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JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL BEHAVIOR, 17 (2), 183-195 ISSN 0364-0213. Copyright 0 1998 Ablex Publishing Corp. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

On Conceptual Obstacles Linked with External Representation in Geometry

ANA LOBO MESQUITA U. de Lille/IUFM Nerd-Pas-de-Calais

In this paper, we discuss some topics related to external representation in geometry and their implications on its learning. First, we analyse the different natures of geometrical and representative spaces (in the sense of Poincari) and the question of the double status of geometrical objects; then, we focus on the typicality of geometrical representations. The last question considered here concerns the role and the nature of an external representation in geometry. The analysis is made on an epistemological basis, taking into account some empirical research results.

The question of representation is of general importance in mathematics. The term representation is used in several specific senses, depending on the context or on the mathematical domains. For example, we can represent lines by equations; we can also represent a concept by its symbolic notation; we represent functions by diagrams or by tables; quantities can be represented in a diagram to solve an additive problem, for instance. In this paper, we consider external and iconical representation in geometry, using these terms in the following senses:
??

??

embodied materially on paper or other support; Iconical, or figurative: centered on visual image (in opposition otic systems).
External,

to other possible

semi-

We also use the term figure as a synonym for external and iconical representation of a concept or a situatidn in geometry. In English, the term diagram is sometimes used in this sense. It is worth analyzing the use of iconical representations. By their origin and by their nature, geometrical objects are often represented by figures. But figures belong to a specific semiotic system, ot register, in the sense of Duval (1988a, 1988b). According to Duval, register refers to the different semiotic systems used to present information or to objectify a representation. Basically, in geometry, three registers are used: the register of natural language, the register of symbolic language, and the figurative register. This register is linked to the perceptual visual system, which has its own organization laws. That is why some of the positions developed in this paper issue from Gesralttheo-

Direcr all correspondence foe:Ana Lobo Mesquita, <ana.mesquita@lille.iufm.fr>.

U. de Lille/IUFM

BP 87, F - 59006 Lille Cedex.France.

183

184

MESQUITA

rie. According to this theory, a figure is considered as a discrimination of a perceptual field, emerging from its background by the presence of borders, or traces; the figure has its shape, contour, organization, whereas the background appears as an indefinite and amorphous continuity (P. Guillaume, 1979, p. 67). The oppositon figure-background has great importance in the psychology of perception and, consequently, in the study of geometrical learning. In this sense, Gestalttheorie gives us tools to understand some of the difficulties observed in the learning of geometry. External representation of a geometrical problem, per se, does not enable one to solve the problem, but it may contribute to the definition of the structure of the problem in order to facilitate treatments. Most treatments require a specific form of perception. As Merleau-Ponty (1945) noted: an isolated line and the same line belonging to a figure are not the same to the perception. The identification of these two functions to the same line presupposes an analytic perception, which is not natural (p. 18). This kind of identification is a necessary step to many treatments. Figurative representation of geometrical objects may give support to geometrical intuition, which in some situations can be very powerful. Its power comes from the fact that it helps individuals to apprehend relationships among geometrical objects. As Frenkel (1973) mentioned clearly, figures enable the simultaneous mobilization of multiple relationships-while word and writing, which are linear in time, only allow for successive enunciation. This fact can lead to some ambiguities, as is well known. Figures may mobilize the multiple relationships, but they do not enable one to distinguish between what is given (i.e., the assumptions or hypotheses) and what is requested as a conclusion. This mobilization may give visual support to intuition, but in some cases this support can be too strong: geometrical relationships can appear as evident to students, preventing geometrical reasoning from developing. Besides, these visual aspects are in some sense outside the scope of mathematical rules and behaviors. In this sense, figures can introduce some bias in geometrical reasoning. Perhaps because of these contradictory factors, the importance accorded to external representation in geometry has changed in school programs. In some countries (or time periods) it is assumed that figures facilitate this mobilization. In these cases, mathematics programs give an important place to figures. In other countries (or periods), it is considered that, as the influence of perceptual laws may suggest ambiguities, the use of figures can be spared, or even avoided. For instance, during the new maths period in France, figures were unusual in textbooks and books. A significant example came from Dieudonne (1964), who recognized that I had allowed myself not to introduce any figure in the text, perhaps only to see that we can entirely dispense with them very well; but this is an omission, and my readers will fill in the gap of my text.

1.

