HENRI TAJFEL

University of Oxford

Co-operation between Human Groups

THE COMPLEXITIES OF human social behaviour both these views are inadequate; that co-operaare not the preserve of any single discipline. tion or hostility between human groups cannot There has always been a great proliferation of be understood fully on the basis of calculations theories about the social nature or behaviour of of utility; and that they can be understood even man. These ideas were sometimes expressed in less on the basis of sweeping assumptions about the form of modest and cautious inferences from the role of instinct in the social behaviour of man. empirical data; sometimes as systems of social or The "social psychological man" stands somepolitical philosophy related to postulates about where apart both from the instinctive and from such-and-such inherent characteristics of"human the utilitarian man; he is a good deal more nature"; and sometimes they took a sweeping complicated than the two other homunculi could analogy as their starting point and emerged at ever become. the other end with a cosmic all-embracing theory. The difficulty we have to-day is to distinguish between what is useless and what useful for further inquiry; the subject matter is so vast Psychological Analysis that almost any system of ideas is likely to A psychological analysis of the problems of contain much truth. For example, as Plamenatz 10 wrote, there is no doubt that modern social co-operation between human groups can be science could learn a good deal more than it has undertaken only if its limitations are clearly kept until now from the ideas of social and political in mind. Such an analysis cannot provide an philosophers of the past. explanation of large-scale historical or social When one considers the problem of co-opera- events. Each case of co-operation or of conflict tion between human groups and other related must be understood in its own right, in terms of problems, such as competition and conflict its own conditions and determinants which may between groups and aggression displayed by one be economic or social, political or historical, and group towards another, it is not too difficult to are most often a mixture of all these. No set of identify two general assumptions which form- a priori psychological principles can replace the implicitly or explicitly-the basis of much detailed knowledge which is necessary for the theorizing on the subject. These assumptions analysis and understanding of a concrete social represent, in some ways, two entirely distinct situation. The social phenomena which arise ways of approaching the problems of human from it pursue their course in terms of their own interaction in society. One concerns itself with logic. Modern wars, for example, cannot be the "instinctive social man", the other with the "explained" on the basis of hostile attitudes "utilitarian social man". One attempts to harboured by large masses of individuals living explain the course of relationships between in the countries engaged in armed conflict. Such social groups in terms of instinctive character- attitudes may contribute to the creation of a istics of man; the other relies on a rational conffict, they may facilitate an explosion, they calculation, by members of a group or by their may even be fostered to serve these ends. But leaders, of the future utility of various possible large-scale social and political events are not courses of action. I shall try to argue from the predictable from a crude algebra of attitudes and evidence gathered by social psychologists that motives of millions of individuals. 77
THE EUGENICS REVIEW, June 1966, 58, 2.

