes do,
when
the
argument
is
:
objectively confidered, contain their conclufion, is beyond a doubt and a writer on logic does but little who does not make his reader
fully alive to this.
But the
gifm,
is
a mifapprehenfion of
phrafe, as applied to a good fyllo meaning : for its definition refers
it to what is affumed in one The moft fallacious pair premife. of premifes, though expreffly constructed to form a certain con clufion, without the leaft reference to their truth, would not be
But a further charge affuming the queftion, or an equivalent. has been made againft the fyllogifm, namely that very often the
conclufion, fo far from being deduced from the principle, is that for inftance, in All men are actually required to deduce it
:
argue.
s anfwer to his applicant s ilfaut namely, pas la mcejfite, had fomething of inhumanity in it but, as applied to the Mais, Monfieur, il faut fe difputer oi the preceding aflumption, it would generally be quite the reverfe.
<vi<vre,
Cardinal Richelieu
<vois
Je nen
258
On
Fallacies.
mortal; Plato is a man; therefore Plato is mortal we do not know that Plato is mortal becaufe all men are mortal, but that we need to know that Plato is mortal, in order to know that it is There is much ingenuity really true that all men are mortal.
argument but I think a little confideration, not of the fyllogifm, but of how we ftand with refpect to the fyllogifm, will
in this
:
anfwer
it.
When we
thing called
objects,
it
fay that
is
B,
fpoke of objects as would not matter under what name, and A is B would
is
the thing called
we do B
not merely
if
mean
that the
we
be no other than be of its

It
feems
B is B and the very proportion itfelf would own nature a mere identity, an affertion that what is, is. to me that between objects, thus viewed, there can nei
c
ther be proportions nor fyllogifms. as fuggefting one idea to our minds

:
A
;
may remind
us of a thing
of the fame thing as
is B then aflerts that and the proportion c fuggefting another the two ftates of our mind are from the fame external fource.
Our logic, in wholly feparating names from objects, and dealing only with the former, makes a fort of fymbolic reprefentation of
the diftinction between ideas and objects. the objection above ftated to the fyllogifm appears to me to be founded upon thinking of the object, as if it had no names.
Now
all things marked, each with every name which can be to it. applied Undoubtedly then, each one marked man will have the mark mortal upon him, and fome the mark Plato, it
Suppofe
may
fon
be
who
is
and by the time all the marks are put on, and to a perfuppofed to be immediately cognizant of the fimul-
taneous exiftence of two or more marks on the fame thing, it would be an abfurdity to attempt any fyllogifm at all. What coexiftence of marks could there be which he muft not be fup
pofed to have noted in making the induction necefTary for a univerfal propofition. When he collected the elements of All men
are mortal
he faw
o man among
is
the reft and
fet it
down.
But
fuppofe that his knowledge

all at
once
but that each coincidence of marks

All
not acquired, as to different marks, is to be a fepa-
rate acquifition to his mind.
time he has found out that
Then he does not know, by the men are mortal whether Plato
a ftatue, a dog, or a
be mortal or not.
Plato
may be
book written
On
by a
Fallacies.
259
man with
it
:
man of
tells
that
name.
Plato does not carry
his
him nothing about Plato, until he has the minor, major c Plato is a man and then, no doubt, he has abfolutely acquired the conclufion Plato is mortal. The whole objection tacitly
aflumes the fuperfluity of the minor know Plato to be a man, as foon as
;
that
is,
tacitly
aflumes
we
we know him
and no doubt
to be Plato.
Grant the minor
to be fuperfluous,
we
grant the
neceffity of connecting the fluous alfo. Grant
major and the conclufion to be fuper any degree of neceffity, or of want of necef to the minor, and the fame is granted to the connection of fity, the major and conclufion.
In the preceding cafe, the fyllogifm is looked upon as one of communication, by the authors of the objection ; while at the
fame time
nicate
:
it is
tacitly
aflumed that the minor does not
commu
is
Plato,
by virtue of our acquaintance with the name,
taken to be a man.
Moreover, it is to be noted that the proportion ufed in argu ment, whether to ourfelves or to others, is very frequently not fo much the mere attribution of one idea to another, as a decla
term
ration that pro hac vice the idea contained in the more extenfive is all that is wanted, and that the differences which conftitute the fpecies are not to the purpofe. the diminution of the comprehenfion which increafe of extenfion is only contingent. It
Or
is
(page 234)
it
is
neceflary, and the
is ftripping the com idea of the to plex prevent only what is requiunneceflary parts, Thus any one who will aflert that, in the Mofaic account, fite.
no animal life whatever was deftroyed by {laughter before the deluge, muft be convinced by being reminded that an antedilu vian (Cain) killed Abel who was a man and therefore an animal.
With the petitio principle may be clafTed (for it might alfo be referred to other fallacies) cafes of the imperfect dilemma. Supor muft be true if be true, is pofe we fay Either
impof fible. Now if the disjunctive premife ought to have been ei or or Z is true, here would have been almoft an exther c prefs petitio principii. For example, fay A body muft either be
impoffible
;
if
be true,
is
impoffible
therefore
is
in the ftate
it
or the ftate
it
cannot change
in the ftate
cannot change in the ftate A ; therefore, it cannot change at

or
all.
Now,
if
the alternative
be neceflary, the correct
260
ftatement
On
may be
c
Fallacies.
either be in the ftate
body muft
A, or
in
the ftate B, or in the ftate of tranfition from one to the other. Of this kind is the celebrated fophifm of Diodorus Cronus, that motion is impoflible, for all that a body does, it does either in the place in which it is, or in the place in which it is not, and it cannot move in the place in which it is, and certainly not in the
place in which it is not. Now, motion is merely the name of the tranfition from the place in which it is (but will not be) to that in which it is not (but will be). It is reported that the in
ventor of
this
fophifm fent for a furgeon to
fet
his
diflocated
fhoulder, and was anfwered that his fhoulder could not have been put out either in the place in which it was, or in the place in which it was not ; and therefore, that it was not hurt at all.
4.
The
we
fhould
ignoratio elenchi^ or ignorance of the refutation^ is what now call anfwering to the wrong point or proving
:
fomething which
may
it is,
It not contradictory of the thing afferted. be confidered either as an error of form or of matter ; and
is
of
all
the fallacies, that
which has the wideft range.

have read,
for inftance, as the cafe of a writer I
who
Such, admits that
certain evidence, if given at all, would prove a certain point ; and admits that fuch evidence has been given but refufes to admit
:
the point as proved, becaufe the evidence was given in anfwer to objections, and in a fecond pamphlet. The pleadings in our courts
of law, previous to
trial,
are intended to produce, out of the varieties
of ftatement which are made by parties, the real points at iflue ; fo that the defence may not be ignoratio elenchi^ nor the cafe the
counter-fallacy,
which has no
correlative
name, but might be

to fue another for
called ignoratio conclufionls. If a for fold and debt, delivered, goods
man were
and
if
defendant were to reply
that he had paid for the goods furnifhed, rejoin that he could find no record of that
and
plaintiff
payment would be palpably committed. The rejoinder, fuppofed true, (hows that either defendant has not paid, or plaintiff keeps negligent accounts and is a dilemma, one horn of which
;
in his
were to books
the fallacy
It is plaintiff s bufmefs to prove only contradicts the defence. the fale, from what is in his books, not the abfence of payment
from what
the
It
is
not
and
it
is
then defendant
bufmefs to prove
to prove a
payment by
is
his
vouchers.
faid
commonly
that
no one can be required
On
negative, and often that
Fallacies.
261
much
confufion about this
no one can prove a negative. There is for any one who proves a pofitive,
:
proves an infinite number of negatives. Every thing that can be proved to be in St. Paul s Cathedral at any one moment is fairly proved not to be in more places than I can undertake to enume
What is meant is, that it is difficult, and may be impoflible, to prove a negative without proving a pofitive. Accordingly, when the two fides of the queftion confift of a pofitive and nega
rate.
tive, the
burden of proof
it is
it is
is
generally confidered to
lie
upon the
perfon whofe intereft
underftood,
to eftablifh the pofitive. This being ignoratio elenchi to attempt to transfer the charge
of proving the negative to the other But this rule is by party. no means without exception there are many departures from it
:
the law, for example, though not under the moft logical For inftance, a homicide, as fuch, is confidered by the phrafes. law a murderer, unlefs, failing juftification, he can prove that he had no malice. Here, in the language of the law, the homicide,
in
fuppofed unjuftifiable, is in the accufed is to rebut. It
itfelf
is
preemption of malice, which
not true, in point of fact, that fuch exifts on the mere cafe of homicide, independent of prefumption the manner of it if the law will confult its own records, it will
:
find that, for
one homicide with malice of which
it
has had to
take cognizance, there are dozens at leaft, done in heat of blood, and called manflaughters. But the cafe ftands thus ; the alter
natives are few, fo that proving the negative of one, which the accufed is called on to do, can be done by proving the affirmative
one out of
a fmall number. There are but malice, heat of blood, mifadventure, infanity, &c. to which the action can be referred. Of thefe few things, it is eafier for the accufed to eftablifh fome
one out of feveral, above all when motive is in queftion (of which only himfelf can be in pofTeffion of the moft perfect knowledge) than it is for the profecutor to eftablifh a particular one. And
the principle on which he is called on to eftablifh a negative (or rather another pofitive) is that the burden of proof fairly lies on
the one to
whom
it
will
be by
much
the eafieft.
The
proof of
a negative, then, being as eafy as, in fact identical with, the from proof of one of the pofitive alternatives, fuch proof
may,
the circumftances, lie upon a difputant, particularly when the number of the alternatives is few. But the negative proof^ a
262
On
Fallacies.
very different thing, is of its own nature hardly attainable, and therefore hardly to be required. book has been miflaid ; is it
in
is
one room or the other ? proof of the negative as
If found in the fecond room, there and almoft any one who to the firft
:
can read can be trufted to

certain
fay,
on
his
own
room
firft
there
is
a certain book.
it
knowledge, that in a But to give negative proof
muft be made certain, firft, that every room has been found and examined, fecondly, that it has been No one, in fact, can prove correctly examined. more than that he cannot find the book whether the book be there or not, is another queftion, to be fettled by our opinion of
as to the
room,
book
in the
the vigilance and competency of the fearcher. Controverfialifts too much ftrefs on their own negative proofs, on conftamly lay
their / cannot find, even as to cafes in their intereft to find.
which
it
is
palpably not
Somewhat
troverfialifts,
akin to the preceding
is
conveyed
in their ftrong aflertion
the conftant fallacy of conof the refults of

is
their
own
arguments.
Few
can bear to admit that there
queftion for others to decide ; and after fumming up both fides, to feparate the points which the reader is to pronounce upon.
decide for him, and thus act both counfel and judge becaufe their arguments are not fo convincing to their probably own minds as they wifh them to be to the reader s. They prove,
They muft
utmoft, their own conviction that they have the right fide but the thing to be proved is that fuch conviction is well founded. They know the maxim Si vis me flere, dolendum eft primum ipfe
at the
:
good of the reafon, as well as of the The confequence is, that the deli berate reader fufpects them, and feels inclined rather to differ than agree he will not dance to a writer who pipes too much.
tibi,
and think
:
it
will hold
feelings
as
it
will, to
fome.
Juft as
"
ll
tell
you
a capital
thing,"
fets
the hearer
;
upon avoid
ing laughter, and gives
him
notice to try
fo
I intend to give
moft unimpeachable proof, puts the judicious reader upon look ing for inadmiffible aflumptions, and he is feldom allowed by
fuch writers to look in vain.
declaring his intention to
But,
if
the difputant
be
irrefiftible,
is
who begins by be fufpicious, the one

Does he
tell his
who
If
it
ends by announcing that he is fo, be very clear, why ftiould he fay
abfolutely felf-convicted.
it ?
reader
that he
muft remember
to diftinguifh the
black letters from the
On
fide
Fallacies.
at the lop
263
of the book
c
white paper, or does he print
keep
this
uppermoft
Thefe things
:
does leave to the reader

out (though he fays
it is
but he
as they are) he really (eflential dares not truft the latter to find
as clear as black
and white) that
his ar
that nothing but wilful difguments are fo ftrong and fo good, refift their force. can or hopelefs prejudice, honefty, Another common form of the ignoratio elenchi^ lies in attri
fome ultimate end or tendency. buting to the conclufion afTerted of checking the power of the favour in an Thus, argument
Crown
lutifm
:
is
called Jacobinifm
though the argument of its propofer s wifhes. This is a cafe in which the refult dently of the method is juftifiable, though the method is wrong. Many readers will remember the advice given by an old judge to a
of an increafe of that power, abfopropofed may be found, indepen
young one,
Give your judgments without reafons

and
it
moft
likely
your your decifions will be right ; This advice mould be followed by many reafons will be wrong. The propofer is of a of thofe who judge or decide arguments. towards the con bias a him which known ftrong
is
that juft as likely
gives opinion, He clufion of the argument.

effecl:
is
upon in the receiver s argument and teftimony. The teftimony is, is a radical, and the receiver the order of a low propofer mind, or elfe, perhaps, is of opinion that a radical would pick a pocket the propofer is a tory, and the receiver is of the belief that a tory muft have picked a pocket. Thefe opinions may be right or no formal fallacy wrong but they exift and there is certainly in admitting them, as affecting the teftimony, to fubtraft from But there is a of the truth of the conclufion. the
;
:
the
mind of the
receiver
a witnefs (page 205), and the is to be that of the united
probability
formal fallacy, a decided ignoratio elencbi^ in throwing

difpofition to receive There is a much
all
the in-
upon the invalidity of the argument. more culpable form of the fame fpecies. If fuch a conclufion were admitted, it would lead to fuch and In queffuch another conclufion, which is not to be admitted.
tions of abfolute demonftration, this procefs
is
found
if
be
certainly falfe,
and
if
A
*
muft
alfo
be
falfe.
it be the neceflary confequence of A, then But it is unfound when it takes the form,
;
I believe
to be falfe
I believe
it
to follow
from
there
fore I afTuine a right to difbelieve
whatever evidence may be
264
offered for
it ?
On
This
fallacy
is
Fallacies.
is
fufficiently
expofed in page 209.
There
a tradition of a
Cambridge
I
its
profeflbr
who was once

Not
I,
afked in a mathematical difcuflion

the whole
until I fee
is
fuppofe you will admit that
greater than
ufe
part/ and
who
anfwered,
This was no you are going to make of it. doubt the extreme cafe ; the more ordinary one arifes in a great meafure from the great fallacy of all, the determination to have a particular conclufion, and to find arguments for it. Obferve a
what
who is led on by a wily opponent in converfation nothing is prefented to him except what his reafon fully concurs At a fudden in, and no inference except what is indifputable.
certain perfon
:
turn of the argument, he fees a favourite conclufion, which he cares more for than for all the reafonings that ever were put He confiders himfelf an together, upfet and broken to pieces.
ill-ufed man, entrapped, fwindled out of his lawful goods ; and he therefore returns upon his fteps, and finds out that fome of the things which he admitted when he did not fee their con-
nent has the
Neither he nor the oppo fequences, are no longer admiffible. leaft idea of the nature of probable arguments, and of their oppofition both proceed as if the train of reafoning were
:
The conclufion, formed perhaps which is more upon teftimony, likely to be a guide to truth for the mind in queftion than any appreciation of argument which that mind could make, muft, according to the maxims of the age,
either demonftration or nothing.
be referred to argument, and argument only. The perpetual and wilful fallacy of that mind is the determination that all argument
If fhall fupport, and no argument mall make, the conclufion. there were only a diftincl: perception of another fource of con viction, fo ftrong that ordinary argument can neither materially weaken, nor materially confirm it, there would be fenfe in the
conclufion
is
fenfe,
becaufe there
is
truth.
Right or wrong, fuch

:
fuch the fource of moft convictions in, perhaps, moft minds fource ought therefore to be acknowledged. It would be an ex
any difputed matter, thofe who are better by authority of the truth of one fide of the conclufion than of the validity of argument in general, would avow it, keep their own fide, and let others do the fame. But here is the diffi
cellent thing,
if,
in
fatisfied
culty
the perfons
difpofed to
much
who mould avow fuch a ftate of mind are make converts as others they do not like
:
as to
On
Fallacies.
265
Accor
debar themfelves from diflemination of their opinions.
dingly they propound their beft arguments, be they what they may, as what ought to produce all the conviction which them
felves feel.
On
this point fee
The whole
clafs
page 194. of argumenta ad kominem^ having fome refe
rence to the particular perfon to whom the argument is addrefTed, will generally be found to partake of the in queftion. Such fallacy
are recrimination and charge of inconfiftency, as, You cannot ufe becaufe in fuch another cafe you oppofe it. But if the itfelf fhould be a then perfonal attack, original argument
this afTertion,
fuch a retort as the preceding may be a valid defence. In many fuch argumenta ad hominem^ it is not abfolutely the
fame argument which which is aflerted to be

cafes are
is
turned againft the propofer, but one

it,
like to
points,
dangerous and divergent
things, liable
or parallel to it. But parallel to be parallel in immaterial
in material ones.
logic afTerts, that no one occupation of a fportfman
A celebrated writer on meat ought to object to the on the ground of cruelty. The parallel
who
eats
will not exift until, for the perfon
who
eats meat,
we
fubftitute
one
who
turns butcher for amufement.
There
gar notion that butchers cannot fit on a jury. a law were propofed, on the ground of the habits arifing from continual infliction of death. Would it really be a counter-argu
or was, a vul Suppofe that fuch

is,
ment
that
men who
eat
meat have the fame animus and are

is
liable
to acquire the fame habits. It a defire to take life for fport

thofe
contended
(juftly or not) that

;
is
a cruel defire
to anfwer that
who
eat flefh
from which
life
has been taken by others have
therefore alfo cruel defires, ought to be called arguing a ditto
fecundum quid ad diffum fecundum alterum quid. The matter is clear enough. Cruelty of intention (the thing in queftion) muft be fettled by our judgment of the circumftance in which the
fport confifts.
perfon who feeks bodily exercife and the ex citement of the chafe, and who can acknowledge to himfelf that
his object
is
thofe
which he
gained on the birds which he mifles, as well as upon hits, even if thoughtlefs, cannot be faid to act
with cruelty of intention.
who
collects his
game
in
But the fportfman, as he calls himfelf, one place, merely that he may kill,
without exercife, or feeling of

oj elfe a favage,
who
fkill, is either culpably thoughtlefs, Let any delights in the infliction of death.
266
On
Fallacies.
man afk himfelf, whether in the event of his being called upon to vote for a perfectly abfolute fovereign, he would feel much con cerned to inquire whether the candidate was or was not a fportf-
man of
the
firft
kind
and then
let
him
afk himfelf the fame
queftion with refpedt to the fecond. The moft amufing, and perhaps the moft
common, example
of the ignoratio elenchl, is the taking exception to fome part of an illuftration which has nothing to do with the parallel. The
word
is
(though it mean throwing light upon a thing) confined to that fort of light which is derived from ufually mowing a procefs of difficulty employed upon an eafier cafe.
illuftration
firft
The
fallacy
may be committed by
the illuftrator.
He
has
before him the fubject matter of the premifes, their connexion in the procefs of inference, and the refult produced. Either may
be
illuftrated
thus, if
it
be doubtful whether fuch premifes

:
be employed, the illuftrator may throw away his mode of connexion, and choofe another if the procefs of inference be doubtful, he may choofe other premifes and fo on. But he may
may
illuftrate the
wrong
point
and
this
is
a fallacy very
common
to
teachers and lecturers.

learners
is
not knowing
greateft difficulty in the way of exactly in what* their difficulty confifts ;
The
and they are apt to think that when fomething is made clear, it I am of opinion that the examples muft be the fomething. of in works of logic are examples of wrong fyllogifms given
illuftration.
The point in queftion is the form, the object is to of the form, of its necefTary validity. If the conviction produce ftudent receive help from an example ftated both in matter and
form, the odds are that the help is derived from the plainnefs of the matter, and from his conviction of the matter of the conclufion.
Many
*
learners are puzzled to fee that
If this be the cafe, he has not got over his difficulty. is is not a Every
neceflary confequence of* Every
is
Y.
If the
want of con-
Every learner, in eveiy fubjeft, fhould accuftom himfelf to endeavour the re to ftate the point of difficulty in writing, whether he want to I wifh I had kept a record of the number of times fult to another or not.
mow
which I have infifted on this being done, previoufly to undertaking the ex planation, and of the proportion of them in which the writer has acknow ledged that he faw his way as foon as he attempted to aflc the road in precife
That proportion is much more than one half. written language. faid Bacon, that writing makes an exaft man.
Truly
On
Fallacies.
267
nexion be eftablimed by an inftance, as by appealing to their knowledge that every bird is not a goofe, though every goofe be
knowledge of the proportion is not logical. The reflection on inright perception may, no doubt, be acquired by but the minds which are beft fatisfied by material inftances
a bird, their
:
ftances, are alfo thofe
The
illuftration
which give themfelves no further trouble. being fuppofed correct, there is more than one
it. Some perfons will difpute the very of form, in which the fame mode of infer ence is applied toeafier matter ; but thefe are mere beginners, hardly even entitled to a name which fuppofes the poffibility of progrefs.
fallacious
mode of oppofing
illuftration
method of
Others will deny the analogy of the matter, and thefe there is no means of meeting for illuftration is ad hominem^ and the per
:
a ception of it cannot be made purely and formally inferential denier of the force of an illuftration is inexpugnable as long as he only denies. But when he attempts more, when he indicates
:
the point in which the illuftration fails, he very often falls into the error of attacking an immaterial point. If any one were to con
tend (as fome do) that it is unlawful to take the mal, he might be afked what he would fay if
trained a pigeon to carry the
of any ani Guy Faux had

life
match
its
to the vault,
been lawful to moot the bird on

a
way
or not
would There
it
have
are not
few
who would
think
it
an anfwer to fay that he could not
have trained the pigeon, or that pigeons were not then trained
to carry.
5.
quitur]
^\\Q fallacla confequentis (now very often called a non feis the fimple affirmation of a conclufion which does not
If the fchoolmen had lived in our would have joined with this the affirmation of logical day, they form applied to that which wants it, a very common thing among
follow from the premifes.
us. little time ago, either the editor or a large-type correfpondent (I forget which) of a newfpaper imputed to the clergy the maintenance of the c logic of the following as 4 confecutive and
without flaw.
This was hard on the clergy (particularly the was no middle term, neither of the conclud Oxonians) in the terms was premifes, and one negative premife gave a ing
for there
pofitive conclufion.
It ran thus,
Epifcopacy
is
of Scripture origin.
268
The
land,
On
church of England
Fallacies.
is
the only epifcopal church in
Eng
Ergo, the church eftablifhed

ported.
is
the church that fhould be fup-
Many
fore
cafes offend fo (lightly that the offence

c
is
not perceived.
defirable, there knowledge gives power, power is no mid there is not a is defirable ; knowledge fyllogifm is a dle term. It is a forites, as follows, knowledge giver of the a defirable of the of is power, power thing, the giver giver*
is
For inftance
giver of a defirable thing

firable.
is
defirable, therefore
knowledge
is
de
that the copula c gives refembles is greater than (page 5) and is an admiffible copula in in ferences with no converfion, provided that c gives B and B gives
It
mould be noted, however,
The fame may be faid of the verbs to gives C. And many of thefe verbs are, by bring, to make, to lift, &c. the unfeen operation of their having the effect of is in inference,
C/
implies
often fupplanted by the latter verb in phrafeology. Thus we * murder is death to the perpetrator where the copula is fay c two and two are four the copula being c have the brings ;
&c. But this practice may lead to fallacies, as above which muft be avoided by attention to the clafs of verbs which communicate their action or ftate, fuch as make, give, All thefe verbs are applied bring, lift, draw, rule, hold, &c. &c. to denote the caufe of the feveral actions fo, to give that which or to which that is to The gives, bring brings, give or to bring. faid to rule the Greeks becaufe he ruled his mo who was boy
value
of
:
mown
ther,
who
ruled Alcibiades,
who
ruled the Athenians,
who
ruled
the Greeks,
would have been corredMy faid fo to do, if the mat ters of rule had been the fame throughout. 6. The non This is the miftake of imagin caufa pro caufa. connexion there where is none, in the ing neceffary way of caufe,
confidered in the wideft fenfe of the word.
The
idioms of lan
guage abound
in
it,
that
is,
make
their
mere expreffions of phe
nomena
afTert real
attribute
them
to
connexion.
Thus we fay
is
apparent caufes, without intent to that a tree throws a madow,
Becauie power
defirable.
See page 115, as to this llcp.
On
to dcfcribe that
table
is
it
Fallacies.
269
hinders the light. When the level of a billiard not good, the favoured pocket is faid to draw the balls.
particular cafe of this fallacy,
which
is
often illuftrated by
the words poft hoc^ ergo propter hoc, is the conclufion that what follows in time follows as a confequence. things are feen together, there is frequently an aflumption of necefTary connexion. There is, of courfe, a prefumption of connexion if and B have
When
:
never been feen apart, there is probability (the amount of which depends upon the number of inftances obferved) that the removal of one would be the removal of the other. It is when there is
only one inftance to proceed upon that the ailumption falls under fallacy ; were there but two, induclive probability might be faid to The fallacy could then confift only in eftimating begin.
this
the probability too high.
As may be
fuppofed, the non caufa pro caufa arifes
more often
from mere ignorance than any other fallacy. To take the two inftances that I happened to meet with neareft to the time of writing this page ; Walpole, remarking on the uniform practice the old among writing-mafters of putting their portraits at the of their beginning works, remarks that thefe men feem to think
tures.
their profeffion gives pofterity a particular intereft in their fea of the Probably they did not think about it : the
ufage
day prevented any
man from
being chargeable with undue va
nity who exhibited his phyfiognomy, and moft of the writing mafters were tbemfelves engravers^ and either did their own por traits, or more probably made ufe of their acquaintance with the
for whom they did the under drudgery, done on eafy terms. Again, Noble (in his con Granger) remarks that Saunderfon had fuch a pro found knowledge of mufic, that he could diftinguim the fifth The author did not know, firft, that any perfon part of a note. who cannot diftinguifh lefs than the fifth part of a note to begin to get themfelves tinuation of
more celebrated engravers
to keep the peace if he exhibit the of learning any mufical inftrument in which in tonation depends upon the ear ; and fecondly, that if Saunderfon were not fo gifted by nature, knowledge of mufic would no more have fupplied the defect, than of would
with,
mould be bound over
leaft intention
knowledge
optics
give
him
fight.
Thefallacia plurium interrogationum confifts
in trying to get
270
one anfwer to
yes or no to a
in
On
Fallacies.
It
is
feveral queftions in one.
barrifters in the
examination of witnefTes,
who
fometimes ufed by endeavour to get
complex queftion which ought to be partly anfwered each way, meaning to ufe the anfwer obtained, as for the whole, when they have got it for a part. An advocate is fometimes
guilty of the argument a ditto fecundum quid ad diftum Jimpliciter : it is his bufinefs to do for his client all that his client might
honeftly
do for himfelf.
?
Is
not the word
in
Italics frequently
omitted
Might any man
counfel frequently try to do the two men who ftole the leg of mutton ; one could fwear he had not got it, the other that he had not taken it. The counfel
is
honeftly try to do for himfelf all that are often reminded of for him ?
We
doing his duty by his client
the client has
left
the matter to
his counfel.
intention of the client, and the unintended execution of the counfel, there may be a
Between the unexecuted
wrong done, and, if we are to believe the ufual maxims, no wrong doer. The anfwer of the owner of the leg of mutton is
fometimes to the point,
is
c
Well, gentlemen,
all I
can
fay
is,
there
That a barrifter is able to put off his a rogue between you. forenfic principles with his wig, nay more, that he becomes an
is
upright and impartial judge in another wig,

tainly true.
curious, but cer
above were the forms of fallacy laid down as moft effential to be ftudied by thofe who were in the habit of appealing to and of throwing principles fuppofed to be univerfally admitted,
The
all
deduction into
fyllogiftic
form.
Modern
difcuffions,
more
con
favourable, in feveral points, to the difcovery of truth, are
ducted without any conventional authority which can compel and the neglect of formal logic occaprecifion of ftatement :
fions the frequent occurrence of thefe offences againft mere rules which the old enumeration of fallacies feems to have confidered
as fufficiently guarded againft
by the
rules themfelves,
and
fuf-
For defcribed under one head, thefallacia confequentis. ficiently it would have been a childifh miftake, under the old example,
have afferted the univerfal propofition, meaning the fyftem, to the thing is true in moft cafes. The rule particular one, becaufe
was imperative
not all muft be fome^ and even #//, when not known to be #//, was fame. But in our day nothing is more common than to hear and read affertions made in all the form,
:
On
and intended to have
all
Fallacies.
271
the power, of univerfals, of which no can be faid that moft of the cafes are true. If a except thing contradiction be aflerted and proved by an inftance, the anfwer
is
Oh
that
is
an extreme
It turns
cafe.
made of all
nary cafes
;
cafes.
out that
it
But the aflertion had been was meant only for ordi
why
;
three caufes
formal logic
it was not fo flated muft be referred to one of mind which wants the habit of precifion which has a tendency to fofter, a defire to give more
ftrength to a conclufion than honeftly belongs to
it,
or a fallacy
intended to have
chance of reception. The application of the extreme cafe is very often the only teft by which an ambiguous aflumption can be dealt with no won
its
:
der that the aflumer fhould dread and proteft againft a procefs which is as powerful as the fign of the crofs was once believed
to be againft evil fpirits. Where anything true with exceptions, there is often
is
aflerted
which
is
great difficulty in forcing the
aflertor to attempt to lay down a canon by which to diftinguifh the rule from the exception. Every thing depends upon it for the queftion will be whether the example belongs to the
:
always
rule or the exception.

is
When
one
cafe
is
brought forward which
certainly exception, the aflertor will, in nine cafes out of ten, refufe to fee why it is brought forward. He will treat it as a
argument againft the rule, inftead of admitting that it reafon good why he fhould define the method of diftinguifhthe he will virtually, and perhaps abfolutely, de ing exceptions mand that all which is certainly exception mail be kept back,
fallacious
is
fimply that he may be able to aflume that there is no occafion to acknowledge the difficulty of the uncertain cafes.
The
ufe of the
extreme
cafe, its decifive effecT: in matters
of
demonftration, may likely to be in matters of aflerted near approach. As in the following in ftance. It feems almoft matter of courfe, when ftated, to thofe
it is
furnifh prefumption as to
what
who
have not ftudied the fubject of

life
is
life
contingencies, that the
that of the annuity made certain annuity during the average exiftence of fuch lives as that of the annuitant. That if, for example, perfons aged 22 live, one with another,
proper value of a
40
years, an office which receives from every fuch perfon the prefent value of forty payments certain, will, without gain or lofs, in the If this be (as was long run, be able to pay the annuities.
272
ftoutly
it
On
Fallacies.
contended by fome writers of the laft century) a univerfal Let there be two per will hold in this extreme cafe. truth, is certain to die within a one of whom fons, year from the grant
certain to live for ever.
to both
life
is
(and therefore never claims anything) and the other of whom is It is clear that the value of an annuity
of both
fet
of any
value
the value of a perpetual annuity. But the average : one perpetual duration makes the average Hence by the falfe rule the in which it is, perpetual.
is
eternal
is
We
two perpetual annuities, or juft double of the truth. might fuppofe that moft perfons have no idea of a uni
:
verfal propofition
but ufe the language, never intending all to
fignify ftated broadly

liberty
more than
moft.
And
in the
fame manner principles are
far
as
and generally, which the aflertor is afterwards at to deny under the phrafe that he does not carry them fo It would not do to avow that the the inftance named.
is
:
not always true fo it is ftated to be always true^ but Are not capable of being carried more than a certain length. about confufion under fome the not meaning of perfons
principle
the
many word general? In

:
fcience
it
verfal
and the fame
in old Englifh.
always has the meaning of uni Thus the catechifm of
the church of England aflerts that there are
two facraments
for
which are generally neceflary

all
to falvation
it
meaning neceflary
of the genus in queftion, be
church, or any other.
But
is
general means only ufual^ great deal of what
man, Chriftian, modern and vernacular Englifh, and generally means ufually.
in
member of
the
called evafion belongs to this head,
The or to that of the Ignoratlo elenchi, as the fophift anfwers. never of war abfolute unlawfulnefs of the for inftance, advocates,
tell,
invafion.
unlefs prefled, what they think of the cafe of refiftance to Is the country to be given up to the firft foreigner
who
choofes to
come
for
it ?
Sometimes the extreme
cafe
comes
into play : fometimes the aflertion that no one will come ; which is irrelevant as to the queftion what would be right if he did
come.
Among amufmg modern

confider that
evafions are
it
There
in
is
no
occafion
to
and
do nt confider
the
that point of view.

their
Any
one
who watches
manner
*
in
which men defend
opinions will frequently fee
is
and
is
C, therefore
that
is
anfwered, not by denial of either premife, but by
is
not
On
Fallacies.
c
273
This I don t fee it in that the proper point of view or light. fhould be called the confufion between logic and perfpective.
The
denial of
one univerfal
is
often
made
to
amount
to, or to
of the oppofite, or fubcontrary, univerfal. This craving after general truths, the moft manifeft fault of the old logicians in their choice of premifes, did not expire with them.
pafs into, the aflertion
Bacon
ral
fays
the
mind
It
delights in fpringing
up
to the
moft gene
axioms, that
fettled opinions,
may find reft. which is well

is
it it
Many
;
perfons are defirous of
mean
univerfal, as
is
often the cafe.

