David Berger Fundamentals of Political Science Midterm

Looking Back to Spring Forward: Origins and Outlooks of the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring began with riots in Tunisia the self-immolation of Mohammed al-Bouazi and culminated in the ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.1 It spurred many other unstable Middle Eastern Countries to revolt and provided an impetus for the people of the various oppressed regimes to act and overthrow their governments. People speak about the Arab Spring as one indivisible unit, but in truth, each participating country in the Spring requires its own individual analysis to predict its own outcome, and indeed the outcome of the Spring overall. Nevertheless we can attempt to aggregate some of the root causes of the uprisings and propose strategies that may ensure the success of the revolutions that have shook the Arab world. The uprisings in Tunisia arose against a faade of economic prosperity and moderate government. Both of these untruthful ideals were meant to conceal the authoritarian nature of the regime of ben ali, but ultimately could not suppress
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Miller, Laurel, Democratization in the Arab World, 57

Tunisians. There was a wide earning and employment gap between the urban coast and the countrys center. The elections were always rigged and the opposition had no real power.2 Additionally the state had a large internal security apparatus that enforced repression of freedom of speech, press, and assembly and maintained use of physical coercion and intimidation.3 The events in Egypt were catalyzed by the events in Tunisia and followed only a few days later. As in Tunisia, economics were at the forefront of the masss disgruntled attitude over high unemployment and the costs of growing inflation.4 The people took to the streets and rioted Tahir Square. President Mubarak was ousted and elections were held while a constitution is being drawn up. A unique facet of Egypt is the standing of the military. The military had a strong hold on public support in Egypt, with approval in the 90% range.5 This was galvanized after the military refused to stop protestors during the inception of the revolutions. However, support has waned somewhat as the public have begun to perceive it as slowing down the road toward a constitution. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi led an oppressive and totalitarian regime. Though he was rich from oil profits, his people were not, due to the fact that Gadaffi did not use the profits to better his country. The discontent in Libya grew and in February of 2011, on the heels of Egypt and Tunisia, a civil war broke out. The rebels gained ground, overtaking the city Benghazi, but Gadaffi struck back and

Ibid., 58 Ibid., 68 4 Ibid., 87 5 Ibid., 82-84

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appeared poised to crush the opposition.6 The United States joined France and other European partners to create a no-fly zone over the area and bombard Gadaffis forces. The rebels prevailed and executed Gadaffi. In the aftermath of the civil war sectarian and tribal allegiances prevail. The military and police are now faced with competition with local militias7 that are often funded externally. Syria had been under the rule of the Assad family for over 40 years. The Assad regime kept the country in a state of emergency, granting far-reaching powers to security forces and stifling the freedoms of the people. Bashar Al-Assad is a member of the Alawites a small minority in Shiite Syria, delegitimizing his rule. The same appears to be true in Bahrain where the Shiite majority is rebelling against the Sunni monarchy. The Syrian civil war continues to this day with tens of thousands of casualties. The battleground has caused dangerous to take an active role and opt for influence.8 Tribal sectarianism remains strong, as in Libya and Yemen, the latter facing an infiltration by Al Qaeda. There are a few trends that will inform us further regarding the details described above. First, none of the leaders had true legitimacy. After the Europeans withdrew after World War II, power was handed over. It was never earned. The weak and vulnerable infrastructure Europe left made it easy for military personalities to take control of the states.9 The people themselves never crowned any of these men their leaders. There was no sovereignty granted by the people.
6Washington,

Anthony Shadid, Qaddafi Forces Routing Rebels." The New York Times. March 16, 2011. 7 Gause, F. Gregory, III. "The Year the Arab Spring Went Bad." ForeignPolicy.com 8 Zelin, Aaron Y. "We Are All Jihadists Now." ForeignPolicy.com 9 Unver, H. Akin. "Legacy of the Arab Spring: The Question of Independence and Sovereignty." Columbia Journal of International Affairs

Instead there was a trade-off: stability and bread for acquiesce to be ruled. It is worth noting that in terms of force, the primary concern of these states was often more directed towards its internal security apparatus than the military.10 The people did not actually feel that their interests were being represented. It is for this reason that economics played such a crucial role in the Arab Spring. Even though it culminated in touching upon lofty political ideas such as democracy and freedom, those elements were only put into the equation when the implicit economic contract of old fell apart. While democracy may be the hot-button word in the Arab Spring, it may be said that legitimate sovereignty is a more accurate one. It is not the pining for democracy that exposed the weakness of the regimes that fell, it was the lack of legitimate rule. The state needed economic bargains and strong-handed internal security forces to keep the people submissive. Eventually these were not enough. The quest for legitimate soverinty must be undertaken without the help from outsiders, both in and outside the Middle East. According to H. Akin Unver of the Columbia School of International Affairs, Arab governments will continue to lack legitimacy if they rely on foreign powers to maintain their states.11 In other words, a continued reliance on the foreign powers for sovereignty will not aid in moving forward in this process. It appears to me however, that this argument, while logically understandable, is overlooking the radical Islamic groups that are willing to swoop in at any moment. Without a stable government it is entirely possible for the Salafists and even Al Qaeda to gain a foothold in the wake of a truly destabilized country. If the economic
10 11

Ibid. Ibid.

