Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Rebellions in Palestine Author(s): 'Adel Manna' Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.

24, No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 51-66 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537982 . Accessed: 06/12/2011 05:31
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EIGHTEENTH-AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY REBELLIONS IN PALESTINE

'ADEL MANNA'

andjournalscientists, political historians, intifada, ofthe time Atthe in 1936-39. rebellion, Palestinian to a previous ists calledattention comparison the sides, on all to those was apparent Whiletheanalogy negacertain in to highlight order byIsraelis made frequently wasmore in both uprisings. tive aspects about little has beenwritten very revolt, In contrast to the1936-39 the during that took placein Palestine uprisings several other popular in events or indeedaboutother centuries, and nineteenth eighteenth oftheZionist thebeginning before ofthecountry history themodern haveachevent itself, doesnotrepeat Itis true that history enterprise. out. how it playsitself thatdetermine ingits uniquecircumstances ourunderstandcouldenrich earlier rebellions a familiarity with Still, the pastis an important intifada, anduncovering most recent ingofthe the ofthepopuwhat This is study a nation. gives of rebuilding aspect theevents perse, beyond in times pastan importance lar rebellions WritPalestine. modern of in the were history they though milestones is also imperative century sincetheeighteenth history ingPalestinian of Eastand author Middle ofthemodern 'AdelManna'is a historian earlier An 1800-1918. al-'Ahd al-'Uthmani: Awakhir Filastin fi A'iam vol.2 in Qadaya in Arabic appeared ofthisarticle version Uerusalem), 3-22. pp. 1990), (February
no. 1 (Autumn1994), pp. 51-66. Studies XXIV, ofPalestine Journal

52

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

for liberating mindsofthemyth thatnothing worth telling happenedin Palestine untiltheadvent of Zionism. The last two centuries of Ottoman rulesaw three popularuprisings of significance in Palestine.The first, whichtookplace in and around in 1703-5,is knownas thenaqibal-ashraf Jerusalem rebellion because oftheleadingroleplayed byJerusalem's naqibal-ashraf (thehead ofthe associationof sharifs, or direct descendants of theProphet)ofJerusalem.' The secondtookplace in 1825-26, also injerusalem.Despitethe intervening century and a quarter,these first two rebellionsshared in termsof causes and the unfolding manycharacteristics of events. The third revolt was againstthe rule of Muhammad 'Ali and his son Ibrahim in thespring of 1834. In contrast to thetwoearlier rebellions, each ofwhichlastedfor twoyears, thisrevolt was crushed within a few months.Butthefact thatitwas thick withevents and thatlargesectors ofthePalestinian population, from Galileein thenorth to Hebronand Gaza in thesouth, participated givesit a specialplace in thehistory of modernPalestine. A detailedstudyofthesepopularuprisings lies beyondthescope of thisstudy, and we shallsatisfy withoutlining ourselves their maincharacteristics. We shallthencompare thesewiththenationalist rebellions ofthetwentieth Our hope is thatin highlighting boththeconcentury. stantand changing factors thatdrove theseextraordinary and in events, to see whatis common to all three and whatis peculiarto each, trying thiscomparative of theintifada studymaydeepenour understanding of thePalestinians againstIsraelioccupation.

TheRebellion ofNaqibal-Ashraf
to Thereis no historical evidence ofanyorganized popularresistance ruleor policiesin anypartof Palestine Ottoman priorto thenaqibalin theveryearlyyearsof theeighteenth The rebellion ashraf century. in sixteenth Ottomanstate was strongand centralized the century, an occawhichis whyat thetimeBedouinclans werealone in raising to theauthorities. Butby theseventeenth the sional challenge century, in in had as Ottomanadministration Palestine, neighboring regions, and conflicts weakened, amonglocal rulersincreased.The combinasituation tion of theirquarrelsand the deterioration of the security in thestate'sability tookitstollon thelocal population, who lostfaith themThe peoplelearnedto protect to provide justiceand protection. Bedouin from the of selvesand their crops depredations bandits, tribes, and greedy tax collectors. Ottoman Thus,in theshadowofweakand ineffective rule,local leadfrom ofruralshaykhs and urbannotables. ers emerged amongfamilies resisted It was thisgroupthatled thepopulation when they Ottoman who leviedexcessive taxesand tried to collect them governors by force.

