FAA Comments on Chapter One - 9/11 Commission Final Report

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on Chapter One of the 9/11 Commission's

Final Report. The Commission has spent over 15 months investigating what happened
that day and the FAA has produced thousands of tapes* transcripts and documents and
provided thousands of staff hours in support of the Commission's work. The FAA does
not have benefit of all the Commission's evidence, but using the evidence that is
available to the Agency, we offer the following comments:

The Commission's report acknowledges that what happened to the United States on 9/11
was unprecedented and that neither the FAA nor the Military had ever encountered or
trained for such an attack. Unfortunately, the Commission then characterizes the actions
or lack of action taken by the FAA as failures to improvise a response which might have
led to a different outcome. Where the Commission charges FAA personnel with inaction
based on our present excellent hindsight, it does a disservice both to them and to the
public. You will appreciate that this is frustrating and disappointing for many in the
FAA, both current and former employees, who have felt that the Agency responded well
considering the difficult and confusing circumstances of the national emergency.

Chapter One is a detailed accounting of the FAA response on 9/11 from the compilation
of facts gleaned from many facilities, but what is lost on the reader are these facts
essential to an understanding of the tragic events:

1. Four planes were airborne and hijacked within approximately the same basic
timeframe - approximately one hour.
2. Information critical to an understanding of the scope of the attack was not
available instantly to either FAA or Military personnel who might have made use
of it had it been available instantly.
3. There were numerous reports of other errant aircraft that turned out to be
erroneous, and
4. Nearly 5,000 airplanes airborne in the airspace above the United States during the
attacks had to be safely handled by air traffic controllers, many of which were
diverted to airports other than their intended destinations.

There is no question that there were communication breakdowns and other problems on
9/11. However, it is important to note that FAA employees understood immediately that
communication capabilities had to be improved, learned from the weaknesses in our
system, and took immediate action to address them.

Focusing on the draft of Chapter One, we provide the following comments and invite the
Commission to consider them seriously. We look forward to reviewing the Commission's
recommendations.

Transmissions from Terrorists

The Commission's report gives the false impression that there was immediate awareness
by controllers and others above them in the chain of command of exactly what was said
 in the transmissions from the terrorists early on that morning. The inference is that
awareness in FAA Headquarters, particularly, was much more clear and complete than it
was. The fact is that in most cases, the controllers were not sure what they were hearing
and the tapes had to be pulled immediately and replayed and analyzed in order to
determine what was said. As you are aware, some of the transmissions required
conferring with language experts at FBI after 9/11 to determine what was said. All of the
transmissions were enhanced after the fact to eliminate background noise, etc. As the
events unfolded that morning, controllers had one chance to hear the transmission. When
the public does have access to the actual unenhanced transmissions, we believe that the
comparison would be stark.

Documentation
On 9/11, the FAA's Headquarters did not have recording capability on Headquarters
phone lines, therefore, many of the conversations that took place that day are lost to
posterity. The Commission heard from many FAA Headquarters witnesses about critical
calls made to the Military and others but those recollections are not included or not
considered in this report as best we can determine. It would appear that if the
Commission does not have in its position a tape, a log entry, or other document proving
that a communication occurred, such communication is deemed not to have occurred.

Communication Problems
On 9/11, the telephone lines in the Washington, DC metropolitan area were jammed
much of the morning. There is no question that this is a contributing factor to the
communication breakdowns among FAA, its field offices and other agencies, including
the Department of Defense. The report makes no mention of this fact. Nor is there any
mention of the fact that the Pentagon was evacuated after it was struck by American 77,
which made communication between DoD and other agencies, including FAA, all the
more difficult.

Page specific comments

Page 4, third full paragraph

"By 8:00 am on the morning of Tuesday, September 11,2001, they had defeated all
of the security layers that America's civil aviation security system then had in place
to prevent a hijacking."

