Cross - Logos and Forms in Plato PDF

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Logos and Forms in Plato Author(s): R. C. Cross Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 252 (Oct., 1954), pp. 433-450 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251498 . Accessed: 11/05/2013 09:46
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VOL.
LXIII.
No. 252.]
1954 [October,.
M IND
A QUARTERLY
OF
REVIEW
PSYCHOLOGY
I.-LOGOS
AND PHI
OSOPHY
AND FORMS BY R. C.
CROSS
IN PLATO
then it is knowable(dv jEV pq &r-t Vyos', OVK ErUT7-ra'dElvat (201d)). Thisviewis thenelaborated a 'EXcEl Etor-nq-a out of which everythingis composedhave no logos. (UTocXEica) Each of themtaken by itselfcan only be named. We can add further, sayingthat it existsor does not exist. None of nothing can be toldin a logos,theycan onlybe named,fora the elements name is all that theyhave. On the otherhand, whenwe come to the thingscomposed of these elements,then just as the a logos, form so theirnameswhencombined are complex, things of names. Thus the the latter being preciselya combination but can be perelementshave no logos and are unknowable, S' (202b)), while the ceived (a'AoyaKac ayvwc'a-a ETvaL, acor6yrad and are knowable and statable (p-&ras) complexes(ovAAaflas) you can have a truenotionof them. The view is thensummed up at 202b ff.-' wheneverthen anyone gets hold of the true withouta logos his soul thinkstrulyof it, notionof anything but he does not know it; forif one cannot give and receivea of that thing(io'v yadp one has no knowledge logos of anything, but when he has also acquired a logos, then all TEpf Tov5Tov), are realised and he is fullyequipped for knowthese thiings ledge.'
28 433
OVVa'Evov
to the question foran answer in thesearch IN the Theaetetus, is madeat 201dthattrue ? thesuggestion Whatis knowledge whilebelief of a logosis knowledge, withthe addition belief no logoscan be given Where is notknowledge. a logos without a logoscan be given, it is notknowable;where then ofa thing,
elements 'dream'. It is the viewthatthe first in Socrates's
Sovvat
TE
Kat SE'eaoOat Ac'yov avE7Ttr-/ova
Elva
434
R. C. CRoSS:
Theaetetus expressessatisfactionwith this view. Socrates it is interesting himself, to note,remarks (202d) that the statement(that true beliefwitha logos is knowledge) taken just by itselfmay well be satisfactory;for,he asks, how could there ever be knowledgeapart froma logos and rightbelief? lie ' feature objects,however, to the 'most ingenious of the theory, namely, that the elements are unknowable, whilethe complexes are knowable. On this point, using the model of lettersand syllables,Socratespresentsthe theorywith a dilemmawhich, cashingthe model,runslike this; ifthe logos just is the names whichcomposeit, each name beingthe name of an unknowable thenit itself element, no morethan do its severalwords conveys it is a merecongeries of unknowables. On the otherhand, if the logos is something morethan the nouns out of whichit is composed,a new linguistic unit whichsomehowconveyssomethingmore than is conveyedby the bare enumeration of the individualnames in it, then this something more will itselfbe a new simple,whichas such will be unknowable (as havingno logos),and the logoswillstandin the same naming relation to it as the individualnouns did to the original elements. Thus the logos will no more conveyknowledge than do the names with whichwe began. In a paper read to the OxfordPhilologicalSociety Professor Ryle has related the theory of Socrates's dream and the criticism of it in this part of the Theaetetus to logical atomist theoriesabout wordsand sentences such as are to be foundin Russell's earlywritings and elsewhere. Withthe largerbearing of this part of the Theaetetus on modernversionsof logical atomismI am not here concerned,but with some remarks Professor Ryle made about its relevanceto Plato's own theory of Forms. He argued that ' if the doctrine of Forms was the view that theseverbs,adjectivesand common nouns are themselves the names of simple,if lofty, then Socrates's nameables, criticism of the doctrineof Forms, is, per accidens,a criticism whether Plato realised thisor not', and he added that 'if a Form is a simpleobject or a logicalsubject of predication, no matter how sublime,thenits verbalexpression will be a name and not a sentence; and if so, thenit will not be falsebut nonsenseto it (savoir) or not knowing speak of anyone knowing it, of his it out, being taughtit, teachingit, concluding finding it, forgettingit, believing,supposing,guessing or entertaining it, it or questioning asserting it, negating it'. It is theseremarks I wantto discuss. What then are we to say of this criticism of the theoryof
LOGOS
AND
FORMS
IN PLATO
435
FormswhichProfessor Ryle developsfrom the discussion in the Theaetetus ? A numberof possibilities suggestthemselves. In the first place, we might say that what Plato is concerned with in the Theaetetus is knowledge in relationto perception. The
and he is not thinking of anything but perceptual'simples ', nor of any relationthe argument mighthave to the theoryof Forms. Still, it seems clear that the argument does'hold for any simplenameables,whether or objects objectsof perception of thought. Further, it is not easy to believethat Plato could have missedthis,especially whenso muchof the languagehere echoesthe languagehe has used elsewhere in setting out his own philosophical views. (Cf. e.g. Theaetetus 202c io-v'yapIq Svvac(%EVOV Sovvat TE Kat
elements unknowable thereare, as he himself says,acdrOp-qac,
withRepublic531e wherethe dialecticianis contrasted with those who w)Svvai-o' . . . Sovfva TIE Kat a7rolegauOat
