Accounting Organizations and Society, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 93-99, 199 I.

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A C C O U N T I N G ELITES AND A C C O U N T I N G THEORY

PAUL M O N T A G N A B r o o k l y n College a n d C U N Y G r a d u a t e C e n t e r

Abstract

A review essay of Sten J6nsson, Accounting Regulation and Elite Structures: Driving Forces in the Development of Accounting Policy (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1988). Using a reputational and a decisional approach, the study identifies a three-tiered Swedish accounting elite of approximately 40 persons. This elite plays a significant role in establishing and maintaining accounting regulations. These regulations govern the development of accounting practice which in turn determines accounting theory. The suggestion is made that this study would benefit by more closely examining alternative paradigms and theories, which would de-emphasize the strong structuralist position taken and allow consideration of the influence of theory on practice. A metatheoretical framework is offered for consideration.

T h e r e a r e v e r y f e w e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s that e x a m i n e e l i t e s in t h e a c c o u n t i n g profession, so the appearance of Accounting Regulation and E l i t e S t r u c t u r e s b y Sten J 6 n s s o n is an i m p o r t a n t event. It is d o u b l y i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e this b o o k a t t e m p t s to p l a c e t h e analysis o f elite f u n c t i o n s within the paradigmatic framework of accounting. Unfortunately, t h e p r o j e c t d o e s n o t s u c c e e d in its b r o a d e r goal b u t m a n y significant p o i n t s a r e m a d e a l o n g t h e way. I will t r y to h i g h l i g h t t h e s e p o i n t s and e x p a n d o n e l e m e n t s o f his model. A c c o r d i n g to J6nsson, t h e p u r p o s e o f his b o o k is to d e s c r i b e t h e p r o c e s s e s in w h i c h a c c o u n t i n g elites p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c c o u n t ing n o r m s a n d policies, w h i c h p l a y a p a r t in gove r n i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w e a l t h in Sweden. T h e e l i t e in a c c o u n t i n g is d e f i n e d b y t h e s e p r o c e s s e s : it is "the g r o u p o f p e r s o n s w h o a c t i v e l y a n d w i t h a u t h o r i t y take part in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f [the rules ] o f a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e . " T w o w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d social s c i e n c e techn i q u e s a r e u s e d to identify t h e S w e d i s h a c c o u n t ing elite: t h e r e p u t a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h a n d t h e decisional a p p r o a c h . T h e r e p u t a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h asks a s a m p l e o f a g r o u p ' s m e m b e r s w h o its m o s t influential m e m b e r s are. T h e r e s e a r c h t e a m asked e i g h t p e r s o n s it c o n s i d e r e d to h a v e a g o o d overv i e w o f t h e a c c o u n t i n g field in S w e d e n to give 93

t h e n a m e s o f p e r s o n s t h e y c o n s i d e r e d to b e w e l l i n f o r m e d a b o u t d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e a c c o u n t i n g field. This r e s u l t e d in a list o f 145 p e r s o n s w h o were then asked who they thought were most i m p o r t a n t in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e . T h e final list p r o d u c e d an e l i t e o f 39 persons plus one frequently mentioned by these elites t h e m s e l v e s . T h e d e c i s i o n a l a p p r o a c h asks w h o m a k e s t h e i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n s in a g r o u p a n d h o w . Using this a p p r o a c h t h e r e s e a r c h e r s e x a m i n e d t h r e e c a s e s t u d i e s o f a c c o u n t i n g p r a c t i c e to u n c o v e r the structure of influence operating within and b e t w e e n institutions, t h e state, t h e profession, t h e c l i e n t c o r p o r a t i o n s , a n d t h e media. T w o o f t h e cases s t u d i e d d e a l t w i t h e l i t e i n f l u e n c e in S w e d i s h A c c o u n t i n g S t a n d a r d s B o a r d (Bokf o r i n g e n a m d e n ) S t a t e m e n t 14 o n a c c o u n t i n g for i n d i r e c t m a t e r i a l a n d S t a t e m e n t 11 o n a c c o u n t ing for s t a t e grants. T h e t h i r d c o n c e r n e d t h e curr e n c y t r a n s l a t i o n p r o b l e m a n d FAS No. 8.