GEOMETRICAL

AND REPRESENTATIVE

SPACES

Representation of geometrical objects is a central problem in geometry. But this poses with it a new problem, that of the links between geometrical objects and their representation. Difficulties arise because the space of representations is not a purely visual space; it is related to our body, to our position, in the space. The distinction introduced

CONCEF TUAL OBSTACLES IN GEOMETRY

185

by Poincare

(1902) between

the geometrical

and the representative

spaces makes possi-

ble a clarification concerning the links between these two spaces. To Poincare (1902) the geometrical space, the space of geometrical objects, is very different than the representative space, the framework of our representations and sensations. These two spaces have very different natures and, in consequence, different properties. When we represent a triangle-r any other geometrical concept+xternally, using a sheet of paper or other support, we use a representative space rather than a geometrical one. As Poincare stated, our representations are only the reproduction of our sensations; both are located necessarily in the same level, that is, in the representative space. According to Poincare, both spaces are continuous and injinite; but, while the geometrical space is -?-dimensional (unless a restriction is made), homogeneous (in the sense that all points have the same importance) and isotropic (there are no privileged directions, i.e., properties do not depend on directions), the representative space, as a framework of our representations, is 2-dimensional, is non-homogeneous and anisotropic (in the sense that there are points and directions having special status).
The anisotropy of this space can explain some of the results For instance, exercises with symmetries are easier if the axis if it is oblique (Grenier, 1988; Kuchemann, 1981). Triangles horizontal-and two oblique sides (Mesquita, 1991); cubes sides, rather than six faces (Mesquita, 1992). in the didactics of geometry. is horizontal or vertical than have one base-in general, haves two bases and four

The links between these two spaces may not appear in a clear way for pupils; the differences between them have many didactical implications. The main point is that mathematicians and pupils use space in a different way; mathematicians work in the geometrical space and they automatically control (or correct) the information coming from the representative space. Knowing the limitations of the space of representations, they use such representations as a kind of encoded diagram in which some properties of the geometrical space (but not others) are mentioned. Experts know they deal with the geometrical space, even as they use the representative space and know the limitations of it. They do not confuse the two. However, pupils can be confused. In many cases, they work in the representative space. Later we will see examples of this situation.

1.1.

The Double Status of External Representation in Geometry

One of the main difficulties with external representation is what we call the double status of a representation (Mesquita, 1989a, 1991). In fact, in representing a concept or a situation in geometry, the material trace or drawing can suggest two different possibilities: A. finiteness, in the sense of finite and diversified porality; forms (Gestalten) in its spatio-tem-

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MESQUITA

geometrical form (Form) in its ideal objectiveness, straints linked to external representation.

detached from the material con-

These distinctions, due to Husserl (1954), may contribute to clarify the ambiguity that the figurative register can raise: it does not give enough information about the degree of abstraction or concreteness desired for a representation. For instance, the trace of a straight line can be considered, depending on the situation, to be a representation of a: (1) straight line; (2) semi-line; (3) segment of a given length; (4) segment of an arbitrary length; or (5) a vector. To avoid this multiplicity of meanings, artificial conventions are used; but even in this case, the status is not easy to distinguish in many situations. Consider another simple example, that of a triangle. When we represent it, the triangle drawn in Figure 1 may be considered as a triangle of sides 2, 3, and 4 in any units, as a geometrical form with for instance, in centimetres-an example of a finiteness-r three sides, free of the empirical constraints associated with its concretization-an example of ideal objectiveness.

FIGURE 1.

This means that the same figure can represent either an abstract geometrical object, or a particular concretization. Depending on the problem, we are sometimes interested in the first situation, and sometimes in the second. Furthermore, in some cases, one particular characteristic stands for all the situations. Based on this ambiguity, it is clear that the figurative register, used alone, does not enable one to distinguish between the two cases. The degree of abstraction that is required to deal with a representation varies from one situation to another. Note that this phenomenon is not specific to geometry. We can find it in every utilization of a concept. For example in language, chair may refer to this particular wooden chair, or to a general and abstract chair. In other branches of mathematics we also find it. The word number can suggest a particular number or an abstract one. But to distinguish these situations we can use different symbols and different notations for them, in contrast to what happens with figurative representations in geometry. In algebra, for instance, letters are in general used to represent unknown quantities (variable or parameter), whereas ciphers represent a known quantity. In this domain we have the contribution of symbolic language: different symbols (e.g., 1, fi , A, x) are used for different situations. In natural language, there are means for dealing with this phenomenon, for instance, by using articles or pronouns. But when representing objects through figures in geometry, this distinction is not considered. We always represent a concrete object, even if we are interested in the abstract one. The idea of any, in the sense of whatever, so easy to express in a symbolic way, appears to be (visually)

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187

irrepresentable.