:
unlefs by fettled opinions they That fome are and fome

cafe require
are not
tion, to fee
no fettlement under which
makes every
falls.
examina
And
with the above
we may
couple the tendency to believe that refutation of an argument is proof of the falfehood of its conclufion, and that a falfe confe-
quence muft be a
falfe proportion. Hence it arifes that fo many dare not perfons give up any argument in favour of a proportion which they fully believe they think they abandon the propo:
fition.
difficult to
:
fometimes happens that an aflertion is made, which it is fuppofe can be anything but a cafe of a univerfal proand pofition yet the afTertor takes care not to make his proIt
pofition univerfal, but perfifts in the particular cafe. logician in our day has aflerted that when Calvin fays that all officers of
the church
ftood
as
elected by the people, he muft be underreference to deacons only, becaufe the fpeaking aflertion is made in the chapter on deacons. If it had been
in
mould be
roundly ftated that

univerfes limited
univerfal propofitions are to have their the by headings of the works or chapters in which they occur for inftance, that the aflertion that all men are mortal, occurring in a hiftory of England, is to be taken as
all
made of Englifhmen only there would have been at leaft no But as it is, we are left to furmife whether this be ambiguity.
meant, or whether the proportion be to apply to Calvin only, or Reformers only, or to men whofe names begin with C, &c. The odds are that the application of a univerfal propofition will be dictated by the heading of a chapter but the extent to v/hich
to
:
a premife
it is
is
aj/erted as true
ufe
:
wanted for
not to be judged of by that to which and the lefs, the nearer we go to the day of
is
the old logicians.
274
Wrong
On
Fallacies.
views of the quantity of a proportion are as frequent as any fallacies. Some, meaning moft, and feme , meaning few, This is the neceflary confequence are frequently confounded.
of the nature of human knowledge, in which we can but rarely form a definite idea of the proportion which the extent fpoken of It is part of the value of the mathematical bears to the whole.
theory of probabilities, that the mind
is
accuftomed to the view

-,
of
it
refults
may
as ufelefs, perfectly definite fuppofed cafes in a book of of as the in themfelves, be, queftions many
drawn from
It is not furprifarithmetic, but neverthelefs good for exercife. that fallacies about quantity mould be capable of moft ftriking that ing expofure in queftions concerning meafurable quantity, clafles be mould nor that there of mathematics : in is, queftions
of
fallacy
of which
it is
difficult to illuftrate the detection
by any
example, to ordi c of things of that than broad ftatement the nary apprehenfions the fame kind, that which is fometimes right muft be better than
other inftances.
clear, for
What
can be more
that
which
is
always wrong.
is
But a
little
confideration will
fuggeft that
is
what
fometimes
right, if
always wrong we do not
may know how

:
be as good as that which

alfo
cafes in
which the
latter is right
and
to diftinguifh the that what is not
much wrong,
generally,
may be more
:
ufeful than that
moftly very wrong, when it is not abfolutely right. which does not go is right twice a day but it is not one which does go, though very badly.
which is watch
fo ufeful as
wrong
give an account of all the fallacies which depend upon notions of quantity would require much fpace, and more affumption of mathematical knowledge in my reader than is confiftent with my plan. But I may mention the miftaken ufe of abfolute terms and notions in queftions of degree. There can if this be a will but a a and and be, difputant fay, right wrong ;
To
not right, it is wrong. Many perfons will announce that their watches are quite right, abfolutely at the true time, to a fecond and will end by giving the time which was mown when they
:
looked, as being accurately that of the inftant at which they
proverb Fruftra fit per plura, quod fieri poa bargain per pandora contains an inaccuracy of degree which cofts twenty millings and is worth fifteen, is not twenty
tefl
:
announce
it.
The
(hillings
loft,
overreached
will
but only feldom
five,
though the vexation of the party
fufFer
him
to fee this.
On
Fallacies.
275
are often
Proverbs in general are liable to this miftalce. They ufed in exactly the fame manner as the firft principles of the old In fact, remembering that thefe firft principles were logicians.
till they were perfectly proverbial, the learned and obferving the appli ; it, among cation of our modern proverbs, as made by the mafs of thofe
bandied from mouth to mouth
as
we now
call
who have
faults
not profited by mental difcipline, we may fee that the of the fchoolmen are only thofe of the ordinary human mind. It is hard indeed if there be a purpofe which a proverb cannot be found to ferve it is a univerfal propofition of no very
:
meaning, fanclioned by ufage, having the appearance of authority, and capable of ftretching or contracting like Prince
definite
Ahmed
error
at
:
pavilion.
One
only
is
allowable
this deftroys all the reft,
and then, when
In generalibus latet clofely looked
commits
fuicide.
All miftakes of probability are eflentially miftakes of quantity, the fubftitution of one amount of knowledge and belief for an
other.
It
is
often difficult to convey a proper notion of the
degree of force which

to retain
it
is meant to be given ; and ftill more fo throughout the whole of a difcuffion. A perfon be gins by ftating an explanation as poffible, or probable enough to require confideration, as the cafe may be. The forms of language
by which
exprefs different degrees of probability without intentional difhonefty (but not always) the propofition may be made to flide out of one I am fatisfied that degree into another. many writers would
are eafily interchanged
;
we endeavour to
fo that,
ftirink
from
fetting
down,
in the
margin, each time they
make
certain afTertion, the numerical degree of probability with which often it hap they think they are juftified in prefenting it.
Very
pens that a conclufion produced from a balance of arguments, andyfr/? prefented with the appearance of confidence which might
be reprefented by a claim of fuch odds as four to one in its favour, is afterwards The writer ufed as if it were a moral certainty.
who
%
in the
thus proceeds, would not do fo if he were required to write margin every time he ufes that conclufion. This would
prevent his falling into the error in which his partifan readers are generally fure to be more than ready to go with him, namely, turning all balances for, into demonftration, and all balances
againft, into evidences of impoflibility.
One
of the great fallacies of evidence
is
the difpofition to dwell
276
on the actual
exift
poffibility
On
of
its
Fallacies.
being
falfe
:
a poffibility
which muft
when
way
it is
till
not
demon ft rative.
Counfel can bewilder juries
in this
they almoft doubt their
own
fenfes.
man
is
and another man, with a recently difcharged piftol in his hand, is found hiding within fifty yards of the fpot, and ten mi nutes of the time. It does not follow that the man fo found
fhot,
committed the murder and cafes have happened, in which it has turned out that a perfon convicted upon evidence as ftrong as the An aftute above, has been afterwards found to be innocent.
:
tion that
exifts,
defender makes thefe cafes his prominent ones he omits to men it is not one in a thoufand againft whom fuch evidence
:
arrange the univerfe, fquare the of circle, and fo forth, not only comfort themfelves by thinking met real difcoverers other the neglect which Copernicus and
except when guilty. All the makers of fyftems
who
with for a time, but fometimes fucceed
Thefe
laft
forget that for every true

a
been for fome time unregarded,
making followers. improvement which has thoufand abfurdities have met

in
It is not wife to tofs up for a chance of that fate permanently. hazard one of the in of the advance age, by taking up at being little will it do to defpife As over. which the things age pafles
the ufual track for attaining an object, becaufe (as always hap pens) there are fome who are gifted with energies to make a road for themfelves. Dr. Johnfon tells a ftory of a lady who ferioufly
meditated leaving out the claffics in her fon s education, becaufe Telford is a (he had heard Shakfpeare knew little of them.
{landing proof
not
eflential for
The
to
is fuppofed by fome) that fpecial training is an engineer. difpofition to judge the prudence of an action by its refult,
(it
contains a fallacy
when
it
is
applied to fmgle inftances only, or
number. That which, under the circumftances, is the prudent rule of conduct, may, neverthelefs end in fomething as bad as could have refulted from want of circumfpection. But upon
few
in
dozens of inftances, fuch a balance would appear in favour of pru dence as would leave no doubt in favourofthe rule of conduct, even
in the inftances in
which
it
failed.
from the
refult
about the conduct of one

c
circumftances to guide him.
by the refult,
is
a paralogifm,
The fallacy confifts in judging who had only the previous You acted unwifely, as is proved implies You did, except when
c
it
On
as
it
Fallacies.
277
which
did not lead to
happens
in this inftance, take a courfe
the defined
feen.
refult.
Take
makes
A
frill
chemifr.
a ftrong cafe, and the abfurdity will be up a prefcription wrongly, and his cuf:
this other, fo it may happen, makes would poifons the patient. venture to fay that he acted unwifely, as is proved by the refult, in leaving the tradefman whom he knew to be carelefs, for another
tomer leaves him
for another
it
up
more wrongly, and
Who
of
whom
he
be imputed,
is
is
knew no harm. The only way in which blame can when it can be faid You acted unwifely, in not
the one which
you might have done, that the refult which has was likely to happen. One refult happened little as to the wifdom of the courfe which proves very fuperior a of it ; feveral and the it, produced may give prefumption greater
finding out, as
the number, the greater the prefumption. So little is this thought of, that the common phrafe, c I acted for the beft, meaning originally I acted in the manner which
fults,
under the circumftances, appeared likely to lead to the beft revery often lofes its proper meaning, and is ufed as fynonymous with c I acted with good intentions/
I will
I can only flightly touch on proceed to notice a few other caufes of error. And firft, of equivocations of ftyle. I have before referred to
:
Thefe, and many other points,
fuch a
phenomenon
as the alteration of a
good ryllogifm into a
bad one, to make the fentence read
better.
But nothing ever
reads well (for a continuance) except the natural current of a I fhould like it to be the law of letters, that writer s thought.
every book fhould have inferted in

forth the
it
the printer
s affidavit, fetting
number of verbal erafures in the manufcript, fair copies It would be worth at leait one review. being illegal. There is a wilful and deliberate equivocation, which it is
fuppofed the age demands.
pofed fynonymes,
in the
It is the ufe
to prevent the
far is
fame paflage. So
of fynonymes, or fupfame word from occurring twice the neceffity of this practice recog
nized, that there are
few
printing-offices in
London, the readers
of which do not query the fecond introduction of any word which prominently appears twice. And then the author obeys the hint,
frrikes
and would have been content

for
out one of the offenders, fticks in a dictionary equivalent, if the printer s reader had done it
him.
And
fo
he writes a good ftyle.
To
be fure, he does not
278
fay
:
On
Fallacies.
what he meant, exactly ; for fynonymes are feldom or never logical equivalents but what is that to elegance of expreflion ? The demand for non-recurrence of words arifes from the pub
(I
lic
beg
its
pardon) not knowing
how
to read.
If,
when
twice, the proper emphafes were looked for, and obferved, there would be nothing ofFenfive about the repetition. It is the reader who makes one and one into two, by giving both
units equal value. Take this fentence from Johnfon, (the firft I happened to and read light on, in the preface to Shakfpeare),
it firft
word occurs
as follows
"
He therefore indulged
Rymer
"
his natural difpofition
and
tion
his
difpofition^
as
and then as follows

;
He
is
has remarked, led him to comedy therefore indulged his natural difpofi
:"
and his
difpofition, as
Rymer
has remarked, led
him
to
comedy."
This reading
what the context
effect
tence
toil
of the repetition is next to nothing. In tragedy he often writes, with great appearance of and ftudy, what is written at lajl with little felicity but in
"
requires, and the ill Take the next fen
his
comic fcenes he feems
to produce, without labour^
what no
labour can
Thefe were the firft inftances I found, improve." from a chance opening of the Elegant Extracts, purpofely chofen
firft
as a mifcellany.
that the
The laws of thought generally dictate this rule, occurrence of a word is the more emphatic of the
the leflbn of experience is, that a writer who prevents re currence by the ufe of the dictionary of fynonymes, is a good ftyle-maker for none but a bad reader, and may very poflibly be
two
Of courfe, I fhould a good arguer for none but a bad logician. not deny that recurrence of both word and emphafis is a defect,
if it
be frequent.
in the place
is
The
one
confufion between the means and the end, and putting of the other, is well enough known in morals
:
but there
a correfponding tendency to forget the diftinction between the principle which is to be acted on, and the rule of
refe action by which adherence to that principle is fecured. rence to the derived rule is in all refpedts as good as one to the firft principle, between parties who underftand both, and the
connexion between them.
But thofe who underftand the
rule
only, are apt to forget that a rule may or may not be the true expreflion of a principle, according to the circumftances in which
it is
propofed to apply
it.
If,
indeed,
it
were of
univerfal appli-
On
cation, thofe
ciple
Fallacies.
279
:
who do and thofe who do not underftand the prin might be on the fame footing as to fecurity but there are
rules.
few fuch
preceding caution may be applied in all departments of thought, in law and in logic, in morals and in arithmetic. It is impoflible, for inftance, to ftate the rule of three in fuch a man
clude thofe to which
The
ner as eafily to include the cafes in which it mail apply, and ex it does not. To fay that it muft be ufed
where the fourth quantity, the one fought, is to be a fourth pro portional to the three which are given, though correct, ftill leaves it open to inquiry what are the cafes in which this condition is to be fatisfied and many cafes might be, and are propofed, in which
:
the inquiry is not eafy to a beginner. but rules for their application. rules,
To an
In law, there are not only unlearned fpectator,
particularly in the courts of equity, in which the advocate addrefles a judge, and not a jury, the argument takes that technical form
which makes many perfons think

only
arbitrary rule.
It
that the
whole law
it
is,
at beft,
may
be that fome of thofe

better of
:
who
there
addrefs the court can
make nothing
and juft
as there
are arithmeticians, and good ones too, who are but the flaves, and never the mafters, of their procefles, fo there may be advocates, and even judges, who have not one element of the legiflator in
them.
But there
are
enough of a higher
rules
is
fpecies.
The
great art of
in contravention,
embody.
them in aid, and not of the principles which they are intended to rule may have exceptions, it is faid ; but this is
ufmg
to apply
rule with exceptions is no rule, hardly a correct ftatement. unlefs the exceptions be definite and determinable in which cafe
:
the exceptions are exclufions by another rule.

perfect
The
parallel
is
and proportions (page 143). Thus, c All Europe, except Spain and Portugal is a univerfal propofition ; but All the ftates of Europe except two 7 is a particular one. A
rules
between
rule
which
:
rule
rule.
applies to all ftates except Spain and Portugal is a but a rule which applies to all except two (unknown) is no
When
it is
ftated, in ordinary language, that

it
every rule
is
fubject to exception,
are thofe
is
cumftances under which
meant, part, that the ciradherence to the rule gains the object,
for the
moft
which moft frequently occur, and that the circumftances under which adherence to the rule would defeat the object are
280
rare.
On
If this
Fallacies.
were remembered, much confufion would often be

(hall fo far exprefs rule, that
it
faved.
fhall
We want a word which
which will generally fucceed, without the notion of obligation which accompanies that of rule, and which perpetu rule nifi of the courts, which ally mifleads. We want, in fact, the
imply that
is
to be a rule unlefs caufe be ftiown againft
it
and which
is
will,
in
moft cafes, be ultimately made abfolute, but from the beginning.
not abfolute
The common
firft
miftake
it
is,
that the rule nifi
is
an abfolute rule,
leading object or
and that therefore
may
be fubftituted for
its
that principle, and that even the very words which exprefs fatisfaction of as taken be expreffive equally objecl: gained, may of the rule, and vice verfd. For inftance, it is commonly ftated
is determined, is publication ; publifhes the difcovery, is to he held the difco verer ; one lapfe more, and it is faid that he is the difcoverer ; difco yet one more, and it will be faid that the publication is the
that the rule

that he
by which a difcoverer
who
firft
very remarkable circumftances attending the recent of peculiar indifcovery of the planet Neptune, involving points rule to be much tereft and delicacy, have caufed this difcufTed, and
very.
The
have brought out every variety of ftatement of it. The thing to be determined is the aftual truth of the queftion, the real hiftory of the human mind with regard to it. No one has a right under
no matter what its authority, nor by whom impofed, to which is not, for the thing which is, or the If philofophers were to at lefs probable for the more probable. a law of their own tempt, by framing, to fubftitute the conven tional refult for the real one, the common fenfe of mankind would
any
rule,
fubftitute the thing
The firft rule difpute their authority, and reverfe their decifion. firft printer is the firft publifher, the the that is undoubtedly (nifi) fecond, that the firft publiftier is the difcoverer. Thefe will, un
lefs
caufe be
fhown
is
againft
them, be made abfolute
in
every
cafe.
very prevalent, namely, that the firft publifher has therefore the rights of the difcoverer, is as incorrect as that take the cur the firft printer is therefore the firft publifher.
notion which
To
rent language, one would fuppofe that printing one hundred thoufand in copies would be held better than circulating one manufcript, and that even though the firft publifher could be
proved to have plngiarifed, he has
ftill
the rights of difcovery.
On
tation
Fallacies.
281
Juft as (page 244) early notions make laws of literal interpre fuperfede thofe of intended meaning, fo, in the earlier
ftages of law, rules are often
made
to over-ride the principles
on
a
which they
fenfe.
profefs to be founded,
is
and to defeat truth and
common
in
There
more excufe here than there would be
queftion of fcience, for peace and convenience are main objects of law, and it may be that rigid adherence to a rule, as a rule, at
avowed facrifice of truth and practicable means of preventing a larger

a certain
juftice,
facrifice
may be
the only of both. In old
was
times, the rule of affiliation, Pater eft quern nupticz demonftrant, held fo abfolutely, that the hufband of the mother would be
rent
the legal father, though the two had been confined in two diffe jails a hundred miles apart for twelve months preceding the
birth
of the child.
it
The modern
law has made
this rule to
be no
more than
It
is
ought to be, namely,
one which muft hold unlefs

of
the contrary be proved.
not
uncommon,
is
in difputation, to fall into the fallacy
making out conclufions

fays that lieve is
for others
another will
by fupplying premifes. One take for granted that he muft be
C, and will therefore confider him as maintaining that A is C. But it may be that the other party, maintaining that A is B, may, by denying that A is C, really intend to deny that B is C. In religious controverfy, nothing is more common than to reprefent feels and individuals as avowing all that is efteemed
the reprefentation to be what, upon their pre to avow. All parties feem more or lefs afraid mifes, they ought of allowing their opponents to fpeak for themfelves. Again, as
by thofe
who make
to fubjecls in which to take one premife
men go
in parties,
it is
not very
uncommon
from fome individuals of a party, another
from others, and to fix the logical conclufion of the two upon the whole party when perhaps the conclufion is denied by all, fome of whom deny the firft premife by affirming the fecond,
:
reft deny the fecond by affirming the firft. Any feel: of Chriftians might be made atheifts by logical confequence, if it were permitted to join together the premifes of different fections
while the
among them into one argument. This is a fallacy which, how ever common, could eafily be avoided, and would be, if thofe
who
ufe
it
cared for anything but victory.

is
form of the fame, which every one
fubjecT: to,
But there is another and which it is
282
not
On
Fallacies.
fo eafy to perceive. It is that of drawing upon our former felves for the premifes which are to guide us for the time being. Conclufions remain in our minds long after the grounds on which
:
and it may happen that one they were formed are abandoned premife of an argument will ftill have force, when the very reafons on which the fecond premife is now admitted are contra
dictory of thofe
which once induced us
to admit the
firft.
Thus
learnt to advocate the legal toleration of opinions which they ftill believe, by force of education, to be abfolute crimes againft fociety, are logically the advocates of toleration of
many who have
crime
whereas, the arguments which they have learned to think
valid for the firft premife, ought, if worth anything, to teach them to deny the fecond. I have myfelf heard from one mouth
in one part of the Creator are fins againft fociety, that againft
in
one converfation (of courfe not

ought to be punifhed by
it) all
that
all
fins
fins againft
fociety
fociety, that certain opinions then

it
named
are fins againft the Creator, and that for his opinions. injuftice to punifh any one
is
the height of
or aflertion
In printed controverfy, the ftatement of the oppofite opinion may be made by defcription without citation (by
chapter or page), by defcription with citation, or by quotation The firft is not allowable. The with or without defcription.
prefumption is ftrong that a perfon who oppofes an opinion, im putes an error, or makes a charge, upon the writings of another, is bound at leaft to cite, in a manner which cannot be miftaken,
the part of thofe writings to
which he
refers.
There
are writers
who
refer defcriptively
reference of citation,
and even commentatively, putting the and thus (as Bayle fays Moreri conftantly
of their paradoes) lead the reader to fuppofe that the words I do not fee phrafe and comment are thofe of the paflage itfelf.
that quotation
reader muft
obligatory, though highly defirable : but the remember, when there is only citation, that it is not
is
the author cited
ward.
It is a
who fpeaks, but the perfon who brings him for man s own account of his own witnefs with the
:
advantage of an apparent
exifts fage in queftion
:
of enabling the reader to go and If the citer be honeft, the paffor himfelf. ftatement the verify
offer
if judicious,
it
is
to the effecT:
ftated.
is
Confequently, whenever the citer s honefty or judgment no mere citation is admiflible. prefsly in queftion,
ex-
On
When
when
citations are
Fallacies.
283
:
few they ought perhaps to be quotations
they are many, it may be impracticable to make them fo. But extenfive citation ought to be encouraged. Lazy readers do not like it they are not pleafed to have a power of verifica
:
of which they do not mean to avail themfelves ; and they would rather, in cafe of being mifled, have to throw the blame upon the author than upon their own non-acceptance of
tion offered
verification. Accordingly, they exprefs But the more pages loaded with references." At the fame a boon. diligent readers confider every citation as there are writers time it is to be remembered that who, relying
the offered
means of
"
their difguft at
on the
common
difinclination to verify, add a large
number of
citations, and give the appearance of a ftrong body of authorities, which are often nothing to the purpofe, and fometimes not taken
from actual examination, but copied from other writers. Perhaps the greateft and moft dangerous vice of the day, in the matter of reference, is the practice of citing citations, and
quoting quotations, as if they came from the original fources, inftead of being only copies. It is in truth the reader s own fault if he be taken in or by the falfe appearance of au by this,
thority juft alluded to ; for it is in his own power to certify himfelf of the truth though there may be difficulty when the cita
:
tions are
many, or when fome of them are from very
rare books.
Honefty and policy both demand the exprefs ftatement of every citation and quotation which is made through another fource.
If a perfon quote
4
what he
finds
of Cicero in Bacon,
it
mould be
It has happened often Cicero (cited by Bacon) fays, &c. enough that a quoter has been convicted of altering his author,
and has had no anfwer to make except that he took the pafTage from fome previous quoter.
Quotations are frequently made with intentional omiffion and But no rule ought to be more inflexible than that alteration.
all
within the marks of quotation ought to be a literal Sometimes the omiffion is made of the book quoted. tranfcript becaufe part of the fentence is unnecefTary, as the quoter thinks. But this is juft the point which he has no bufinefs to decide
which
is
without letting his reader
know
that he has decided
it,
which
is
If mark of omiffion ( ) eafily done by the recognized a perfon would quote the /Eneid for the antiquity of Carthage,
284
:
On
Fallacies.
c
he has no bufmefs to write down, as from Virgil, Urbs antiqua fuit fuit it fhould be Carthago
if
Urbs antiqua
Carthago, he decide upon omitting c Tyrii tenuere coloni. In this cafe, not only may the omiflion make the proportion appear more There was categorical than it is in the original, turning it from
c Carthage, rather towards Carthage was an old city ; but a reader may choofe to think that the omitted words qualify
an old
city,
the epithet, or even offer proof deftru&ive of it. fhould deny the antiquity of Tyre ? The omijjion
What
if
he
may (or may not) be right, but the omiflion without notice, or fupprejfion^ is
wrong. Moreover, it is dangerous to truth to fhorten without notice, inafmuch as thofe who quote the quotation will be apt to do the fame thing; that is, thinking they have the whole pafTage, to What this may end in, no one can predict fhorten it further.
certainly
:
but miflakes have been brought about in this way quite as abfurd It may reafonably be fuppofed as any that ever were made.
good many years many very ludicrous errors arife thus. a fhortened quotation, put away ago, I fucceeded, by means of until it was wanted, in arriving at, and publifhing, the conclufion
that
Archimedes was once fuppofed to have been an anceftor of Henry IV. of France. The real purport of the fentence was that he was fuppofed to have been an anceftor of the Sicilian martyr It has happened St. Lucia, on whofe day Henry IV. was born.
that
that
has been
faid to
have aflerted in a fecond book, that
faid in the firft related the death of C, when the truth is that before the B died that book (See Companion to the many years Almanack for 1846, page 27). I do not fpeak of omiflions made
becaufe the part omitted would prove more this of courfe is fraud. likes
:
than the quoter
omiffions may be, ftill more fo are Unjuftifiable as unnoted additions and alterations. Writers have fometimes inferted glofles
or alteration.
of their own, into the text which they quote, either as addition Explanatory additions may eafily be made within
brackets
which are underftood marks of fuch a thing but But why, the reader may afk, are fuch things infifted on ? Is not the fimple rule, Be boneft, enough to include thefe and hundreds of things like them, with To this I reply that within a twelvemonth before out detail ?
[ ],
:
alterations are intolerable.
On
the time
I
Fallacies.
285
write this, a clergyman, a man of high education and character both, publifhed a fermon in which he gave a verfe from the Bible within marks of quotation, in which he wilfully ftruck out one word, and inferted another, without notice and
:
fermon went through feveral editions, either without detec tion, or without that detection leading to fuccefsful remonftrance. I do not here ; but rather the fol fuppofe there was
his
difhonefty
lowing reafoning
ftate that
it
was
one
faid.
it was meant; therefore I may Such reafoning is one of the curfes of our
am
fure
literature.
There
is
alteration within the

:
marks of quotation which
of grammar to bring may the quoted phrafes into connected Englifh with the quoter s context. As when a man fays I know" and another perfon,
at firft
it is
feem reafonable
alteration
"
quoting him, fays

to put
"
He
"
knows."
know."
down He
fays
But it is furely juft as eafy There is often an alteration
of emphafis in this adaptation of grammar, and generally an in troduction of irony and it is the premier pas to fomething worfe. As far as I have feen, thofe who do it as a matter of courfe, are
:
tation.
apt fometimes to put their own paraphrafes under marks of quo writer fhould fuit his own grammar to that of his
quotation, and not the converfe.
Omiffion of context, preceding or following the quotation, alter its character and this is one of the moft fre entirely quent of the fallacies of reference, both intentional and uninten
may
tional.
The
:
only
that
way
is,
to infure full confidence
is
to give the
egg
in its fhell
to begin at a point
which
clearly precedes
the immediate fubject of quotation, and to continue until the matter is as to give a fentence clearly paft preceding and a
:
fentence following the matter quoted for its own fake, diflinguiming the latter. This is not always conclufive becaufe the
:
fubject may be refumed in a fentence or two, or in another part of the book. But it will inform the reader, in moft cafes, whe ther he is or is not likely to differ from the quoter as to the
meaning of the part quoted.

tations
And
this refers
particularly to
quo
of opinion treated with fafety.
thofe of fact
may
often be
more
briefly
torious, the various readings
In quoting ancient authors, in cafes where the text is not no mould be given, efpecially when it
286
is
On
Fallacies.
Or
an author whofe text has an indifferent reputation for accuracy. if this cannot be done, the edition fhould be cited. Shameful
things have occurred in controverfy, by omiffion of a part of the ordinary text, which the quoter chofe to confider as an interpola tion, without choofing to confider that the reader ought to have
liberty to
Among
in
judge for himfelf on that point. the cafes of indirect citation, fhould be included that
is
exifting, not on the authority on that of a catalogue. The num ber of nonexifting books which are entered in catalogues and
which a book
s
mentioned as
of the writer
own
eyes, but
copied, as to their titles, into other works, is greater than any one who has not examined for himfelf would fuppofe poflible.
In thofe who know this, confidence is deftroyed ; and this fometimes affects queftions of opinion. I am told that Dugald Stewart, who had a ftrong notion of the practical impofftbility of prefenting Euclid in a fyllogiftic form, never
had been done by Herlinus and Dafypodius* entered in catalogues but I mutt fay that the
:
would believe that Such a work
it
is
ftate of catalogues fuch that Stewart or any one elfe had full right to doubt of any work, upon no other than catalogue evidence. The work
is
does
exift,
and
have a copy of
ftand,
no one has
it. But, feeing how matters a right to declare that an old book ever was
written, without informing his reader
on what
fort
of evidence
he
relies.
CHAPTER
On
have made a
in
XIV.
the Verbal Defcription of the Syllogifm.