18TH AND 19TH CENTURY REBELLIONS

53

Mostoftherebellions against thepoliciesoflocal Ottoman administratorsemerged againstthisbackground. Atthebeginning oftheeighteenth century, thedistricts ofJenin, Nablus, and Jerusalem weregoverned from Damascus,while the Galilee and coastal regionscame underthevilayet of Sidon.2 Despitethe reforms attempted by the Ottoman viziersof the Koprulufamily at the end oftheseventeenth century, local government and administration in the regionremained basicallyunchanged.The authorities failedtime and again to ensuresecurity and stability forpeasantsand citydwellers. In Hebron,forinstance, we read of renewed struggles duringthis periodbetween theKurdsand Tamimis who enlisted (Dayris), thehelp of peasantsfrom neighboring villages.3The governors, jurists,senior intervened to settle thedisputeand 'ulama',and notablesofJerusalem make peace betweenthe warringfactions.They were successfulat but onlyforbrief times, periods.4 The governors ofJerusalem wereunable to establishsecurity, not only in Hebron and its surrounding hills, but even in rural areas around itself.As an example Jerusalem ofthekindofproblem thatwas a court tellsofa groupofMuslims common, register who,after visiting theAqsa Mosque,theDome oftheRock,and theresting place ofMusa al-Kalim (Moses), wereunableto return hometo their villagesbecause theinhabitants ofBayt Iqsa and Bayt over which Laqia werequarrelling of thetwovillageswas to collecttheghafar tax.5 Fearing banditsand from thevillagers asked theqadi BaytIqsa and BaytLaqia, thevisitors shar'i to intercede on theirbehalfand guarantee theirsafe passage thearea. The qadi did so and theMuslim visitors wereable to through of "thelack of security on theroads,"as leave,but thebasic problem thedocuments put it,remained.6 The main road from Jerusalem to Jaffa was not much moresecure thantheroadsfrom to Nablusand Hebron.Attimes Jerusalem thegovernors succeededin restoring temporarily security alongtheroads,but was sometimes thepriceforsuch initiatives high: whenAql Agha,the administrator of Lydda,forexample,led a sortiein his (mutasallim) in response district Bedouinbandits tolocal complaints, he and against one ofhis soldiers werekilledin an ambush, whiletherestofhis men and stripped weretakenprisoner oftheir possessions.7Giventheoverall lack ofsecurity, manypeople decidednotto pay taxesto thegoverto protect their livesand property. norsand to relyon themselves In 1701, Muhammad Pasha KurdBayram was appointed wali (goverextensive nor) ofJerusalem, Nablus,and Gaza and granted powersto in theregion.He arrived and reestablish in restore security authority at the head of a largearmyand doubled taxes,makingit Jerusalem notpaid willingly wouldbe collected clearthatmoney by force.As an and his powerto carry out his threat, indication ofhis resolve thewali theBedouinclans thathad taken led twosuccessful campaigns against

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oftheroadsin Gaza and that control werelording itover thelocal population. Muhammad Pasha returned from the second campaignin November1701 ladenwithprisoners and booty, including women,girls, and flocks of sheep.8 The following year,thewali launchednew militarycampaignsagainstrebellious Bedouinsand peasantsin the Gaza and Jerusalem governorates, and returned toJerusalem withtheheads ofelevenrebels, whichhe hungoverthegateways to thecity. Over200 Bedouinsand peasantsare estimated to have been killedin the 1702 campaign.9 ButMuhammad Pasha'sharshrepression did notbringsecurity and to the region, and in factincreasedresistance stability to his rule. A largenumber ofrebellious Bedouinsand peasantsfortified themselves in thevillageofBaytJibrin and could onlybe dislodged bythewaliand his armyafter of siege. Muhammad eightmonths Pasha's forces laid wasteto manyofthevillages in thecourseofthese they passed through repeated campaigns. The 'ulama' and notablesofJerusalem, manyofwhomwerecustodians of waqf property the Palestinian dispersedthroughout countrythe intermediary of the qadi and side,10advised the wali through Muhammad Effendi themufti ofJerusalem, to desistfrom his Jarallah, When Muhammad Pasha the people of Jerusalem policy. persisted, rose up. A stateof rebellion was declaredafter Fridayprayers at the Aqsa Mosque in May 170311 when the wali was away on one of his in theNablusregion and had left military campaigns onlya mutasallim ofJerusalem and a fewtroopsbehind. The inhabitants seized thisoptheprisoners, thenmovedon to to attacktheprisonand free portunity the mutasallim's house (saraya) and arquartersin the government himalongwithsome ofhis guards.12 TheJanissaries rested and timar whichmade holders(sipahis)joined therebelsin thecity, (land grant) and his troops. it easy for theJerusalemites to overcome themutasallim who had heardabout the 'ulama"s apPeasantsfrom nearby villages, to takepartin therebellion.In thisway,the peal, came into Jerusalem fora people easily took controlof the cityand set about preparing Pasha. counterattack by Muhammad thenaqib ofJerusalem, Once therebelsgainedcontrol they appointed as shaykh ibn Mustafa and Muhammad al-Wafa'i al-ashraf, al-Husayni, leader of the city. They also appointedthe shaykhsof the various the city'saffairs, to help the naqib administer quartersof Jerusalem lastedfor a periodofself-rule that overtwoyears, thusbeginning nearly Pasha and the untiltheend of 1705. Duringthisperiod,Muhammad but vain attempts to regain walis ofDamascus made several Jerusalem, of theholy city of the sanctity tookadvantage the rebelssuccessfully fire whenever and itsfortifications, closingthecity gatesand returning documentdemonstrates the state armies approached.The following

18TH AND 19TH CENTURY REBELLIONS

55

theenthusiasm ofthepeoplein defending themselves and their solidarityat thatcrucial juncture:

