Fact Sheet

Case Studies of Failed Water

Privatizations
W ater privatization has left a trail of failures in cities across the United States.
From Alabama to California, high rates and bad service plague communities
who transfer control of their water service to the hands of corporations. The water
barons prioritize stockholder returns over public wellbeing and leave municipalities
to clean up the mess.

Below are 20 examples of what happens with water privatization. While privateers
have lauded these so-called successful operators, every case is marred by skyrocket-
ing rates, sewage flooded basements, federal investigations, broken pipes, bad water
quality, cost overruns, corruption or scandal.

Discolored Water in Chattahoochee Valley, Losing Money in Shelby Co., Ala.

Ala.
Population: 30,000
Date of original privatization: 1970
Contract: 5-year, $892,000 to operate, maintain
and manage a water treatment plant
In 2006, residents were worried about the
discolored water coming from their home faucets.
The Veolia-operated treatment plant was unable
to treat increased levels of iron and manganese,
which tinted the water. While officials said the
discoloration was no cause for concern,1 monitoring
violations the following year left the residents in the
dark about the quality of their water. In 2007 alone,
the Chattahoochee Valley Water Supply District
had 21 violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act
– for failure to monitor 21 different contaminants
throughout the year.2
Population: 178,000
Date of original privatization: 2005
Contract: Sale of the wastewater system for $8.5
million
In 2002, the county decided to sell its wastewater
system and use the proceeds to finance a new water
treatment plant.3 Southwest Water was the only
company to make a proposal, starting with a low-
ball of $3 million and then upping it to $8.5 million.
An outside firm appraised the system’s value at $12
million, but offers did not pour in when the county
announced its intention to sell it.
Southwest Water estimated that it would have to
hike rates increasing the typical monthly bill from
$31.50 to $63 within nine years. The proposed sale
outraged county residents from Greystone and Eagle
Point, the two neighborhoods that comprised most
of the system’s customer base.4 Mary Sue Ludwig,
a representative of the Greystone Homeowners
Association, interrogated officials about why her
bills would more than double.5 “Southwest is a stock
company,” she said. “Their bottom line is making a
profit.”6
 High rates, sewage spills in Corning, Calif.
Population: 6,200
Date of original privatization: 1990
Contract: 12-year contract to operate, maintain
and manage the wastewater system

Facing a cease and desist order from the state

of California because of inadequate wastewater
treatment, the city of Corning privatized its
wastewater treatment plant to Southwest Water in
1990. The city extended the contract in 2003 for
another 12 years.12 Rate hikes followed.

In 2003, the city chamber of commerce protested

a proposed sewer rate hike that it said would
adversely affect small businesses. The city had to
rework the rate increase.13

In 2004, a crowd packed a city council meeting to

Residents were fed up and organized Friends Linked
protest massive rate increases. The city planned to
Up to Stop Sewer System Heist, advising the county
hike sewer rates 9 percent annually for five years
to FLUSSSH the sale. “We want Shelby County to
and then 3 percent annually for another five years.14
keep the sewer system,” said Roger Moraski, an
The city needed the hikes to balance books after
organizer in the group. “What I don’t want is to
pursuing an expensive sewer expansion project right
open the paper one day and see that it’s been sold
as it lost its biggest sewer client, which made up 20
and our rates are going to triple.”7
percent of the system’s revenue.15
The county ended up selling the system to
After nearly 20 minutes of riotous protest, one
Southwest Water for $8.5 million and sewer rates
councilmember said he had enough. “This has to
began their steady climbing, increasing 8 percent a
be done,” said councilmember Rex Roush, “none of
year for 11 years. The base rate alone will skyrocket
us here are making dime [sic] on that plant and I’m
from $32.45 in 2005 to $76.64 in 2016.8
getting pretty damn tired of getting called a liar by
some of the people out there.”16
Bob Bruce, a community member, questioned the
sale. “Why are we selling the sewer system?” he
Roush might not have been telling the full truth in
asked. “It is a profitable plant. We can control our
his outburst. Someone could have been making a
own destiny if we own it.” 9
pretty penny on the plant expansion – Southwest
Water, the contract operator whose fee most likely
County Commissioner Ted Crockett agreed and said
increased to accommodate the larger plant. The
as much when he voted against the proposed sale.
expansion was enough that the additional capacity
“I’ve always thought the sewer needed to turn a
“should last 20 years,” according to the public works
profit,” he said, “and we’re starting to do that. I’m a
director.17
financial person, and this is what I do. I don’t think
it makes sense to sell something that could make us
In 2008, Southwest Water got a 12 percent boost in
money.”10
its service fees from the city.18
Unfortunately, they weren’t the only ones who knew
the system could yield good returns. Southwest
Water chairperson and CEO Anton Garnier said,
“This transaction marks an important expansion of
our utility footprint, a key element of our long-term
strategy for profitable growth.”11
Widespread corruption in Los Angeles
County, Calif.
Population: 300,000
Date of original privatization: 1993
Contract: 5-year, $25 million contract to design,
build, operate and manage a water recycling plant
At least two West Basin Water District board
members know the spoils of privatization, but their
plundering didn’t go unnoticed.
In 2004, a jury convicted R. Keith McDonald of 10
federal felony counts for kickback and votes-for-
cash schemes involving contractors for Carson City
and the West Basin Water District.19 The charges
surrounding the water district mostly concerned a
$30 million pipeline construction project for the
water recycling facilities.20 Prosecutors argued
that he demanded $140,000 from Luster National,
Inc., in exchange for his help getting the company
three construction management deals for the water
district.21 McDonald was sentenced to 41 months in
prison for mail fraud, money laundering, bribery
and conspiracy to extort.22
The jury acquitted him of other charges alleging he
told United Water, which operates the district water
recycling plant, to give him a $25,000 campaign
contribution as a reward for his approval of the
5-year, $25-million contract.23,24
During the trial, McDonald’s lawyer contended that
United Water made these allegations to federal and
local agencies as retaliation for his scrutiny of the
company’s performance. In letters to these agencies,
he said, the company accused McDonald of slander
but never suggested he tried to extort money.25
United Water did contribute $2,000 in McDonald’s
run for state assembly.26
Tyrone Smith, another water district board member,
is also serving time for his role in another scheme.
He allegedly extorted $25,000 from an investment
banker who stood to earn 10 times as much if his
firm handled the refinancing of the water district’s
debt.27 He pleaded guilty in the extortion and
money-laundering scheme.
McDonald and Smith are just two of the 12 people,
including the former mayor, convicted and
sentenced after a massive federal investigation
into South Bay political corruption.28 The entire
scandal never would have occurred had the city
not contracted out two public services: garbage
collection and water.
A waste management firm and two water companies
allegedly hired city officials to broker deals with city
council members in exchange for awarding multi-
million dollar contracts to the companies. Two low-
level officials at the waste management firm were
also convicted and received probation.29,30
Privatization reduces public accountability and
breeds an environment ripe for corruption.
Expensive, brown water in San Juan
Capistrano, Calif.
Population: 34,000
Date of original privatization: 2002
Contract: 20-year, $20 million contract to design,
build, finance and operate a water treatment plant
Troubles plagued San Juan Capistrano’s water
treatment plant, and residents ended up paying far
too much for bad quality water.
When the city signed a 20-year, $20-million
contract with Southwest Water to design, build and
operate a new desalination plant, the public works
director predicted that rates would rise.31
Sure enough, the first increase came almost exactly
one year after the city cemented the deal. San
Juan Capistrano residents saw their bills jump 5
percent, even as the cost of getting water from the
Metropolitan Water District, the city’s major water
source, fell by 5.9 percent.32
But 5 percent was nothing. The big hike came the
following year. In 2004, the city hiked rates 29
percent, with half of that increase going to pay for
Southwest Water’s expensive treatment plant.33
The end wasn’t near. In 2007, water rates jumped
again by 8 to 10 percent, with additional increases of
8.5 percent a year expected for following six years.
About half of these hikes went to cover operating
costs, which includes Southwest Water’s fee to run
the plant. From 2003 to 2007, the average monthly
bill jumped from $38 to more than $65. 34,35
In 2004, councilmember David Swerdlin expressed
his disapproval of hikes. “Every time we turn
around, we’ll be looking at rate increases,” he said.
“I am finding it harder and harder to support our
water department. And we need to take a hard look
at where we are going with water.”36
The councilmember’s concerns were well founded.
Southwest Water’s desalination project was 70 to 80
percent more expensive than importing water from
the Metropolitan Water District, as the city had been
doing.37
What’s more, despite the excessive cost, the
treatment plant was riddled with problems. The
first major glitch was low water output. A general
manager of nearby water district speculated that
faulty design work might be the culprit. Southwest
Water could have placed the six groundwater wells
too close together, which can cause water to be
drawn down instead of up.38
Another issue was bad water quality. The
community became discontented with discolored
water, described as orangish brown, pouring from
their home taps. “We’re paying for water, we ought
to be able to drink it,” said one city resident. “I’m
not going to drink something that is yellow.”39
The tea-colored water was the product of an
inadequate filtration system at the new plant, which
was failing to remove enough iron and manganese.40
By November 2007, the city deemed the water
quality so bad that officials shut down the facility
and hired a consulting firm to test the water and
examine Southwest Water’s operations.41
To correct the issues, the city required Southwest
Water to replace certain plant components and
make significant changes to the water treatment
process. Before, the plant filtered only a portion of
the water, which caused not only discoloration but
also premature breakdown of expensive reverse
osmosis membranes.42 Perhaps, Southwest Water
had attempted to skimp on the construction
costs to win the contract and pad its bottom line.
Meanwhile, the city had to pick up the tab for
poor design and execution as residents endured
skyrocketing rates.
Eight months later, when the company completed
the construction upgrades, the water plant
reopened, but not all the wells were in operation.
The city had to shut down two of the six wells after
discovering they were contaminated with MTBE,43 a
banned fuel additive and possible carcinogen.44
Privatization has failed to live up to even the lowest
of expectations in San Juan Capistrano.
High rates in Crystal River, Fla.
Population: 4,528
Date of original privatization: 1991
Contract: 10-year, $3 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the water and sewer
systems
In 1991, this Gulf Coast community handed over
its water and sewer systems to U.S. Filter, now a
subsidiary of French multinational Veolia.
A few years later, the first large rate hike came. In
1995 water and sewer rates jumped by 22 percent,
bringing the average monthly bill from $45 to $56.45
Businesses complained about the hefty increase, so
the city council ordered a survey of their water and
sewer records to determine whether they are being
assessed the proper rates. “No one wants to see any
rates increase or any costs go up,” said city manager
Roger Krieger. “But unfortunately, sewer and water
is a business.”46
The mayor spoke out against the high rates and
a revised rate structure that he considered would
unfairly burden local restaurant owners. “What’s
happening here is at the expense of the little fellow,”
mayor Curtis Rich said. “Is this going to help our
work to entice businesses into Crystal River?”47
“After I delved into this thing, I found it a bit
shocking, to say the least,” said Rich. “I just don’t
know that it’s fair.” Not only small businesses,
but also residents on fixed incomes would feel the
impact of high rates.48
Despite the hikes, the system still needed repairs.
Groundwater was leaking into the sewer system
and driving up the cost of wastewater treatment.49
In October 2004, Veolia treated 12 million gallons
more wastewater than drinking water. That is, the
utility sent out 23.3 million gallons of drinking
water to the city and got back 35.6 million gallons
of wastewater.50 City-hired consultants said that
groundwater was infiltrating the sewer system
through cracks in the pipes. Veolia needed to
evaluate and fix old pipes.51
Cost overruns were also a common occurrence
for Veolia. In 2007, the city paid an additional $9
million on top of the contract fee. But that’s nothing.
In 2006, adjustments to the contract set the city
back a whopping $52 million.52
An Embarrassing, Cautionary Tale in Tampa
Bay, Fla.
Population: 2,400,000
Date of original privatization: 1999
Contract: 30-year, $120 million contract to build,
operate and manage a desalination plant
Once hailed as the project that would shatter price
barriers for saltwater conversion plants worldwide,
Tampa Bay’s desalination facility was a messy failure
that crushed any dreams of cheap desalted water.
It didn’t begin badly. Unlike many privatizations,
Tampa Bay’s desalination project actually had sev-
eral bidders, and the utility got to choose among
four different proposals. With these options in its
hands, in 1999, Tampa Bay Water projected that the
plant would be built in three years for $98 to $129
million.53 How wrong they were.
At the end of 2007, four years behind schedule and
nearly $80 million over the original budget, the na-
tion’s largest seawater desalination plant finally be-
gan supplying drinking water to 2.4 million people
in the Tampa Bay region.54
In 1999, Tampa Bay gave Posiedon Resources a
30-year, $120 million contract to manage the con-
struction and operation of the new plant. Posiedon
Resources said they could build the plant for $79
million, but necessary upgrades doubled the costs,
driving the final bill up to $158 million.55
Within a year, the original engineer declared bank-
ruptcy and dropped out of the project, so in 2001,
Posiedon Resources hired Covanta to finish the job,
but a pattern of failure unfolded. A year later in
2002, Covanta too was in bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion.56 With a low credit rating, the company was
unable to secure a surety bond and the financing
costs were sky high.
Tampa Bay Water, a public utility, could get much
lower interest rates, so in 2002 it bought out Posie-
don Resources for nearly $9 million and assumed
ownership over the project. The takeover saved
money on financing, but it failed to resolve the prob-
lems with Covanta.57
The plant opened in March 2003, and within two
months, it was failing performance tests.58 Sedi-
ment and biota clogged the expensive reverse os-
 Water Lost and Repair Costs in
Edwardsville, Ill.
Population: 24,073
Date of original privatization: 1987
Contract: 15-year, $34 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the water and sewer systems
In 2002, Edwardsville granted a 15-year, $34
million contract to U.S. Filter, a subsidiary of
French multinational Veolia. The company had
been operating and maintaining the city’s water and
sewer system for the previous decade.71

