John Shook is Vice President and

Senior Research Fellow at the Center

for Inquiry Transnational in Amherst,
N.Y., and Research Associate in
Philosophy at the University at
Buffalo, since 2006. He has authored
and edited more than a dozen books, is
a co-editor of three philosophy
journals, and travels for lectures and
debates across the United States and
around the world.

Could Atheism Prove that God does not

Exist?
March 20, 2009

The skeptical atheist – the original and genuine atheist – has competition even among
atheists. Distinctions between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ atheism, and between ‘strong’
and ‘weak’ atheism, have appeared in recent literature. Definitions of these types of
atheism vary across atheists. What ‘positive’ and ‘strong’ atheists have in common is
their view that one is justified in believing that no god exists, and they regard ‘weak’ or
‘negative’ atheists as only holding the lesser view that one is only justified in not
believing that any god exists.

What exactly would be the difference between concluding that one should believe that X
does not exist, and concluding that one should not believe that X exists? Let’s try it on
Santa Claus. Could I say, “I should not believe that Santa exists, but I should not believe
that Santa does not exist.” If I can’t bring myself to believe that Santa doesn’t exist, I am
admitting that for all I know, Santa might exist. This “weak anti-Claus” stance seems too
weak to someone convinced that Santa does not exist, for lots of reasons involving the
extreme implausibility that Santa does exist. No one sees Santa, his North Pole hideout
hasn’t been discovered, his Christmas eve schedule would violate natural laws, etc.
These facts about Santa encourage the “strong anti-Claus” stance, but they can
simultaneously encourage the weak anti-Claus stance, too. After all, if Santa is
admittedly so mysterious and so unnatural, it is very hard to imagine how to show that
he doesn’t exist! In the absence of a definitive proof that this amazing Santa doesn’t
exist, the weak anti-Claus stance is the more reasonable alternative. The burden of proof
is definitively shifted to the strong anti-Claus position. Returning to god, can the
positive/strong atheist conclusively eliminate the possibility that no god exists?
It is, contrary to legend, quite possible to prove a negative. But not all negatives. It all
depends on the kind of negative, the non-existence of something, that you aim to
prove. When talking about alleged supernatural beings, there aren’t many successful
options.

Many atheists believe that there are rational proofs that god does not exist. For example,
some atheists are so impressed by the argument from the existence of evil that they
conclude that this argument proves that god cannot be omnipotent, omniscient, and
benevolent. There are many ways for Christian theology to reply to this argument, and
we will cover the ensuing debate in a later blog entry. But suppose, just for a minute,
that there really is a perfectly valid argument for that negative conclusion. Well, what
does that argument exactly prove? Only one thing: that one specific kind of god cannot
exist: a god having omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence.

Two lessons are learned here. First, the atheist is reminded that there might be other
kinds of gods. Second, the theologian is reminded that it is possible, in theory, to prove
that some specific gods do not actually exist.

There are two basic ways to design non-existence proofs. The “dialectical non-existence
proof” argues that two or more characteristics of a specific god are logically
incompatible. On the reasonable assumption that a definition of something having
logically incompatible characteristics can only be the definition of a necessarily non-
existent entity, dialectical non-existence proofs can prove that specific kinds of gods
cannot actually exist. For example, many Christians believe both that god is perfect and
that god can suffer along with us. Figuring out how a perfect being can suffer requires
some fancy refinements to god to avoid the harsh verdict of a dialectical non-existence
proof. And even if these refinements go badly and one characteristic of god must go,
theology is often flexibly accommodating to such modifications to its conception of god.
Avoiding dialectical non-existence proofs is, from theology’s point of view, just another
way for humanity to learn more about god. It also keeps theologians very busy.

The other kind of proof confronts a specific kind of god with the actual existence of
something else, where it is necessarily impossible that both can exist together. This
“evidential non-existence proof” attempts to demonstrate that some specific god cannot
exist if something else (the “disprover”) actually does exist. Of course, this sort of proof
works well only if there is conclusive evidence of the actual existence of the disprover.
Theologians are attracted towards investigating the validity of a proof’s logical steps, but
ordinary believers have a notoriously expeditious way of disposing of the problem, by
stubbornly denying the existence of the disprover. Consider the example from the
previous paragraph. What sort of evil could disprove the existence of god? There just
couldn’t be any! Or, expressed from the theologian’s perspective, what sort of god would
permit getting disproven by any actual turn of affairs? Not surprisingly, Christian
theology has already carefully insulated god and god’s plan for the universe from any
and all possible evidence. What appears to be evil really isn’t; what we must
nevertheless declare to be evil (such as the Holocaust) still has some inscrutably divine
sanction, for all we know. A debate over god and evil soon sidetracks into a debate over
the extent of our knowledge of god. Revising god (well, our conception of god) is
endlessly productive and profitable for theology. Here’s another example. Does natural
evolution prove that god did not specially create humanity? Well then, god must have
designed the natural laws responsible for humanity’s origins. Keeping god out of harm’s
way from actual evidence has also helped to keep theologians employed and busy.

The atheist can offer impressive proofs that specific and inflexible gods do not exist.
Logic, obvious evidence, and scientific knowledge can rule out a wide variety of gods.
Unfortunately, the number of potentially conceivable supernatural entities (some have
already been thought of, but most have not) far outruns the number of disprovable gods.
But perhaps the intellectual’s gods don’t really count. An atheist could still feel proud
that many the gods which have been worshipped by the great mass of humanity have
suffered disproof. Nevertheless, that accomplishment, though nobly executed, is hardly
the same thing as successfully proving that no god could possibly exist. The human
imagination will, in all likelihood, forever outrun reason’s logic or science’s facts.

When an atheist proudly claims that god can be disproven, he overstates the actual
achievement, ignores imaginative theology, and encourages religious believers to
suppose that the only reasonable atheist is the one who can prove that their god does
not exist. This bold tactic unfortunately sets off a philosophical vs. theological arms race
which no one can win. Indeed, this strategic race has already begun. The ordinary
believer cheers on theologians protecting god from refutation, but the needed
theological refinements to god in turn make god more and more mysterious, which in
turn forces atheists to design ever-more intricate arguments against god, and when
these arguments fall short, the believers rejoice at the atheists’ dismay and congratulate
themselves for their blind faith in incomprehensible mystery. Atheism has a poor strategy
if it mainly results in the spread of fideism.

To further appreciate the magnitude of the task of proving that no god exists, compare it
to the task of proving that no extraterrestrial life exists. Would any scientist, no matter
how skeptical about alien life she might be, eagerly undertake such a demonstration?
With what degree of confidence could a scientist, using only current scientific knowledge,
assert that no alien life exists anywhere in the universe? Now, keep in mind that today’s
scientists are rightly skeptical about alien life, in the sense that we do not yet have good
evidence of alien life. Scientists cannot reasonably assert that alien life exists, even if
they suppose that such life has a fair probability of existing somewhere else out in the
vast universe. Nor can scientists reasonably assert that alien life does not exist. And
scientists cannot even affirm not believing that alien life does not exist. There simply
isn’t enough evidence at present for either the ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ position about alien life.
The entire dichotomy between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ stances breaks down completely here,
and the same situation holds for the existence of god.

The only useful category remaining is skepticism, pure and simple: all scientists should
be skeptical about alien life, and everyone should be skeptical about god. What kind of
atheist are you? I recommend answering, "a skeptical atheist."