PRACTICE AND THEORY J 6 n s s o n finds that t h e e l i t e is stratified into t h r e e levels. A t o p level o f five p e r s o n s has t h e g r e a t e s t i n f l u e n c e o n s t a n d a r d s e t t i n g and plays a c e n t r a l r o l e in t h e d e s i g n o f s o l u t i o n s to p r o b -

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PAULMONTAGNA ability to "judge the appropriateness of proposed norms." Accounting by deductive measures, setting standards through deductive reasoning, is highly improbable. Since it is not possible to conduct rational reasoningfrom more than one point of view at the same time, and since a compromisebetween existing points of view easilybecomes meaningless from a logical point of view, science probably cannot add much to the process (of standard setting) (p. 28). Thus, we must look to practice for accounting regulation and we must look to the good judgment of the elite, which has c o m p e t e n c e and experience and is a "harmonious and open group of people w h o make a point of listening to others and trying to be as fair as possible." Very clearly, J6nsson comes down on the side of realism, that we must develop theory on the basis of "observation of real conditions," we must see things m accounting practices - - as they "really are." He leaves no room for the possibility that theory might also affect practice, which is the guiding principle of the basic postulates movement. Finally, in another unrelated section of the book, JOnsson presents two accounting perspectives. The first, which he calls the consumer perspective, emphasizes output, as depicted on c o m p a n y reports. The second, the p r o d u c e r perspective, concentrates on input in the form of transactions of the company. The former focuses on the need for future-oriented or problemoriented information, i.e. business forecasts. The latter deals with such topics as information overload in annual reports and rule support for specific decision-making cases. Auditors and finance executives are producer-oriented and business pluralists and academics typically adopt the consumer perspective. Presumably, accounting as rule following is dominated by those w h o hold to the producer perspective the accounting elite, as identified byJ~Jnsson. Throughout the book there are references to perspectives, paradigms, and theories and JOnsson provides interesting reviews of the social science and philosophy of science literature which deals with these terms. But he often does

lems. The second level comprises I 0 to 15 "advocates" w h o strongly support the positions of the top five. Finally, and JOnsson is equivocal as to whether these are part of the elite, are the "active audience" of 20 or so who function as a sounding board for elite arguments and thus reinforce or muffle these arguments, depending on current attitudes. The three case studies make it clear that the accounting elite significantly influences the regulation of accounting standards. JOnsson argues that the formation of these accounting norms governs practice and practice in turn determines theory. Two conclusions follow from this: first, accounting theory is developed inductively, and second, "(A)ccounting theory cannot yet be shown to be an important driving force in the development of accounting practice." Therefore, the search for accounting theory should begin with the analysis of the normformulating structure of accountants, namely, the accounting elite - - w h o they are and h o w they choose the rules of accounting. We must develop a theory a b o u t accounting that describes what accountants do and h o w accounting develops over time. This is important to the development of a theory o f accounting (which we do not yet have) because a theory a b o u t accounting maps the norm formulating structure of accounting and describes how this structure produces accounting norms. Theories are "something demanded by practice." The question is, then, what use value should be contained in accounting regulations established from norms in accounting practice? We are not interested in what the norms of accounting should be as logically derived from deductive scientific procedures but rather h o w these norms are developed and used, as derived from systematic observation o f the accounting community. The latter is what he calls accounting as rule following and the former accounting as production of measures. J6nsson devotes an entire chapter to clarifying the differences between these two approaches. In accounting as rule following, the elite gives authority to the norms and institutions. It does so because of its professional competence, its