'Iov'rov
Ao'yov SE'etaoOaL
avE1T=u'rflova
EIvat
7TEpt
In any case, whetheror not Plato was himself at this point aware of the possible effects of the argument on the theory of Forms,we oughtto consider them. It might be suggested,secondly,that Plato himselfwas aware that the arguments here weredamagingto the theory of Forms, but was undisturbed by this, because he had already abandoned, or was about to abandon, the theory. Some scholars have certainlythoughtthat the theory was either abandoned or fundamentally altered in the later dialogues. Burnet,for instance,maintainsthat 'the doctrineof Forms findsno place at all in any workof Plato later than the Parmenides '.1 How much alteration theremust be beforewe say that the theoryis 'fundamentally altered' or 'abandoned' is, of course,a prettyproblem. Stenzel sees a change fromthe ' to the Form as something formas a 'representative intuition approachinga 'concept', but he would certainlynot have wantedto say that Plato had abandonedhis theoryof Forms. So far as verbal expressions are concernedthe language still occursin-the later dialogueswhichwas used in the earlierin connexion withthe theoryof Forms. This is true even of the of the one Laws, e.g. 965b-cwherethereis the familiar contrast and the many,and the necessityis insistedon of being able Too much cannot be made of verbal similarities and we have
1 Burnet, Platonism, p. 120. Cf. also p. 119, " in the Laws thereis no traceofthetheory of 'ideas ' ". 7TpOS /Uav lEav EK T6V 7ToAAWV Kat avol-toiwv . . . 3AELEv.
(OV' SOKOVfClV) Ec'rEorOaC 7ro'-E-rt cbv qaj5Ev &Etv AOcyOV
3EEvat.)
436
R. C. CROSS:
Lewis Campbell's warningthat ' in Plato . . . philosophical terminology is incipient,tentative,transitional'.' Still, they are there. Further, some of the familiar notionsof the earlier dialoguesare theretoo, e.g. knowledge and Forins,opinionand sensibles,and so on. The theorymay have evolved, but the evidencesuggeststhat there is enough left both linguistically and in content to makeit rash to say that Plato had abandoned it. If, however,we are not preparedto say that Plato abandoned the Forms, we cannot adopt the device of reconciling Professor Ryle'sinterpretation ofthearguments in the Theaetetus with the theoryof Forms by the simple procedureof annihilating the latter. A thirdpossibility suggestsitself, arisingout of some things Mr. Robinsonhas said. His interpretation of this part of the Theaetetus is this-and hereI quote from his article'Forms and Error in Plato's Theaetetus' (Phil. Review,vol. lix, p. 16): ' Here at the end of the Theaetetus he (Plato) offers strong argumentsto showthat logos does not entailknowledge, and, mucih worse,that some aloga mustbe knowableif thereis any knowledgeat all.' On the otherhand, just above he has pointedout that it was 'one of Plato's ownfavourite ', bothbefore doctrines and afterthe Theaetetus, 'that knowledge entailslogos'. Now two things about this. First, it is clear that Mr. Robinson interprets this part of the Theaetetus differently fromProfessor Ryle-he treatsit as a sortof reductio ad absurdum argument in favourof the conclusion that ' a thing'sbeing alogon does not make it unknowable'. Thus on page 15 he writes: 'the examinationof the three senses of " logos" is immediately precededby a discussionof uncompounded elements, the tendencyof whichis to concludethat,if elements are unknowable because they have no logos, everything is unknowable, from whichanyone who thoughtthat knowledge does occur would have to concludethat a thing'sbeing alogon does not make it unknowable.' I myself am preparedto reject this interpretation and accept Professor Ryle's, partlyforreasonswhichwill, I hope, be obvious later,partlybecause withinthe Theaetetus passage itselfthe emphasisof the argument seems to be not that we shouldsubstitute forthe low-grade 'pool' atoinsof the sensationalist new high-grade 'branded ' atoms,but thatno sort of atomsor atomistic nameableswilldo. Secondly, Mr. Robinson reconciles his own interpretation withhis admissionthat it continuesto be a favouritedoctrineof Plato elsewherethat
1
The Republic of Plato, Jowett and Campbell, vol. ii, p. 292.
LOGOS
AND FORMS
IN PLATO
437
is a smaller that this. entailslogos,by the suggestion knowledge example of what we find in the Parmenides-' namely a searchingcritique of one of Plato's own favouritedoctrines, xvhichhe neverthelesscontinued to hold after writingthe in spiteofthe factthat he does not appear everto have critique discoveredthe answerto it'. We mightthen,whilerejecting accept this selfof the argument, Mr. Robinson'sinterpretation We would explanationfor our own interpretation. criticism then say that the doctrineof Forms does lead to the logical which Plato exposed in the T'heaetetus. atomist difficulties but still went on Plato had no answer to these difficulties, holdinghis doctrine. But whileit may be that thereare parts whichdefyany otherexplanation,this selfof Plato's writing criticism story cannot but create some feelingof uneasiness. doctrines in central difficulties exposesdamaging If a philosopher point, and thisis the important that he holds,and nevertheless, the to hold themwithoutever answering continues apparently is, to say the least, puzzling,and in his procedure difficulties, the end mightlead us to suspecthis credentials. It looks then shouldbe adopted only explanation as thoughthe self-criticism in the presentcase in defaultof a better. There is, however, was that 'if a fourthpossibility. ProfessorRyle's argument of Formswas the view that theseverbs,adjectives the doctrine if lofty, the namesof