Occasional - Papers - 3 - 2002 (Romania's Westernization and NATO Membership)

OCCASIONAL PAPERS No.
3(I)/2002
ROMANIAS WESTERNIZATION AND NATO MEMBERSHIP - A HISTORICAL APPROACH -
By Brig.Gen.
MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. Director of Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History
Romanias Ministry of National Defense
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization
CONTENTS Romanias Westernization and Membership - A Historical Approach................................................. p. 5 Annex 1. Letter of Application on NATO Membership from the President of Romania to the Secretary General of NATO..................................... p. 7 Annex 2. Statement................................................... p. 13 Annex 3. DECLARATION of the political parties represented in the Parliament concerning Romanias admission into NATO............................................... p. 13 Annex 4. Romanian Favourable Public Opinion for NATO Integration.................................................. p. 13 Annex 5. Study on NATO Enlargement.................. p. 13 Annex 6. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council / North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 10-11, 1994................................................. p. 13 Annex 7. Membership Action Plan (MAP).............. p. 13 Annex 8. What is the most important problem in Romania?...............................................................p. 13 Annex 9. MAP IV (IVth Cycle - 2002-2003)........... p. 13 Annex 10. Romanian Participation in PSOs Under the Aegis of UN, NATO, OSCE and in the Fight Against Terrorism as of 15 August 2002.................. p. 13
Immediately after the collapse of the old regime in 1989, to reorient Romanias foreign policy was among the main priorities. The new authorities have declared they agree to comply with all the international commitments of the state, an express mentioning being made in relation with the Warsaw Treaty. The bipolar era was not completely dead, and the above mentioned issue had its well founded reason. In the following years, in accordance with the new historical evolution in Central and Eastern Europe the former Soviet outside empire , Romania evolved towards a strategic objective unprecedented in its last half of century foreign policy> integration into NATO and European Union. In other words, Romanias strategic objective at an international level became the integration into the Western institutions of security and economic development, with all that this means from the point of view of internal and foreign aims orientations. In September 1993, Romania addressed the official request of becoming a part of NATO (Annex 1), and in January 1995 it became associate member of the European Union. The rapidly change of paradigm that occurred in Romanias fate in the first years of 90s could be itself a 5
Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.
subject of a different analysis. We limit ourselves here to highlighting that Romanias new orientation was based on the substantial changes occurring inside the market economy and democratic construction and in the international arena> the shaping, as a probability, of a space of cooperative security from Vancouver to Vladivostok and the outrunning of the division typical of the Cold War in adverse political-military blocks. The domestic transformation needed protection for avoiding the falling back into a recently outrunned past, and the new political elite, under the hard influence of the developments in the former communist states of Central Europe, which strongly required the accession into NATO as an umbrella of survival and consolidation of the new regime, did not hesitate to require the admission into the North-Atlantic Alliance. On the other side, at the international level, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (July 1991) and the development of NATOs strategic concept (November 1991), which gave impetus to the creation of some cooperative security institutions including the former enemies (for example, the NorthAtlantic Partnership Council), facilitated and galvanized the process of assuming a new political orientation. Of course, some inhibitions had to be overcome, related to a certain historical inertia, as well as to defeat the resistance of the pressures coming from some internal and external circles (Russia was not and is not convinced of the constructive character of NATOs eastern enlargement) interested in maintaining an orientation outside the blocks, which was not quite unusual (see Finlands case). 6
This change of fundamental orientation in Romanias foreign and security policy enjoyed the support of the entire national political spectrum (it is significant, from this perspective, the 1995 and 2001 Snagov declarations Annexes 2 and 3), as well as of the big majority of public opinion (the polls were constantly, except for a short period of time during the Kosovo campaign, in March-June 1999, over 70% in favour of the new course - Annex 4). It was accompanied by political and economic measures aiming at fulfilling the admission criteria into the North-Atlantic Alliance, which were made known to the aspiring countries since 1995, through the Study on NATO Enlargement (Annex 5). Romania was the first country from East and Central Europe to join Partnership for Peace, launched by NATO in January 1994 (see Annex 6). NATO admitted the first wave of candidate states in 1999, the invitations being addressed at Madrid Summit (July 1997) to Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. Romania detach itself during Madrid Summit as a leading candidate for the next wave of enlargement toward East, and the visit of the American president, Bill Clinton, in Bucharest immediately after the Alliances Summit and the simultaneous conclusion of a Strategic Partnership Romania-SUA on that occasion, have strengthened this internal and international perception. NATOs Washington Summit of April 1999 strengthened the open doors policy, of continuing the process of North-Atlantic Alliance enlargement towards East, launching the MAP exercise (a roadmap for membership) opened to the aspiring states. Romania has prepared, 7