Two weeks after signing the contract, the city lost

mosis filters. The plant needed a prefiltering system around a quarter of a million gallons of water when
to remove the larger particles before water passes two water lines broke. These were the fourth and
through the salt-removing members.59 fifth breaks in the past two months. After the major
water loss, Veolia placed the city under conservation
Desalting water is three to four times more expensive orders.72 Veolia is responsible for pipe maintenance,
than treating groundwater. In order to sell the idea line replacement and major projects. Any costs that
to a skeptical public, the company skimped costs and exceed the contract value are supposed to be the
ended up with a facility that did not work.60 Tampa company’s risk,73 but it looks like the city suffered
Bay sued the original engineering companies for the for this one.
faulty design that cut too many corners. In 2007,
they settled the suit for $7.9 million, most of which From the summer of 2002 to the summer of 2003,
went to pay Tampa Bay Water’s legal fees. Only $1 the city experienced three water main breaks that
million remained to go toward repairs.61 forced businesses to close – sometimes for days
on end. By fall 2003, fears of another massive
In 2004, Tampa Bay Water awarded a $29 contract break prompted the city to dig into its pockets
to American Water-Pridesa to remedy, operate and to pay for the replacement of a 100-year-old cast
manage the desalination plant. 62,63 The company iron water pipe. City workers did the work and
predicted the plant would be operational by October the city officials picked up the tab,74 even though
2006.64 In December 2007, after missing at least two Veolia was supposed to be responsible for capital
repair deadlines,65 American Water finally completed improvements.
all required tests and the plant was ready to go.66
In 2005, a computer malfunction at the Veolia-
But the plant still has never reached full capacity. It operated plant left most of Edwardsville without
produces only 21 million gallons a day – not the 25 water for hours. The company apparently did not
million that it should. The plant also is a heavy pol- have backup mechanisms or checks on the system.
67