None of the layers of security in place on 9/11 were relevant to suicide hijackings
because such an attack was not anticipated. It would be more accurate to say that the
layers of defense in place on 9/11 were not designed with suicide hijackings in mind, and
so were not effective against them.

Page 10, last paragraph

I "As news of the hijacking of American 11 filtered through the FAA and American
/ Airlines systems after 8:20, it does not seem to have occurred to the system's
leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too might be
hijacked."

At or shortly after 8:20am, there would have been no basis for either the FAA or
American Airlines to alert other aircraft that they might too be hijacked. At that point,
there was one situation that the FAA was dealing with and knew about - American 11-
and no indication that multiple hijackings were about to occur.

Page 11, second and fourth paragraphs

"Around 9:00, the FAA, American and United Airlines were facing the staggering
realization of apparent multiple hijackings."

The assertion that by sometime around 9:00am FAA, along with American and United,
failed to act to warn other aircraft of multiple hijacks grossly oversimplifies the situation
as we all understood it then. There was much confusion and very little in the way of well
understood factual information to broadcast warning messages to thousands of aircraft at
9:00am or shortly thereafter. However, FAA air traffic management did take action
locally in Boston and New York to stop all traffic based on the information they had by
that time.

Page 15, first paragraph under

.* tifofc-
FAA Mission and Structure /
"As of September 11,2001, the FAA was mandated by law to regulate safety and
security of civil aviation. From a controller^ perspective, that meant maintaining a
safe distance between airborne aircraft."

The following should be added for clarification and context:

Before 9/11 the mission of the FAA's air traffic control system was to provide the safe,
orderly and expeditious movement of aircraft in the national airspace system. Safety was
defined as separating air traffic from other traffic, terrain and weather. Air Defense was
not considered a role for the FAA. FAA air traffic personnel supported DoD efforts to
counter threats but this support contemplated an airborne threat coming from outside the
U.S.

Page 18, third paragraph

"If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to
contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) to ask for a
military "escort aircraft" to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid
search and rescue in the event of an emergency."

As FAA indicated in comments to Staff Statement No. 17, per the procedures that were in
place on 9/11, the request for military escort was situation dependent. It was not always
the case that a military escort would be requested. The Commission's depiction of the
scenario, i.e., that every confirmed hijack called for military escort is not accurate.
Page 20, top of the page, paragraph continued from Page 19
"By this time, American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south."

The Commission's statement is not accurate. As FAA indicated in comments to Staff

Statement No. 17, the turn at 8:26am would not have appeared "dramatic" to controllers.
In hindsight with a recreation of the flight path, it does appear dramatic. Of note, when
describing the turn at 8:26am on Page 6 (second full paragraph), the Commission uses a
more factual description - "A minute later Flight 11 turned south."

Page 20, top of the page, paragraph continued from Page 19 last sentence
"FAA Headquarters did not follow the hijack protocol and did not contact the
NMCC to request a fighter escort."

The Commission's statement is not accurate. At 8:32am, the FAA Headquarters was
receiving initial information about a possible hijacking. The information gathering was J
underway and the conference call was an internal call, not the external or "primary net"
that would have included contact with NMCC.

Page 24, second paragraph, last sentence

"We have found no evidence to suggest that Command Center managers instructed
any Centers to issue a cockpit security alert."

Personnel at FAA's Command Center recall that there was a teleconference with the
Center traffic management units instructing them to issue warnings through their
facilities. At least one Center manager remembers that such a teleconference took place.
Research is underway for evidence (i.e., taped conversation) that supports the
teleconference took place.

Page 25, first paragraph, last sentence

"NORAD had no indication that any other plane had been hijacked."

In FAA's comments to Staff Statement No. 17 the point was made that neither FAA nor
NORAD knew of other hijacked aircraft when the Langley fighters were placed on battle
stations at 9:09am. The wording in the report is the same as the Staff Statement and
mistakenly leaves the reader with the impression that FAA knew of additional hijacked
aircraft at 9:09am.