I
firft attempt to exprefs the rela language which will make fyllogifms capable of verbal defcription, and the inference of their conclufions matter of felf-evidence. It is defirable that this fhould
page 75, IN tions of propofitions
fully done, and I accordingly renew the attempt, with the beft words of defcription which I can find or make. Any one who can fuggeft words which better convey the meaning to
be more
himfelf, will find
it
eafy to fubftitute
them
for thofe
which
have
ufed.
Defcription of the Syllogifm.
287
The
as
much imported meaning
conditions to be fatisfied are, that the words fhould have as poflible, that every word and its
contrary fhould have the connexion of contrariety well marked, and that the verbal defcriptions mould be capable of being eafily formed from the fymbolic notation. As may be fuppofed, thefe conditions are to fome extent contradictory of each other the
:
facrifice
of either to the others

effect.
is
then to be
made
to the
moft
advantageous
the fyllogifm.
in which it may be neceflary to defcribe uied throughout this work, the one hitherto Firft, in which one is referred to the other term concluding by the in
There
are
two ways
tervention of the middle term
what
is
of Y, and what
is
of
is of Z. Z, determine what Secondly, that in which the two terms are referred to one another by comparifon of both with the
middle term
what
and
feverally are of
determine what
is
of Z.
firft
is
In the
fcription
mode, the middle term

;
middle in the fentence
is mentioned, and its dewhile the reference term is
understood in the predicate of each defcription. Thus c a of a is a fubidentical, fay fubcontrary fupercontrary
when we
it is
that
a fubcontrary of a fupercontrary (of Z] is a fubidentical (of and the fupercontrary of Z is the middle term.
Z)
In the fecond mode, the middle term
is
underftood in the fub-
ject, and the concluding terms in the predicate, tion of the fyllogifm. Thus when we fay genus
1
of the defcrip
and fpecies are
genus and fpecies, it means that two terms which are feverally genus and fpecies of the middle term (one entirely containing, the other entirely contained in, the middle term) are genus and
fpecies to
one another (the

will
firft
genus, the fecond fpecies).
Now
firft
it
be very
c
eafily feen, that the

is
way
defcription into the fecond
as follows.
to change the Say the defcrip
tion runs thus,
P of
and
c
happens when
is
If R. be its own correlative, as are convertibly connected, then c P of
Q
its
merely becomes correlative, then

be
its
P and
P of
it
correlative, trary of fupercontrary
R R
Q but Q^have another, O, for O becomes P and QV Again, if

:
if
own
correlative,
its
plural takes
c
its
place
but
if
have
for
its
becomes
and
RV
firft
Thus
fubcon
is
fubidentical
of the
mode, becomes
fubcontrary and fupercontrary are fubidentical and fuperidenti-
288
cal
On
meaning
c
the Verbal Description

and
that Ci
of the middle term are Di and
D
in
of each other.
becomes
I
fubcontrary of fuperidentical is fubcontrary fubcontrary and fubidentical are fubcontraries.

c
But
need hardly fay that terms of Z, muft be read

terms of X.
It
is
;
P of
is is
of P
R R
with
with
refpecl: to refpecT: to
X
Z
in
This
rule
we have
it is
already ufed.
only neceflary to dwell on the firfr. the queftion what words are to be em After a ployed in defcribing the eight ftandard propofitions. good deal of confideration, I prefer to denote the univerfal rela
thus
that
mown
now
mode
and
arifes
tions by pofitive terms, and their contrary particulars by the cornot without full perception of the refponding negative ones facrifice which enfues of the firft condition above mentioned to
:
the third.
The words
genus and fpecles immediately fuggeft themfelves to
denote the relation of

to be underftood as
fpecies
to
and
to
in
X)Y.
;
Thefe are
employed up
.
to their limit
or the genus and
thing
may be coextenfive. For two names which have no in common, as in X Y, I propofe to fay that they are exof each other.
for two names which have nothing out of one or the other, as in x .y, that they are complements of Remember that complemental does not mean only each other.
ternals
And
jufl complemental (which
is
contrary), but
may be
contrary or
fupercontrary.
In
X :Y, I
call
a non-fpecies of Y, and
as
a non-genus of
X.
Thefe words have not
much
as
could
wim
I
meaning, nor are there any pofitive terms which
of imported can propofe
to fupply their places. They appear as fynonymous with not let In not containing the whole. in and contained entirely
XY,
and
Y be non-externals
as follows,
and
in
xy,
plements.
Accordingly, in defcribing
X and Y be non-com what X with refpect to

let
is
Y, we have
mowing
the fubftitutions
which occur
in
reading the fyllogiftic fymbols into this language.

Ai, fpecies
Oi, non-fpecies.
A
E
If
genus
O
I
non-genus.
non-external.
Ei, external
f
Ii,
1
complement
non-complement,
we
consider genus and complement as larger terms, and fpecies
of the Syllogifm. and external as fmaller ones^ and if we put down

followed by its two weakened particulars, writing is of the fame accent, we have
289
each univerfal
firft
that
which
Thus it appears that the primary weakened form of a larger name contains a larger name, and of a fmaller a fmaller and
:
primary and fecondary do not refer to importance, but only to order of deri vation thus AI was in our table X)Y, weakened into XY,
the contrary for the fecondary forms.
:
The words
before
it
became y)x, weakened
into
The
rules for forming particular fyllogifms
yx or xy. by weakening uni
verfal premifes may now be repeated. In a univerfal fyllogifm, fubftitute for they?r/? premife and for the conclufion their primary weakened forms, or for thefecond premife and for the conclufion
their fecondary weakened forms. In a ftrengthened fyllogifm, fubftitute for its the_/?r/? premife fecondary form, or for
thefecond
premife
I
its
primary form.
now
write
down
the
whole body of
fyllogifms, that the rea
the independent comprehenfion of may their meaning, and in aflent to their inferences ; deducing the particular ryllogifms from the univerfals only.
der
exercife himfelf in
Univerfal and particular Sylloglfms.

Symbol.
Defcription of
with refpeft to Z.
Ai AI AI
I
LAJi
Species of fpecies is fpecies. Non-external of fpecies is non-external. Species of
[AiIT
f
non-complement
is
is
non-complement,
AAA I A I
1 1
1
Genus of genus
genus.
<j
jÂ
IiIi
Non-complement of genus is non-complement. Genus of non-external is non-external,

Species of external is external. Non-external of external is non-fpecies.
f AiEiEi
LEiOi
<j
AjO
Species of non-genus
is
non-genus.
On
EE
E
1
the verbal Defcription
OOi
J
Genus of complement is complement. Non-complement of complement is non-genus. Genus of non-fpecies is non-fpecies.

External of genus is external. Non-fpecies of genus is non-fpecies.
External of non-external
is
TEiA Ei Oi
OA
[EiliO
non-genus.
[E AiE
J
O AiO
EiE
!
Complement of fpecies is complement. Non-genus of fpecies is non-genus.
JETOi
f
Complement of non-complement
External of complement
is
is
non-fpecies.
A
Ii
1
fpecies.
OiE
[EiOJ
fE EiA
J
[
is non-external. Non-fpecies of complement is External of non-fpecies non-complement.
O EJ EOL
1
Complement of external is genus. Non-genus of external is non-complement. Complement of non-genus is non-external.
Strengthened Syllogifms.
Ai
AT
AiL
Species of genus
is
non-complement.
non-external.
Genus of fpecies
is
AiE
O
1
EiOi
is non-genus. Species of complement Genus of external is non-fpecies.
EiAiO
E A Oi
EiEJ EEL
?
External of fpecies is non-genus. Complement of genus is non-fpecies.

External of external
is
non-complement.
is
Complement of complement
non-external.
to himfelf a better exercife in the perfon could propofe of command over language, than practifmg the deacquifition monftrations of thefe relations, or more properly their reduction
No
its into fpecific ftiowing, as to the matter of the inference, in what a non-com of the For inftance, complement extent confifts.
plement
a non-fpecies How, and by how much ? The nonis neither in the term uncomplement leaves fomething which
is
:
derftood, nor in that non-complement.

:
This, the complement
of that non-complement muft fill up and by this then, at leaft, the complement of the non-complement is not in the term underfo far non-fpecies. ftood, of which it is therefore
of the Syllogifm
291
In the preceding view, I have particularly confidered the con nexion between contrary forms, and the adaptation of language to that connexion. But in the firft derivation of the fimple fyllogifms (page 88) the univerfals
were
related, not to their
con
I now proceed to traries, but to their particular concomitants. the confideration of this view, and to the j unification, on felf-
evident principles, of the afTertion that there is a real and ftriking affinity between the univerfal fyllogifm and its concomitants, as
AiAiAi and
verfal
it,
O AO E E A
! ! f
and
ETOi, &c.
The complex
proportions Di,
and
contain each a uni
which, in common language, is generally confounded with and a particular, the exiftence of which is therefore for the
1
in thought to accompany the univerfal. The remaining univerfal, E , is differently circumftanced if we fay that and complete the univerfe, we fhould generally mean
moft part fuppofed
that they only juft complete it, and fhould not think of the fuperbe contained contrary relation, or of their overcompleting it. but not to fill ; to contain with room to fpare, or to overfill ; to
To
exclude and be excluded without completion ; and to exclude and be excluded with completion (or to complete and be completed
without inclufion); are our moft ufual ideas of the relations of the extent of names.
The
verfal,
when done by removal of

:
reduction of the complex propofition to the fimple uni the concomitant particular^ is
in all cafes a
lowering of the quantity, by the removal of an ex-
cefs, as follows
Di means D means Ci means C means

1
that
X X that X that X
that
is
contained in
Y, and more
is
contained.
Y, and contains more. excludes Y, and excludes more. completes Y, and *more than completes.
contains
AI, &c. ftill the
Drop the fecond claufes, and DI, &c. are reduced to Drop the firft claufes, and it would feem as if we had
*
The
alteration of
grammar
In
here feen
is
in deference to the
word com
plete , the beft I
can get.
this propofition, the
verb refers to the uni verfe,
and
it is X(joins in completing the univerfe) (than the univerfe).
Y and joins in completing more
292
that
On
the verbal
;
Defeription
its tacit reference to complex propofitions which it is more than. Let this tacit reference be dropped, and then we have, inftead of the whole complex propofition, only its particular. And this abandonment is actually made in com mon language, by what would be called perhaps a lax, but is a There are more than fifti on very logical, ufe of the word more.
for more will contain
the dry land, would be perfectly intelligible, and not as implying c that there were he was actuated by more than the fifh any
:
motive, &c. very often means
other than the motive* &c.
complex fyllogifm, as we have feen (page 81), the exceffive part of the conclufion (whence comes its fecond claufe, its additive more] is the fum of the exceffive parts of the premifes.
Now,
in the
If one of the complex premifes be deprived of its aflertion of excefs, or lowered into a fimple univerfal, the conclufion ftill
remains, though not a fortiori, neceffarily. This being done, the valid excefs of the conclufion depends upon the excefs of the remain
ing premife
;
as part of the
and the concomitant particular fyllogifm, confidered mixed complex fyllogifm, is the expreffion of this,
Finally, the excefs
ufed in the lax, or non-correlative, fenfe, and then the concomitant fyllogifm ftands
without the
reft.
may be
by
itfelf.
For example,
concomitant of
that
is
OiA Oi may
be read thus
contains
A
;
in
1
.
not in]
Y Z
is
contains
X
1
.
than [fomething that
not in] Y. and more, this would be [fomething not X] is contained in
DAD
Z
Confider Oi as more than [fomething therefore, Z contains more If more than Y mean c Y Again, O EJ is more than
:
X
fo
Y Y
;
excludes
there
fore, X than X
excludes more than
were
If c more [fomething not in Z]. and more, &c. this would be DiEiCi. And
:
on
for other cafes.
I now proceed to what I may call the quantitative defcription of the fyllogifm by which I mean the expreffion of its cafes in terms of the quantities only of its names and propofitions, leaving
:
law of thefe
fyftem in fo
that
the alternative of affirmation and negation to be fettled by the reafon for the prefentation of the quantities.
My
points of view will be obvious enough which claims to be complete, muft mow itfelf to contain juft the fame, and no more, as to refults, whatever may be the prin of conftruftion. ciple which is chofen as the bafis
many different
of the Syllogifm.
propofition, in fpeaking
293
of two names, fpeaks of their Every and of the four contraries, (page 63) terms, two direct and two two are univerfal and two are contrary, particular. Since univerfal and are themfelves particular contraries,
properly
is
Xs, known to be
let
all
and
Some Xs
are
<Xs,
(for Every not known to
be
all
propofition
us fignify the univerfal and particular forms of the and v. Again, fpeaking of a name, let its mode by
of entry, univerfal and particular, be denoted by

ing
T and
t.
Writ
or v) applied to T( or t), T( or t) we can make eight varieties, which give us the eight ftandard forms applied to one as follows ; order, fay
down V(
XY
A,
= V(Tt)
=v(Tt)
A = V(tT) 0. =v (tT)
1
E,
1
= V(TT) = v (TT)
E =V(tt)
f
I,
=v
(tt)
Thus P or xy, may be defcribed as the particular in which both terms are univerfal for and are both univerfal in xy, or x: Y, or y:X. And v(TT) defcribes it thus.
:
If,
down any
underftanding the order to be XY, YZ, XZ, three propofitions, we make an attempt at a
we
write
fyllogifm,
valid or not, as the cafe
may be
as in
V(Tt).v(tt).V(tT) or VvV(Tt,tt,tT)
which muft be AJiA It will affift the memory to obferve that or vt at the beginning, fub-fymbols have fuper-fymbols vT or
.
VT
Vt.
Alfo, that affirmatives have an even number of capitals or (none* or two) and negatives an odd number
univerfal
and
its
T and
(one three). particular concomitant have the fame entries of
t,
thefe letters.
and contranominals have inverted modes of entry of The convertibles have in both places, or t the
inconvertibles have
T and
t.
Firft, it is unneceflary to write down the term-letters of the conclufion, for they muft be taken from the premifes, in every cafe in which the conclufion is the ftrongeft that can be drawn
from the premifes

*
and our fyftem has no others (nor, indeed,
The reader muft here follow the mathematician in confidering o as an even number.
294
On
the verbal
Defeript ion
has the Ariftotelian any other except Bramantip). Thus, TT,tt being the term letters of the premifes, ftrike out the fecond and the firft t, which refer to the middle term, and Tt muft be
long to the conclufion. To prove this, obferve that that t in the premife cannot in the conclufion give
we know
:
therefore
T cannot give
Again,
for
if,
the term being
Z,
T gave
ting z properly in
its place, t would give T, we know that the valid forms, as to propofitions, are VVV, VVv, vVv, Vvv fo that v occurring once only, muft
;
then, put which it cannot.

t,
come
third,
and
muft come
in the firft pair.
Further, in the
four term letters of the premifes,
alone requires TT, or tT, to come in the middle, while which can take formation or tt. Obferve thefe laws, and every
VVV, vVv, VVv
Vvv,
require Tt,
Putting dots to replace under them leads to a valid fyllogifm. univerfal the form a blank we fyllogifms by prefent place, eight
t,T .) and VVV(. T,t .) ; and ftrengthened fyllogifms from VVv(..T,T..) a univer with which the begin VVv(. t,t .) eight particulars fal from Vvv(. t,T .) and Vvv(. T,t .) ; and the eight par ticulars which begin with a particular from vVv(. t,T .) and
filling
up the blanks
.
in
VVV(.
the eight
vVv(..T,t.
other cafes.
.).
And, under the rules juft given,
we
have no
Taking the preceding as a bafis, we might make the rules of accentuation follow from it. For, fince the firft blank in our the firft and concluding term, muft agree, and fince ac fymbol,
cents depend only on the
pofition,
firft
two
letters in the
we may
them, mean
T or
proceed
t,
as follows.
Let
fymbol of a proand L, each of
as the cafe
it
may
(hall
be, but with the provifo that
what
in
it
means
in either place
mean
in the other.
Then,
which fymvVv(KT,tL,KL), VVV(KT,tL,KL) bols of conclufion are introduced, we fee that the firft and third
and
in in
As to the accents muft agree, which is part of the direct rule. firft and fecond accents, they agree in the firft inftance above, if be t, which puts an even number of capitals in the firft fym
bol
VKT,
or an affirmative propofition at the
commencement
they
difter if
be
T, which
I
puts a negative propofition

if
firft.
In the fecond inftance, they agree

affirmative
cafes
firft,
be
T, which
puts an
&c.
leave
it
to the reader to
deduce the other

premifes give an
of
this rule, the inverfe rule,
and
alfo that
of the Syllogifm.
or unlike figns.
affirmative, or a negative, conclufion, according as they And thus it will appear, that the
295
have
like
fymbolic rules
given in chapter
quantity.
It will
fal
V,
are really expreflions of the general rules of
have the fame term
VVV
be obferved that the concomitant fyllogifms of a univerletters as that univerfal, and only change into Vvv, or vVv. Alfo, that the inverted fyllogifms of
page 96 only invert the order of all the term-letters, and the letters of the premifes, when different.
Thus, E.A Ei being

and
VVV(TT,tT),
its
concomitants
TAT
vVv(TT,tT) and Vvv(TT,tT). But the in verted form AEiEi is VVV(Tt,TT). Contranominals have different quantities in all the term-letters. The weakened forms
,
EiOJ
are
of a univerfal change the firft premife letter and the firft term V V(TT,tt), letter, or the fecond of both. Thus, E E A, being
t
its
weakened forms, OiE L and EiOJ
are vVv(tT,tt) and
Vvv(TT,tT).
The forms of the numerical fyllogifm (page l6r) may be re covered by few and eafy rules, in which the premifes as they ftand determine the conclufion, as follows Let | be defignated as
:
the
number of X, and
as that
of x
and
it is
fo on.
Let a term
and
of the conclufion be called direff when

inverfe
1.
in the premife,
Then, contrary In every cafe, the conclufion has the fum of the quantities mentioned in the premifes, as part of the exprefiion of its quan
is
when
its
in the premife.
tity.
inverfe term in the conclufion, the number of term appears in the quantity of the conclufion, fubtracted. in the conclufion, muft Thus, x in a premife, with have But the direct terms of I in the concluding quantity. the conclufion never introduce anything into the concluding
2.
its
For every
direct
number.
3.
When
the entrances of the middle term are fimilar
(YY,
or yy), the terms of the two forms of conclufion are both direct and both inverfe, with fubtraction of the number of the middle
term
form.
4.
in the former, addition
of the number of
1
latter.
Thus, yy
gives
in
its contrary in the the direct, +xj in the inverfe
When
the entrances of the middle term are diflimilar (Yy,
296
or
On
the verbal
Defer ipt ion, &c.
term
yY), each form of conclufion has one direct and one inverfe and no number from the middle term enters the conclud ;
ing quantity. Thus, the conclufions from
wxY + wYZ
+n+J
!
are
immediately
written
down
as
v)xZ and (m
while thofe from
)Xz
mx Y + n yz,
T f
are at once
)Xz and
There are relations gifm which I have not

of
exifting
confidered.
between the forms of the fylloFor inftance, the defcription

it it is
with
refpecl: to
its
being that
is
fcription
of
contrary, x,
that
is a fpecies, (Ai), the de a fupercontrary, (E ). If

1
then
that
we
give the
name of contradefcriptives
and
to
AI and
E we
f
find
and EA,
and Oi, are
alfo contradefcriptives.
The
arrangement of iyllogifms by contradefcriptives, and the laws of connexion thence refulting, will be an eafy exercife for the
ftudent.
APPENDIX.
I.
Account of a Controverfy between the Author of this Work Sir William Hamilton and
and
of Edinburgh
final reply to the latter.

appendix contains an account of a controverfy in which fome ma ers treated in the preceding work involved me with cbir William Hamilton, ProfbiTor of Logic and Metaphyfics in the UniIt has verfity of Edinburgh. produced four publications (to which I mail refer as I, II, III, IV) namely: I. Statement in anfwer to an affertion made by Sir William Hamilb A uguftus De Morgan, .... (London, oftavo, R. and j E. Taylor, pp. 16, publifhed April 30, 1847.) II. A letter to Auguftus De Morgan, on his claim to an Efq independent redifcovery of a new principle in the theory of fyllogifm. From Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Subjoined, the whole previous correfpondence, and a poftfcript in anfwer to Profeffor De Morgan s State ment (London and Edinburgh, oftavo, Longman and Co., Maclachlan and Co. pp. 44, exclufive of Profpeftus hereinafter mentioned: re ceived by me May 22, 1847.) III. Letter from me to Sir W. Hamilton, dated Mav 24, publifhed in the Atbenaum Journal of May 29. I V. Letter from Sir W. Hamilton to me, dated June 2, publifhed in the lame Journal of June 5.
THIS ori?
th(
"
There
other
are
purely literary.
Hamilton words) him // is manifeft that for a certain principle I was wholly indebted to his and that information, ifljhouldgive Viforth as a /peculation of my own (which I had done to himfelf, and meant to do, as he knew, and have imce done, m print) I mould, even
r
offalfe dealing towards the public. gatory fuppofition of which he may formerly have furmifed the poJRMitj (iuch are his fubfequent qualifications of it) is unrefervedly retraced at the beginning and end of II: but it is frequently infmuated in the mid dle, by propofmg things as difficult to be explained otherwife, by hint
that others
queftions involved, one concerning my character, the The former ftands thus. March 13, Sir informed me by letter that /, (the Italics are his own
two
chr $
f an inJurious breafh
though recognizing always his priof confidence towards him and This hypothetical charge, and dero
may
believe
alfenood, &c. &c.
it, by hopes that they will not, by charges of For the formal charge is fubftituted imputation of
298
Appendix.
The following is the pro intellectual confufion, &c. lapfe of memory, gramme of the firft intended argument, (II. p. 4.) I confefs, that, for a time, I regarded your pretenfion, as an attempt
at plagiarifm, cool as it was this view, feeling,
From
contemptible. information, reflection turned
me
and
now, Sir, tender you my fmcere apology, for admitting, though founded on your own ftatements, an opinion fo derogatory of one, otherwife fo
well entitled to refpect.
In
itfelf, this
rafter, too,
view was, to me, painful and revolting. The chawhich you bear among your friends, I found to be wholly
You are reprefented as an odious. incompatible with a fuppofition fo active and able man, profound in Mathematics, curious in Logic, wholly of chronological mifincapable of intentional deceit, but not incapable Your habitual confufion of times is, indeed, remarkable, even takes. from our correfpondence. Your dates are there, not unfrequently of
the
wrong month, and not always, even of

works
acutenefs, your
lectual rafhnefs
mow
you
the right year. With much deficient in architectonic power, the
concomitant of lucid thinking; and, that you are not guiltlefs of intelis fufficiently manifeft, from your pretention to advance Logic, without having even maflered its principles. With regard to the fubfequent infmuation of a retracted charge, my
Hamilton always fpeaks fubexplanation (believing as I do, that Sir mind infenfibly fell back to its old bias as he jective truth) is that his conclufion is, felt that the fubftitute for his charge wanted ftrength :
W.
my
he may fay or unneceflary henceforward to notice any thing and my determination is to act accordingly. write on my character SirW. Hamilton s pamphlet contains about a fcore and a half of quo
that
it is
:
on which hang fundry jokes and fneers, maticians in general, and myfelf as one of the fenfe only fay that my notions of the common determination to perfift, generally, in the tone
tations,
fome of them at mathe On thefe I mail body. of controverfy, and my of refpect to my oppo
nent s learning and character which I have hitherto preferved, would, were there nothing elfe, prevent my adopting the habit of which they But as no man willingly Hands an unreturned fire of are fpecimens. facetiae without defiring to prove that his forbearance does not arife from want of ammunition, I will permit myfelf (declaiming the animus under
that quotation, ap which fuch things are ufually written) juft to at an opponent s ftudies, are all plication, allufion, fneer, joke, and fling among the weapons which I could have employed, if I had thought
mow
them worthy of my
Among
I want to convince. antagonift, or of thofe I might, for inftance, have written fomething like the following ; the aflets of the old logicians, difcovered when the fchools
whom
out, there was found, as is well known, the queftion \Jtrum cbimtera bombinans in vaeuo pojfet comedere fecundas intentionss : a very but a treatife good title, as Curll would have faid, wanting nothing Now whether it be comedere, or whether the fchoolmen written to it. invented comedere, Sir W. Hamilton, on whom their mantle has fallen,
were fwept
has written the treatife, and fuccefsfully maintained the affirmative.
His
Appendix.
299
notion that his communication could give any hint, is clearly and aptly defcribed by chimera, his ftyle by bombinans, his proof by vacuum; and the fecond intentions, above noticed, chewed up and given forth with
his
firft
ones, are a practical example of the poffibility of the Q.E.I.
He,
or rather the bombinating chimaera which has perfonified itfelf in his form, as the sAof ovsipog did in that of Neftor, is thus both retraftor
and detractor.
liquid to dental
cafe.
But though the
tranfition
indicates convalefcence, yet, as here
made
may
be only the growing
flops to folids generally manifeft, the paffage from weaknefs, the perifcence, of the
from
I afTert the following
documents
refpecl: to the literary part end of this appendix.
to be all that are relevant with of the controverfy. They are given at the
is
an extracl from a communication of mine to the Cambridge
Philofophical Society, made before I received any communication whatfoever from Sir W. Hamilton. I affert it to contain a diftincT: an
nouncement and
judge.
ufe of the principle of quantification of the middle term, be that middle term fubjecl or predicate. On this point the reader is to
B
is
is
communication from
Sir
W.
Hamilton
to
me.
The
reader
judge firft, whether it contain anything which is intelligible with to any fyftem of fyllogifm ; refpecl: fecondly, whether, if it fhould fo con tain anything, that fomething would have been information to me who had written A, on fome matter afterwards found in C. C is the relevant part of an addition made by me to A, when the
to
latter
came before me in proof. The reader is to judge firft, whether C contain anything more than an application of A; fecondly, iffo, whe ther that fomething more is derived from anything intelligibly hinted at
in B.
The
ifTue
is
this.
only bare faft on which Sir W. Hamilton and myfelf are at I affert and maintain that the matter of C was written in
before I received
my
for
in
poffeffion
Sir
W.
Hamilton holds
me
mif-
taken, and thinks he can prove from the correfpondence that in this This I continue to treat as irrelevant : point my memory has failed.
are both agreed that the corpus delifti, if deliclum there be, lies containing fomething not fubftantially contained in A, but furHciently hinted at in B. Any reader who thinks that C does contain
we
fomething fuggefted by B which is not in A, may declare againft the correftnefs of my memory; any one who thinks the contrary, will hold it of no confequence whether my memory on the difputed fa6l be good
or bad.
all I
With
the
firft
reader I have no cafe
with the fecond I have