On the date recorded below,therecame to the augustmajlisalshari'a all the renowned'ulama',noble shaykhs and grandimams, thecommander thesipahis, of thefort, theJanissaries, and thenotables of thevilayet and all thesubjects, Janissaries, inhabitants of the of thecity, and theentire quarters ofJerusalem. population Andthey entered intoa common in good faith accord, and without reservation, thatall theinhabitants ofJerusalem shallbe ofone mind as to whattheshari'a requires, and thattheyshould succorone anto thetrueshari'a: otheraccording Ifbrigands shouldattacka Jerusalemite or a groupofthem, and if theyshould tryto killhimoutsidethecity, in an orchard or village, thatthey and ifhe shouldsatisfy himself wereout to killhim,and if and fight he should thendefendhimself them, killingone of their number to fendoff theattack, thediya[blood money, or compensaofthedeceased]shallbe dividedamongall thepeotionto thefamily ple ofJerusalem, Muslimsand dhimmis andJews]alike. [Christians If brigandsshould attacka Jerusalemite, and iftheinhabitants of ofthis, shouldrushto fendoff theattackagainst Jerusalem, learning him by attacking and if a Jerusalemite the brigands, should firea or similar musket contrivance, one oftheattackers, and ifthe hitting of thisman should demandpayment of a diya,thesaid diya family notjust the man who shall be paid by all the people ofJerusalem, themusket. fired a thief in his home at If a Jerusalemite shoulddiscover or brigand and kill him in orderto wardoffthe and if he should strike night, thenhis diyashallalso be dividedamongthepeoattackon himself, ple ofJerusalem. thepeopleofJerushouldattack and killa Jerusalemite, Ifbrigands salem shall ask forhis diyato be paid, and theyshall exactthedue in fullmeasure. and remedies reparations The aboveaccordhas been entered intoby commonconsent. on thethird of Muharram, Recorded 1115 [19 May 1703].13

in repelling thestate'satwerelongsuccessful Whiletheinhabitants whichwas theessential condito quell therebellion, tempts solidarity, with tion for success, was undermined arose, as well time. Personaldifferences were ofprinciple, for instance on While theinhabitants as differences in repelling long successful the mannerin whichthe land was to be to quell and theform oftherelation- thestate'sattempts administered was solidarity the rebellion, The ship with the Ottomanauthorities. undermined with time. thestaterose against costsoftherebellion dragged on. The stipends as theuprising and thesipahis(cavalry)and the 'ulama' used to thattheJanissaries themerchants werecutoff.Businessdriedup for from Istanbul receive the unsaferoads,and the factthat situation, because of the security Under intotheholycityand itsenvirons. coming had stopped pilgrims numbers wantedto accept the offer increasing these circumstances,

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madebytheOttoman authorities to dismissthewali,believing thatthis would be a sufficient achievement fortherebellion. Butanother faction, headedby thenaqibal-ashraf, was distrustful of Ottoman promisesnot backedby adequateguarantees and wantedto continue therebellion.Thus thepopulation was split, and differences ofopiniongrew intobloodyclashesbetween thenaqibal-ashraf and his followers on theone hand,and theopposition, whichwas gaining wide support from thepopulation, on theother.14It was at this juncture, in 1705, thatthe Ottoman authorities, who had encouraged the opposition,feltthe timewas ripe fora new military campaignto quell the rebellion. The Ottomanforcemade slow progressfromDamascus, meeting resistance from thepeople of theNablus district who harriedit along theway,but to little effect. Meanwhile, thearmedclashesbetween the naqib's men and theiropponentswere raginginside the Jerusalem walls. As theOttoman force reachedtheoutskirts ofthecity, thenaqib a losingbattleand decidedto and his men realizedthey werefighting withdraw before they werecut off.Theyretreated through the 'Amud (Damascus) gateand theMagharibah gateon thenight of 28 October 1705, leavingthecityin thehandsofthegroupfavoring reconciliation
15 with theOttomans.

Thus,whentheOttoman a fewdayslater, armyarrived thegatesof thecitywereopen,and it entered without a struggle. Thus ended the rebellion ofthenaqibal-ashraf, ofOttoman and therestoration authorityand Ottomanadministration began. This includedpursuingand in the rebellion.The punishing manyof thosewho had participated witha fewof his faithful naqib al-ashraf himself had disappeared folhimuntilhe was found theauthorities continued for lowers; searching and arrested several months laterin theTartuscastle, whichis within Fromthere he was senton toIstanbul, theTripoli where he was vilayet. in 1707.16 triedand sentenced to death. He was executed In the cityofJerusalem the stateappointeda new naqib alitself, ibn al-Din Muhi 'Abd al-Samad.Manyof thosewho had taken ashraf, in and had remained faithful to the old naqib were the rebellion part of the naqib who had led the rebellion was arrested.The property Their his and as that of brother Musa. was seized, possessions posion their within thefaction thathad coltionswerebestowed opponents laboratedwith the authorities.17 Faced withthe problemof finding forhundreds oftroops who had been brought intothecityto quarters in the ofsimilar rebellions maintain and to prevent theoutbreak order, the Ottomanauthorities future, requisitioned manyhouses near the fort in whichto billetsoldiers.18 did But thepolicyof theOttoman statein thewake of therebellion or there ofrebuilding was also thecarrot notconsistsolelyofthestick; or had sufrestoring mosquesand holyplaces thathad been destroyed