The

visual

representation

of geometrical

concepts

returns

them,

in

some sense, to their source in the physical world. Note that the historical evolution of geometrical notations is to some extent connected with the status of geometrical objects. This evolution indicates that the same symbol designates, over different periods of time, objects with different status, According to Freudenthal (1985), the notation of a point, for instance, begins as geographic: the notation A means a point at A (and not at any other place). Next, the point at A becomes a point A and afterwards A (where A denotes an element of a set, with some properties). The notation A remains the same in all three cases, even as its meaning changes from a geographical notation (where emplacement is important) to an abstract one. An additional difficulty is that it is sometimes possible to deal with these three kinds of points, simultaneously: . geographical points, concrete and abstract points instance; concrete or abstract points,* in Euclidean geometry. in analytical geometry, for

??

This question of double status (particular or abstract) of external representations in geometry appears to be one of the first difficulties for a beginner, and in fact corresponds to the more general problem of abstraction. In some cases this difficulty rapidly disappears, and a beginner acts as an expert, as a mathematician would act. It is well known that mathematicians interpret a representation as a network of geometrical relationships among elements, while pupils tend to identify not only the essential relationships, but also the accessory or nonessential ones, depending on the constraints of the concretization. In other words, pupils tend to see an external representation as a finiteness, while experts see it as an ideal objectiveness.

1.2.

Typicality

of a Representation contribution to mathematics education comes from typicality theory,

An important

developed by cognitivists such as Adelson (1985) Le (1989) for instance, and applied to mathematics education by Cordier and Cordier (1991). Typicality is a property of elements from a category and corresponds to the idea that some elements are better examples than others of the category to which they belong; that is, they are more typical than others. For instance, a chair with four legs is more typical than a chair with three legs; a dog is a more typical example of mammals than a whale. Applied to a geometrical context, the typicality of a representation results from the fact that individuals more easily associate some external representations than others to a given problem or situation. Cordier and Cordier (1991) studied the typicality of what is called Thales theorem3 in some European countries. They showed that there are cognitive differences between the possible representations pupils may associate to this theorem: some representations

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MESQUITA

are more easily associated than others. For instance, in Figure 2, a is a better example of a representation of Thales theorem than b, d better than c.

.i
C FIGURE 2.

+F
d

Centered on ten different representations -in the sense of finiteness-concerning the theorem proposed to 16 years-old pupils, Cordier and Cordier showed that some of them were more naturally linked to the theorem than were others. In these instances, the theorem was more easily evoked; for example, they showed that pupils made more errors in case c than in the other cases (Cordier & Cordier, p. 57). Moreover, they showed that the typicality of some representations is a source of cognitive bias (pp. 61-62). In fact, the question of typicality is linked with the question of double status. From a mathematical point of view, there are no differences between a and b, or c and d. The latter result from a particular simplification obtained from a. In terms of ideal objectiveness, only the number of parallel lines is important; the distance between them or the relative inclination-factors linked to finiteness-are not relevant, mathematically. But from a didactical point of view, these representations appear different for pupils. As it is shown in the Cordier and Cordier study, the angle between non-parallel lines affects the performance of pupils. The situation with regard to the obtuse angle makes it more difficult to make an association with Thales theorem. In terms of the status of representations, typicality results from the fact that individuals tend to see an ideal objectiveness as a finiteness.

CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES IN GEOMETRY

189

Typicality of geometrical figures has some links with the question of heterogeneousness of the representative space. For instance, we can say that a representation of a triangle with a horizontal base is more typical than another one without such base. The same point can be made about vertical lines. The heterogeneousness of representative space has some effects on the typicality of representation. The more typical linesvertical and horizontal ones-have special perceptual properties. The pregnancy of vertical and horizontal lines are linked to this phenomenon. Consider, for instance, a (perceptual) identification of orthogonality. It is easier to identify perceptively this property in the case of an angle between horizontal and vertical lines, than in any other case of perpendicularity between obliques. Cultural reasons-where architectural and physical constraints take role-are in general evoked to explain it. But the question of organization of visual fields according to a vertical line and two oblique lines forming angles of 45 with it, may be a more plausible explanation. Prototypical Figures. The characteristics of representative space and the typicality theory applied to mathematics representation of geometrical objects enable us to call prototypical figures those ones corresponding to a regular organization of contour, orientation and form; prototypical figures tend to respect enclosure laws (closed borders are preferentially perceived), privileging some directions (such as horizontal and vertical ones) and forms (which tend to be regular, simple and symmetric); the components of the figure (sides, angles, for instance) have approched dimensions. Stability and aesthetic preoccupations may reinforce the perception of these prototypical figures. In opposition to them, we can consider the limit-cases figures. For instance, in Figure 3 the rectangle A can be considered a prototypical one, but the same does not happen with the rectangle B; the rectangle D appears to be an example of a prototypical rectangle, rather than the rectangle C.