consequently, the Integration National Annual Plans, in September 2002 being already in its forth edition. Each of them and all together represents the comprehensive process of Romanias preparing of becoming full-fledged NATO member. Inviting Romania for becoming NATO member at the Prague Summit is an event with a special impact upon the national development. Of course, the accession into NATO and EU represents Romanias framing into a community of states to whom it belongs by right through origin and culture, the only Latin country from Eastern and Central Europe , its connection to a space of prosperity and security from which it was separated by the almost 50 years of communism, the finding again of the old allies with the support of whom the national unity was reached in 1918 etc. In the following lines there will be approached an aspect less debated in the political speech and even in the experts analyses, related to the process of Romanias integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance. The thesis that I assert is that Romanias integration into NATO means the formal recommencement of the process of Romanias modernization/westernization launched almost two centuries ago and suddenly interrupted at the end of the Second World War by the Communist conquest of state power. Firstly, I will begin by presenting historically, in its main data, the process of Romanias modernization/westernization in the last two centuries, continuing with the underlining of the meaning of integration into NATO. Finally, I will briefly explain why Romanias moderniza8
tion means its westernization. I. The Adrianople Peace Treaty (1829) is unanimously considered the starting point of Romanias westernization1. The end of the Ottoman monopoly over the Danubian Principalities grains trade had opened the way of their inclusion into the European trade. Great Britain, which needed Romanian grains, was the country that became the main power interested in the Danubian Principalities free trade. The position of the Great Britain was mainly determined by geopolitical reasons, namely supporting the Ottoman Empire as a balance factor in Europe at large, and also by the acute need of agricultural products for supplying the country. The coming of the Great Britain to the Principalities therefore of the international systems hegemon, established at the Paris Peace Congress of 1815 was simultaneous with the beginning of the Russian protectorate over them. It is an epoch historically known as the period of the Organic Regulations in which the westernization was the prevalent process, economically, socially, and politically. Of course, there must be mentioned the necessary limitations as regarding the stipulations of these Regulations, that confirmed the political primacy of the classes attached to the old regime (especially the landed gentry). Moreover, the Romanian revolution of 1848 would make of the burning of these constitutions implemented during the Russian occupation, its symbolic moment of outbreak. Yet, due to the Organic Regulations, there were institutionalized typically Western institutions lets mention only 9
the governments and the annual budget and the Russians, preparing their next annexation of the Danubian Principalities, were not stingy in appealing to Western elements of administration and social management just for wining on their side important segments of society. The Danubian Principalities (Moldova and Wallachia), have entered an epoch of accelerated transition from the old regime to the new one, of a Western nature. The Principalities passed indeed through a curious crisis. On the one side, still Turkish signs, on the other one, the upsurge towards advancement, without still knowing what political fate they will have. A representative government, under the daily Russian oversight and interference. A society that struggled between the Eastern customs and the European ones. Westernism rather in shapes than in spirit and character. Transition and contrast in all, in houses, in clothes, in laws, even in language 2. Therefore, we have a prevalence of the European-British capital in the first place and the bureaucratization, monitored by Russia, of the states machinery and institutions. It is worth to be noticed that Romanias modernization/westernization, reaching the economic field, was immediately and strongly reflected also in the field of national civilization (linguistically, in morals, in education, gastronomy etc.). Russias protectorate appeared to the new western educated generation3 of the Principalities as an obstacle in Romanias integration into West. Not only that this protectorate meant the conservation of the old regime, through the perpetuation of the oligarchy and the hindering of the process 10
of practical absorption of the French liberal revolutions ideas. But geopolitically, the confrontation between East (Russia) and West (France, Great Britain firstly) in shaping the continent was felt as a predominant action in tailoring the political map of Europe. There was also impossible for this young Moldavian-Wallachian generation not to observe that Russia was preparing the Principalities annexation, which meant the loosing of their identity in the midst of an absolutist empire. The Revolution of 1848 would promote just the liberal Western values as a counterweight to the stifling domination of the East (Russia) that tried to replace the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and, targeting Constantinople, met on this direction the Principalities. As a symbol of this rejection of Russian protectorate, the revolutionaries burned, at Filaret Field in Bucharest, the Arhondologia (the register of the nobiliar ranks, a kind of Wallachian Gotha Almanach), in which the Russian occupation regime codified the domination of the oligarchy belonging to the old regime. Moreover, from a geopolitical point of view, the Romanian revolutionaries rather opted for the Ottoman Empire supported by the West, than for Russia, understood as a rival of the West in the East and South-East of the continent. This orientation became obvious in the Romanian revolutionaries option during the Crimean War, when they declared solidarity with the anti-Russian camp, to whom also belonged the Ottoman Empire, just for keeping the chances of modernization/westernization. It is what historiographically was called the rejection of the fake friend (Russia) in favour of the fake enemy (Ottoman Empire)4. 11
The victory of the West over Russia in the Crimean War meant also the Danubian Principalities gaining of the first attributes of a distinct international actor. They entered under the guarantee of the great European powers, for separating Russia on ground of the Ottoman Empire and, thus, discouraging an aggression of Russia. Also, based on this overwelming European interest to separate Russia of Constantinople and thus arresting its advance the Paris Convention (1858) settled the conditions of their unification. Under the impetus of this victory of the West over Russia, there was also pronounced the little Unification of January 24, 1859, in which the reviving Romania included also the three southern counties of Bessarabia, (Cahul, Ismail and Bolgrad). Romanias modernization/ westernization was now accelerated, as the hindrance represented until then by Russia disappeared. Joining the Western values was taking place very fast and in all the fields, including, and very important, the cultural one (linguistically, at the Romanian Academy were taking shape the final frames of Romanian language development, under the influence of the linguists from Ardeal, irrevocably linking the Romanian language to the Romanic ones). Romanias modernization/westernization in this period was firmly watched by a generation of political and cultural activists that the Romanian historiography named pa[opti[ti (fortyeighties). They are claimed both by the freemasonry and by the nationalist school subsequently developed, but it is obvious that their great achievement 12
