G.R. No. L-3894 March 12, 1909 JUAN IBAEZ DE ALDECOA, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellant. Attorney-General Villamor for appellee. TORRES, J.: On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square meters in extent, situated in the town of Surigao; a plan and technical description of said parcel was attached to his application. After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the request of the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by a writing dated March 21, 1905, objected to the registration applied for, alleging that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States, and is now under the control of the Insular Government; that the title of ownership issued by the politico-militargovernor of Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the 19th of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, antecessor of the petitioner with respect to the land in question, was entirely null and void, for the reason that said grant had not been made in accordance with the laws then in force on the subject, and because the said governor had no authority to make such a grant; he prayed the court below to dismiss the application with costs. As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of April, 1905, amended his former petition, and relying upon the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration of the land in question, comprised in the plan then submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force, and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the land in question, the applicant availing himself of the benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be applied to the inscription of his land, inasmuch as it was included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of section 54, Chapter VI, thereof, and prayed the court to take into consideration the amendment of his petition. Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the case, and on February 2, 1907, the judge of the Court of Land Registration entered his decision in the matter and, in view of the opposition offered by the Insular Government denied the petition without costs, and ordered the cancellation of the entry made of the said property in the record under No. 408, folio 206 of volume 2 of the municipality of Surigao. The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial; his motion was overruled to which he also excepted and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved and submitted to this court. The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for Juan Ibaez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is

susceptible of being cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest of this Archipelago the occupation or material possession together with the improvement and cultivation for a certain number of years, as fixed by the laws of the Indies, of given portions of vacant Government lands, was the method established by the Government to facilitate the acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by the royal decrees of June 25, 1880, and December 26, 1884, the system of composition with the State and that of sales by public auction were instituted as the means of acquiring such lands. In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid dispatch of the proceedings instituted for this purpose, the royal decree of February 13, 1894, was promulgated, establishing the possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set out in said decree. After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Act No. 926, relating to public lands, in accordance with the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the Congress of the United States of July 1, 1902, section 54, paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926) is as follows: SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit: xxx xxx xxx

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by a war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter. All applicants for lands under paragraph one, two, three, four, and five of this section must establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession. Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in the record, it is seen that the land, the registration of which is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or

public land which the State could alienate to private persons, and being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time the person in possession desired to convert it into agricultural land he might do so in the same manner that he had made a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of the said Act of Congress, as well as the provisions of the abovecited section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of Act No. 926, for the reason that the said land is neither mining nor timber land. We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the nature of the land whereon was built the greatest cities of the world; and confining ourselves to that on which the cities and towns in these Islands were erected, it can not be denied that, at the commencement of the occupation of this Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the time of the distribution of lands, the latter were rural and agricultural in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle and foundation of the present cities and large towns of the Philippines, and as the inhabitants increased, and added to the number of their dwellings, the farms gradually became converted into town lots. In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are to be seen that are erected on lots that form part of land used for agricultural purposes. If for the time being, and to the advantage of the possessors thereof, they have ceased to be such agricultural lands, they may later on again become transformed into farming land and, by the industry of the owner, again be made to yield fruit. Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa vs. The Insular Government, No. 3793 (10 Phil. Rep., 175), the legislation in force was interpreted in a similar sense. It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two sovereign powers that have successively promulgated the said laws, to place those in possession of building lots under title of ownership in an anomalous, uncertain and insecure position, rendering it impossible for them to obtain legal titles to the lands appropriated by them, and denying them the care and protection of the law to which they were certainly entitled on account of the efforts they have made, both in their behalf, and for the benefit of the cities and towns in which they reside, contributing to the wealth and increase of the country. In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were enacted after almost all the towns of this Archipelago were established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers have started from the supposition that titles to the building lots within the confines of such towns had been duly acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one, wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated within a town created and acknowledged administratively, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in force and

classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land. It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and regulation of the 25th of June, 1880, says: "In the Philippine Islands, all vacant lands, soils, and grounds without a lawful private owner, or, which have never been under private control, shall be deemed to be alienable crown lands for the effects of the regulation, and in accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novsima Recopilacin;" that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th of February, 1894, states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be alienable Crown lands, provided they are not included within the following exceptions: (1) Those of private ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those comprised in the communal laws, or within zones reserved for the use in common by residents of the community; and (4) those lands which are susceptible of private appropriation by means of composition or possessory information;" and that although section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, directs the Government of the Philippine Islands to classify public lands that are neither forest nor mining lands according to their agricultural character and productiveness, section 14 authorizes and empowers the said Government "to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title, etc.;" and section 15 authorizes and empowers the said Government of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as it may prescribed, by general legislation, to provide for the granting, or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it may deem wise, etc." From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or judicial person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urban lands or building lots being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into rural estates. If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land, and on the other hand is susceptible of cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision whatever that would exclude it from being classified as agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that classification, the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of Act No. 926, must forthwith be applied for the reason that it has been fully proven that the applicant was in possession thereof for more than 13 years prior to the 26th of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect. Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause to exclude urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the contrary, the