luter. During its first four months of full operation, As a result, households across the city had to boil
Tampa Bay received three violations for flushing too their water before drinking, cooking or brushing
much waste down the sewer pipeline.68 their teeth. The city administrator had to meet
with Veolia officials to determine the reason for
Five years late, 16 percent under capacity, 44 per- the failure and what backup measures could have
cent over budget, the desalination project is finally prevented it. “We’re going to get with these guys to
up and going, but only after the public utility bought see what could have been done, should have been
out the private manager. Water costs are 62 percent done,” said Ben Dickmann, the city administrator.75
more than original projections.69
Half a year later, in 2005, the city had to hike its
The Veolia-managed surface water treatment plant water rates after draining its reserve funds to pay
in Tampa also suffered embarrassing problems, al- for capital projects over the course of the Veolia
though not as severe as the desalination plant. 70
contract.76
Legal Battles, Sinkholes and a Federal
Investigation in Gary, Ind.
Population: 180,000
Date of original privatization: 1998
Contract: 10-year, $95 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the wastewater system
Without discussion or input from the audience, the
Gary Sanitary District board voted to privatize its
wastewater system during a 1998 meeting. At the
end of the meeting, a dozen people who watched the
decision unfold stood up to voice their dissent.77 No
one in the crowd spoke out in favor of the proposal.78
The board granted the contract to a consortium led
by United Water,79 which has since bought out the
other partners.80 Upon winning the deal, the cor-
poration agreed to cut $2 million from the annual
operating budget without eliminating jobs.81 This
promise didn’t hold water.
One year later in 1999, the company was trying to
buy out the plant’s 119 workers, offering them lump
sum payments in exchange for their resignation.
This was part of the company’s plan to downsize the
workforce. “It’s a standard business practice, one
that we have done at other places,” said the com-
munications manager for the corporation.82 United
Water wanted to eliminate 62 jobs.83
The city council fought the privatization bid from
the beginning. Within one month of the board’s de-
cision, various city council members had filed three
separate lawsuits challenging the proposed privati-
zation,84 although judges dismissed all of the suits.85
Councilmember Gardest Gillespie accused the
mayor and the attorney for the sanitary district of
having “racially discriminatory and other illegal rea-
sons” for wanting to privatize the operation. Along
with two fellow council members and other parties,
Gillespie sued the mayor and sanitary district board
to stop the deal. The suit alleged that the privati-
zation was “part of an ongoing scheme to replace
African-American managers, professionals and con-
tractors with persons of European ancestry.”86
Despite the legal battle, the sanitary board gave its
final approval of the $95 million, 10-year contract
to United Water, which paid the city a $10 million
franchise fee.87
A week later, more than 100 community members,
including six city council members, the former may-
or and a state representative, rallied on the steps of
city hall to voice their opposition to the privatiza-
tion. “No private company should control the access
of the community,” said one resident. “We demand
a public referendum and be allowed to vote on the
matter.”88
Nevertheless, the water board stood firm in its sup-
port of the privatization, although perhaps it would
soon wish it had listened to the chants of the protes-
tors. To cut costs, United Water may have just cut
corners.
In 2003, a main break created a sinkhole the size of
a small car that devoured a large segment of an al-
ley. Water poured up. Basements flooded. It wasn’t
the first sinkhole in that location, but the water
company had failed to correct the problem. “When
they did fix it, something went wrong again,” said
one resident whose basement was more than knee
deep in water.89
The same year, another resident noticed a large hole
in the road behind her home. A sewer line break
caused it and United Water was responsible for
repairing it, but for months on end it remained un-
touched. “I’ve talked to different ones [departments]
from the city,” said the resident, “but no one’s come
out.” She was not alone. Heavy rains caused more
than a dozen such cave-ins in just the first half of
2003.90
During a heavy rainstorm in 2006, stormwater
tainted with raw or partially treated sewage flooded
basements, ditches and streets. After heavy rains
overwhelmed the storm and sewer system, United
Water released massive amounts of wastewater, po-
tentially elevating levels of pathogenic bacteria. But
residents were not alerted to the potential danger.
The company had failed to notify city officials in
Gary and two nearby cities about releases. United
Water also did not test the bacteria levels in the area
waterways after the event.91
Overflowing sewers and flooding are all too com-
mon in Gary. One neighborhood flooded three times
in four months over the winter of 2007, prompting
one 14-year resident to declare, “This summer we’re
moving. If I can last that long.”92
United Water was supposed to manage the system,
but the sanitary district had to take action and hire a
separate consulting firm to try to repair the flooding
problem.93 Work the corporation actually did turned
out to be a waste of money. It paid to have several
sewers cleaned only to watch them crumble after-
wards. There were more than 80 cave-ins between
2003 and 2007. Each broken line was an emergen-
cy, often prompting road closures.94
In 2007, federal investigators began scrutinizing the
Gary Sanitary District at the request of the Justice
Department with the Environmental Protection
Agency. By 2008, they had turned their attention to
United Water’s operations. FBI and EPA investiga-
tors interviewed sanitary district officials about pos-
sible irregularities in reports on wastewater coming
into the treatment plant that resulted in $400,000 in
extra charges for residents in surroundings towns.95
Attorneys representing the suburban areas contest-
ed the figures, saying the towns produced 30 per-
cent more wastewater at the same time Gary’s pro-
duction dropped by more than 15 percent. United
Water officials admitted that meters at the plant had
been malfunctioning for over a year, and agreed to
reduce the bills for the towns. Only after this pres-
sure did the company decide to replace the broken
meters, which were at least 20 years old and difficult
to recalibrate.96
Meanwhile, rates jumped an astonishing 85 percent
in 2008, and federal investigators continue to look
into all aspects of the sewer system’s operations.97
Sewage Overflows and Possible Scandal in
Indianapolis, Ind.
Population: 800,000
Date of original privatization: 1993
Contract: 20-year, $560 million contract to
operate, maintain and manage the wastewater
system
Indianapolis first privatized its wastewater system in
1993 when it awarded a 5-year, $72 million contract
to United Water, which is now a subsidiary of French
giant Suez. The company promised to save $68
million over the contract term by downsizing the
workforce by more than a third from 328 to 206.98
Despite cutting back the workforce, by the end of
its first term, the company had only realized $46
million – only two-thirds of its promised savings.
Nevertheless, the city extended the contract for
another 10 years in 1998.99
While cost savings may sound great, they might
have come at the expense of the environment.
Without proper improvements and maintenance,
the sewers had 60 overflows a year, spilling
sewage-laden water onto city streets and into
area waterways. It was so bad that by 2006 the
Environmental Protection Agency had to intervene.
Under an EPA consent order, the city agreed to
make $1.86 billion worth of improvements, pay
a $1.1 million penalty and spend $2 million on
supplemental environmental projects.100
Even though United Water was in charge of the
system’s operation, maintenance and management,
the city still was ultimately responsible for
environmental compliance.
With such a bad environmental record, why would
the city extend the contract yet again in 2007?
Perhaps it could have had something to do with the
business relationships that the city council president
had with the company.
According to the city’s attorney, council president
Monroe Gray should have had to disclose the
work his construction company had done for
United Water. In the summer of 2006, the mayor’s
company got two jobs worth $56,000 and six
nonbid jobs for another $10,000.101
The following year, Gray voted to extend United
Water’s $28 million a year contract for up to 20
years. He claims there was no conflict of interest
since he had no on-going business, but certain
city and county officials disagreed and demanded
that he step down as council president. “Gray
deliberately twisted and manipulated council rules
for his personal gain,” said Tom John, Monroe
County chairperson. “He is using the power of his
office to avoid having to answer for his misdeeds.”102
Gray is under two investigations concerning alleged
misconduct. While the county prosecutor declined
to expand on the nature of his ongoing inquest,
a separate city council investigation focused on
six potential problem areas, including possible
violations of conflict-of-interest laws by failing to
disclose his company’s dealings with United Water.
The city council committee recommended that the
prosecutor’s office look into the matter.103
Paying a lot for Bad Service in Gulfport,
Miss.
Population: 72,000
Date of original privatization: 1999
Contract: 7-year, $42 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the water and sewer
systems
When Gulfport privatized its public works
operations, it received only two bids – Optech and
Eco Resources, both of which are now subsidiaries
of Southwest Water Company.104
In 1999, the city signed a $2 million-a-year contract
with Optech to handle water and sewer operations
and services, including billing and collection.105
Although the company promised to save half a
million dollars on the city’s $7 million annual
budget,106 the privatization ended up costing
the city. Private operation was 68 percent more
expensive than public operation. In 1998, the year
before the privatization, the city spent $5.6 million
to do the same tasks that it paid Southwest Water
$9.4 million to do in 2002.107
Meanwhile, the company was failing to collect
enough delinquent bills, which set the city back
another $1.7 million.108 Water and sewer fees were
the city’s biggest source of revenue, so uncollected
bills were a serious concern.
The city told the company to be more aggressive
not only in collecting late payments but also in
responding to service problems. A single water
main break left one subdivision without water for
eight hours, and several residents said they received
no warning about water quality risks posed by
contamination during the repair work.109 Sewage
backups were also a problem.110
Despite these concerns, in 2001, the city extended
its contract with Southwest Water for four
more years and $22.9 million,111 increasing the
management fee to allow the company to add 26
employees to the workforce and improve service.112
Additional staff would also come in handy, since the
city planned to acquire a neighboring community’s
water system.
When Gulfport took over the system of Orange
Grove in 2002, the residents were far from pleased.
Many households saw their bills skyrocket,
quadrupling to more than $200 a month. They
stormed city hall to confront the city council and
mayor.113 The community’s rage inspired a lengthy
debate in the city council, which eventually decided
to review disputed water bills on a case-by-case
basis.114
The council had considered – but decided against
– forgiving the residents’ water bills and returning
them to the flat monthly fee for a period of time
to allow them to check their homes for leaks,
and to allow the company to test the meters. The
local manager for Southwest Water contested this
proposal and claimed to not have enough staff to
check the meters.115
The company still only had 20 staff members,116
even though the previous year the city had upped
its management fee to allow for 26 additional
employees.117 Then when the company didn’t have
enough employees to meet the city’s needs, it had
the gall to suggest that the city hire temporary
workers to do its job.118
During this time period (though not prompted
by the billing dispute), an independent auditor
advised the city council to take a closer look at its
contract with Southwest Water. The accounting
firm said the city had no way to evaluate the
company’s performance. “What we’re saying is that
y’all need to get a committee together to evaluate
the cost-effectiveness of this privatization,” said a
representative of the accounting firm.119
Over the next year, Southwest Water finally
intensified its efforts to collect bills, but it did so by
shutting off water to delinquent homes in a manner
that one city council member said was unjust and
discriminatory against lower income residents.
“There are customers with very large water bills that
still have water,” said councilmember Ella Holmes-
Hines, “and there are very poor people who have
had their water shut off. That’s it in a nutshell.”120
Growing bills only compounded the problem. In
2003, flat rates increased more than 22 percent
from $53 to $65 a month. Residents complained
that Southwest Water was rude to them when they
called in service requests, which sometimes went
unanswered.121
In 2004, one couple learned that they had been
paying for not only their water use, but also that
of five neighbors. Ed and Thess Ostavitz told
Southwest Water that they had water bills that said
they used several times more water than they should
be. Instead of looking into the matter, the company
merely dismissed their worries and claimed it was
probably just a leak. As the bills piled up, the cost
got particularly stressful for Thess Ostavitz after her
husband was deployed to Iraq and she was left to
care for three children and a grandchild.
When Ed Ostavitz came home, he discovered the
source of the problem – the water used by his
neighbors all went through his meter. During a
grievance meeting, he demanded that the company
correct the problem. After more than two years of
ignoring the Ostavitzs’ concerns, Southwest Water
finally listened and corrected the problem.122
But this was not the end of bad service in Gulport. A
broken sewer lift station caused sewage to spill and
a section of the county’s beach to close in 2003.123
Drainage pipes remained broken, spewing water and
flooding yards. Southwest Water employees came
out to photograph the pipeline but later admitted
they did not know what the exact problem was.124
After all these issues, and after three years of
independent auditors advising the city to do so, the
city finally decided to set performance benchmarks
for Southwest Water.125 The first report, in 2004,
showed that the company was not meeting these
standards, which the company manager then
condemned as “unreasonable and unrealistic.”
The company failed to complete too many service
requests and the completed work was often poorly
done.126
In 2005, the city had 309 unanswered service
requests, more than 1,000 in 2006 and around 500
in 2007. Despite the poor performance, the city
decided to extend the company’s contract yet again
in 2007. It gave Southwest Water the 7-year, $42
million deal in hopes that a greater performance
incentive would improve service.127 While it remains
to be seen, that goal seems like a long shot.
High Rates and Environmental Problems in
Great Falls, Mont.
Population: 56,690
Date of original privatization: 1977
Contract: 10-year, $25.7 million contract to
operate, maintain and manage a sewer treatment
plant
U.S. Filter, now called Veolia, has operated Great
Falls’ wastewater treatment plant for three decades.
In the last 10 years, mounting problems have come
to a head, with the city paying the price.
In 2000, the city faced a possible $10,000-a-day
fine after the wastewater plant dumped 500 gal-
lons of wastewater into a creek in the second such
spill that year. The state Department of Health and
Environmental Control gave the Veolia-operated
plant an unsatisfactory rating during an inspection
because of inoperable machinery and high chlorine
levels.128
The same year, the Environmental Protection
Agency proposed a $134,000 fine for the city for al-
legedly failing to adequately inspect and monitor the
pretreatment of industrial wastewater.129 Veolia was
responsible for the collection and analysis of indus-
trial pretreatment samples.130
In 2005, EPA ordered the city to reduce the high
levels of hydrogen sulfide, commonly known as
“sewer gas,” in the city’s wastewater system, citing
violations of pretreatment regulations. The next
year, EPA went after the city again, this time requir-
ing it to investigate, monitor and submit a remedia-
tion plan for the sewer gas, which could pose both
acute and long-term risks to the health of wastewa-
ter system employees.131
In 2004, the city approved a 10-year, $25.7 million
contract extension with Veolia.134 As part of the deal,
the company gave the city $200,000 for economic
development and offered a $200,000 loan.135 Veo-
lia also submitted a preliminary study encouraging
the city to pursue a co-generation plant that would
produce its own energy to fuel the plant. While
the plant would cut back on the gas bill, Danbury,
Conn., rejected a similar proposal after determining
that the cost of the plant was too high and the pay-
back period too long to make it worthwhile. Not only
is the construction expensive, but cogeneration also
increases labor costs.136
Nevertheless, the city responded favorably to
Veolia’s proposal and hired the company to do a
$60,000 study of the feasibility of upgrading the
wastewater plant to recycle gases from sewage
digesters and capture wind energy to power the
plant.137
Unsurprisingly, Veolia found that the $2.45 million
cogeneration plant was feasible, saying it would pay
for itself over the 20-year life of the bonds. The city
charged ahead with the project in 2005.138 Over the
next three years, Veolia’s monthly fees increased
nearly 25 percent, from $181,300 in August 2005, to
$212,571 plus a $12,500 monthly improvement fee
in August 2008.139,140