THE EUGENICS REVIEW

To stress this point I can do no better than emotional identification with a group? What are quote from a recent paper byWithey and Katz 16: the conditions for the stability of such an The social psychological approach to war and identification? What are its effects on an peace is commonly misconceived as viewing inter- individual's attitudes and behaviour towards national conflict either in terms of the personalities members of his own group and towards other of national leaders or in terms of a national character groups as a whole or their individual members? which suffuses the masses and the elite in similar And, finally, as a special case of all this, what are fashion. Relevant social psychological processes are not revealed, however, by imputing to the character the conditions leading to co-operative attitudes of the people in the system the outcome of system and behaviour towards groups other than one's processes. For example, a nation declares war, own? hence, its people or its leaders are regarded as aggressive or warlike. This is the group mind fallacy in reverse, because there is the attribution of system Aggregations or Social Groups? outcomes such as belligerent or conciliatory actions If in the attempt to provide some form of to the personalities of the individual actors (p. 65). answers to these questions one turns first animal social behaviour, such Once these reservations have been made, the towards studies of in the preceding papers, some those discussed as task of identifying the contributions that can be be made. According can perhaps points general of to problems made by social psychology workers in this other to many to Etkin5 and co-operation between human groups becomes a classified roughly be can groups animal field, little more tractable. The diversity of ways in This social groups. and genuine into aggregates which mankind can be classified into groups is of on based the nature the is classification a to belongs practically infinite. Every one of us individto other individuals by made response large number of them, some as transient as a Thus, as Etkin puts it, animal groups are journey in a lift, some as permanent as a family, uals. social: a tribe or a nation. For the purposes of the present discussion I shall define a group as a when the members stay together as a result of their responses to one another rather than by category of people fulfilling two criteria: the social to other factors in their environment. responses first, that an individual identifies himself as Groups that are held together by responses to such belonging to that category; and the second, that other factors will be called "aggregations". Thus a this identification is to him of some emotional flock of sheep is a social group, since it is maintained by the social responses of the animals to one significance. Let me add immediately that there another; but the massing of insects around light at are many other possible definitions, but their night is an aggregation, since it results from their adequacy is not vested in some sort of absolute common attraction to the light (p. 4). criterion of "truth". They are useful only in Despite the fact that there may be many cases relation to the problem for which they are needed. And a second point: this definition, when it is difficult to decide which of these two though it takes two subjective criteria for its types of response determines the coming together point of departure, need not remain "subjective" and the functioning of a group, there are also at the level of empirical investigation. There are many animal groupings which can be assigned many behavioural indices which can be used to without too much hesitation to one or to the decide whether an individual does or does not other class. There is little doubt that many human feel himself to be a member of a group in the aggregations can be found to exist. But they sense just indicated. Thus, a group has been defined here not in undoubtedly constitute the most temporary and terms of its physical characteristics or of its social least complex type of human groups, and they structure, but in terms of its psychological become social groups in a more adequate sense existence for an individual. The main empirical only when, because of various pressures and problems that arise within the framework of this needs, they give rise to more stable organizations definition would then be as follows: What are whose members can be shown to display the sort the origins of an individual's conceptual and of identifications to which I previously referred. 78

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN HUMAN GROUPS

A comparative study of animal groups exhibiting the second type of response-the one which is genuinely "social" in the sense employed by Etkin-can teach us a good deal about the origin and the functioning of human social groups. It remains true, however, that facile analogies from animal to human are easily derived from the results of such studies. The less is the social behaviour of a species determined by its capacity to show flexibility and variability due to learning, the more likely it is that such analogies will be widely off the mark. Studies of animal social behaviour have shown that, in many species, learning plays an important role in various forms of social behaviour; for example, in individual recognition between parent and offspring, in differences in aggressive behaviour shown towards members of in-groups and outgroups, in territoriality, in the establishment of social hierarchies. Even this brief and incomplete enumeration shows clearly the striking similarities of some aspects of animal and human social behaviour. The question that arises concerns the extent to which the processes underlying these phenomena display the same sort of similarity. The study of the role played by innate and acquired patterns of behaviour in animal social groups is usually based on a careful analysis of its various relevant aspects. This would include a detailed and painstaking account of a sequence of behaviour, its relation to physiological mechanisms, to the ecological features of the environment, and also the analysis ofthe possible functions and survival value of the sequence. No self-respecting student of animal behaviour would commit here the "group mind fallacy in reverse", which would consist in this case of "explaining", for example, the intra-species aggressive behaviour of members of a group towards members of another group by a simple attribution of this aggressive behaviour to an innate tendency to be aggressive. And yet, in the case of human social behaviour we are often offered this type of statement with its implicit injunction that we can now rest content since we have explained the phenomenon. For example, in a recent symposium on aggression,4 its attribution in human affairs to an aggressive instinct seems to be, according to the editors, the

consensus of opinion reached by several members of a distinguished panel of contributors ranging from ethologists to social anthropologists. Indeed, one of the papers7 consists mainly of an impressive array of examples showing the horrifying incidence of cruelty, sadism, torture and massacre in the history of mankind. The author concludes that nothing but the existence of an innate aggressive tendency could explain all these phenomena. The argument has an undeniable ring of plausibility; but using another selection of examples one could infer with equal plausibility the existence of innate tendencies underlying the incidence in human affairs of co-operation, altruism, patriotism, self-sacrifice, or even perhaps of changes in fashion and of beauty contests. There are two principal reasons why all such explanations must remain unsatisfactory: one is that, without further independent evidence, they are tautological; the other, that they are not based on a detailed analysis of conditions under which the behaviour in question occurs or does not occur. As has been well shown in studies of animal social behaviour, only such an analysis would enable us to make testable inferences concerning the causal factors that may be involved. Even if it were true that there are innate tendencies lurking behind various forms of human competition, conflict or co-operation, the complexity of social behaviour in man is such that explanations of this nature would not take us very much further than statements relating the development of the rich variety of gastronomic traditions to man's undeniably innate need for food and drink. Identification with the Group One of the basic phenomena of human social interaction has been well brought out by implication in a paper by Thompsonl5 when he wrote "the language of the bees is not the language of love". Human language is also very often not the language of love. But it must be remembered that as the human being matures, one of the primary features of his development, without which he would not be able to adapt to the society of other human beings, is his increasing capacity to deal with his environment in abstract and symbolic terms. In most (if not all) 79