18TH AND 19TH CENTURY REBELLIONS

57

in and aroundtheHaramal-Sharif. The statealso realized fered neglect withinfluential local leaders to cooperate thatit was moreproductive in population.In thisway notablefamilies thanto alienatetheentire in thecountryside partbecameactualand official thecityand shaykhs cenas of theeighteenth nersin local government and administration of Ottomanrule and helped it tury,which enhanced the stability from the without a seriouschallenge endureforanother twocenturies before the rebellion againstthe Ottomans Therewas in factanother in Galilee, reasons was out,thisone centered butfor eighteenth century thatwill be elucidatedpresently it does not fitinto our framework. behind is in order.The primemover Nonetheless, a brief description his fathisrebellion was Zahiral-'Umar al-Zaidani, who had inherited ther'spositionas tax collector forthe regionof Tiberiasand Safad. toneighhis influence Zahirwas ambitious and succeededin extending bringing most of thevillagesof the Galilee boringregions, gradually underhis control from thegovernors of Damascus despiteopposition and Sidon. In 1747 he addedAcretothedomainofhis tax concession, thecityand making it his seat of government.20 fortifying ruler who ribecamea powerful DespitethefactthatZahiral-'Umar he was never valed the governors of Damascus and Sidon, officially he received morethana tax collector; no highadministrative position. His ambitions did not stop at thebordersof Galilee,and he triedto and to unitemostofPalestine underhis control.In expandsouthward he made a the therulerof Egypt, the 1760s, Great, pact with'Ali Bey and to divideSyria(Bitwo tried to Damascus and together the occupy for the Ottoman authem. This was too much lad al-Sham)between him for the to rid of once and all: and decided get thorities, they himmanagedto quash himin 1775. AhmadPasha armiessentagainst ofall ofthevilayet ofSidon. Acre, al-Jazzar succeededhimas governor whichhad becomea prosperous portand a fortified cityin thedaysof remained al-Jazzar's Zahiral-'Umar, yearsof capitalduringthe thirty
his rule until he died in 1804.21 population.19

Zahiral-'Umar's ruleoverGalileeis regarded by some as a rebellion thetruth ofthisassessment, Zahiralrule. Whatever againstOttoman and his dispute withthegovernment conrebellion 'Umaral-Zaidani's which was too tohimbythestate, oftheroleassigned cernedtheextent was a partofthephenomenon his ambitions.Zahiral-'Umar smallfor in the Arabvilayets of local forces as the influence of the increasing austateweakenedand was no longerable to imposedirect Ottoman on those regions. This phenomenon, despiteits importance, thority from whichare the subjectof thepopularrebellions differs radically thisstudy.22 no offers of Palestinein the eighteenth century Thus, the history of naqibal-ashraf. The nextlinkin to therebellion eventcomparable

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the chain of popularrebellions in Palestine comes in 1825, when the inhabitants ofJerusalem once again rebelledagainstthe Ottomanauthorities and succeededin expelling all manifestations ofOttoman rule and administration such as themutasallim and his men,and governed foralmosttwoyears. themselves

TheRevolt of1825-26
The causes oftherebellion ofthe 1820s weresimilar to thoseofthe thetwo events naqib al-ashraf revolt, are separated although by a cenand a quarter.In 1824 Mustafa tury Pasha was appointed governor of Damascus. He triedto levyexorbitant taxeson thepeople and to collectthem byforce.He metwithno successinitially,23 butthefollowing yearhe appearedat thehead of an armyof thousands to collecttaxes fromthe districts of Nablus and Jerusalem, which fell withinhis MustafaPasha spenttwenty governorate. days in the Nablus region, wherehe metwithgreatresistance thepeasantswho refused from to paythetaxeshe demanded.The governor thenadvanced withhis army from the hills of Nablus to theJerusalem wherehe metwith region, similar from thepopulation, resistance thepeasantsofthe particularly Bethlehem regionwho wereallied withtheTa'amraclan. Because he in Damascus,Mustafa needed to return to theseat of his government Pasha agreedto acceptlessersums thanhe had demanded.24 No soonerhad thegovernor leftJerusalem thanthepeople and peashis mutasallim, antsofthearea revolted 'Uthman against Agha,who at the timewas leadinga military campaignagainstthe peasantsof the Bethlehem therebelsinJerusalem region.Whilehe was thusengaged, of the fort and closed the citygates,shutting him out gained control in thedirection himto withdraw ofRamlah.25 Fromthere and forcing themutasallim triedin vain to securereinforcements Pafrom Mustafa sha in Damascus,but thelatter could notcome to his aid as he had to thehajj caravanto theHijaz.26 accompany In Jerusalem, had takencontrol of the fort and the the inhabitants in the the mutasallim's men still and had arrested saraya city. They and other disarmedand expelledtheTurkish, Albanian, foreign troops. who chose two local fellintothe hands of therebels, Thus authority who armyolhcers-YusulAgha al-Ja'uni, forthe arms depot,and was responsible The entire populationof he commander AhmadAgha al-'Asali, Muslimsand Christians, ofthegovernment takecharge thefort-to citydwellers, and peasants- and the armedresistance.27 The leaders tookpartin therebellion, of therebellion actedas therulersof the just as they had in the forpartheinhabitants rewarding region, earlierrevolt. in the rebellionby exempting ticipating peasants frompaymentof the miri tax

