Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles

Research Programme
Engineering
Communication technology and functionality in passenger vehicles
Rail Safety and Standards Boards (RSSB's) response to the report by Interfleet Technology, entitled Communication technology and functionality in passenger vehicles. 1. 1.1. 1.2. Purpose The purpose of this paper is to outline RSSBs response to the attached report. The report, prepared by Interfleet Technology, reviews the design and operation of existing train communication systems and assesses the benefits that more modern technology would deliver. The report recommends changes to existing equipment and its operation that would improve response following an incident or accident. The requirement to undertake the research stems from Recommendations 85, 86 and 87 of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry (Part 1). The key objectives of the research were to review the feasibility and cost effectiveness of three types of communication: Passenger to signaller communications; providing a communication link between passengers and the signaller/control centre. Roaming communications; such that train staff can readily communicate with each other or make broadcasts to passengers from any part of the train. Remote broadcasting; enabling the signaller or control centre to make announcements to passengers on a train at a remote location. This feature is of principal use on driver only operated trains where there is a possibility that the driver may be incapacitated in certain accident scenarios and there are not necessarily any other train crew on board.
1.3.
2. 2.1.
RSSBs response In addressing the above inquiry recommendations, this report makes a number of recommendations pertaining to communications technology to take matters further. Before doing this however, it is important to first establish what needs to be communicated, how and when. On behalf of RSSB, Cranfield University are currently undertaking the 'Evacuation and Communication' project that is due to conclude in June 2004. This broader work considers passenger reaction to incidents and their perceived needs. It identifies the most appropriate methods by which passengers and staff should communicate following an
2.2.
accident/incident to promote survivability and reduce injury. It will consider who needs to communicate with whom, what information needs to be passed on, timescales for communication, the communication media, how communication might affect workload, how communication requirements are likely to vary on the incident and the operating scenario, and how communication strategies might vary in different situations. 2.3. 3. 3.1. RSSB will respond to the recommendations in the attached report once the outcome of Cranfields work is known. Contact For further information please contact: Jim Lupton Head of Engineering Research RSSB jim.lupton@rssb.co.uk
RAILWAY SAFETY ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
REPORT NO DATE
: :
AUTHOR
12TH DECEMBER 2002
ITLR/T11272/002 C.A.WILSON
CONTENTS 1.
PAGE NUMBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................ ........................................................................ ........................................ 6

1.1. Recommendation 85 - Passenger to Signaller Communication ...................... 6 1.2. Recommendation 86 - Roaming Communication.......................................... 7 1.3. Recommendation 87 Remote Broadcasting ................................................ 7 1.4. Common Issues ........................................................................................... 8
2.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................ ............................................................................... ............................................... 9

2.1. Research Programme................................................................................. 10 2.1.1. GSM-R Overview ......................................................................... 10 2.1.2. Implementation Methods ............................................................. 10 2.1.3. Possible Benefits .......................................................................... 11 2.1.4. Human Factors............................................................................ 11 2.1.5. Final Report................................................................................. 11 2.2. COMMUNE Communications for UK Train Environment .......................... 11
3.
CURRENT PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGY .............................................. .............................................. 12

3.1. Methodology ............................................................................................. 12 3.2. UK, Former BR Operators .......................................................................... 12 3.3. UK non-BR operators ................................................................................. 15 3.3.1. Heavy rail operators .................................................................... 15 3.3.2. Light rail operators ...................................................................... 16 3.3.3. Summary .................................................................................... 19 3.4. European Operators .................................................................................. 20 3.5. Asia/Pacific Operators ............................................................................... 21 3.6. North American Operators......................................................................... 22
4.
POTENTIAL METHODS TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ ............................................................................................. ............................................................. 24
4.1. GSM-R ...................................................................................................... 24 4.1.1. EIRENE (European Integrated Railway radio Enhanced NEtwork) ... 24 4.1.2. MORANE (MObile RAdio for railway Networks in Europe) ............. 25 4.1.3. Railtrack ...................................................................................... 25 4.1.4. Manufacturers ............................................................................. 26 4.1.5. Nortel ......................................................................................... 26 4.1.6. Siemens Transportation ............................................................... 28 4.1.7. Other Manufacturers ................................................................... 30
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4.1.8. Industry Reports ........................................................................... 30 4.1.9. GSM-R Summary ......................................................................... 31 4.2. Other Methods .......................................................................................... 32 4.2.1. Supplier A ................................................................................... 32 4.2.2. Supplier B.................................................................................... 40 4.2.3. Supplier C ................................................................................... 42
5.
BENEFITS ................................................................ ..................................................................................... ..................................................... 45

5.1. Assessment Methods .................................................................................. 45 5.2. Recommendation 85: Passenger to Signaller Communications for DOO ..... 46 5.2.1. Safety Benefits and Disbenefits ..................................................... 46 5.2.2. Quantitative Assessment .............................................................. 48 5.2.3. Other Benefits ............................................................................. 49 5.2.4. Disbenefits .................................................................................. 49 5.2.5. Where Benefits Could be Achieved ............................................... 50 5.3. Recommendation 86a: Roaming Communications (including PA access) ..... 52 5.3.1. Safety Benefits ............................................................................. 52 5.3.2. Quantitative Assessment .............................................................. 54 5.3.3. Other Benefits ............................................................................. 54 5.3.4. Disbenefits and Limitations .......................................................... 55 5.4. Recommendation 86b: Collision Resistant PA Systems ................................. 55 5.4.1. Safety Benefits ............................................................................. 55 5.4.2. Quantitative assessment .............................................................. 57 5.4.3. Other Benefits ............................................................................. 57 5.4.4. Where Benefits Could be Achieved ............................................... 57 5.5. Recommendation 87: Remote Broadcast .................................................... 57 5.5.1. Safety Benefits ............................................................................. 58 5.5.2. Quantitative Assessment .............................................................. 58 5.5.3. Other Benefits ............................................................................. 58 5.5.4. Where Benefits Could be Achieved ............................................... 59
6.
INDICATIVE COSTS ................................................................ .......................................................................... .......................................... 60

6.1. Assessment Method ................................................................................... 60 6.2. Recommendation 85: Passenger to Signaller Communication ..................... 62 6.2.1. GSM-R Based System Using Existing Voice Based PCA .................. 62 6.2.2. Trainwire Based GSM System Using New PCA .............................. 62 6.2.3. Fully Independent GSM Based System .......................................... 63 6.3. Recommendation 86 Roaming Communications ...................................... 64 6.3.1. Basic System Non Collision Resistant ......................................... 64 6.3.2. Compliant System........................................................................ 64 6.4. Recommendation 87 Remote Broadcast ................................................... 65 6.4.1. GSM-R Based System................................................................... 65
6.4.2. GSM-Based System...................................................................... 65
7.
DISCUSSION ................................................................ ................................................................................. ................................................. 66

7.1. Recommendation 85: Passenger to Signaller Communication ..................... 66 7.2. Recommendation 86A: Roaming Communications ..................................... 69 7.3. Recommendation 86B: Collision Resistant PA.............................................. 70 7.4. Recommendation 87: Remote Broadcast .................................................... 71
8.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ ............................................ 73

8.1. Passenger to Signaller Communication....................................................... 73 8.2. Roaming Communication System ............................................................... 74 8.2.1. Roaming Communications........................................................... 74 8.2.2. Collision Resistant PA................................................................... 75 8.3. Remote Broadcasting ................................................................................. 76 8.4. Human Factors Study ................................................................................. 76
9.
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS .................................................... .................................................... 78
Copyright 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board

This publication may be reproduced free of charge for research, private study or for internal circulation within an organisation. This is subject to it being reproduced and referenced accurately and not being used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as the copyright of Rail Safety and Standards Board and the title of the publication specified accordingly. For any other use of the material please apply to RSSB's Head of Research and Development for permission. Any additional queries can be directed to research@rssb.co.uk. This publication can be accessed via the RSSB website www.rssb.co.uk
1.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On the 5th October 1999 two trains operated by Thames Trains and First Great Western collided at Ladbroke Grove junction. Part 1 of the resultant public inquiry (LGRI/1) made recommendations to improve rail safety in the future. Interfleet Technology Limited was commissioned by Railway Safety to research the feasibility of three communication recommendations (85, 86, 87), and this report presents the findings. The research was broken down into defined areas and information sought from various parties including Train Operators (both in the UK and globally), equipment suppliers and Railtrack. Once an adequate sample of data had been obtained a high level analysis was undertaken to determine; the level of safety benefits that would be obtained and to ascertain what future actions should be taken. The recommendations have been considered in the context of the GSM-R implementation programme. GSM-R has been chosen to become the European radio system and as such Railtrack will employ it as the national radio system. Railtrack were consulted to obtain their view on the recommendations and to obtain details of the national rollout for GSM-R. Currently the GSM-R infrastructure program is scheduled for completion at the end of 2006. 1.1. RECOMMENDATION 85 - PASSENGER TO SIGNALLER COMMUNICATION Passenger to signaller communication systems are not commonly installed, but they are provided on some railways. Currently the automatic DSD alert system on Cab Secure Radio provides some of the desired functionality of this recommendation. Full passenger to signaller communication could be technically achieved through GSM-R. An interface unit would need to be designed to link the radio with passenger communication alarm panels, and it would be necessary to ensure that the radio was adequately protected in a collision. Safety benefits likely to be provided by a passenger to signaller communication facility were found to be limited. In terms of equivalent fatalities prevented, a maximum figure of 0.075 fatalities per year was estimated. A cost benefit analysis suggested a pay back time of 15 years therefore it is likely that such a facility would only be justifiable on newer fleets. Design work should be commissioned into the interfacing of Passenger Communication Alarm systems, so that emergency calls not dealt with by drivers are routed via GSM-R to the signaller.
1.2.
RECOMMENDATION 86 - ROAMING COMMUNICATION Some basic forms of roaming communication are already in use, but none conform fully with the LRGI/1 recommendations. GSM-R allows the use of hand held mobiles therefore it could be used to support a roaming communication system. However, as the capacity of GSM-R would have to be greatly enhanced to accommodate such a facility other systems (DECT, GSM) that could be used in conjunction with GSM-R were explored. Apart from the safety benefits provided by a roaming communication system, there is also potential for significant benefit to efficiency, customer service and staff safety. A first approximation of the likely safety benefits estimated an upper limit of 0.49 fatalities per year with a pay back time of approximately 20 years, suggesting that such a system could be only justifiable for new builds and retro fit to recent stock. Train operators should be encouraged to investigate the existing options for roaming communications. Subject to the result of a trial to determine the effectiveness of DECT and wireless LAN transmissions in and around trains, development work should be carried out into the provision of roaming communication systems.
Recommendation 86 also envisaged that a roaming system should interface with the public address system even when carriages become decoupled, as such a collision resistant PA was considered. No examples of this type of technology were found although it is technically possible. It was estimated that the provision of a collision resistant PA would cost 50% over and above the cost of a basic roaming communication system giving a benefit of only 0.035 fatalities per year. It is therefore considered impracticable to implement this type of system. 1.3. RECOMMENDATION 87 REMOTE BROADCASTING Remote broadcasting is already provided on DOO trains via Cab Secure Radio but is not widely used. GSM-R already has a functional address allocated for remote broadcasting so can be used to provide this facility. An initial consideration of the safety benefits suggests that remote broadcasting is only likely to be useful in a limited number of situations on non-DOO fleets.
Train operators who do not currently have remote broadcasting facilities should consider whether it would have any benefits for their particular operations.
1.4.
COMMON ISSUES The extent of the benefits that could be provided by the proposed communication systems can only be truly evaluated following a detailed consideration of human factors issues. Human factors research will be required to study passengers communicating with signallers, the potential benefits of roaming communication and remote broadcasting. It is expected that this work would also confirm the low level of benefits obtainable from collision resistant PA. To preserve the operation of the train borne radio in the event of collision, and hence maintain the safety benefits available, the radio equipment should ideally be fitted in protected locations with local emergency power provision.
2.
INTRODUCTION
Following on from an initial review performed on behalf of ATOC, Interfleet were commissioned by Railway Safety to progress a research project addressing the technical feasibility and potential safety benefits that could be obtained from the implementation of recommendations 85, 86 and 87 made by Lord Cullen in Part 1 of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry (LGRI/1). Recommendation 85 states; The possibility of installing on driver-only trains a telephone by which passengers can communicate with the signaller in the event of the driver being killed or incapacitated should be studied (para 14.65). Paragraph 14.65 states; There should also, in my view be a study of the possibility of installing on driveronly trains a telephone by which passengers can communicate with the signaller in the event of the driver being killed of incapacitated, so as to enable them to obtain advice and information in such an emergency. Recommendation 86 states; The feasibility of a roaming communication system for train staff should be examined (para 14.68). Paragraph 14.68 states; Professor Galea and Dr Weyman suggested that the feasibility of introducing a roaming communication system used by train staff should be examined. They said that ideally it should interface with the public address system and also allow crew to communicate amongst themselves. It should be capable of operating despite de-coupling of carriages. Counsel for RMT submitted that a modern communication link should be available between the guard and the driver so that the guard was able to obtain access to the public address from any of the coaches and not merely his own compartment or the buffet car. I agree with the substance of that submission and, in addition, the submission made on behalf of the Rail Users Committees. But the possibility of remote broadcasting from outside the train, where it is not already available, should be investigated. Recommendation 87 states; The possibility of remote broadcasting from outside the train, where it is not already available, should be investigated (para 14.68). Paragraph 14.68 states; See recommendation 86.
Another LGRI/1 recommendation relates to radio communication. Recommendation 51; There should be a national system of direct radio communication between trains and signallers. Recommendation 51 will be satisfied by the implementation of the Global System for Mobile Communications Railways (GSM-R) and as such is not a main topic of this research project. However as GSM-R will be the national Radio system employed, its ability to provide recommendations 85, 86 and 87 had to be considered. 2.1. RESEARCH PROGRAMME The research program was initially broken down into defined areas allowing a project plan to be created and time scales to be determined. Other associated projects/reports were reviewed to ensure that work was not being duplicated and that any information previously documented was considered. Information was sought from various parties both in the UK and globally. Once an adequate sample of data had been obtained a high level analysis was made to determine the level of safety benefit that could be achieved. 2.1.1. GSM-R OVERVIEW A full understanding of the timescales projected (to date) were sought along with details of migration issues associated with rail zones and vehicle types. Manufacturers were contacted to determine their involvement with GSM-R, to obtain more current information on the rollout situation in Great Britain and to understand the capabilities of the technology. 2.1.2. IMPLEMENTATION METHODS This research activity considers GSM-Rs ability to perform LGRI/1 recommendations 85, 86 and 87 and the possible impact on its program, should the recommendations be implemented. To ensure that the optimum level of benefit would be gained other systems, that could be interfaced with GSM-R were considered, ensuring that the most appropriate solutions were identified. This involved identifying best practices employed inside and external to the confines of the UK rail industry, and supplier liaison to determine the possibility/cost of developing suitable systems.
2.1.3. POSSIBLE BENEFITS Predominantly the research considered safety benefits, however any additional (non-safety) benefits that could be obtained were also documented. The approach taken was to assess the benefits in a qualitative rather than quantitative perspective. To ascertain the true benefits that could be gained an overview cost analysis was performed. This provided an approximate (i.e. 50%) figure along with details of the main factors which would influence the final cost. UK operators (formerly BR) were consulted to establish where the implementation of the LGRI/1 recommendations, and hence the potential safety benefits would be best employed, i.e. roaming communication on a driver only train may be considered unnecessary. 2.1.4. HUMAN FACTORS The original project plan included a section to address the topic of human factors. However during a project review meeting held with Railway Safety, 20th May 2002, it was decided that this issue will be picked up under the main Accident Survivability series of projects and as such was excluded from this project. 2.1.5. FINAL REPORT This final report details the findings of the research project concluding with recommendations to enable Railway Safety to suitably respond to LGRI/1 recommendations 85, 86 and 87. 2.2. COMMUNE COMMUNICATIONS FOR UK TRAIN ENVIRONMENT Railway Safety had recently instigated another research project associated with communications, Project COMMUNE. To prevent duplication the scope of this project was reviewed. Primarily, its objective was to investigate the potential for developments in satellite based communications to contribute to the cost-effective safe operation of trains. Although this project considers GSM-R as a communication technology, no immediate concerns were highlighted that would influence the communication research generated from the Ladbroke Grove Rail Enquiry. Consequently this research program has been performed independent to Project COMMUNE.
3.
CURRENT PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGY

3.1. METHODOLOGY The method used to carry out this research was to compile a questionnaire based around the three LGRI/1 recommendations. The questionnaire principally asked respondents about the systems which are currently fitted, but it also sought to find out about the operational background of the systems, the experience gained with existing equipment, proposed trials etc. In this way the aim was to put the information into its proper context and gain a full picture of the current and planned emergency communication systems in use with each operator. The research was divided up as follows: UK, former British Rail (BR) operators UK, non BR operators (e.g. light rail and Eurostar etc) Europe Asia/Pacific North America
Other regions were intentionally omitted due to an anticipated low level of technology use and perceived difficulty in obtaining contacts. Where a respondent was found to have an interesting system, the questionnaire was followed up with a detailed discussion or, in some cases, a site visit. 3.2. UK, FORMER BR OPERATORS Train Operating Companies (TOCs) that were formerly part of BR were approached and asked to complete the questionnaire described above. This was achieved either through written or verbal communication. Responses were obtained from many, but not all companies. The responses obtained indicated that most train operators have made little change to the communication systems inherited from BR, and whilst aware of the LGRI/1 recommendations have not taken any steps to investigate the feasibility of introducing such systems on their fleets. In view of the likely complexity of such systems, the need to interface with Railtrack, and the fact that most operators do not own their rolling stock, this is perhaps not surprising.
The general picture is summarised in the sections below: 3.2.1. PASSENGER TO SIGNALLER COMMUNICATION FOR DOO TRAINS ! ! No train operators currently provide this facility. Vehicles built since approximately 1990 are generally fitted with voice-based Passenger Communication Alarms (PCAs) that allow the passengers to communicate with the driver only. This type of equipment is fitted irrespective of whether the vehicles are intended for Driver Only Operation (DOO) use. Earlier vehicles have a simpler system that makes a partial brake application. No known trials or investigations have been carried out with passenger-signaller equipment. In discussion with certain train operators, a view was expressed that the existing communication systems are subject to a significant amount of abuse, and that this would need to be taken into account in designing a passenger to signaller communication facility.
! !
Trains operating over Cab Secure Radio (CSR) equipped routes have a facility that provides a limited subset of the functionality of this type of system. Activation of the Drivers Safety Device (DSD) automatically sends an alert to the control centre, notifying the signaller that the driver has become incapacitated. The DSD alert device therefore provides some of the benefits of a passenger to signaller system. It is not clear how often the DSD alert facility is being tested. Some train operators have introduced a very thorough testing regime and are able to demonstrate that the whole system is working on all their units. However, this is believed not to be the case for all train operators, and may be worth further investigation. 3.2.2. ROAMING COMMUNICATIONS AND COLLISION RESISTANT PA SYSTEMS ! All vehicles are equipped with a train-wire based PA system but none would be resistant to the parting of vehicles. There are no plans at present to introduce systems that would be and as such no trials have been carried out. Some newer vehicle types (such as Mark 4 coaches and Multiple Unit classes 373, 220 and 221 have a PA communication panel/transmitter in every vehicle. Older rolling stock has a number of transmitters distributed along a train. As a minimum, all driving cabs contain transmitters,
! !
whilst staff compartments and buffet areas may also be equipped. Some train operators provide mobile phones for the use of train crew. Great North Eastern Railway (GNER) and First Great Western (FGW) have carried out studies into the use of roaming communications. FGW investigated the possibility of providing a system that would provide full roaming access to the PA, but failed to find any suitable technology. GNER investigated the use of roaming crew-to-crew communication, and selected commercially-available VHF handsets. GNERs experience with this system is discussed further below. Wales and Borders expressed support for the concept of roaming communications, but have not conducted any trials or investigations.
The use by GNER of commercially available VHF radios partially fulfils recommendation 86. The solution chosen by this operator is simple, practical, low cost and does not require modification of vehicles. However it does not fully comply with the recommendation made in the LGRI/1 and consequently has a number of disadvantages: ! ! ! ! ! Public Address (PA) announcements are not possible. Discrete ("one to one") crew communication is not possible any conversation via the handsets will be broadcast to/overheard by all users of the system. The handsets are bulky. There can be cross-talk between adjacent trains. Licensing issues exist.
Despite these limitations, the experience gained has been positive. In the case of GNER the adoption of the system was motivated by a need to protect lone workers, and the system has been successful in that respect. Its use has been extended to help improve customer service. These experiences demonstrate the potential benefits, even for a system that has limited functionality. 3.2.3. REMOTE BROADCASTING ! ! All DOO operators are able to provide this facility via the existing Cab Secure Radio (CSR) system. The facility is only used in exceptional circumstances.
Non-DOO operators are not generally able to provide the facility. The significant exception to this is Chiltern Railways, who have installed a Public GSM-based remote broadcast facility on their Class 168 units.
Some operators expressed concerns about the extent of CSR coverage, highlighting the possibility that the system might not always be available on all parts of the network. Another concern over CSR is the extent to which the remote broadcasting facility is tested. Some train operators have introduced a very thorough testing regime and are able to demonstrate that the whole system is working on all their units. However, this is believed not to be the case for all train operators, and may be worth further investigation. The Chiltern Railways system is an example of a new development in remote broadcasting. It allows public GSM access to the trains PA. Unauthorised access is prevented by the requirement to send an SMS (Short Messaging Service) message prior to making the call. The system could be adapted to provide roaming PA access by guards and other train staff, although it is not used for this at present. 3.3. UK NON-BR OPERATORS It was considered worthwhile to approach UK passenger operators who have come into existence independently of the former BR network. This is because their facilities have generally been planned from new and include fewer legacy systems. The opportunity may therefore have been taken to adopt new communication systems not considered by the national railway. Details for these operators are summarised below. 3.3.1. HEAVY RAIL OPERATORS The three mainline heavy rail passenger operators, which have risen independently of BR, are Heathrow Express, Eurostar and Eurotunnel. The operational characteristics are substantially different between these three railways but, from the point of view of communication systems, they do have some similarities: All three employ voice-based Passenger Communication Alarms (PCAs). These allow the passenger to speak to the driver, but no connection is available directly to the signaller.
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All three have limited roaming communication systems based on VHF radios. In the case of Eurotunnel the signal is carried on a leaky feeder cable running along the train, and is hence vulnerable to vehicle separation. PA announcements can be made on this system. On Heathrow Express the signal is carried in a similar cable laid in the Heathrow tunnel, and hence the system only works on that portion of the route. Remote broadcast is possible on all three routes. However, it is not operational on Eurostar vehicles due to the transmitters along their route not being equipped with suitable hardware. Eurostar have taken steps to ensure that their VHF radio system is properly licensed in the UK. They have used the system for train evacuations in the Channel Tunnel and following a highspeed derailment in France. During these events it was found to be both effective and useful. The bulk of the use of the roaming communications is, however, centred on customer service. The other major heavy rail operator is London Underground. Underground trains do not have any train crew and so roaming communications are not relevant. However, the trains are fitted with Passenger Communication Alarms that allow the passengers to speak with the driver. Remote broadcasting by the line controllers is possible on all London Underground lines with the exception of sub-surface routes and the Victoria Line. It is available at all times on the Jubilee and Northern Lines (as per BR Cab Secure Radio), but on the other lines it is only accessible when the vigilance system has timed out (i.e. the driver is incapacitated). London Underground is beginning the process of integrating all of its separate radio systems into a new Digital Trunked Radio System (TETRA) based network called Connect. With respect to emergency communications this will provide the same functionality as the older systems. 3.3.2. LIGHT RAIL OPERATORS Light rail system operators rely heavily on communication systems to maintain the integrity of their service operation. Incidents happen at a relatively high frequency owing to the problems associated with on-street running and mingling with road traffic. This has led to the operators gaining valuable experience regarding the usefulness of different communications systems.
The tramway operators were found to all have similar systems based on analogue radio technology, but with capabilities varying significantly between operators. A basic system, such as that used on Croydon Tramlink, offers functionality similar to the national rail network: Passengers can contact the driver (via the passenger emergency alarm), but not the signalman. No roaming communication systems are generally available (although Croydon does have a TETRA system covering part of its route, it is carried as a backup and is reportedly never used). PA announcements are only possible from the cab. Remote broadcasting is not possible. These simple arrangements can be justified because of a wide variety of risk mitigation factors, which would not necessarily be present on a heavy railway. These include the relative ease of disembarkation from low-floor vehicles, the safe nature of the tram tracks themselves, the constant monitoring of vehicle positions by the control centre, the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) and the presence of help points at stations. However, some light rail operators have very comprehensive facilities over and above the basic system described above. Examples of technologies in current use are as follows: Passenger to signaller voice communication (Midland Metro). Passenger to signaller text alert (Docklands). Roaming communication handsets (Manchester Metrolink and Docklands). Remote broadcasting to the PA (Midland Metro, Docklands). Text message broadcasting to drivers (Manchester Metrolink). Status code advice from the driver to the control centre (Sheffield Supertram). The system that has most functionality is that used by Midland Metro. This incorporates recommendation 85 (Passenger to Signaller communication) and recommendation 87 (remote broadcasting). However it was found that problems existed with
the passenger-to-signaller communication system and that controllers had mixed views regarding its usefulness. The passenger-to-signaller call points are integrated with the trams PCA system in a simple interface, which is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1: Midland Metro passenger call point The call points are subjected to a relatively high level of abuse (or accidental activation). Whilst the calls are routed via the driver first, in practice it has proved not always possible for the driver to answer within the required 10 seconds. This leads to calls being diverted to the control centre, and a number of spurious calls (approximately one per day) causing distraction to the line controllers. Note that this number of calls is generated by a total of 12 trams in service at any given time. This level of spurious use must be contrasted with only two instances of genuine use in four years. These relate to passenger falls. The control centre has a sophisticated call queuing system and is well equipped to deal with spurious calls and multiple alerts from passenger call points as well as ordinary radio traffic. The software places emergency calls at the top of the queue, colours
them red and makes an audible alert to the controller. Figure 2 shows the system in use with a queue of two ordinary calls (shown in blue on the left of the screen).
Figure 2: Control centre screen at Midland Metro, showing the call stack containing two non-emergency calls The same interface is used to speak to drivers, make remote broadcasts, to send text to Passenger Information Displays and to make ordinary telephone calls. Experience of the remote broadcast feature is positive this system is used occasionally for passenger information updates. None of the systems have ever needed to be used in a major emergency, despite the tramway having had several level crossing collisions. The low speeds used on the tramway combined with the excellent braking characteristics of the trams make a major incident highly unlikely. 3.3.3. SUMMARY The operators who have appeared in the post-BR period have all taken steps to ensure that modern communication systems are provided, and as a result have better overall facilities than the ex-BR operators.
The facilities adopted in each case are specifically tailored to the needs of each operator. This has resulted in a lack of standardisation from the point of view of functionality. However, the technologies used are common to all the operators, being VHF analogue radio based. 3.4. EUROPEAN OPERATORS To establish an understanding of the communication systems used on mainland European rail networks, and the possible inclusion of the functionality recommended in LRGI/1, national rail administrations were approached. In general, the people named as national contacts for the EIRENE project were contacted to provide information on the emergency communication systems used on their railways. The response rate achieved via this method was relatively poor, and consequently efforts were made to obtain further contacts by other means. In addition, the UIC (Union Internationale des Chemins de fer) was contacted in order to provide a general overview. The general pattern is that virtually all the European main line operators have a communications functionality, which is similar to that of the UK national network. GSM-R implementation is underway in some countries, but no particular emphasis seems to have been placed on upgrading emergency communication facilities as part of this work. Some railways, such as FS in Italy and SBB in Switzerland, equip their staff with public GSM telephones. FS has implemented a direct access system, by which it is possible to contact a member of the train crew by dialling a common number plus the train number. Swiss railways considered implementing such a system but decided against it on cost grounds. Remote broadcasting is possible on many urban networks. Unlike the situation in the UK, this facility is used regularly for non-emergency purposes such as the broadcast of information concerning service disruption or connections. National fitment of a radio system, which supports remote broadcasting, was considered in Switzerland, but abandoned due to its cost. Swiss Railways anticipate providing the facility via GSM-R. The most advanced emergency communication systems on European railways were found in Norway. NSB (Norwegian State Railways) is introducing the RailCom system on all its trains. The reason for this fitment is believed to be an inquiry following a severe accident, a contributory cause of which was found to be poor communication systems
and confusion over which mobile phone numbers to use when contacting train crew. The RailCom system consists of two separate elements one based at the signalling centre and one based on the train. The signalling centre uses the RailCom Telephone Wireless Access Concentrator (TWAC). This is essentially a database, which relates train numbers to mobile phone numbers, allowing the signaller to easily contact drivers or train crew on specific trains. The train-based element is termed the Guard Radio. This uses a central communications hub to provide full roaming communications to the guard, including the following features: Crew to crew communication PA access Mobile phone network access (via hub).
Communications internally to the train do not rely on the presence of a mobile phone network. However, the PA system still relies on train wires and would therefore fail if vehicles became separated. Experience with the guard radio has generally been good, and NSB plans to complete its fitment to all trains by the end of 2002. Staff tend to use the wireless functionality regularly for non-emergency situations, for example giving right-away signals during train dispatch. 3.5. ASIA/PACIFIC OPERATORS Research into the technologies used and operational experience in the Asia/Pacific region was carried out by Interfleets Australian office. Local knowledge suggested that most of the companies in the region operate using fairly basic communication methods, and have no experience, which is relevant to the LGRI/1 recommendations. This includes most Japanese railways, despite their heavy reliance on modern technology in other areas. The exceptions to this general rule are the KCRC system in Hong Kong, and the SMRT system in Singapore. These are known to be the most technologically advanced railways in the region with respect to communication systems, especially the Singapore system that is currently taking delivery of driverless trains. For those operators who responded, it is clear that the communication systems in use comply partially with the LGRI/1 recommendations. Remote broadcasting is provided, along with driver-to-signaller radios. Portable radios are used by train crew, and these offer the ability for the
crew to speak directly to the signaller. However, PA access from the portable units and direct passenger to signaller contact are not available. The Singapore SMRT systems new driverless trains will incorporate a passenger to signaller communication system, but in common with Midland Metro in the UK, this operates in the context of a heavily supervised network. The Singapore vehicles incorporate CCTV cameras in each vehicle so that the controllers can immediately see who has activated the alarm and why. The actual operation of the passenger to signaller alarm is based on a TETRA digital radio system. 3.6. NORTH AMERICAN OPERATORS North American rail operators use an entirely different type of radio system to that common in Europe. Part of the VHF spectrum from 160.215 MHz to 161.565 MHz has been allocated for railway voice communication. This spectrum has been divided up into 96 separate channels, and these are allocated to operators within different areas of the country. In any given area, a particular channel will be allocated as the road channel. This is used by the control centre and all drivers and guards in the local area. The system is simplex; meaning that from an operational point of view only one person can speak at once and all users can hear what is being said. The open nature of the system has led to it being used in a different way to the radio systems in Europe. In some respects, this pattern of use is more appropriate to the sparse distribution of railways in the USA. For example, drivers are required to examine passing trains for defects and announce any found over the radio. In addition, if a train is stopped at a station the driver will make an announcement over the radio, so that approaching trains will be warned of the possibility of passengers on the tracks. Drivers will also announce whenever they pass a caution signal, and the guard is required to repeat this back as a confirmation. It is argued that the open nature of the communication leads to greater safety, as all the staff involved have a higher level of general awareness of what is happening on the railway. However, it is difficult to see how this would be of benefit in the UK context of heavily trafficked lines. It represents a significant divergence from established UK practice. US passenger operators have not implemented any emergency communication systems along the lines recommended by Lord Cullen.
The deficiencies of the US system have been recognised by the railway administration, and a new digital radio system is being developed based on the APOC project 25 standard. This continues to use VHF frequencies but reallocates the available bandwidth into 182 channels. These will be divided up to provide 80 trunked duplex voice channel pairs, five nontrunked channel pairs, plus 11 simplex channels. The system will therefore provide both the established US functionality of open simplex channels plus the duplex channels familiar in Europe. The system is on trial on a freight railway in the Pacific Northwest, but it has not yet been used on passenger operations. The only known passenger system using APOC project 25 technology is the Korean high speed line, however the details of this system are not known at the present time.
4.
POTENTIAL METHODS TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS

GSM-R has been chosen to become the European radio system and as such will satisfy the requirement for a national train radio system specified in LGRI, recommendation 51. As part of this research program, consideration has been given to determine, not only to whether GSM-R as a system could deliver LGRI recommendations 85, 86 and 87, but also whether GSM-R would be the most appropriate implementation method. This section addresses the functionality of GSM-R in relation to the possible delivery of the LGRI/1 recommendations and considers other methods that could be used in parallel to GSM-R to achieve the technical requirements recommended. Various available reports on train communications were also reviewed to determine the viewpoint of other Industry commentators. 4.1. GSM-R The EU, through its various directives on interoperability, has ensured that the future European train cab radio system will be GSM-R. The UIC through its member constituents and multi-party bodies, such as EIRENE and MORANE, has provided a set of specifications with which this system must comply. The purpose is to produce a pan-European train radio system that will allow trains to cross borders with an interoperable radio system. Consequently GSM-R is to become the national radio system for trains on the Railtrack network. 4.1.1. EIRENE (EUROPEAN INTEGRATED RAILWAY RADIO ENHANCED NETWORK) This is the body set up by UIC (Union Internationale des Chemins de fer), the international union of railways, to explore the issues surrounding the choice of a pan European train radio. GSM-R was chosen from the possible candidates' e.g. TETRA, to be the future train radio. Once GSM-R had been chosen EIRENE developed the Functional and System Specifications to ensure that interoperability could be achieved. Inspection of the EIRENE website revealed that little progress has been made with rollout of the GSM-R system in Europe. Sweden already has a major part of its network covered by GSM-R, although it is different to the requirement of the EIRENE specifications as it uses hand portable radios rather than fixed cab radios. Germany has possibly progressed the furthest as it now has one high-speed route converted. Several other countries have test sections on their rail networks.
4.1.2. MORANE (MOBILE RADIO FOR RAILWAY NETWORKS IN EUROPE) This is the project set up to produce prototypes of the GSM train radio and evaluate the system development, testing and validation. Three test sites were operated in France, Germany and Italy to validate operation over different terrain and operational situations. Their main objective is to: validate various propagation conditions. allow equipment interoperability tests. allow different EMC testing situations (15 kV ac, 25 kV ac, 3 kV dc). 4.1.3. RAILTRACK The key player in the rollout of GSM-R in Great Britain is Railtrack. Therefore decisions made by them on the installed capability of the infrastructure will influence the level and variety of services that the GSM-R system will be able to offer to the end user. The National GSM-R project, sponsored by Railtrack entails the replacement of existing train radio systems, mainly CSR and NRN with GSM-R. The project comprises of a Delivery team, based at Fitzroy House and a Sponsor team, based at Railtrack House. The Delivery team is primarily responsible for building the national GSM-R network comprising of some 2000 base stations plus switching stations etc. The Sponsor team is responsible for stakeholder liaison (principally Train Operators), network change and strategic direction of the project. The project is currently in the design/development phase and current intention is to seek implementation authority. This will be followed by the issue of tenders for network provision with construction planned to start early next year. The implementation date for the national fitment of Railtracks GSM-R infrastructure is the end of 2006. As NRN is expected to expire in 2008 this then provides a 2 year period in which train operators must swap out the old radios (primarily NRN) for new ones. Railtracks remit is to install GSM-R (voice radio) as a national replacement for existing radio systems and as such that is what they are budgeting for. Any enhancements/features above those already employed will require separate benefit analysis, funding and risk management. Approximately 90% of a provisional specification has now been written for GSM-R.
4.1.4. MANUFACTURERS Several manufacturers were contacted to determine their involvement with GSM-R. Information on each companys involvement with GSM-R being initially researched through phone calls, e-mail and website content. Two manufacturers; Nortel Networks and Siemens, were found to be the major players in the rollout of GSM-R on the Railtrack network. This is essentially because they are suppliers of infrastructure equipment as well as being capable of supplying the various levels of operational equipment that is required. Most other companies only produce handset/mobile units and therefore are reliant on the infrastructure suppliers to provide the capability for any services supplied. Meetings were arranged with both Nortel and Siemens, to determine their views on GSM-Rs suitability for the requirements of the recommendations. Their input into this project is valuable because the capabilities of the infrastructure will largely determine which of the EIRENE specification options will be available and therefore useable. The opportunity was also taken to canvass their opinions on GSM-R in general, and to obtain more current information on the rollout situation in Great Britain. 4.1.5. NORTEL Nortel are one of the largest telecommunications companies in the world. GSM-R is an enhanced sub set of the public GSM mobile phone technology, and it forms a fairly small part of their Telecommunications business. They manufacture equipment such as base stations and mobile units themselves and other components are bought in and integrated with their own products. They also produce and supply many of the different mobile handset types available. Nortel Networks involvement with the GSM-R program in the UK to date involves the supply of the infrastructure (base stations etc) to the West Coast Main Line project. Apart from the Test Line at Old Dalby and possibly certain parts of the actual main line, very little progress has been made with roll out of the system. Nortel believe that GSM-R is capable of achieving the three LRGI/1 recommendations provided that additional equipment was added to interface with the necessary peripherals.
External interface with the PA system, remote broadcasting from outside the train (recommendation 87) is possible as there is a dedicated functional address reserved for it. GSM-R has the ability to broadcast to the PA system through its Functional Addressing facility. This enables several different personnel to be called through the cab radio in addition to the driver. These may include the guard, catering personnel and additionally the public address (PA) system. This functionality is specified within the EIRENE Functional Specification, (section 10 group membership, section 11 functional addressing, section 13 emergency calls) and EIRENE System Specification (section 9 numbering plan). The only issue that would require to be resolved is how PA systems, fitted to existing trains would be interfaced to the GSM-R cab radio. Passenger to signaller communication (recommendation 85) could be possible by using a spare functional address. However as a passenger call system does not exist on most trains, this would have to be designed along with an extra interface with the emergency call initiation circuitry of the cab radio. Roaming communication for train crew (recommendation 86) could be set-up as a peripheral of the cab radio, using either Digital Enhanced Cordless Technology (DECT) or GSM-R technology operating through the cab radio Functional Numbering system. This facility would be compromised if the cab radio became incapacitated but the use of GSM-R mobiles would enable continued use of the system, albeit under a different mode of operation. A major problem with this arrangement would be ensuring that mobiles are synchronised with the individual train system i.e. are registered to the correct functional identity on the correct train and do not get transferred from train to train inadvertently. Either a mandatory procedure would have to be set up to ensure that the mobiles were set up correctly or a method of doing this automatically could be enacted. More research would need to be done in this area. As with passenger to signaller communication one of the main considerations would be to ensure that the Functional Numbers are made available on the GSM-R system, as they are currently not mandatory.
4.1.6. SIEMENS TRANSPORTATION Siemens involvement with GSM-R in Great Britain will be extensive. They are a supplier of the dispatcher control centres, which interface with the main GSM-R infrastructure with train cab radios and they are also developing and producing train borne equipment. Siemens are involved with GSM-R development projects in Europe. The Swedish infrastructure is supplied by Siemens, which gives them operational experience. They were also involved with the British Rail DART project in the late 1980s/early 1990's. This was a forerunner for GSM-R, based on the public GSM service with rail related add-ons. Siemens have already been involved with the cell and frequency analysis for the Railtrack network and were expecting contracts for installation of infrastructure to be awarded soon, with a possible rollout early next year. They are actively pursuing the future sale of train borne equipment but, due to the current emphasis being on the infrastructure installation, no actual equipment will be sold for some time. They are also currently involved in actively upgrading the CSR network (not merely replacing worn out items), this suggests that the demise of CSR is not likely to be imminent. Siemens highlighted an issue concerning Railtrack operating practices differing significantly from those of the continental operators. This has several ramifications on the operation of the GSM-R system. The main problem is that the UK train running numbers are alphanumeric not pure numeric. The GSM-R EIRENE specification has no facility for running numbers to be alphanumeric. What ramification this has on the principle of interoperability is currently indeterminate, any customisation away from EIRENE standards would not be practicable without heavy cost and time penalties. Siemens are of the opinion that the current infrastructure resources are only sufficient to supply basic cab radio voice traffic. When ERTMS is eventually added to the network, all spare capacity will be utilised and upgrades will be required to cope with system demand. This will particularly be the case in congested areas such as London Stations. There would appear to be little spare system capacity available for the many other potential GSM-R applications that have been touted around the industry as future enhancements.
Siemens have designed their GSM-R Man Machine Interface (MMI) to be a direct replacement for the CSR MMI, which helps simplify change over to the new system. The cab radio can also interface with many other optional subsystems. However whether there is enough system capacity to use these options is open to debate. Remote Broadcasting from outside the train (recommendation 87) is easily achieved, as it is part of the EIRENE specification (as previously discussed with other parties). The Siemens cab radio has the ability to connect to UK standard and UIC 568 PA interfaces. Any other types of PA would need an interface to be designed to enable connection to the cab radio; some vehicles may also require a PA system to be fitted. Passenger to signaller communication (recommendation 85) could be achieved using the UIC intercom facility, which currently allows the Train crew to call the driver or signaller through the GSM-R cab radio. The passenger call facility hardware would need to be designed to interface with this equipment and would need to take account of security and misuse issues. It is thought that passenger call systems are not in common use. Roaming communication for train crew (recommendation 86) could potentially be the most complex issue to deal with. Siemens consider that the use of mobile handsets should be possible to satisfy this requirement. However there are several potential problems in producing a coherent system. One of these is caused by Railtrack using alphanumeric train running numbers as opposed to pure numeric. Train running numbers and crew functional numbers would need to be entered to ensure correlation between the train and crew radios. It is not possible to input alphanumeric codes on standard EIRENE handsets and therefore they could not be used in this manner. It is considered by Siemens, that it is unlikely that the EIRENE compliant software for handsets would be altered for such a small market as the UK, because it has been written to SIL2 standards and the costs would be difficult to justify. Various other methods of entering the required information would have to be investigated which would require technical modifications and changes to procedures. Other potential problems include poor reception for mobiles within vehicles, particularly if they have metallised
windows. Experiments have shown that these can reduce the field strength by 30-35 dB in some cases. This would appear to be a function of the physical system layout, which requires the base stations to transmit in cells along the length of the track. This causes the transmissions to have a glancing incidence on the metal sides of the vehicle for large sections of the track. This is potentially the worst case scenario for mobile reception internal to the vehicle, and the metallisation of windows only makes this worse. Therefore it may be necessary to investigate the use of signal boosting equipment to ensure a reasonable level of service. One issue to be aware of is that not all mobile radios are able to make emergency calls. The General-Purpose Radio (GPR) mobile specification only requires emergency call transmit and receive to be optional in this class of mobile. Therefore care has to be taken when specifying the type of mobile required for on board use. 4.1.7. OTHER MANUFACTURERS There are many other communication system manufacturers that may have an input to the GSM-R project, some already having participated in GSM-R trials. Nokia and Ericsson both manufacture mobile handsets, these are basically enhanced mobile phones. The EIRENE specification and manufacturing economies of scale dictate that it is unlikely that the handsets would vary much in specification and function. Sagem, a French company, also produce handsets and are suppliers for Swedish railways. Kapsch are both manufacturers of GSM-R equipment and train borne systems. They are also a company that Siemens use for some of their on-train hardware requirements. 4.1.8. INDUSTRY REPORTS Several GSM-R related industry reports were reviewed to determine whether they could supply any useful information on the areas of interest with respect to the recommendations or, whether they would have an impact on their implementation. Although the reports provided a broad spectrum of rail communication study, ranging from the Railtrack DART project in the late eighties to the new (as yet unpublished GE/RT 8080,
GE/RT8081) group standards, no major insights into the LRGI/1 areas of interest were evident. 4.1.9. GSM-R SUMMARY All three LRGI/1 recommendations being considered could be technically implemented via GSM-R. Recommendation 87: Remote broadcasting is possible through GSM-R as there will be a dedicated functional address reserved for it, in line with the requirement of the EIRENE specifications. Basically this entails using the radios Functional Addressing facility which can allow a PA system or individual mobiles to be configured as an extension to the cab radio. Provided that a voice PA system already existed on a train, only an interface between GSM-R and the PA system would need to be developed. Recommendation 85: Passenger to signaller communication could be achieved via GSM-R by using either, a spare functional address or the UIC intercom facility that would normally be used for communication between the guard (or other train crew) and the driver. However, although GSM-R could be used as the bearer for this facility, research would be required to determine details of the actual passenger alarm/call system hardware. Note the development of such hardware would be required irrespective of the technical solution/equipment chosen to implement such a facility. Recommendation 86: GSM-R mobiles can be used in a similar manner to public GSM mobiles so the supply of a roaming communications system that could be used by the train crew should be very simple. This system would even work when vehicles are separated as the mobile units simply act as a mobile phone either on the GSM-R network or, as a fall back, on the public GSM network. Unlike "remote broadcasting", "passenger to signaller" and roaming communications are not facilities that are intended to be transmitted via GSM-R. Other major concerns highlighted in relation to "roaming" communication were the lack of RF coverage and the difficulties that would be experienced correlating mobile handsets to a specific train set. For GSM-R to provide this facility a functional address may need to be allocated for it and major issues associated with alphanumeric running numbers overcome.
4.2.
OTHER METHODS Although GSM-R could potentially deliver recommendations 85, 86 and 87, other systems that could be used in conjunction with GSM-R had to be explored to ensure that the optimum level of benefit would be gained. Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcasting) is already available from GSM-R (without system enhancement) and as such does not warrant further direct research in relation to other methods. However, if this function is found to be easily obtainable from another system that provided recommendations 85 and 86, it could be considered as an additional feature, which would be useful in the event of an incident, where the function of GSM-R is lost. To document the requirement of a "roaming" communication and a "passenger to signaller" system a specification was produced. It should be noted here that Lord Cullens recommendation 85 specifically refers to passenger to signaller communication on driver only trains and that roaming communications would have limited use on such vehicles. Consequently a single system providing both functions is unlikely to be used in its entirety. However as the technology used to create the two systems would have similarities they were grouped in one specification for the purpose of this study. Using this specification as a platform for discussion a sample of three known railway accredited radio system suppliers were approached to determine the possibility and cost of developing suitable systems. 4.2.1. SUPPLIER A Supplier A is an established communication system manufacturer focussing heavily on the provision of advanced audio communications equipment. They also have considerable knowledge in safety systems having previously designed, manufactured and commissioned the PA system for the Channel Tunnel. Currently they have no specific communication system that satisfies the LGRI recommendations. However when approached they were already actively reviewing all three recommendations with a view of developing a suitable audio communication system based on existing equipment and their extensive knowledge of GSM technologies. Having reviewed the specification they produced a comprehensive report, documenting their views on the Cullen recommendations. In line with their own study, the report
actually reviews all three recommendations not just 85 and 86 considered in our own specification. Their report initially looks at current communication practices used on rail vehicles within the UK with respect to the recommendations. It then documents various technical solutions for each recommendation as summarised below. Recommendation 85 (Passenger to Signaller) A telephone (or hands free) device in each carriage, as recommended by LGRI/1, can be achieved this will require a "communications control unit" in each car. Use of existing passenger communication devices may be more logical and cost effective this will require a "communications control unit" in every cab (or every few coaches). This solution would not comply with the need to operate un-coupled. Passengers using their own telephone to call an "emergency number", the number to be at a national or TOC control centre. There is a strong case for this solution as the communications system is already available. Recommendation 86 (Roaming) It is assumed that this recommendation cannot be applied to driver only trains as the driver cannot "roam". Licensed radio (higher power) will present problems in respect of approvals, since a train is not a fixed site. Only low power (license exempt) systems are considered. Traditional radio microphones have been considered, this technology is proven in a railway (platform environment), but is limited to PA operation only. A specialised DECT talk-back system has been considered, an investigation is needed on radio propagation and interaction between base-stations. A DECT telephone system has been considered, but there are concerns about the ongoing availability of this technology. Recommendation 87 (Remote Broadcast) Supplier A recognise that GSM-R will provide a "remote broadcast" facility and although they consider existing commercial GSM as an alternative solution it is not recognised as a viable option and as such is not considered further within this study.
Their report concludes with the proposal of two possible options. Option 1 is a fully compliant system and option 2 is aimed at demonstrating how costs can be reduced if the requirement to operate "de-coupled" is relaxed. Option two will permit operation if there is a single break in the train wires, but it assumes that the power system will be maintained. 4.2.1.1.Option 1 (Communications control unit per car) The proposals for option 1 are intended to provide full compliance, but this necessitates new equipment in each carriage. This proposal makes the assumption that it is not practical to enhance the resilience of existing on-train power supplies, and that there may be multiple failures of the train wires due to uncoupling. This proposal is therefore an emergency communications package that, in an emergency, is independent of existing on train equipment. However, it will interface with the existing audio communication train wires, providing additional communications facilities for normal operational use. The system comprises of the following parts: Communication Control Unit (CCU) housing the electronics, horn loudspeaker and batteries. GPS antennae (fitted to driver only trains). GSM antenna. Remote loudspeaker a second loudspeaker to be installed at the other end of the car. Passenger Emergency Communications Units (PECU) (fitted to Driver Only trains) one at each body end. DECT base-station (not fitted on driver only trains) DECT belt pack storage cabinet and charger system (this may be on the train or in a crew office). Option 1 is illustrated on the following page.
38 39 40
Through train wires (wire numbers are for an EMU) GSM GPS
DECT basestation Communications Control Unit (CCU)
Passenger Emergency Communication Units (PECU)
110V 12V 12Ahr
0V
Remote LS
CCU +LS & DECT
Remote horn loudspeaker (LS)
Plan view of each carriage for Option 1
Option 1 System Descriptions The PECU (emergency telephone, rec. 85) The PECU shall be a distinctive unit, with a standardised style and colour thus recognisable by the public. Appropriate labels shall be fitted, with instructions for use. When the alarm button was pressed, the GSM modem immediately sends an SMS (text) message Latitude, Longitude, Speed, Heading, time (UTC), PECU (1 or 2) and originating number. Once the SMS has been sent (within a few seconds), the GSM modem is made to set up a voice call to the control centre. The control centre HMI shall associate the SMS data to a map location; a drop down window allows the control centre to manually acknowledge (causing the DTMF signal to be sent). The control centre can decide whether to communicate, or can simply monitor audio activity from the carriage. The call shall be cleared and the alarm reset under the following conditions: The control centre sends the appropriate command. The GSM link is lost (a repeating confidence tone may be required to validate the link). Communication with the passenger shall be full duplex, with high stability due to application of adaptive echo cancelling hands-free technology. DECT Communication System (Roaming Microphone, rec. 86) The belt pack may be worn on the belt or within a jacket pocket (subject to size). The head/lapel microphone/earpiece is connected to the belt pack. There are three buttons on the belt pack, namely: Crewcom Normal PA Emergency PA The Emergency PA button shall be distinct from the other buttons to avoid accidental operation. For the purpose of registration to a particular base-station, the belt pack has an LED and flying lead connector (normally stowed). Registration is not required unless the unit is moved from the train unit.
When the CREWCOM button is held operated, the users speech shall be broadcast as a radio signal from the local base-station. Furthermore, if the train speech pair is available the signal is sent through the train to all other base-stations where it is relayed and transmitted to any other belt pack user. The same process will take place if the call is a CREWCOM from the fixed existing equipment in each cab. The system will allow communication to be heard from any on train staff with their CREWCOM button pressed. All on train users, including those with handsets in the cabs, will be able to monitor the CREWCOM conversations. When the "Normal PA" button is held operated, the CCU shall record the users speech. When the "Normal PA" button is released, the recorded speech is played back over the train PA system. This announcement is not played over the horn loudspeakers, unless the power to the saloon receiving amplifiers (existing PA) is no longer present whereupon the CCU horns are enabled. When the "Emergency PA" button is held operated, the users speech shall be recorded by the CCU. When the "Emergency PA" button is released, the recorded speech is played back over the train PA system, and is then repeated once. This announcement is played over the horn loudspeakers of the local CCU. Elsewhere in the train it is played twice over the normal loudspeakers, unless the power to the saloon receiving amplifiers (existing PA) is no longer present whereupon the CCU horns are enabled. Note Emergency PA speech is at a higher level (approx. 5dB) when compared to normal PA. 4.2.1.2.Option 2 (Limited compliance, lower cost) The proposals for option 2 will use much of the same technology described for option 1, with the following fundamental changes: Option 2 is non-compliant in respect of continued operation on an un-coupled train. The CCU does not have its own battery, it requires a secure supply from the train battery along with the existing train PA system. The CCU does not have its own integral emergency PA system no horn speakers.
There are fewer CCUs. Typically one per cab vehicle in DMU/ EMUs. The actual number will depend on the propagation of the roaming communications belt pack.
In option 2, the system comprises the following parts: Communication Control Unit (CCU) housing the electronics GPS antenna (Driver only trains) GSM antenna (may be mounted on the CCU) DECT base station (not fitted on Driver only trains) DECT belt pack storage/ charger cabinet (not required on Driver only trains) The general arrangement for a 3 car EMU is illustrated on the following page. A similar arrangement would be used for 2/3/4 car EMUs and DMUs, subject to the operating range of the DECT communication system. In the case of coaching stock, the system would be separated into different areas of the train, for example: First class Buffet (central coaches) Standard Class Option 2 System Description The description of option 2 is similar to option 1 with the following exceptions. The horn loud speaker systems do not apply. When a PASCOM button is operated, a signal (110V) shall be provided in each cab (or wherever the CCU is located). This will necessitate some vehicle wiring and system change, as the signal is presently only available in the active cab. The CCUs will call the TOC control centre, where communication will be monitored/ recorded. If the call is not dealt with by train crew/driver, the TOC control centre can deal with the call themselves. There are fewer base-stations. The radio coverage range will be a factor determining how many CCUs are to be fitted. In respect of coaching stock, the FM communication system would not be interfaced to the DECT system. Furthermore, it is doubtful that a DECT belt pack would communicate from the cab to the coachs base-station. Option 2 is illustrated on the following page
38 39
40
GSM GPS GPS
GSM
DECT basestation 110V 0V
Communications Control Unit (CCU)
DECT basestation
Communications Control Unit (CCU)