Sewer rates increased 2 percent in 2004, up to

$15.42 a month, in part to help cover unknown
costs at wastewater treatment plant.132 A few years
earlier, a man tore off his shirt during a city com-
mission hearing on water and sewer rate increases.
The mayor remembers the message: “You might as
well take the shirt off my back, too.” In 2003, sewer
rates jumped 8.1 percent. Over the ten-year period
from 1994 to 2003, the average annual sewer rate
increase was 4.2 percent – more than the 3.1 per-
cent average increase for water and the 2 percent for
stormwater.133
Main Breaks and Boil-Water Alerts in
Hoboken, N.J.
Population: 35,000
Date of original privatization: 1994
Contract: 10-year contract to operate, maintain
and manage the water system
Ever since United Water took over Hoboken’s
water system in 1994, 141 water outages, boil-only
advisories and water main breaks have plagued the
city.
When the company took over the operation and
management of the water system, it paid the city
an upfront fee of $5.5 million, which it planned to
recover over the next decade by sending household
bills through the roof.142 The company was not
expecting to have to repair pipelines.
The first major water line breaks occurred within
a year and a half, causing other cities to rethink
potential privatizations with the company.143 The
broken lines disrupted service throughout the
county, and combined with lagging earnings, they
frustrated and angered many of the company’s
shareholders. At a May 1996 meeting, one
stockholder shouted, “I’m sick and tired of losing
money.”144
Just a few months later, a storm knocked out power
to the company’s water treatment plant and more
than 200,000 New Jersey residents, including those
in Hoboken, had to boil their water for four days. A
working generator would have prevented this crisis,
but the company had failed to repair its back-up
power source for more than a year.145 The residents
had to pay for the company’s negligence.
In December 1998, about 300,000 people in Jersey
City, Hoboken and Lyndhurst lost water service for
a day after a construction company hit two water
mains. The construction company said United
Water had failed to mark the piping, as required
by state law.146 In 2000, state regulator fined the
corporation $24,000 for failing to mark one pipeline
and $2,000 for improperly marking another. In
1999, a ruptured water line delayed a rail service
with 8,000 commuters on their way to work.147
Despite the problems, Hoboken extended its
contract with United Water for another 10 years,
through 2024. United Water paid the city a $2.7
million upfront fee plus $300,000 for meter reading
technology and promised to make $350,000 a year
in system improvements.148
Residents continued to experience problems.
In 2002, another broken water line reduced
water pressure and potentially contaminated
drinking water in Hoboken. United Water told the
community to boil the water before consumption.149
A year later, thousands of Jersey City residents
lost water, and all Hoboken residents had to boil
their water after a pipeline burst. Fire hydrants had
inadequate water pressure, leaving the city in “a
precarious situation,” according to the Jersey City
Fire Department director. Schools closed. A hospital
lost water service. When the former Jersey City
mayor called United Water, a company employee
told him, “It’s a holiday and there’s nobody here.”150
In 2007 another pipeline ruptured, disrupting
Hoboken’s water service and flooding several
streets.151 Widespread outages and low pressure
affected thousands of residents. With main breaks
such a common occurrence, United Water should
have been well prepared to deal with them, but this
time, the company had failed to adequately notify
its Hoboken customers. The company had not yet
connected the city to its alert system, leaving people
ill informed.152
In 2008, another pipeline broke, unleashing a
geyser of water and flooding nearby cars. Several
residents lost service for several hours and others
had low pressure and black water.153
Bursting pipelines surely lost a considerable amount
of water, and officials became concerned that United
Water might be draining the county reservoir. The
company was drawing close to its state allotment,
including 7 million gallons of surplus water that
could be used for future deals. Jersey City gave
the company a poor performance rating in 2004
because of its excessive water withdrawals, poor
service and failure to repair leaks.154
Rate and Quality Concerns in Wilsonville,
Ore.
Population: 200,000
Date of original privatization: 2002
Contract: 5-year, $8.5 million contract to operate
and maintain the water system