was, regardless of their ideological allegiance, Romanias affiliation to the West, incredibly efficient in relation with the time consumed. The states fundamental institutions were shaped following a Western model from monarchy (a royal house of Western origin, a solution taken into account since the launching of the westernization process) to education and administration or armed forces , which means the rejection both of the old East origin regim (Phanariot) and of the intermediate Russian one. This fortyeighties generation is responsible of the great achievements in the process of westernization the adoption of the 1866 constitution, the independence, the settlement of the kindgom, the economic liberalization and the creation of a real market economy etc. , made not without harsh opposition of the old regime. The revenge taken by the old regime is felt especially in the cultural field where it appealed to an anti-westernization passeism or to an autarchy with the same features, which would have a significant duration (they will be founded, resumed and at other level, including the political one, also in the inter-war period). Great personalities of the Romanian classic culture could not elude these hooters of the passeism and of the narrow traditionalism5. The process of Romanias westernization, taking place almost during the entire XIXth century, determined also the polarization of the Romanian political spectrum. On the one side, the liberals, whose emblematic figures were, in the XIXth century, Ion C. Br\tianu and C.A. Rosetti, considered that the imperative of the old regime change 13
could not be achieved but through revolution. In this way, they placed themselves in direct connection with the French revolution, whose representatives in Romania they considered to be< they also considered that this is the only way of quickly filling up the huge gap that separated the Romanian Principalities from the West. On the other side, the conservatives, with Barbu Catargiu as a central figure in the initial phase, and then P.P. Carp and Ion Maiorescu in the junimist period, in the decades preliminary to the First World War, could not oppose the change of the old regime, but they proposed this thing to take place in an evolutive way. The concept differences between the two camps would be reflected in their tackling of the major issues of Romanias Westernization (with which both agreed in principle), from the agrarian issue to the one of Romanias foreign policy orientation6. In the field of security and defense policy, this firm proWest orientation was implemented in the 1883 model of Romanias external alliances. As the political elite from Bucharest had the experience of the 1878 Russian occupation when Russia prepared for a new war with Europe in order to keep the Straits and a Bulgarian client state from the Danube to the Aegean Sea, gains stipulated at the San Stefano peace , it considered that the main threat for the new independent state came from the East. Romanias chances of resisting alone to a Russian invasion were almost inexistent due to the asymmetry of potential< thus, in Bucharest, there was considered that the only solution is the 14
alliance with the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy). In this way, they banked either on a discouragement of a Russias invasion or, in case of its occurrence, on a balanced defense. Moreover, the 1883 model of Romanias security and defense policy did not mean only the initial alliance with Austro-Hungary, the great neighboring power from the West, but also with other Western great powers allied with Austro-Hungary, namely Germany and Italy. Of course, the option for this model was not easy, as it made of Transylvania the prisoner of the alliance with the neighbor from West during its entire duration, but it was preferred based on solid reasons (the perception of Russias overwhelming threat, which dominated Bessarabia). Ion I.C. Br\tianu, the main architect of this models rejection in 1914, in the eve of the Great War, but also the one who supported it until then, explained in December 1919, in parliament, the reasons of its existence for almost four decades> Here, let me insist on the real reason that we went on with Germany and Austro-Hungary, as allies, for a long period of years... After the war of 1877-1878, Russia refused to comply with its commitment, formally stipulated by treaty. After the war, instead of guaranteeing the integrity of our territory against the others, Russia itself took our part of Bessarabia, which belonged to us following the Paris Conference... Therefore, Russias expansion towards us and over us was the most significant threat... Then, of course, the Romanian government tried to find support first to the ones that it considered normal to find to... The French government, with loyalty, said that it was not able to sup15
port Romania< the English government gave us some hopes that vanished away when, through the Cyprus Island, the way to India was ensured. We, then, were left face to face with the Russian colossus, against whom Germany seemed to guarantee us, in case we would politically appeal to it. This guaranteeing treaty was made on two main reasons. It had a purely defensive character against Russia and also constituted a peace alliance< it was an alliance made between states that wanted to protect Europes peace against a new war. This treaty was made for hindering a conquering advancement of Russia to the Balkan Peninsula, especially against Romania. This was the reason of our alliance 7. It could be noticed that, for dealing with the main threat of Russia to the states individuality, Bucharest appealed, in turns, to the Western great powers for support. The Germanic option was made in the circumstances that Ion I.C. Br\tianu mentioned. The period of the 1883 model functioning was also one of unprecedented economic prosperity. This thing was possible because now the modernization/westernization was rapid, the fundamental institutions for the functioning of the market economy being built and strengthened (the national bank, proper legislation of exploiting national wealth and of encouraging the foreign capital etc.), and the economic infrastructures being properly developed (railways and roads, harbors etc.). The German and AustroHungarian capitals became prevalent on Romanian market (only towards 1913-1914 the French capital also penetrated the Romanian market)8, and the foreign trade was pre16