0
C
FIGURE 3.

I
D

190

MESQUITA

The triangle E appears as a prototypical

triangle, whereas the triangle F does not (Figure 4).

E
FIGURE 4.

Due to the influence of physical space and other cultural reasons, teachers (and textbooks) tend to privilege prototypical figures, which are more easily used than others. Economy of paper and page setup factors also contribute to the same effect.

2.

THE ROLE AND THE NATURE OF REPRESENTATION IN GEOMETRY

In spite of the difficulties mentioned above, representations are useful tools to individuals. In some cases, they may have a heuristical effect in the solution of a problem, in the sense that the conditions of visibility in a particular figure and the possibilities for reorganization of the figure have great importance in the searching for a solution. In this sense, the power of a figure depends directly on the conditions of its possible reorganization. There are factors that can facilitate (or complicate) this reorganization; they are in general connected with the possibilities for reorganizing some specific geometric structures, where the conditions of visibility of these structures may play an essential role. In analyzing processes of spatial aptitude, Pellegrino and Kail (1982) show that these conditions are very different. Their study of reaction times on recognition tasks where elementary spatial transformations were involved (such as rotation, shifting and translation) suggests that reaction times vary strongly, depending on which elementary transformations were involved. These times extended to ten seconds in the case where several transformations were used simultaneously. In the case of geometrical problems that require, in general, much more than such recognition tasks require, the visibility conditions become a fortiori a very important question. But visibility and recognition conditions depend on the kinds of external representations used. For analysis purposes we will consider the following two criteria, which appear to be convenient as a preliminary distinction in the study of external representations: the role and the nature of the external representation.

2.1.

The Role of an External Represention

External representions do not have the same function in all geometric problems. We can distinguish between two main roles of an external represention. In some cases, the external

CONCEF TUAL

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representation

illustrates

the multiple relationships

and properties involved in the problem,

without suggesting solution procedures. We say the external representation has a descriptive role in this case. In other words, an external representation is descriptive when its sole function is to give a synoptical apprehension of the properties mentioned in the problem statement. In this case, the figure is a translation to a figurative register of the verbal statement of the problem. For instance, in the following problem analysed in Mesquita (1989b), Figure 5 appears as the translation of the statement: The following figure is formed by three semicircles C 1, C2 and C3, whose diameters are SU, ST and TU, respectively. Compare the lengths of the arcs: (a) Cl and (b) C2 followed by C3.

Cl

FIGURES. The role of the external representation is here a descriptive one. In this problem, the figure does not suggest specific treatments. It is an example of a descriptive role for a figure. In other cases, the external representation itself acts as a support for intuition, suggesting transformations that lead to solution. In this case, we will say that the external representation has a heuristical role. The figure asks for treatments tending (or not tending) to a solution. For instance, in the following problem-an adaptation to the case of rectangles of a proposition of Euclid (Book 1, prop. 43, in Heath, 1956), analysed in Mesquita (1989a)-the proof that rectangles 1 and 2 (Figure 6a) have the same area can be constructed by recognizing that: (a) the two reconfigurations in Figure 6b have the same area; (b) I and 2 can be obtained by complementarity of these reconfigurations; therefore I and 2 have the same area.

FIGURE

6a.

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MESQUITA

The role of the figure is somewhat dependent on individual behaviours. For this problem, there are different solutions from the above mentioned solution (for example, a solution based on proportionality). In this case, the role of the figure would be descriptive rather than heuristical. FIGURE 6b.

2.2.

