0260-9576=02=$17.63 0.00 www.catchword.com=titles=02609576.

htm # Institution of Chemical Engineers 2002

Maintenance craftsman burned by bitumen

Keith Cassidy

A maintenance craftsman was sprayed on his face, arms and legs with hot bitumen as he attempted to remove a pump suction lter for cleaning. Although colleagues quickly removed his contaminated clothing and placed him in a safety shower, he was hospitalized with extensive burns. He had not been wearing protective clothing or equipment.

 the suction side of the pump was repressurized by reverse ows through the pump body (perhaps due to excessive clearances between the screws).

Lessons learned
The equipment clearly had not been prepared for maintenance in a proper manner:

Run up to the incident

The positive displacement screw type bitumen pump, normally operating at a temperature of 180 C, had been shut down about two hours earlier as it was suspected that the lter was blocked by coke. The craftsman attempted to open the pump by removing all the bolts holding down the lter cover, and then trying to break the joint by pulling on the handle of the cover. Despite the pump having been valve isolated and having gone through a depressurizing procedure, as soon as the lter cover came away hot bitumen was expelled under pressure from the pump, hitting the tter. It was subsequently noticed that the pump discharge pressure gauge was registering 4 bar g.

 Draining a screw type pump in the manner described is undesirable for mechanical reasons, and because there is every possibility of the relief valve lifting and circulating hot material back to the suction.  Relocation of the suction drain lines to allow easier access was desirable (indeed this modication was carried out after the accident and is shown in Figure 1).  Removal of process materials, particularly hot liquids, is always accompanied by some degree of hazard (in this case the substantial risk of contact with very hot bitumen).  Only one drain point was available, and this should have been viewed with suspicion as it was remote from the lter and any deciency in trace heating or lagging could result in it being inoperative.

Depressurizing the pump

The layout of the section of plant involved is shown in Figure 1. After the pump was valve isolated, the normal depressurizing procedure involved opening the discharge drain and running the pump for a short period. Whilst such techniques are not best practice, it had become the standard method in this case since the suction lter drain was difcult to access (and indeed was believed to be blocked). In this case, a combination of factors are thought to have prevented the suction lter from being depressurized, including:  the pump discharge drain was blocked or restricted;  the relief valve protecting the pump discharge lifted;

FIGURE 1: SKETCH SHOWING TYPICAL FLUSHING OIL, SLOP, VENT AND DRAIN CONNECTIONS TO HOT OIL EQUIPMENT

LOSS PREVENTION BULLETIN 167

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 The reading on the pump discharge pressure gauge was either not seen, or the implications not understood or ignored.  It is not good practice to remove all holding bolts completely when breaking joints. Slackening sufcient bolts to allow the joint to be broken into from the opposite side of the equipment is preferable.  Although a permit to work had been issued, it contained no reference to the need for protective clothing and equipment. Indeed, investigation of the accident revealed a degree of complacency in permits to work had arisen for routine operations such as this.

practicable when preparing hot equipment for maintenance.  The use of local temperature indicators should be considered where retention of hot material is a risk.  A second check should be built into equipment draining procedures to conrm that the plant has indeed been emptied and depressurized.

Additional recommendations
The following further recommendations were made as a result of the investigation of the incident:  In order to reduce the risk of escape of hot material, the use of a cold ushing medium should be adopted where

LEARNING FROM THE PAST The IChemE Accident Database contains:  5 records of incidents resulting in personnel burned by bitumen

LOSS PREVENTION BULLETIN 167

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