simple, nounsare themselves and common is . . . a of logicalatomism thenSocrates'scriticism nameables, of the doctrineof Forms'. If we are already concriticism of Forms,and if we accept,as vincedthat thisuas the doctrine -of Ryle's interpretation I have been preparedto do, Professor it looks as if of the passage forthat doctrine, the implications explanation. fall back on the self-criticism we must perforce But if on othergroundswe werenot so sure that this was the passage would encourageus doctrineof Forms,the Theaetetus of Formsis not capable of a different to see ifthe theory further interpretation.I want to suggest some other grounds for of the doctrineof in acceptingthe interpretation lhesitation Ryle. Before, Formsindicatedin the quotationfromProfessor state the interpretation we come to these,let us first however, morefully. somewhat It would maintain(no doubt among other things)that on Plato's view, apart frompropernames, which stand for parand verbs adjectives,prepositions ticulars,othersubstantives, are the names of these. Ross stand for Forms or universals, puts this clearlywheAhe says: ' The essenceof the theoryof of the fact that thereis Ideas lay in the consciousrecognition
438
R. C. CROSS:
a class of entities, for whicbthe best name is probably" universals", that are entirely different fromsensiblethings. Any use of language involves the recognition, either conscious or unconscious, of the factthat thereare such entities; forevery word used, except propernames every abstractnoun, every generalnoun, everyadjective,everyverb,even everypronoun and everypreposition-is a name forsomething of whichthere 1 These universals are or may be instances.' existtimelessly in theirown rightapart fromthe sensibleworld; they are 'real entities ', 'substances' (the phrases are from Professor Cherniss) 2 and to know them is, or involves some formof imilmediate apprehension in which we are directlyacquainted with them. In Professor Cherniss'swords again 'the special facultyof knowledge is characterised by directcontactof subof some of the ject and object'.3 This is the interpretation essentialfeaturesof the theoryof Forms that is to be found, or implicitly, in the writings ofa largenumber whether explicitly of the most distinguished modernPlatonists-Ross, Cherniss, and many others. In fact, it is Taylor, I think Cornford, acceptedorthodoxy. Two thingsmay be said about it. First, it mustbe allowedthat thereis muchin Plato's actual language to support thatcouldbe construed thisinterpretation.Secondly, if this is what Plato was saying, the theory of Forms is than perhapsit once seemed. This remarkis, less illuminating to the questionof the correctness of the of course,irrelevant but it is worthmakingforthis reason. A numinterpretation, of this ber (and I suspecta large number)of the propounders Ross is a clearand distinguished interpretation-and exampleof this-have not merelybelievedthat this is wbat Plato meant but that it is, by and large,a good theory. If it by his theory, can be seen, and I thinkit can be seen, that as a theoryit is use of the word unworkable and in the strictand non-abusive it on we may be the less inclinedto father largelymeaningless, to re-examine what Plato unlesswe must,and the moreinclined he actuallysays. Since the meritsof the orthodox interpretaare irrelevant to the questionof tion as a piece of philosophy it is the correct it wouldbe out of place whether interpretation, here to elaborate its demerits. It is enoughto say that the that it is an unworkableand largely meaningless suggestion theoryarises not merelyfromthe logical atomist difficulties
D. Ross, Plato's Theoryof Ideas, p. 225. 'The Philosophical Econo,my of the Theory of Ideas', Journal of Philology,vol. lvii, 1936, pp. 452, 456. 3 Loc. cit. p. 452.
2
1 W.
American
LOGOS
AND FORMS
IN PLATO
439
the Theaetetus, but frommanyotherconsideradevelopedfrom of giving tions as well e.g. to mention onlyone, the difficulty any cash value to a phraselike 'timeless substantialentities. or demerits of the theory I repeat,however, that the merits are to its correctness as a piece of interpretation. irrelevant strictly Thereare, however, thingsin Plato that seem to me to suggest that he may have had otherideas in mind,and I shall row try a fewof them,turning first to the Meno. to mention Meno opens the dialogue by raisingcertainquestionsabout the acquiringof virtue,and Socrates says he cannot possibly answer them until he knows what virtue is--' Ecri-v acpE5r. Meno thinksthis an easy questionand proceedsto enumerate the virtuesof a man, of a woman,and so on. Socratesobjects whenhe asks (72a-b) that this is to givehima swarmof virtues on the figure of the swarmpointsout that forone, and carrying when the questionis about the nature of the bee it is not a properanswerto say that thereare manykindsof bees. Bees do not differ fromone anotheras bees, as Meno readilyadmits, and what the questionerwants to know is what this is in but are all alike-(L ov3EV respectto whichthey do not differ, Similarlywith the virtues-they have all one commonform whichmakes them virtues,and on this he who would answer the question,what is virtue,would do well to keep his eye oraat E'XovoCt & fixed. (E'v yE -ncEtoos -avi-rov O' E?CoYL cLpETcaL, (72c).) Meno ofa common is stillnot altogether clearabouttheexistence charhe seemsnot to feelany acteristic in the case of virtue, though
&jA6oat, EpWTqYcavTL EKEWVO
O' TvyXaJvEt oviaa E1S o &ctabEpovcrtv
aAaJ
E -rcavt-roEv
ctTv aV7Tctr,
Tov1ro
Ectvat;
KaACoS-s -Tov
EXE
i ro|A6bcj-av-a
ov
a7TrKpCVWOJLEVoV ico
apEl-'4
in other cases--74a-b oviyap difficulty