The idea to treat and drink Willamette River

water came from a 1994 study by Montgomery
Watson,155 the engineering firm that five years later
in 1999 would win a $42 million deal to design and
construct such a treatment plant.156 Before winning
the deal, the corporation hired the water district
director who helped lead the suburban effort to use
the river water,157 and the city changed its bidding
rules to award the contract not based on lowest cost
but on a number of factors, including key personnel
and financial capacity.158

From the beginning, many people in the county

opposed getting their drinking water from the river.
But the water agency spent tax dollars lobbying
against anything that would threaten its plan.159
A series of lawsuits challenged everything from
the validity of the residents’ vote approving the
project to whether the city had followed the proper
procedures in switching to the new water source.
Every lawsuit failed.160
Environmental Noncompliance in Keystone,
The high cost of building the new treatment plant S.D.
sent water rates skyrocketing. By 2001, the city had Population: 300 (8,000 max)
the second highest rates of all the 34 cities in the Date of original privatization: 2000
Portland-Vancouver area. The typical household Contract: 20-year, $10 million contract to design,
was paying $64 a month.161 build and operate a sewer treatment plant

A year after officials turned on the tap at the new
plant – operated by Veolia – several families were
still worried about the quality of their water.162 The
Tualatin Valley Water District, which owns a 40
percent stake in the water plant, decided to audit
the plant. A consultant for the district found that the
chemical samples taken during the plant’s design
and construction were inadequately controlled and
documented.163
Every summer, this small town near Mount
Rushmore swells from a population of 300 to 8,000
as tourists flood its roads. In 1999, Keystone gave
a 20-year, $10 million contract to a subsidiary
of Southwest Water to design, build, finance and
operate a wastewater treatment plant.164
In May 2004 and again in May 2008, EPA had
to take informal enforcement actions against the
wastewater system under the Clean Water Act.
Over the past three years, the treatment plant had
been in permit noncompliance four separate times
for discharging wastewater with fecal coliform,
biological oxygen demand (BOD) or a pH above
permitted levels. In one instance, the discharge had
fecal coliform bacteria 370 percent above its legal
limit.165
High Rates, Low Pressure, Poor Quality in
Bexar County, Texas
Population: 110,000
Date of original privatization: 1998
Contract: 10-year, $30 million contract to design,
build and operate a water treatment plant
In 1998, Bexar Metropolitan Water District gave
United Water a 10-year, $30 million contract to
design, build, operate and manage a new surface
water treatment plant.166
Over the next several years, water rates grew
steadily. The water district hiked rates by an
average of 35 percent in 2001, 4 percent in 2002
and 5 percent in 2003. It needed the extra revenue
to cover new costs associated with the water
treatment plant, among other expenses.167 In 2006,
high demand was straining the treatment capacity
of the facility, leaving several residents with low
pressure.168 As a drought stressed water supplies,
the district board declared a crisis for the area
served by United Water’s treatment plant. Residents
worried that such low pressure would hinder their
ability to fight fires.169
By 2004, the district needed to expand the plant to
accommodate population growth. Partly because of
this project, it blew its budget by 24 percent, or $8.2
million, that year, even though operating revenues
were 5.1 percent higher than expected.170
The water district had a contract with another
corporation – Canyon Lake Water Supply Corp. –
for a different treatment plant. This privatization
caused another string of problems for the residents
in 2005. High levels of trihalomethane, a byproduct
of the plant’s treatment process, polluted the
water for more than a year. As a result, the water
district had to shell out $200 home water filtration
systems to every household in the Bulverde Hills
subdivision.171
Buy Back Cuts Costs in El Paso County, Texas
Population: 16,000
Date of original privatization: 1994
Contract: 20-year, $22 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the water and sewer
systems
In 1999, El Paso County Water Authority awarded
Southwest Water’s Eco Resources a 20-year, $22
million contract to operate and maintain its water
and sewer systems. As part of the deal, Southwest
Water would finance, build and operate a $6.7
million water treatment plant, which would serve
residents in Horizon City, Texas.172 Through a build-
own-transfer deal, the corporation owned and
operated the plant and received about $58,400 a
month in lease payments from the authority.
Several residents feared their water or tax rates
might have to increase after five years because of
the deal. “What if we can’t buy the plant,” asked one
resident, “or it’s sold to us at a very high price? I’d
like to see the part about no new taxes or new water
rates in writing.”173
Horizon’s mayor even had reservations about
the new plant, calling the entire proposal process
rushed. “Why did it become an emergency all of a
sudden when we’ve known for several years that we
needed to do some serious long-term planning?”
Mayor Tom Ruiz asked. “I’m not sure we looked at
all the viable options first.”174
Fortunately, the water authority secured a $7.8
million loan to purchase Southwest Water’s
treatment plant by 2001. The authority said that a
public buyout would lower costs and forestall rate
hikes.175
Discrimination and high rates in
Gladewater, Texas
Population: 6,800
Date of original privatization: 1996
Contract: 10-year, $2.8 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the water and sewer systems
Since 1996, Veolia subsidiary U.S. Filter has been
operating and managing Gladewater’s entire public
works system, including the water and sewer utili-
ties.176
In 2002, when Mayor John Paul Tallent was tempo-
rarily acting as the city manager, he decided to use
his time to go out in the fields with Veolia and over-
see their operations. He went with the corporation
to ensure that water and sewer line services were ex-
tended to African American neighborhoods, which
he said were being neglected.177
With the mayor’s eyes on them, Veolia began
clearing ditches that had not been cleaned for 10
to 15 years. “They’ve been put on the back burner,”
Tallent said. “Well, I’m going to put these people
on the front burner. That’s my No. 1 goal now to get
these streets in the black neighborhoods cleaned up.
If you get them cleaned up, most people will take
care of it, but it is our responsibility to get them
cleaned up.”178
Tallent said that while the corporation was repairing
the leaks, the system, nevertheless, was experiencing
numerous line breaks.179 The same year, the city
raised water rates by 20 percent to $1.50 per 1,000
gallons.180 For residents who lived outside the city,
the increase was far steeper.
Clarksville City, a community of 800 that bought
wholesale water from Gladewater, balked at a
proposed rate hike. When its water rates jumped by
80 percent and its wastewater rates by 160 percent,
Clarksville refused to pay them. So, Veolia shut off
its water service, leaving the entire community high
and dry. The Texas Commission for Environmental
Quality had to intervene and force the city to restore
water service to Clarksville.181 A long fight ensued.
After more than a year of mediations and more than
$200,000 in legal fees, the cities finally arrived at a
solution. Clarksville agreed to a rate hike, but also
laid out plans to build its own water and wastewater
treatment plans.182
By 2007, Gladewater had one of the highest water
rates in East Texas.183 Meanwhile, service was
questionable. Veolia officials could not explain
why a water pump that was fewer than three years
old would break. The city had to shell out another
$4,300 to purchase a new pump.184
Steadily Climbing Rates in Seattle, Wash.
Population: 1,300,000
Date of original privatization: 1997
Contract: 25-year, $109 million contract to design,
build and operate a water treatment plant
In 1997, Seattle awarded a water contract to Philips
Services Corp., which later became a subsidiary of
Azurix, Enron’s debacle of a water corporation that
American Water eventually bought. The company
got a 25-year contract to design, build and operate a
new water treatment plant on the Tolt River.185
It wasn’t long before suburban customers of the
Seattle water utility were feeling the pinch. In the
fall of 1997, Bothell City had to boost its rates to
cover system maintenance costs and increases
in wholesale prices of water bought from Seattle.
“We are extremely sensitive to wholesale water
prices,” said Lynn Guttman, Bothell’s public works
director.186
Then in 1998, the city announced that water rates
would double within a decade. Although the city’s
rates were already more than the national average,
the cost of water was going to climb by 9 percent
a year. Seattle raised rates not only for their
residents, but also all for the 18 cities and water
districts that rely on Seattle’s water. Three-fourths
of King County residents got their water from the
city. These communities had to share the burden
as corporations built and operated two big-ticket
projects – the water treatment plants.187
The Tolt treatment plant opened at the end of 2000.
Originally slated to cost $68 million, the plant
actually set the city back $76 million. As Azurix
put the finishing touches on this project, the city
jumped into negotiations for its next one – a water
treatment plant on the Cedar River.188
CH2M Hill won the $109 million contract, with $78
million to build the plant and $31 million to operate
and maintain it for 25 years.189 At the same time
that the corporation broke ground on the new plant
in 2002, residents learned their bills would jump
14.5 percent over the next two years, from $19.14 to
$22.27 a month.190
The rate hikes didn’t end there. In 2006, the mayor
proposed raising rates by 4.1 percent a year for the
next three years,191 and two years later, the utility
proposed increasing water rates by 40 percent over
the next three years. By 2011, the typical family
could be paying a monthly water bill of $34.52 –
$10 dollars more than the $24.61 they paid in 2008.
The utility said the increased revenue would cover
debt payments on the new treatment plants.192
Sewage Spills in Milwaukee, Wis.
Population: 1,100,000
Date of original privatization: 1998
Contract: 10-year, $391 million contract to operate,
maintain and manage the sewer system.