ACCOUNTINGELITESAND ACCOUNTINGTHEORY n o t make the linkages b e t w e e n these c o n c e p t s . Nor does he always apply t h e m to his o w n research. In an a t t e m p t to clarify his discussion, I have c o n s t r u c t e d a chart ( T a b l e 1 ) w h i c h provides a historical o v e r v i e w of the relationships a n d differences b e t w e e n paradigms, theories, a n d u n d e r l y i n g assumptions, t T h e d i c h o t o m y in each paradigm is based o n a f r a m e w o r k for explaining p a r a d i g m s t r u c t u r e in sociology b y Ritzer (1975). In effect, t h e r e are three levels to consider. Paradigms c o m p r i s e the m i d d l e level; t h e y constitute the theories, m e t h o d s , a n d t e c h n i q u e s that c o m p r i s e a single b r o a d u n i t of c o n s e n s u s w i t h i n a d i s c i p l i n e a n d serve to differentiate o n e c o m m u n i t y or s u b c o m m u n i t y from a n o t h e r . ' T h e private value p a r a d i g m focuses o n o b t a i n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o n o b j e c t i v e m a r k e t prices. Costs reflect the value p l a c e d o n e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s b y specific individuals, i.e. the marginal utility o f products. 3 Social value a c c o u n t i n g argues that labor effort ("socially necessary labor") determ i n e s value a n d price. T h e u n d e r l y i n g presupp o s i t i o n s of b o t h these paradigms i n f l u e n c e the form a n d s t r u c t u r e of the paradigms' theories. P r e s u p p o s i t i o n s are social ontologies, statem e n t s a b o u t the n a t u r e o f the w o r l d w h i c h are largely u n p r o v a b l e a n d w h i c h s h o u l d n o t b e s e e n as having p r i o r i t y over epistemologies. 4 T h e r e are generally t w o o p p o s i n g presuppositions in social s c i e n c e paradigms w i t h i n w h i c h theories in the same p a r a d i g m m a y b e influenced. 5 Utalitarian rationality is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y self-interest as the regulator of a h a r m o n i o u s society; a n o b j e c t i v e reality w h i c h c a n b e meas u r e d to o b t a i n "true" facts, a n d an emphasis o n

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individuals as efficient p r o d u c e r s of value. Dialectic rationality assumes a d y n a m i c interaction of actors/organizations in c o n s t a n t conflict w h i c h p r o d u c e s i n n o v a t i o n a n d c h a n g e in a n d b y structures. Q u i t e possibly, those w h o hold a c o n s u m e r p e r s p e c t i v e are of the dialectic persuasion and those with a p r o d u c e r p e r s p e c t i v e a utilitarian perspective. For J6nsson, a c c o u n t i n g t h e o r y c a n effectively d e v e l o p o n l y in its p r e s e n t form - - in a stable s t r u c t u r e of elite individuals w h o give a u t h o r i t y to "the m e c h a n i s m s of n o r m formation" in the profession. But what of the a s s u m p t i o n s of these elites w h i c h i n f l u e n c e their n o r m selections, i.e. n o t o n l y w h o they are a n d h o w they c h o o s e b u t also w h y they choose. At o n e point, in a r e v i e w a n d d i s c u s s i o n of organizational decision-making, he a c k n o w l e d g e s the e x i s t e n c e of c o m p e t ing perspectives, w h i c h w o u l d indicate a plurality o f choices. But at o t h e r p o i n t s he reverts to the p o s i t i o n of i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y in a c c o u n t ing theory, that is, o n l y o n e d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m at a t i m e c a n exist in a scientific discipline. In his case it is u t i l i t a r i a n - o r i e n t e d private value acc o u n t i n g . J 6 n s s o n carefully n o t e s that a c h o i c e is p r o v i d e d b e t w e e n historical cost a n d c u r r e n t cost philosophies, as he calls them, as the EEC 4th Directive permits. But these are c h o i c e s a m o n g theories, n o t philosophies, w i t h i n the private-value paradigm. 6 I n e x a m i n i n g Kant's ethic of duties, J 6 n s s o n agrees that "there are p r o b a b l y n o e t e r n a l truths in the a c c o u n t i n g field . . . . Instead t h e r e are several legitimate free wills w h e n it c o m e s to determ i n i n g w h a t is g o o d a c c o u n t i n g practice." But he t h e n argues that if the legitimacy of several

tin developing this chart ! have relied heavily on Tinker et aL (1982) and Cooper & Sherer ( 1984). 2Thisdefinition follows Masterman (1970). See also the discussion by Alford( 1975, p. 145 ), who depicts three levels. -~Fora more complete description of the paradigms,theories, and presuppositions of this chart, see Montagna( 1986, pp. 121130). ~Fora discussion of this distinction, see Lloyd( 1986, pp. ! 36---158).Dewey ( 1929, p. 178) suggested they be called "takens" instead of givens. Gouldner ( 1970, pp. 31, 35) used the term background assumptions. I will use Max Weber's ( 1949[ 1904], p. 78) term, presuppositions. ~Fora more elaborate differentiation of presuppositions into fivesocial ontologies, see Lloyd( 1986, pp. 96, 149). At least two of the five (phenomenology and behaviorism) have been depicted by various other scholars as either theories or paradigms, indicating the degree of disagreement and confusion on this issue. Wells(1976) argues that historical cost and current cost are separate paradigms.