CVy t>?)TEt5, pcav
a'pET-rv AaflEZV KaTa
cUvaiaC rco, c arcV1TcovwC
Kpa-mg,
VEp ETo
by taking the example of AAots. Socrates explains further figure. What we want to know here is what that is whichis and all the otherfigurescommonto the round,the straight, Socrates then gives two answersto this questionT-i Ec'TC axijua, eitherof whichhe wouldregardas a satisfactory replyto the question. The first is the onlythingwhich is that figure colour(75b), alwaysfollows would be satisfied if Meno would and he adds that he himself give him an answerof the same sort about virtue. Meno asks what answerSocrateswould have givenif a personwereto say that he did not knowwhat colourwas, and Socratesthen prois the limitof a solid. duces his secondanswer(76a), that figure
TL EUTWVEM TC) OTpOYYVAL) Kact EVELC Kat mrcidrovm; (75a). arIjqttaTa KaAECS, TaVTOV
. mC -rot-SI AAots-,a'
440
R. C. CROSS:
This is the sort of answerhe wants to this sort of ' what is no moresucto try,-with it' question; and Meno is encouraged cess than before,to produce a similartype of answerto the question' what is virtue'. in this sectionof the Now thereare threepoints of interest in the dialogue is not represented Meno. First,Meno himself skilledin philosophy acute or particularly as beingparticularly -rather the reverse. Yet he does not seem to findany diffiin the factthat we do use striking particularly cultyor anything ' as a generaltermforany one of a wordlike ' bee ' or ' figure a groupof particulars. No fussseemsto be made on thispoint either by Meno or Socrates. They both just seemto take it for that we do use wordsthat way, or, to use the language granted commonto a of the presentcontext,that thereis something whichare called by one name. Yet this group of particulars commonis, on the orthodoxview of the theoryof something and their of universals Forms,a ' universal',and the discovery of is hailed as one of the achievements relationto particulars the theory. But neitherMeno nor Socrates seem much inin this revelation. It is true that Meno is not so sure terested (73a) that virtuewill be the same in a child as in an adult, in to confined is apparently a womanas in a man, but his worry over the special case of virtue. He seemsto have no difficulty the one and the many elsewhere(cf. 74a-b quoted above). over, and what both he and Secondly,what he has difficulty to discover whatthisone, in, is in trying Socratesare interested virtuesin the case of each groupof particulars bees, figures, is. -The whole emphasisis on this i.e. not on the point that thereis one overagainstthe many,but on whatthisone,in the Socratesby the is. Thirdly, case of each groupof particulars, the way in which he expects example of 'figure' illustrates Meno to cope withthis ' what is it ' question. If he is asked 'what is figure' the appropriate responseis to say that, e.g. is the only thingwhichalways followscolour,i.e to use figure responseis to say vague language,the appropriate deliberately to tell the questioner to make some sort something, something, ofstatement. Now in all this the Meno is in no way peculiar. This 'what is X' questionappears in the Republic ' what is justice', in the Theaetetus 'what is knowledge',in the Sophist 'what is a sophist', and so on, as well as in manyof the earlydialogues, importance and it is quite plain that Plato attachesthe greatest to it. In the Theaetetus too, Theaetetusmakes just the same is, sort of mistakeas Meno does-when asked what knowledge
LOGOS
AND FORMS
IN PLATO
441
thissortofthing in the case of roots(8vvcuEcsg), and Socrates