interpretation that urban real estate, that is not mineral or forestall in character, be understood to fall within the classification of agricultural land, is deemed to be most rational and beneficial to public interests. Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be, as it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in general default all such persons as may have any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of the same shall be granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No special ruling is made as to costs. So ordered. Willard, Carson, J., concurs in the result. Separate Opinions ARELLANO, C. J., concurring: The land that is the subject of the petition in this case, is described in the judgment of the court below, whose conclusions of fact are of the following tenor: The object of registration in this case is a lot situated on McKinley Avenue, in the municipality of Surigao, province of the same name; it comprises an area of 3,375 square meters, and is bounded on the north by the seashore; on the east by the land of the heirs of the late Andres Ojeda; on the south by the aforesaid street; and on the west by the premises of the government building. In order to acquire the said property, which is a building lot situated in the inhabited portion of the said municipality of Surigao, Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa on June 11, 1889, filed a petition with the politico-militar governor of the 3d District of Mindanao to whom then belonged the municipality and Province of Surigao, claiming the said lot as being abandoned, and requesting that he be granted a title of ownership thereto. In view of the said petition, D. Juan Cirlot y Butler, major of Infantry, who at the time was governor, directed bandillos (proclamations) to be published for three successive nights in the said municipality of Surigao, calling on all persons who considered that they were entitled to the said lot; after the bandillos had so been published, and no one appearing to claim the lot, and it appearing from the report of the governadorcillo and principales of said municipality that the lot was unoccupied and that no one had ever been known to own the same, the governor, on the 19th of the said month of June, granted to the said Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa title of ownership to the said lot in order that he might forthwith build a house thereon. The document setting forth the said concession was a certificate issued on the same date, the 19th, by the aforesaid governor; and by order of the Court of First Instance of Surigao, the same was entered in the record of public instruments of the said court corresponding to said year on the 22d of October. A certified copy of the document so recorded was obtained and attached to the record of the J., concurs.

case, and was recorded on the 23d of March, 1896, in the registry of property of the said Province of Surigao, lot No. 408, first entry. After the title of ownership to the lot in question had been granted in the manner above stated, the grantee, Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, immediately took possession and within a short time had it fenced in and took care to keep the fence in good repair; and thus keeping the land constantly fenced in he continued to possess it publicly, in his own name and as the owner thereof, without any interruption or opposition from anyone until he died in the year 1902. "After the death of the said Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa, his widow succeeded him in the possession of one-half of the lot in question for the reason that it pertained to thebienes gananciales (property acquired during marriage), and his son, the petitioner herein, as sole heir of the deceased, inherited the other half. He also has kept the land fenced in, and lately replaced the fence with a wire one. Toward the month of March or April, 1903, the provincial board of Surigao, in spite of the opposition and protests on the part of the aforesaid possessors, ordered the removal of and did remove the fence around the lot above referred to, claiming that the said lot belonged to the Province of Surigao; that for this reason their possession was interrupted until March, 1904, when the said possessors, after having filed their application for registration in these proceedings, erected monuments on the lot. And that lot has never been devoted to cultivation, neither is it by its nature suitable for any kind of cultivation. Such are the facts that should be considered as proven in these proceedings. From the facts set forth it evidently appears: First. That the land in question is a building lot situated within the inhabited portion of the town of Surigao. Second. That since June, 1889, the said lot had been possessed with the knowledge and consent of the said municipality, peacefully and without any opposition up to March or April, 1903, to-wit, approximately fourteen years; that prior to the said adjudication, the gobernadorcillo and the principales of said municipality had been cited and heard on the subject. Third. That the little of ownership issued by the provincial official of Surigao was entered in the registry of property of said province on the 23d of March, 1896. Fourth. That from March or April, 1903, until March, 1904, the material possession suffered interruption on account of an abusive and arbitrary act of intrusion of the provincial board of Surigao which had absolutely no authority to commit such an act of spoliation; and, Fifth. That in March, 1904, after the peaceful and quiet possession was resumed, the petitioner instituted these proceedings for the purpose of obtaining a new title of

ownership in accordance with the Acts of the Philippine Commission that created the new registry of property. The present opposition is based on the supposition that the said lot was a parcel of land subject to composition, as if it were vacant Government land; that as such vacant and Government land, it had not been duly granted by composition when in June, 1889, Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa obtained his title of ownership from the politico-militar governor of said province, who was not the person called upon to grant titles by composition after the promulgation of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, and that of December 26, 1884; and the Court of Land Registration, assuming on the contrary that the said land is not vacant crown land, it not being devoted to agriculture but to building purposes, and because "by reason of its nature it is not suitable for agriculture but is destined exclusively to building purposes, and is therefore not agricultural, it believes that the same can not be the subject of adjudication under the provisions of the Act of Congress and Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission, and that in the opinion of the court, paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 is not applicable to urban real estate." An established rule which has been repeatedly laid down by this court, is that only the vacant Crown lands were subject to composition; that is, rural lands devoted to cultivation. In the present case the petitioner finds himself between the horns of a dilemma: As to whether the land in question is urban or rural property; if it is rural, the Attorney-General argues that it has not been subjected to composition, and that the possession thereof is consequently illegal; and if it is urban, the lower court rejects it as not being susceptible of acquisition under the title of ownership that has been newly created and organized. In conclusion it appears: First, that the owners of urban real estate can not obtain Torrens titles through possession for ten years, nor by a possessory information recorded for that or a longer period of time. Second, that urban real estate, possessed for more than fourteen years with knowledge and consent of the authorities of the town wherein it is located, may be recovered by the Government on the ground that it is public land that had not been alienated by it, for the reason that it is not agricultural, nor is it mineral or timber land. It would be necessary to demonstrate that this building lot, which was recorded in the registry of property with possessory information, and continuously and materially possessed as private property since June, 1889, until the 11th of April, 1899, without opposition from the Spanish Government, was public land transferred by the treaty of Paris to the public domain of the present sovereignty, and that under said character of public land it is not agricultural land that may be conveyed to private dominion according to section 13 of the Act of Congress, and section 54 of Act No. 926. It is true that at the time above referred to, June of 1889, the politico-militar governor of Surigao had no authority to issue titles by composition. And as a matter of fact, at that time, the said governor did not issue to Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa a title by composition. So that this is not the question. What he did was to adjudicate to Telesforo Ibaez de Aldecoa a building lot in the town of Surigao, and to that effect he issued to him a title of ownership to the said lot. And this is a question anent which absolutely no argument has been made in the whole proceedings.