vailingly directed towards West. The economic prosperity has created in Romania a significant social middle-class segment satirized by the sketches and plays of I.L. Caragiale for the shortcomings owing just to its incipient stage which is the backbone of Romanias capitalist development. A nuance is to be made when referring to the 1883 model. It is related to the fact that Romanias westernization was aggressively promoted in close alliance only with a part of the European West, which practically was the block of the Central Powers. This fact has a clear explanation, namely the division of the international system of states after 1880 into two competing blocks what would become, in the decade previous to the First World War, Antanta and Central Powers , but this circumstance did not encroach upon the coherence of the process of westernization. In this assertion we are relying not only on the spectacular results of this process, but especially on the circumstance that the polarization of the system of states did not have the features of decisive cleavage in Europe as happened during the Cold War , but we rather had a first epoch of globalization (the end of the XIXth century and the beginning of the next century). This epoch is, in many aspects, similar to the second globalization, the contemporary one, that helped Romania to build more rapidly the new European regime. The 1914 moment represented a poise in the orientation of Romanian leading elite. This would also explain its divi17
sion into two parts, pro-Germanic and pro-Entente. The difference is very subtle, because it implied the Russian factor with Russia being an ally of France and Great Britain within the Entente, the coalition opposed to the Central Powers (which Romania joined since 1883). Once the World War was unleashed, Romania had to urgently make its choice. To be with the Central Powers would have meant the acceptance of the definitive loss of Transylvania in the case of victory, in spite of the vigorous movement for national unity already developed there. First and foremost, Romania would have suffered the consequences of the eventual Austrian-German hegemony in the Balkans and have played only a political subordinate role in the region, as the Balkan clashes of 1912-1913 had demonstrated. The main threat for the Romanian interests came at that moment from Austro-Hungary, which did not hesitate to send all its forces against one of Romanias neighbors, comparable in size with our country Serbia. On the other side, being with the Entente would have meant that Romania abandoned Bessarabia in case of victory, but especially the awareness of the fact that a victorious Russia would have destined Romania for a vassal-like posture in an Eastern Europe dominated by the former. The avoidance of a choice between the two camps namely neutrality was an illusive option, given the fact that the size of Romania could have not allowed it to be involved in the huge transformations which were to come at the end of the war on the international arena. Romanias dilemma was then expressed by a part of 18
Romanian political elite as being the necessary choice between Germanism and Slavonism as a dominant element on the European continent (P.P. Carp and many conservatives). For other political elites (the liberal party, authoritatively led by Ion I.C. Br\tianu) such a dilemma was inexistent because the Entente was seen as the eventualy victorious coalition, and the West that is Great Britain and France represented, in accordance with the 1883 model a sufficient counterweight for a triumphant Russia. Between the scenario of a Romania enlarged with Transylvania and by that becoming a strong state in Eastern Europe and the scenario of keeping up the status-quo, the former was finally preferred given the fact that it was likely to offer more force to Romania in order to oppose the foreign domination/hegemony (especially Russian one). The result of this realist calculation was the conclusion of the secret agreement with Russia (October 1914) which stipulated the recognition by the Eastern Empire of Transylvania and the most territories of Bukovina as belonging to Romania, in exchange of neutrality in war. The next two years were used by the Romanian diplomacy with a view to obtaining the commitment of the Western Entente Great Powers (Great Britain, France and Italy) in what Russia had already confirmed. When, in August 1916, these desiderata were reached, Romania equally obtained the necessary counterweight, from the West, useful in the post-war period, when a victorious Russia would possibly have tried to set up its domination over the Eastern side of the continent. 19
As it could be easily observed, the pro-West option was decisive in 1916. Only after having ensured the connection to the West (the treaty with the Entente of August 1916), the Romanian decision-makers thought that entering the war in order to retrieve Transylvania was feasible, until then an alliance with Russia alone being considered by the Romanian liberal elite as an "invitation to hegemony", which had to be avoided at any costs. It is not without reason that the alliance with Austro-Hungary (1883 model) has been maintained up to August 1916 in order to deter Russia. The Liberal and the pro-West orientation rapidly triumphed at the end of the First World War because, first of all, Russia had been defeated which, as a consequence, redirected itself towards its domestic problems. This was for Romania a period of a resolute commitment for modernization/westernization, without external hindrances. The great transformations that occurred were accompanied, of course, by counter-reaction. The latter developed especially as an internal phenomenon taking the shape of the radical, extremist nationalism as in the case of the legionnaires, or the one patronized by Goga-Cuza, a doctrine characterized by the rejection of the liberal values and the aspiration towards an ethnocratic state, of a corporatist type. The antiWestern attitude and the anti-Semitism became the main features of this political orientation. The inter-war period modernization/westernization was a process in which there were politically developed two 20