be
effential parts
think worth caring about. Sir. W. Hamilton maintains
my
letters
it is
to
of the
cafe.
They may become
which is A. When
alleges to
pointed out what C contains hinted at in B, and not contained in fubftance or principle, in
fo, as
foon as
Sir W. Hamilton points out, by citation from C, what he have been taken, and by citation from B, what he thinks it has been taken from, and when I thereupon fail to produce equivalent
3oo
knowledge from
Appendix.
or elfe to expofe the irrelevance of his citation from then thofe letters may become of importance. This he has not done,
fpecially challenged to
it
:
and IV,
do fo and when I come to difcufs III mall appear that he admits he has not done it. I now give the beft account I can of the origin of the difpute, premifmg, that up to this 3d of September, 1847, 1 do not abfolutely know
though
what the fyftem is which I am charged with appropriating. There is a fyftem which I think is moil probably the thing in queftion : but a fyf tem containing a defe6t of fo glaring a character, that I will not attribute
it
to Sir
W.
Hamilton,
who
defcribes his
it,
own
as "adequately tefted
I
and
matured"
until he expreffly claims
or until
have the moil indu
bitable proof. In the common, or Ariftotelian propofition, the quantities of the fubor implication, jecl: and predicate are determined, the firft by exprejfion
And the fecond by the nature of the copula (fee page 57 of this work). the only quantities confidered are all and fome ; the latter meaning any thing that not none may mean, fome, it may be all but not known to be
The matter contained in fuggefted perhaps not more than one. me in the fummer of 1846, and was forwarded to Cambridge with the reft of the memoir on the 4th of October. I will now introduce Sir W. Hamilton s defcription of the various
all,
itfelf to
kinds of quantity (II p. 31, 32).
Your Statement" is chiefly plaufible from a wretched confufion of diftinft things. This confufion, with which you delude yourfelf, and many of your readers, is of two independent fchemes of logical
"
quantification ; the one, affertingtf# increafe in the expreffly quantified terms, the other, a minuter divifion of the forms of quantification itfelf. To difmtricate this entanglement, we have fimply to confider, in their
contrails, the three following
firft fcheme quantity to the
fchemes of quantification
all exprefled in nethe Predicate to be taken Subjett, prefuming gative propofitions, always determinately in its greateft and leaft extenfion (univerfally and fingularly), in affirmative propofitions, always
is
The
that
which
logically
confines
indeterminately in fome part of
extenfion (particularly). extends the expreffion logically of quantity to both the propoiitional terms, and allows the Predicate to
its
The fecond fcheme
is
that
which
This not only be of any quantity, in propofitions of either quality. on which affords a a but defect, Logic obprinciple fupplies capital
general development. admits more exprejjed third fcheme is that which logically finquantities than a determinately leail or greateft extenfion (quantity gular and univerfal), and an indeterminately partial extenfion (quantity
tains a
new and
The
This, though it corrects, perhaps, particular.) principle for a general logical development.
an omiffion, yields no
The
*
firft
doclrine
is
the
common
and in the third
in fo far as
fideration of right or Now, the fecond
wrong
;
or Ariftotelic ; the fecond is mine ; you have gone, and apart from the conI do not queftion your originality.
but in different refpeds
and third fchemes are both oppofed to the firft, coniequently the fecond and third may, each
Appendix.
301
<
of them, combine with itfelf, either the whole other, or that part of the firft to which it is not itfelf More is impoffible. oppofed. Let the following be noted:* Tour OLD view (that in the body of the Cambridge Memoir} is a combination of the THIRD fcheme of quantification with the FIRST/ your NEW view (that in its Addition) is a combination of the THIRD fême of quantification with the SECOND: and the confufion, of which you are NOW guilty, is the recent and uniform, and perverfe identification, in your PRESENT Statement," of the SECOND fcheme with the THIRD.
"
Before, however, proceeding to comment on your confufion of the fecond and third fchemes, I may alfo relieve a confufion in the term
definite
|
and
its
definite, precifely predejinite (ttOptTOf, VtpOffapirrtf,) is equivalent to exprejed, overt, or, more proximately, to defignate and pre-defignate ; in this fenfe, definite quantity denotes in to under-
In the/ry?,
common,
reverfe, indefinite, as applied to logical quantification. or Ariftotelic or more meaning,
expre/ed,
oppofition
merely
flood, quantity.
<
<
<
<
pluof individuals) as oppofed to particular quantity. In the third which have meaning, you ufurped, definite is equivalent to numerically fpecified; and in this fenfe, a definite is an arithmetically articulate quantity, as oppofed to one arithmetically inarticulate. This your meaning of the word I did not, before the appearance of Statement," apprehend ; for of courfe I your to ufe it prefumed
rality
"
In the fecond meaning, that which I have always ufed, (and certain ancients, I find, were before me,) definite is equivalent to determinately marked out ; a fenfe in which definite quantity is extenfion undivided or indivifibk, univerfal or jtngular (this including any collecled
<
in
its firft
or
common
you
confciouily intend to deviate. Three fchemes of quantity are here mentioned. Firft, the ordinary one.
meaning, from which you never hint that you
^Secpndly,
that in
which the ordinary
quantities,
plied in every way to both fubjeft Thirdly, that in which
allm&fome,
is
are ap
and predicate.
applied to
order of reference
fubjeft or predicate or both : the effential diftinftion of this cafe is nume rical definitenefs : it really contains the fecond fyftem, when numerical quantity is algebraically exprefled. thefe, it appears, Sir milton claims the fecond, or rather, the application of fuch a fcheme to the fyllogifm. What then is it ? I fuppofe it to be the following.
numerically definite quantity
Of
W. Ha
is
X Y.
My
* Let the old view following alfo be noted (that in the body of the Cam is entirely on the/r/? fcheme, except in one digrefR-ve fedion and one both of iubfequent paragraph (from which is quoted) in which the frond and third are combined next view in the addition) is alfo a combination of the my (that fecond and third khemes: and my "Statement" contained alfo a uniform, but not recent, identification of the fame and third fecond fchemes, which I never feparated in thought until 1 law this paragraph. Any one who can form an opinion of the way in which the iubjeft would prefent itfelf to the mind of a mathematician, will fee that the fecond would prefent itfelf concomitantly with, and as an effential part of, the alge jCheme braical form of the third. A. De M.
:
My
bridge paper)
302
All
Appendix.
is
all
is
Y means
A
t.
that
X
is
and Y are
all
identical
f
.
it
is is
X
As
all
is
fame
is
Y
A.
Some
is
T
is
is
Some
X
4
.
my D.
All
is I|.
T
all
to negative propofitions,
All
X
is
not all
f
.
is
E
is
fome Some
Y
is
All
notfome
Some
X
its
is
not
not fome
true
it is
of
what
pairs of terms one I have in Chapter
of which is plural. In VIII. called fpurious.
indefinite form,
propofitions of this fyftem are then the complex D, or Ai-f-A , 1 1 the fix Ariftotelian forms , Ej, O, , I|, and the fpurious form, 4,
The
A A
which may be called U. In looking over (Sept. 5) Sir W. Hamilton s pamphlet, I happened to light on the affertion (incidentally made) that On examining his iyftem gives thirty-fix valid moods in each figure. I mould not have pubthe preceding fyftem, I find this to be the cafe. limed the refults, had not Sir W. Hamilton made it necefTary for me I mall denote the propofition U, or Some Xs to comment on them. Y ; and I mall, fuppofmg each cafe to be formed are not fome Ys by X
:
then tranfpofe it into my own notation. forms in which enters. Whenever 1. There are ff of the premifes, the other premife and conclufion agree. Thus AjDAj, DUU, &c. &c. ! ! f 2. ; AjEjEj, Fifteen Ariftotelian forms AiAjA,,
in the
firft
figure,
"teen
is
either
we have
;
A.0
AAA Â Ej O A 0; A OA, O A O A 1,1,, 1^,1,; EÔ I|EA; A AJj A EA, EjA.O A O U, OÛ A UU, UA U; I O U, 3. Six more U fyllogifms
1
f 1
0,1,17.
The two
tical
propofition
the introduction of the iden things to be confidered are ; and that of the fpurious one, as I call it. ;
It is, I fuppofe, a fundamental rule of all formal logic, that every pro has no fimple its contradiction. pofition muft have its denial, T and O, both contradict it (and alfo contradiction in this fyftem : that
Now D
or O, . but the mere contradiction is the disjunction can mow that one or the other of thefe is true, has deperfon monftratively contradicted D, even though it could be proved impoffible to determine which of the two it is. is But if we introduce it, we The propofition ufually fpurious. or Y be plural muft introduce its contradictory alfo. Now if either
E,)
is
true
who
names,
it
muft be true
confequently, the contradiction of
is
and
a fyllogifm having the pre is Y. are fmgular names, and mife is introduced, either that premife may be contradicted, or it may If it may, there is no form to do it in : if it may not, then it is a not.
When
fpurious propofition, and cannot, by combination with others, prove anything but a like fpurious conclufion.
Let
is
but one
be
X Y denote Some Xs are not fome Ys, and X,Y, denote there X and one Y, and X Y. Then either X Y or X,Y, muft A logical iyftem which admits one and not the true, and one only.
: :
is
other, which contains an aflertion incapable of contradiction without adequately tefted and going out of the fyftem, can hardly be faid to be The propofition X,Y, includes in matured," and is not felf- complete. itfelfthe conditions of D, and is a kind of fingnlar form of D.
"
I prefume,
as
from the number of Sir
Appendix. W. Hamilton
303
s
moods,
above obtained, that the contradidlion neither of finds a nor of Admit them, and the contradiction of alone (call it V) de place. mands fixteen new moods in each figure. I will now proceed. In my publication, fpeaking now of (A) what was fent to Cambridge before I communicated with Sir W. Hamilton, I had no quantification intermediate between the ordinary one, and the numerical one applied to either fubjecl or predicate, as wanted in the canon of the middle term there given. Look at the laft of the feven fyllogifms in tiizfecond extra ft, where lotb the predicates, being of the middle term are quantified, and the condition of validity is quantitatively ftated. But for * Y,-|-Y 2 lefs than I mould be read yi-j-y 2 greater than i. The equivalence of this to Y,-j-Y 2 lefs than I is a miftake. In theyfr/? extra ft, the general canon is given which is afterwards ufed in C. Up to the time when Sir W. Hamilton publifhed his letter in reply to my ftatement, (II), I never had feparated the idea of his fecond fcheme of quantification from that of the third. Thus then we flood on Oclober 3, when I fent my paper to Cam Sir W. Hamilton had been teaching the application of the bridge. I had arrived at the ordinary quantities to both fubjecl: and predicate algebraical reprefentation of the numerical quantification of terms, whe ther fubjecl: or predicate matters not, as long as they were middle terms. 1846, Oftober 6. My communication (containing A) was in the hands of Dr. Whewell (as he informs me) for tranfmiffion to the Cam I never faw it again till the next February. Oftober bridge Society 7, Sir W. Hamilton wrote to me, in anfwer to an application of mine on the biftory of the fyllogifm, further informing me that he taught an extenfion and fimplification of its theory, which he offered to commu nicate. November 2, (the offer having been accepted) Sir W. Ha milton forwarded the communication B, which I give entire ; coniifting of a letter, and the Requifites which he had furnifhed to his fludents, for a prize December 28, he wrote again, forwarding a printed EfTay. This is not material ; for, Profpeftus of his intended work on logic.
thirty-fix,
on receiving it, I thought certain, what from the previous communica tion I had thought poflible, that Sir W. Hamilton was in pofleffion of the theory of numerically definite fyllogifms (but this was a miftake of
mine,
rights,
tail)
as will prefently appear).
immediately forwarded
(as will prefently
I accordingly, to preferve own be ftated more in de
my
an identifying defcription of the meets of paper on which
my
1
nu
merical theory was written, and an account of both my fyftems (in letters dated December Of this, Sir 31, 1846, and January I, 1847).
W.
Hamilton (who has publifhed both

I
letters)
is
my
witnefs.
847,
dated the addition to the proof fheet of my Cambridge This addi paper, which was defpatched to Cambridge the next day.
February 27,
C, which itfelf contains (in fubftance) all that part of my I which refers to the March 13, Sir difputed point. W. Hamilton wrote the letter containing the charge of plagiarifm ; hav ing been for two months prevented by illnefs from refuming the fubjecl.
tion contains
letter
of January
304
Appendix.
All fubfequent correfpondence referred to proceedings, and not to the fubject matter of the charge. Many days before the middle of October, I had applied the fyftem of
quantification in the manner fhewn in C. memory has failed here : I know better.
Sir
W.
Hamilton thinks
my
My
memory
does not depend
upon a date, but upon the opening of the Univerfity College Seffion, which takes place in the middle of October. But it matters nothing, for the notion of the complete quantification of a predicate, when wanted
becaufe it is the middle term, will prove the pofTeflion of that procefs as well as quantification in all cafes whether wanted or not. On receiving
B, I looked with curiofity at 2, on which, in fact, Sir W. Hamilton grounds his declaration of having made a communication. He demands of his pupils, The reafons why common language makes an ellipjts of the exprejjed quantity, frequently of the fab j eft, and more frequently of the predicate, though both have always their quantities in thought. On looking at this, and feeing mention of the quantities which the terms have in thought, in common language, I took it for granted that the common quantities were fpoken of: namely, that of the fubject from the tenor of the proportion, that of the predicate from the nature of the I never mould have imagined that in the common language of copula. common people, there were any other quantities, even if, in their minds, the predicate have thefe. Had this been all, I mould have paffed it over, as referring to common quantities, and making common people a little more of logicians, as to the predicate, than I have found them to be. That this common language meant the language of any fcientific fyftem, I had not the leaft idea ftill lefs that it referred to the language of the writer s own unprinted fyftem, current only between himfelf and his
:
And, though I gained a fufpicion that Sir W. Hamilton might have (which he had not) adopted numerical quantification, it was not from this pafTage, which by itfelf was nothing, but from what is now
hearers.
coming, which made
this paffage
ambiguous.
Now I had two fyftems, each tions, and a general canon of fyllogifm. of which had its own way of adding to the converfions, and each its own canon of fyllogifm. In my firlt fyftem (which has now grown into Chapter V) the permanent introduction of the contranominals is a com and the reduction, by the remarks in pages 96, pletion of converfion &c. of all fyllogifms to univerfal affirmative premifes, was the canon of In the fecond, feen in A and C, which has grown into fyllogifm. Chapter VIII, there is the univerfality of fimple converfion, and the canon of the middle term. Sir W. Hamilton may deny (I believe he let it be fo ; but I took them for canons, does) that thefe are canons and thought of them when I faw the word canon in his fummary. And then the queftion was, had Sir W. Hamilton one of thefe fyftems, or a third one ? I had been throughout our correfpondence well pleafed with the idea that I had hit upon fomething in common with Sir W. Ha milton ; and in my anfwer to communication B I faid,
:
:
looking further into B, (which fee) I found that Sir William s fyftem, whatever it might be, noted defects in the converjion of propoji-
On
am
not at
originality
on
Appendix. all clear that I (hall mt have feveral points. When I fee
"
305
to
"
claim only fecondary
defects of the
"
common
fyllo-
doctrine of converfion
and a
"
fupreme canon
of categorical
think I
gifm, I muft wait for further information

able to flatter myfelf that I have followed
ingly.
may
yet be
you
in foine points
unknow-
The reader will obferve that this inftructive communication is fuppofed to tell me, that in my thoughts the predicate has all kinds of quantity though in truth both have their quantities is not Englifh for either may have Sir W, Hamilton any one of two fpecies of quantity. has exprefled (perhaps) the dictum which is to have taught me new
:
quantification, in terms of that new quantification unknown. By both have quantities he feems to aflert that he meant both have all quantities,
That both have their quantities, is true in the common fyftem thefe words, which exprefs a truth of the common fyftem, Sir W. Hamilton declares to be a fure mode of communicating the difference between his
:
in his own lecture room, norma loquendi in his own A diftinctively unmeaning phrafe may, in virtue of his expla hands. and a private bank, nations, pafs current between him and his pupils of courfe, muft receive its own notes. But they are not lawful tender
This fyftem and the common one. in which he has the arbitrium et
may do
et
jus
nor good tender out of the neighbourhood. proceed to the letters in the Athenaum (III and IV). Thefe contain the iflues raifed by the pamphlets my fhort letter con tains the ftrength of my cafe I am to prefume that my opponent s letter contains the At ftrength of his anfwer, and I think it does fo. leaft I can fee nothing ftronger in his pamphlet.
anywhere
I
mail
now
I take this
MR. DE MORGAN. mode of acknowledgreceipt of your printed me. I promifed an
SIR
W.
HAMILTON.
ing the
letters to
you
anfwer, if you would bring forward the grounds of your afTertion that I had acted with breach of confidence and falfe dealing. But
In reply to your letter in the laft number of the Athemeum; you were not wrong to abandon your promife "of trying the ftrength of for never was there my polition a weaker pretenfion than that, by
;"
admit that your grounds are no grounds ; you declare your
you
now
you, fo fuicidally maintained. You would, indeed, have been quite right had you never hazarded a
conviction that (though chargeable with confufion, want of memory, &c. &c.) I have acted with good
fecond
word
for every additional
and you offer a proper reand apology. You ftate in various places and manners, that
faith
;
fentence you have written is another mif-ftatement, calling, fometimes, for another correction,
traction
of my in not be fo ; and, thereupon, you call for an anfwer. But I think that others will be
though you are

tegrity, all
fatisfied
may
306
quite fatisfied with your fwer to your own charge.
Appendix.
own
anI
There
is
nothing
left
which
care to difcufs
with you.
firft
Our
dates,
views of logic, their coincidences,

their differences, their
my
memory, &c.
am
content to
leave to thofe
who
your
will read
letters,
my
ftatement and
with
two remarks.
no ftrength in an abandoned pofition. pamphlet was Hamilton character: when Sir own of defence in publifhed retraced his charge of breach of confidence and falfe dealing, there was to which I flood engaged, nothing I cared to write feparate
There
is
my
My Wm.
nothing
the approach of this prefent publication pamphlets on, efpecially when was confidered. Any one who reads page 9 of my pamphlet, in which
"
the promife was made, will fee that it has reference to what I there call the infamy which would attach to any one who had deferved the I certainly forgot to fay terms he ufed for the conduct he defcribed."
"
he had propofed an examination)
becaufe, extent ; and alfo, becaufe I wifhed to take time before I mind as to the way of treating what I faw of them.
but as he had already refufed to retracl (though I would then undergo fufpend the charge, provided it did not enter into my head to provide for fuch a con about weaknefs, misftatement, &c. are for the tingency. The affertions reader s judgment. I did not, in this letter, allude expreffly to Sir W. Hamilton s various infmuations that the old charge might be true both at the firft hurried reading, I did not become aware of their
"
unlefs
you
retraft
to
made up
my
MR. DE MORGAN.
i
.
SIR
W.
HAMILTON.
As foon
as the
queftion of
charafter was difpofed of, it was your bufmefs to mow that my Ad-
not deny, that your corthe refpondence afferts a claim to

principle
You do
communicated
to
you by
dition* written after I communicated with you, contained fome

in my Meprinciple not contained moir,\ written before I communi-
me
but you complain that I have not mown that your Addition involves a new doctrine, uncontained in tbat part! [from the overt con;
This you do cated with | you. You affert, and you denot do.
fcribe,
traditions of
its
of your
clared
Memoir which you

to
other parts I had] dethe

principles
and you fum up
but you do
contain
except a few words, which are not in that part of my Memoir which I declared to contain the principles ufed in my
not quote,
ufed in your Addition.

"
And
this
you can fay, when I explicitly Hated that throughout the whole paper (the Memoir) not only is
there
tidition.
much in contradiction
A,
fo far as relevant.
there
* Here given in C.
f Here
s
given in
Sir
W.
Hamilton
part of this
is
B.
Appendix.
is
307
abfolutely nothing in (more then the fortuitous) conformity with theory of a quantified
predicate"
(L. p. 34). This, too, you can unanfay whilit before your
eyes,
"
fwered, there was lying
mal requeft,
that
my for you would point

*
out any pa/Jage of your previous writings in which this doctrine

(that afferted in your Statement, of a quantification of the middle
term, be
it
contained"
fubject or predicate) for 1 could (Ibid)
is
find
none j
and none has
by you been
indicated.
principle
do deny, in one fenfe, that communicated by Sir
municated any principle. I prefume of courfe that the Profpedtus and tter fent on the 28th of December are out of the fmce I queftion gave the fyftem on which the charge was made return of Sir
:
my correfpondence afferts a claim to the W. Hamilton for I deny that he com

:
very properly himfelf, in his pamphlet, to communication (B) of November 2, as containing the communica tion which he afferts me to have ufed. Let the reader look through it and afk himfelf what new principle is communicated, and where. Sir W. Hamilton afferts that he has mown my Addition to contain a new doctrine, not contained in one definite part of my memoir, by the contradictions of its other Let P, Q^ R, be parts of a memoir ; parts. and S an addition. By mowing that P and (^contradict one another, Sir W. Hamilton thinks he mows that S contains a doctrine not in volved in R. The fact is, that all memoir Seftion iii.
his
W. Hamilton
by
has
port.
confined
you have not mown ) does fa&fomething in my memoir in conformity Wttb the theory of a He fays it is fortuitous: quantified predicate. but it did not feem to him requifite to bring it forward, and point out This point is for the reader to itefortuitoufnefs. "How judge of. dare you," he rob me of my fays, Good Sir," quantified predicate." I anfwer, I had it before I knew What if you had," he you." it is replies, enough if I inform you that it was only by accident." Sir W. Hamilton cannot find either in the memoir or the addition (he fays here only in the previous writings, but in his pamphlet (p. 34) he ftates it of both memoir and addition], any thing about the doctrine of quantification of the middle term, whether it be fubject or predicate, which doarine he fays // It is repugnant to all that is there
"
" "
quantity ofproportions and one other paragraph (from both which is taken) belongs to the fyftem of Chapter V. in this work : while Seftion in., the other paragraph, and the addition, belong to Chapter VIII. Let the reader take notice that Sir W. Hamilton (who, by the way, feems to confider I explicitly ftated as a fufficient anfwer to
the
my
except
On
"
"
taught.
308
Appendix.
^
I true that in the next fentence he refers to previous writings, as cited. will therefore conclude that Sir William included the addition by mifWhether my Seftion iii. (A) is or take, and meant the memoir only. middle term, without reference to the of is not full of quantification whether that middle term be fubjeft or predicate, I am quite content to This I he cannot find it. Hamilton Sir leave to the reader.
W.
fays
believe,
and wonder
at
but
it
does not follow that
it is
not there.
Let
the reader look.
Again,
when
to
which
I got
he ought find it in
Hamilton averted that C contains fomethmg from him, and which is therefore not in A, I repeat that His affertion that he cannot have pointed out what it is. that it is not in A, nor that it is in C. neither
r
Sir
proves
This
is
the pinch
which obliged him

:
to fixteen of defence cufation in anfwer
to write forty-four pages and this is the point on
of ac-
which
I am tedioufly often obliged to bring the queftion will finally turn, but what elfe can I do with an oppo to its matter whole the nent who writes an ignoratio elencbi of forty-four pages long. Immediately after what Sir W. Hamilton is not good at finding. from himfelfas above, comes the following paffage; he has
ABC;
<
<
quoted In regard to your third affertion, that perfettly definite qxantifieathis tion dejtroys the nece/tty of diflinguijhing fuljeft and predicate; definite quantification," (in whatIt is not is altogether a miftake. of both ever fenfe the word definite bt employed), but the quantification of fubjeft and the
<
"
tbe terms
which
and
deftroys
neceffity
diftinguiming
are merely equations, by mowing, that proportions and enabling us to convert them allJimplyS Of the two fentences now coming, Sir I now quote from myfelf. W. Hamilton quotes the firft, omits tbe fecond, which mows that my in botb terms, and then makes phrafe perfeBly definite means definite
predicate
;"
this
the preceding remark.

<
In
the neceffity of diifaft, perfeftly definite quantification deftroys
<
tinguifhing fubjeft are all to be found
70 Ys, is precifely 20 out of 50 Xs.

In a writer of
To fay that fome 50, Xs are 20 out of among 70 Ys, or that 20 out of 50 Ys are the fame thing as faying that 20 out of 70
and predicate.
difhoneft intention might be concluded,
20 Xs out of
whom
we
mould know how

there
is
no
referred to the
tification
fame difpofition which prevents him from feeing quan What I take that difpofition to be, of the middle term in A.
But to explain the omiflion of the fecond fentence. the omiffion muft be : Hamilton in Sir difhonefty
W.
matters nothing to
my
reader.
Perhaps
this
fentence alone will enable
fome
to deteft that I
had not any idea of the fecond fyftem ofquantifi-
tion independently of the third.
MR. DE MORGAN.
2.
cies
SIR
All the alleged inconfiften-
You
except
fay,
"
W. HAMILTON. that my expofure

is
of
which you
find in
my
letters,
your inconfiftencies
I
unavailing,
&c
will not help
you
till
you have
mow
that
my commu-
Appendix.
done
309
was
intelligible."
and even then, you will have to mow that your com munication was intelligible. In glancing over my letters and the mafs of notes which you have written on them, I fee that I have
this
:
nication
You
forget that
"
it is
how, having
to explain to" as "fubfcribed
for
you
having rightly underftood" twen ty-two fentences of my profpeftus (L. pp. 19, 1 6), you could fubfequently declare that communica tion to be unintelligible ! ! (L. p.
59). I have now no doubt, how fubfcribed ever, that you then to more fentences than, by you,
"
"
feveral times ufed inaccurate lan guage, as people do in hurried let ters. Still more often you have
mifunderftood me.
If
my
occa-
fional inaccuracy and your occafional mifunderftanding mould be
were
"
rightly underftood."
"
In
held to furnifh fome excufe for you
when you precipitately charged me with diflionourable conducl, I mail

be better pleafed than not.
deed, had you only betimes avowed that all you had fubfcribed to, as rightly underftood," was to you really unintelligible, and that the repetition of my do&rine was in your mouth mere empty found, two pamphlets might have eafily
been fpared.
not the communication. The communica of November 2 (B). Let the reader look at it, and fee whether it be intelligible communication of new principle. In my pamphlet I have feveral times fpoken of the communication, This was natural enough, inafmuch as there though there were two. was one communication (that of Nov. 2), on which the charge was made
Firft, the profpefius is
is
"
tion
that
againft
which
that
pamphlet was a defence.

profpeclus,
Sir
Wm.
Hamilton has
never ventured to maintain that I derived anything from the cation of Dec. 28, to which I containing the
communi
But evening I received it, as prefently mentioned. places of which the above is one, a mixture of the two communications.
replied on the he makes, in various
Secondly, I have looked carefully at pages 19 and 16 of Sir s letter, and at all the reft of our correfpondence, without find ing that I have ever admitted that I fubfcribed to any part of the prof-
Wm.
Hamilton
peftus as by
for 39.
I
rightly underftood." Page 59 is no doubt a mifprint have neither found, nor have I the flighteft remembrance of, any fubfcription of mine to any thing Sir Wm. Hamilton ever wrote as
"
me
"
rightly underftood." I repeat the account given in
my
pamphlet of the manner in which
fubfcribed to this profpeftus
is dated Dec. 28, and confifted of I. printed profpeftus of Sir William Hamilton s intended work on logic. Nothing turns on this, for the fimple reafon that my anfwer contained the moft exprefs and formal proof that, come by it
The
next communication
2.
letter.
how
I
I might, I was then in the moft complete written poffeffion of all have fmce publifhed. The profpedtus which accompanied this letter
.
. .
o
very
full
Appendix.
on the
;
is
*
refults
which
Sir
William Hamilton can produce

^
from
his principles
but gives nothing,
I think, certainly
nothing intel-
ligible
to
foon as I faw thefe refults, I inftantly faw that many of them I had then no doubt that we poffeffed fomething agreed with my own. reader in common ; and I faid fo very diftinftly in my reply. As the been confirmed. Feeling will fee, this firft impreflion has not
me, on thofe principles themfelves.
As
prefently
it
*
now
me,
to
time to fecure whatever of independent difcovery might belong I anfwered Sir William Hamilton in two letters, dated Decem-
In thefe letters her 31 and January I. I.I returned the printed profpeftus with the refults underlined
which my fyftem would produce.