Page 26, second full paragraph

"In addition, although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither
it nor FAA headquarters issued an "all points bulletin" to surrounding centers...."

As the FAA indicated in previous comments to Staff Statement No. 17, through the
benefit of hindsight and the radar reconstruction work, we now know what happened to
American 77. However, the suggestion that FAA should have issued an "APB" is an
overly simplistic suggestion, particularly because American 77 was believed to have
crashed. Controllers believed that they had confirmation of this. The fact is that radar
contact was lost on American 77 and there was no primary target to see for
approximately 10 minutes. Due to radar update rate variations, it would have been
extremely difficult to discern the primary target.

As more information came in that morning and controllers began to question the initial
assumption that the airplane had crashed, they began to quickly search for a target. As
Staff Statement No. 17 stated accurately, no one had perfect information that day.

Page 26, third full paragraph

"By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew the
following. They knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They
knew American 77 was lost. They knew a hijacker on board American 11 had said
'we have some planes'."

The Commission's statement is not accurate.

A more accurate account is this:

By 9:25am, FAA HQ knew that 2 aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center,
American 77 was lost and although initially believed to have crashed somewhere near the
Ohio/Kentucky border, controllers had by this time begun to question the earlier
assumption that the plane had crashed. The search for a target was underway. There was
not widespread awareness of the "we have some planes" transmission on 9/11 as the
Commission indicates. This knowledge came in the days following. To further
complicate the situation, there were dozens of erroneous reports on 9/11 that controllers
and others were working hard to sift through.

Page 28, second paragraph, last sentence

"No one at FAA Command Center or headquarters ever asked for military
assistance with American 77".

This statement provides no context around the circumstances of American 77. For
approximately thirty minutes after the loss of radar and radio communication, controllers
and others in the FAA believed that American 77 had crashed. When controllers began
to rethink the earlier assumption about American 77 in the 9:20 timeframe, they began to
search for a target. When a target was found by Dulles controllers at about 9:32, it was
not identifiable as American 77. Since we did not have a target identified as American
77, it is difficult to understand the Commission's point about asking for Military
assistance with American 77. And according to what the Commission has learned, there
was a call to NEADS about American 11 at 9:34 and during that communication, a
Washington Center manager indicated that FAA was looking for the lost American 77.

The FAA did not know that American 77 had crashed into the Pentagon until sometime
later in the morning. In fact, one of the initial reports that came into Headquarters was
that an American Eagle (small commuter airplane) flight had crashed into the Pentagon.
Page 30 and 31
"A minute after that, at 9:49,13 minutes after getting the question from Cleveland
Center about military help, Command Center suggested that someone at
Headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance:

FAA Headquarters: They're pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93.
Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?
FAA Headquarters: Uh, God, I don't know.
Command Center: Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in
the next ten minutes.
FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.

"At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed Command Center that the Deputy Director
for Air Traffic Services was talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about
scrambling aircraft. Then Command Center informed headquarters controllers
had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area...."

It is not clear why the Commission did not include the following from the same transcript
at 9:54:
Command Center: / was just advised that we are scrambling in the Washington and New
York area.
FAA Headquarters: We are scrambling in the Washington and New York area.
Command Center: That's what I've been told.

The selection of the quotes chosen by the Commission would lead the reader to believe
that it intended to portray the FAA as an agency in disarray, indecisive, and uncaring in a
national emergency. When seen in the larger context, the fact that several decisionmakers
have just left the Operations Center is neither unexpected nor untoward.

Page 32, first full paragraph

"Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA Headquarters
requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any manager at FAA
headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military.

While we now know that the "primary net" failed to function as it did historically in
traditional hijack situations, managers in Headquarters were communicating with the
military indirectly through the Command Center. In addition, there was communication
between FAA liaisons at the NORAD sectors on 9/11 and FAA facilities.