main orientations. On the one side, there was the orientation that promoted the thesis of a Western-framed modernization through the encouragement of national potentials by ourselves, as the slogan of the traditional liberals sounded , the strengthening of the national capital as being extremely important. On the other hand, such a nationalization of Romanias westernization, a country possessing at that moment almost a doubled territory, was rejected by the other political orientation which estimated that only the Western support materialized in capitals and know-how could have ensured the success of such an ample process. The victory of this second direction of thought and subsequent open door policy for the foreign capital, certainly played a key-role in the economic growth and development experienced by Romania during the forties, when, in 1938, it reached the climax of its economic progress. It was, however, a short success both because of the insufficiency of foreign capital invested in Romania to whom the practice of big budgetary commands served as a substitute and especially of the fact that military expenditures became national priority when Europe obviously entered the pre-war period (1938-1939). In the foreign affairs realm, Romanias connection to the West was a constant feature generated by the very nature of the threats which the enlarged country had to face. The retrieval of national territories had unleashed the reaction of their former-owners, among which Russia and Hungary made themselves conspicuous by the radicalism of their revisionism. The tight connection with the West, 21
with the great Western democracies, Great Britain and France guardians of the Versailles-system, set up at the end of the Great War has been seen in Bucharest as the only possible solution in a quasi-untenable security posture. Joining the French system of alliances in Eastern Europe the Little Entente (1921), the alliance between Romania and Poland (1921), the Balkan Pact (1934) , represented, in fact, the implementation of this solution. The guarantees given to Romania by Great Britain and France in April 1939 - these two great powers guaranteed only the Romanian state's independence in case it would resist to a German aggression, but not its territorial integrity constituted, after the alliance treaty of August 1916, the most obvious proof of the West's interest in Romania and, at the same time, of Romania's firm pro-West orientation. The viability of this allegiance has been proved in the first year of the Second World War, when Romania loyally fulfilled its obligations, in the difficult conditions of neutrality, by supporting the English-French camp and the first victim of nazi aggression, Poland. The Second World War represented, from this perspective, the setting up of an authoritarian state with a warshaped economy, directed towards maximing the resources of waging an asymetric confrontation. National territory was reduced in the summer of 1940 (June and August), as a consequence of having yielded pieces of soil under the extreme pressure exercised by the hegemonic great powers in Eastern Europe (Germany and USSR). The defeat of 22
France and the retreat of British troops have deprived Romania of its main external supporters. At the same time, the guarantees which Germany gave Romania, on August 30, 1940, once with the imposition of Vienna award which led to the abandonment of Northern Transylvania reflected the setting up of the formers hegemony over a small state. From the point of view of modernization/westernization, the subsequent period was a regress, given the enormous consumption of human and material resources and the fact that the priorities of the state were different than before. It could be added that, because of some erroneous political decisions taken by Ion Antonescu (the crossing of the Dniester in August 1941 in the war waged alongside the Nazist Germany and the continuation of the war deeply inside the Soviet territory, among others), until 1944 Romania found itself in the camp opposed to the Western Great Powers. Only on August 23, 1944 Romania made a decisive movement by redirecting its foreign policy, breaking with the German hegemony and, then, re-joining the Western camp which it had been cut off from as a direct consequence of the contradictory evolution of the balance of power during the first period of the World War. The end of the great clash of 1939-1945 and the first post-war years created the frame for the emergence of a bipolar states system, with USA and USSR as the superpowers. In these circumstances, Romania was pushed against the will of its political elite into the sphere of the Soviet geopolitical influence, and, thus, passed through a quick process of communist reform materialized in the 23
modification of its domestic institutions, as well as its security orientation. The communist hiatus (1947-1989) meant a pause imposed to the process of modernization/westernization. Inspired by the Marxist-Leninist theory, the forced industrialization of Romania represented a modernization cut off from its native Western paradigm where the technical and cultural advance used to lie on. The consequence was a chaotic evolution, as in the case of every compulsory, imposed process. The industry was built in accordance with ideological requirements, giving up subtle balances (like the compatibility between resources and projects) specific for the Western economies. Even more than that, it was added the dictate of the big brother, which generated, after a while, a political resistance within the Romanian communist elite with negative consequences in the realm of modernization. The voluntarist decisions of the communist leadership from Bucharest regarding the economic development had also a Stalinist reek and, perhaps linked to each other, an anti-Soviet orientation, the result being a harmful mixture which influenced the modernization process9. The Stalinist reek was obvious in the cult of gigantism, related to the projects launched, but also in the assumption of the Stalinist slogan regarding the predilect development of the heavy industry (with its main pillar, the machinery building industry), a choice which Romania had nor the necessary resources, neither the necessary capital and the know-how for. The logic result was an enormous consumption of energies and 24
resources directed towards orientations which proved later (that is today) to be wrong and counter-performant. One should necessarily notice an important fact concerning the tandem modernization/westernization. It could not work under the communist regime, firstly because of ideological reasons. The basic institutions of a liberal democracy had been expressely forbidden by the communists (that is political parties, free press etc.) and the economy became centralized, the opposite of a market one. Thus, modernization proved to be a limited and ideologically forced process, cut off from the main pole of its efficiency the West. The assumption, after 1989, of the Western values, specific to the liberal democracy and market economy, also meant the re-connection with a modernization process that had been forcedly broken in 1945-1947 (after the censorship of the Second World War). After some brief hesitations and oppositions, the integration into NATO and EU became the main goal of the foreign and security policies of Romania. The meaning of this fact is the connection to the West of Europe, which Romania had already joined since the Adrianople Treaty in the XIXth century. In 1994, Romania was the first state to adhere to NATOs Partnership for Peace and in 1995 it became an associated member of the European Union. Romania resolutely started the race in order to enter NATO together with other states of Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia). At the Madrid Summit (July 1997), Romania was declared to be the leading candidate 25