CACU (Transmitting Amp ) Drivers desk PASCOM alarm SACU (Receiving Amplifier) SACU (Receiving Amplifier) PECU's PECU's
110V 0V
CACU (Transmitting Amp ) Drivers desk
PASCOM alarm
SACU (Receiving Amplifier)
PECU's
Driving car
Driving car
4.2.2. SUPPLIER B Supplier B have designed and manufactured a broad range of audio communication products. They have considerable knowledge with communication, information and multimedia systems supplying both military and domestic organisations with advanced systems. They possess extensive railway application knowledge and are involved in the fitment of the Train Protection Warning System (TPWS) on to the Railtrack network. They believe that their On Train Communication System (OTCS) would provide a roaming communications system inclusive of: Passenger emergency points. Train public address system. On train and signalling staff communications. Core System Architecture
The system is based on the industry standard Ethernet (IEEE 802,2 10Base-T 10Mbits/s), the communications protocol, being based on the TCP/IP standards are the basis for the world-wide Internet networks. Originally developed for military applications these protocols were adapted to the Internet and are now finding there way into almost all industrial and commercial networkbased systems. The modular design facilitates low cost entry-level systems, which can be easily expanded to meet specific customer requirements
and technological changes. In the case of retrofit trains the Thales system would link into an existing PA system. Further work outside of the core system would be required to meet additional Cullen report recommendations. i.e. Automatic Emergency Communications via Train Radio. Passenger to Signaller (recommendation 85). Signaller to Train PA (recommendation 87). Emergency Services to Train PA. UPS per Carriage. It is envisaged that in an emergency scenario stand alone operation will be achieved in such a way that if the data link from the system server is lost, the wireless handset will communicate with a WLAN point in the carriage and transmit a message over the PA. The handsets will communicate with any active WLAN within range. The system power would be via an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) located in each carriage. The OTCS could be interfaced with existing systems as shown below:
The Control Console would require an input line (see diagram, labelled "Active") to indicate that an incoming call has been received. The Control Console would also require an input line (see diagram, labelled Drive Active Signal) to indicate whether to route the incoming audio to the driver or to the PA system. The main advantages associated with the OTCS are its flexibility and upgrade potential, offering other benefits beyond the safety benefits being considered in this study. Dependent upon the requirements of individual train operators and the commercial
implications imposed the system could provide the following features. Audio and visual advertising. Passenger and entertainment systems. Real-time passenger information. Passenger Internet access. Data and video logger interfaces. Automated digital voice annunciation to passengers. Audio communication with mobile handsets (on Train). Passenger information displays, destination display and train number display. CCTV interfaces, with surveillance cameras. Platform to cab video interface. 4.2.3. SUPPLIER C Supplier C were approached following promising feedback from Norwegian State Railways (NSB). Supplier C currently have no radio systems in operation within the UK rail industry however by 2003 the majority of NSBs rolling stock will be fitted with their RailCom system. RailCom is a wireless radio system fitted to individual train sets. Basically it is a local radio network specific to an individual train set, which performs or could perform the LGRI/1 recommendations. The RailCom system primarily uses standard products that are adapted using specially developed software and interfaces. The advantage of this approach is that separate functions in the system are modular and can therefore can be replaced and/or upgraded without having to make alterations to the entire system. Interfaces with established communication channels, such as GSM, GPRS, Wireless LAN, digital mobile radio, TETRA and GSM-R are available. The RailCom system basically consists of two separate elements, the Train Wireless Access Concentrator (TWAC), based at the signalling centre and the RailCom Guard Radio, based on the train.
The Train Wireless Access Concentrator links the train number and the communication system on the train. It consists of a database that keeps track of all trains in operation on a day to day basis. If you call the database and enter the train number, the database identifies the train and patches your call through to the communication system on that train. This provides a simple and reliable means of establishing contact with the train driver or guard on any train. The RailCom Guard Radio is based on wireless internal network throughout the train; every train has its own communications base. By using functional handsets train personnel can communicate with each other, even in areas not covered by other mobile networks e.g. tunnels. The handsets can also be used to communicate to the passengers via a loud speaker system. The communication system is also capable of connecting to commercial mobile networks and transmitting text messages. The RailCom system does, in part, satisfy the three LGRI/1 recommendations by providing the following features. Crew to crew communication. Crew to PA communication.
Crew to signaller communication. Signaller to crew communication.
Although remote broadcasting and passenger to signaller communication are not currently provided the fundamental elements required are already in place. As with GSM-R the key piece of hardware required is a passenger interface unit. The roaming communications function (crew to crew) is independent of a shore based radio network and as such could operate in the event of an incident irrespective of vehicle location. However, the RailCom system would not function in its entirety should the vehicles become separated. To overcome this Supplier C propose to evaluate the possibility of fitting a communication control hub in each vehicle, treating each as an individual system linked via the train number. Although technically possible this approach would be expensive suggesting that the RailCom system would not be a viable collision resistant option. Supplier C agreed to review their RailCom system in relation to the "roaming" communication and "passenger to signaller" system specification, to ascertain the need for any further enhancement. The aim of their review was to provide a cost for any further development required along with an indicative equipment cost. Although Supplier C have responded to the specification clause by clause they have not to date been able to provide any indicative costs. This is mainly due to their lack of previous communication experience within the UK rail market, as such they have little experience with the relevant UK specifications and have found it time consuming to translate and analyse them. The requirements of the UK standards could have a considerable effect on the outcome of their product; subsequently they are not willing to provide any costs without obtaining a full understanding of the UK rail environment.
5.
BENEFITS
5.1. ASSESSMENT METHODS The approach taken to the assessment of the benefits was initially qualitative rather than quantitative. The first stage was to consider what kinds of operational benefit could be anticipated. The assessment method used was a discussion meeting involving Interfleet staff and representatives of train operating companies. A structured discussion was held based on the detailed consideration of the following theoretical scenarios: 1. A major incident (involving severe damage to vehicles, and fatalities). 2. A minor incident (similar to the above but with minor damage and no fatalities). 3. Fire and/or smoke on a train. 4. Passenger emergency (e.g. medical problem or criminal activity). 5. Driver incapacitated. 6. Evacuation of a train. 7. Stranded train (possibly not requiring evacuation). For each scenario, the first activity undertaken was to agree on its likely characteristics. This took into account the differences between DOO and non-DOO trains. Next, an attempt was made to identify the main actions undertaken by train crew in the immediate aftermath of the incident, with particular focus on communication-related activities. For each communication activity, the likely persons who could be involved were identified, along with the possible means of communication available to them. This covered both the officially approved communication chain and also the unofficial methods that are likely to arise in practice. This was then repeated, but with the assumption that the LGRI/1 recommendations had been implemented. In some cases it was agreed that the recommendation functionality would make little difference. However, in other situations it was found that the recommendations provided new and improved methods for train crew to communicate, and sometimes that they also provided opportunities for passengers to become involved in communication. The outcomes of the meeting were recorded in a structured format and were then discussed further with representatives of the operational staff of different levels within various train operators.
To ensure that the assessment considered the scenarios from the perspective of the Emergency Services the British Transport Police (BTP) were also consulted. Having obtained a good qualitative understanding of the potential benefits, the next stage was to attempt to quantify the findings. To accurately estimate the value, in terms of equivalent fatalities prevented, of each recommendation was considered to be a major task beyond the scope of the current remit. However, it was felt that an indicative first approximation might be obtained by reference to the Railway Safety Risk Profile Bulletin (SP-RSK-3.1.3.11 Issue 2). The usefulness of the Risk Profile Bulletin is limited for this exercise because the number of fatalities due to inadequate communications is not specifically identified as a category. In addition, incidents relating to driver only trains are not specifically identified. It is also very difficult to estimate how many of the existing numbers of fatalities might be prevented by the adoption of the recommendations. The approach taken was to deliberately over-estimating the benefit of each recommendation. This gives an approximate upper estimate of the benefits for each system and provides a basis for further study and refinement. 5.2. RECOMMENDATION 85: PASSENGER TO SIGNALLER COMMUNICATIONS FOR DOO 5.2.1. SAFETY BENEFITS AND DISBENEFITS A passenger to signaller communication system offers the potential for passengers to inform the signaller, about a hazardous incident if it is found that the driver is incapacitated. The system is proposed for DOO trains only, on the basis that a conductor would be likely to survive in an incident that left the driver incapacitated. There are only a limited number of scenarios in which drivers become incapacitated. These include medical emergencies, penetration of the cab windows by missiles, and head-on collisions. In all but head-on collisions, the passenger to signaller communication system would provide no greater benefits than the existing DSD alert system, which is fitted to all driver-only trains. This informs the signaller automatically via the cab secure radio if the driver fails to operate the DSD pedal. Consequently, the benefits of passenger to signaller communication systems are limited to collision scenarios.
In all recent serious collisions, passengers have been able to use mobile phones to contact the emergency services. This could be used as a reason not to implement a dedicated passenger to signaller communication system. However, communication by GSM phone may not be possible at all points on the railway network. An example is the incident that occurred at Branchton near Glasgow in June 1994. In this case a train was derailed in a cutting; killing the driver and destroying the cab secure radio. The signalling centre was unaware that a collision had occurred, the only indication being that a short circuit had occurred on the traction supply. Emergency services subsequently experienced difficulty in finding the train. If this incident were to recur today, it is considered likely that its location (in a deep cutting) would have blocked mobile phone reception, preventing passengers raising the alarm using their own phones. CSR coverage would have been present (as will GSM-R in the future), but the key issue is that this coverage could not be taken advantage of because both the driver and the radio were incapacitated. Notably, the train involved at Branchton was not a DOO train. The effects of shock made the guard unable to offer assistance. This suggests that the benefits of a passenger to signaller communication system need not always be limited to DOO trains. The benefits of passenger to signaller communications are very difficult to quantify because they are strongly dependant on human factors issues which are outside of the scope of this survey. Some examples of uncertainty over human factor issues are as follows: It is difficult to predict whether passengers in an incident would actually use such devices. They could be ignored, or create confusion. It is unclear as to whether passengers would be able to offer any useful additional information to the signaller. Would multiple calls be generated in an incident, and would these form a distraction to signallers?
These uncertainties need to be addressed by a formal human factors study. This could possibly draw on the experience of Midland Metro where relevant. The BTPs representative commented that multiple calls to the emergency services are the norm for any incidents which occur in built up areas, and that additional calls would probably not make any difference to the speed of response. However, for incidents in rural areas the contribution of passengers might be more significant. This lends further weight to the Branchton evidence that passenger-signaller communication could be of benefit for non-DOO trains.
5.2.2. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT The Risk Profile Bulletin is particularly difficult to apply in the case of passenger to signaller communication. It does not separately identify fatalities arising on DOO trains, nor does it specifically identify any situations in which passenger to signaller communications might be considered a critical factor. The approach taken has therefore been to work with the existing data, constructing a simple event tree based on a large number of assumptions and approximations. The principal benefits of a passenger to signaller communication system apply to DOO trains where the driver has become incapacitated. Under these circumstances the system would have the following potential benefits, (assuming that the equipment survives the initial impact): 1. Prevention of a multiple collision should a DOO train become foul of another running line. 2. Once the signaller has been made aware of the incident, it also has the potential to prevent or limit uncontrolled evacuation of the vehicles if used in conjunction with remote broadcasting (already present on DOO routes). 3. Improvement in speed and scale of response of emergency services. The Risk Profile Bulletin lists the following hazardous events that might lead to a train becoming foul of an adjacent line: HET 1 HET 2 HET 10 HET 12 Collision between two passenger trains. Collision between a passenger train and freight train. Collision with a passenger train and a road vehicle. Derailment of a passenger train.
Should any of these events occur, the risk model shows that fatalities are likely to occur. For the purposes of this analysis, it may be assumed that the passenger to signaller communication system will not make any contribution to preventing these fatalities. The benefit of the system can be modelled by considering its ability to prevent further consequential fatalities due to other trains becoming involved in the collision or due to uncontrolled passenger evacuations. A table was constucted showing the probability of each of these events occurring and the estimated probability of the train driver becoming incapacitated.
It is assumed (on the basis of a crude first approximation only) that 50% of these events take place on DOO trains. Not all of the events will leave the vehicles foul of the adjacent track. The example event tree given in the Risk Profile estimates the probability of the adjacent track being blocked as 0.125, and the probability of subsequent collision with another train as 0.1. Hence for all the events which result in a major incident on a DOO train where the driver is incapacitated, there is a 1.25% chance of a collision occurring with a vehicle on an adjacent line. In this situation, it is assumed that a collision with another passenger train occurs (HET 1) and that an uncontrolled evacuation takes place (HEM 1 uncontrolled). By contrast, it is assumed that the fitment of a passenger to signaller communication system would always result in a controlled evacuation and no collision with a train on adjacent lines. By tablulating the various possible outcomes and the number of equivalent fatalities it was found that there is the potential to prevent approximately 0.075 equivalent fatalities per year. It should be noted that this figure is likely to be an upper estimate of the benefits due to the approximate method used. 5.2.3. OTHER BENEFITS The proposed system has no significant commercial or operational benefits. In this respect it differs from the roaming communications and remote broadcasting proposals. 5.2.4. DISBENEFITS In addition to the uncertainties over human factors discussed above, a number of potentially serious disbenefits can be cited for this type of system. The main concerns are as follows: There is potential for abuse. There is also potential for deliberately misleading calls. Calls could themselves constitute a distraction to signalling staff. If passengers are able to communicate directly with the signaller, then the existing train crew are being bypassed and would have no knowledge of the communication having taken place. Information provided by passengers may not be particularly valuable, or may be inaccurate.
The question of abuse is raised based on the understanding that the existing Passenger Communication Alarms (PCA) are regularly abused by passengers. However, a reliable figure for the actual frequency of this occurring is regrettably not available.
The BTP felt that the potential for abuse was serious, and that the design ought to try to prevent abuse as far as possible It was thought that, to prevent multiple calls and nuisance calls, it would be necessary to route all communication via the driver first. This would have the additional benefit of allowing the majority of genuine calls to be dealt with by the on-train staff, and prevents the possibility of emergency calls taking place without the train crew being aware. The counter-argument to this proposal is that the driver would be subject to additional distraction. However, this is not a valid claim because the PCA systems on all modern rolling stock already involve passenger to driver verbal communication. The provision of a divert system to pass calls on to the signaller in the event of driver incapacity does not affect the base level of distraction which takes place already. A second method for dealing with abusive calls would be to route all calls to the Train Operators route control centre rather than directly to the signallers. This has the benefit of minimal distraction to the signallers, and also minimises the number of locations, which need to be equipped to deal with passenger calls. The staff at the control centre would be able to quickly advise the appropriate signal box along the route if they judged that the call was genuine. The principal disadvantage of the use of a separate control room is that an additional stage is introduced into the communications chain. In addition, a GPS facility would be required on the vehicles to advise the control centre of the vehicles location. 5.2.5. WHERE BENEFITS COULD BE ACHIEVED The concerns over abuse can be dealt with practically by linking the system to the existing Passenger Communication Alarm (PCA). This would avoid the installation of a potentially confusing additional emergency handle, and would ensure that no communication can take place between the signaller and the passengers without the drivers knowledge. Calls to the driver on the PCA would be redirected to the signalling centre after a set period of time if unanswered. The signalling centre would be aware of the origin of the call because the both Cab Secure Radio system and GSM-R provide a function to uniquely identify which train is calling. For this system to be effective, the drivers radio would need to be protected in the event of a collision. Currently, radios are not protected and are likely to become damaged in a collision. However, the introduction of GSM-R offers the opportunity to correct this weakness. Protection of radios also offers benefits in respect of Recommendation 87,
remote broadcast. GSM-R cab equipment already offers the possibility of physically separating the main bulk of the equipment from the control panel, allowing it to be placed in a less vulnerable location. Additional hardware would be required in order to interface with the PCA system. However this is not likely to be complex, and in any case interfacing methods are already going to be necessary in order to link the radio to systems such as the PA (for remote broadcast) and the DSD (for the DSD alert system). A PCA-based system could therefore be installed on all vehicles that already feature voice based PCA systems, whenever the vehicles are upgraded to GSM-R. This fitment need not be limited to DOO trains. However, the concern over bypassing the authority of train crew raises the need to consider further whether the system would be appropriate for nonDOO type operation. For maximum flexibility in the deployment of rolling stock, it may be appropriate to provide an isolation switch which can be used to deselect the transfer to signaller function on non-DOO services. The following fleets are known to have voice-based PCA systems and would therefore be suitable for the fitment of this upgrade when equipped with GSM-R: Class 168/170 Class 175/180 Class 220/221 Class 332/333 Class 334/458/460 Class 365 Class 357/375/377 Class 373 Class 390 Any classes entering service after those listed above.
Older rolling stock could not be fitted with this type of system without first installing a voice-based PCA system. This would add substantially to the cost of fitment. In practice this would exclude a substantial part of the existing DOO-capable rolling stock such as Class 455 and 319. Studies on the feasibility of retrofitting voice based passenger communication systems to these classes would therefore be required. The main disadvantage of a PCA-based passenger to signaller communication system is its reliance on trainwires and hence vulnerability in the event of vehicles becoming de-coupled. A potential solution to this problem would be the replacement of existing PCA units with GSMequipped modules capable of connecting directly with the signaller if the
driver does not respond or if the trainwires are broken. No such units currently exist, and so an extensive design and development programme would be needed to prove the concept. The final cost per unit is likely to be relatively high due to its complexity. The above discussion assumes the use of public GSM to carry the signals, as Railtracks policy on GSM-R opposes this type of use of the network. Railtracks view is that it does not believe that sufficient capacity will be available. 5.3. RECOMMENDATION 86A: ROAMING COMMUNICATIONS (INCLUDING PA ACCESS) Recommendation 86 of the Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry proposed that non-DOO trains be provided with a roaming communication system for train-crew. (Note that the other part of recommendation 86 is dealt with separately as recommendation 86b, in section 5.4.). Discussions with representatives of train operating companies at both managerial and operational levels revealed a strong belief that roaming, or wireless communication systems allow train crew to carry out their duties in a more flexible and effective manner. This increased flexibility is achieved in two main ways as follows: PA announcements may be made from any location within or near to the train. Staff may liaise with one another and with the driver whilst in any location within or near to the train, and in parallel with other duties where appropriate.