THE EUGENICS REVIEW

cases of social interaction in animals the social responses cannot be related to a capacity of perceiving the events from the point of view of another individual. The simpler processes also no doubt play an important role in human social behaviour; but they are inserted, as it were, within a larger framework of symbolic activity. The eminent Swiss psychologist Piaget has shown in much of his work that as the child progresses from one stage to the next in his intellectual development, he becomes increasingly more capable of transcending the concrete perceptual context of the moment and of drawing inferences about the environment on the basis of invariant rules applying to situations which may differ widely in their concrete perceptual characteristics. If this were not so, we would never be able to teach our children that the area of a square with sides of 6 in. is equal to the area of a rectangle with sides of 2 in. and 12 in.; or that if a child in Ibadan lives further south than a child in London, this means that the child in London lives north of the child in Ibadan. These examples point to a universal human phenomenon which is sometimes ignored in discussions of human social behaviour. Emotional and conceptual identification with a group consists of more than invariant responses to clear-cut stimulus configurations. The origins of identification with a group-or with a large number of groups-are to be found in early childhood. The Freudian accounts of the manner in which the young child internalizes emotionally his relations with his parents and other members of his family are well known. The important aspect of these accounts from the point of view of the present discussion is the fact that the transfer of these early emotional reactions to other people or to groups of other people is possible only through the use of symbolic activity in which one individual is made to stand for another. It is just as true, however, that independently of these early emotional experiences and of their possible transfer in later life, we also come to identify with a complex matrix of human groups in a manner which seems to have, at best, tenuous links with these early emotional reactions. We are all members of national, professional, religious, social and many other groups. 80

Definitions of most of these groups are not based on a set of recognizable and invariant physical characteristics of their members; they are abstract class concepts. We know that co-operation within a human group is likely to develop as a function of various concrete common needs. It must, however, also be remembered that the only possible basis for such co-operation in any complex social situation is to be found in the conceptual processes of the sort that Piaget investigated in children. To return to Thompson's 15 reference to bees, the language of the bees is not only not the language of love; it is also not the language of co-operation. The possibility to co-operate in most human situations is based on the ability to perceive a situation from the point of view of another individual, and then to make use of the information so obtained as a guide for subsequent actions. If co-operation were not based on the implicit or explicit use of this ability to become allocentric as distinct from egocentric, it could happen only sporadically, by chance encounters of parallel or complementary actions, and it could never form the basis of a complex and co-ordinated sequence of behaviour originating from many individuals. If it is true that co-operation largely depends upon this capacity to see the world from the point of view of someone else, then its success must depend upon the conditions which make it possible or impossible to engage in this type of behaviour. This is clearly the case in modern societies with their complex checks and balances due to a tangled network of competitive and co-operative interests. In such social systems the "zero-sum-games"-all loss to one and all gain to the other-are becoming increasingly infrequent, particularly at the level of large-scale social events. An individual's identification-conceptual and emotional-with a group has many psychological aspects. One of the most important is in the sharing of social norms. There are several ways in which a social norm can be defined. Three of these can serve as examples: "social norm" may refer to contractual obligations accepted and shared by members of a social group; it may refer to shared ideas about what ought to be the