for the next wave of enlargement. In 1999, on the occasion of the Washington Summit, the Alliance launched, for the candidate-states, the MAP exercise Membership Action Plan (Annex 7) , which allows each candidate to define its basic lines of development (economic, political, military, security related etc.), together with the Alliance. We must add that these evolution lines are not imposed by NATO< on the contrary, they are freely assumed by the applicants, the Alliance ensuring a feed-back mechanism in order to evaluate the processes. The assumption of the westernization goal both in the realm of societys rebuilding and of the security orientation was the result of a national political consensus, without historical precedent. If during the former periods, except the communist one, of course, there was a strong opposition from the ancien rgime in the socio-political and cultural fields, this time the main national political forces reached a consensus (see Annex 2, Snagov 1995, and Annex 3, Snagov 2001). Its origins are to be found both in the pro-West orientation of the new political elite which emerged after 1990, and especially in a rational and competent assessment of the domestic and international developments. In the domestic area, nobody could pass over the intense pressure from the public opinion (see Annex 8) which saw the connection of the country to the West as a solution for a favorable transformation of the whole society. Concerning the international arena, the national political forces quickly acknowledged the fact that, in the context of globalization and the inexorable tendency towards 26
European integration, westernization is the only possible national choice. Other options autarchy, neutrality or integration to other horizons excluded themselves in the light of objective (cultural, geographical, political a.s.o.) facts and reality, not to mention they were already abandoned in the area where Romania is located, within a process that did not lack some obstacles (see the case of Serbia and Muntenegru). Two points are really essential to understand why becoming a member of NATO represents a hastening, an acceleration of the modernization/westernization of Romania. The first one refers to the divisions within the structure of the Integration National Annual Plans (Romanias MAP), and the second one to the linkage between NATO and EU integration processes. Until now, Romania already passed three MAP cycles (see Annex 9, MAP IV). Each MAP is elaborated through the joint endeavors of states structures and is then approved by the Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT). It contains five divisions> political-economic, military, resources, security issues, juridical issues. Within each of these divisions objectives are assumed, whose fulfillment is observed and assessed during the annual cycle, in close connection with future-anticipatory trends on the medium and long term. Inside each chapter, the Western values are essential and they represent, in fact, genuine criteria for the admission into NATO. Thus, within the political-economic chapter, the assumed goal is to build a consolidated democracy, to ensure the respect of human rights 27
and of minorities, the proper economic development, the construction of good and constructive relations with the neighbors, the participation to the international political and economic cooperation via the current international institutions, the elimination of the corruption and of other negative phenomena in the economic, political and social realms etc. In the second chapter, the military one, the assumed goals are related to the building of an efficient military establishment taking into account the existing resources and the firm civilian control over the military affairs , to the transparency and the control of the democratic institutions over the defense policy, to ensuring the field interoperability with the armies of the other NATO member-states. The following chapters are made on the same pattern> the one regarding the resources considers their allotment to the security sector in such a manner as not to burden the economy/the budget of the state, but concomitantly to assure the existence of a viable military< the chapter referring to security issues concerns the methods adopted to ensure the security of communications among allies< that one which refers to the legal issues reflects the harmonization of the legislative requirements in the area of security/defense with those in force in NATOs memberstates. As one could easily observe, we have to deal with a real roadmap of westernization of all aspects of life within the state, with the main goal to implement the Western values, even by transforming existent institutions or building new ones if necessary. It is the first time in Romanias mod28
ernization history when we have such an annual document for the development of the country, established together with and under constant oversight of the competent authorities of the Alliance. However, as Romania will continue to elaborate its own MAP until it becomes a full-fledged member (after about two years following the invitation for membership), it could be asserted that, as a premiere in our national history, the westernization of the country takes place jointly with the West, in accordance with a mutually agreed plan. This trend will go on, especially in the military field, even after Romania becomes a full-fledged NATO member. The second point refers to the complementarity of NATO and European Union accession processes. Far from being opposite or alternative processes, they complement each other, a fact which is obvious especially regarding the modernization/westernization process of the candidate states. If the NATO admission requires the fulfillment of the goals assumed within MAP, the admission into the EU imposes the adoption of the convergence criteria. These criteria mainly refers to the assumption of the essential Western values in the political and economic fields, being, as compared with the MAP, more detailed in the economic and legal domains (the acquis communautaire). In order to be issued an invitation for EU admission, the candidate-states have to negotiate 31 chapters (economic, political, military, juridical issues etc.), able to guarantee the compatibility of the applicant with the EU norms and standards, that is the norms of the West. 29