' just as you foumd a singlecharacter to embracethese many roots,so nowtryto finda singlelogos that appliesto the many
of he enumerates the different sorts of knowledge-knowledge geometry, of cobbling,of carpentry, and so on, and Socrates makesjust the same objection-146d 'you are generous indeed, my dear Theaetetus so open-handed that,whenyou are asked forone simplething, you offer a wholevariety'. Further, here too Socrates, after remarking at 147bthat a man cannot understand the name of a thingwhen he does not know what that he wants; thingis, gives an illustration of the sort of answer' if he is asked what clay is, the simpleand ordinary thingto say is that clay is earth mixed with moisture(147c). Theaetetus mentions a mathematical example,wherehe has been able to do exhortshim similarlyzrTEp
7carlS7
inwhat I TVYXavEL o'v (148d) adding,
think an important remark,

7TOAAas- ovoCras EVl E'EI aS EVL AoNyp 7AJOUElTELV
Aa/E-v
Ao'yov
-It
'rOTE
kindsof knowledge' (oor7TEp TCTaS

rEpLEapEs, ov'CO KaTt -ra
(148d). Mr. Robinson in Plato's Earlier Dialectic, chapter5 has some excellent remarks on the pitfalls and the vaguenessof the 'what is X' question. As he has shown, unlessthe question is put in some specificcontext,a numberof quite different answersto it would all be equally legitimate, and as he says, quotingfromG. E. Moore," the vague form' What-is-X' is an especial temptation'to answer questions, without firstdis' covering precisely whatquestionit is you desireto answer ,.: The important thingfor our presentpurposesis that there is evidenceboth in the Meno and elsewhere that whenPlato asks this '"whatis X' question,e.g. as in the Meno 'what is virtue', he will be farfromcontentwiththe announcement that 'there is a Form of virtue' or that 'virtue is a Form or universal',or and virtueis a that 'there are Forms as well as particulars, Form'. As I pointedout above both Meno and Socratesmake practically no fussat all of the point that thereis an Ei8os for the group. To keep telling themthat thereis would be merely infuriating.This is not to deny that Plato elsewherealso with raises what mightbe called status questionsin connexion Forms in general-questionsabout theirseparationfromparticularsand so on. But it is quite clear in the Meno and elsehe is taking wherethat whenhe asks this 'what is X' question, it forgrantedthat thereis a formof X, and wanting to know what that formis. And as I have alreadyinsisted, fromwhat he says it seems that he hopes to achievethis comingto know
1 Op. cit.(first p. edition),
E'TLU)L ,ToAAacS
62.
442
R. C. CROSS:
OECOJ/EVOV Kal orvvovros av-c-o (212a). Whatis ofinterest, however, is that thismoment of acquaintancewithbeautyitself, the goal of human life,is so strongly markedofffromall ordinary experience. In particularin 211a, wherethis supremebeauty is we are told that of this thereis ov8E' tLS A6oyosbeingdescribed, ) L8E s ELT4mr 4-there is no logos of it and no kmowledge of it. The suggestionis that it is above knowledgein any ordinary sense, and that with knowledge in its ordinary sense therealways goes a logos. Beauty itself, on the otherhand, is nameable,but not in any ordinary sense knowable. It is true that in the same passagethereis a reference to a 4aOrnJ-ta of av'-ro7 but here again this quite special #OaSryq4a is distinTo KacAov, guished fromwhat are ordinarily known as a4a-ra-a7m T6v paO 4a-rwcov co (not T63v JAAv EKElVO T( a%,4Twv) Ezr TEAEv-rcoratL to (211c); truealso that thereis a reference I_L4arnca to the visionofa ' singlescience,if it maybe calledthat', which
& lWV TWV EpJWTlKWV EcCf Vqs KaTo,ETaL TL OaV1acTov 'n)V qV'cv KaAOV (210e), an act of contemplation and communion
TEAOS
the Form by way of statements, logoi. I suggest,therefore, that it is misleadingwhen Shoreywrites: ' except in purely mythical passages,Plato does not attemptto describe the ideas any morethan Kant describes the Ding-an-sich or Spencerthe " unknowable ". He does not tell us what they are, but that theyare.' 1 Fromthe earlydialoguesto the late it is, I suggest, one of Plato's main motifs to tryto tell what the E'L'7 are. It may be that he never succeeds,but failureto emphasisethat that is certainly one of the thingshe is trying to do, and that he hopesto do it by logoi,is liable to lead to the obscuring of an important element in his theory. In factit leads to the orthodox view that Plato has discovered, and is well satisfied with the discoveryof, universals-good sound entitiesof only too too solid flesh,of which words are names, and of which the fundamental mode of awarenessis some kind of directinsight, Professor Cherniss's' directcontact of subject and object' or Russell's ' knowledge by acquaintance'. Now in connexion withthisnotionof knowledge by acquaintance in Plato, Diotima's speech in the Symposium, whichis usually taken as embodying views of Socrates or Plato, is of interest. As befits the speechof a priestess, it is highly enthusiastic, and here,if anywhere, we would expect the languageof insight or directcontactor acquaintance. And thisis what we do in factfindwhenDiotima describes how the soul aftera long training comesto see beautyitself. It is a suddenvision-7TpOS
Unity ofPlato'sThought, p. 28.
LOGOS
AND
FORMS
IN PLATO
443
but thisspecialsort of scienceor knowledge is of beautyitself, meant, as ordinarily or thesciences knowledge off from is marked and from the logoi to which the lover of wisdom is usually
Kat KaAovsconfined-I7oAAov's
Kwl &cavo'q(ara
TrOlOV&
EV
1 that this ua4Oyjpaand (210d). I agree withFestugiere this 'rno-r'4w belongonly to the momentof c1TomrTEa and go knowbeyond the ordinarynorms of knowledge. Ordinarily ledge and logos go hand in hand, and of the ideal beauty ov8E tur-4pDw. If we like we can call this TlS Ao?yos ovi8E' Tl5 by acquaintance, of av'-roiTo KaAov knowledge specialknowledge and thereis no reason why we should grudgePlato his special moments, moments ofacquaintance. But theseare not ordinary with wbich he is usually the knowledge nor is the knowledge concerned. The knowledgethat interestshim in his nonmomentsis the knowledgein which logos is inenthusiastic that he primarily involved; it is of this knowledge extricably withthe Forms; and it is not, I contend, speaks in connexion made knowledgeby acquaintance. The point is frequently that ' Plato constantlyuses metaphoricalexpressionstaken fromthe senses of sight and touch to denote the immediate Lutoslawski,e.g. from '.2 characterof his highestknowledge whom I have just quoted, cites 1EFv, a'Tr-EorOaL, opa6v, and so on fromthe Republic. This is a fair and scholarlypoint, but too muchcan be made of it. We too, in our language,talk,for example,of 'seeing' a problem,'handling' it, 'grasping' it, 'grappling' with it, and so on, withoutwishingto convey of our highestknowcharacter about ' the immediate anything ledge' -of the problem. Two examples may perhaps suffice it is to relytoo muchon Plato's ' seeing' to show how difficult in his articlein Cherniss, and 'touching' language. Professor AmericanJournal Phil., vol. lvii, to which I have already in explainingthe passage in the Meno 81d, where referred, says Socrates produces his theoryof learningas recollection, is really 'learning or discovering that on Socrates'shypothesis of that whichhas already been directlyknown', recollection ' directly'; and in a footnote he adds ' note the word italicising in thefirst place: E(copaKvLa (81c6)' .3 usedfor knowledge acquiring But it should also be noted that four lines below Socrates
(especially note (2)).
3 Op. cit. p. 448.
2
KatL aV'6O0Et%S KaTLf
AoyovS- Kat I_LEyaA0OTTpE7T1ELS TlKTV Eco av E Evtav^Oa pCor0ECs btAouorobta ait/Ovcp, /rtaV TOLcWT7, 77 EUTL KaAol) TLVa ETlUrT or17V
1 Festugiere, et Contemplation
selon Platon,p. 231 Vie Contemplative
and Growth Lutoslawski, Origin ofPlato'sLogic,p. 294.
444
R. a. CROSS:
ifthesoulcan remember remarks thatitis notstrange whatit knew before, wherethe Greekis otov -r' EclvaL avcTr-qvn JvaJLVTr7OijvaL, a' suggestdirectknowledge by acquaintance. Again Lutoslawski
quotes ammorTEUOaL in Republic 511B as an example of the meta-
Kat 7TpOTEpOV theverb7T'aorauOat ys kTkYTzaTowhere would not
to conveythenotion phoricaluse of sightand touchexpressions of immediate knowledge;but in the passage,whichrunsI To-ro and to pressthe metaphor in ratherthan immediate knowledge,
and &taAE'yErOaLseems acr-EcrOat coming as it does between Ao'yos o Aoyos mrTEratL (this segment of the line) ov'aviTo Tn Tov &taAEyErOaL 3vvacLEtL the emphasis seems to be on hard argument
highlydubious. The truth seemsto be that here, as I think oftenin Plato, it is dangerousto make too much of the particularlinguistic expressions he uses. This linguistic argument thenis not decisive enoughto lead to our abandoning the contention that in Plato knowledge and logos go together, and that, cases like av'3To 'To' KaAov which exceptin exceptional he specially marksofffor us, he is not relyingon the deviceof knowledge by acquaintance. Two furtherpoints require attention. First, it must be the dialogues knowledge, stressedhow constantly throughout forms, and logos turnup together. We have alreadyseen this in in the Meno and have noted the Eirt-i-qt-Ao'yoS connexion the Symposium. The same is truein the Phaedo,e.g. 78d av3-n)
ovcrta ns Aoyov 818O/JEEV TOV
pwvlvLEVOl,
or again the famouspassage 99e ff.: E&O6E& 8