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thatyearand by reducing thejizya tax to be paid by theheads of the 28 Christian and communities. The eni entirepopulationJewish city's Muslimsand Christians, citydwellers and peasants-tookpartin the rebellion, just as they had in thenaqibal-ashraf rebellion. The 'ulama' and notablesofJerusalem were aware of the possible consequencesof the eventsand sentpetitions explaining the reasons forthe rebellionto the authorities in Istanbuland the governors of Egypt and Acre.29Istanbulrepliedby ordering the populationto forsake seditionand end therebellion, but therebelswantedguarantees thatthey wouldnotbe punished, thatthegovernor wouldbe replaced, and thathis taxation policieswouldnotbe adoptedby his successors. The government did depose MustafaPasha and appointeda replacement as governor ofDamascus,butthepeoplemadetheir ending ofthe rebellionconditional upon guarantees forthe safety of theirpersons and possessions. Meanwhile, itbecameapparent thatthenewgovernor of Damascus was unable to put down the rebellion through military so thesultanasked'AbdAllahPasha,thegovernor force, to do ofAcre, To discharge the task assignedto him,'Abd Allah Pasha mobilized 2,000 troopsand sentthemto lay siege toJerusalem. By thetimehis of the city,he had won overthe Abu armyarrivedon the outskirts Ghushfamily, whichcontrolled theJaffa-Jerusalem road and had influence withthepeasantsofJabalal-Quds.31 'Abd AllahPasha's troopssurrounded the cityand opened negotiationswiththerebelsto avoidspilling blood in theholycity.Eventually, the inhabitants the two sides reacheda peacefulsettlement whereby would surrender on condition thattherebels, their including leaders, wouldbe granted a fullpardon. So it came aboutthatthecitysurrenderedpeacefully, and thepledgenotto punishthecityforitsrebellion was honored.The leadersof therebellion, Yusufal-Ja'uni and Ahmad wereexiledto nearby to Ramlahand thesecal-'Asali, places: thefirst further ond to Nablus.32Thus therebellion endedwithout bloodshed, inJerusalem and 'AbdAllahPasha'stroops remained untilthegovernor of Damascus sent over a new mutasallim at the end of December 1826.33 between thenaqibal-ashraf of The similarities revolt and theevents and themanner 1825-26areobvious. The causes ofthetworebellions, in whichthey and both brokeout and unfolded werealmostidentical, of the population, all classes and segments rural embracedvirtually it shouldbe recalledthatbothrebellions, and urbanalike. Moreover, their historical had limited aims. The mainengine despite importance, in both cases was discontent withthepolicies of local events driving excessivetaxationand forcible tax collection. governors, particularly The aims of thepeople weresimilarly to limited, basicallyamounting no morethana changein governors and their policies. The legitimacy
it.30

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of Ottoman rule under the sultan, the Islamic caliph, was not challenged.

TheRising Against Muhammad 'Ali

The third rebellion of our study, therebellion againstEgyptian rule whichoccurred in thespring of 1834, resembled its twoprecedents in causes and objectives. Muhammad ofEgypt, 'Ali,theruler had senthis armyto occupySyria(Biladal-Sham) in 1831 and initially metno serious popularresistance despite thesultan'sexhortations for thepopulation to rise up againstthe mutiny.34 But Muhammad 'Ali's policyin Biladal-Sham in thefollowing yearsfomented rebellion amongthepopulationagainstEgyptian rule. The administrative reforms and centralization policies whichMuhammad'Ali implemented his son through Ibrahim Pasha undermined thepositionof thelocal leaders,both the urban notablesand the ruralshaykhs.Otherinnovations introduced by the Egyptians prior to the rebellion, such as the imposition of military conThe 1834 rebellion scription and thedisarming ofthepopulamanifested aspectsof tion, were seen as detrimental to wide modern popularuprisings ofthepeople. In addition, sectors theOtin theArabworld. toman state was constantly incitingthe populationto rebel: Ottoman decreesretheillegitimacy peatedly stressed oftheEgyptian occupation, endowing the 1834 rebellion withan ideologicalcharacter transcending limited demands concerning matters of taxationand specificmeasuresand to a challenge to thelegitimacy amounting ofgovernment itself.It is in thissense thatthisrebellion manifested aspectsofmodern popularuprisings againstforeign occupationin variouspartsof theArabworld. The rebellion against Egyptian rulein Palestine spreadfrom theGalilee in the northto Gaza and the hills of Hebronin the south. The rebels,under the commandof ruralshaykhs, scoredinitialvictories thatcompelledIbrahimPasha to withdraw to Jaffa and requestreinforcements fromMuhammad'Ali.35 But the Egyptian rulerquickly in putting showedhimself moreefficient thantheOttomans downlocal rebellions.As soon as reinforcements arrived, IbrahimPasha waged in thehillsofJerusalem, military campaigns Nablus,and Hebron. The Egyptian armyscoredsuccessive victories againstthe rebels,and the was put downwithin a fewmonths.But thatdid not satisfy uprising Muhammad'Ali,who pursuedthe rebelswho had fledto the Karak River regioneast of theJordan and executed themostprominent rebel leadersamongruralshaykhly families such as al-Madi, al-Jarrar, Qasim and others.36 He also exiledthe'ulama' al-Ahmad, al-Samhan, al-'Amr, and notablesfrom and Hebronwho had Jerusalem, Nablus,Nazareth,

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supported the rebellion, including thosewho did so secretly, without actively participating. Thus,in contrast to therebellion against thegovernor ofDamascus a decadeearlier, thepopulation thistime paid a highpricefor itsactions against theauthorities. Butthepeople,longaccustomed to a largemeasure of self-rule, bided theirtime,waitingforan opportunity to rid of Egyptian themselves rule. That opportunity came when the armies of the OttomanEmpirewere again pittedagainstMuhammad'Ali's troopsas the 1830s drew to a close. Many rural shaykhsdeclared in rebellion themselves and attackedMuhammad 'Ali's armyas it retreated through Palestine on itswayto Egypt.