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ACCOUNTINGELITESAND ACCOUNTINGTHEORY p e r s p e c t i v e s is recognized, "the c o n d i t i o n s for a d e v e l o p m e n t of practice g u i d e d b y t h e o r y are n o t favourable." W h i c h again assumes that scientific paradigms are i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e . To argue, h o w e v e r , that a c c o u n t i n g is presently m u l t i p a r a d i g m a t i c ( c o m m e n s u r a b l e ) s e e m s unrealistic. T h e theories r e p r e s e n t e d in social value a c c o u n t i n g have few adherents. Even t h o u g h cost/benefit analysis has r e c e i v e d m u c h a t t e n t i o n b e c a u s e of its use in e x a m i n i n g the impacts of b u s i n e s s o p e r a t i o n s o n the envir o n m e n t , it is of little use in s u p p o r t i n g the social value paradigm. In principle, c o s t / b e n e f i t measures the m o n e t i z e d market w o r t h of social impacts. However, w i t h rare e x c e p t i o n s (e.g. Abt, 1977), the emphasis in practice has b e e n placed o n the m e a s u r e m e n t of e f f i c i e n t social values such as Pareto o p t i m a l i t y or Pareto improvem e n t , w h i c h c o n c e n t r a t e o n the o b j e c t i v e rationality o f markets and i n d i v i d u a l decisionmaking. Measures of e f f e c t i v e n e s s D the results of c h o i c e s limited b y imperfect c o m p e t i t i o n , imperfect k n o w l e d g e of markets, a n d sex, race, age a n d e t h n i c factors - - are almost n e v e r considered. In theory, cost/benefit is social value acc o u n t i n g b u t in p r a c t i c e it is private-value oriented. Even less a c k n o w l e d g e d is political e c o n o m y a c c o u n t i n g , w h i c h emphasizes the results of conflict b e t w e e n g r o u p s a n d the effects of the m e a s u r e m e n t process o n the systems b e i n g measured. A s t r o n g social value p a r a d i g m may n o t materialize, b u t a c c o u n t i n g will have to c o n f r o n t the q u e s t i o n s this paradigm poses if it is to cont i n u e its d e v e l o p m e n t as a social science. 7 THEORY AND PRACTICE

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T h e q u e s t i o n remains, c a n t h e o r y inform practice? At o n e point, J 6 n s s o n argues that t h e r e s h o u l d b e a " m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e relation" bet w e e n t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e in a c c o u n t i n g . However, again he reverts back to his original position: it is necessary to s t u d y p r a c t i c e a n d t h e n c h o o s e a theoretical approach. "Such a s t u d y of practice w o u l d have to b e c o n d u c t e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s that constitute the choice. "8 Therefore, a c c o u n t i n g elites s h o u l d s t u d y w h a t exists, c o m p l e t e l y dissociating t h e m s e l v e s from t h e o r e t i c a l influences, a n d t h e r e b y w o u l d r e a c h a logical, rational c o n c l u sion based o n the e v i d e n c e o f p r a c t i c e alone. T h e s e elites are therefore n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a n y special interests b u t i n s t e a d serve the greater good. In a sociological c o n t e x t , this c o n s e n s u s based, structuralist analysis is best d e s c r i b e d as a social facts paradigm (Ritzer, 1975, p. 7). 9 JGnsson, h o w e v e r , c h a r a c t e r i z e s his a p p r o a c h as W e b e r i a n , which, he emphasizes, c o n c e n t r a t e s o n b o t h the rationalizing effects o f b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n and the i n n o v a t i v e effects of charismatic leadership. H o w e v e r , his m o d e l is averse to a n y t h i n g b u t the most gradual e v o l u t i o n a r y change; it is m o r e akin to P a r s o n i a n s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m (Parsons, 1937, 1 9 5 1 ) than to W e b e r ' s ideas a b o u t social behavior, class a n d status-group divisions, and b u r e a u c r a t i c domin a t i o n ( W e b e r , 1946 [ 1922]). I Elites i n v o l v e d in a c c o u n t i n g regulation, then, are m e r e p i e c e s in a system of n o r m s and institu-