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN HUMAN GROUPS

way to behave in a variety of situations; and it may finally refer to observed uniformities of behaviour in a social group, large or small. The manner in which a society comes to create and perpetuate norms in all these three meanings of the term is a very vast issue fraught with implications which I should neither wish nor feel competent to discuss here. This issue has always been a joint focus of interest for historians, social philosophers, sociologists, lawyers, social anthropologists and many others-and this represents too many toes for anyone to dare to tread on. I should like, however, to attempt a discussion of the manner in which an individual comes to share the established norms of social groups in which he enters. In doing this, I shall mainly be concerned with the third meaning of the term "norm" which I previously mentioned: the observed uniformities of behaviour. Many psychologists engaged in the study of animal behaviour reached the conclusion that some aspects of animal learning cannot be adequately explained unless one postulates the existence of a drive or a tendency to explore the environment.2,8 The biological survival value of getting to know one's surroundings is obvious. Some of the greatest achievements of mankind would never have taken place had it not been for the existence of a similar urge to explore and to understand. But in the case of man, there is one essential aspect of gathering this information about the environment which appears only in a very rudimentary form in non-human behaviour. An enormous amount of human knowledge about the environment-physical and social-is not collected through the direct experience of an individual but through information transmitted to him by other members of the social groups to which he belongs. Each human being learns that one of the efficient ways to evaluate the information he has about his surroundings, about himself, about the consequences of his actions, about other people, about the relative probabilities of various possible future events, is to rely on the information provided by others.6 In addition, the more an individual perceives other people as similar to himself, the more will his behaviour be determined by his perception of their behaviour. The importance of this phenomenon in the determination of human reactions to all kinds of

events in the environment is sometimes not sufficiently appreciated. It will be obvious that under conditions of "common fate", such as shared threats, dangers or goals, this convergence in behaviour is bound to become more marked. But it can also be found in cases where the function of concerted behaviour does not appear at all obvious. For example, there are many psychological experiments showing the extent to which individuals are prepared to accept the unanimous verdict of a majority even in tasks as simple as judging differences in length between several lines, and even when this majority verdict flatly contradicts the evidence of their own senses.1 One example can perhaps be briefly described, since it will serve as a transition to the next stage of this discussion. It concerns the so-called "autokinetic phenomenon": when a stationary pin-point of light is shown in complete darkness, it appears to move. When several observers are put together in a dark room, their judgements of the extent of this apparent movement tend to converge.13 In an interesting modification of this procedure, various degrees of insecurity were introduced into the situation. This was done through varying the size of the pitch-dark room, placing obstacles in the subject's way, making him wander through complicated routes, and varying the degree of pleasantness and help shown to him by the experimenter. The most extreme of these experimental conditions led to considerable disorientation and confusion in the subjects. Two successive experimental sessions were used at an interval of several days. In the first of these, each subject was alone; in the second, they were in pairs. As a function of the increasing degree of confusion there was, from the first to the second session, an increasing convergence between the subjects in their judgements of the extent of the apparent

movement.14 The interpretation of results such as these leads one immediately into one of the chickenand-egg situations so common in social psychology. The feeling of intense confusion creates presumably a situation in which the subjects see themselves as confronting together the same difficulty. It is not, however, clear why this shared crisis amongst wreckage in a pitch-dark
81

THE EUGENICS REVIEW

room should lead them to greater uniformity in judging the movement of a point of light. This agreement cannot conceivably have anything to do with any rational attempts on their part to deal with their plight. And thus, it appears that a group situation in which people share common needs or difficulties leads in turn to the development of a need to create a variety of norms. This emergence of norms seems therefore not only determined by the utility value of co-operating in order to remove a difficulty, but also as an emotionally autonomous consequence of affiliation with a group, whatever may be the original causes of the group coming together. There are many experiments in social psychology which show the strength of these so-called "normative" effects of group membership. It is for such reasons that the model of "utilitarian social man" to which I previously referred is no more adequate for the explanation of co-operation in human groups than is the model of the "instinctive social man". Shared needs and shared background lead to shared norms; shared norms lead to more shared background and to an emotional investment in the creation of more shared norms. All these interlocked processes result in the strengthening of group identification, and to the increased capacity for perceiving those who are in the same group as essentially similar to oneself. It will be obvious that this perception of similarity makes it much easier to adopt in any relevant situation the point of view of those who are categorized as being "in" in contrast to those who are perceived as being "out".