2. I ftated that I
had a fyftem written on certain meets of paper, which number, fize, &c., adding the head words of each page. I felt inclined to get the fignature of fome good witnefs put fame time I felt reluftant that Sir Wilupon thefe papers ; but at the liam Hamilton mould fee, if it ever became neceffary to produce thefe that I had been taking precautions againft him. I therefore deI defcribed as to
papers,
3.
<
termined to make himfelf
my
witnefs.
fyllogiftic
I ftated diftindtly the firft principles of both formulae to which they lead.
my
fyftems,
and the
is
fo far Thirdly, I fubftantiate the above, Sir from two cerned, by quoting paflages of my letter of December 3 1
.
as the fubfcription
con
W.
Hamilton
publication
your
this morning and am now your obliging communication that I have, in one of my views of fyllogifm, arrived at fatisfied fully fo like them, that I could fubviews in fubftance, or
I received
fomething
fcribe in
one on the meets of paper above referred to] chapter [meaning the underlined in the I might exprefs in your words wherever they are I return, hoping you will fend another. which profpedtus which Sir W. Ha Where are thofe words rightly underftood
_
"
my own
fenfe
to a great part
of your paper
This
"
milton attributes to me three times in one paragraph ? He muft have been quoting from memory. Seeing bis refults, I found they were alfo my refults; fo I told him that I could fubfcribe" this word more than once, and it is in (and I cannot find I have ufed
"
in my own fenfe to a great part page 19 referred to by Sir William) here tell him that I can words If of" his fpeak meaning, I "paper."
"
fubfcribe in
fubfcribe in bis, that
applied has transferred in a different fenfe to of the moods, is the eftablifhment of

all
whether I fenfe, leaving it to the future to is, whether I under ft and him rightly. was reading this for the prefs, when I found out the words which, [I Hamilton in one fenfe hypothetically to one of his refults, Sir
my own
mow
W.
the figures,
this.
of
The
ample, The abrogation I did not know whether
of his refults, fpeaking Their numerical equality under I could not make out the Englifh the Italics being his. For ex others I underftood in the grammatical fenfe. of the fpecial laws of fyllogifm is intelligible
all.
:
One
my
fenfe
of thefe words, that
is
to fay,
my
Appendix.
abrogation of thofe laws, was the fame as Sir W. Hamilton s ; ftill that he did abrogate certain laws was clear. But numerical equality of moods
I
I could only underftand as referring to the numerical quantities which fuppofed (the reader will remember that I fent back the profpedus by
the next poft, and had little time to look at it) Sir to contain. It means, I find, that there are the fame
in
all figures
:
W.
Hamilton
fyftem
number of moods
mode of faying
but to attribute numerical equality to different things is a that there is the fame number of them in different fets to
which I was unaccuftomed. Having however, as I thought, divined what the Englim of this might mean, I underlined it, adding (as Sir W. Hamilton ftates in one of the foot-notes, which I never remarked till
now)
thefe
I
think."
words, meant,
"
"
W. Hamilton actually takes from this fentence, joins it to mentioned in another document , and reprefents me fubfcription as declaring that I have to as rightly underftood" twenty-two "fubfctibed
rightly, Sir
If I underftand this rightly I may underline it I If I can make out the words" This underftand
my
"
"
fentences, &c.,
and himfelf as quoting from one paffage.] But, had I betimes avowed my non-underftanding, two pamphlets might have been fpared. Where are we now ? I did avow my not unfirft
derftanding the
in
communication, and
Sir
Hamilton fubfequently anfwered to the effecT: that I fpoke falfe, that I did underftand the firft, for that I had fent him, in letters written immediately after the fecond was fundamental doctrine and received, his many of its moft important
"
"
my own fenfe.
To which
W.
my
fubfcribing to the fecond
"
have I been contending for all along, except confequences." that the doctrine of Mis firft communication was to me mere empty found,
What
when I received the fecond, was my Hamilton actually gives me a right to fay, with reference to the fecond, the more developed and more intelligible com munication, that I did not underftand it, infifts upon my faying it, and Well then, to ufe a Scottifli phrafe, reproaches me for not faying it. the lefs I lie when I fay I did not underftand the firft, which is the point at iffue. So that, as to the matter of our controverfy, Sir W. Ham ilton admits that there was (fortuitous he calls it) entrance of the theory of the quantified predicate in my writings prior to his communications ; and as to the conduct of it, he admits that I did not underftand his communication ; and in the face of fact, reproaches me with maintain ing that I did till after the pamphlets were written when it was of the
and that all own ? But
I
was
able to produce
Sir.
W.
effence of
my
ftatement,
neither I nor any to whom the requifites
that I did not underftand, fecondly that one elfe could have underftood, fave only the pupils
firft,
were addrefled.
SIR
MR. DE MORGAN. Your copious and flaming criticifms on my intellect (by which
you
avenge yourfelf for the retraction of your afperfion on my integrity), I will profit by fo far as I
W. HAMILTON.
I difregard your mifreprefentation that I avenge myfelf for the

"
retraction of
integrity by ing criticifms
my afperfion on your my copious and ilafhon your

intellect."
2
:
difcover
{hall
them to be true the reft amufe me; and the whole
Appendix. When
will be good for the printer. Take one retort from me on the fame terms. You have much fkill in
your (excufable) irritation has fubfided, you will fee that I could only fecure you from a ver-
did of plagiarifm by bringing you

in as fuffering
criticifms
under an
is all
illufion.
;
forming
fair,
new words and, as is you put your own image and

;
What, however,
will
in
I
all
my
be
not,
lefe
think,
fuperfcription I think age.
on your
own
coin-
you have got into the habit of afTuming the fame authority over that already exifting
portion of our language
found untrue, If guilty of

ference to
the
majefty by res
Queen
Englim,
?
have I not
my
accufer as abettor
which
is
commonly faid to belong to the Queen and that you need an inIf I can arrive at your meaning by the time I write the
terpreter.
For you not only paffed my mintages (quantify and quantification) as current coin ; but, in borrow"
ing, actually
words"
thanked
me
for the
preface to my work on logic, I will ftate your claim, accompanied
However, (L. p. 22). my verbal innovations are, at leaft, not elementary blunders, I do
not, for example, confound a term with a prepojttion, the middle with
the conclusion of a fyllogifm.
by your own words ; if not, I can Till ftate your own words. then, I have nothing more to fay.
flill
Sir Hamilton unconfcioufly adapts his language to a very true fuppofition, namely, that he has, in his pamphlet, made himfelf the jury in this cafe. He is unfortunate about the mintage. I fay to him You
W.
make new words well, but I am afraid you alter the old ones. To which he replies Why, you thanked me for my new words. So I did, and fo I do again but what has that to do with the lefe majefty part
:
of
my
Sir
infmuation.
Hamilton fays that I have fomewhere (where he does not term for proportion, middle for conclujion, collectively for difThis may be ; fuch flips of the pen are common enough. tributively. He fets them down as blunders of ignorance. I am not afraid the reader will follow him. He ought to have faid where they occur, that Till I put thefe is, when he firft mentioned them, in his pamphlet.
fay) ufed
letters together, I
W.
was
fatisfied,
on
:
Sir
Wm.
Hamilton
ftatement, that
"
had done
all
underftood"
but now, after the cafe of rightly which I have juft had to difcufs, I do not feel fo well fatifthefe enormities
fied,
SIR
Finally, I
W.
HAMILTON,
There is now evidence in your beg leave to remind you. pofTeffion that for feven years, at leaft, the doctrine of a quantified pre dicate has been puclickly taught by me ; whilft, on your part, there is
a counter aflertion or innuendo, which, your character formally to annul.
I never denied that Sir
as
you cannot prove,
it
concerns
W.
quantified predicate.
By
the time I wrote
Hamilton had taught a doftrine of the my pamphlet, I was pretty
Appendix.
fure
3
Sir
that
it
was not the fame
as
mine.
W.
Hamilton
anfwer
confirmed
I
which I mould per haps have omitted, if I had not pledged myfelf in my pamphlet to give an account of a certain offer which I there made to Sir William Ham It is a curious ilton, in the event of that offer not being accepted.
of that difpofition to hold a correfpondent or an opponent capable of folving enigmas, and bound to do it, which appears in his an obfcure reference to what is prefuming that (fee B, paragraph done in common language would enable me to guefs at the uncommon
inftance
now
in this, as appears in page 300. come to mention a part of the difcuffion
me
2)
Oft. 7, 1846, I learnt from Sir Wm. Hamilton that his doctrine had obtained confiderable publicity through the notes and effays of his fludents. In my reply, referring to this fyflem, and to his offer of communicating it, I afked if he had a pupil whom he could truft with the communication ; the anfwer was B, prefently given. But, Dec. zS, in fending the profpectus, Sir W. Hamilton informed me that, before forwarding it (the firfl communication in which that he had other than Ariftotelian quantification was intelligibly announced) he had waited for a reply from Mr. That gentleman continues Sir W. Hamilton, in words fome of which I place in Italics * was a pupil of mine fix years ago, and obtained one of the higheft honours of the clafs ; he was therefore fully competent to which I afford you
.
I infert it, alfo, as a language of his fyftem and his lectures. fpecimen of the various mifunderftandings and mifapprehenfions which Sir W. Hamilton imputes to me, referring to a matter which readers will fepaHad I fpace or inclination to deal with them all, rately comprehend. I believe I could ferve them all in the fame way.
information,
to do, in regard to logical doctrines as they were taught fo far back. I knew him to be a graduate of your College, and he tells me that he was for three years a pupil of your own. If you are ftill
begged
him
my
interefted
acquaintance,
ftranger.
the matter, you can therefore obtain from him as an what information you wifh, more agreeably than from a When he attended me, befides the twofold wholes in which
in
the fyllogifm proceeds, the quantification of the predicate, and the effect of that on the doctrine of converfion, on the doctrine of
fyllogirtic
moods, on the
partly given
<
fpecial fyllogiftic rules, &c., were topics difcuj/ed, and out for exercifes. They were, in fa ft, then mere common-
place.
called on me at Univerfity College, after Jan.l$, 1847, Mr. an evening lecture of mine, put his notes into my hands, and has fmce dated (in which I have no doubt he is correct, though I do not remem ber it) that he informed me he was doubtful whether they contained
exactly
what I wanted, and
that he
"information.
Now
would gladly
it
furnifh
W. Hamilton I mould do, that the notes of one of the belt fludents, even if not exactly what I wanted, were fure to contain fomething of the mere commonplace (by which I took to be meant the ordinary matter of the lectures) which was difcu/ed, and given out as exercifes to thofe
I conceived, as I thought
any additional was intended by Sir
4
attended.
this
Appendix.
But
in thefe notes I
who
had
found nothing on quantification (I key word, which did not appear in the main communica tion B) differing from what is ufual ; and after expreffmg this in my pamphlet, I proceeded as follows But if there really be anything in which Sir William Hamilton has moft interefted in preceded me, I mail be, of all men except himfelf, his having his full rights. And I make him this offer, and will take his of it as reparation in full for his fufpicions and aiTertions.
now
acceptance With the confent of the gentleman to whom thefe notes belong, which I am fure will not be refufed to our joint application, I will forward to of their table of contents, having more than a hundred and him a
copy
<
fifty
From thefe Sir William Hamilton mail felect thofe which are, in his opinion, fure to contain proof of his priority on any I will have copies made and point which I have inveftigated. Of thefe fent to him and will print in the work on Logic which I am preparing he {hall felecl: as fit to (and in fome one part of it) the parts which let him call it as he likes) his could he mow that to prove, prove (or
headings.
:
<
cafe, or the
germs of his
cafe (as
he
pleafes, again).
Provided always,
that the matter mall not run

<
beyond fome eight or a dozen octavo pages

allowed to part propofe that I {hall be
of fmall print.
And
on
my
Sir William Hamilton, of adprint, to one-half the amount felected by ditional extract : but if this be refufed I will not infift on it. With this I will put a heading fully defcriptive of the reafon and meaning of the
and fuch diftinct reference and account at the beginning of the preface as mall be fure to call the reader s attention to it. So that my book mall eftablifh the claim, if it can be eftablifhed from the notes of one of the beft fludents. If this offer be not accepted, an account of William Hamilton, or it will take the place of any other refult. If Sir
infertion,
I mall proelfe, can propofe anything to make this offer fairer, addition. And though, I bably not be found indifpofed to accept the will frankly fay, my prefent conviction is that the acceptance of the
any one
<
offer
*
would alone
caufe
my work
to
knock
Sir
William Hamilton
affertions to atoms, yet I will pledge myfelf, in any cafe, to abide by it. our places in this difcuffion been changed, I mould have taken
Had
fair
no reader of my anfwer mould have been left in ignorance of more efpecially if that offer on the part of my opponent and fraud me of had accufed been falfehood, in a manner by opponent which I felt obliged formally to retract. But Sir Wm. Hamilton does not notice the offer, even by an allufion and refers to the notes in the
care that
fo
an
following
(
way
In regard
to
Mr
and
his
my
relative letters, neither to that
Notes, I beg leave to fay, that in gentleman nor to you, did I ever
Notes of my lectures, but exclufively to his perfonal information in regard to them. And for a fufficient reafon. The Paragraphs on Logic dictated to, and taken down by, my fludents, on which I afterwards prelect, were written fo far back as the year 1837, and prior to many of my new views, and to the whole doctrine of a quantified prediThefe views, as developed, were, and are, introduced in a great cate.
refer to his
Appendix.
meafure
*
315
;
as corrections
of the
common
doclrine
in the older
Notes
efpecially, they may, therefore, not appear in the dictated and numbered Paragraphs at all j whilft, frequently, (particularly at firft,) they were given out as data, on which, previous to farther comment, the ftudents
were
called
on or excited
to write expofitory EiTays.
I diftindlly recol-
which Mr. attended my courfe of Logic (1840-1) it was required, on the hypothecs of a quantified preto Hate in detail, the valid moods of each fyllogiftic figure ; and dicate, was one of thofe who I, further, diftinftly recoiled, that Mr. effayed this problem. If wrong on this point, I mail admit that my
left, that in
the Seffion during
memory
Mr.
is
as treacherous as yours.
It
was, indeed, quite natural, that
and that you ihould receive, his Notes ; but, of courfe, you could have fought or obtained no perfonal information from him, in reference to the point in queftion, without mentioning the fad Were it, however, requilite to give proof from Notes of fo manifeft a fad, I doubt not that fcores of ftudents would be willing to
give,
mould
W. Hamilton s pamphlet, Mr. wrote him a very ftraightforward letter, of which he fent me a copy, with permiffion to both of us to ufe it. The general tenor is that Sir W. Hamilton is corred in his ftatements of what he had taught (which ftatements I never impugned as to fad ; I did not know what they
meant).
place theirs at my difpofal. On the appearance of Sir
On
the point in queftion

Seffion in
Mr.
fays (the
Italics
are
mine)
*
During the
1841) your
which
I attended
your ledures (1840 and
fyftem, bafed on the thorough going quantification of the predicate (the fecond of the three fyftems mentioned in page 3 1 of your publilhed letter) and its confequences in making all proportions
new
f (
4
limply convertible &c. was not developed by you in your ordinary feries of Leftures. I believe it was not touched upon in them, but it was partly explained to the clafs verbally* and then given out as a fubjeflfor Effays.
When the Effays were given in they were read aloud in the clafs, and commented upon by you, and in fo doing you fully explained the a full extension and thereby a complete fimplification of the fyftem as
"
fyllogiftic
*
theory."
Thefe fads which were ftrongly fixed in my memory, becaufe I believe on that occafion I happened to be the only EfTayift who had will account for the rightly apprehended and worked out the thefis, circumftance that my notes, which were originally taken in Ihorthand,
although containing a
full
Report of
all
your ordinary Lectures, are
completely
filent
on the
fubjed."
Hamilton re The reader may find out, if he can, where Sir ferred to perfonal information as diftinguiihed from notes, or to his teaching of his new fyftem, as a matter diftind from that of his ordinary
ledlures
:
W.
and muft judge what

this fhould
his fuccefs
is
in faying
what he means
ufually reads his
think
be extempore-, meaning that
Sir
W. Hamilton
le&ures.
6
And
he
Appendix.
may find out further, how I was to guefs that the mere commonplace of the topics difcujfed in Sir William s teaching was to come, after an interval of fix years, from his old pupil s perfonal infor mation, and not from the full and (as I found them) excellent notes which
to fay.
he made at the time. I mould add that Mr. , fubfequently to the printed controverfy, anfwered every query which I put to him on Sir W. Hamilton s fyftem, but did not feel juftified (as in a like cafe I mould not in
anfwering pofitively
years. I have
as to the
minute
details
of it,
either) after laying it by for
Sir
mentioned one or two inftances in which, as feems to me, Hamilton has a ftrange idea of the fenfe of his own words I will now take one of the cafes in which he has dealt as ftrangely with mine. The way in which we ufe language, is one of the means which the reader has, for forming his judgment on the whole of this difpute and he muft decide which of us is of incapable of giving to the ^
W.
phrafes
the other their proper fignification. When I returned to Sir W. Hamilton his profpeftus, with thofe own fenfe, the more parts underlined which I could interpret in
my
derlined.
important parts relating to logical mood and figure were not thus un In the accompanying letter, I ufed thefe words, To mood and figure, I have attended but little ; what I get on thefe points will be from your hint, or from The whole letter was on what your book. I had done in the way of inveftigation, not of elementary reading and
:
fafely fay that it is clear I meant that I had not made mood and figure, as conftituent parts of a theory of fyllogifm, fubjefts of inveftiga tion, with a view to new But Sir in two
may
properties.
W.
Hamilton,
places,
ignorance of the ordinary fyftem of mood and In a foot-note to the above, he And yet, though configure. fays, feffedly to feek in the very alphabet of the fcience, Mr. De Morgan would be a logical inventor What is here acknowledged in terms, is
"
makes
me avow
well as the will
And in his pamphlet (II. p. no thorough ftudent, in the fcience ; and refers to this paragraph of mine as the ground of the afTertion. It would have been ftrange, if, avowing ignorance of the ordinary doftrine of mood and figure, I had faid that what I mould get on thefe points muft be from Sir W. Hamilton s hint or unpublifhed book, when any ordinary treatife would have given it fo ftrange, that this claufe ought, I think, to have fuggefted the obvious meaning. Is Sir W. Hamilton s I do not doubt that he interpretation a fair one ? meant it to be fair. What I afk is, has he the power to read fairly as
<
fufficiently manifefted as 9), he reprefents
me
from no
miftakes."*
proficient
preceding cafes (that of the notes and that of the avowed ignorance] are fpecimens of Sir W. Hamilton s give and take, of the
* Sir W. Hamilton fhould have cited a few but when he declares elementary blunders, he does not give fo much as a reference. The plan
:
The two
I
is
have made
a fafe one.
Appendix.
manner
claims"
3
and of that
in
in
which he expefts
to be underftood,
which he
a right to underftand.
They
are alfo, of courfe, fpecimens of
my
own.
1
In (A), the fymbols A, E, I, O, are the and a, e, i, o, are the A
A, E I|, O E I O
(,
4,
of
this
work
(A) From the paper as fent to Cambridge before I bad any communica tion whatfoever from Sir William Hamilton (without any corrections).
SECTION III.
"
On
the quantity of proportions .
as merely more than none, knowledge of the extent of a profome Xs are not Ys in knowing, for inftance in pofition would confift both what proportion of the Xs are fpoken of, and what proportion The want of this exifts between the whole number of Xs and of Ys. information compels us to divide the exponents of our proportion into An algebraifl learns to cono, more than o not neceffarily I, and I. fider the diftin&ion between o and quantity as identical, for many and another the logician purpofes, with that between one quantity mull (all writers imply) keep the diftinftion between o and a, however a there being but fmall a may be, as facred as that between o and I We mail now fee that this matter the fame form for the two cafes.
The
logical
ufe of the
word feme,
ExacT:
needs no further explanation.
has not been fully examined. Inference muft confift in bringing each
"
compared
two things which are to be into comparifon with a third. Many comparifons may be the made at once, but there muft be this procefs in every one. comparifon is that of identity, of is or is not, it can only be in its ulti
When
mate or individual
this
is
cafe,
one of the two following
This
;
X
;
is
Y,
Z
Y,
is
is this the very fame Y, therefore this is not the very fame Y, therefore this this
or elfe
is is
This X not this Z.
And
colleftively, it muft therefore thefe Ys is a ;
be either
thefe
Each of
thefe
is
Xs
;
each of
each of thefe
Xs
Z,
or elfe
Each of
thefe
thefe
Xs
a
is
Y, no one of
is
Ys
is
therefore
that
no one of
Xs
is
"
Z.
efTential
All that
then to a fyllogifm
is
its
premifes fhall
mention a number of Ys, of each of which they fhall affirm either that The pre it is both X and Z, or that it is one and is not the other. mifes may mention more but it is enough that this much can be picked out ; and it is in this laft procefs that inference confifts. Ariftotle noticed but one way of being fure that the fame Ys are all of them in one fpoken of in both premifes ; namely, by fpeaking of at leaft. But this is only a cafe of the rule for all that is neceffary is that more Ys in number than there exift feparate YsJbaH be fpoken of in
:
"
both premifes together. Having to make m-\-n greater than unity, when neither m nor n is fo, he admitted only that cafe in which one of the two m or n, is unity and the other is anything except o. Here then
are
two
fyllogifms
which ought
to
have appeared, but do not,
8
Moft of the Ys Molt of the Ys
.*.
Appendix.
are are
Xs Zs
..
Moft of the Ys Moft of the Ys
are
Xs
Zs Zs
are not
Some Xs
are
Zs
Some of
the
Xs
are not
And
and
It
inftead
of moft, or ^ -\-a, of the Ys,

a
may
be fubftituted any two
fractions
If thefe fractions be greater than unity. \ of the Ys. n, then the middle term is at leaft the fraction m-{- n
which have
fum
is not really even neceffary that all the Ys mould enter in one premifs or the other: for more than the fraction m-\-n I of the whole may be repeated twice.
And
in truth
it is this
;
mode of
fyllogifing that
we
are frequently
perhaps more often than not in our univerfal fyllogifms. All men are capable of fome inftruction ; all who are capable of any inftru&ion can learn to diftinguifh their right and left hands by name ; therefore all men can learn to do fo. J Let the word all in thefe two cafes mean only all but one, and the books on logic tell
obliged to have recourfe to
us with one voice that the fyllogifm has particular premifes, and no conBut in fact idiots are capable of no inftruction, clufion can be drawn.
many
is
is
are deaf
admiflible.
Here
and dumb, fome are without hands and yet a conclufion m and n are each very near to unity, and m-\-n I
:
clufio h
any one perfon it means there is the chance m that he can receive inftruction, and n that one fo gifted can be made to name his right and left hand therefore m X n (very near unity) is the chance that this man can learn fo much. But I cannot fee how in this inftance the probability is anything but another fort of inference from the demonftrable conclufion of the Befides which, fyllogifm, which muft exift under the premifes given. even if we admit the fyllogifm as only probable with regard to any one man, it is abfolute and demonftrative in regard to the propofition with which it concludes. But this is not the only cafe in which the middle term need not enter univerfally this however is matter for the next Section. I now go on to another point."
:
"
"
therefore near to unity. : that in the cafe of
Some
will fay that this
is
a probable con-
Extratt
"
II.
now
:
take the
two
cafes in
which
particular premifes
may
give a
conclulion
I7/
namely
XY+XY=XZ
XY+Y:Zz=X:Z
O ro
on the fuppofition that the Ys mentioned in both premifes are in num ber more than all the Ys. If Y x and Y 2 {land for the fractions of the whole number of Ys mentioned or implied in the two premifes, and r y
2
for the fractions
of the ys implied or mentioned,
we
mail by a
Appendix.
repetition of the procefs on YX-}-YZ=XZ (the other being obtained in the courfe of the procefs) arrive at the following refults or their remembering that Y T 4-Yj, is greater or lefs than i, ac counterparts
:
cording
as^-j-^
is lefs
or greater.
Condition of
its
Dcfignation.
Syllogifm.
exiftence.
I 7/
O O O
fo
YX + YZ = XZ YX+Y:Z=rXZ
X:Y
Y, +Y 2
greater than I ........................
oi
+ yz =X:Z
XZ
Y,+Y 2
lefs
than
oi
loo
X:Y + Z:Y=
.....................
th of November from Sir (B) Communication received on the ^tb or William Hamilton, being the pretext for his charge that I have, with
injurious breach of confidence towards himfelf, and falfe dealing to wards the public, appropriated his Fundamental Doctrine of Syllo
"
gifm"
privately communicated to me : and, after the retraction of that charge, noticed in pages 297, S,for the aj/ertion that I have done the
unconfcioujly.
"
fame thing
1 6, Great King Street, November 2nd, 1846.
have been longer than I anticipated in anfwering now fend you a copy of the requifites for the prize It Elfay, which I gave out to my ftudents at the clofe of laft feffion. will mow you the nature of my doctrine of fyllogifm, in one of its halves. The other, which is not there touched on, regards the two wholes, or quantities in which a fyllogifm is caft. I had intended fend ing you a copy of a more articulate ftatement which I meant, at any rate, to have drawn up ; but I have not as yet been able to write this. I will fend it when it is done. From what you ftate of your fyftem * having little in common with the old one, and from the contents of
"
DEAR
laft
SIR,
your
letter.
Firft Notions, we mall not, I find, at all interfere, for my doctrine limply that of Ariftotle, fully developed. It will give me great pleafure if I can be of any ufe, in your inveftiI have paid great gations concerning the hiftory of Logical doctrines. attention to this fubject, on which I found, that I could obtain little or
your
is
no information from the profelfed

tion of Logical books But, as I mentioned to
is
hiftorians of Logic ; and my collec probably the moil complete in this country. you in my former letter, it is only in fubordinate matters that in abftratt Logic there has been any progrefs.
"
I remain, dear Sir, very truly yours,

"W.
HAMILTON."
320
Effay on the
Appendix.
new Analytic of Logical Forms.
it
is
to prefcribe any definite order, there fhould be rtated in the Effay,
Without wifhing
required that
language makes an ellipjts of the exfrequently of the fubjecl, and more frequently of the predicate , though both have always their quantities in thought. \This paragraph is the one on which Sir W. Hamilton principally relies],
preffed quantity
1. What Logic poftulates as a 2. The reafons why common
condition of its applicability.
3. 4.
5.
on the common doctrine. Converfion of proportions Defeds of this. Figure and Mood of Categorical fyllogifm, and Reduction,
ftatement).
on
common doctrine (General
6. Defects of this (General ftatement). 7. The onefupreme Canon of Categorical Syllogifms. 8. The evolution, from this canon, of all thefpecies of Syllogifm. 9. The evolution, from this canon, of all the general laws of cate
gorical Syllogifms.
10. The
error of
\h.z
fpecial laws for the feveral Figures of Catego
rical Syllogifm.
11. How many Figures are there. 12. What are the Canons of the feveral Figures. 13. How many moods are there in all the Figures
crete examples, through all the Figure makes in a fyllogifm.
mowing
in
con
Moods,
the uneffential variation
which
(Thofe which follow 13 were wrong numbered.) 15. What relation do the Figures hold to extenfion and comprehenJton.
1 6. Why have the fecond and third Figures no determinate major and minor premifes and two indifferent conclufions while the firft Fi gure has a determinate major and minor premife, and a fmgle proximate
:
conclufion.
17. What relation do the Figures hold to Deduction and Induction. N.B. This EiTay open for competition to all ftudents of the clafs of Logic and Metaphyfics during the laft or during the enfuing feflion.
April I5th, 1846.
(C) Extract from the Addition to my Paper, taken, as can be Jhown, from the papers which I gave the means of identifying in January laft, and which papers (though I hold it immaterial) I ajjert to have been written before I received any logical communication from Sir William Hamilton. (To be compared with the extracts given in A).
Since this paper was written, I found that the whole theory of the fyllogifm might be deduced from the confideration of propofitions in a form in which definite quantity of afTertion is given both to the fubject
"
and the predicate of

paper,
propofition.
Sir
when
I learned
from
I had committed this view to William Hamilton of Edinburgh, that
Appendix.
321
he had for fome time part publicly taught a theory of the fyllogifm differing in detail and extent from that of Ariftotle. From the profpeaus of an intended work on logic, which Sir William Hamilton has recently iffued, at the end of his edition of Reid, as well as from infor mation conveyed to me by himfelf in general terms, I mould fuppofe it will be found that I have been more or lefs anticipated in the view juft alluded to. To what extent this has been the cafe, I cannot now afcertam ; but the book of which the profpeaus juft named is an announcement, will fettle that queflion. From the extraordinary extent of its author s learning in the hiftory of philofophy, and the acutenefs of his written articles on the fubjea, all who are interefted in logic will look for its appearance with more than common intereft.
"
mould be glad to put proportions, if footing upon our knowledge were minute We mould ftate enough, is the following. how many individuals there are under the names which are the fubjea and predicate, and of how many of each we mean to fpeak. Thus mftead of Some Xs are Ys, it would be, Every one of a fpecified Xs is one or other of b And the negative form would be as fpecified Ys. No one of a fpecified Xs is any one of b If propofifpecified Ys. tions be ftated in this way, the conditions of inference are as follows. Let the effeaive number of a propofition be the number of mentioned cafes of the fubjel, if it be an affirmative propofition, or of the middle
The
which we
be a negative term, propofition. Thus, in Each one of 50 Xs is one or other of 70 Ys, is a propofition, the effeaive number of which is always 50. But No one of 50 Xs is any one of 70 Ys is a propo fition, the effeaive number of which is 50 or 70, according as X or Y is the middle term of the fyllogifm in which it is to be ufed. Then two each of two terms, and proportions, having one term in common, admit an inference when i. They are not both negative. 2. The fum of the effeaive numbers of the two premifes is greater than the whole number of And the excefs of exifting cafes of the middle term. that fum above the number of cafes of the middle term is the number of the cafes in the affirmative premifs which are the fubjeas of inference. Thus, if there be 100 Ys, and we can fay that each of 50 Xs is one or other of 80 Ys, and that no one of 20 Zs is the any one of 60 Ys ; effeaive numbers are 50 and 60. And 50+60 exceeding 100 by 10, there are i o Xs, of which we may affirm that no one of them is any one of 20 Zs mentioned.
<
if it
The
following brief fummary will enable the reader to obferve the
complete deduaion of all the Ariftotelian forms, and the various modes of inference from fpecifc particulars, of which a fliort account has already been given. Let a be the whole number of Xs ; and / the number fpecified in the premifs. Let c be the whole number of Zs ; and w the number
"
Let b be the whole number of Ys ; and u and numbers fpecified in the premifes of x and z. Let X,Y M denote that each of/ Xs is affirmed to be one out of u Ys and X, YM that each of/ Xs is denied to be any one out of u Ys. Let X,,, n fignify m
fpecified in the premifs.
the
322
Xs taken out of a
poffible fyllogifms,
Appendix.
larger fpecified
number n
:
on
the condition that
and fo on. Then the five ; no contraries are to enter either
are as follows premifes or conclufion,
X,
2.
X.Y.+Y.Z.
:
=X + ^
l
1
f<
3.
4.
5.
"
Y B X,+ Y.Z., 4- -i, X + -b, X Y M -|-ZW Y y u X +Z w :Y v =:X u+v^,

v
/ t
= X.
Z w -Z + Z W =ZU + Zw
t
.
X
b>w
v _ b w X,
,
:^
X
m>t
clufion,
of the con condition of inference exprefles itfelf; in the muft neither be o nor negative. The firft cafe gives no Ariftotelian fyllogifm ; the middle term never entering univerfally (of which its forms, under any degree of fpecification neceffity) into any of The other cafes divide the old fyl the ufual modes of fpeaking allow. fo themfelves in the following manner : they are written logifms among of amount of fpeci as to mow that there is fometimes a little difference which changes in the the refults of different
The
fication
between
figures,
reduction from one figure to another.