This flexibility gives rise to several safety benefits and also a wide range of other benefits. During discussions on the subject of evacuation, the point was raised that there is no way of addressing passengers as a group once they leave the train. It was thought that the provision of a simple loudhailer as part of the trains emergency equipment could be a practical way to address this problem. The representative of the BTP commented that this option might be worthy of further consideration. 5.3.1. SAFETY BENEFITS Most types of incident require the train crew to give advice to passengers. Accurate and timely information leads to safety benefits because passengers are less likely to become confused or frustrated, and hence are less likely to inadvertently put themselves at risk. A roaming communication system would allow staff to be much more effective at this role. For example, a conductor would be able to make PA announcements
at the same time as carrying out protection of line duties, thus potentially avoiding leaving passengers alone for an extended period of time. In those incidents that require the evacuation of passengers, the improved teamwork made possible by a roaming system is likely to be very useful. For example, the system would allow one member of the train crew to stand in a good vantage point when making PA announcements, whilst another member of the crew assists passengers. In major incidents, maximum benefit would be achieved if the system can withstand vehicles becoming uncoupled - see section 5.4. The usefulness of any system would increase slightly with increasing length of train and number of train crew. However, some other factors need to be taken into account: Some newer trains, such as the IC225 and Class 373 fleets, have PA and driver/guard access points in every carriage. This decreases the need for the roaming handsets. However, it is interesting to note that the operators of both these fleets have independently introduced roaming communication facilities in addition to the fixed handsets. In a single-car train (e.g. Class 153), roaming communications may appear to be of less benefit than in longer trains. However, they would still offer some benefits because they would allow the conductor to make announcements from outside of the train if the need arose.
It is very difficult to put a value on these safety benefits, because it is hard to estimate how many fatalities or injuries might be prevented in incidents purely because of better communications. In common with the passenger to signaller communications (see 5.2.1 above), human factors considerations are likely to bear heavily on the benefits obtained. Examples of uncertainty over how human factors would affect the benefits include the following: To what extent do passengers pay attention to announcements given in emergency situations? Are staff likely to be able to make clear announcements in an emergency, even if the equipment is available? Is there a risk that announcements could be misleading? Would staff prefer to use the roaming equipment?
Subjectively, and through discussion with train operators, it is felt that the potential benefits offered by roaming communications are likely to be worthwhile and that studies aimed at resolving the above uncertainties
would be worth pursuing. It is likely that experience from other transport industries could be used. The attitude of the BTP towards the idea of roaming communication was positive. The emergency services are introducing the Airwave system, which is based on TETRA technology. However, it is thought that there is no need to make the train-based roaming system compatible with Airwave. 5.3.2. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT A quantitative assessment using the Railway Safety Risk Profile can be based on the hazardous event HEM 1, which considers evacuation of trains. Although roaming communications would be useful in many other situations, train evacuation is the only relevant situation for which figures are provided. The "risk profile" identifies numbers of equivalent fatalities per year for controlled and uncontrolled evacuations from stopped trains. As might be expected, the number of equivalent fatalities is higher in the case of uncontrolled evacuations. It can be assumed for the purposes of this calculation that the availability of roaming communications equipment would help to ensure that train evacuations would take place in a controlled manner. This would include not only evacuations from stopped trains, but also evacuations following other incidents such as collisions and derailments. It is assumed that roaming communications could enable staff to improve the proportion of evacuations classified as controlled evacuations, hence reducing the risk. As an initial approximation, a figure of 50% is used. Calculations made showed that approximately 0.49 equivalent fatalities per year could be prevented by the use of roaming communications. It should be noted that this figure is likely to be an upper estimate due to the approximate method used. 5.3.3. OTHER BENEFITS Improved teamwork and flexibility allows the staff to carry out their customer care duties more effectively. In addition, time saved in walking back to the PA transmitter implies that more time will be available for other duties. In Norway, one of the major benefits of the Telenor system is for use in train dispatching on curved platforms, where the guard is able to instruct the driver to close the train doors whilst standing in a suitable vantage point.
If the roaming communications system is used regularly for non-safety related activities, then staff will be more familiar with it and more proficient in its use during emergencies. This is considered to be an important point. In common with the safety benefits detailed above, it is very difficult to put a value on these non-safety benefits. It is expected that individual train operators would be able to make their own value judgements. However, it should be noted that two UK train operators (GNER and Eurostar) have already adopted roaming communications, (crew to crew - not to driver). 5.3.4. DISBENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS There may be a risk of feedback occurring when using the roaming handset to make a PA announcement from within the train. This may limit its flexibility, and require the retention of some fixed transmitters. A possible solution is the use of store and forward technology. Control methods will need to be introduced with regard to issue of handsets, charging and storage of handsets, and maintenance. Issues such as EMC will need to be addressed. Public concern over health risks associated with the use of GSM phones may need to be addressed if a GSM-based system is adopted. The use of window films to block mobile phone transmissions (currently used on some fleets) may prevent handsets from being used outside of the train.
5.4.
RECOMMENDATION 86B: COLLISION RESISTANT PA SYSTEMS A second part of recommendation 86 is the provision of a PA system, which can resist de-coupling of vehicles. Such a system would have been potentially useful in an incident such as Hatfield, in which the train was separated into two generally intact portions. Had the PA system not failed, evacuation of the passengers could have been made easier and the level of panic may have been reduced. In theory, it may still be possible to make PA announcements to each part of the train separately. However, in practice the damaged cables may have short-circuited making this impossible. In any case, separate use of the PA system is likely to be inconvenient, difficult to co-ordinate and dependent on the presence of at least two members of staff. 5.4.1. SAFETY BENEFITS The provision of a collision-resistant PA system is likely to be of benefit only in major accidents such as high-speed derailments, especially when vehicles fall onto their sides. In the event of this level of severity, there may
be other factors, which cause a PA system to stop working aside from the possibility of severed control cables. These include: Failed amplifiers due to power surges. Failed battery supply due to loss of electrolyte when the vehicle has rolled over. Disconnected loudspeakers due to ceilings collapsing.
It would be technically possible to create a system with the capability to cope with all of the above factors, but inevitably this would increase the development cost. It is not possible at this stage to estimate what quality of broadcast could be achieved by such a system in real-life accident scenarios. Human factors will be highly relevant, because if a vehicle is very badly damaged it is likely that any passengers who are able to move would leave of their own accord, irrespective of any announcements. Other events are also likely to happen e.g. track circuits may turn all local signals to danger, multiple calls will be made to the emergency services via public GSM mobiles, the guard as well as the driver may be incapacitated. All of these would limit the need of an operational PA system in such a scenario. The simplest solution would be to adopt a development of the Railcom system. In principle, the central communications hub would receive PA transmissions from wireless handsets, and pass these on via a wireless LAN (Local Area Network) to receivers and loudspeakers in each of the coaches. However, the central hub in this system is relatively large and vulnerable. For this reason, Norwegian Railways have chosen to situate it at the centre of their trains in a guards compartment, a location that is both collisionresistant and convenient for staff access. The most similar equivalent location on the existing UK trains would be the buffet car. However, in the Hatfield incident the buffet car was severely damaged. The Railcom equipment would possibly have failed in this scenario, and hence the PA throughout the train would have been unavailable. Supplier C have undertaken to consider how their system could be adapted to cope with such a situation. It is anticipated that the solution will be the provision of multiple hubs. Clearly this will increase the cost of the system. It can be seen from the above discussion that the benefits of a collisionresistant PA system are quite limited in scope. However, the following quantitative assessment attempts to estimate a figure for number of fatalities prevented.
5.4.2. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT The benefit of a collision-resistant PA system is that it makes it more likely that evacuation will take place in a controlled fashion after a major incident. The approach taken to the calculation is similar to that employed for roaming communication, but only those incidents, which might lead to vehicles becoming de-coupled, have been considered. A detailed assessment showed that approximately 0.76 equivalent fatalities per year could be prevented by adopting this recommendation. However, this is an optimistic assessment because it assumes that vehicles become de-coupled in every instance of collision or derailment. It would be conservative to estimate that at least 75% of incidents do not result in vehicles becoming de-coupled. This reduces the number of equivalent fatalities prevented per year to 0.035. 5.4.3. OTHER BENEFITS There are no non-safety benefits associated with collision resistant PA systems. 5.4.4. WHERE BENEFITS COULD BE ACHIEVED Collision-resistant PA systems would be applicable to all passenger rolling stock, except articulated trains such as Class 373 where de-coupling of the vehicles would be much less likely to occur. 5.5. RECOMMENDATION 87: REMOTE BROADCAST A remote broadcast facility is already fitted to all DOO trains as part of the Cab Secure Radio (CSR) system as required by GO/RT3271. However, such facilities are not generally available on non-DOO trains. These trains are usually fitted with the older National Radio Network (NRN) radios, which cannot provide remote broadcast. Some non-DOO trains are equipped with Cab Secure Radios for operation in regions that have CSR coverage, but a remote broadcast facility is not required by Group Standards and hence is not necessarily provided. Both the NRN and CSR systems will be replaced by GSM-R. This has the capability to provide remote broadcasting to the whole network at marginal cost. Railtracks policy is that non-DOO Train Operators will have the option of deciding whether they require the facility. The link between the GSM-R radio and the PA system will have to be made at the individual Train Operators cost.
5.5.1. SAFETY BENEFITS The remote broadcast facility provides a safety benefit for DOO trains because it allows passengers to be kept informed in situations where the driver is incapacitated or occupied with other tasks (e.g. protection of the line). It may also be useful as an aid to the driver in less severe circumstances, such as minor collisions, fires, and stranded trains. In all cases, the aim of the remote broadcast is to prevent passengers from putting themselves at risk by leaving the train. More complex instructions are not likely to be practicable since the signaller will not have any visibility of the incident. It is considered that there is likely to be limited benefit in providing this type of facility for non-DOO trains, given that the train crew will usually be in a better position than the signaller to offer appropriate advice. However, there may be certain circumstances in which the facility could be of some use. The BTPs view was that in rare occurrences such as hostage situations the remote broadcast could be of benefit. 5.5.2. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT No assessment is presented for remote broadcast systems on DOO trains because these are already fitted. It would be possible in theory to carry out an assessment of the benefits associated with extending the use of remote broadcast to all trains via GSM-R. However the benefits are considered to be so marginal that it would be difficult to provide a realistic estimate of them given the approximations which are appropriate to make at this stage. 5.5.3. OTHER BENEFITS The remote broadcast facility theoretically offers an opportunity for line controllers to broadcast useful information to passengers, such as details of connections or delays to the system. Some European railways exploit this potential for example the Zurich S-Bahn. In the UK the remote broadcast system is not used for this purpose, presumably because the signallers duties do not include this type of activity, and also possibly because of limitations of the CSR equipment. Extension of the use of the remote broadcast facility to provide this type of information may have commercial benefit for some train operators, although it would be difficult to estimate what value to ascribe to it. It would also have an indirect safety benefit through increased familiarity with the system and more frequent testing. However, this use of the system could only be contemplated if adequate resources were provided at
the control centre so that there was no risk of signallers being distracted from essential duties. 5.5.4. WHERE BENEFITS COULD BE ACHIEVED The remote broadcast facility is present in all areas equipped with the Cab Secure Radio system, and in all units fitted with CSR cab radios that operate in those areas. In future it is anticipated that the same facility could be extended to the entire network at marginal cost via GSM-R, but it is felt that the additional benefits gained by non-DOO services would be relatively limited.
6.
INDICATIVE COSTS
6.1. ASSESSMENT METHOD The approximate cost of providing communications equipment compliant with the LRGI/1 recommendations is dependent on three main factors: Development costs. Equipment cost (which many include off-vehicle equipment). Installation cost (including bracketry, trim, wiring and consumables, as well as labour). The development costs for complete integrated systems have been estimated as 160,000 by Supplier A and 250,000 by Supplier B. These figures are considered to be unreliable given that the Supplier A's system is believed to be in an earlier phase of development. In practice, given the uncertainty over human factors and the various different implementations which might be taken forward, it would be advisable to increase these estimates to 1 million. This gives a contingency for error, but does not have a significant effect on the overall project costs because the material and labour charges for fleet fitment are much larger figures. If the recommendations are tackled separately by smaller stand-alone solutions then it is expected that the development costs would be much lower. The equipment costs also vary significantly between suppliers, with Supplier B's costs being much higher than those of Supplier A due to the inclusion of a wide range of additional equipment not relevant to the LRGI/1 recommendations. The costs are not broken down by Supplier B and so it is not possible to isolate specific elements. For this reason it has been decided to work on the basis of a rounded-up version of Supplier A's costs. Supplier A has presented a fully integrated system that addresses all the recommendations and which does not rely on GSM-R. They also propose an alternative system, which is compliant with all recommendations except for 86B collision resistant PA. This approach is different to that adopted by this report which considers each recommendation separately. The installation costs of the equipment have not been provided by the equipment suppliers, and require separate estimation. These costs are likely to be significant, and they depend heavily on the following factors: Availability of external network resources (e.g. GSM-R, public GSM, radio etc).
Technical specification, configuration and size of equipment to be fitted. Vehicle type and space available. Fleet size. Variation of vehicle types within fleet.
The approach taken has been to consider a generic type of vehicle and to put together cost estimates based on experience of other similar projects such as TPWS fitment. At this stage a number of broad assumptions have to be made with regard to costs. These are as follows: Prices for equipment are based on indicative estimates from suppliers. Because little of the equipment is currently available on a commercial basis, these estimates must be treated with caution. It has been assumed that space for the equipment can be found on the vehicles. In practice this may not be the case, especially if the equipment is bulky. Modern vehicles tend to have a lot of on-train systems and their equipment cupboards are often fully populated. This could instigate the need for the installation of under seat boxes creating additional cost. A further assumption is that existing vehicle power supplies can be used. In practice this would require a detailed study of the characteristics of the supplies and the amount of power available on individual vehicle types. Vehicle Acceptance and HMRI costs have been omitted. These costs may be significant in practice because of the novel nature of the proposed systems. Materials and design costs are based on comparable installations of other equipment and do not take into account the actual characteristics of the equipment that would be needed to fulfil the recommendations. Installation costs are a very crude approximation because the amount of work required in removing interior trim cannot be accurately estimated at this stage.
In addition there are a number of specific assumptions for each recommendation. The cost estimates provided are indicative only and are subject to a variation of 50%.
6.2.
RECOMMENDATION 85: PASSENGER TO SIGNALLER COMMUNICATION Three possible approaches to fulfilling this recommendation are given in the sub-sections below. These cover costs relating to traction and rolling stock only. In addition to this on-train equipment there will be a need to provide equipment at other locations. Supplier A estimate that equipment costing approximately 120,000 will be required at all locations where passenger calls are to be received. It is recommended that these locations are kept separate from the signalling centres and that individual train operators manage them. The cost of installation of this equipment, the cost of providing suitable accommodation for it and the cost of providing staff are not considered in this analysis. 6.2.1. GSM-R BASED SYSTEM USING EXISTING VOICE BASED PCA This option assumes that the vehicles have already been fitted with a collision-proof GSM-R radio and already have a modern voice-based PCA system. The only additional costs relate to the installation of an interface between the radio and the PCA system in every driving cab. Installation design / project management cost per fleet Interface unit cost per driving vehicle Other materials cost per driving vehicle Labour cost per driving vehicle Total cost per driving vehicle 45,000 2,000 850 350 3,200
Total cost per multiple unit (i.e. two cabs), based on a fleet of 100 = 6,850 Total cost per multiple unit (i.e. two cabs), based on a fleet of 50 = 7,300 Note that the cost for the interface unit has been estimated based on a suppliers quotations for a generic part. 6.2.2. TRAINWIRE BASED GSM SYSTEM USING NEW PCA In this option it is assumed that GSM-R is not available and that the existing PCA system is not suitable for use. The approach is to fit a communications control unit in each cab and connect it to new PCA points in every vehicle using the existing trainwires. This solution would continue to function in the event of a single separation of the train, but it would not be able to cope with multiple separations and extensive damage.
This option is based on a Supplier A proposal. Installation design / project management cost per fleet Equipment cost per cab Other materials cost per cab Labour cost per cab Total cost per cab Equipment cost per saloon Other materials cost per saloon Labour cost per saloon Total cost per saloon 45,000 2,000 850 350 3,200 500 750 1,000 2,250
Total cost per 4-car unit (i.e. 2 cabs an 4 saloons), based on a fleet of 100 = 11,850 Total cost per 2+8 car train (i.e. 2 cabs and 8 saloons), based on a fleet of 50) = 17,300 6.2.3. FULLY INDEPENDENT GSM BASED SYSTEM This option is based on the installation of communications control unit with a GSM aerial in every vehicle, along with new call points. Each server would feature battery backup and emergency PA speakers, and hence would continue to function in the event of train separation. These costs are based on Supplier A proposals. Design/project management cost per fleet Equipment cost per vehicle Other materials cost per vehicle Labour cost per vehicle Total cost per vehicle 45,000 2,500 1,000 1,000 4,500
Total cost per 4 car unit, based on a fleet of 100 = 18,450 Total cost per 2+8 car train, based on a fleet of 50 = 36,900
6.3.
RECOMMENDATION 86 ROAMING COMMUNICATIONS The roaming systems described in this section form the core of the passenger-signaller communication systems described in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 above. Hence if any of the following were implemented then it would be possible to add on passenger-signaller functionality without incurring the full costs described above. These systems all assume that Supplier A's DECT based system is used. This, in common with other wireless systems such as WLAN will require support facilities such as charger units for roaming handsets. The cost of these is estimated at 500 for a unit, which can store and recharge the equipment for one train crew. The actual quantity of these units which is required will depend on the way that train crew are managed by the train operator and therefore these costs are not included in the sections below. 6.3.1. BASIC SYSTEM NON COLLISION RESISTANT This estimate is based on a Whiteley Electronics proposal and uses cabbased communication control units to provide roaming communications using DECT technology. It would be able to continue in operation if the train was de-coupled at one point, but it would not be able to continue functioning if there were multiple separations and extensive damage to the train. Installation design / project management cost per fleet Equipment cost per cab/buffet area Other materials cost per cab/buffet area Labour cost per cab/buffet area Total cost per cab/buffet area Roaming equipment cost per train (handsets) 45,000 2,200 1,000 500 3,700 700
Total cost per 4 car unit (i.e. 2 cabs) based on a fleet of 100 = 8,550 Total cost per 2+8 car train (i.e. 2 cabs and 1 buffet area) based on a fleet of 50 = 12,700 6.3.2. COMPLIANT SYSTEM This estimate is based on Supplier A's alternative proposal. It places communication control units in every vehicle to provide roaming communications using DECT technology. The CCUs are provided with battery backup and would be able to continue in operation if the train was de-coupled. The provision of
emergency loudspeakers would enable PA announcements to continue to be made in the event of severe damage to the consist. Installation design / project management cost per fleet Equipment cost per vehicle Other materials cost per vehicle Labour cost per vehicle Total cost per vehicle Roaming equipment cost per train (handsets) 45,000 2,200 1,000 500 3,700 700
Total cost per 4 car unit, based on a fleet of 100 = 15,950 Total cost per 2+8 car train, based on a fleet of 50= 31,200 6.4. RECOMMENDATION 87 REMOTE BROADCAST 6.4.1. GSM-R BASED SYSTEM Remote broadcast is already available on DOO trains, but the introduction of GSM-R will make it possible to extend the facility to all trains. This is an estimate of the likely costs associated with providing an interface between the new GSM-R radio and the PA system. Design/project management cost per fleet Interface unit cost per cab Other materials cost per cab Labour cost per cab Total cost per cab 45,000 2,000 850 350 3,200