"Most social sciences recognize at least three major perspectives (i.e. paradigms): positive, interpretive, and critical. For a historical review of these perspectives see Levine(1985). Montagna(1980) discusses their use in the study of organizations and occupations, Chua (1986) in accounting, and Mirowski(1988) in economics. aThe theoretical approaches cited are those of the American Accounting Association,Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance ( 1977 ): classical "true income;" decision usefulness; information economics. 9Ritzer describes this paradigm as follows: People's behavior is controlled by norms, values and social control agencies. External social constraints determine behavior. The focus is on structure. Institutions control the individual. Usesprimarily questionnaires and interviews. Occasionally combined with historical method. The major theories are structural functionalism,conflict theory, macrosocioiogy, and systems theory. mlnterestingly,both Weber and Parsons can be located in the same social facts paradigm. However, as with most renowned social theorists, they are found in more than one paradigm - - they are paradigm bridgers. Weber's concept of social action as subjective would also place him in the interpretive paradigm (see note 7 above). The theories that have stood the test of time expand beyond the boundaries of a single paradigm.

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PAULMONTAGNA factors that p r o v i d e a labor m a r k e t s h e l t e r for this el i t e g r o u p ? W e d o n o t k n o w b e c a u s e t h e alt e r n a t e v i e w is n o t c o n s i d e r e d , t t T h e o r y n e c e s s a r i l y g u i d e s p r a c t i c e . It d o e s so in s t u d i e s a b o u t a c c o u n t i n g , i n c l u d i n g a c c o u n t ing elites, as w e l l as t h e st u d i es o f a c c o u n t i n g p r act i ce. T h e J 0 n s s o n s t u d y c e n t e r s o n a highly s t r u c t u r a l i s t f r a m e w o r k in e x a m i n i n g a c c o u n t ing elites and identifies o n l y t h e d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m in a c c o u n t i n g . In a w o r k w i t h s u c h a b r o a d goal o n e m u s t identify t h e frames o f refere n c e o f t h e s e p o l i c y m a k e r s and h o w t h ese idea s y s t e m s differentially affect t h e issues b e i n g faced, i

tions in w h i c h t h e r u l e s are an o b v i o u s and logical o u t c o m e o f t h e rational r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f reality. Institutions d e t e r m i n e th e individual. Institutionalized practice shapes individual i d i o s y n c r a s i e s e x p r e s s e d in th e o r y . This is hardly a d e s c r i p t i o n o f h o w t h e p r o c e s s s h o u l d b e " o p e n to n e w ideas a n d to s t i m u l a t e debate." T h e r e is n o r e a s o n to d o u b t that th e S w e d i s h a c c o u n t i n g elite is o p e n to n e w ideas and that it a t t e m p t s to s t i m u l a t e d e b a t e in t h e discipline. But to w h a t e x t e n t a r e th e ideas and d e b a t e s lim i t e d b y t h e elite's o w n p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and paradigm? R el at ed to this is t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e s e elites are r e c r u i t e d . D o t h e y fall into th e s e p o s i t i o n s o n the basis o f t h e i r effort in a merito c r a t i c system? J 6 n s s o n suggests ( h e c o n d u c t s n o s y s t e m a t i c analysis) that t h e a c c o u n t i n g e li te is self-selected. In m a n y cases t h e i r families c o u l d n o t afford to f i n a n c e t h e i r e d u c a t i o n s , so t h e m e m b e r s o f this e l i t e f o u n d a c c o u n t i n g a q u i c k w a y to e n t e r a p r o f e s s i o n a l career. But w h y is it that t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e e l it e c a m e from a single s c h o o l , t h e S t o c k h o l m S c h o o l o f Econo m i c s , an d a l m o s t all o f t h e r e m a i n i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h r e e o f t h e t o p five i n n e r c o r e , w e r e trained at G 6 t e b o r g University? Is it t h e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e f u n c t i o n o f t h e rational social s t r u c t u r e that " c h o o s e s " t h e s e candidates? O r is it a s y s t e m o f p o w e r rel at i o n s b a s e d o n class, sex, and r e l a t e d