infrastructure falls apart, as it did in Yemen, who is to say that people will not turn to Al Qaeda for bread? There is already ample evidence that it is social and economic factors that are prevalent in decisions to turn allegiance to these parties. Without foreign aid it is unclear that these states can, while trying to create new governments, also keep their countries stable enough to safeguard against radical Islam. Either way this is the choice the Arabs must make. On one hand, there is an option to get caught up in another economic bargain, in which loyalty is given not to those who they believe would represent them best, but to whomever is willing to provide the most welfare measures and put bread on the table. On the other hand, there is a determination to internally shape the character of their states future. In this case they must ward off foreign powers, to whom they would risk owing a debt that would damage their legitimacy, as well as extremists who would try and swoop in with social benefits. Either way the Arab people would risk losing the soul of the revolution and legitimate sovereignty with it. Another aspect that will shape the outcome of the Arab Spring will be the role of Islamist actors. In Tunisia, the Salafis are becoming violent and in Egyp,t the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis have had success in elections and now maintain a great advantage in the constitution writing process.12 It is possible that these parties may be rallied against if all the moderate and secularist elements of society unite. This is unlikely to occur in of itself, and even if it did, it has become more and more clear that in these states lies a majority of those who would prefer an Islamic
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dont_give_up_on_the_arab_spring

government. The only real way to guarantee moderate government and civil liberties is for the more Islamic elements of these governments to compromise with the other groups. Unfortunately, as of now there is no real sign that they will be forced to do so. A key ingredient in determining how the Arab Spring will turn out is the structure of their governments. The more power that is granted to an executive branch, the more of a chance the state will fall to autocracy.13 A strong legislature will help guarantee that power is not concentrated in any one place and there are enough checks and balances in stabilize power. This can be achieved if legislative capabilities fall on a parliament alone. If the executive is also provided with legislation rights, it becomes too powerful. Additionally, the makeup of a legislature should in no way be appointed by a presidential power.14 Taking into account the above factors, there are a few forecasts we can make about the countries of the Arab Spring. Consider Tunisia: It has a strong background in moderate, non-Islamist elements such as female participation in government. Furthermore, the constitution being drawn up gives full legislative power to the legislative branch of government.15 The government in place is not perceived to be in power by the hands of foreign actors, and the representative government in place truly has the power to create a legitimate sovereignty in the state. All of these things spell out a potentially bright outcome to the Tunisian Spring. The major threat will be whether or not the Salafis and the Islamic party at large can be checked. They Fish, M. Steven, and Katherine E. Michel. "What Tunisia Did Right." ForeignPolicy.com 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.
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have slowly created a greater and greater push towards Islamism and become more violent, threatening to create an oppressive majority as well as the good faith necessary for a civil democracy. Another possible threat may be the lack of an independent military. The state security apparatus was such a large part of the former government that its infrastructure is still in place, and may be abused if the opportunity arises. Egypt is in a more precarious position. It too has a strong Islamist elect that threatens unity with the more moderate and secular groups. Additionally, the constitution in its current form would allow the president legislative powers as well as the right to appoint a quarter of the members of the top legislature. This type of power will not only allow for more autocratic rule but also will take away some of the legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, the state will continue to rely on the United States for aid, which may take away from the perceived autonomy of the state in the eyes of the people and weaken sovereignty. However, the state does have a strong military wing that is largely independent of the government, which can act as a check against autocratic measures that may be adopted. In Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Lybia there is still much conflict and the road forward is not as paved as in Tunisia and Egypt. Nonetheless we can safely say that their ability to move forward will be predicated on the level of sectarianism they can overcome. The tribal tendencies in Lybia, Syria, and Yemen make it difficult to harness any form of national unity. The sovereignty of any form of government will be severely limited if there is any feeling that a party is getting special treatment

from abroad. The same applies to Bahrain if it wishes to overcome the schism between the Sunni monarchy and the Shiite majority. To sum up the outlook of the Arab spring we must acknowledge that it was not newfound democratic dreams that catalyzed the uprisings. Nor were economic factors in of themselves the driving factor. It was the lack of legitimate soverinty in these states that caused the uprisings to take on revolutionary characteristics, catalyzed by a breakdown in the defacto, implicit bargain the autocrats had made with their people: economic wellbeing and security. When bread became scarce and security threats did not justify the oppressive measures of the regimes, revolution ensued. Thus, democracy and prosperity will not be enough to guarantee a stable future for the leaders of these countries. They will need to harness legitimacy to their soverinty. One distinct task in accomplishing this will be to not appear to be too caught up in foreign aid, so as not to appear indebted to anybody besides the native people for their power. Elections can help in this legitimacy as well, but the governments in place will need to decentralize power away from extremist forces and away from individuals. The latter will not only ensure a sense of legitimacy, but will also prevent autarchy and the type of oppression that the Spring tried to throw off.

Bibliography

Miller, Laurel. Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from around the Globe. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012.

Washington., Anthony Shadid; Reporting Was Contributed By Alan Cowell From London; Kareem Fahim From Benghazi, Libya; David D. Kirkpatrick From Tripoli, Libya; And Mark Landler From. "Qaddafi Forces Routing Rebels." The New York

Times. March 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/africa/16libya.html?pagewanted=al

Gause, F. Gregory, III. "The Year the Arab Spring Went Bad." Foreign Policy. December 31, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/31/the_year_the_arab_spring_we nt_bad?page=0,0.

Zelin, Aaron Y. "We Are All Jihadists Now." Foreign Policy. December, 11, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/11/we_are_all_jihadists_now.

Unver, H. Akin. "Legacy of the Arab Spring: The Question of Independence and Sovereignty." Columbia Journal of International Affairs. Accessed January 08, 2013. http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/legacy-arab-spring-question-independence-andsovereignty.

Fish, M. Steven, and Katherine E. Michel. "What Tunisia Did Right." Foreign Policy. November 2, 2012. November 2, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/02/what_tunisia_did_right?page= 0,2.