Total cost per train assuming 2 cabs, based on fleet of 100 = 6,850 6.4.2. GSM-BASED SYSTEM The proposals put forward in the sections above all have the capability to provide remote broadcasting using public GSM, and this is included within the costs given.
7.
DISCUSSION
This section is divided into four parts, dealing with each of the recommendations separately: Recommendation 85: Passenger to signaller communication Recommendation 86A: Roaming communications Recommendation 86B: Collision resistant PA Recommendation 87: Remote broadcast
For each recommendation, the approach taken is to draw together all the available knowledge in respect of current practice, available technologies, costs and benefits. 7.1. RECOMMENDATION 85: PASSENGER TO SIGNALLER COMMUNICATION At present, the DSD alert system operating in conjunction with CSR provides a simple method of alerting the signaller that a driver has become incapacitated. However, its effectiveness is compromised by the fact that the CSR radio is neither protected from collision damage nor provided with battery backup. The current emphasis on the testing of the DSD alert varies between the different train operators. LGRI/1 compliant passenger to signaller communication links are provided only rarely. Their principal use is on driverless systems such as Singapore, and on some light rail projects. No examples have been found of main line railway use. During various discussions the fundamental idea of passengers being able to communicate with the signaller was not met with enthusiasm. Generally most people interviewed thought that such a facility would introduce risk into the operation of the network, and that it would be difficult to police. As a result of these views it was decided that any passenger to signaller communication system should have two principal characteristics: 1. Any calls are dealt with first by the driver (this filters out the nuisance calls and also has the advantage that the train-crew are always aware of the communications which are being made). 2. The location of the calling train should be visible to the recipient of the call (either via train number if received in the signalling centre, or via GPS if received elsewhere).
Depending on the geography of the network, it may be appropriate in some cases for calls to be received by the train operators control room rather than in the signalling centre itself. This would be preferable in areas, which have a lot of smaller signal boxes, where it would be impracticable to equip every location with the facilities to receive passenger calls. From a technology point of view it would be relatively simple to provide this type of facility. The key requirements are a reliable, secure radio network, suitable facilities at signalling centres (or control rooms), and the presence of call points in passenger saloons. GSM-R will, when introduced, provide the former two requirements, whilst voice-based Passenger Communication Alarms are already a standard fitment on new trains. It would be substantially more difficult to implement this type of system using NRN or CSR technology, or on vehicles which currently do not have a voice-based PCA system. The main design effort would need to be focussed on creating an interface between the PCA and the radio. It would also be beneficial to ensure that the critical components of the GSM-R radio were mounted in a secure location and provided with local battery backup, so as to ensure that the system continued to operate in the event of a collision. The development of other commercially available integrated communication systems could also satisfy this requirement using public GSM. For example, passenger to signaller communication could be easily introduced as an additional feature on a system used to provide roaming communication (Recommendation 86). However, the added complexity of these integrated systems combined with the imminent introduction of GSM-R makes these systems less attractive. It is felt that the passenger to signaller communication facility is likely to offer only limited benefits, due to the small number of scenarios in which it might be useful. It would generally be of most use for DOO trains, but there are instances where non-DOO trains could benefit as well for example in remote areas. The extent of the benefits, which might be gained from this type of system, is very difficult to estimate without a detailed consideration of human factors issues. However, a first approximation of the likely benefits in terms of equivalent fatalities prevented has produced an upper estimate of 0.075 equivalent fatalities per year. An indicative cost estimate suggests that the cost per unit will vary between 6,850 and 7,300 per unit, depending on the number of units to be fitted.
Alternatively, a completely standalone GSM based system could be fitted but the costs are significantly higher (by a factor of approximately three times). The advantage of adopting such a system would be its resistance to de-coupling of vehicles. However, it would be difficult to arrange for calls to be dealt with preferentially by the driver and a GPS signal would be needed to provide the trains location to the control room. In addition to the train-based costs it is necessary to take into account the costs of control room equipment, the provision of the control room itself and the costs of staffing it. If it is assumed that the DOO fleet consists of 300 4-car units, then the cost of fully equipping it with the simplest form of passenger to signaller communications can be estimated at 3 million. This is broken down as follows: Vehicle modifications to newer fleets 100 x 7,000 Vehicle modifications to older fleets 200 x 16,000 Control room equipment 6 x 120,000 Total 700,000 3,200,000 720,000 4,620,000
This must be considered against the anticipated benefits of 0.075 equivalent fatalities prevented per year. If a value per fatality prevented of 3.22 million is assumed, then the installation will pay for itself over approximately a 15 year period. Cash flow discounting has not been used in this analysis given the uncertainties which exist over the base data, however it can be seen that even for a high-side estimate of the benefits passenger to signaller communication does not appear to offer good value. The introduction of TPWS and its anticipated impact on the frequency of collisions is likely to reduce the benefits further. However, the above estimate is based on a crude averaging of the costs over all fleets, and it can be seen that the bulk of the cost is incurred in retrofitting old fleets with voice based PCA systems. If the passenger to signaller communication system was restricted to modern fleets and new build stock then, subject to human factors analysis, it is likely to prove more justifiable.
7.2.
RECOMMENDATION 86A: ROAMING COMMUNICATIONS Roaming communication systems are now considered the state of the art for new railway projects. However, the systems that are currently in use are based on analogue VHF radio, and do not generally provide the roaming PA access envisaged by Lord Cullen. GSM-R could technically provide roaming communication facilities, but in practice the network will not have sufficient capacity, and roaming communications has not been accounted for in any GSM-R planning. For this reason, other solutions are considered to be better. One other factor, which may count against GSM technology, is the alleged health risks that affect GSM handsets this is likely to be an important issue from a staff relations viewpoint. There is only one system in current use that allows full roaming crew communications and access to the PA. This is the RailCom system, which is fitted to all passenger trains in Norway. The system is based on standard PC equipment and works using a wireless LAN. A visit to Norway was able to confirm that the system is used and that it appears to be popular with train crew. However, concerns were noted over a variety of aspects, including feedback problems, electromagnetic interference, equipment size and ruggedness. A first approximation of the likely benefits of roaming communications (expressed in terms of equivalent fatalities prevented) estimates an upper limit of 0.49 fatalities per year. This represents a potentially significant safety benefit but this must be taken as an upper limit subject to the results of a human factors study. Experience gained by the operators which use roaming communication systems suggests that there are significant benefits, both safety-related and otherwise, to be gained from its use. It is, however, extremely difficult to quantify these benefits, because the circumstances surrounding the use of roaming communications vary so much and human factors must be taken into account. An initial cost estimate suggests that the costs of fitting a roaming communications system are likely to vary between approximately 8,350 and 17,000 for a 4-car unit. During the course of discussions with train operators and with the BTP, it was agreed that the provision of loud hailers might be beneficial as an aid to addressing passengers once they have left the train. These would be
useful in non-emergency evacuations such as train failures, where the emergency services would not necessarily be present. If a very rough approximation to the number of passenger trains in the UK is taken as 1500 x 4-car units, then the costs of adopting roaming communication systems on all of them can be estimated as 15 million (assuming a cost per unit of 10,000). This must be considered against the benefits, which may amount to as much as 0.49 equivalent fatalities prevented per year. If a value of 1.5 million is ascribed to these fatalities (based on the assumption that the fatalities will occur individually) then the installation of roaming communications systems will take about 20 years to pay back the investment. This crude method suggests that for certain fleets the investment will be worthwhile. It is likely that these will be the long-distance type trains which have long consists and relatively large numbers of train crew. 7.3. RECOMMENDATION 86B: COLLISION RESISTANT PA No existing examples have been found of PA systems that can withstand de-coupling of vehicles. This appears to be a concept that has not previously been considered by the railway industry in any country, and as a result there is no readily available technology that could be used to provide the facility. The technical problems associated with creating a collision-resistant system include the creation of a wireless transmission system for the announcements, local battery backup for the loudspeakers, and sufficiently rugged mounting of the speakers and amplifiers. All features of the systems must be duplicated into every vehicle in the train. Whilst all of the above can be achieved in principle (and suppliers have provided detailed proposals), it would require a substantial amount of design work and would entail significant installation costs. In many classes of vehicle there may not be sufficient space available for the equipment which would lead to compromises needing to be made over seating and luggage space. The benefits of a collision-resistant PA system are limited to major incidents in which there is uncoupling and rollover of carriages. These incidents are rare, but when they do occur there is potential for severe loss of life or injuries, and the retention of a functioning PA system could be of significant benefit. However the true benefit can only be determined subject to human factors study. It can be argued that because the probability of other protection measures (outside the confines of the train set) being actioned in a major incident is high; all train crew may be
incapacitated; and multiple calls would be made to the emergency services via public GSM, the need for a collision resistant PA is limited further. In a major incident where carriages have rolled over and the vehicle battery has lost its electrolyte but the train set (and subsequently the PA) is still intact, benefits may be gained from merely providing the existing non collision resistant PA with a battery back-up. An initial estimate of the likely benefits (in terms of equivalent fatalities prevented) calculated an upper figure of 0.035 fatalities per year. This must be regarded as a maximum figure, subject to the results of a human factors study. An approximate cost estimate for the installation of collision-resistance features on a roaming communication system is an increase of cost of 50% over the basic version described in section 7.2. On this basis, comparison with the cost-benefit analysis given in the section above for roaming communications suggests that collision resistant PA systems will not be cost effective. 7.4. RECOMMENDATION 87: REMOTE BROADCAST Remote broadcast is already provided on all DOO trains in the UK via the existing cab secure radio system. Similar facilities are also common in other countries, although on many railways the remote broadcast facility is used for routine announcements as well as for emergencies. The main concern with existing CSR networks is the extent of the coverage provided, and the extent to which the facility is tested. There appears to be some inconsistencies in the level of testing employed by different train operators. The GSM-R specification includes the possibility to provide remote broadcast facilities to all trains in the UK, and not just to those operating under CSR. The only additional cost necessary (over and above the GSMR costs) would be the provision of an interface between the cab radio and the PA system. This cost would have to be borne by train operators. An initial estimate of the cost per train is approximately 6,850. Remote broadcast is the only one of the three LRGI/1 recommendations being considered which is currently being complied with, and for which there is an established plan for system enhancement and expansion. This planned future improvement of the system would, however, benefit from taking account of the following observations:
The benefits of the remote broadcast system would be maximised if the train radio was protected from impact damage and provided with a local backup battery. The provision of a collision-resistant PA system (as per recommendation 86B) would also help to increase the number of scenarios in which the system might be useful.
The potential benefits associated with network-wide availability of remote broadcast are not easy to quantify - this would require a comprehensive review of human factors issues. However, the work done so far suggests the following: 1. Remote broadcast on non-DOO trains is only of use in situations where both the driver AND the traincrew become incapacitated. These events are rare, and are confined to major incidents only. 2. In major incidents, the remote broadcasting system is only likely to work if a collision-protected cab radio and a collision-resistant PA system are provided. 3. Section 7.3 has already shown that the benefits of collision resistant PA are not considered worthwhile. 4. In major incidents, it is considered unlikely that a person in a remote location could offer much useful advice to passengers. 5. The benefit of advice given over the PA is likely to be limited in major incidents, because the nearby running lines and power supplies are likely to have been isolated. Hence the immediate dangers of electrocution or contact with other trains are eliminated. Hence provision of network-wide remote broadcast is considered unlikely to be a cost effective measure.
8.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. PASSENGER TO SIGNALLER COMMUNICATION Passenger-signaller communication is feasible but its benefits are limited and its potential for abuse should be carefully controlled. Currently the automatic DSD alert system provides some of the desired functionality but it could be improved. Longer term, the implementation of GSM-R on newer rolling stock offers an opportunity to introduce a passenger to signaller communications at lower cost. The cost-benefit analysis suggests a payback time of 15 years assuming all DOO rolling stock is fitted with the passenger-signaller communication system. This is based on an upper estimate of the benefits, and does not take into account risk reductions arising from TPWS. In practice, therefore, it is likely that passenger-signaller communication will be worthwhile on newer fleets but not on older stock. The decision over which fleets to fit and which to exclude will rest on the outcome of human factors work aimed at better understanding the potential benefits of the system. Short term recommendations R8.1.1 Review coverage of existing CSR networks. . R8.1.2 Review maintenance practices of DSD alert system. . R8.1.3 If CSR is expected to operate for a significant period of time, . investigate the possibility of moving the radio to a protected location with a separate cab desk display, and a battery backup. Longer term development R8.1.4 Ensure that GSM-R cab radios are fitted in protected locations . with internal battery backup. R8.1.5 Commission design work into the interfacing of PCA systems with . GSM-R, so that emergency calls can be dealt with initially by drivers and only passed on to signallers if the driver is incapacitated. R8.1.6 Carry out human factors study into the subject of passengers . communicating with signallers encompassing the following: Staff related ! What training is necessary for signalling staff when dealing with calls from passengers? ! What degree of distraction is likely? ! How often might drivers fail to respond to alarm calls? ! What interface should be provided?
Passenger related ! How should the possibility of speaking to the signaller be displayed to passengers, if at all? ! What briefing should passengers receive in communication with the signaller? ! Under what circumstances would passengers use the PCA system? ! Are passengers likely to give any useful information to a signaller? 8.2. ROAMING COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 8.2.1. ROAMING COMMUNICATIONS Roaming communication systems are currently in use both in the UK and overseas, and are considered a necessary part of any new rail systems. Apart from their benefits in emergencies they offer significant benefits to efficiency, customer service and staff safety. However, the current standard approach is generally based on bulky simplex VHF radios and does not include PA access. An alternative approach is based on public GSM mobile phones. The GSM-R system is not likely to be able to accommodate on-train roaming communications and therefore development work for the future should focus on other solutions. The cost/benefit study for roaming communications shows that the pay back time for the investment is of the order of 20 years, assuming that all fleets are fitted. This suggests that there is not likely to be any benefit in equipping older fleets, but that the system may be justifiable for new builds and for retro fit to recent stock. Although the benefits are based on an upper estimate, subject to revision based on human factors studies, there are also a large number of softer benefits of roaming communications, such as better customer service. These soft benefits will be of particular interest to train operators and need to be balanced against the costs. Short term R8.2.1 Train operators should be encouraged to investigate the existing . options for roaming communications, with a view to gaining a better understanding the human factors involved and quantifying the benefits that arise from the use of roaming communications. R8.2.2 The provision of loud hailers to assist in evacuations should be . considered. This recommendation arises from a consideration of the communication needs in major incidents and relates to the control of passengers outside of vehicles. R8.2.3 A simple trial of the effectiveness of DECT and wireless LAN . transmissions in and around trains should be considered, in order to inform future evaluations of wireless communications.
Longer term R8.2.4 Development work should be carried out into the provision of . roaming communication systems. The aim should be to reduce the size of the installation and improve its ruggedness, whilst addressing concerns over issues such as feedback and interference. R8.2.5 Any roaming communications solution should take into account . health issues associated with the use of GSM phones. This is considered necessary from the point of view of staff relations. R8.2.6 Carry out human factors research into the potential benefits of . roaming communications encompassing the following: Staff related ! What kind of interface should be provided for the roaming communication equipment? ! How should the equipment be carried, stored and managed? ! How useful would roaming communication be as an aid to teamwork between staff and for the presenting information to passengers, in safety-related situations? Passenger related ! What are passenger's perceptions of the usefulness of additional announcements from traincrew in safety related situations? ! To what extent would such announcements actually be of use? 8.2.2. COLLISION RESISTANT PA This concept is thought to be fairly new and was not found to be employed extensively on railways around the world. The benefits would be limited to major incidents only, but in such incidents it would certainly be helpful if the PA remained operational. The provision of a collision resistant PA would augment the benefits of remote broadcasting and roaming communications. The cost/benefit study shows that the 50% additional cost of collision resistant PA, over and above the cost of basic roaming communications, gives a benefit of only 0.035 fatalities per year. It is therefore considered impractical, given the lack of suitable equipment on the market, to implement this type of system in the short term. Human factors research is recommended for the other LRGI/1 communications proposals, and it is expected that this work will help to confirm the low level of benefits obtainable from collision-resistant PA systems.
8.3.
REMOTE BROADCASTING Remote broadcasting is currently provided on DOO trains. The implementation of GSM-R offers the possibility of extending it to all trains at a relatively low cost. However, an initial consideration of the benefits suggests that it is only likely to be useful in certain specific situations. Human factors research, combined with a review of safety cases by train operators, is needed in order to understand the potential benefits of network-wide application. Short term recommendations R8.3.1 Review coverage of the existing CSR networks. . R8.3.2 Review maintenance practices for remote broadcast systems. . R8.3.3 If CSR is expected to continue in use for a significant period of . time, investigate moving the radio to a protected location with a separate cab desk display, and provision of battery backup. Long term recommendations R8.3.4 Ensure that GSM-R cab radios are fitted in protected locations . with internal battery backup. R8.3.5 Train operators who do not currently have remote broadcast . facilities should consider whether it would have any benefits for their specific safety cases. R8.3.6 Carry out human factors research into the potential benefits of . remote broadcasting encompassing the following: Staff related ! How useful would remote broadcast be in providing passengers with information in safety related situations? ! What training would be required? e.g. what decision mechanism would be used to action the use of this facility? Passenger related ! What are the passengers' perceptions of the usefulness of additional announcements from the signaller in safety related situations? ! To what extent would such announcements actually be of use?
8.4.
HUMAN FACTORS STUDY To gain a complete understanding of the potential safety benefits offered human factors would have to be considered. The three sections above list human factors issues specific to the individual communication facilities reviewed during this research program. As there is a commonality
between all of the issues raised a human factors study should consider all of the communication facilities together within one program. Initially, as apart of a first stage possible scenarios should be identified and necessary communication needs determined. A second stage could then be performed to identify the design requirements and the likely usefulness of the communication facilities. Interface design / training / signage Needs of passenger interface Use and effectiveness (perceived and actual) Risk of distraction to staff
Likely level of use
Briefing for staff
Needs of staff interface
Usefulness to signaller
Usefulness to traincrew
Passengersignaller communications Roaming communications Remote broadcasting
* * *
* *
* * *
* *
Usefulness to passengers
Briefing for passengers
* * *
* * *
Stage 2: Identify design requirements and likely usefulness
9.
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS

A/D AEIF APCO ATC ATOC ATP AWS BR BT BTP CACU CCTV CCU CIU CSR DART D/A DBAG dB DC DECT DIL Direct Mode DMU DOO DSD DTMF DUPLEX EC ECML EIRENE EMU ERTMS EU FGW FM FRS FS GNER GPR GPRS Analogue to digital converter European Association for Railway Interoperability Association of Public safety Communications Officials Automatic Train Control Association of Train Operating Companies Automatic Train Protection Automatic Warning System British Rail British Telecom British Transport Police Cab Audio Communications Unit Closed Circuit TeleVision Cab Communications Unit Communications Interface Unit Cab Secure Radio Digital Advanced Radio for Trains Digital to Analogue Converter Deutsche Bahn (German State Railways) Deci bel - measurement of radio frequency power (in this context) Direct Current Digital Enhanced Cordless Technology Dual in Line (switches) Method of communicating directly between GSM-R radios, not via the usual base station network Diesel Multiple Unit Driver Only Operation Driver Safety Device Dual Tone Multiple Frequency Transmission of Data or Voice in both directions European Community East Coast Main Line European Integrated Radio Enhancement Network Electric Multiple Unit European Rail Traffic Management System European Union First Great Western Frequency Modulation Functional Requirement Specification Ferrovie Dello Stato Italian State Railways Great North Eastern Railway East Coast operator General Purpose Radio General Packet Radio Service
GPS GSM GSM-R HMRI HST Hz ID ITR KCRC kHz kV LAN LED LTA LGRI LUL MHz MMI MORANE MTBF NRN NSB OTCS PA PASCOM PC PCA PECU PIS PTT RCH RETB RF RMT RTM RVAR SBB SIL SIM SIMPLEX SMS SNCF SRS STM TDM
Global Positioning System Global System for Mobile Communications Global System for Mobile Communications - Railways Her Majestys Rail Inspectorate High Speed Train Hertz Measurement of Frequency Identification (number) International Train Radio Kowloon - Canton Railway Corporation - Hong Kong Railways kilo Hertz Frequency measurement - 1000Hz kilo Volts Local Area Network Light Emitting Diode Land Transport Authority - Singapore Railways Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry London Underground Limited Mega Hertz Frequency measurement - 106 Hz Man Machine Interface Mobile Radio for Railway Networks in Europe Mean Time between Failures Measurement of reliability National Radio Network Norwegian State Railways On Train Communication System Public Announcement/Address Passenger Communication (alarm) Personal Computer, or abbreviation for PASCOM Passenger Call/Alarm Passenger Emergency Communication Unit Passenger Interface System Push To Talk Railway Clearing House Train remote lighting control circuit Radio Electronic Token Block Radio Frequency Rail, Maritime and Transport workers union Radio Transmission Module Rail Vehicle Accessibility Regulations Swiss State Railways Safety Integrity Level Subscriber Identity Module Transmission of data or Voice in one direction only Short Messaging Service Societe National des Chemins de fer Fracais (French State Railways) System Requirement Specification Specific Transmission Module Time Division Modulation
TETRA TOC TSB TPWS TPWS-E TWAC UK UHF UIC UMTS US(A) UTC VHF Vrms W WCML WLAN
TErrestrial Trunked Radio - Digital trunked radio system Train Operating Company Train to Signal Box radio (same as CSR) Train Protection Warning System TPWS Enhanced - using Eurobalise Telephone Wireless Access Concentrator United Kingdom Ultra High Frequency Union des Chemins de Fer International trade association and pressure group for railway operating companies Universal Mobile Telecommunication System United States of (America) Universal Time Co-ordination (same as GMT) Very High Frequency Radio spectrum Volts root mean square Measurement of Alternating voltage Watts Measurement of electrical power West Coast Main Line Wireless Local Area Network
AMENDMENT RECORD
ISSUE DATE COMMENTS NAME
12/12/02
Final Report
C.A.Wilson
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Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles

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Communication Technology and Functionality in Passenger Vehicles

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Research Programme

RAILWAY SAFETY ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

12TH DECEMBER 2002

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................ ........................................................................ ........................................ 6

INTRODUCTION ................................................................ ............................................................................... ............................................... 9

CURRENT PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGY .............................................. .............................................. 12

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BENEFITS ................................................................ ..................................................................................... ..................................................... 45

INDICATIVE COSTS ................................................................ .......................................................................... .......................................... 60

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6.4.2. GSM-Based System...................................................................... 65

DISCUSSION ................................................................ ................................................................................. ................................................. 66

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ ............................................ 73

APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS .................................................... .................................................... 78

Copyright 2004 Rail Safety and Standards Board

RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

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RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

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CURRENT PRACTICES AND TECHNOLOGY

RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

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RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

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POTENTIAL METHODS TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS

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RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

DECT basestation Communications Control Unit (CCU)

Passenger Emergency Communication Units (PECU)

110V 12V 12Ahr

CCU +LS & DECT

Remote horn loudspeaker (LS)

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Plan view of each carriage for Option 1

DECT basestation 110V 0V

Communications Control Unit (CCU)

Communications Control Unit (CCU)

RAILWAY SAFETY - ACCIDENT AND SURVIVABILITY PROJECT 4 - COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

CACU (Transmitting Amp ) Drivers desk

SACU (Receiving Amplifier)