The Twilight of Ottoman Rule

Duringthetwo decades following thereimposition of Ottoman rule in 1840, thestruggles for powerand influence thatoccurred in various regionsof Palestine wereamongnotableand shaykhly alfamilies;37 ofJabalNablus,calls themcivilwars,a resurgence thehistorian Nimr, oftheQaysiand Yemeni and thesedo notfigure feuds, amongthepopular rebellions thatare thesubjectofthisstudy.38 It is truethatthose mobilized families peasantmilitias to support them, but thenatureof internecine struggles forpowerand influence againstthe authorities in reaction differed from to thepoliciesand conduct popularuprisings ofgovernors. In thefinal decadesofOttoman rule,a newclass oflargelandowners and bureaucratic office holdersemerged.The imposition by theOttomansofdirect and centralized ruleoverPalestine and theother vilayets in the second halfof thenineteenth had undermined the incentury to thebig families of thejabals. With influence dependent belonging theland law of 1858 and thevilayets law of 1864, class formation beand accessionto segan to takeshape on thebasis ofland ownership nioradministrative The new social elitetherefore office. had economic from interests thatdiffered thoseofthetraditional and political leaders who had led thepopularrebellions.It was notto be expected thatthe thathad been new elitewould lead rebellions againstthe authorities for itsrise,enabling it to consolidate itseconomic responsible position as partof theTanzimat and modernization policies.39 ofthespring of1834 was thelastpopuThusitwas thattherebellion laruprising oftheOttoman no organized era,and thestateencountered in Palestine WarI. Andalthough resistance somePalestiniup toWorld in theArabRevolt led by Sharif ans did participate Husaynof Mecca in theselast daysof Ottoand his sons,thenature ofthatinsurrection as Palestinian itsconsideration manruleand thelimited roleprecludes a local rebellion similar to thosethathad occurred earlier.

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At the end of WorldWar I, the empirefell. The Ottoman umbrella was blown away and the Palestinians came under the authority of a great powerthey believed for a brief instant to be a friend oftheArabs. thatBritain was comnletelv Theyweresoon to discover biased in favor of the Zionist agenda that was already thefaceofPalestine, changing the though British administration had a Arabsdid not fully appreciate at thetime fargreater and farcrueler thesignificance ofthechallenge.Thus the impactthanfourcenturies lastleafin thebook ofOttoman in history ofOttoman rule. Palestine was turned, and a new era began. The British administration lasted a merethreedecades, but had a fargreater and farcruelerimpacton Palestine thanfourcenturies of Ottoman rule. The Ottomans had ruledtheArabregionforcenturies, yettheOttomanstate, liketheIslamicstatesthat preceded it,did nottry to alter the ethnicor cultural mix of theArabpopulation.As long as thepeople paid their annual taxesand recognized theauthority of thesultan,for whomMuslimssaid prayers on Fridays, theauthorities interfered little in theirdaily lives. Thus the Arabsenjoyedself-rule generation after undertheumbrella ofOttoman generation administration. This policy ofdecentralized of a class of rulepermitted theemergence and growth whichplayedan important townnotablesand ruralshaykhs role in local administration, as well as in social and economiclife. when the regioncame It was only in the finaldecades of empire, under a centralized administration and especiallywhen the Young therealmas of 1908, thatOttoman rulebeTurksset aboutTurkifying Untilthattime,theArabs,particularly gan to be seen as intolerable. the Muslims,had consideredthe sultan'sstate as theirown: it had to themto questionthelegitimacy of Ottoman authorneveroccurred ity,to secede,or to demandindependence. ofBritish Itwas because ofthedifferent nature ruleand especially its Britain had changed supportof the Zionistagenda,whose prospects of thattherebellion overnight byissuingthe 1917 Balfour Declaration, ofprevious centuries 1936 differed in kindfrom therebellions against of 1936 was Ottoman The enginethatdrovetherebellion governors. or at least nationalism, thegoal was to driveout theforeign occupiers, to getthemto altertheir policiesin a fundamental wayso as to put an that and to guarantee and uprooting, end to theprocessofJudaization to livein its homeland. thePalestinian peoplewould continue

Conclusion
undertheOtofthepopularrebellions Despitethelimited objectives of historical to the cumulative tomans,theircontribution experience

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thePalestinian of a distinctive people and to theformation Palestinian personality shouldnotbe minimized. In highlighting thesignificance of therebellions, it is well to sketch certainof theircharacteristics thathad an impactbeyondthe events reviewed in thecourseofthisstudy.It is striking thatin thesepopular uprisings citydwellers cooperated withpeasantsfrom nearby villages as well as Bedouin clans, despitethe social gap separating them.40 Moresignificantly, bothMuslimsand Christians, urbanand rural, parin therebellions, ticipated a striking in theperiodprior phenomenon to thespreadof nationalconsciousness, whenreligious and sectarian affiliation playeda fundamental rolein molding individual and group consciousnessand identity. The Christians, who did not constitute ofthepopulation, morethan15 percent came to form an integral part ofsociety in thelast centuries despitetheir minority status. TheJews, on theother hand,wereexclusively citydwellers at thetimeand fewin number, mostlyold people or students at religiousschools,so they wereon themargin of events. As forthe leadership of the rebellions, the social elitein townand was at the cutting country edge of events.Duringthe Ottomanera, untilthemiddleof thenineteenth century, class divisions between the apex and thebase of thesocial pyramid had limited salience,particularlyin ruralsociety, whichconstituted thedemographic In majority. thissocial structure there was nota largegap between theleadersand thepeople,so thattheleaderscould defend ofthepublic, theinterests or at least take those interests into account,and act as advocatesof thoseinterests morethanas representatives oftheinterests ofthestate to their people. This social structure theend of thenineteenth cenchangedtoward theadoptionofthecapitalist ofland ownership. tury following system This led to class polarization, a gap between theeliteand the creating popularclasses. Although thisis thesocial structure withwhichArabs are familiar as of thelast decades of theOttoman era,one shouldnot ofOttoman thissituation to thefour centuries simplistically generalize rule: it was onlyverygradually overthatlong periodthatthe demographic, economic, and cultural makeupofPalestinian as it apsociety, ofthetwentieth pearedon theeve oftherapidmodernization century, began to takeshape. in contrast The British to Ottoman a real Mandate, rule,constituted and directthreat to the existence of the Palestinian and their people future ofits embraceof theZionistagenda. Despitethissigby virtue nal difference, withtheregion's and society will thosefamiliar history have no difficulty of old the continuation inheridentifying patterns, itedfrom the Ottoman era,in theArabresponsesto thenew realities taking shape undertheBritish.