Dissociation from other Groups These phenomena are of direct relevance to what is often referred to as "depersonalization". Many people who are passionately humanitarian do not experience the slightest stirring of conscience when they confront half of a dead chicken on their plates at lunch. There has never been much of sharing of norms with a chicken, nor much opportunity of seeing the world from the chicken's point of view, But it may be worth remembering that the dead bird on the plate represents no more than an extreme case of a familiar phenomenon. It is notoriously easier to 82

drop a load of bombs from a height or to press a button releasing a missile than to plunge a knife into someone's belly even when there is no danger of retribution. And to present a counterpart to our dead chicken, pet-lovers are well known for their attribution of all sorts of subtle characteristics to the objects of their love. The creation of a psychological distance between oneself and one's victim is probably responsible for at least as much murder and massacre as is the much vaunted sadism and the presumed ineradicable aggressive instinct in man. The recent play by Weiss The Investigation based on the Auschwitz trial in Germany does not show most of the men involved as towering monsters of inhuman proportions. They were little men who managed to do what they did partly because they were able to dissociate themselves completely from recognizing in their victims a similarity to themselves, some form of a common denominator. In mentioning the executioners of Auschwitz one approaches a level of dissociation from other human beings which veers on the borderline of psychopathology. But milder versions of this phenomenon are by no means uncommon. No one needs a psychologist to tell him that in situations of intense conflict between human groups, of real threat, or of eruption of violence, hostile attitudes between members of the groups involved intensify rapidly. The conditions for coexistence of human groups living in a common environment are such that, in one way or another, some forms of competition between them are bound to arise sooner or later. A discussion of conditions which may facilitate co-operation cannot be based on utopian dreams of a world free from competing interests. The question is rather to what extent, in Rapoport's terms, fights can be transformed into games or debates. Fights have no rules; games and debates are ritualized. Ritualization and the establishment of norms which effectively guide behaviour, are only feasible when one of two sets of conditions is satisfied: either when compliance to established norms is enforced through the existence of an authority superordinate to the groups involved; or when, despite the competition the other group, while remaining definitely "other" in some respects, is at the same time

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN HUMAN GROUPS

perceived as similar in fairly fundamental ways. It is likely that the creation of both these sets of conditions is interdependent: the existence of a superordinate authority would lead to a slow change of attitudes; a change of attitudes would facilitate the creation of such an authority. Both these processes have happened many times in the past. There is a good deal of evidence that hostile attitudes towards an outgroup are closely related to its perception as essentially dissimilar from one's own group. This process starts early in childhood, and it is very difficult to decide whether perception of dissimilarity leads to dislike, or dislike leads to the perception of dissimilarity. In some research that we have recently done in co-operation with colleagues from the University of Leiden in Holland,9 we found that there were high correlations between children's preferences for one or another foreign country, and their perception of these countries as similar to, or different from, each other; i.e. the greater was the gap between two countries on a preference scale, the greater tended to be the judged dissimilarity between them. It is also known from research on highly prejudiced people that they differ from those who are not prejudiced in the differentiations they make between their own group and the other. Two examples will make this clear: in one experiment, (Secord, Bevan and Katz 11) after a preliminary assessment of the degree of antiNegro prejudice, the subjects at the two extremes of the continuum of prejudice were asked to rate the shade of skin in a series of photographs, some of which were of Negroes and some not. It was found that the highly prejudiced subjects tended to exaggerate more than the other subjects did the differences in skin colour between those photographs which they assigned to the category "Negro" and those which they assigned to the category "white". A related finding is that prejudiced subjects tend to be less accurate than others in recognizing individual Negroes whose photographs they had previously seen.12 The depersonalization or dehumanization of members of out-groups must be closely related to these effects of emotional attitudes. It is only because a member of another nation, class, race or any other group is perceived by virtue of this

membership as dissimilar in some fundamental ways from those who are-to use a current phrase-our kith and kin, that things can be done to him which we would not otherwise dream of doing. This inability to conceive the world reciprocally leads directly to a further compounding of difficulties: namely, it creates blocks in communication. This may take one of two forms: either we assume that members of another group must be able to communicate in ways which are familiar to us (though we do not have to repay the courtesy)-and if they do not, this only serves to strengthen the case for their essentially alien character; or it is assumed that they may have acquired the gimmick of pretending to be like us in order to be able "the better to eat us up". This wolf in a grandmother's bonnet has now unexpectedly come to life in a context far removed from a fairy story. A colleague who had returned to the United States from a trip to the Soviet Union presented to a group of American children photographs of a tree-lined street in Russia. In his informal report he writes: "A hand went up: 'Why do they have trees along the road?' A bit puzzled, I turned the question back to the group: 'Why do you suppose they have trees?' Another hand rose for eager answer: 'So that people won't be able to see what's going on beyond the road.' A girl had a different idea: 'It's to make work for the prisoners.' I asked why some of our roads had trees planted along the side. 'For shade.' 'To keep the dust down.' "3
Conclusion I should like to conclude by stressing a few points which perhaps hardly need stressing. First, this paper is not a plea or an argument for the disappearance of differences between human groups. The world would be a sad and boring place to live in if this ever happened. Secondly, I was concerned neither with social, economic nor political causes of conflicts between groups nor with any policies relating to these aspects of inter-group problems. My purpose was to discuss those psychological aspects of inter-group hostility and inter-group co-operation which are vested in the attitudes and behaviour of individuals who compose the groups. It is my 83