figures.
?.
The Roman
numerals mark the
/
t
i
~
<
Barbara
tf ,
I.
vi^b
v
z>
Bramantip IV
</z,
D^r
I.
a,
in ^
Dimaris IV.
Darapti III.
*/
<
b,
v
*///
III.
ui^.by v
~~~
III.
T*
~~~
""~
Z+XJY^X Z X)Y,,+Z Y=Z X

.
Celarent
C<?>^
I.
II.
Cameftres
Fm<?
II.
Y Z=X,Y M = X,: Z
.
X)Y ,+Y ZzrZ X

. . ?
Camenes IV.
I.
Z.Y-f-X^-X^Z
Y.
/V/?/#0 II.
Baroko
II.
=X
7(
:Z
Felapton III.
III.
:Z Z Y+Y Yv Z+Y)X^X,, :Z
.
X<=X 7 ,
Frefifon
IV.
III.
Bokardo
conclude by fubmitdng to the reader what I began with, namely, William Hamilton produces fomething from C, intelligi nor in at hinted B, and neither fubftantially contained in the matter, bly
I
that until Sir
Appendix.
323
immediately deducible from the principles, of A, he has no right what ever to aflert that I have borrowed from him confcioufly or unconfciI have not found oufly. can any perfon who thinks that fuch a
be produced and I leave every reader to form his it can he done or not.
:
own
thing opinion whether
APPENDIX
On fame forms of inference
II.
differing from thofe
of the Arlftotellans.
it deiirable to ftate all I know of any attempt to deal with the forms of inference othenvife than in the Ariftotelian method. Since the time of Wallis, three well known mathematicians have written on the fubjecl, Euler, Lambert, and : there have been
THINK
others, but I have not
Gergonne met with them.
may
Euler s Lettres a une PrincefTe d Allemagne fur quelques fujets de Phyfiqueet de Philofophie (3 vols. 8vo. Peter/burg 1768-1772, accord ing to Fufs) contain the reprefentation of the fyllogifm by fenfible terms,
There was a Paris edition by Condorcet and Lacroix, namely, areas. 1787, as is ftated by Dr Henry Hunter, who publifhed an Englifh tranflation from it and from the original edition, London, 1795, 2 vols. 8vo. Euler makes ufe of circles to reprefent the terms. In a tradl
in
publifhed (or completed) in 1831, in the Library of Ufeful Knowledge, under the name of the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics I fell upon this method before I knew what Euler had done, ufing, for diftinftion, fquares, circles, and triangles, as in Chapter I. of this work. The author of the Outlines" prefently mentioned, has what I confider a very happy improvement on Euler. The propofition fome X is Y, is reprefented by the latter as the circle of X, partly infide and The author of the Outlines" puts a broken partly outfide the Y. fegment of the circle of X infide the circle of Y, leaving it unfettled whether the reft of the circle is united to the broken piece, or tranfferred elfe where.* But Euler had been preceded in the publication of this idea by Lam Neues Organon, &c. Leipzig, 1764, 2 vols. 8vo. In bert, in his this work, the terms are reprefented by lines, and identical extents by The parts of the lines vertically under one another, as in page 79. whole notion is reprefented by continuous line, the part left indefinite
" "
in particular Some of the contranominal proportions by dotted line. forms are more diftinftly mentioned than is ufual, but there is no intro duction that I can find of any form of inference which is not Ariftote
lian.
(fee page
fhould fay that Euler does not ufe the numerical, but the magnitu.iinal notion, 48 of this work).
324
Appendix.
In the feventh volume of the Annales de Matbematiques (Nifmes,

entitled
1816 and 1817, 4to.) there is a paper by the editor, M. Gcrgonne, this paper, nor E/ai de dialettique rationale. I did not fee Lambert s work, until after my memoir in the Tranfactions of the have given Cambridge Society had been publimed. The fecond would me no hint the firft might have done fo. There is the idea, and fome
^
formal ufe, of a complex proportion
but the divifion
is
erroneous.
are there; thefe fubidentical, identical, and fuperidentical forms are not eafily miffed : the others which Gergonne ufes are, the complete
The
of my fyftem, which, disjunctively, exclufion (the contrary or fub contrary are only the common univerfal negative) and partial inclufion with par
tial
ex clufwn (the complex particular, or fupercontrary, of mine). The ufe of contraries is expreffly* forbidden, the old converfion by contraafferted pofition formally declared/^, and the particular proportion But M. Gergonne s complex to be incapable of being made univerfal. are ufed in a manner refembling that in fuch as
proportions,
they are,
chapter
V, of
this
many
things the analogues
work, though requiring a feparate tatonnement for of which appear as connected refults of my
I
fyftem.
Accordingly,
am bound
to attribute to
M. Gergonne
the
firft
and of the comparifon of publication of the idea of a complex fyllogifm, But numerical ftatement is not hinted at. the fimple one with it.
Sir William Hamilton s fyftem dates, as to its publication in lectures, from 1841, as far as has yet appeared. What I have to fay of it will be found in another appendix. In 1842, there was publimed anonymoufly Outline of the laws of and Graham) ottavo in twos thought ; London and Oxford (Pickering, The author is the Rev. Wm. Thomfon, tutor of Queen s (fmall). and learned. The fyftem of College, Oxford. It is a very acute work, of both the common quantiproportions is extendedby the introduction
rcations of the predicate into the affirmatives only, and Y, as the author calls them, or proportions
which introduces the "All Xs are all Ys,"
and
"
Some Xs
are
all
Ys."
Cambridge Tranfactions in which I gave the firft account of what has fmce grown into Chapters IV, V, VIII, and X, of With re this work, is defcribed as to date in the preceding appendix. ference to the fubject of chapter V, I may note the following defects as preand That only one arrangement of of that memoir I
The memoir
in the
mifes being taken, only half the fyftem is given, and many correlative arrangements are not obtained (fee page 140). 2. That owing to my not feeing diftindtly that each univerfal propofition has two weakened forms, the fyllogifms AjA I and E E I t are confidered as a clafs apart. of forming eafy rules is not gained, by the 3. That much of the power order of reference being made XY, ZY, XZ, inftead of XY, YZ, XZ.
The
former appears
at
firft
the
more
natural order, and
is
certainly
I am told that fome works on logic ufed in the Irifh colleges formally announce law of fyllogifm depends upon the exclufion of contra that the truth of the [ordinary] laws but I have not met with any of them. ries
"I
Appendix.
more
325
eafily defcribed ; namely, to refer each of the concluding terms to the middle term, with which both are I obfcrvc, fmce, compared. that M. reference : but the other is Gergonne adopts this laft order by an immenfe deal more convenient in its refults, as I think I have
of"
numerical quantification, what I did in the Me Sir given in full in the preceding appendix. William Hamilton, who diftinclly renounces all claim to the arithme tically articulate" fyftem, and doubts whether it afford any bafis for a logical developement, ftates that he had formerly obtained the ultrarefpecl: to the
is
mown. With
moir and Addition
"
"
publifhing it, as I underftand, in any way. To his reply, he appends a note which I think it defirable to republifh at length, as a document in the hiftory of this fpeculation, and that I may
fubtlety,
total quantification" (page ufelefs without
317) and thrown
it
away
as a
cumbrous and
make
I
that hiftory complete (II. p. 41). have avoided, in the previous letter and poflfcript, all details in regard to the third fcheme of quantification (p. 32) ; becaufe that fcheme except in fo far as it is confounded with the jfcrwfc/, has no bearing in the controverfy; and I admit that whatever Mr. De Morgan has therein accomplifhed, he has accomplished independently of me. Further, I mail not deny him any claim of priority to whatever he may have ftated in our correfpondence, in reference to this third fcheme.
Finally, I mail acknowledge, for I think it not improbable, that his fyllogifm (p. 19) fuggefted a reconfideration, on my fickbed, of a certain former fpeculation, in regard to the ultratotal quantification of the middle term in both premifes together ; a fpeculation determined by the vacillation of the logicians, touching the predefignations more, moft, &c. but which I had laid, afide, as a ufelefs and cumbrous fubtlety. Arirtotle, followed by the logicians, did not introduce into his doctrine of fyllogifm, any quantification between the abfolutely univerfal and the merely particular predefignations, for valid reafons. 1, Such quantifications were of no value or application in the one whole (the
univerfal, potential, logical), or, as I

relative
would amplify
it,
in the
two
cor-
and counter wholes (the logical, and the formal, aftual, For all that is out of metaphyfical,) with which Logic is converfant. clarification, all that has no reference to genus and fpecies, is out of Logic, indeed out of Philofophy ; for Philofophy tends always to the univerfal and neceflary. Thus the higheft canons of dedu&ive reafoning, the difla de Omni et de Nullo, were founded on, and for, the procedure from the univerfal whole to the fubjeft parts ; whilft, converfely, the principle of indudive reafoning was eftablifhed on, and for, the (real or prefumed) collection of all the fubjeft parts as conilituting the univerfal whole. 2, The integrate or mathematical whole, on the contrary, (whether continuous or difcrete) the philofophers contemned. For whilft, as Ariftotle obferves, in mathematics genus and fpecies are of no account ; it is, almoft exclufively, in the mathematical
term, in neither premife, equal to the whole.
whole, that quantities are compared together, through a middle But this reafoning, in
326
which the middle term
*
Appendix.
is
particular, is, in philofophy.

*
vague, partial, was accordingly ignored in Logic ; and die predeas I have faid, referred, to univerfal, or, more moft, &c., fignations This to particular, or to neither, quantity. (as was moft common)
It
as
never univerfal, and the conclufion always and contingent, of little or no value
attracted my attention ; difcrepancy among Logicians long ago confidered abfolutely, inference of the that at once, faw, poffibility of the middle term, in both exclufively on the quantifications
and
depended,
*
*
more than poffible totality premifes, being, together, At the fame time I was impreffed I*, with the almoft in any one. of fuch reafoning, in a philofophical relation ând 2, utter
its its
diftribution,
inutility
recognition in Logic would introduce. The mere quantification of the predicate, under the two pure quantities of definite and indefinite, and the two qualities of in each figure, thirty fix affirmative and negative, gives (abflraftly) be correft,) would be valid moods which, prefent calculation
alarmed with the load of valid
moods which
its
(if
my
<
introduction of the two hybrid or ambiguous quanmultiplied, by the of four buntifications of a majority and a half, to the fearful amount the dred and eighty valid moods for each figure. Though not, at
of thefe objeftions, they however time, fully aware of the ftrength me from breaking down the old limitation ; but as my fu-
* *
on the mere formal poffibility of preme canon of Syllogifm proceeds forms of quantiit of courfe comprehends all the legitimate reafoning, and relation What is It predicate, fubfifts fication. of fubjett ; worjl between either of two terms and a common third term, with which one,
at leaft,
prevented
<
<
that relation fubfifts between the two related ; is pojitively In as far as two notions both terms themfehes : in other words ; with a common third notion: other the or one agrees, dif agreeing, agree, each other. This canon with or notions in fo far, thofe agree dif agree in extenfion to all categorical fyllogifms, and proximately, applies,
and comprehenfion,
determines
all
through
and of any figure. affirmative and negative, the varieties of fuch fyllogifms ; is developed into all In fliort, without their general, and fuperfedes all their fpecial, laws. no categorical reafoning can, formally, be wrong. violating this canon, Now, this canon fuppofes that the two extremes are compared together, common middle ; and this cannot but be, if the the
It
fame
both its quantifications tomiddle, whether, fubjeft or predicate, in in either its totality, though not taken in that totality exceed gether,
premife. But, as I have ftated, I
<
was moved
to
the reconfideration of this
whole matter
and
it
may
have been Mr.
De Morgan
fyllogifm in
our correfpondence
(p. 19),
was the opinion, that thefe account by Logic, as authentic forms, but then relegated, as of little mafs of ufe in pra&ice, and cumbering the fcience with a fuperfluous in our s ftatement De Mr. correfpondence (p. moods. As to Morgan 2 1) of the principle on which (by his later fyftem) fuch fyllogifms I did not comprehend at to ufe his own exprcffion, proceed, this,
"
which gave the fuggeilion. The remit two quantifications mould be taken into
Appendix.
all
"
327
* *
nor do I now,* having, to fpeak with the Rabbis, referved it for the advent of Elias." I faw however, that, be it what it might, it had no analogy with mine ; indeed, even from the fuller expofition of his dodlrines, contained in the body of the Memoir and
;"
Cambridge
its
*
Addition, which I afterwards received, I can find no indication
of his having generalifed either, I the comprebetijive principle of all inference, that the two quantifications of the middle term, Jbould, tounder a get her, exceed it as a Jingle whole y or,
2,
non-diftributed
forms of its quantification. On receipt, however, of Mr. De Morgan s Cambridge Memoir, I faw, or thought I faw, in the body of the paper, on his old view, fome manifeftation of
middle, the
TWO
exclujive
a lefs erroneous doctrine in his Letters
upon
this point,
than that afterwards contained
and Addition, upon his new. Accordingly, to obviate all mifconftruftion, I wrote immediately the following letter,f of which an account has been previoufly given (p. 26, note).
EDINBURGH, 30^ March,

Your paper read
oppofed
*
to
1847.
many
to the Society I of its doctrines, I
have curforily perufed ; but though admire the ingenuity which charac-
and
"
The paflages which Sir William Hamilton does notunderftand, are the following, alfo that relating to the effective terms, in of the preceding appendix. fuppofe propofitions in which the quantitative part of the preceding is made
Now
more
definite.
Say that
X
is
Yu
and
|
Yu
mean
Every one of t Xs one or other of u Ys
No
is
one of t Xs any one of u Ys

it
is
Let the effe&ive number of cafes in a propofition be the number which fective in inference. Then the effective number in a pofitive propofition ber of cafes of thefubjefl.
makes ef
the
num
middle
The
term.
effective
number
in a negative propofition
is
the
number of cafes of the
the criterion of inference being poflible, is that the fum of the effective num bers of the two premifes (not both negative) is greater than the whole number of cafes of the middle term. And the excefs is the number of cafes involved in the inference, of all which are
And
mentioned in the conclufion-term (or terms) of the pofitive premifs (or premifes). For inftance, let b be the whole number of Ys in exiftence I afk whether we can infer anything from
:
X
Anfwer,
if
t
t
:
Zw
-J-
Yu Yv
b,
effective
number ....
infer
v be greater than
we can
b
:
Xt-fv
Zw
Or, if each of t Xs be one or other of u Ys, and no one of w Zs be any one of v Ys, then if t and v together are more in number than there are Ys, we may infer that no one of t -|- v b Xs is any one of the w Zs juft fpoken
of."
This letter (the firft paragraph of which is omitted, as not relevant to this appen dix,) was addrefied to me, and was fent open to my friend Dr. Sharpey, to be deli vered to me. Dr. Sharpey refufed to deliver (and, as it happened, I was as much prepared to refufe to receive) any thing on the literary fubject matter of the controverfy which did not contain a retraction of Sir W. Hamilton s then fubfifting charge againft me. Accordingly, I never faw it till it appeared in print.
328
*
Appendix.
throughout.
one point, I find we coincide, in principle, They have referred the quantifying predefignations plurimi, and the like, to the moll oppofite heads ; * fome making them univerfal, fome, particular, and fbme between both ; (for you are not correft in faying, (p. 6), that logicians are unanimous in regarding them as particular, [though molt do]). This conflidlion attracted my attention ; and a little confideration mowed me, that befides the quantification of the pure quantities, univerfal vn& particular, (which I call definite and indefinite,} there are two others of * thefe, mixed and half developed, which ought to be taken into account
terifes it
On
at leaft, againft logicians in general.
by the
tific
*
logician, as affording valid inference ; but which, without fcienerror, cannot be referred either to univerfal, (definite,) or to par-
ticular, (indefinite) quantity, far lefs left to vacillate tween thefe. I accordingly introduced them into
ambiguoufly bemodification, in
my
Englifh doggerel, of
formerly faid was at
AJJerit A" &c. f which [in the original caft] I your fervice ; and as it affords a brief view of my
"
doclrine on this point, I
may now
quote
it.
A,
it
affirms of this, that, all,*
Whilft
I, it affirms, whilft
denies of any, denies, Offome (or few or many).
Thus
And
Thus
A affirms, as E denies,
O
And
*
definitely either ; I affirms, as denies, definitely neither.
A half, left femi-definite,

This, neither
lefs
Is worthy of its fcore ; U, then, affirms, as Y denies,
nor more.
To UI, YO, laft we come And that affirms, and this denies,
}
Indefinito-definites,
Of more,
moft, (half plus fome),
"
The
rule
of the
logicians, that the
middle term mould be once
at
"
leaft diftributed
"larly,
"
= definitely,)
whole.
[or indiftributable,]
is
premifes together,
"definite
"
its
taken univerfally or fmguuntrue. For it is fufficient, if, in both the quantification be more than its quantity as a
(i.e.
(Ultratotal)"
"It
is
valid fyllogifm, that the

partially
this is
two extreme notions mould
enough
for a
(or
mould
not),
"ofneceffity,
"
neceffarily
*
mown
Better
:
coincide in the third or middle notion; and to be the cafe, if the one extreme coincide
A,
it
affirms of this, tbefe, all:
Appendix.
"
329
;
with the middle,
to the extent
of a
half, (dimidiate quantification)
"and
the other, to the extent of aught "diate quantification).

"
more than
a half, (ultradimi-
"fufficient
"
and higheft quantification of the middle term is (. .) not only in combination with itfelf, but with any of all the three inferior. The fecond (. ,) fuffices, in combination with the
firft
The
higheft,^
"
"
third, but not with the loweft. combination with either of the higher, but not with itfelf, far Ids with the loweft. The fourth and loweft (,) fuffices only in combination with the higheft." Definite;
itfelf,
with
and with the

in
The
third
(.) fuffices,
[i.
Indefinite-definite; 3. Semi-definite; 4. Indefinite.]" Of the efFeft of this new fyftem of quantification in amplifying the fyllogiftic moods, (which in all the figures remain the fame,) I fay nothing.
*
"2.
It
mould be noted, however,
that the letters
A, E, &c. do not
mark the
quantification [and qualification] of proportions, (as of old) but of proportional terms. The fentences within inverted commas are
"
taken from notes for the Effay towards," &c. Before concluding, I ought to apologife, in the circumftances, for the details, that have infenfibly lengthened out, of a part of my doctrine, which I have found, to a certain extent, coincident with what
was anxious, however, that you and others furmifmg, that I borrowed any thing from my predeceflbrs without due acknowledgment. On fecond thoughts, however, I deem it more proper to make this communication through
appears in your paper.
I
mould have no grounds
for
William Hamilton and myfelf called a very able third party into the field, who addrefled the following letter to the editor of the Atbenaum, in which journal it was publimed, June
Sir
a third party. The difcuffion
between
19* 1.847*
As two great logical innovations the one due to Sir William Sir, Hamilton, the other due to Mr. De Morgan ufed in conjunction, have led me to the fimpleft and moft general formulae of fyllogifm that ever have been given (formulae which correct: a ferious miftake into which both Sir William Hamilton and Mr. De I think Morgan have
fallen),
it
will gratify thofe interefted in logical fcience if
you would give them
publicity through your columns. n l, 7/ , &c. are any numbers.
",
<
n u marks the total number of the clafs x ; placed before a propofition, it marks the number of things of which we mean to fpeak. of n n xs are of n ys, means that a number of Thus, , things n are alleged to have both the characleriftics x and y ; and are to the whole IF ul clafs of xs as to : fimi, and to the whole clafs ofys as n to n of n n xs are not of n inys, n larly with the negative propofition things being here faid to have the charafteriitic x, and to want the charafteriftic y. It is clear, from the nature of a propofition, that in affirmatives, n can never be greater than the lead extenfive of the terms, and in negatives never greater than the number of the clafs whofe chara&eriftic it is faid to have. But within thefe limits the pron"xs>
When
placed before a term, as
330
(
Appendix.
l
* * * *
we then mark it with ; William Hamilton, indefinite as of equality when we mark quantity. It may be perfectly determined; Mr. De Morgan, any other arithmetiit with all, every, or, following as a half. cal proportion (Sir William Hamilton has erred in calling
portion n
the
to
?i
may be wholly undetermined
word fome t
we
call
this,
with
Sir
a half, femi-definite
it is
nite quantity.
Lailly, the indefinitude
All this we call defithoroughly definite). may be reduced within limits
indefinite-definite, as moft,
&c.
all
formula contains fion, without any exception.

firft
l
The
fyllogifms with an affirmative conclu-
I.
u Iir n of n xs are of jv v IV zj are of n ys of v \\ __ O f n xs ar e o f n zs ) (fli+fliv
William Hamilton s principle takes away all diftinftion of it will be feen that, and by fubjeft predicate in affirmative proportions, varying the proportions of the fymbols, n t &c., every poffible affirmative logical inference, in whatever mood or figure, emerges. The fyllogifms with negative queftions or conclufions, are not fo
Sir
l
As
*
*
They fall into two divifions, according as, in the negative the characleriftic of the extreme, or premifs, the things fpoken of have of the middle; and from each of thefe, two conclufions, not one, are drawn, according as the things to be fpoken of in the conclufion have
fimple.
the charafteriftic of the extreme in the affirmative premifs, or of that in the negative premifs.
lll n of n xs are of n y s lv v n of n zs are not of nys concludes ; v v u ^ are not ofn zs ) of n xs doubly i (n -f- n n IV not n are xs. zs ri* ^ n 2
II.
"
^"
^"
It
e
is
to this
formula I referred
as correcting a ferious error into
which
William Hamilton and Mr. De Morgan have fallen of holding, as a general principle of all inference, that the two quantifications of the middle term mould exceed it as a whole ; for this fyllogifm proceeds wholly irrefpeftive of the total quantity of the middle, which is excluded from our fymbolic conclufion.
Sir
m n of n vxs are of n ys v lv n of nys are not of n zs concludes ; alfo, m of n"xs are not of n v zs lv a1 ) doubly i (n v 1 of n v zs are not of x u xs. nm 2 (n -f- a -j- n
III.
l
<
#")
Such
*
rence.
are the three fymbolical formulae of every poffible logical infeI have the demonftrations that thefe are in all their extent valid,
poffible
and are the only

fults.
forms
but
it is
fufficient to give here the re-
It will furprife
*
not converted in
fvllogiftic
no one who confiders that the negative proportion is the fame fenfe as the affirmative, that the negative For the rule of negative formulae are not reducible to one.
Appendix.
f
331
:
m ui of ?i ys are not of n"xs. confequence of a form univerfally true, (7/ As to the two conclufions, they are but the converfe of each other. * It will not be difficult to interpret thefe, by as every or n The ufual Ariftotclic forms will be feen to n u indefinite fome, &c. be derived from them. Thus the mood Cefare, and the corresponding indirect mood (or, if you will, the mood of the fourth figure, call it at another time Celantes or Cadere at will, but let it be Celantcs for the
//")
converfion changes the things fpoken of, and is as follows m m of ?i wys are not of are not of n ys; converts ( -|- n
l
//")
of
u
ti
n
ji
xs
xs.
The
/?"
nonce),
come
forth from the third formula.
# IV n
*
*
1IX
gives
"
no y
is is
z
y
# IV
:
every
is
# v indefinite n m indefinite.
Hence
and
I
in Cefare,
in
no x Celantes, no z
it
is
z from x from
our firft, our fecond conclufion, and
fo
of
all
the others.
owe
to Sir
William Hamilton and Mr.
DC Morgan
to fay that
*
*
* *
without their improvements I could not have advanced one ftep. Mr. De Morgan has even attempted a like reduction to general formulae, and has failed, chiefly through a mifapprehenfion of Sir William Hamilton s prinHe has introduced a fuperfluous quantity, ciple of quantified predicate. one logically ufelefs, or worfe than ufelefs, as the refult has mown. Had it not- been for this circumThis confufion explains his errors. fiance, I mould not have had the honour of prefenting thefe formula:
to logicians.
Permit
me
to
add what
think alfo of fome value.
am
not of thofe
think with Sir William Hamilton that the fyllogifm always prothat it ceeds in the two counter wholes of intenfion and extenfion
*
who
mufl always be an involution or evolution in refpect of claffification. This is, no doubt, true in the moil important reafonings of fcience ; but
it is
not fcientifically accurate to afTert this univerfally. is of three kinds not Quality, which is the comprehenfive element, two, as heretofore affirmed ; for fmce Kant, the divifion of affirmatives
into analytic and fynthetic, or (as Sir William Hamilton wifhes) explicative and ampliative, has been eftablifhed. James Bernouilli has puzzled himfelf to reduce thefe two to the fame form, but without fuccefs ;
an immediate relation of part to whole, and only a remote one of part to part, while this contains an immediate relation of whole. Thefe, as diflindt kinds of part to part, and remote of part to As the words ampliative elided in language. quality, are erroneoufly and reftfifiive are generally oppofed in logic, perhaps we might replace the old divifion of proportions, according to quality, into affirmative and by one into Explicative, Ampliative y and Reftrittive. negative
for that contains
Where, then, both premifes are ampliative, the fyllogifm proceeds is neither involution nor evolution purely by force of extenfion. There but a paffage or tranfition from one neither induction nor deduction mark to another, or from clafs to clafs. Of this kind are all fingular,
*or, as
Ramus
calls
them, proper fyllogifms.
Let us
call
this
new
33 2
clafs
Appendix.
of fyllogifms tradudtive, to contrail
it
with the inductive and de-
dudtive.
The
eafily appear.
ufe of thefe in philofophy as independent modes of inference will we collect the fcattered fragments of our know-
When
ledge into unity of fcience, we ufe induction and induftive fyllogifm y when we apply the principles of fcience to fpecial events of things, we ufe deduction and deduftive fyllogifm; but when, abandoning one fcheme
of clarification,
traduftion
(
we
transfer our
and traduttive
has been predicated by

ferred to
fyllogifm. hiftorians of
knowledge direttly to another, we ufe Thus, in political fcience, what
men
claffed geographically
is
tranf-
men
duction.
clailed according to conftitutions of government by traThis lafl efcapes Sir William Hamilton s rule, and never
concludes through a comprehenfive containing and contained. I mail not add, at prefent, any attempt to prove a priori the exclufive
validity of fyllogiftic inference. I admit that I ought not, without good ground, to diffent from a cured opinion of Sir William Hamilton in any part of philofophy,
in logic ; but I vicus Vives faid in
maflill
more
obey the force of demonilration, and, refpect to Ariflotle, Verecunde diffentio.

f
as
Ludo-
Yours, &c.
JAMES BROUN.
Temple, June 9, 1847.
My
to the editor
reply to this confifled in forwarding, on the fame Ipth of June, of the Athenaeum, a fummary of the refults of chapter VIII,
:
This fummary appeared on the 26th I do not infert it, becaufe the chapter in queftion is a better anfwer ; and though the pub lication faved my rights, the republication is unnecefTary. Mr. Broun s
then written.
three forms are the
firft
(without the contranominal), the ninth, and the