It is argued that the said provincial governor had no authority to issue the title, and that the said title is null on the unwarranted supposition, that it was a title of composition such as was provided for by the royal decrees of 1880 and 1884, which is entirely incorrect. What should have been proven was, either that the said lot, though a building or town site (not rural property or arable land) could not be acquired otherwise than by composition, in accordance with the aforesaid royal decrees of 1880 and 1884, or, that the politico-militar governor of a province could not adjudicate the ownership of land situated within the town to a resident thereof as such building lot or urban real estate, and still less as vacant Crown land, although within the inhabited portion of the town, as it is desired to consider the same. And in this sense nothing has been proven or sought to be proven in the whole case. The question is merely one supposition. The Attorney-General has supposed that it was vacant Crown land, and as such, agricultural land which was possessed without title by composition. The court below has supposed it to be a building lot or urban property, not agricultural land, entirely excluded from the benefits of Act No. 926 of the Commission. And in either form the said land or building lot possessed as private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, can not be recorded in the new registry of property. Was it an illegal possession? Was the possession held from 1889 to the 11th of April, 1899, usurped from the Spanish Government so that at the latter date, the land thus possessed should be considered as part of the public property which Spain transferred to the United States by the treaty of Paris? According to Article VIII of said treaty, Spain cede all real property which under the law was of public domain, and as such belonged to Spain. It was held that this cession could in no way affect the ownership or rights which, in accordance with law, corresponded to the peaceful possessor of property of every class, that is to say, the property of private individuals. Ever since the year 1889, the land in question has been owned by a private individual, and was not public property belonging to the Spanish Government. It was possessed as such, and in order to deprive it of this status it was necessary that the Spanish Government or its assignee should recover possession of the same by due process of law. And in order to recover it, it would be necessary to prove that the said lot, which formed a part of the inhabited portion of Surigao, belonged to the Spanish Government on the 11th of April, 1899. This has not been advanced by the opposition; recovery of possession has not been sought, but the title adjudicated in 1889 is repudiated on the ground that the provincial governor of Surigao had no authority to adjudicate it to the said private individual. But, from the enforcement of the Laws of the Indies, provincial governors were authorized to organize towns and distribute land for building purposes. Law 1, title 12, book 4, of the Recopilacin of the Laws of the Indies, reads:

It is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go out to people the new territories, houses,building lots, lands peonias and caballerias in the towns and places which may be assigned to them by the governor of the new settlement . . . . After selecting the territory, province and locality where the new community is to be founded, and after ascertaining the conveniences and resources that may exist thereon, the governor within whose district the same is located shall 1 announce whether it is to be a city, town or village. . . . (Law 2, title 8 of the same book.) First let there be set aside whatever land may be necessary for solares (building lots) for the people, commons, and abundant pastures whereon the cattle owned by the residents may graze, and as much again for the use of the natives; the rest of the territory shall be divided into four parts, one of them, which he may select, shall be for the person who obliged to form the town, and the other three parts shall be distributed among 2 settlers in equal parts. (Law 7 of the same title and book.) Law 8 provides as to how temples shall be constructed: "Somewhat distant from the plaza, where it will be separated from any other building not necessary for its use or adornment." . . . . "Building lots being assigned near it but not in continuation, for the erection of casas reales(government buildings) and booths in the plaza for public use . . ." it seems that the lot in question in the case at bar is contiguous to the government building or casa real of Surigao. Law 14 of the same title 7, book 4, is a fundamental law which, as a complement to the foregoing organic laws of towns, provides for the separation of the land constituting the inhabited portion of the town from land properly called vacant (baldos), of which so much is spoken in these land registration cases. It reads as follows: Sufficient land having been set aside for the town common, and to allow for the growth of the town as already provided, let all persons authorized to discover and establish new townships indicate pasture lands adjoining the common in order that work cattle, horses, and cattle for slaughtering purposes, together with other cattle which by ordinance the settlers are bound to have, may graze thereon, together with an additional amount, all of which shall be the property of the council, and the balance shall be farm lands to be drawn by lot; there shall be as many of the latter as there are building lots in the township; and if there should be irrigated lands, they shall likewise be divided and distributed by lot in the same proportion among the original settlers. All other lands are to remain vacant in order that we may grant them to new settlers. From said lands the viceroys shall reserve such as they may think advisable to assign to towns unprovided with any, to assist them to pay the salaries of their mayors; they shall provide commons and sufficient pasture grounds, as provided by law, and they shall act accordingly.

Building lots are not vacant lands, and the building lots used to be distributed and adjudicated by the governor of the province or district to which the town belonged, after hearing the gobernadorcillo and the notables of such town. As urban property, building lots forming part of the inhabited portion of a town, passed beyond the sphere of the administrative laws to enter that of the civil law. Thus, all questions arising in connection with them, after they had been ceded or granted, could only be decided by the civil law, even though raised by the Government, through action brought before the ordinary courts of justice, and not before the administration, nor the contentious tribunals which the Government itself had established in its relations with persons under its administration, as has already been held by this court in the case of Roura vs. The Insular Government (8 Phil. Rep., 214). Vacant lands were those which remained at the disposition of the King or the supreme government at the capital of the nation after due assignment and distribution of what was needed for the newly formed town; such vacant lands were adjudicated by sale or by composition, or in the form of free grants to new settlers. We can not affirm the reason given for denying the title of ownership applied for in this case, that the subject of the petition was a building lot, which, not being agricultural land was not entitled to the benefits of section 54 of the Act No. 926. Paragraph 6 of section 54, which determines the persons who may obtain confirmation of their rights, reads: "All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and the occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902," and what are agricultural lands as defined by the said Act of Congress has already been declared by this court (Mapa vs. The Insular Government, 10 Phil. Rep., 175). On this ground the confirmation and title applied for herein should be granted. Mapa, J., concurs.