Ten years of Suez operating its sewer system left

Milwaukee with a pile of environmental problems,
and Veolia can only be expected to add to the heap.

Billions of gallons of raw and partially treated

sewage have poured into Lake Michigan and local
streams since United Water (owned by Suez) took
over the system in 1998. Many of the spills were
blamed on heavy rains, but others were the fault of
employees and malfunctioning equipment.

In one incident alone, 1.5 billion gallons of raw

sewage spilled in May 2004, marking the second-
largest mishap since Milwaukee’s “Deep Tunnel”
system opened in 1993. City officials blamed the
rain, but the accident led state legislators to call for
an investigation.193

The spill came one year after a city-appointed

auditor raised questions about United Water’s
management, including whether the company
cut staff too drastically (from 300 to 209) and
whether it had a sufficient inventory of spare
parts. A backlog of uncorrected problems had
also accumulated – some dating back more than a
year.194

This audit came one year after a state review

found United Water likely violated its contract
by shutting down pumps to cut costs – a practice
that saved the company $515,000, but which also
caused the dumping of more than 100 million
gallons of sewage.195 The city threatened to void
its contract with United Water if “persistent and
repeated failures” continued.196
The contract saved the city about $1 million more
per year than United Water promised,197 but
at what environmental costs? On top of public
relations headaches, Suez acknowledged it lost
money on the deal198 – a half-million dollars in
energy costs in May 2005 alone.199
officials gave the deal to Veolia – another French
multinational and the only other company vying
for it – with the expectation of great cost savings
from Veolia’s no-profit bid.200, 201
Whether Veolia will better serve the city and meet
environmental regulations remains to be seen,
but based on its record, including sewage spills in
Burlingame and Richmond, Calif. – Veolia seems
likely to continue in the noncompliant tradition of
its fellow French conglomerate.