:
Mr. Broun was wrong in deducing from the forms that the principle of the middle term was erroneous for in thefe very forms the two quantifications exceed the whole being
eleventh, of page
161.
two
latter
the whole (in premife one) plus fome (in the other). As to the fuperfluous quantity, it only becomes fuperfluous when fuch quantifications are introduced as diftinguifh fpurious from admiffible proportions fee that the forms are correct. pages 145, 146, in which it is
:
mown
Nothing but
clofe
the accordance of the
comparifon, and that after practice, would detect two fymbolic modes of expreilion in pages 145
and 161. I am not therefore furprifed that Mr. Broun mould, having obtained cafes of that in page 161, pronounce that in page 145 erro neous.
In the anfwer which I made, I promifed to ftate diftinctly how much of the chapter was written before Mr. Broun s letter appeared. This I now do. With the exception of pages 145, 146, the matter of which is moftly from my Cambridge Memoir, the whole of it was then written, excepting fuch verbal alterations and occafional introduction of fentences, as take place at the prefs, or at the lafl reading of the manufcript. I had
Appendix.
333
thought that there would be no neceflity to introduce thofe pages, ex cept (lightly, and in anfvver to certain objections which feemed likely to The examination which the affertion that they are erroneous occur. made me give my previous forms, pointed out the defirablenefs of intro ducing them as they now Hand.
September 17, 1847. I had finifhed the preceding appendix, when I became aware of the exiftence of the Commentationes PhilofophiczE Seleftiores of Godfrey Ploucquet, of Tubingen, Utrecht, 1781, quarto. The laft title (p. 561) is De Arte Charadleriftica. Subjicitur Methodus
<
calculandi in logicis, ab auftore inventa. I find 1763. by a catalogue* that this methodus calculandi had been previoufly publifhed in 1773, at Tubingen, at the end of a work entitled Principia de Subftantiis et Phaenomenis : alfo that the * Methodus demonftrandi direcle omnes fyllogifmorum fpecies of the fame author (which is probably the thing I am going to defcribe) was publifhed at Tubingen in 1763. From the
title
of a work which, I
am
informed,
exifts,
namely,
given pure fpeculation on mental fubjecls. The calculus (a term which Ploucquet ufes in as wide a fenfe as I do when I call the contents of Chapter V. a part of the calculus of infe rence) confifts in the invention of a fimple notation, and the mechanical fubftitution, in one premife, of an identical equivalent to the middle term therein contained, taken from the other premife (this laft being one in which the middle term is univerfal). There is neither ufe of contraries, nor numerical definition but there is every variety of quantity of the predicate which can be produced by fimple converfion of the ordinary forms. term ufed univerfally is denoted by the capital letter ; par
:
Schriften welche von logifchen Calcul des Prof. Ploucquet betreffen Tubingen, 1773, one would fuppofe that this fyflem had obtained great I give a fliort account of it local currency. premifing that Ploucquet to appears to have been a well informed mathematician, much
:
Sammlung der
ticularly,
by the fmall
<
letter
affirmation
is
by juxtapofition
is
X>
:
interpofmg
x>
Thus X)Y
is
Xy
X.Y
Y XY
;
negation, by
is
Y.
The
xy
X:Y
is
following
complete fpecimen
Sint prsemiffae
Pm
s
>
Calculo
s mP quoddam s non eft P Omnis ducatus eft aureus Quaedam moneta non eft aurea.
>
Da
m>
A
eft
Calc.
mj>
aD.
feu
mj>
D, quasdam moneta non
ducatus.
As Ploucquet feems
to concrete inftances,
by aid of
to think that this a6lual application of the calculus their initial letters, is a material part of
The
fecond edition of
a catalogue
Mr. Blakey s * Eflay on Logic recently publi&ed, contains of upwards of a thoufand works on logic, briefly titled.
334
Appendix.
The
rationale of the fyftem each other, which I under-
his fyftem, I have inferred the cafe entire. confifts in that fubftitution of identicals for
William Hamilton (with perfect truth) to employ in every in the above Some of the Ss are not any Ms, are rot thofe Ms which make up all the Ps, are not therefore any Ps. This demand for identical fubftitutes requires both kinds of quantity for every predicate, and Ploucquet ufes them accordingly, as far as wanted to eilabliih the Ariftotelian Sir W. Hamilton goes further, fyllogifms. and invents fyllogifms for all the kinds of quantity. Thus Ploucquet ufes mP or * fome Ms are all the Ps and P or all Ps are not fome of the Ms ; but not or p m. At the fame time with the knowledge of Ploucquet I obtained that of the work of a follower and extender, M. W. Drobitfch, author of Neue Darftellung der Logik Nebft einen logifch-mathematifchen Anhange, Leipzig, 1836, oftavo. As far as the fymbolic part is con
ftand
cafe.
Sir
Thus we have
>
MP
>
Mr. Drobitfch begins by a convention which would reconcile any one to the found, not merely of Barbara and Celarent, but even of Baroko and Frejtfon. He makes S and P the fubjeft and predicate of the conclulion and the middle term ; and puts the Ariftotelian vowel between them thus S)P is SAP, and P:S is POS. Hence his premifes may be map fam or mop fam ; and one of his fyllogifms is mepIn the algebraical part, he ufes large and fmall letters for the famfep. univerfal and particular, or for the whole and part extent of a term. He alfo introduces the figns and to fignify identity and (what I This ufe of the mathematical figns involves an excall) fubidentity. tenfion, which is made by all thofe who fignify the identity of X and Y by X=Y. The mathematician thinks of extent as quantity only the logician includes both quantity and pofition. Thus when the for mer fays that five feet are lefs than {even feet, he means any five feet, be they part of the feven feet or not the latter, when he fays that X is a name of lefs extent than Y, means not only that the former can be
cerned,
<J
contained in the
latter,
but that
it is.
To make
it
negative propofitions,
as I have done) an extent greater than the utmoft extent of all the names, otherwife inde finite. And here he falls into fome confulion and being the
Mr. Drobitfch
takes a limited univerfe (call
U,
muft be of greater extent than X+Y: now if we had names, he fays need only be of greater extent than Y. If from the genus Y X)Y, be taken all the fpecies X, the remainder is denoted by Y X. Ac X. cordingly, the contrary of X is Mr. Drobitfch then lays down eight forms of predication, of which, And I cannot find out that however, he only ufes the ordinary ones.
the limited univerfe, or the contrary, has any ufe except to furnifh means The eight forms are ; firft, y, or my X)Y ; fecondly, XzrY, or ; thirdly, x=y, or XY; fourthly, u=Y, or all contained in is <U Y, which tells us that Y)X; fifthly,
of notation.
X~
X)Y+Y)X
X
Y
what
is
left
X=z
trary
<JZ
<JU
of the univerfe after Y is removed, or is X.Y ; fixthly, Y, a very roundabout way of faying that X is /^con
or
of Y,
X.Y-j-xy;
feventhly,
xzzU
or
X:Y
eighthly,
x=X
.
of X, or Y)X+ X:Y. us mixture of two fyflems, both in principle and nota The forms are A,, A O| (and O ), Ej, I , D, D (and tion. ), and C 4 Allb C is virtually given but E , l C , do not appear. The remain and ordinary rules under which the mathematicians ufe and thus there is an elegant mode or true in this logical ufe of them
Y, which
tells
Appendix. that Y is a fubidentical

1 ! ,
f f 1
335
This
is
in faft a
<!,
exhibiting the inference in fyllogifms.
havePirm,
For initance, in Cameftres we .-. 
But it has happened very often ferve all purpofes. that a fyilem of notation, already exhibited, has been extended by a better one, and mended only, inilead of being reconilrudled. Ploucquet had
troducing this
laft)
the latter fymbol a for denial ufed the large and fmall letters, and Mr. Drobitfch were intended. if mathematical one, analogy ilrange mould reprefent denial, and has been has ingenioufly contrived that Tak led to what might have ufefully amended all he had to begin with. for the ex ing little x to reprefent a part of the extent of X, &c. and tent of the univerfe, the following notation might have been adopted fhould have and Firft when both include their limit,
:
>
<^
<
>
We
or or
A! O,
E,
I4
X<Y
xX
Xx
A O
E
I"
Y<X
1
or
X>Y
yX
X>U
X Y
U U
U
X>y
Y<X
orY>x
,
<
is
inexpreffible.
To
exprefs I
we
Next, when
X. muft invent a fymbol for a part of do not include their limits, we have and
>
D D D
<Y
or
Y>
X=Y
X>Y
or
or
Y=X
Y<X
C,
XU
Y orU Y or U Y or U
Y>X
Y=X
Y<X
inexpreffible.
I am inclined to think that the reprefcntation of quantity and location both under one fymbol is objectionable, if that fymbol be one already I would on no account appropriated in mathematics to quantity only. as A is lefs than (becaufe a part of) B. accuftom myfelf to read Mr. Drobitfch is much more complete than his predeceflbrs in his enu
<!B
meration of the various kinds of forites. While this flieet was paffing through the prefs, Qttober 29, 1 847. in which the views of I became acquainted with fyllabus of logic, Kant are generally adopted, and the laws of fyllogifm fymbolically ex"
prefled.
Cambridge, 1839, 8vo. The of a peculiar character the algebraic in a fenfe which preferves the rules of fign, while the figns are adopted the fyllogifm, or elfe the notions of par fymbols reprefent the terms of ticular and univerfal. Thus, if p Hand for particular, u for univerfal, and m for one of the terms of a fyllogifm, mi=.u or m implies
By Thomas
Solly,
Efq."
here given fymbolical expreffion
is
uQ
336
that
Appendix.
a univerfal term, and that either is univerfal, or n
m is
(mu}(np)o
is
implies the alternative
particular.
By means of
fuch alter
figures
native relations, the conditions of validity of the various

expreffed.
are
Solly contends for fix forms in each figure, by intro ducing all forms which have weakened conclufions, and proves a priori, from his equations, that fix and no more are poflible in each figure. If
I
fyllogifms, which might be deduced, either from the fixteen particulars.
Mr.
had admitted weakened forms, there would have been fixteen more from the eight univerfals, or
THE END.
C.
WHITTINGHAM, CHISWICK.
28,
Upper Gower
November
1,
Street,
1847.
PRINTED FOR TAYLOR & WALTON.

D)
(o:
Liebig- Gregory.
Eighth Edition.
in the
II.
Turner
Chemistry.
1
Edited by JUSTUS LIEBIG, M.D., Professor of Chemistry University of Giessen, and WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D., Professor of
Complete in
Parts.
Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh.

105.
volume, 8vo.
(Just published.)
The Work may
also be
had in Two
PART
I.
II.
INORGANIC CHEMISTRY. 15s. cloth. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. Us. cloth.
Guesses at Truth.
By Two BROTHERS.
First Series.
Third Edition.
Fcap. 8vo.
6s. cloth.
Mohr Redwood.
Comprising the
Practical Pharmacy.
Arrangements, Apparatus, and Manipulations of the Pharmaceutical Shop and Laboratory. By FRANCIS MOHR, Ph.D., Assessor Pharmacise of the Royal Prussian College of Medicine, Coblentz. Edited, with numerous Additions and Alterations, adapting it for the use of English
Chemists, by THEOPHILUS
REDWOOD,
Professor of
Pharmacy
ceutical Society of Great Britain.
One volume,
to the Pharma 8vo, illustrated by several
hundred Engravings on Wood.
(In December.)
Be Morgan.
Formal Logic
By AUGUSTUS DE Or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Prohahle. MORGAN, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London 1 vol. 8vo.
(In November.)
WORKS PRINTED FOR TAYLOR AND WALTON,
Schmitz.
Niebuhr
Lectures on the Early
History of
Rome.
Translated from the German, with numerous Additions from MSS. in the exclusive possession of the Translator. By DR. L. SCHMITZ, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh. 1 volume, 8vo. 12s. cloth.
This volume embraces the period from the earliest times to the First Punic War, and with the two volumes of Lectures already published completes Niebuhr s History of Rome in the
Lecture form.
Thirlwall Hare.
Niebuhr
Translated hy BISHOP THIRLWALL and Edition of Volume I. 8vo, with Map,
History of Rome. ARCHDEACON HARE. A New

s
16s.
Sharpey Quain.
Fifth Edition.
Dr. Quain s Anatomy.
Edited by DR. SHARPEY and MR. QUAIN, Professors of Anatomy and Physiology in University College, London. Complete in 2 vols. Illustrated by several hundred Engravings on Wood. 8vo.
***
The Work may

I.,
also be
had
for a short
time in Three Parts.

[
PART
l& The
13s.
|
PART
II., 14s.
PART
III.,
s.
Publishers are authorised to state that Part III., completing the
Work,
will be
published in November.
Dictionary of Greek and

By
Roman
Antiquities.
Second Edition. Edited by DR. WILLIAM SMITH. various Writers. Revised throughout, with very numerous Additions and Alterations. One thick volume 8vo, with several hundred Engravings on Wood.
(Early in 1848.)
Linwood.
Lexicon
to JEschylus.
Containing a Critical Explanation of the more difficult Passages in the Seven Tragedies. By the REV. W. LINWOOD, A.M., M.R.A.S. Second
1 2s. 8vo. Edition, revised throughout. We have much pleasure in recommending the work to the notice of students, who will derive very great assistance from it in the study of Êschylus." Classical Museum, No. I.
"

By
Edited by DR. various Writers. IV. of Vol. III.), price 4s.
***
Roman Biography and

Part XXII. (Part
Mythology.
WILLIAM SMITH.
Volume
III. (in course of publication) will
complete the Work.
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
Latham on the English Language.

Second Edition.
Revised, with Additions.
8vo.
(In November)
Schmitz.
From
History of Rome,
the Earliest Times to the Death of Commodus, A.D. 192. By DR. L. SCHMITZ, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh, Editor of Niebuhr s Lectures. One thick volume, 12mo, 7s. Gd. or 8s. Gd. cloth, strongly bound
in leather.
The whole
** This work presents, in a popular form, the results of the investigations of the most distinguished scholars, especially those of Xiebuhr, Arnold, Goettling, llubino and Becker is based upon a careful examination of the original sources.
Robson.
Questions on Dr. Schmitz *s History

of
Rome.
By JOHN ROBSON, B.A.
12mo,
2s.
Liebig
By JUSTUS
Gregory.
Researches on the Chemistry of Food.
LIEBIG, M.D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Giessen. Edited from the Author s Manuscript, by WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh. 8vo, 5s. 6d. cloth.
The medical man will find in these researches a prospect of many and great im provements in practice, whether as regards dietetics or the action of acids, alkalies, and salts on the digestive and respiratory processes and with respect to both it is to Chemistry he must look for assistance in his efforts to advance. Lastly, the present work contains some most valuable practical applications of the chemical discoveries therein detailed, to an art which immediately concerns the whole of mankind, namely, the culinary art." Editor s Preface.
"
Maclise.
Surgeons.
"
Comparative Osteology,
by 54
Plates.
Being Morphological Studies to demonstrate the Archetype Skeleton of Vertebrated Animals. By JOSEPH MACLISE, Member of the Royal College of
Illustrated
Small
folio, 21. 12s. Gd. cloth.
Suffice it to say that the
Book ought
to be
in the hands of every scientific
anatomist."
Morning Chronicle.
Liebig Playfair and Gregory. Chemistry in its to and Applications Agriculture Physiology.
By JUSTUS
University of Giessen. PLAYFAIR, Ph.D., and 8vo, 10^. Gd. cloth.
"
LIEBIG, M.D., Ph.D., F.R.S., Professor of Chemistry in the Edited from the Manuscript of the Author," by LYON WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D. Fourth Edition, revised.
It is not too much to say, that the publication of Professor Liebig s Organic Che mistry of Agriculture constitutes an era of great importance in the history of Agricul tural Science. Its acceptance as a standard is unavoidable; for following closely in the straight path of inductive Philosophy, the conclusions u-hich are drawn from its data are incontrovertible. We can truly say, that we have never rNen from the perusal of a book with a more thorough conviction of the profound knowledge, extensive reading, and practical research of its author, and of the invincible power and importance of its reasonings and conclusions, than we have gained from the present volume." Sillhnan s Journal.
Liebig Gregory.
Animal Chemistry
r
and Pathology. By JUSTUS Or, Chemistry in its Applications to Physiology the University of Giessen. LIEBIG, M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Chemistry in Professor Edited, from the Author s Manuscript, by WILL AM GREGORY, M.D., Third Edition, almost wholly of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh. 8vo. Part I. (the first half of the work) 6s. 6d. cloth, just re-written.
published.
Under the heads of animal heat ; of the nutrition of the carnivora and herbivora ; and of the origin and use of the bile ; of the relation between the change of matter elements the consumption of oxygen ; of the origin and use of the non-nitrogenised ot the of food, and particularly of fat, and their relative value as sources of heat ; on the volume of the effects of alcohol and fermented liquor* ; of the effects produced of the true functions of the inspired air by the different articles of food ; and lastly, of the faeces, with their relation intestinal canal, and the origin, nature, and composition under all these heads, the reader will find to the food, and to the supply of oxygen that we have entered him such an amount of new and interesting matter as must satisfy most on the true path of discovery, and that the industry of modern chemists has been first edition of this the since has which elapsed profitably employed during the period work appeared." From the Editor s Advertisement.
"
Part
II.,
Christmas. It has been completing the Work, ivill be ready lefore some of which are delayed for the results of important investigations) still in progress.
De Morgan.
From
Arithmetical Books,
;
being Brief Notices the Invention of Printing to the Present Time AUGUSTUS of a large Number of Works drawn up from Actual Inspection. By DE MORGAN, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London. Royal 12mo, 6s. cloth.
in the United A sreat number of persons are employed in teaching Arithmetic of placing before many of them Kingdom, In publishing this work, I have the hope of their literature the of more materials for the prevention of inaccurate knowledge both expense and science than they have hitherto been able to command, without
"
research."
Preface.
Latham.
By R.
Is.
First Outlines of Logic applied to
Grammar and Etymology.

G. LATHAM, A.M., Fellow of King
6d.
s
College,
Cambridge.
12mo,
Latham.
By
Edition.
An
12mo,
English
6d. cloth.
Grammar
s
for the
Use
of
Schools.
R. G. LATHAM, A.M., Fellow of King
4s.
College, Cambridge.
Second
The
A
The work
is
Classical
Vols. III.
Museum
Literature. Journal of Philology and of Ancient History and

Vol. II. 12s. 6d. cloth.
8vo.
and IV., each
14s. 6d. cloth.
continued Quarterly.
is
Price of each Part,
3s. 6d.
Part XVII.
of Vol. V.) (the Third Part
just published.
Histories of Greece and Bagland,

Upon
the same Plan as DR. SCHMITZ S History of Rome.
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
atottgttttte,
^-
DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES Edited DR. WILLIAM

by
SMITH.
New
Edition.
One thick vol.
8vo. (See page 2.)
DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN BIOGRAPHY AND MYTHOLOGY.

6
Edited by WILLIAM SMITH, LL.D., Editor of the
^W
Roman
d>
Antiquities."
Medium
8vo.
Illustrated
fbrm Three "voTume?

Vol.
I.
** C0ntinued in
Qua * erl y Parts,
by
to
and
II.
*~*
(1100 pages), (1200 pages), 19 to 22

_
11.
16s. cloth lettered.
11.
16s.
ditto.
? !!
(^mmencing
Vol. III.) are also published, each 4*. ny formal eulogiuni on this new Classical Dic-nsions to the
m-tr c *i,H^f
name in our language; û desires to
NIEBUHR S HISTORY OF ROME, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH OF

CONSTANTINE.
5
vds^
18s. 6d.
14,
G!
Translated by BlSHOP
T HIRLWALL and ARCHDEACON
Vol. Ill Translated by DR. Veto. IV. and V. LECTURES.
SMITH and DR. SCHMITZ. Edited by DR. SCHMITZ.
2 vols.
11. 4s.
NIEBUHR
TI NF
Vol.
R M
I.
??? /, n
11
LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF ROME A LI TIMES
fI SCHMITZ
T0 THE DEATH OF CONSTAN!

o1 of
>
3 vote 8vo
YG*
Rector of the Hi S h Sch
Edinburgh.
)
Earliest History to the First Punic War. 1 vol. 8vo, 125. (See p 2 II. First Punic War to the Death of Constantine. 2 vols. 8vo, 11.4s.
SCHMITZ^S HISTORY OF ROME, TIMES TO THE

or 85. 6d. strongly bound in leather.
DEATH OF COMMODUS.
(See page
FROM THE EARLIEST

1
vol.
12mo
7,G.
doth,
3.)
ROBSON
TO
OF ROME.
QUESTIONS ON DR. SCHMITZ

12mo,
2s.
HISTORY
AKERMAN S
(See page
3.)
(J. Y.) or, GUIDE THE COLLECTION AND STUDY OP GREEK, ROMAN, AND ENGLISH COINS. with numerous Engravings, 11. Is. 8vo,
NUMISMATIC MANUAL;
-
A SCHOOL DICTIONARY OF ANTIQUITIES from the

abridged
"Dictionary
selected and Greek and Roman Antiquities." By ne SmaU V 1Ume TW Hundred Woodcuts.
of
KEATS (JOHN) POETICAL WORKS. a

"
fcap, Portrait from a Drawing by HILTON. Price 5s. cloth. As it is, there is not a poet living who could surpass the material of Endvmion poem, with all its faults, far more full of
In one
vol.
with
a
beauties.-V///^ PcnciWngs bytfojfjy
EXERCISES IN LOGIC;
Colleges.
designed for the Use of Students in

12mo.
Price
3*. 6d. cloth.
By
J. T.
GRAY, Ph.D.
POTTER
ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON MECHANICS,
By RICHARD POTTER, A.M., for the use of the Junior University Students. late Fellow of Queen s College, Cambridge, Professor of Natural Philosophy 8s. 6d. cloth. in University College, London. 8vo, with numerous Diagrams.
POTTEB/S
ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON
9s.
OPTICS.
;
8vo,
with numerous Diagrams.
6d. cloth.
AND YOUNG S LECTURES ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY with References and Notes,

and Edinburgh, late Fellow of by the Rev. P. KELLAND, M.A., F.R S. London &c. in the University Queen s College, Cambridge, Professor of Mathematics, II. 4s. cloth. 2 vols. 8vo, with 43 Copper Plates. of Edinburgh.
but by
seek information should know that Young is not merely a popular writer, most popular of those whose accuracy can be relied on in a vast range ot written through that range." Atlienaium. subjects, and who have actually
All
and the This volume contains all the requisite propositions carried to first approximations the Solar, construction of Reflecting and Refracting Telescopes and Microscopes, and Lantern; the Phantasmagoria Magic Oxyhydrogen-and Lucernal Microscopes; Camera Obscura Hadley s Sextant and Reflecting Circles the the Daguerreotype &c. Opticaf Square the Screw Micrometer the Goniometer,
; ; ; ; ;
THE MECHANICAL ARTS. A New Edition,
who
far the
LARDNER S STEAM ENGINE,

with an Account of
its
Invention and Progressive Improvement, and its also a Memoir of Application to Navigation and Railways ; including Watt. Seventh Edition. Illustrated by numerous Engravings on Wood, and a Portrait of Watt. 8vo. Is. &d. cloth.
Explained and Illustrated:
TWELVE PLANISPHERES,
every Night
in the
forming a Guide to the Stars for

8vo.
6s.
Year, with an Introduction.
6d. cloth.
DE MORGAN
S ELEMENTS OF ARITHMETIC. By AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, Professor of Mathematics in University College, London. Fifth
Edition, with Eleven
new Appendixes.
Royal 12mo.
5s. cloth.
DE MORGAN S ARITHMETICAL BOOKS AND AUTHORS.

Royal 12mo.
6s.
(See page 4).
DE MORGAN DE MORGAN
S
S
ELEMENTS OF ALGEBRA,
Second Edition.
preliminary to
9s. cloth.
the Differential Calculus.
Royal 12mo.
ELEMENTS OF TRIGONOMETRY AND

9s. cloth.
TRIGONOMETRICAL ANALYSIS, preliminary to the Differential Calculus.

Royal 12mo.
TABLES OF LOGARITHMS,
for
the Diffusion of Useful
COMMON AND TRIGONO

Under
the Superintendence of Foolscap 8vo. 3s. sewed. the Society
METRICAL, TO FIVE PLACES.

Knowledge.
REINER
LESSONS ON FORM;
"
or,
AN
INTRODUCTION TO
12mo, with
GEOMETRY, as given numerous Diagrams.
in a Pestalozzian School, 3s. Gd. cloth.
Cheam, Surrey.
that a It has been found in the actual use of these lessons, for a considerable period, to study the Mathematics with decided larger average number of pupils are brought Dr. Rev. manner." Mayo. success, and that all pursue them in a superior
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
REINER
LESSONS ON NUMBER,
THE THE
zian School, at
as given at a PestalozCheam, Surrey. Second Edition. Consisting of MASTER S MANUAL. 12mo. 4s. 6d. cloth. SCHOLAR S PRAXIS. 12mo. 2*. bound.
LARDNER S FIRST
RITCHIE
S
SIX
mentary and Geometrical Exercises
Treatise on Solid Geometry, and Short Essays on the Ancient Geometrical Analysis and the Theory of Transversals. Ninth Edition. 8vo. 7s boards.
;
BOOKS OF EUCLID, with a Com a
PRINCIPLES OF GEOMETRY,
and applied
to a variety of useful purposes.
trated, tion of
Young
Persons.
3s.
familiarly Illus Designed for the Instruc Second Edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo, with
150 Woodcuts.
6d. cloth.
RITCHIE
INTEGRAL CALCULUS,
useful purposes.
4s. 6d. cloth.
PRINCIPLES OF THE DIFFERENTIAL AND
familiarly Illustrated and applied to a variety of Second Edition. Revised by J. A. SPENCER, B.A., Assistant Mathematical Master in University College School. 12mo, with Diagrams.
BARLOW S TABLES OF SQUARES, CUBE and

ROOTS,
"
CUBES, SQUARE
to 10,000. Stereotype Under the Superintendence of the Society Edition, examined and corrected. for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. Royal 1 2mo. 8s. They will be found useful to the more scientific class of Engineers and Surveyors, for immediately obtaining results which are now usually got by logarithmic calculation, or the sliding rule to actuaries (in the table of reciprocals) to schoolmasters, for ob taining examples of the ordinary rules of Arithmetic to all, in fact, who are calculators by choice or necessity, though of course to some more than to others." Preface.
;
ROOTS,
RECIPROCALS, up
Ufarte
antr
Sountafe.
Common-Place Book.
THE LITERARY DIARY,

Post
4to, ruled
or Complete
12s.
throughout and half-bound.
A POCKET COMMON-PLACE BOOK.

Post 8vo, half-bound.
85. 6d.
With Locke
Index.
THE STUDENT S JOURNAL.

for receiving an
Arranged, Printed, and Ruled

s
Account of every Day

4s. 6d.
Employment
for the space of
One
s
Year.
THE PRIVATE DIARY,

Journal,"
formed on the Plan of

"
The Student
for general Use.
4s. 6d.
OUTLINE MAPS:
Three Maps,
folio,
MERCATOR
stitched in cover, Is.
;
EUROPE
single
:
BRITISH ISLES.
Maps, 4d. each.
GEOGRAPHICAL PROJECTIONS
BRITISH ISLES.
each.
MERCATOR
cover,
Is.
j
EUROPEsingle
Three Mapo,
folio, stitched in
Maps,
Id.
TEACHING MAPS
I.
ENGLAND, WALES, and Part of SCOTLAND.

Price 6d.
II.
Rivers, Mountains, &c.
Towns.
Price 6d.

GREEK.
Linwood
Allen
s s
LATIN.
Allen
s
Lexicon to J^schylus.
8vo. 12s. (See page
2).
New
Latin
Delectus
;
New Edition, revised.
New
Greek Delectus
being Sentences for Translation from Greek into English, and English into Greek; arranged in a systematic progression. By DR. RAPHAEL KUHNER. Translated and Edited from the German. Second Edition, revised. 12mo. 4#. cloth.
being Sentences for Translation from Latin into English, and English into Latin ar ranged in a systematic progression, on the Plan of the Greek Delectus. Second Edition,
revised.
12mo,
4*. cloth.
Robson
thesis,
Constructive
Latin
Exercises, for teaching the Elements of the

of Analysis and Syn with Copious Vocabularies. By J. ROBSON, B.A., Assistant Master in Uni versity College School. 12mo, 6s. 6dL
Language on a system
an analytical and synthetical praxis on the forms of the Greek language, communicating, by the way, considerable knowledge of the syntax, and information on points connected with the Greek writers?." Preface.
"
It is
Allen
Constructive Greek
Ex
Allen Allen
Etymological Analysis
Fcap. 8vo,
5*.
of Latin Verbs.
ercises, for
teaching Greek from the begin ning by writing. Second Edition, revised
and enlarged. ]2mo. 5s. cloth. pupil, on beginning Greek, needs no book besides this. He has here Grammar, Vocabulary, and Exercise Book. The
Eclogse
Ciceronianse
containing Narrations, Maxims, Descrip tions, Characters, Philosophical Pieces, and Letters. Selected from the Works of Cicero.
12mo,
2*. 6d. cloth.
Hardy
s
I.,
Anabasis
Chapters
1
of
Cyrus,
and Inter
Book
to 6. Literal
Caesar for Beginners. Latin

;
and
linear Translation of the First Chapter, and a Lexicon to the whole, 12mo. 3s. 6d. cloth.
English with the original Text at the end. 12mo, 3*. 6d. cloth.
London Greek Grammar; de

signed to exhibit, in small compass, the Elements of the Greek Language. Edited by a GRADUATE of the University of Oxford. Fifth Edition. 12mo. 3s. 6d. cloth.
Hall
Principal
Roots of the
;
Latin Language, simplified by a display of their incorporation into the English Tongue with copious Notes. Fifth Edition. 12mo,
4s. 6d. cloth.
Plato
the Apology of Socrates,
the Crito, and Part of the Phaedo; with Notes (translated into English) from STALLBAUM and SCHLEIERMACHER S Introductions. Edited by DR. WM. SMITH. 12mo. 4s. 6d. cl.
Hodgson
(Provost of
;
Eton)
or a Brief Sketch of the Fables of the Ancients, pre pared to be rendered into Latin Verse.
Mythology for Versification
Fourth Edition.
ditto.
12mo,
3*. cloth.
Key
to
Life
of Socrates.
By DR.
G.
8vo, 7*. cloth.
WIGGERS.
with Notes.
Translated from the German, 12mo. 3s. 6d.
Hodgson
12mo,
(Provost
Key
of
Eton)
Royal
CONTENTS
Life of Socrates, by Wiggers Life of Socrates, by Diogenes Laertius Schleiermacher on the Worth of Socrates
:
Select Portions of Sacred History, conveyed in sense for Latin Verses. Third Edition.
3$. 6d. cloth.
to ditto.
as a Philosopher.
8vo, 10*. 6d. cloth.
Tayler
(Rev.
Charles)
Intro-
duction to the Art of Composing Greek Iambics, in Imitation of the Greek Trage dians, designed for the Use of Schools. 12mo. 2s. 6d.
Hodgson
(Provost
;
of
Eton)
Extracts from the Pro phetical and other Scriptures of the Old Testament adapted to Latin Versification in the principal Metres of Horace. 12mo,
Sacred Lyrics
;
or,
Greek Authors, selected

use of
Schools
;
for the
6*. 6d. cloth.
containing portions of Lucian s Dialogues, Anacreon, Homer s s Iliad, Xenophon Memorabilia, and Hero
dotus.
Csesar
Helvetic War.
In Latin
original
12mo, s
3s. 6d. cloth.
and English, Interlinear, with the Text at the end. 12mo, 2*. cloth.
Taylor
What
1
is
the Power of
3s.
Latin Authors, selected for the

use of Schools; containing portions of Phsedrus, Ovid s Metamorphoses, Virgil s Êneid, Csesar, and Tacitus. 12mo, 3*. 6d.
cloth.
*the Greek Article
8vo,
6d.
Four Gospels in Greek,

use of Schools.
for the
Fcap. 8vo,
3s. 6d. cloth.
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.