G.R. No. L-630 November 15, 1947 ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee. Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee. Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies. MORAN, C.J.: Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court. There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated. According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondentappellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular

and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution. All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question. Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows: Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources . SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a

technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession. As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said: Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land. In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.) It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that

sense in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.) Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated. It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution. It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional

limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion: Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . . Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural. Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129). Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home. This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration, and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations. It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain

are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows: Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens. Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost

all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands. It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that

the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land. This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows: SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter. SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter:Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this

section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.) It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters. SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government. These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in

prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention. It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been. And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition. It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire. For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs. Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur. Separate Opinion

PERFECTO, J., concurring: Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by future generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming catastrophe. On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for our decision. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution." On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment of error as follows: The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic. The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the Japanese addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case. As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July of 1941, that is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the

Pacific War broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946. After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially on the legal question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on the question. The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again, we deliberated on the constitutional question for several days. On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the constitutional question was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented. While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked out. On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines. Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office gave its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947? Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is, whether this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.

After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated. Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the opportunity of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial. But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows: TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS: Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows: 5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.) "(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935. "(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the

Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or pertaining to the public domain." ROMAN Secretary of Justice OZAETA

Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows: Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest therein, is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may be entered in the primary entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615. The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final result of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947: In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for decision, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A redeliberation was consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to withdraw is considered denied. Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the previous vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.

Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy. He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases like this. Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules, the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla. Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal. The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that last two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the question. Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging that it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an

important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our decision. If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947. The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public interest. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them. The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one of the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his daring enterprises, with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan. Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an unrelentless struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of obedience, resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the

eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their property in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed estates were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions. Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty to insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off faraway enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and survival. When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be needed and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us. One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very words, that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed to all departments and branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession the only exception allowed by the Constitution no foreigner may by any means acquire any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style the drafter of the final text has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao. The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case cannot be overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have been transferred to and registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we

can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following: It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and more people had bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under the Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract. But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New Hampshire, had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of the finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions. We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and due to legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing. We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all violations which may have taken place should be corrected.

We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm. HILADO, J., concurring: Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the merits. After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a government like ours that I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. The very doctrine that the three coordinate, coequal and independent departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the respective department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court. I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of Justice, was issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate, the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty, peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion, given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land.

Of course, none of us the other governmental departments included would desire such a situation to ensue. I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question here presented, namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision. With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by the Chief Justice, I have signed said decision. BRIONES, M., conforme: Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede aadir ni quitar nada, tal es su acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y extraordinario. I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este ao, confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del patrimonio nacional se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del ao. A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las vacaciones judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente. Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte

apelante como este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte, entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante. Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de la sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales, comerciales e industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso la interdiccion constitucional ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion, abandono de un deber jurado. Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y sorprendente todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento la prohibicion que precisamente ataca

el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante Nos y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e industriales." La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un simple tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es precisamente el objeto del presente asunto venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos. A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion consentida insolitamentepor el Procurador General. Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extrao quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko: In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which amends Circular No. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties and the question is now 1 moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case. Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el camino de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales de sujurisdiccion y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo tradicioninviolada e inviolable maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel

gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la inhibicion era tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraa. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia hechura. No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza! No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel Departamento el que tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo: SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at Manila. When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. Que hizo

Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se dice que la prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14: . . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, unless and /or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code. La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos 2 actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones judiciales. Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los poderes del Estado, es usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte 3 disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el opinante. Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion sin ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu independencia. Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como sigue: Rule 52, SEC. 4 An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appelle's brief.After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)

Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o disconformidad de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y significacion el pueblo filipino ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion. Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no tener queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra maera . Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y apelante, Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso. El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade las disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico. Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los disidentes, consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente. Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto, puesto que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contraGaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe

decidirse por sus propios meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver de otramanera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco de parsimonia, lentitud. Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? Habia alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario, nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia de todos del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee la interdiccion de que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este asuntoen Febrero de este ao (8 contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela avanzado de la Constitucion. No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y poner en vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad exclusivano solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio. Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no tanto para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no en virtud de una

sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es que antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno. Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion equivale "a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie. Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de la votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. Donde esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"? Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo denegada.Pregunto otra vez: donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en Filipinas.

II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas cuantas observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia nacionalcontemporanea, aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas. Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural) usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion: SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no. Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales. Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares. La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos publicos enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land." La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subjectto rights 4 existing prior to the enactment of such law" ;y la seccion 5 es la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land." No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural"

aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares residenciales, comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra 5 clase de terrenos, excepto forestales yminerales. Es decir, que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo. Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene talsignificado y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente por que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado? Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? Donde esta esa definicion? O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate de terrenopublico o privado? Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa. Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete elcomite encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el exDecano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.