After giving United Water at least 20 notices

of contract non-compliance, the city decided
against renewing its contract in 2007. Instead,
Endnotes
1 “Discolored water no cause for health risk.” Valley Times-News
(Lanett, AL), Aug. 4, 2006.
2 SDWIS Violation Report – water quality violations for Chattahoochee
Valley Water Supply Dist. (1998 - 2008), Office of Water, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency. Available at www.epa.gov/enviro/
html/sdwis/sdwis_ov.html.
3 Leech, Marie. “Residents question sewer sale, fee increase.”
Birmingham News, Oct. 1, 2003.
4 Leech, Marie. “Group’s advice on sewer sale: FLUSSSH it.”
Birmingham News, June 23, 2005.
5 Wilstach, Nancy. “Sewer rates to climb if Shelby takes offer.”
Birmingham News, Aug. 6, 2003.
6 Leech, 2003, op. cit.
7 Leech, 2005, op. cit.
8 Wilstach, Nancy. “Residents protest Shelby sewer sale.” Birmingham
News, June 30, 2005.
9 Ibid.
10 Leech, 2003, op. cit.
11 “Southwest Water to acquire wastewater utility; transaction expands
company’s presence in Alabama.” Business Wire, Sept. 20, 2005.
12 McIntryre, Karen. “Corning water cost increases.” Red Bluff Daily
News, Feb. 28, 2008.
13 Crow, C. Jerome. “Corning passes audit, increases sewer fees for new
businesses.” Red Bluff Daily News, Dec. 2, 2003.
14 Crow, C. Jerome. “Corning residents protest rate hikes.” Red Bluff
Daily News, April 19, 2004.
15 Crow, C. Jerome. “Corning Council to set public hearing on proposed
fee increases.” Red Bluff Daily News, Jan. 28, 2004.
16 Crow, April 19, 2004, op. cit.
17 MacEachern, Michelle. “Corning gets $3.8 million loan to expand
sewer plant.” Chico Enterprise-Record (CA), Sept. 15, 2004.
18 McIntryre, op. cit.
19 Krasnowski, Matt. “McDonald reports back to prison; appeal
denied.” Copley News Service, April 25, 2006.
20 Rohrlich, Ted. “2 on water board accused of extortion; a
congresswoman’s son is arrested in a case linked to Carson political
scandal.” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 1, 2003.
21 Krasnowski, Matt. “McDonald found guilty on 10 felony counts.”
Copley News Service, Oct. 21, 2004.
22 Krasnowski, April 25, 2006, op. cit.
23 Krasnowski, Oct. 21, 2004, op. cit.
24 Rohrlich, op. cit.
25 Krasnowski, Matt. “Federal fraud trial for water official underway.”
Copley News Service, Oct. 6, 2004.
26 Krasnowski, Matt. “Hardeman gets one year, one day; last defendant
in Carson corruption probe.” Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA), Oct. 13,
2004.
27 Rohrlich, op. cit.
28 Krasnowski, Feb. 13, 2006, op. cit.
29 Krasnowski, April 25, 2006, op. cit.
30 Krasnowski, Matt. “McDonald gets 41 months after tearfully asking
for leniency.” Copley News Service, Feb. 14, 2005.
31 Tokarski, Kelly. “San Juan Capistrano.” Orange County Register,
Sept. 5, 2002.
32 Tokarski, Kelly. “Prepare to pay more for water // water bills
increase by 5 percent.” Orange County Register, Sept. 4, 2003.
33 Perez, Erica. “Water world – City officials explain the reasons behind
an impending water rate hike.” Capistrano Valley News: Orange
County Register weekly, May 13, 2004.
34 Emery, Sean. “Water plan calls for likely rate increase.” Capistrano
Valley News: Orange County Register weekly, Feb. 22, 2007.
35 Tokarski, 2003, op. cit.
36 Ibid.
37 “CEO interview: A Garnier – Southwest Water Company (SWWC).”
Wall Street Transcript, Nov. 15, 2004.
38 Potter, Angela. “A tale of two plants.” Dana Point News: Orange
County Register weekly, Nov. 8, 2007.
39 Emery, Sean. “Residents push city to clear up water problems.”
Orange County Register, Feb. 2, 2008.
40 Potter, 2007, op. cit.
41 Emery, op. cit.
42 “City’s groundwater recovery plant set to start running within 10
days.” City of San Juan Capistrano, July 28, 2008, available at www.
sanjuancapistrano.org/index.aspx?recordid=790&page=29.
43 Ibid.
44 Emery, Sean and Jolly, Vik. “Well with traces of MTBE shut down.”
Orange County Register, Jan. 26, 2008.
45 Solov, Dean. “City OKs water, sewer rate increase.” Tampa Tribune,
June 28, 1995.
46 Solov, Dean. “Council orders survey of water, sewer records.” Tampa
Tribune, July 20, 1995.
47 Behrendt, Barbara. “Water rate changes would hit some hard.” St.
Petersburg Times, April 30, 1996.
48 Ibid.
49 Lesley, Elena. “Sewage system will get more use.” St. Petersburg
Times, Dec. 14, 2005.
50 Vadarevu, Raghuram. “Water disparity puzzles officials.” St.
Petersburg Times, Dec. 17, 2004.
51 Lesley, Elena. “Sewage system will get more use.” St. Petersburg
Times, Dec. 14, 2005.
52 “Minutes of the Crystal River city council regular council meeting.”
Crystal River City Council, City of Crystal River, March 24, 2008.
53 “Tampa Bay desalinated water will be the cheapest in the world.”
Canada News Wire, Feb. 22, 1999.
54 Anderson, Zac. “Is there salvation in desalination?” Sarasota
Herald-Tribune, June 15, 2008.
55 Ibid.
56 Pittman, Craif. “Desal plant builder insists it will complete the
project.” St. Petersburg Ties, Jan. 29, 2002.
57 Stockfisch, Jerome R. and Johnson, Neil. “Obstacles swamp
desalination plant.” Tampa Tribune, Oct. 19, 2003.
58 Ibid.
59 Salinero, Mike. “Desalination Plant Ok’d to join system.” Tampa
Tribune, Deb. 18, 2007.
60 Anderson, Zac. “Is there salvation in desalination?” Sarasota
Herald-Tribune, June 15, 2008.
61 Salinero, op. cit.
62 “American Water-Pridesa secures contract to remedy and operate
the Tampa Bay Seawater Desalination Plant.” Business Wire, Nov. 16,
2006.
63 Salinero, op. cit.
64 “American Water-Pridesa secures contract to remedy and operate
the Tampa Bay Seawater Desalination Plant,” op. cit.
65 Johnson, Neil. “Desalination plant misses 2nd deadline for repairs.”
Tampa Tribune, Dec. 19, 2006.
66 Salinero, op. cit.
67 Pittman, Craig. “5 years late, 4M gallons short.” St. Petersburg
Times, Jan. 26, 2008.
68 Pittman, Craig. “Desalination plant flushes too much waste.” St.
Petersburg Times, March 1, 2008.
69 “Desalination: doing it right – Environmental, fiscal questions
remain unanswered.” Daytona Beach News-Journal, June 8, 2008.
70 Pittman, Craig. “Reservoir’s cracks a stubborn mystery.” St.
Petersburg Times, Aug. 19, 2008.
71 Saxton, Jennifer Kapiolani. “Edwardsville city council approves
water contract.” Belleville News-Democrat (IL), Sept. 5, 2002.
72 Gehling, Becky. “City facing water woes.” Edwardsville Intelligencer
(IL), Sept. 17, 2002.
73 Gehling, Becky. “Council gets report from public works.”
Edwardsville Intelligencer (IL), April 3, 2003.
74 Saxton, Jennifer Kapiolani. “City fixes old water main pipe – breaks
would force businesses to close.” Belleville News-Democrat (IL), Nov.
19, 2003.
75 Wilkinson, Krista. “Computer blamed for city’s water woes.”
Edwardsville Intelligencer (IL), Feb. 5, 2005.
76 Davidson, Hilary. “Officials say water rate hike necessary.”
Edwardsville Intelligencer (IL), Oct. 24, 2005.
77 Caldwell, Lori. “Sewage plant goes private.” Post-Tribune (IN), Feb.
11, 1998.
78 Caldwell, Lori. “City sewer spat spills into court.” Post-Tribune (IN),
March 2, 1998.
79 Caldwell, Feb. 11, 1998, op. cit.
80 Zorn, Tim. “Name to change at Gary sewers.” Post-Tribune (IN),
Aug. 10, 2003.
81 Caldwell, Feb. 11, 1998, op. cit.
82 Caldwell, Lori. “Workers offered bid for buyout.” Post-Tribune (IN),
June 3, 1999.
83 Caldwell, March 2, 1998, op. cit.
84 Caldwell, Lori. “Privatize lawsuits adding up.” Post-Tribune (IN),
March 6, 1998.
85 Caldwell, Lori. “Council’s lawsuit dismissed.” Post-Tribune (IN),
June 6, 1998.
86 Caldwell, Lori. “Suit says privatizing is racial – it claims privatization
of the Gary sanitary district is intended to replace black managers.”
Post-Tribune (IN), Feb. 26, 1998.
87 Caldwell, Lori. “Sanitary district bid ok’d.” Post-Tribune (IN), April
11, 1998.
88 DeNeal, Lisa. “Foes flap at city hall sewer rally.” Post-Tribune (IN),
April 19, 1998.
89 Sarver, Scheffie. “Sinkhole swamps homes in Gary.” Post-Tribune
(IN), July 28, 2003.
90 Zorn, Tim. “Filling in sewer sinkholes a big task for Gary.” Post-
Tribune (IN), Aug. 2, 2003.
91 Grimm Andy. “Sewage alert lacking during flood.” Post-Tribune
(IN), Sept. 24, 2006.
92 Siedel, Jon. “Glen Park neighborhood deluged by flooding again.”
Post-Tribune (IN), Jan. 6, 2007.
93 Ibid.
94 Siedel, Jon. “Gary makes new push for sewer repair.” Post-Tribune
(IN), Feb. 10, 2008.
95 Grimm Andy. “Feds looking into Gary Sanitary’s plant operations.”
Post-Tribune (IN), April 6, 2008.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Mao, Phillippe. ”Water with a French touch.” Forbes 154(6):
212-213, Sept. 12, 1994.
99 Soltis, Dan. “United Water contract extended for Indianapolis
partnership.” Water Engineering & Management 145(1):8, January
1998.
100 “City of Indianapolis agrees to make $1.86 billion in improvements
to sewer system.” US Fed News Service, Oct. 4, 2006.
101 O’Shaughnessy, Brendan. “Business woes plague council
president.” Indianapolis Star, Jan. 28, 2007.
102 O’Shaughnessy, Brendan. “Republicans keep the heat on Gray.”
Indianapolis Star, Oct. 10, 2007.
103 O’Shaughnessy, Brendan. “Gray faces 2 investigations.”
Indianapolis Star, Aug. 3, 2008.
104 Pender, Geoff. “Privatization considered city hopes to unburden
busy public works.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), Nov. 17, 1998.
105 Pender, Geoff. “City agrees to turn over water, sewer to company.”
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), Sept. 15, 1999.
106 Pender, 1998, op. cit.
107 Cummings, Mike. “Optech deal questioned – Gulfport told to check
contract’s cost-effectiveness.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), July 2, 2002.
108 Ibid.
109 Dockins, Metric. “Gulfport wants to get utility collections flowing.”
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), Jan. 23, 2001.
110 Wilemon, Tom. “Sewage flow fouls.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), May
20, 2001.
111 “Business digest- Southwest Water unit has pact renewed.”