THE EUGENICS REVIEW

view that one of the essential ingredients of these attitudes and of the behaviour relating to them is to be found in man's capacity to see others as men like himself, however different they may be from him. No one needs to be told that this is far from being the case to-day. It would be a form of academic escapism, however, to leave it at that and not to attempt some conclusions about concrete problems. Though no one can expect any sudden changes in the attitudes of millions of people, some attempts to induce changes can certainly be made. It seems to me that-with regard to the psychological aspects of these problems-these attempts should be concentrated on two fronts: education and law. A good deal is known about the development of hostile outgroup attitudes in children. Very little of this knowledge has penetrated into the curricula of primary or secondary education and of teacher training colleges. As to law, the point can perhaps be briefly stated as follows: discrimination without prejudice leads to discrimination with prejudice; conversely, prejudice shorn of its capacity to manifest itself in discrimination withers away little by little. Strong and strictly enforced sanctions against any form of discrimination or exercise of brute force, whether in national or international affairs, would certainly not succeed overnight in eliminating blind outgroup hostility. But they would go some way towards bringing it home to all of us that the life and rights of every human being are a matter to be seriously considered.
REFERENCES 1. Asch, S. E. 1952. Social psychology. New York, Prentice Hall.

2. Berlyne, D. E. 1960. Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity. New York, McGraw-Hill. 3. Bronfenbrenner, U. 1961. Some problems in communicating with Americans about the Soviet Union. Mimeo report. 4. Carthy, J. D., and Ebling, F. J. (eds.) 1964. The Natural History of Aggression. London and New York, Academic Press. 5. Etkin, W. 1964. Cooperation and competition in social behaviour. In Social Behaviour and Organization among Vertebrates. Ed. W. Etkin. University of Chicago Press (pp. 1-34). 6. Festinger, L. 1954. A theory of social comparison processes. Hum. Relat. 7, 117-40. 7. Freeman, D. 1964. Human aggression in anthropological perspective. In Carthy and Ebling, op. cit. (pp. 109-20). 8. Harlow, H. F. 1953. Motivation as a factor in the acquisition of new responses. In Current Theory and Research in Motivation. Ed. J. S. Brown et al. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press. 9. Jaspars, J. M. F., Van de Geer, J. P., Tajfel, H., and Johnson, N. B. 1965. On the Development of International Attitudes. Psychol. Institute, University of Leiden. 10. Plamenatz, J. 1963. Man and Society. A critical examination of some important social and political theories from Machiavelli to Marx. London, Longmans, Green. 11. Secord, P. F., Bevan, W., and Katz, B. 1956. The Negro Stereotype and Perceptual Accentuation. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol. 53, 78-83. 12. Seeleman, V. 1940. The Influence of Attitude upon the remembering of Pictorial Material. Arch. Psychol. No. 258. 13. Sherif, M. 1936. The Psychology of Social Norms. New York, Harper. 14. Sherif, M., and Harvey, 0. J. 1952. A study in Ego Functioning: Elimination of stable anchorages in individual and group situations. Sociometry, 15, 272-305. 15. Thompson, W. R. 1958. Social Behaviour. In Behaviour and Evolution. Ed. A. Roe and G. G. Simpson. New Haven, Yale University Press (pp. 291-310). 16. Withey, S., and Katz, D. 1965. The Social Psychology of Human Conflict. In The Nature of Human Conflict. Ed. E. B. McNeil. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., PrenticeHall (pp. 64-90).

84