Some Headquarters personnel recall that communication was occurring between FAA
and the Military about United 93. Unfortunately not all calls made that day were on
recorded lines. Specifically telephone lines in Headquarters were not recorded on 9/11
and therefore, we have not been able to conclusively prove conversations took place. For
purposes of reconstructing what occurred in Headquarters, those personal recollections
have seemingly been discounted by the Commission.
Finally, it is important to know that information coming into FAA facilities, much of
which was erroneous, had to be vetted before it was given to the Military as fact. Both
FAA and Military personnel were aware of the potential for a tragedy if an airplane were
mis-identified as hostile and shot down.

Page 33, second paragraph under "Clarifying the Record"

"We do not believe that understanding the truth about the events of that morning
reflects discredit on the operational personnel from NEADS or FAA facilities."

This statement seems to implicate both FAA and NORAD leadership. The use of the
word "truth" in the first sentence will leave any reader with the mistaken impression that
accounts of 9/11 heretofore were fabrications. The Commission reveals discrepancies in
notification times by DoD when they testified before the Commission in May 2003. The
May 2003 testimony was based on information that DoD and FAA shared in the early
days after 9/11 as we were reconstructing what happened and when.

The Commission has spent over 15 months investigating what happened on 9/11. We
now know that some of the information developed after 9/11 was incorrect but there was
no intentional misrepresenting of information. In the days and months following that
tragic day, the FAA's focus was in support of the FBI investigation into the terrorist acts
and in establishing security measures and procedures to prevent subsequent attacks and
we did not conduct an in-depth review on the scale of the Commission's investigation.

Page 36, first paragraph last sentence

"Acting Deputy FAA Administrator Belger was frustrated and upset to learn later
in the morning that the military had not been on the call."

A more accurate description of Mr. Belger's frustration is this:

Mr. Belger was frustrated to learn that a conference call initiated with the NMCC as a
participant did not at that time include the Military. For reasons unknown to us at this
time, perhaps owing to the telephone problems encountered that day or other factors, the
NMCC was no longer part of the telconference at the time of Mr. Belger's inquiry.

Page 37
The Pentagon Teleconferences

Comment:
There was well-established protocol for handling hijack incidents prior to 9/11. On that
day, the FAA attempted to follow the protocol initially, although the established protocol
in no way considered that hijacked aircraft would be used as missiles. Nonetheless, the
only protocol the Agency knew was what had been used effectively over the years. We
can only assume that NMCC chose not to follow the protocol and improvised an
alternative course based on the attacks. Unfortunately FAA was not largely a part of the
communication network that NMCC established. There is no indication that NMCC
called FAA Headquarters to be part of the Air Threat Conference Call. Perhaps they
could not get through to Headquarters. It is not clear to us how the decision was made at
NMCC to include the Command Center on the Air Threat Conference Call. Based on
this it seems unfair to criticize the FAA's participation on this call.

Endnotes

64 "FAA knew or strongly suspected that Flight 11 was a hijacking 11 minutes after
it was taken over and that Flight 175 was a hijacking 9 minutes after it was taken
over. There is no evidence to indicate that FAA recognized Flight 77 as a hijacking
until it crashed into the Pentagon."

This is a complete overstatement with regard to the knowledge of Flight 11 and Flight
175. Some FAA employees may have known or suspected this fact. However, to make
the statement that indicates the FAA as a whole knew this information is entirely
inaccurate.

The Commission acknowledges that information was not instantaneously known on 9/11;
as noted on page 16, the Commission states "Each Center thus had part of the knowledge
of what was going on across the system. But it is important to remember that what
Boston Center knew was not necessarily known by centers in New York, Cleveland, or
Indianapolis, or for that matter by the Command Center in Herndon or FAA Headquarters
in Washington."

In spite of the Commission's statement above, Chapter One is replete with conclusive
statements that FAA knew about certain information before all of the critical parts of the
FAA actually had the information.