The complementarity between NATO and EU accession processes is visible not only in the quasi-identical content of the admission criteria, but also in the successive integration of the candidate-states. After the first wave of NATO enlargement (1999), the same countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic) are to be accepted into the EU in 2004 and one could anticipate a similar movement in the future (European officials spoke about 2007 as the admission date of Romania). In the case of Romania becoming an EU member, we have also a premiere in the process of its modernization/westernization, the Western states actively and programatically supporting Romanias integration into the West (including even the non-reimbursable resources, again without any precedent). The fact that since their emergence NATO and the European Union (that is, the previous institutions like the European Community of Coal and Steel or the European Economic Community, among others) were functionally thought of as a tandem of security integration and economic development, represents a feature which influences also the process of Romanias westernization. In fact, it is the first time when Romania, carrying out the process of its connection to the West, deals to the West as a single partner without facing the fracture lines specific of the recent historical frames when the balance of power within the states system had generated the emergence of opposite political military blocks. This new reality of the European unity built on the grounds of common values represents for Romania, as well as for the other states of 30
Central and Eastern Europe, which are nominated for the enlargement process of the both organizations, a major index for the optimization of the westernization process and a guarantee of its successful accomplishment within a given convenient time. As a starting point for this historical process of the Western connection of Romania, the invitation to become a member of the North-Atlantic Alliance, officially issued at the Prague Summit (November 21-22, 2002) represents, therefore, an unprecedented act in the evolution of the modernization/westernization process which is almost two centuries old. This explains why the year 2002 is, perhaps, the most important one within this historical framework. The invitation for NATO membership and the quality of full member once achieved, this doesnt mean that the westernization as a process already became historical datum. There is a strong need for the commitment of all national resources in order to make this process not only irreversible but especially efficient under the ratio costs/benefits. Practically, this means making the required efforts for building up a new Romania, managed according to Western standards, disencumbered, in short time, from all the evil inheritance of its recent history> generalized corruption, inefficient management, centralism and statecentric economy, lack of true performances in the educational and health systems etc. These are as many challenges for our national political class, which has the duty 31
to well manage the westernization process of Romania, and its positive answer will also give the weight and validation of its historical legitimacy. The achievement of NATO full membership essentially depends upon the political will of the applicant-state to fulfil the accession criteria, and also upon the benefits the Alliance expects to count on. Therefore, we could speak about a win-win game in which both partners NATO and the candidate are finally winners. The Alliance is interested in increasing its military-strategic potential through the incorporation of new members, and the applicant-state is supported as in the case of Romanian in accomplishing its modernization/westernization process. In the context of post-September 11 events and of the carrying out of global antiterrorism war, a special importance is attached to the quality of security provider of the applicant-state (logically, the posture of only security consumer is excluded from the very beginning by NATO) corresponding to its own potential. An equal importance seems to be attached to the geostrategic location of the candidate-state especially for regions characterized by a high-level of instability and by the risk of its spread through the spillover effect (nowadays it is the case in the Near-East, the Black Sea area, the Caucasus and Central Asia). Regarding both criteria above-mentioned security provider/consumer and geostrategic significance , Romania enjoys the appreciations of the Alliance. Such appreciations are justified by the security export done by Romania in its close neighborhood or, further, by its participation in interna32
tional peace-keeping missions (in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, among others Annex 10), or, equally, by its status as a pole of stability in the proximity of some turbulent areas. Post September 11, 2001 international context made more obvious Romanias qualities in both prospects. In the last year, the leadership from Bucharest has admirably valorized its own arguments for NATO membership. Taking into account the benefits Romania will provide to the Alliance, one could assert that the process of its modernization/westernization corresponds with NATOs own interest to see the quick and successful accomplishment of this process. Why did I use in a joint manner the syntagm> modernization/westernization? There are many reasons, but I will explain only few of them. Firstly, in our national history modernization meant as indices of efficiency westernization. The ancien regime imbued with Eastern colours was removed in the XIXth century as a consequence of the adoption of liberal ideas born in the West. The communist period, when a tentative was done to modernize the country out of this liberal paradigm, finally proved to be a failure. Secondly, for Romania, as a European Christian state of Latin language and culture, the modernization could not be anything but westernization, that is the integration into the aboriginal cultural space. Thirdly, if we look at the current conditions of the globalization we see an expansion without obstacles of the Western values< and trying to ignore this dominant trend would mean, for Romania, the overlooking of its genetic 33
data. Fourthly, historical and contemporary examples indissolubly link these processes or make them coincide (the case of Japan, the Meiji era or the Asian tigers in the XXth century or the present tentative of Russia). Last but not least, geographically speaking Romania is nowadays surrounded by the West both from the West, being naturally included in the processes of NATO and EU enlargement towards East, and from the East> the West already has its outposts (economic and military ones) in what is geopolitically considered Greater Middle East (the proper Middle-East, the Caucasian area, the post-Soviet Central Asia). Therefore, for a country like Romania, a modernization outside the westernization is a historical, cultural, geographical and practical impossibility.