in
London Latin Grammar;

Twelfth Edition.
ITALIAN.
Panizzi
s
cluding the Eton Syntax and Prosody in English, accompanied with Notes. Edited by a GRADUATE of the University of Oxford.
Extracts from Italian

One thick volume, 12mo.
Prose Writers.
10*. 6d. boards.
12mo,
2s. fid. cloth.
New Latin Reading Book

gression. 6d. cloth.
con
Panizzi
Elementary
12mo.
3*.
Italian
Grammar.
bound.
sisting of short Sentences, easy Narrations, and Descriptions, selected from Caesar s Gallic War ; arranged in systematic pro
FRENCH.
Complete Course of the French
Language.
With a
Dictionary.
12mo.
3*.
"The plan of this work differs in one important point from other works of a similar kind. The sentences have been selected exclusively from Caesar s Commentary on the Gallic War, instead of being taken from different authors, as has There is an obvious usually been the case. advantage in this plan ; the same words are con tinually repeated by the same author in a simple narrative ; and the pupil thus becomes accus tomed to his style, and finds the work of transla tion grow easier every day, which cannot be the case when the extracts are taken from many dif ferent authors, whose style must of course vary Preface. exceedingly."
By
P. F.
MERLKT, Professor
of
French in University College, London. Merlet s French Grammar, divided into Three Parts the Pronuncia the and the tion, Accidence, Syntax. New
;
Edition.
12mo.
5*. 6d.
bound.
Merlet
Key
12mo.
to
3*. 6d.
the
bound.
French
or,
Grammar.
Merlet
Le Traducteur;
of
His
Tacitus.
Germania,
Agricola,
s
Dramatic, and Miscellaneous Selections from the best French Writers; accompanied by Explanatory Notes ; a
torical,
selection
and First Book of the Annals. With Notes translated into English, from Ruperti,
Passow, Walch, and Botticher on the style of Tacitus. 12mo.
12mo.
5*. 6d.
Idioms, bound.
&c.
New
Edition.
remarks
Merlet
5s. cloth.
Virgil
Îneid.
12mo.
The
First Six
Books, with
line for line,
an interpaged translation, and numerous Notes. Second

6*. fid.
s Petit Tableau Litteraire de la France ; containing an Essay on French Literature, with Specimens of the best Authors, from the earliest period to the present time ; a sequel to Le Traducteur." 12mo. 6*. bound.
"
Edition.
Merlet
Manilia.
ties;
Dictionary of Difficul
Cicero.
Pro
1*.
Lege
12mo, sewed,
ENGLISH.
Latham
Latham Latham
"
to the French Grammar. Second Edition. 12mo. 4*. bound. Con an taining explanation of the peculiarities of the French Language Complete List of Adjectives, showing why they are placed before or after the Substantive Comprehensive List of Idioms, and Proverbs now
Appendix
English
Language.
1
Second Edition revised. page 3.)
vol. 8vo.
(See
in use List of Synonyms Mercantile Expressions, Phrases, and Letters, &c. &c.
First Outlines of
Lo
Hurwitz
s
HEBREW.
Grammar
8vo.
gic, applied to Grammar 12mo, 1*. 6d. cloth.
and Etymology.
of the
:
He
Grammar. For the Use

Edition.
the
Elementary English
of Schools.
Second
"
Or in Two Parts, sold separately ELEMENTS. 8vo. Cloth, 4*. fid. ETYMOLOGY and SYN
13*. cloth.
brew Language.
12mo.
4*. 6d. cloth.
TAX.
8vo.
Cloth,
9s.
His comparison of the old Saxon forms with
modern English, his classification of verbs under the heads of weak and strong forms, and
his
Mr. Hurtwitz s Grammar is the best ele mentary work of its kind extant in the English lan Journal of Education, No. 9. guage."
remarks on the derivation and construction of English words, afford evidence of laborious inves tigation and research, and are a valuable contribu tion towards reducing our language within its proper limits." Classical Museum.
Greenfield
Book
of Genesis in
Green
1*.
s Questions on the above, with an Index of Reference. 12mo. cloth,

6d.
English Hebrew, accompanied by an Inter linear Translation, substantially the same as the authorised English version Philo logical Notes, and a Grammatical Introduc
;
Fourth Edition. 8vo. 8*. cloth. With the original Text in Hebrew characters at
tion.
the end.
8vo.
10*. 6d. cloth.
1(1
INTERLINEAR TRANSLATIONS.
LOCKE
SYSTEM
CLASSICAL
INSTRUCTION,
Restoring the Method of Teaching formerly practised in all Public Schools. The Series consists of the following Interlinear Translations ; with the Original Text, in which the quantity of the doubtful Vowels is denoted ; Critical and Explanatory Notes, &c.
***
By means of these Works, that excellent System of Tuition is effectually restored which was established by Dean Colet, Erasmus, and Lilly, at the foundation of St. Paul s School, and was then enjoined by authority of the State, to be adopted in all other Public Semi naries of Learning throughout the kingdom. Each volume 2s. 6d.
Latin.
Greek.
1. I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
PHÊDRUS S FABLES OF OVID S METAMORPHOSES. Book VIRGIL S ^NEID. Book I. PARSING LESSONS TO VIRGIL.
LUCIAN
2.
3.
THE HOMER S
DIALOGUES. Selections. ODES OF ANACREON.

S
ILIAD.
Book
I.
4.
5.
I.
5.
6.
CAESAR S INVASION OF BRITAIN. TACITUS S LIFE OF AGRICOLA. Part

Italian.
PARSING LESSONS TO HOMER. XENOPHON S MEMORABILIA. Book
I.
6.
HERODOTUS
HISTORIES.
French.
Selections.
STORIES FROM ITALIAN WRITERS
AL-
SlSMONDI
THE BATTLES OF CRESSY AND

POICTIERS.
FIERI, BARETTI, CASTIGLIONE, &c.
German.
STORIES FROM
GERMAN WRITERS.
12mo.
,
AN
ESSAY, EXPLANATORY OF THE SYSTEM.

Also, to accompany the Latin
Qs. 6d.
and Greek
Series.
2s.
,
THE LONDON LATIN GRAMMAR. THE LONDON GREEK GRAMMAR.
12mo
12mo.
6d. 6d.
3s.
SINGING.
The Singing Master.

Edition,
revised
Fourth.
8vo.
Children, arranged to Popular Airs, and
and
corrected.
105. 6d. cloth.
No.
No.
I.
FIRST LESSONS IN SINGING
AND
II.
THE NOTATION OF MUSIC. Price 2*. RUDIMENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF HARMONY, OR THOROUGH
BASS.
Price
1*.
Seventy Psalms and Hymns, with their appropriate Tunes. 8vo. 5s. 6d. cloth. The Vocal Exercises, Moral Songs and Hymns, with the Music, may also be had, printed on 87 Cards. Price 2d. each Card, or
Twenty-five for
3$.
6d.
The Words without the Music may be had
in
No,
III.
THE FIRST CLASS TUNE-BOOK.
Thirty Simple and Pleasing Airs, ar ranged, with Suitable Words, for Young Children. Price Is. 6d. No. IV. THE SECOND CLASS TUNEBOOK, Price 25. Gd. TUNE-BOOK. Price No. V. THE
Three Small Books. Moral Songs from the First Class TuneBook, Id. Second Class TuneBook, Id. from the Hymns Hymn Tune-Book, l$d.
HYMN
2*. 6d.
Helen
S. Harmony
HerscheLTs Fireside
;
School Music; or Songs and

Hymns from
prising
Singing.
or Domestic Recreation in Part Selection of favourite old
com. Singing Master Seventy-six Moral Songs for

the
;
Glees, Rounds, and Canons; arranged to words suitable for Families and Schools. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. (oblong) 2s. Gd.
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
11
DRAWING.
Lineal Drawing Copies for the
Trachsell
s
Drawing
Models,
Earliest Instruction. Comprising 200 Sub jects on 24 sheets, mounted on 12 pieces of thick pasteboard. By the Author of
"
consisting of Rectilinear Figures, Polygonal and Mixtilinear Models, Models chiefly for
Drawing
for
Young
Children."
In a Port
Shading, and Models for application and further practice. Price of the complete set
101.
folio, 5*. 6d.
Any
Figure
may
be
purchased
Drawing Copies
Instruction.
for
Elementary
"
separately.
the Author of Drawing 2 Sets, each consist on thick mounted of 12 paste Subjects, ing board. 3s. 6d. each Set, in a Portfolio.
By
The whole
for
Young
Children."
the houses,
plaster.
Collection, with the exception of is painted white, to resemble
Deacon
tive
Elements of Perspec
complete Collection on a larger scale, such as that used in the Mechanics Institu
tion, Liverpool, Ibl.
Drawing, or the Science of Deline ating Real Objects. Being a Manual of Directions for using a Set of Models, com posing a variety of Picturesque Forms.
for the Practice of Beginners. Illustrated with Eight Plates, 8vo. 4*.
***
detailed Prospectus
may
be
had on
application.
Suitable
Drawing Materials.
A
Quarto Copy Book of 24 leaves,
.
.
common
Drawing
Forms
Models, consisting of
paper, 6d. Ditto .
ditto
for constructing various Buildings,
Gateways, Castles, Bridges, &c. The Build ings will be found sufficiently large to be drawn from by a numerous Class at the same time. In a Box, with a small Trea Price tise on Drawing and Perspective. 21. 10*. Length of the Box, 18i inches ; inches inches. 13 Bi breadth, ; height,
paper of superior quality, is. 3d. Pencils with very thick lead, B.B.B. 2s. per half dozen. ditto Ditto F. at
....
6d. ditto.
1*.
Drawing Chalk, 9d. per dozen
sticks, in
a Box
Port-crayons for holding the Chalk, 4d. each
EDUCATIONAL MODELS
FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS, MECHANICS INSTITUTIONS, AND FOR PRIVATE INSTRUCTION.
1
Set of Apparatus for

statics,
Hydro
;
Sets
of
Mechanical
Powers;
Hydraulics, and Pneumatics with a Pamphlet containing full Descriptions and Directions for Performing many Ex periments. Price 61. 6*. in a box.
Apparatus for Cohesion, Capil

with Descriptions and Diagrams. 21*. in a box.
lary Attraction, Electric and Magnetic Attraction, Impenetrablility and Inertia ;
1.
Price
2.
containing the Lever Wheel and Axle Series of Pulleys The Inclined PlaneWedge Screw; with Examples of the Parallelogram of Forces Centre of Gravity Friction Collision of Elastic Bodiess. d. Compound Lever. For large Lecture- rooms (size of the frame height 3 feet 1 inch; width, 3 feet) For Schools and smaller Lecturerooms (height of the frame, 2
880
Machine for
In a box,
10s.
Illustrating
Cen
3.
feet 6 inches;
width 2
feet 3
inches)
550
trifugal Motion; including a representa tion of the Governor of a Steam Engine.
Att wood
ing
Machine
of
for
Explain
:
with Falling Bodies Apparatus attached for Illustrating the of of Attthe Price Pendulum. Theory
the
Laws
4.
omitting the Pa rallelogram of Forces and Col lision of Elastic Bodies (height of the frame, 2 feet 1 inch ; . . width, 1 foot 111 inches) Commoner Set (height of the frame, 2 feet ; width, 19 inches)
Smaller
set,
2 12
1
6 3
wood s Machine, with a

21. 2g.
;
"
Companion,"
The Bent Lever.
Convertible
additional Apparatus, for the

II. Is.
Pen
dulum,
into a Bent Lever or Toggle Joint Press. With weights, and a description. Price 10*.
12
EDUCATIONAL MODELS
Apparatus for Magnetism. Price
18*. in
continued;
Geometrical Solids.
; . ;
The Five
;
a box.
Train
weights.
of
mounted on a mahogany
Price 21*. in a box.
Spur
Wheels,
stand,
with
A Double
Inclined Plane, with
an Application of the Composition and

Resolution of Forces. In a box, 10*.
A Portable Hydrostatic Bellows;

with Description and Diagram, including a weight. Price 21*. in a box.
1. Tetrahedron; 2. Octa Regular Solids hedron 3 Icosahedron Hexahe 4. dron 5. 6Pentagonal Dodecahedron Rhomboidal Dodecahedron 7. Bipyramidal Dodecahedron 8. Trapezohedron. PYRAMIDS. 9. Triangular; 10. Quadri 11. Hexagonal; 12. Octagonal. lateral; PRISMS. 13. Triangular; 14. Quadri lateral; 15. Hexagonal; 16. Octagonal. 17. Sphere; 18. Cylinder; 19. Cone. The Set in a box, 9*.
;
; ;
Another
Set,
containing
Price 18*.
the
6d.
A
A
Sectional
Model of the Steam

|
Conic Sections.
the motions of the several parts, its internal structure, and the high and low pressure principles, can be easily explained. Price 21. 2s. in a box.
Engine; by which
A Larger
An
Set. Price II.

for
Us.
Instrument
ton s Goniometer. a box.
Teaching
21.
Pyrometer, for Showing the

Expansion of Metals.
Price 15*.
Geometry; convertible into a Theodolite, Spirit Level, Hadley s Sextant, and WollasPrice
12*.
6d. in
Diagrams in Wood, to
Dr. Lardner s Euclid. metry, Book I. Price 7*. 6d.
trate
Illus
Geo
Pair of Large Dividers, for

making
Price 4*.
Solid
Diagrams
on
a black board.
MINASrS MECHANICAL DIAGRAMS. For
the Use of Lecturers, and Schools. Complete in Five Numbers, each containing Three Sheets of Diagrams, prices*, each Number, coloured, illustrating the following subjects: 1 & 2. Composition of Forces 3. Equilibrium. 4 & 5. Levers. Steelyard, Brady Ba and Danish lance, Balance 7. Wheel and Axle. 8. Inclined plane. 9, 10, 11, Pulleys. 12. Hunter s Screw. 13 & 14. Toothed Wheels. 15. Combination of the Mechanical Powers.
f>.
The Diagrams are printed on
This size will be found suited for large lecture rooms.
large sheets of paper, measuring 2 feet 11 inches
by
2 feet.
CHEMISTRY.
TURNER S ELEMENTS OF CHEMISTRY.

Also, in
Edited by JUSTUS LIEBIG, M.D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Giessen, and WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh. 1 vol. Bvo. 11. ] Os. (See page ] .)
Eighth Edition.
Two
Parts.
PART
I.
II.
INORGANIC CHEMISTRY. 15*. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. 15s.

for the use of
GREGORY
4
Students. By WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D., Professor of Chemistry in the Uni versity of Edinburgh. Complete in 1 vol. foolscap 8vo, 1 2s. cloth. Part I.
OUTLINES OF CHEMISTRY,
5s. cloth.
(INORGANIC CHEMISTRY),
Part II.
(ORGANIC CHEMISTRY),
7s. cloth.
This is beyond comparison the best introduction to Chemistry which has yet appeared. The directions for preparing substances are usually confined to the best method, so that brevity and selectness are combined. The size and price of this little work, as well as its intrinsic merits, commend it to every student of Chemistry." Lancet.
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
13
WILL
ANALYSIS FOLLOWED IN THE GIESSEN LABORATORY. By

HENRY WILL, Ph.D.,
of Giessen.
OUTLINES OF THE COURSE OF QUALITATIVE

With a
linen, 7s.
I
Preface, by
Professor Extraordinary of Chemistry in the University BARON LIEBIG, Bvo, 6*. ; or with the Tables
have followed in
LIEBIG.
mounted on
"
The present work contains an accurate description of the course

with great advantage, for twenty-five
years."
my laboratory,
BARON
PARNELL S ELEMENTS OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS,

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE. By EDWARD ANDREW
Author of
ECONOMY."
"APPLIED
PARNELL, MANUFACTURES, AND DOMESTIC Second Edition, revised throughout, and enlarged by the addition
CHEMISTRY;
IN ARTS,
of 200 pages 8vo, 14s. cloth.
PARNELL
APPLIED CHEMISTRY; IN MANUFAC

AND DOMESTIC ECONOMY.
Illustrations.
Vol. /., 13s. cloth lettered) contains:
TURES, ARTS,
Engravings and
With numerous Wood
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS GAS ILLUMINATION DYEING AND CALICO PRINTING.
PRESERVATION OF
WOOD
Vol.11., 135., doth lettered, contains:
GLASS STARCH TANNING CAOUTCHOUC BORAX AND THE BORACIC LAGOONS SOAP SULPHUR AND SULPHURIC ACID, AND SODA.
PETZHOLDT
5s. cloth.
LECTURES TO FARMERS ON AGRICUL

People
s Edition.
1 vol.
TURAL CHEMISTRY.
small 8vo.,
4s.
6d. sewed
"The author does not overload his subject with needless details, which is the vice of some such books, but he confines the reader to those points only which he ought to be well acquainted with, and these he explains in a clear and simple way. Gardener s
Chronicle.
LIEBIG
LIEBIG
ITS
TURE.
S
SERIES.
RELATIONS TO COMMERCE, PHYSIOLOGY, AND AGRICUL

Third Edition.
Foolscap 8vo,
4s.
FAMILIAR LETTERS ON CHEMISTRY, AND

6d.
SECOND THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE SCIENCE. Foolscap 8vo, 5s.
The plan of the Letters is as simple and intelligible as their style. The author sets out with a general consideration of Chemistry and of the rank to which it is entitled among the other sciences treats shortly of chemical affinity and chemical equivalents, illustrating the symbols and formulae by which these affinities are expressed explains the atomic theory considers the relation of heat, light, electricity, and gravity to chemical force, and shows wherein these forces differ from what has been called the vital principle and lastly discusses the transformations fermentation, putrefaction, and decay which take place in organic bodies when removed from the influence of Chambers Journal. Notice of Second Series. vitality."
"
FAMILIAR LETTERS ON CHEMISTRY,

;
LIEBIG
S ANIMAL CHEMISTRY; OR, CHEMISTRY IN ITS APPLICATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. Third
Part
I., 6s.
Edition, almost wholly re-written.
6d. cloth.
(See page 4.)
LIEBIG
S CHEMISTRY IN ITS APPLICATIONS TO AGRI CULTURE AND PHYSIOLOGY. Fourth Edition, revised. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
cloth.
(See page
3.)
PORTRAIT OF PROFESSOR LIEBIG.
7s. 6d.
14
CHEMISTRY
continued.
PLATTNER ON THE USE OF THE BLOWPIPE IN THE

by DR. J. S. MUSPRATT. With a Preface by PROFESSOR LIEBIG. by numerous Wood Engravings. 1 vol. 8vo, 10s. 6d.
EXAMINATION OF MINERALS, ORES, FURNACE PRODUCTS AND OTHER METALLIC COMBINATIONS. Translated, with Notes^
Illustrated
FKESENIUS AND WILL

LIMETRY,
MANGANESE.
"
NEW METHODS
;
OF ALKA
AND OF DETERMINING THE COMMERCIAL VALUE OF AdDS, AND

12mo,
4s. cloth.
This little work will prove of the highest importance to Calico Printers, Bleachers, Dyers, Manufacturers of Soap, Paper, and Prussiate of Potash also to Chemists, and
to dealers in Alkalies, Acids,
&c."
INSTRUCTIONS FOE MAKING UNFERMENTED BREAD;

CIAN.
with Observations on its Properties, Medicinal and Economic. Twelfth Edition, containing the New Formulae. 8vo, 3d.
By
;
a PHYSI
Postage
or,
free, 5d.
social to the
11
^The author, by directing attention to a subject of the highest importance in a and economical, as well as a medical point of view, has rendered a great service public." Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal.
We recommend this Pamphlet to the
serious attention of the
public."
Times.
SURGICAL ANATOMY.
MORTON S SURGICAL ANATOMY OF THE PRINCIPAL

REGIONS.
Royal 8vo.
Plates and Woodcuts.
PERINEUM. Four Plates and Three Woodcuts. 65. plain, 7s. 6d. coloured. GROIN, FEMORAL AND POPLITEAL REGIONS. Eight Plates and Eleven
Wood
INGUINAL HERNIA, TESTIS AND

Eleven Woodcuts.
Engravings.
9s. plain, 13s.
coloured.
ITS COVERINGS.
Five Plates and
EIGHT PLATES OF THE HEAD AND NECK, THE AXILLA, AND BEND OF THE ELBOW. 13s. coloured, 7s. 6d. plain.
The production (volume on the Groin) recommend to the working student
"
12s. coloured, 9s. plain.
is
altogether one which
elaborate treatise, that cannot
fail
and Foreign Medical Review.

"
The work will constitute a complete and to be highly useful to surgeons in general." British
we can conscientiously
The present work (Inguinal Hernia) is a worthy successor to those on the Groin and Perinaeum, and will prove, we do not doubt, as great a favourite with students."
Med.-Chir. Rev., April, 1841.
CUTLER
S SURGEON S PRACTICAL GUIDE IN DRESS ING AND IN THE METHODIC APPLICATION OF BANDAGES.
Second Edition.
"
100 Engravings on
Wood.
Foolscap 8vo,
6s. 6d.
This appears to be a valuable little treatise. The author seems to have spared no pains in procuring correct descriptions of all the surgical apparatus at present employed in bandaging and dressing, both at home and abroad. He has given numerous illustra tions in the form of well-executed Woodcuts, and has altogether produced what we conceive to be a very useful, and by no means an expensive publication." Medical
Gazette, Nov. 10, 1834.
HIND
S TWENTY EXTREMITIES.
PLATES OF FRACTURES OF THE

Second Edition.
Folio, U. 4s. cloth.
PORTRAIT OF ROBERT LISTON, ESQ.
2s. Qd.
28,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
ANATOMICAL PLATES.
SERIES
GRAPHY
OF ANATOMICAL PLATES, IN LITHO:
With REFERENCES AND PHYSIOLOGICAL COMMENTS,
illustrating
the Structure of the different Parts of the
Edited by JONES QUAIN, M.D., and ERASMUS WILSON, Lecturer on Anatomy and Physiology at the Middlesex Hospital. 2 vols. royal folio, half-bound morocco, gilt tops,
Human
Body.
price
2l. plain,
2(K coloured.
IN
THE WORK MAY ALSO BE HAD
SEPARATE PORTIONS, AS FOLLOWS
THE MUSCLES OF THE HUMAN

BODY.
plain
;
THE VISCERA OF THE HUMAN

BODY;
INCLUDING
Royal Folio,
51
Plates.
21. 16s.
THE ORGANS OF Dl-
51. 5s.
full coloured.
THE VESSELS OF THE HUMAN

BODY.
plain
;
31. 18*.
Royal Folio, 50 Plates. 21. Us. with the vessels coloured. Royal Folio, 38
GESTION, RESPIRATION, SECRETION, AND EX CRETION. Royal Folio, 32 Plates. Price 11.18s. plain 32. 10*. coloured.
;
THE NERVES OF THE HUMAN

BODY.
plain
;
THE BONES AND LIGAMENTS.

Royal
21. 15s.
Folio, 30 Plates.
Price
21.
plain
Plates.
21. 4s.
coloured.
4Z. 2s. full
coloured.
The entire Work consists of 105 taining 201 Plates, besides Indexes, &c.
%*
A
Numbers and 2 Supplements, con
list
of Plates, showing the contents of each Number,
may
be
had
gratis,
on
application to the Publishers.
Any Number may
be
purchased separately.
ANATOMY.
DR.
QUAIN
PART
ANATOMY.
PART
|
Fifth Edition.
(See page 2.)
SHARPEY and Mr. QUAIN.

I.
Edited by DR.
2 vols. 8vo.
Also (for a short time) in Three Parts.

13*.
II. 14s.
|
PART
III.
s.
ELLIS
THE DISSECTION OF THE HUMAN BODY.

"
DEMONSTRATIONS OF AN ATOMY; A
One volume,
;
GUIDE TO
small 8vo, 12*.
dical Review.
We think Mr. Ellis s Demonstrations are in every way fitted for the purpose for which they are intended and we therefore strongly recommend the work to the notice of everj member of the profession. We are convinced that it will quickly become the general Text Book of every working student in anatomy." British and Foreign Me
7
MACLISE
OF THE ARCHETYPE SKELETON OF VERTEBRATED ANIMALS.

Illustrated in 54 Plates.
MORPHOLOGICAL STUDIES IN SEARCH

One volume, small
folio, 21. 12*. 6d.
(See page 3.)
MATERIA MEDICA.
BALLARD AND GARROD
Wood.
"
MEDICA AND THERAPEUTICS.

12s. cloth.
ELEMENTS OF MATERIA
One volume
8vo, with Diagrams on
and
will be found to
practitioner."
As a manual
contain
much matter
for students, it is the best that has yet appeared,
well worthy of perusal by the
Ranking * Report.
16
WORKS PRINTED FOR TAYLOR AND WALTON.
PHYSIOLOGY.
MULLER S ELEMENTS OF PHYSIOLOGY.

"
Translated, with
Steel Plates and very numerous En Notes, by WILLIAM BALY, M.D. gravings on Wood. 2 thick vols. 8vo. 20s. each. We do, however, recommend it very strongly, and we have no hesitation in saying that it will supersede all other works as a Text Book for Lectures, and one of reference for
students.
It steers a
modern works, and the

Review, April, 1838.
middle course between the superficial brevity of many of our Med. Chir. pleonastic and metaphysical jargon %rdach."
;
<?
*#*
Supplement
to
Volume II. will
be published
MEDICINE.
MURPHY S
(PROFESSOR,) LECTURES Ol^ NATURAL AND DIFFICULT PARTURITION. One volume 8vo, with numerous
Engravings on Wood.
"
9s. cloth.
refer to difficult and laborious labours, and to the application of instruments, will be found of the very greatest value." .ace.
The whole of these Lectures, which
DR.
DAVID
D.
DAVIS
ELEMENTS OF OBSTETRIC MEWith a

4to Volume containing all the Plates of 6d. cloth.
DICINE.
Second Edition.
the original 4to Edition.
II. 7s.
WALSHE ON THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF

CANCER.
"
One vol. 8vo, with Illustrations. 165. The chapter upon this most important subject (Treatment) is very full and com Dr. Walshe has taken great pains to examine the alleged virtues of almost every plete. remedy and of every plan of medication that has been proposed." Medico-Chir. Review.
Foolscap 8vo.
6d. cloth.
WALSHE ON THE PHYSICAL DIAGNOSIS OF DISEASES

OF THE LUNGS.
"
6s.
treatise is one of extraordinary merit. Indeed we do not hesitate to say, that there exists in no language any work on the Physical Diagnosis of the Diseases of the suited for students, so clear and precise, and at the same time so comprehensive Lungs,
The
and
practical, as
this."
British
and Foreign Medical Review.
DR. BENCE JONES

CULUS,
S PHYSIOLOGY TO THE PREVENTION AND CURE OF GRAVEL, CAL S
APPLICATION OF LIEBIG
8vo.
6s.
AND GOUT.
DAVIS
(DR.
DAVID
D.)
ON ACUTE HYDROCEPHALUS.
8vo.
9s. 6d.
ALLEN ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE INSANE.

8vo.
65.
MR. QUAIN S
WORK ON THE
ARTERIES.
of the 500
%* The Publishers have much pleasure in announcing that 450 out Copies have], been subscribed for, and that 400 have been delivered. intending to subscribe for the remaining Copies are requested to favour the with their names as soon as possible, either direct or through their
Booksellers.
Gentlemen
Publishers
respective
Oct. 1, 1847.
BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.
JUL261972
PLEASE
DO NOT REMOVE
FROM
THIS
CARDS OR
SLIPS
POCKET
UNIVERSITY
OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

De Morgan, Formal Logic, Or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (1847)

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

De Morgan, Formal Logic, Or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (1847)

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

FORMAL LOGIC

The Calculus of inference^

28, Upper Gower Street. M DCCC XLVII

fyftem given in this

work extends beyond

received, in feveral directions.

fubmitted for adoption into

considered as obeying only

thofe conditions which are neceflary to inference.

treated in connection with

the diftinction between thefe words

not being made,

others fupplied in confequence.

tained, between any two names

forms of predication are thus ob the eight of the common

have only ufed the word complex,

was already appropriated

the introduction of contraries, the

increafed to thirty-two, connected to

rules of relation, but all

each with reference to

fhewn to contain, own difpofition of names and

one form of inference. of figure

one of thefe fymbols

ufed (page 60) in abbrevia

tion of the proposition at length.

are considered, both

notation and rules of transformation are given, and the

fyllogifms are treated as reducible to ordinary

ones, by invention of compound names. The theory of the numerical fyllogifm

the numerical relations of the feveral terms

unufual in the quantity of the

to be either fuperfluous, or elfe, as I

old doctrine of modals

the numerical theory of probability.

cannot fee on what

real diftindtion, the exclufion

told that logic confiders

the validity of the inference, independently of the truth

or falfehood of the matter, or fupplies the conditions

which propounds for

further added that the only hypothetical

that logic can take

from that of the confe-

quences of fuppofing the former to be abfolutely true.

fhould maintain, againft

upon names, I mean that I thofe who would exclude the

But any one

will fee that, in all

the terms in which mental operations are fpoken of.

of part of opponent, and the appearance

Flrft Notions (pages

weakened conclulions and ftrengtbened premifes,

1 5 ; the figures, 1 6, collection ofeffentially different fyllogifms y 18, 19 ; examples,

name purely objective, 36; reference of every

54; proportion defined, 54; Limited uni

XY, and X:Y, 60

the Syllogifm (pages

Definition of fyllogifm, premifes, middle term, concluding terms,

84; Complex forms

doubt on the goodnefs

Rules for the fymbols of opponent

Additions and corrections.

derivation from the fyllo"io

Some Xs are Ts does not contradift< [Some Xs are