Pasadena Star-News (CA), Oct. 5, 2001.
112 Scallan, Melissa M. “Gulfport approves new water-sewer contract
with optech.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), Sept. 28, 2001.
113 Cummings, Mike. “Boiling over high water bills, Orange Grove
residents are steamed.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), June 25, 2002.
114 Cummings, Mike. “Flat rate wont’ be reinstated – water bills to be
reviewed on case-by –case basis.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), July 10,
2002.
115 Cummings, Mike. “Optech: Not enough workers to check meters.”
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), June 26, 2002.
116 Ibid.
117 Scallan, op. cit.
118 Cummings, June 26, 2002, op. cit.
119 Cummings, July 2, 2002, op. cit.
120 Cummings, Mike. “Gulfport adopts tough stance on late water
bills.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), Feb. 1, 2003.
121 Cummings, Mike. “Flat water fee unfair, customer says.” Sun
Herald (Biloxi, MS), Nov. 1 , 2003.
122 Dash, Tracy. “Gulfport, Miss., couple tries to get reimbursement for
water bill overpayments.” Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS), Nov. 1, 2004.
123 Musgrave, Beth. “Beach around Debuys closes.” Sun Herald (Biloxi,
MS), May 13, 2003.
124 Fitzgerald, Robin. “Oak lane tired of backyard ‘pool.’” Sun Herald
(Biloxi, MS), July 1, 2003.
125 Cummings, Mike. “Gulfport to grade Optech.” Sun Herald (Biloxi,
MS), Sept. 24, 2003.
126 Cummings, Mike. “Optech takes issue with memo.” Sun Herald
(Biloxi, MS), Feb. 4, 2004.
127 Lafontaine, Ryan. “Satisfaction with Gulfport’s Optech slipped in
2006: City hopes new contract will spark improvement.” Sun Herald
(Biloxi, MS), March 10, 2007.
128 “Great Falls might be fined for sewage spill.” Associated Press, Dec.
22, 2000.
129 Puckett, Karl. “City facing $134,000 EPA fine.” Great Falls
Tribune, Dec. 28, 2000.
130 “Great falls, Mont., extends Veolia Water’s wastewater partnership
for ten more years.” Business Wire, Sept. 27, 2004.
131 “EPA requires city of Great Falls to investigate sewer gas.” US Fed
News, April 4, 2006.
132 Wilmot, Paula. “City proposes water rate increase.” Great Falls
Tribune, March 17, 2004.
133 Wilmot, Paula. “City considers hikes.” Great Falls Tribune, April
19, 2004.
134 “Great falls, Mont., extends Veolia Water’s wastewater partnership
for ten more years.” Business Wire, Sept. 27, 2004.
135 Downey, Mark. “City commission approves waste contract.” Great
Falls Tribune, Aug. 18, 2004.
136 Wilmot, Paula. “City pondering a self-sufficient treatment plant.”
Great Falls Tribune, March 15, 2004.
137 Wilmot, April 19, 2004, op. cit.
138 Wilmot, Paula. “City decides to pursue co-generation project during
sewage processing.” Great Falls Tribune, Aug. 4, 2005.
139 “Budget or contract claims in excess of $5000,” Agenda 8, City
Controller, City Commission, City of Great Falls, Montana, Aug. 2,
2005.
140 “Invoices or claims in excess of $5000,” Agenda 8, Fiscal Services
Director, Commission Agenda Report, City of Great Falls, Montana,
Aug. 19, 2008.
141 Hendren, John. “Hoboken approves water deal with utility.” The
Record (N.J.), May 20, 1994.
142 Ibid.
143 DeMarrais, Kevin G. “Breaks put utility’s expansion in spotlight.”
The Record (N.J.), Feb. 8, 1996.
144 DeMarrais, Kevin G. “Frustration spills over at UWR meeting.” The
Record (N.J.), May 14, 1996.
145 Petersen, Melody. “After crisis, most water is safe to drink.” New
York Times, Aug. 28, 1996.
146 “Water main ruptures test N.J. law on digging.” New York Times,
Dec. 6, 1998.
147 “Rail service disrupted by water line break.” New York Times,
March 24, 1999.
148 DeMarrais, Kevin G. “United Water and Hoboken extend contract –
partnership to run until 2024.” The Record (N.J.), July 17, 2001.
149 “Residents urged to boil water after main breaks in Jersey City.”
New York Times, Nov. 4, 2002.
150 Conte, Michaelangelo. “Keep on boiling – Pressure restored after
main break under river; boil advisory not lifted.” Jersey Journal, Nov.
12, 2003.
151 “Water disrupted in Jersey City and Hoboken.” Associated Press,
July 15, 2007.
152 Pearson, Bernette. “Water main breaks.” Waterfront Journal (NJ),
July 19, 2007
153 Baldwin, Carly. “Broken again! 20-ft geyser on Clinton St.” Jersey
Journal, Feb. 7, 2008.
154 Frank, Al. “Water woes for supplier to Jersey City, Hoboken.”
Jersey Journal, April 15, 2004.
155 Bodine, Harry. “Use the Willamette for drinking water, study
urges.” The Oregonian, Nov. 15, 1994.
156 Tsao, Emily. “Wilsonville selects California firm for treatment
plant.” The Oregonian, Dec. 23, 1999.
157 Tsao, Emily. “Water district’s river proponent joins private firm.”
The Oregonian, Aug. 3, 1999.
158 Tims, Dana. “Wilsonville changes bid rules for plant.” The
Oregonian, Nov. 2, 1999.
159 Hansen, Jim. “Agency kills warnings on Willamette water.” The
Oregonian, Jan. 25, 2001.
160 Tims, Dana. “Wilsonville prepares switch to river water.” The
Oregonian, March 21, 2002.
161 “This week’s question what do you think would be a fair water rate
in your area?” The Oregonian, June 21, 2001.
162 Bella, Rick. “Some no longer trust tap.” The Oregonian, May 8,
2003.
163 Colby, Richard. “Willamette water samplings fall short, auditor
says.” The Oregonian, July 25, 2003.
164 “CET Environmental Services, Inc. subsidiary wins its first U.S.
wastewater privatization contract.” PR Newswire, March 4, 1998.
165 Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO) – Water –
ICIS-NPDES, Geographic Location: Keystone, SD, Southwest Water
Company,Environmental Protection Agency, accessed Sept. 23, 2008.
Available at http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/compliance_report_
water_icp.html
166 “United Water to design, build and operate ultrafiltration water
treatment plant.” PR Newswire, March 25, 1998.
167 Needham, Jerry. “Bexar Met water district is increasing rates.” San
Antonio Express-News, April 29, 2003.
168 Needham, Jerry. “Drought forcing utility to pay.” San Antonio
Express-News, July 25, 2006. 188 Higgins, Mark. “Good to the last drop – a new $76 million
169 Needham, Jerry. “BexarMet areas get ‘crisis’ label.” San Antonio treatment plant means many area residents will get water.” Seattle
Express-News, Oct. 25, 2006. Times, Dec. 23, 2000.
170 Needham, Jerry. “Bexar Met blew its budget by 24%.” San Antonio 189 Phuong, Cat Le. “Work begins on second water treatment plant.”
Express-News, Sept. 15, 2004. Seattle Post Intelligencer, June 6, 2002.
171 Pafford, Jeremy. “BexarMet water customers get filtered.” New 190 Modie, Neil. “Seattle Water rate increase passed, but is trimmed a
Braunfels Herald-Zeitung (TX), Dec. 20, 2005. bit.” Seattle Post Intelligencer, Aug. 13, 2002.
172 “El Paso Water Agency awards $22 million contract renewal and 191 “Increase in residential water rates proposed.” Seattle Post
treatment plant construction project to Southwest Water.” Business Intelligencer, March 11, 2006.
Wire, Nov. 17, 1999. 192 Chan, Sharon Pian. “More demands on your dollar.” Seattle Times,
173 Ramirez-Cadena, Cindy. “Horizon City builds treatment plant.” El Aug. 2, 2008.
Paso Times, March 6, 2000. 193 Schultze, Steve and Rohde, Marie. “Dumping of sewage second
174 Ibid. largest ever.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 20, 2004.
175 Crowder, David. “Loan will help assure water for Horizon City 194 Rohde, Marie. “Review raises concerns about sewerage upkeep.”
area.” El Paso Times, Nov. 17, 2001. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 24, 2003.
176 “Chamber of Commerce in Gladewater, Texas, selects USFilter 195 Schultze, Steve and Rohde, Marie. “Sewage dumping policies
2003 business of the year.” Business Wire, May 6, 2003. faulted.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, July 31, 2002.
177 Bostic, Patrina A. “Local: Gladewater appoints interim city 196 Rohde, Marie. “Improper maintenance blamed in dumping.”
manager.” Longview News-Journal (TX), July 29, 2003. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Sept. 21, 2002.
178 Bostic, Patrina A. “Local: Gladewater looking at balanced city 197 Rohde, Marie. “United Water delivering savings in 10-year
budget.” Longview News-Journal (TX), July 31, 2003. contract.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, June 16, 2003.
179 Bostic, Patrina A. “Local: Gladewater city council rejects bid for 198 Ibid.
removing lake sediment.” Longview News-Journal (TX), Oct. 18, 2002. 199 Ryan, Sean. “Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District saves
180 Bostic, Patrina A. “Local: Gladewater council votes to increase city money by using private contractor.” Milwaukee Daily Reporter, Aug.
sewer rate.” Longview News-Journal (TX), Nov. 22, 2002. 17, 2005.
181 Draper, James. “Local: Rate dispute leaves town high and dry.” 200 Behm, Don. “MMSD won’t renew deal with operator.” Milwaukee
Longview News-Journal (TX), Oct. 25, 2002. Journal Sentinel, Nov. 16, 2007.
182 Bostic, Patrina A. “Local: Cities reach agreement on water.” 201 “PWF’s 12th Annual Water Outsourcing Report.” Public Works
Longview News-Journal (TX), Jan. 14, 2004. Financing, March 2008.
183 Isaac, Jimmy. “White Oak to see increases in water bills, taxes;
budget OK’d.” Longview News-Journal (TX), Sept. 13, 2007.
184 Ward, Angela. “Gladewater passes 2 cent tax increase.” Longview For more information:
News-Journal (TX), Aug. 18, 2007. web: www.foodandwaterwatch.org
185 “Philip Services Corp.: Water treatment facility contract is won by
unit.” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1997.
email: info@fwwatch.org
186 Beason, Tyrone. “Bothell ponders water-rate increase – city would phone: (202) 683-2500
pass along Seattle’s higher fees.” Seattle Times, Sept. 22, 1997.
187 Mcomber, J. Martin. “Seattle water rate to double in decade – most Copyright © October 2008 Food & Water Watch
residents of King County will be affected.” Seattle Times, July 8, 1998.