No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto de un articuloenque un vocablo el vocablo "agricultural" tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders, lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin la establecida en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que la palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales, comerciales, e industriales. A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, p. 758.) Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural" referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces como no el lexico vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos? Ahora mismo no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? Hay acaso uniformidad en la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la palabra "agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular. Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos, "land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only

susceptible of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or educational. . . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen. Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular y de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados que normas claras, concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero resolveria esto la dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr. Willard en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. Que terrenos son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaa mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard aade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare solucion del asunto que nos ocupa, a saber: . . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de cualquier ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo. La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice

aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster que normas segfuras se podrian establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales? Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido la idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. 185). Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso puedo determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous, corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueos de todoslos terrenos de una ciudad; no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por elapelante. Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se aadio la palabra calificativa agricola"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas. La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural" en estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico. Ahora bien; que diferencia hay, despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la

propiedad, al titulo dominical en que el uno es del Estado y el otro es de un particular. En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva en que vulgarmente hablando pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria los abogados. Si no fuera asi paraque los abogados? Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la 6 toga, que dijo un gran abogado espaol? Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida. Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la tamizacion delprecepto se aadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es saber que la aadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro bizantinis mo. III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente: When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.) Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el problema capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y como era tambienel giro de la

opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete? Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el papel particula que desempeaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte: . . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego). Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre propiedad publica y privada. El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras: La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de poder se dueos de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.) Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el Comite: Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia exclusiva de la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)

La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo: The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a government that shall enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre y recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 aos. Querianos, puesd asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual parodiando al Delegado Montilla la tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida? Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas centenares de milliones economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso problema de Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra, instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko. Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico, Cuba y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros. Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la Constituyente se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos. Que de extrao habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion

y finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales. No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos residenciales comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como para otra. Por que se iba a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica? Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente que, noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional la llmada reforma sobre laparidad para equipararlos a los filipinos. The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.) IV. Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra. Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia. Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto. El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no se escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la disposicion

del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos. En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la forma como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision. Se confirma la sentencia. PARAS, J., dissenting: Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land." There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority opinion, lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of the three classes. But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the approval of the Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the conclusion which is at once absurd and anomalous that private timber and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber and mineral lands can never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. The contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and although, after the approval of the Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the pronouncement in Cario vs. Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in section 4?

SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing prior to the enactmentof such law. SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to the enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we have shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only, and in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands. In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands, and the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely, as denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced within the inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine economy. On the other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed to remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time to time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms "private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification, and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5. Following the line of

reasoning of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot be any private timber or mineral land. Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable Filemon Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists." Sr. SOTTO (F) Seor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, seores. Parece que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion, como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeos propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la region que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.

Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera. Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo daos a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero. Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese numero. Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa de que no podra revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida, primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para disponer la expropiacion. Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho menos es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion. Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta maana y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos se ha mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan unissue de esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del

electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. Quien esta en disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?" Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este, pretendamos ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad. Por estas razones, seor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar fin a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.) I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding and acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President, extend this provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these reasons, Mr. President, I do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate Sevilla.) Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution. We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate Ledesma to the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands", under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma

must have in mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto. The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands," the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.) The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by said Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence, even if they become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us, however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein. The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used

for industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after the approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution. The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government Judicial, Legislative and Executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private residential lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public landsacquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial lotsforming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable." This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply. There is no conflict between the two opinions.

Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks of public agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs. Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction against transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R. No. 29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases, unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force because it merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the majority believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit myself to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and in our

power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by Congressional action. There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action was not only possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional question will thereby be avoided. In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice Tuason) that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the eleven members were present, seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens. In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the

Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference," chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is, needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition. BENGZON, J., dissenting: It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition. Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults. There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the constitutional problem. It must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on

thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected like heirs or or creditors of the seller may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough that briefs as in this case have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately touched or improperly considered. It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales will be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such transfers. The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit: (a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose of landowners at the time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the 7 rights of those who should become landowners after the approval of the Constitution; (b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in the United Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and (c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between the United States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government? The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly expensive process of a constitutional amendment. PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien. Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for residence is included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-168), and yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was Act No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and corporations or associations described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides: No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provided, however,

That persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such lands and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations, associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides: Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 121 of the Act provides: No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or

held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore adopted. If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by purchase or lease lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, as held by the majority, there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. The term "private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded, because these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land grants known as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the people that adopted it.

The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien. There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by the appellant whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: . . . is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capizvs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid offending against the constitutional provision referred to above. Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits of the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116, 120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple that adopted it. This

Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the members of the Court were unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the Constitution a costly process would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question. It would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional amendment. In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant and consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review should be reversed. TUASON, J., dissenting: The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our humble understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped. Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads: 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used in this section? Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a construed so to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.) Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature founded on the common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense, and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1 Story, Const. sec. 451.) Marshall , Ch. J., says: The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23). Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no basis for construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.) There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street. That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands proceed from the sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to

aliens, the Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one thing excludes all others of the same kind. Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can see what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided into residential, commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as agricultural land. If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners. Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision: SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands. In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the committee on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources: SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of the articleo n General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the committee in consultation with President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.) The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with sligh alteration in the phraseology. It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first draft of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to nonFilipino citizens of any land of private ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural character. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any possibility that its implication was not comprehended. In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in this Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the premises. According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the scope of the provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties." If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish as witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well enough alone. But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the final draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is against the presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little

as possible to implication." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.) When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally proposed, the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason. If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber land or mineral land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances. The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable for home building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential, commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing." As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The classification of public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of public lands. In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very simple and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands agricultural can find their way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII

of the Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the conveyance of private forests and mines. In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in view. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature. The United States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands. It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration, exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law. It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of scattered small parcels of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely said that for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands should be brought under the class of agricultural lands. On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different aim. This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such as faced it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found itself with reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands, agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of

private non-agricultural lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. When a private non-agricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII. The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups, there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other than agriculture. It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional law, Justice Story and Professor Cooley: "As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.) As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and that the Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity

and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired, the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it ." In reality, this is not a departure from the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional Assembly. The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close. If they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all lands, without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings, always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance." The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says that one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an expression that "lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one knows we don't. The decision says:

It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution." If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my humble opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are lands of the public domain. The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article XIII, which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign policy, economics and politics. From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested counsel for the government in a judicial action is as the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in theory and in practice then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably with the opinion of the head of his department.

The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens. Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5 of Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous. The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals, and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for communal living and for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of the nation. This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,

health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional government and is so well known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous. Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General dread, we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands may be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that "many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members of the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the Constitutional Convention?

G.R. Nos. L-31666, L-31667 and L-31668 April 30, 1979 LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MANUEL DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO DUMYUNG, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY , and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. DUMYUNG BONAYAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BAGUIO CITY, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BAGUIO CITY (BRANCH I), respondents. Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Jesus B. Santos and Hill & Associates for petitioner. Floro B. Bugnosen for private respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the three complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for 1 being without merit. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of misrepresentation and false data and informations furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, 2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City was made a formal party defendant. The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are all dated September 22, 2 196 l. The defendants filed their respective answers.
3

The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended joint answer with 7 counterclaim to the complaint in intervention. The said amended joint answer was 8 admitted in an order dated September 10, 1972. Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio City three (3) criminal cases for falsification of public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, 2359 and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, private respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue statements in their applications for free patents over the lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal cases. After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in the three (3) criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged falsification of public documents. In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court sustained the theory of the defense and dismissed the three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for 9 insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction of the three (3) accused. Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action carries with it the extinction of the civil action when the extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of the trial court acquitting the defendants of the crime charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) the trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the certificates of title in question can no longer be assailed; and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal 10 interest in the subject matter in litigation. The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed the three (3) civil cases because: After a careful examination and deliberation of the MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that upon the issuance of said Free Patents on November 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as amended, and consequently, these properties became the private properties of the defendants, under the operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that OCT Nos. P208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the defendants are now

The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner herein, filed motions for 4 5 intervention dated February 5, 1962 in the three (3) civil cases which were granted. The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the titled lands in question-.ion is within the intervenor's ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 expiring and up for renewal on June 30, 1962 and another portion of said lands is 6 embraced in its mineral claims.

indefeasible and this Court has no power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let alone cancel the same. The records of this case further disclose that the defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province and are members of the socalled Cultural Minorities of Mountain Province, who are the same persons accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based on the same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall squarely 11 under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of Court. They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for reconsideration of the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 12 13 1070. Both motion for reconsideration were denied by the trial court. Thereupon the intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed the instant petition. The petitioner assigns the following errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE PRIVATE 14 RESPONDENTS. Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable. The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide: Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or

construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly called 'friar lands' and those which being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted. Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said properties became the private properties of the defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible. In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial court said, On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Director of Lands to dispose of the properties since they are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act No. 3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states: A member of the national cultural, minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent application, he is not

the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law. The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the right of a person to have a free patent issued to him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to dispose, whether the land be disposable or not. This provision of law, certainly, applies to herein defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and could very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY NOTE, which reads: 'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising Christian brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and other places inhabited by members of the National Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an exodus of the poor and less fortunate non-christians from their ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses of the wilderness where they have settled in peace on portions of agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most cases, within the forest zones. But this is not the end of the tragedy of the national cultural minorities. Because of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the more agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities who have settled in the forest zones for the last ten years have been harassed and jailed or threatened with harassment and imprisonment. The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section 44 of the Public Land Act is to give the national culture, minorities a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain' ... It is for this reason that is, to give these national cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public domain that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the new government policy on liberation of the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more consideration to and sympathy on the members of the national cultural minorities, which our courts of justice must 15 uphold. The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 reads:

SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows: SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has, not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares. A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law. There is no evidence that the private respondents are members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they have continously occupied and cultivated either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent applications. These qualifications must be established by evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein, claims that it was in possession of the lands in question when the private respondents applied for free patents thereon. It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be 16 17 cancelled. In Director of lands vs. Abanzado this Court said: 4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in Director of Forestry v. Muoz, a 1968 decision. After a review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the present state of the law thus: 'If a Spanish title covering forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be appropriated. Before private interests have intervened, the government may decide for i what Portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He

reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court takes of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, above the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation. protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses and highways not to mention precious human lives, ...' The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for falsification was whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the private respondents had committed the acts of falsification alleged in the informations. The factual issues of whether or not the lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal case. There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for the reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether the private respondents belong to the cultural minorities and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free patents on said lands. WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, 1969 and 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents. G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988 BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents. G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988 ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents. CRUZ, J.: The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in 1 the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied. These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to 2 his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 15, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to 3 lots 1-9. In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, 4 which was possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land 5 by Alberto's father. Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax 6 receipts from that year to 1964, Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax 7 receipts from that year to 1964.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and 8 trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the 9 boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that: SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its 10 nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove 11 their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok 12 respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and registerable. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that: There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral

claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes. The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok. It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public

domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546). "The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266) It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be 13 deprived thereof without due process of law. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared: Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under 14 the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over 15 it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons. First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their 16 predecessors-in-interest. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing 17 that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the

concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio 18 testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above 19 it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application. Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights? The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were 20 perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows: Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the Constitution. SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents. SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles. This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in 21 appropriate expropriation proceedings. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 83290 September 21, 1990 STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo for petitioner. CORTES, J.: This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court. In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of Land Registration) of Zambales, through Judge James Ostrand, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431, confirmed the title of Justo de Perio over two (2) parcels of land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912, Decree No. 9328 was issued by the court ordering the registration of the two (2) parcels of land in the name of De Perio. On December 6, 1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of Deeds of Zambales was issued to De Perio. Parcel No. 1 consists of an area of eleven thousand six hundred ninety-seven square meters (11,697 sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2 consists of three hundred forty thousand eight hundred twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a portion consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters (10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold to the Province of Zambales. The sale was annotated at the back of OCT No. 48. In 1954, OCT No. 48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369 was issued to Mercedes de Valencia pursuant to an extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate. In 1962, De Valencia sold Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia subdivided Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E). TCT No. T-1369 was cancelled and TCT Nos. 11865, 11866, 11867, and 11869 were issued to De Valencia. TCT No. 11 868, corresponding to the portion previously sold to the Province of Zambales, was issued to the Republic of the Philippines. In 1970, De Valencia sold the lots covered by TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-12055 were issued to petitioner. Petitioner consolidated the two (2) parcels of land and subdivided them into five hundred thirty-six (536) residential lots which it sold to individual buyers. In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for the annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431, OCT No. 48 (issued to De Perio), TCT No. T-1369 (issued to De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to Baloy). Respondent alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom only in 1961, and hence cannot be the subject of disposition or alienation as private property. Named defendants were De Valencia and her husband, Baloy and his wife and the Register of Deeds of Zambales. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06259. The Baloy spouses filed their answer to the complaint. With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an answer-in-intervention. Later, petitioner filed its first motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of res

judicata, which the Court of Appeals denied. Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof. Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its evidence, consisting of a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land became alienable and disposable only in 1961, and rested its case. Petitioner then proceeded to present its evidence. This was, however, cut short when the Republic moved to amend its complaint to include as party defendants all the other transferees of the land and, thereafter, filed its amended complaint. Petitioner again moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata in an effort to shorten the proceedings. The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be invoked as a bar to an action for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, denied the motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition. After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave due course to the petition and, as required, the parties filed their respective memoranda. On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May 7, 1990 because, as stated in the resolution: ...after deliberating extensively on it, the Court finds the need to hear the oral arguments of the parties on issues which are considered determinative of the case, including the following: 1. the nature and classification, under the pertinent laws traced back to the turn of the century, of the two parcels of land decreed and originally titled in 1912 to De Perio; and 2. the legal considerations that compelled the Government to seek the annulment of the decree of the Court of Land Registration issued in favor of De Perio, his title, and the titles of his successorsin-interest. The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter they were required to submit their memoranda in amplification of their arguments. The question presented before the Court is whether or not respondent CA committed reversible error of law in denying petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res judicata. As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites must concur for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281 (1940); Ipekdjian Merchandising

Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, G. R. No. L-26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589; Aroc v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-39674, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 350; Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. 66807, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano G.R. No. L-25660, February 23, 1990]. In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be annulled because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the respondent Republic puts in issue the presence of the second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue before the Court is whether or not the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land claimed by De Perio, the predecessor-ininterest of the petitioner herein. Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry into the nature of the subject parcels of land in light of the laws prevailing at the time the judgment in the land registration case was rendered. Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its memorandum, was as follows: 17. It must, therefore, be presumed that in LRC Case No. 6431, the court found from the evidence adduced by the parties that (1) the two parcels of land in question were agricultural lands as the phrase is used in Act No. 926, (2) Justo de Perio had been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof for at least 10 years, before July 26, 1912, and (3) his possession of the said parcels of land was in the concept of owner; and thus the court confirmed Justo de Perio's title thereto and ordered their registration in his name. If the Attorney General, the Director of Forestry, the Director of Lands and the Director of Public Works opposed the application, then it must be presumed that the court declared the said two parcels of land to be agricultural lands over their opposition. If they did not oppose, then it must be presumed that they agreed with the court that the said lands were really agricultural lands. It must be pointed out that the question as to whether the two parcels of land in question are agricultural lands and not timber lands is a question of fact and the finding of Judge Ostrand that they are agricultural can not be reviewed by this Honorable Court at this point in time [Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 211-212]. Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the two parcels of land, as described in Decree No. 9328, debunk the contention that they are forest lands. The parcels of land were bounded by privately owned property. Moreover, they were described in the notice published in the March 1912 issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766-767 as "lying within the Civil Reservation, town site of Olongapo, situated in the municipality of Olongapo, Province of Zambales, P. I." [Annex "A" of Petitioner's Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].