CONCLUSION D e s p i t e this highly critical r e v i e w , A c c o u n t ing Regulation and Elite Structures must be a c k n o w l e d g e d as an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n i n f l u e n c e and c o n t r o l in t h e acc o u n t i n g profession. It is t h e first and thus far o n l y a t t e m p t to analyze a c c o u n t i n g elites by exam i n i n g t h e i r relation to t h e o r y an d u n d e r l y i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s . As w i t h o t h e r p i o n e e r i n g studies, a large m e a s u r e o f its s u c c e s s will b e t h e a m o u n t o f d i s c o u r s e it will e n c o u r a g e in t h e p u r su i t o f a better product.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abt, C. C., The Social Audit f o r Management ( New York: American Management Association, 1977). Altbrd, R. R.. Paradigms of Relations Between State and Society, in Lindberg, L N., et al. (eds)Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1975 ). American Accounting Association, Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance (Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 1977). Arrington, C. E. & Francis, J. R., Letting the Chat Out of the Bag: Deconstruction, Privilege and Accounting Research, Accounting~ Organizations and Society (1989) pp. 1--28.

*In response to the utilitarian argument, "If it works, use it." is the question, "For Whom?" and "Why?"The indeterminancy principle in modern science is a denial of the argument that there is a one best way, a theory that spears the real truth. Postmodernism argues that there is no essence or central truth in knowledge. Instead, we must decenter or deconstruct knowledge by examining the texts of accounting as themselves centers of power. Arrington & Francis (1989) discuss, with an example, the method of deconstructionism in accounting. -'Pux ty et al. ( 1987, pp. 289-290) discuss why an adequate account of accountancy regulation must consider these points.

ACCOUNTING ELITES AND ACCOUNTING THEORY Chua, W. F., Radical Developments in Accounting Thought, The Accounting Review (October 1986) pp. 601--632. Cooper, D. J. & Sherer, M. J., The Value of Corporate Accounting Reports: Arguments for a Political Economy of Accounting, Accounting Organizations and Society (1984) pp. 207--232. Dewey, J., The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1929). Gouldner, A. W., The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970). J6nsson, S., Accounting Regulation and Elite Structures~. Driving Forces in the Det~lopment of Accounting Policy ( New York: John Wiley, 1988 ). Levine, D. N., The Flight from AmbiguiOe. Essays in Social and Cultural Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). Lloyd, C., Explanation in Social History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). Masterman, M., The Nature of a Paradigm, in Lakatos, L & Musgrave, A. (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Mirowski, P., Against Mechanism: ProtecHng Economics from Science ( Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988). Montagna, P., Uncertainty as a Scientific Concept and Its Application to the Study of Occupations and Organizations, in Fiddle, S. (ed.) UncertatnOe. Behavioral and Social Dimensions (New York: Praeger, 1980). Montagna, P., Accounting Rationality and Financial Legitimation, Theory & Society (1986) pp. 103-138. Parsons, T., The Structure of SocialAction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937). Parsons, T., The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951 ). Puxty, A. G., Willmott, H. C., Cooper, D.J. & Lowe, T., Modes of Regulation in Advanced Capitalism: Locating Accountancy in Four Countries, Accounting Organizations and Society ( 1987 ) pp. 273-291. Ritzer, G., Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1975). Tinker, A. M., Merino, B. D. & Neimark, M. D., The Normative Origins of Positive Theories: Ideology and Accounting Thought, Accounting Organizations and Society ( 1982 ) pp. 167-200. Weber, M., From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology (transl. & ed. by H. H. Gerth & W. W. Mills) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946 ). First published in Wirt$chaft und Geselischaft ( Tiibingen, 1922) and Soziologie und Sozialpolitik ( Tiibingen, 1924 ). Weber, M., "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, in Weber, M., TheMethodoiogy of the Sociai Sciences (transl. & ed. by E. A. Shils & H. A. Finch ) (New York: The Free Press, 1949 ). First published in the Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik ( 1904 ). Wells, M. C., A Revolution in Accounting Thought? The Accounting Review (July 1976) pp. 471---482.

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