KaTra/VyovTa EV EKElVOlS
VAr6ELcW,
ElVLal
, ,
Kalt EpCOTCOVTES
\, c,2 f'
Kat
'
aITOKT6v
XpTvaP ElS TOVS AoyovS

OvTr6v Tnv
of the dialectician e.g. the description 534b: N
and so on; similarly in the Republic,cf.

Kam &taAEKTLKOV
UKO7TELV
SO again in TOVTOV ov ExrELS EXELV; the Theaetetus, e.g. 148d in discussing knowledge Theaetetusis . . . AaflEv Ao'yovi-I 7ToTE TvyXavEL ov; in told gpo0vNuOyt the Parmenides, of the exercise (135e) e.g. at the beginning whereParmenides says that the exercisemust not be directed KaTa TOCUOvTOV Vovv 7TEpl
KaAELS rov Ao'yov EKacrTGv Actpfriavov-air- ovcotas; Kal rov Im) o ExovTa Kao o rov av DA)E Kal 4AA &'vacu EX7 Aoyov aa%-
4r1
to visibles but forms-aAAa -aEpt EKELva a' vuaAorra's tav Aoyp Ac/3oL Kml EY8&7acv )y-7oraUt-o Eivat; ScpAit 260a -rov'Tov (sc. TOV /J% /EYCL4GoTv, bAo0robt'as acv or-Ep-qAo'yov)yap orGEprqOSEVTE,
&Ol OEl /JEAETcav Aoyov

ra yap acu/.kaTa,
?cus266d -nr Toui& OEZJuEv; Pcqit

8ECLKVVTaL.
(LEOO&)
-r6covAo'ywv
and 286a
EKcorTov 8vva-7ov ECVaL 8ov^vat Kam E'6arOav KcAAWTa ovTa 0ovov 4AAp Kal /LEyLUTa, Aoyp 1 op.
3E OV3EVl oaCbs
It would be tedious to continue
cit.p. 294.
LOGOS
AND
FORMS
IN PLATO
445
thislist into the laterdialogues. As Mr. IRobinson says in the article I mentioned earlier "it was one of his (Plato's) firm convictions . . . that knowledgeentails logos". This trinity of knowledge, forms, logos appearsthroughout. Further, where Mr.Robinson shortly afterwards refers to "the big matter cfthe Forms" and " thislittlematterof logos", I want to insistthat "this little matterof logos" is just as big as "' the big matter of the Forms"-in fact,that the two are of equal importance and cannotbe separated. Secondly,beforeI try to amplify this,a littlemust be said about logos itself. I want to translate this wordin a wide and indefinite way, keeping it closelv connected with the verb AE'Etv as "to tell ", "state ", "say ", and translating it as something like " discourse" or "statement" in a very wide sense in whichhypothesis e.g. would be included. It would be foolish indeedto say that this is themeaning of logos in Plato; but perhapsless foolish, in tracingthe intricacies of his use of the word,to insiston remembering the sayingand statement connexion. Parain in his book Essai sur le Logos Platonicien, from which I have borrowed suggestionsin what follows, suggeststhe translation'operation de langage' 1-I suppose 'linguistic operation'. This seems to me to have certain objections-in particular that one might call "naming " a linguistic operation,whereasI want in Plato to attach logos to saying-but I agreewith him in trying, if one likes as a but I thinka salutaryone, to keep logos,to put it hypothesis, the vaguely,in the domain of language, and in emphasising de langage'.2 point he makes that 'le logos est un phenomene It is perhaps worthnoting,as Parain does, that wherePlato himself defines or describes logos (at Cratylus 431b, Theaetetus 202b, Sophist 262d) he keeps it to the linguisticdomaina rvVGEcos ofA a-ra Ka'co'vo4a-ra; though I do e.g.intheCratylus not thinktoo much can be made of this,since the contextin thesepassages demandssome linguistic sense. More important are Aristotle'sreferences to the Platonists,for example, as Ql EV Tos, AVyots Metaphysics1050b35 'the people who ' (Ross) (cf. 987b 31 with verbaldiscussions occupy themselves of Plato &ta 'rv Jv ToZst A0yos . . . cKEtlV (ob yap 7TpTEpOC or again the interesting OV3 IETEZtXoV)); passage in 8taAEKTtKfJ9 Book XII of the Metaphysics, 1069a 28 fI. where he remarks of thepresent that 'the thinkers the day (Ross says " evidently Platonists ") tend to rank universalsas substances(forgenera and thesetheytend to describeas principles and are universals, 1 Op. cit. P. 10. 2 Op. cit.p. 200.
446
R.
a. cross:
substances,owingto the abstractnature of theirinquiry) '&ca TO' AOylKJiS IqTEFV, where a better translationmight be 'through pursuingtheir inquiryby means of logoi-cf. the oi in Metaphysics 1050b 35 quotedabove. Wat is EV TOlS A5yots of interest here is that Aristotle is contrasting people who get down to the brass tacks of things,withthe Platonistswho interest themselves in talk. It is also veryclearthatAOyLKJJs does the not mean 'logically' in the sense of 'rationally', as though otherswith whom he contraststhe Platonistsproceededirrationallyin the sense of being poor at reasoning. To connect logos in Plato too closelywith'reason ' or 'thought' seemsto to obscure me likelydangerously thepointof what he is saying. Jowettis an arch-of[ender in this,1and I give three examples
in themselves: which are important (1) Phaedo 99e ElS