On the other hand, the public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contended: Records disclose that by virtue of Proclamation dated November 11, 1908, then Governor-General James F. Smith reserved for naval purposes certain lands of the public domain in Subic, Zambales which included the parcels of land embraced under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48 secured by De Perio in 1912. It was only in 1961 that such Proclamation was revoked by a subsequent issuance, Proclamation No. 731, issued by then President Garcia on February 2, 1961 and such portions already classified as alienable and disposable and not needed for government purposes were declared open for disposition under R.A. No. 274, in relation to C.A. 141 and Act No. 3038. This means that the lands, subject matter of the case, were portions of the U.S. naval reservation and were declared open for disposition only on February 2, 1961 [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, p. 230]. Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time Original Certificate of Title No. 48 was issued on December 9, 1912, the parcel of land covered by the title was still within the forest zone and it was not until January 31, 1961 that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest Development as alienable and disposable under Land Classification Map No. 2427" [Ibid]. It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated June 7, 1927 ... shows that the parcels of land covered by OCT No. 48 were still part of the unclassified public forest at the time of the registration" [Public Respondent's Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231]. Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that the Republic has failed to make out a convincing case for the annulment of the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been established that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land, and that OCT No. 48 and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) derived from OCT No. 48 are valid. Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's petition for confirmation of his title to the two (2) parcels of land. It provided: SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit: xxx xxx xxx

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter. xxx xxx xxx In other words, a person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious session and occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of his title over the land he had so possessed and occupied. The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the two (2) parcels of land after due notice and hearing. From this, the following conclusions may be derived: 1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as defined by law, i.e., that they are neither timber land nor mineral land [Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 (1908)]; 2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two (2) parcels of land for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904; 3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide claim of ownership; and 4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of 1904, although it was confirmed only later in 1912. These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other conclusions determinative of the case. If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not have been forest land as claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land classification map notwithstanding. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two (2) parcels of land were in the Olongapo townsite and were bounded by privately-owned land. If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still imperfect, then it could not have been prejudiced by the proclamation of Governor-General Smith in 1908 which reserved for naval purposes land in Subic, Zambales. Said proclamation recognized the existence of private rights, thus:

xxx xxx xxx ...por la presente exceptuo de venta o colonizacion hasta nueva orden y separo para reserva naval,salvo los derechos privados, todos y cada uno de los terrenos publicos comprendidos dentro de los siguientes limites, a saber: [Proclamation del Gobernador General de las Islas Filipinos, 11 Noviembre 1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885 (2 December 1908)]. Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's sudden interest in the annulment of the decree and the certificate of title issued to De Perio and the subsequent titles issued to his successors after some seventy-three (73) years of inaction and after a portion of the land has been developed by petitioner into a subdivision and hundreds of residences have been built thereon. At this point in time, that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be conceived as forest land. Anyway, the area wherein the two (2) parcels of land are found, were released from the unclassified public forest and the territory comprising the Subic naval reservation way back in 1961. Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in 1961. In a few more months, the possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions they adversely possess through acquisitive prescription, without need of title or of good faith, pursuant to the Civil Code [Art. 1137]. Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner reiterates said 'contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier, are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider that notice of the application for registration and the date of hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the Official Gazette and that Governor General Smith's Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private rights. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of Appeals is ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R. SP No. 06259. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 155450

August 6, 2008

was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The investigating team reported that: A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and the same was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May 1994. B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-ininterest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered by LC Project 3-L of LC 8 Map 2999, since time immemorial. Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on 22 February 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928 , petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation 9 and declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private respondents also maintained that the complaint was barred by the doctrines of res 11 judicata and law of the case and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. Private respondents also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed
10

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 2, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO CARAG AND VICTORIA TURINGAN, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN, and the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAGAYAN,respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for review of the 21 May 2001 and 25 September 3 2002 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The 21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of the Philippines ( petitioner) amended complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Facts On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued 4 Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 5 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: 6 Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer 7 Certificate of Title No. T-1278, issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which
1 2

that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a certain Alfonso Bassig, who had 12 an ax to grind against private respondents. On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint for reversion, annulment of 13 decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared: The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders and resolutions in civil actions which this court may annul are those which the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." The Amended Complaint contains no such allegations which are jurisdictional neither can such circumstances be divined from its allegations. Furthermore, such actions for Annulment may be based only on two (2) grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000 square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472 Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19, 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland area is null and void ab initio under the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper 14 trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. (Citations omitted) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. The Issues Petitioner raises the following issues: 1. Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available; 2. Whether the amended complaint clearly alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;

3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the amended complaint and in the motion to dismiss; 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; 5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then Court of First Instance over the land; 6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in this case; and 7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is applicable in this case. The Ruling of the Court While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to allege either of the grounds of 15 extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree. We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended complaint, petitioner stated: 11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government had the authority and power to declassify or reclassify land of the public domain, the Court did not, therefore, have the power and authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad-151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree and the Original Certificate of Title of the said spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree and Title issued covering the timberland area is null and void ab initio considering the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine constitution. xxxx 15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles thereto in the name of the Heirs and said spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently illegal and erroneous for the reason that said Court

and/or the Register of Deeds of Cagayan did not have any authority or jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, consequently, the same are null and void ab initio, and of no force 16 and effect whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and disposable. Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint on the ground of petitioners failure to allege that the "ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." In Ancheta v. Ancheta,
17

Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain. Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the 20 claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by 21 the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. 22 Insular Government, we ruled: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x 23 x (Emphasis supplied) Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, 24 during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as 25 timber land. The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 26 2874, which provides: SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable

we ruled:

In a case where a petition for annulment of judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action 18 or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. Since petitioners complaint is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in petitioners complaint were factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance 19 with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be necessary, the reception of evidence may be referred to a member of the court or a judge of a Regional Trial Court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues raised in the complaint for the complete and proper determination of the case. However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the case on the merits.

(b) Timber and (c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition. Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. Section 8 provides: SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasipublic uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied) However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of 28 Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled:
27

We are inclined to agree with the respondent that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would apply to lands that have become private property or lands that have been impressed with a private right authorized and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an application with the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied) As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review. The finality of the trial courts decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides: SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the 29 inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." When the Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution,

spouses Carag had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.