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Eventherebellion of 1936,whichbrokethemoldoftraditional relationsbetweenthe authorities and the population, was not freeof the legacyof the popular uprisings of the Ottomanera. This legacyincluded,alongwithsuchpositive aspectsas theparticipation ofthevarious sectorsof the populationand the readinessof all concernedto forthecommongood,certain makesacrifices negative aspectsincluding clannish, regional, and sectarian affiliations. Forinstance, inhabitants of mountainous regions had a higher in the rateof participation rebellion than inhabitants of the plains and the coast,peasantswere moreactive thancitydwellers, butthepolitical remained releadership stricted to an eliteofcitynotables. Moreover, thefactional disputesin the 1930s between thefollowers ofHaj Aminal-Husayni and theoppowhichplayed sitionled by theNashashibis, a rolein aborting therebellion, werenot so verydifferent from the clannishfeudsbetweenthe In summary, Qaysisand Yemenis ofpastcenturies. theevents although a new kind of nationalist of 1936-39 represented obvious rebellion, points of similarity connect it to the local rebellionsunder the Ottomans. In concluding, in Palestine, one mightadd thatpopular uprisings from the naqib al-ashraf rebellion to the present, have brokenout despitea clear imbalanceof powerin favor of the authorities,whether Ottoman, Popularuprisings in or Israeli. The people Egyptian, British, Palestine havebroken out sevon therebellion for wereable to carry despitea clearimbalance of eral yearsand to score gains because of powerin favor of theirwillingnessto sacrificeand their authorities. overan extended ability to worktogether thesehistoriperiod. It is also clearfrom and differences are among cal experiences thatinternecine struggles failure of thoserebellions. the mostimportant causes of the ultimate militaThe authorities werein each case able to putdowntherebellion rilyafter divisionshad undermined the unityof ranksamong those was particuwho sparkedand led the rebellions.This phenomenon and 1936 rebellions. The dolarlyapparent in boththenaqibal-ashraf tollof the mestic war of attrition was moreseriousand tooka heavier thandid thetyranny and moraleofthepeople and their fighting spirit ofthePalestinian people repression oftheauthorities. The experience of other peoples of in thisrespect is no different thantheexperiences theworldwho haveundergone warsof nationalliberation. The most severetestof thewisdomand maturity of revolutionary arein directing and conleadership is how responsible decisionmakers to thelevelof usingviolenceto trolling therebellionwithout sinking settle ideological or personal accounts. This will also determine cause. whether themasseswillwillingly rallyto their

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NOTES
1. The first modernreference to thatrebellionwas made by 'Arifal-Arif in his book, Al-mufassal fi tarikhal-Quds (Jerusalem:al-Ma'arif Press, 1961), pp. 355-56. The treatment of the subject in his book was briefand unclear,but nothinghas been published on the subjectin Arabicsince. their followers,""and the others who fled with him." 16. Muhammad Rashed, TarikhRashed (Istanbul, 1282 A.H. or 1865-66 A.D.) See also Hasan ibn 'Abd manuscriptdated 1195 (1781) in the BritishMu-

al-Latif, ahlal-Quds fil-qarn al-thani 'ashar, Tarajim

2. Amnon Cohen, Palestine inthe 18th Century (Je- seum (MS. no. 3047), p. 33. Anothercopy of the
rusalem: Magnes Press, 1973), pp. 158-71. 3. Majiral-Dinal-Hanbali, in his book Al-uns al-jalil bitarikhal-Quds wal-Khalil, vol. II (Jerusalem:alMuhtasib Press, 1973), pp. 298-99, refersto the outbreakof such conflicts in the cityof Hebronbetween Kurds and Dayris during the fifteenth century,under Mamluk rule. 4. For the renewalof clashes betweenKurds and Dayris in thecityofHebronat theend oftheseventeenth century,see the records of the mahkama shar'ia ofJerusalem:Register no. 152, p. 155 and no. p. 364; Register no. 165, p. 113; and Register 174, pp. 16, 174, 416, 440. 5. Registerno. 183, pp. 153-54, dated the beginning of Rabi' al-thani1091 (10 May 1680). 6. Register no. 199, p. 513 dated 8 Sha'ban 1110 (29 December 1699). See also H. Maundrell,A