AOyovS KacTLavyov-Ta Ev EKEtIVOlS' UKO7ELW TWV ovTWv
5,v
TOVS
Jowett's translation: 'I had betterhave recourse to the world of mindand seek therethe truthof existence',whereI should want to translate'I had betterhave recourseto statements, & cAtuia-&a etc.' (2) Parmenides 135e vtEpL EIKEtva a Tts av Aoyco to objects 'in reference Jowett KaLtEL'& av Aaflot ETcVaL; a'%V4YucaLaT0 ofthought, and to whatmaybe calledideas', and mytranslation 'in reference to those thingswhich are especiallygraspedby statement (or 'discourse' (Cornford)) and etc. (3) Politicus 286a Ta yap 0cu4-aTa,Ka'AALTa O'VTa Kat ,dycLUa, AcoIypovov C OVE8EVl aa0s 'forimmaterial a'AA 8ELKVVTaL: Jowett things, whichare the noblestand greatest, are shownonly in thought and idea, and in no otherway', and the suggestedtranslation and in no other ' are shown only in discourse(or statement), of Jowett's blur what I think is way '. All these translations of knowledge, the essentialpoint,namely, the connexion forms, and statement. I shall now tryto sum up, and set my suggested interpretation of the theoryof formsover against the orthodoxview. What lay at the basis of that view was, I said, the notionof the formsas simplenameablesknownultimately by acquaintance. Now let us go rightback to the Meno and take the verysimple example there which we discussedin detail, when Plato asks what is figure, i.e. asks for the El8OS of figure. How does he thinkthis requestshould be met ? Not, it is clear, by, as it were, holdingup a substantialentityand saying: now look at this, this is named 'figure', have a good look at it, get thoroughly acquainted withit, and then you will know figure.
1 References by B. Jowett, are to The Dialoguesof Plato, translated (third edition).
&a'OEcav;
LOGOS
AND
FORMS
IN PLATO
447
we talk about Et&), but correct to say that we talk with E'&7,
Not at all. The movein giving the d0os of figure, in answering ' what is figure the quiestion ', is to make a statement-' figure is the limit of a solid', and this is regardedas a satisfactory answer. The Et0os of figurehas been displayedin the logos, and displayedin the predicateof the logos. It is the same in thepassageI quotedearlier from the Theaetetus Theaetetus where is proudoffinding an E1os5 of mathematical roots,and Socrates says c(Ja7Ep Tav-tas- TroAAas KalC ovoaas' Evl Ect TEpLE'AaclEsE, O'VT Ev A5oypo TpOUE/7TElV. Cornford translates &as IToAAas t5r tkas'just as you found a single characterto embrace all that that applies to multitude, so now tryto finda singleformula the many kinds of knowledge'. It will be noticedthat EVt Aoyo is parallel with E tV 48Ec i.e. to give an Et&os involves giving a logos which embodies, using Cornford's word, 'a formula '. Thus we might say that a form, so far from being ' a substantialentity ', is much more like ' a formula '. It is the logical predicatein a logos, not the logical subject. It is what is said of something, not something about which something else is said. Thus it would be incorrect to say that
'element', and, to quote Taylor himself,Varia Socratica, p. 243 " oftenappears to take on the associationswe should connectwith such termsas ' monad', 'thing in itself', ' real essence', 'simple real' ; and he believedPlato was influenced in his use of the wordby theseassociations (pp. 243 if.). Without goinginto the evidencehere,I should myself say that, as like Gillespieshowed,'Taylorwas wrongin seeingany meaning ' in the Hippocratic 'simple real', ' thing in itself use. An EI?os therewas an Etos ofsomething, not a simplereal. Ross in his to his editionof Aristotle's introduction Metaphysics seems to approve of Gillespie'sview, and adds that ' as regardsPlato's to noticethat both wordsas used by him usage it is important employa dependentgenitive, and he speaks of " the Forms" to the thingsof whichthey are-the withan impliedreference Forms' ; 2 and H. C. Baldry in C.Q. vol. xxxi, 1937, while withGillespiedetects a fairly agreeing generaluse of E1os5 and
1 C.Q. vol. vi, 1912, p. 200, 'There is no case pp. 179 ff.: cf.especially in whichthe wordis an absolutename; it alwavs requires a dependent to complete genitive its meaning '.
2
Hippocratic writings Et8os came to mean 'primary body',
and logoi,piecesof talk,are necessary to displayE&7- to us. A. E. Taylorin his Varia Socraticaessay on the words 1os5, 'E8 (Varia Socratica,pp. 178 fI.) tried to show that in the
Op. cit. p. xlviii.
448
R. C. CROSS:
fromthe Hippocratic use CEa for' quality'. Ofcourseargument cannot be pressed,because Plato may have been uninfluenced given ERos a new use. Still by this use, or have deliberately in the passage quoted it is curiousthat Ross, withhis insistence i.e. cannotfunction in that EiOS impliesa dependent genitive, 'the its ownright, shouldthengo on to say in thenextsentence but that is not what the Forms are for Plato simple entities, the word Et1os always requiresor word means'. If, however, and if Baldryis right in detecting impliesa dependent genitive, a use whereETOS means quality,I suggestthat in both cases we might expect that an EMO5s would functionas a logical not as a logical subject; and I suggestthat that is predicate, whatit does in Plato. or what is Suppose then that when we ask, what is figure virtueor what is justice,i.e. whenwe ask forthe E8OS of any moveis to producea logos,in the predicate of these,the correct of whichthe E8OS is displayed-suppose, that is, taking the of figure roughillustration whichPlato uses, that whenwe ask the correct what is the E8OS of figure, move is what is figure, to make the statement' figureis the boundaryof a solid ', is displayedin the predicateof the wherethe EMOs of figure statement. An interestingquestion now arises about the logical subject, about what the statementis about. We are clearthat the logos is not about the Form figure. The Form is displayedin the predicate. The questionthen is still on our answerstillseemsto be hands,and the simpleand unsuspecting that it is about figure, justice and so on. But this tends to whatis justice,and to the old questions what is figure, prompt in whichwe make a statement startus again on the old process, ofthe statethe answerto the questionis in the predicate where is underdiscussion. mentwhichdisplaysthe Form of whatever or about When then we say that the sentenceis about figure justice it looksas if what we mustmean is that the sentenceis about the word ' figure ', 'justice ', and so on. But then,of ' and course,the wholeprocessis ceasingto be 'real definition a is becominglike 'nominal definition '-not, that is, defining thing,justice-the thingjustice has slid away into the predithe word 'justice'. In this way we will cate-but defining but necessarybecause logically arriveat necessary statements, to denythem. because it would be self-contradictory necessary, They will no longerbe truthsabout things,but logical truths about things. The 'what is X' question about the way we talkl is inherently ambiguousfromthe start. -It may mean tell me about the thingX, or it may mean tell me about the wordX-
LOGOS
AND
FORMS
IN PLATO
449
and Plato never clears up the ambiguity. I thinkit is pretty clearthat he sets out withthe idea that it is a ' thing' question, in somesenseof thing; but it is also clearthat he sets out with and if you want certainty to reach certainty, the determination you mustpay its logicalprice. This is, however,in some degree a digression. The main are logical predihas been that in the end the forms argument cates displayedin logoi and not simplenameables known by acquaintance. This is not to denythat thereare manythings to fitthe 'simple nameables' Plato says that can be construed that the view of I am not pretending view; and in particular displayedin logoiis to be found the Formsas logicalpredicates in Plato. Indeed, at any rate in the explicitlyformulated he had begunhis consciousexamination before earlierdialogues, and Sophistof the notion of logos, with its in the Theaetetus attendantnotions of subject and predicate,he could hardly forsuch a formulation. have had even the technicalequipment in the thereimplicitly is view the that however, I have argued, way in which Plato actually develops and operates with the that it was because he be suggested of Forms. It might theory that ofthisaspect ofthe theory conscious was becoming himself in atomism of logical the criticism from immune to be it he felt the Theaetetus.This mightalso help to explainwhythe Forms in the as a resultof the criticisms not jettisoned are apparently whichI shouldbe temptedto take as an essay, in Parmenides, both its parts,in the follyof takingformsas simplereals and to talk about them as such-an essay directedas much trying perhaps to clearing Plato's own mind as to the instruction of his readers. However this may be, I suggest that the the dialogues of the logos-knowledgethroughout prominence than it has perhaps meritsmoreattention Forms combination received. Finally,since I have put the theoryof Forms verymuch in elaboration the contextof languageand logic I append without which I thinkshould be kept in mind in four considerations dealingwithPlato: (a) It is clear that therewere many puzzles commonat the time which at any rate in part were logical puzzles about language-the sort of puzzles raised by Parmenides,Gorgias, the Euthyand others; clear also from Antisthenes Protagoras, withthesepuzzles. demusonwardsthat Plato was familiar Plato there are clear indicationsof the in(b) Throughout fluenceof the Socratic elenchus,of the procedureof question and answer as the method of attainingKnowledge. But if 29
450
R. C. CROSS:
LOGOS
AND
FORMS
IN PLATO
this is to proceed,it mustproceedby logoi,and the apparatus known by acquaintance seems an alien of simple na-meables ingression. in mathematics. But here (c) Plato was clearly interested and not simple entities again logoi and deductiveprocedures, knownby acquaintance,seem to be what is wanted. He, himself, for example, in the Republicseems to envisage deriving formsby some process of deductive argument. This would seem to indicate that formscannot be simple entities. For or the conclusion the premises howcouldsimpleentities be either of any sortof argument ? perhaps at times with regret, (d) It has to be remembered, mode of speech,and forthe material that Plato has an affection forexistential propositions. If we ourselvesare to understand thoughto his meaning, we mustdiscounttheseto some extent, what extentis a difficult point. It may be that I have overdiscounted. Aberdeen University