The Nature of an External Represention

A second criterion concerns the nature of an external represention, which is linked to the type of treatment allowed by the external represention. In certain cases, the geometrical relationships utilized in the construction of the represention can be reutilized: we say that the external represention has the nature of an object (Mesquita, 1989a). This is the case in the examples described above (Figures 5 and 6). In both cases, the geometrical relationships used in the construction of the figure (parallelism, right angles, intersection points) may be used in geometrical reasoning; furthermore, it is possible to infer geometrical relationships from the construction of the figure. But in some other cases, it is not possible to extract directly a geometrical relationship from the construction of the figure. In these cases, the external represention appears as a kind of topological schema from which we cannot directly extract properties. Even if a relationship of alignment seems to be respected, it is not possible to utilize it. In this case we say the representation has the nature of an illustration. This is the case, for example, in the following problem associated to Figure 7, where-under the assumptions that I is an equilateral triangle, 2 is a rectangle, 3, 4 are squares, and the figure formed by 3, 4 and 5 is a square-we wish to prove the equality of segments AC, LF and FG:

FIGURE

7.

CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES IN GEOMETRY

193

In (Mesquita, 1989a) we presented this problem years-old pupils. Our results are as follows:
TABLE 1.

to approximately

three hundred

14

Answers of 14yearsld (in percentage) LF=AC (%I

pupils

FG=AC (%)
50

correctanswers
Incorrect answers

No answer

64 31 5

42 8

The percentages of correct answers were 64% in the case of the equality of LF and AC and 50% in the case of the equality of FG and AC. The lack of answers is not very different in both cases: 5% in LF against 8% in FG. Our results indicate that the question concerning FG appears to be more difficult than the one concerning LF. In the study mentioned, we also analysed the way pupils associated data from the figure with the statement: 5 1% of the pupils take into account information obtained from the statement and figure, while 24% of the pupils used treatments based on measure and proportionality (Mesquita, 1989a). In this problem, the nature of the external representation as an illusrrution appeared to be the main difficulty for pupils. Note that we can associate a different external representation with the same problem statement. For instance, we can associate the same statement with the following figure having the nature of an object:

FIGURE 8.

In both cases the figure has a descriptive role, only the nature of the figure changes. With an illustration having the nature of an object, this problem does not pose special difficulties for pupils, as is suggested by the study of M. Stein (1986). These results confirmed that the nature of the illustration is the main obstacle in the problem associated with Figure 7. Even if children are accustomed to other kinds of representations, at least the ones associated with perspectives, textbooks almost exclusively use objects as external representations. In fact, the analysis of the pupils answers in our study suggested that once the obstacle created by the nature of the external representation was overcome, pupils made the necessary substitutions to solve the problem. In our study,

194

MESQUITA

some pupils spontaneously drew the representation shown in Figure 8, having the nature of an object. These differences between the nature--object or illustration-of the external representation, naturally perceived by mathematicians, are not automatically understood by pupils. In the problem mentioned above, the nature of the illustration of the external representation was misunderstood by some pupils, who used treatments based on measure and proportionality, treatments that are incorrect and incompatible with the illustration nature of the external representation. For this reason, the nature of the external representation may become an obstacle to pupils understanding. It is possible that there is no coincidence between the nature of the figure associated with the problem and its interpretation by pupils. In contrast to pupils, experts use the illustration or the object as a translation into another register of the properties given by the problem statements. In this sense, they code mentally and automatically the figure as a network of the properties given by the statement. Pupils, however, can use properties that they imagine a figure is supposed to have, and that is suggested by its iconical appearance. The distinction between what is admissible and what is not requires the understanding of the nature of the external representation.

3.

CONCLUSION

Consideration of these aspects of representation can give researchers and teachers useful @ols for a cognitive analysis of geometrical problems. Although more detailed empirical evidence is needed based on further studies with pupils, the aspects linked with double status and typicality of representation may provide an important basis for the analysis of some misconceptions in geometry. Moreover, the criteria mentioned-the role and the nature of an external representation-give objective elements for an identification of some cognitive and perceptual/ cognitive obstacles linked to external representation in geometry. They enable a classification of difficulties in the solution of geometrical problems in accordance with the role and nature of the external representation involved into the problems, and help to establish different levels of difficulty. An evaluation based on the heuristical properties of external representation become possible. In this sense, the role and nature of the external representation appear as relevant elements of a cognitive theory of geometrical problem solving.

NOTES
1. In English, the term figure can refer to the meaning taken here, or to a second meaning as a cipher or number. . i 2. Using appropnate codes, it is possible to distinguish the status of the points with which we deal. In general (Xi,yi) denotes concrete points, while (x,y) refers to an abstract point. 3. Let (Al, Bl); (A2, B2) and (A3, B3) be parallel lines (cf. Figure 2). Then 7ClXZZm = ITI IEWn3-3.

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