manuscript is kept at the Palestinian Museum (Rockefeller). 17. Register no. 203, pp. 101-43. no. 203, p. 54. 18. Register 19. Of course thatdid not prevent the outbreakof and limited rebellions, evenin thehillsofJerusalem Nablus close on the heals of the rebellionby the of naqibal-ashraf.Thereare reports oftheoutbreak a rebellion but there againstthestatein thatregion, is scant information about those events. See Mus-

lished M.A. thesis, Jaffa University, 1989, pp. 34-35 (in Hebrew). 20. For further detailson theroleofZahir al-'Umar in that period, see Amnon Cohen, pp. 30-43 and Abdul Karim Rafiq, Al-Arab wal-'Uthmaniyyun toJerusalem A.D. 1516-1916 (Acre: al-SurujiPress, 1978), pp. 268Journey from Aleppo at Easter, 1697 (London, 1810) pp. 105, 146-47. 75. 7. Register 109, p. 513. Also see Register no. 198, 21. Regarding the role of Zahir al-'Umar and Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, see Amnon Cohen, which pp. 124, 302. in 8. Minna Rosen, "The Naqib al-Ashraf rebellionin focuseson theruleoftheabovetwo personalities and its repercussions on thecity'sDhim- Palestine. Jerusalem 22. BeforeZahir al-'Umar,Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ni mis,"Asian and African Studies,19 (1984), p. 252. 9. M. Rosen, pp. 254-55. Also see D. Savlanian,A [the emir of Mount Lebanon] had rebelled at the History ofJerusalem beginningof the seventeenth century. He triedto (Jerusalem:1931), p. 604 (in Armenian). of districts expand at the expense of the governors 10. For further on Islamic waqfs in neighboring Mount Lebanon, even allyinghimself information with European powers against the Ottoman state. Palestineat the beginningof the Ottomanera, see Awqaf wa amlakal-muslimin fil-qarn al- Of course,thereare otherinstancesofrebellionsby fi Filastin ambitions editedand introduced and their ashar al-hijri, expansionary during byMuhammad governors Aisherly and MuhammadDawud al-Tamimi, (Istan- the eighteenth century. bul: Islamic ResearchCenter,1982). 23. Register no. 308, pp. 81-82, 93, 169, 182. 11. See M. Rosen and Savlanian. 24. S.N. Spyridon (ed.), AnnalsofPalestine, (Jerusa12. See M. Rosen and Savlanian. lem: 1938), pp. 33-35. no. 309, pp. 13. Registerno. 201, p. 456. The same register 25. S.N. Spyridon, pp. 36-37; Register contains manydocumentswithsimilarcontent. 57-58. ofDamascus, Ph.D. 14. Oppositionto the leadershipof naqib al-ashraf 26. GeorgeKoury,TheProvince of Michigan,1971, p. 176. dissertation, University and his policies firstcenteredin the Bab Hatta quarter,which came under attack fromthe upper 27. See the biographiesof these two figuresand quarters which supported the naqib. However, theirrolesin theeventsof 1825-26 in 'Adel Manna', al-'ahd Filastin gradually,a number of 'ulama', led by Shaykh A'lam fiawakhir al-'Uthmani, (JeruMuhammad al-Khalili,in addition to sipahis and salem: ArabStudiesAssociation,1986), pp. 69-70; Janissaries, began tojoin theopposition. The rebel- 179-81. bain hamlatain lion was weakened by these internecine divisions 28. 'Adel Manna',Liwa' al-Quds and Society, 1798-1831:Administration unpuband conflicts. HebrewUniversity, lishedPh.D. dissertation, 15. Registerno. 203, pp. 101-2, dated 11 Rajab 1986, 1117 (29 October 1705). In this document and p. 35. p. 39. the names of forty-six 29. S.N. Spyridon, othersin the same register, p. 39; also, al-'Arif, p. 361. persons who fled with the naqib al-ashrafare re- 30. S.N. Spyridon, and its of 31. For the status of the Abu Ghush family corded. But thosewereonlythe mostprominent the escapees, and not an exhaustivelist of their leadershiprole in thisperiod,see 'Adel Manna', pp. were frequently 24-27. names. The names in the register "and 32. 'Adel Manna', pp. 70, 181. followed by expressionssuch as "and others,"

tafaAbbas, Al-Tuwan fi sanjaqNablus minbidayat al-thamin 'ashar wa hatta al-qarn 'am1823,unpub-

66
33. Annals,p. 42; Register no. 311, pp. 4445. 34. S.N. Spyridon,pp. 44-45. 35. For furtherdetails on the 1834 rebellion againstIbrahimPasha, see Ihsan Nimr,TarikhJabal Nablus wal-Balqa', voli, (Nablus: Print Workers' Cooperative,1975), pp. 324-333. 36. See theirbiographiesin 'Adel Manna'. 37. Moshe Ma'oz, OttomanReforms in Syria and Palestine:1840-1861, (Oxford: 1968). 38. Al-Nimr, vol. i, pp. 348-89. 39. Al-Nimr, vol. i, pp. 277-79.

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

that the social and political 40. It is noteworthy and neighborgap betweenthe people ofJerusalem ing villageswas much largerthan the gap between the inhabitantsof the city of Nablus and its vilofNablus itself lages. The inhabitants weredivided into Qays and Yementribes,and were in the habit of engaging in factional disputeswiththe peasants, in contrast withthe inhabitants ofJerusalem, who kept their distance from such conflicts,leaving themto the peasants of the region.