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Mind Association

elements 'dream'. It is the viewthatthe first in Socrates's

Kat SE'eaoOat Ac'yov avE7Ttr-/ova

elements unknowable thereare, as he himself says,acdrOp-qac,

(OV' SOKOVfClV) Ec'rEorOaC 7ro'-E-rt cbv qaj5Ev &Etv AOcyOV

The Republic of Plato, Jowett and Campbell, vol. ii, p. 292.

in other cases--74a-b oviyap difficulty

a'pET-rv AaflEZV KaTa

cUvaiaC rco, c arcV1TcovwC

thissortofthing in the case of roots(8vvcuEcsg), and Socrates

inwhat I TVYXavEL o'v (148d) adding,

think an important remark,

kindsof knowledge' (oor7TEp TCTaS

Unity ofPlato'sThought, p. 28.

KatL aV'6O0Et%S KaTLf

selon Platon,p. 231 Vie Contemplative

and Growth Lutoslawski, Origin ofPlato'sLogic,p. 294.

Kat 7TpOTEpOV theverb7T'aorauOat ys kTkYTzaTowhere would not

or again the famouspassage 99e ff.: E&O6E& 8

XpTvaP ElS TOVS AoyovS

of the dialectician e.g. the description 534b: N

and so on; similarly in the Republic,cf.

&Ol OEl /JEAETcav Aoyov

?cus266d -nr Toui& OEZJuEv; Pcqit

It would be tedious to continue

in themselves: which are important (1) Phaedo 99e ElS

Hippocratic writings Et8os came to mean 'primary body',

Op. cit. p. xlviii.

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