NOTES
1 See {tefan Zeletin, Burghezia rom=n\. Originea [i rolul ei istoric, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991, p.54< idem, Neoliberalismul. Studii asupra istoriei [i politicii burgheziei rom=ne, Scripta, Bucharest, 1992, pp.26-27< Eugen Lovinescu, Istoria civiliza]iei rom=ne moderne, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1972, pp.78-78, 246. 2 I.C. Filitti, Via]a politic\ a }\rii Rom=ne[ti [i a Moldovei, in Enciclopedia Rom=niei, vol.1, Bucharest, 1938, p.826. 3 In 1803, we find in Paris a young Moldavian student studying the Law> it is the year when a Wallachian boyar traveled to Paris for asking Napoleon Bonaparte to restore the native rules, following that, in the next year, to have in Ia[i a boyars memorial contamined, according to the agitated authorities, by French insubordination, Eugen Lovinescu, Ibidem, p.96. 4 Adrian Niculescu, Aux racines de la democratie en Roumanie> Pruncul Rom=n, premier journal libre roumain, Chronique de la revolution valaque de 1848. These doctorate, Montpellier, Decembre, 2002, pp.47-48, 90-93. 5 Eugen Lovinescu, Ibidem, p.304. 6 Adrian Miroiu, Conservatorii rom=ni> ;ntre parhiarhism [i construc]ia statului modern, in Maria Bucur, Mihaela Miroiu (editor), Patriarhat [i emancipare, p.79. 7 Rom=nia ;n timpul primului r\zboi mondial, vol.1, Bucharest, 1996, pp.26-28. 8 Gheorghe M. Dobrovici, Istoricul dezvolt\rii economice [i financiare a Rom=niei [i ;mprumuturile contractate, 1823-1933, Bucharest, 1943, p.235. 9 Dennis Deletant, Introduction in Romania within the Warsaw Pact> Ambivalence and Ambiguities, Documents Collection, CD-ROM edited by the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, July 2002.
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ANNEX 1
Letter of Application on NATO Membership from the President of Romania to the Secretary General of NATO
Bucharest, 18 September 1993 Dear Mr. Secretary General, The rapid evolution of political events in a world now free of the constraints imposed by the Cold War calls for an ever closer communication and cooperation in order to properly react to the new opportunities in the field of international cooperation, and especially in the field of security. Considering you a friend of Romania and of the Romanian people, a friend who, by the understanding shown for Romanian realities and by the support offered, decidedly contributed to enhancing our relations with the North-Atlantic Alliance, I presented you, on the occasion of my February visit to the NATO Headquarters, the importance Romania attaches to its integration into the Euro-Atlantic space and its basic security institutions. Romania, just like other countries of the region, is linking its concerns for national security and stability in the area with NATO, the most reliable political and military alliance in modern times which, subsequent to the collapse of the Iron Curtain, has proved its ability to adjust to the new European realities. Therefore, we believe that NATO is the sole organization which can provide, at present, a credible framework for the security of the young European democracies and for the stability in the region.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. To support the continuation and strengthening of the process of internal democracy and the implementation of economic reforms in these countries, it is essential to guarantee equal security for all the states in our geographical area. It is the only way to prevent the spillover of conflicts from our vicinity and the emergence of new risks to security. It is for that reason that we appreciate our cooperation with NATO within the Work Plan of NACC and I wish to assure you that the active part Romanian endeavors to play as a cooperation partner with the Alliance is an important component of our security policy. In the new European geo-strategic context Romania has a special position deriving from its size, demographic potential, access to the Black Sea and control over the Danube Rivers mouths. Despite some difficulties inherent to the transition period, my country has a good economic potential. Besides, due to its good relations with all the countries in this region, including the former Yugoslav republics, Romania is, in this part of Europe, a privileged cooperation partner and a factor spurring the efforts meant to ensure a new sub-regional security structure. At the same time, owing to the conflicts and instability prevailing in the proximity of my country, mainly in the former Soviet Union, Romania runs, more than the other Central and East European states, new security risks. Having in mind Romanias location, political, economic and military potential, as well as its firm commitment to the cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance, I consider that my country is able to contribute to the furthering of NATOs basic goals freedom, democracy, rule of law, maintenance of peace and security. It can also contribute substantially to maintaining security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Consequently, Romania has expressed its determination to participate effectively alongside with the NATO member states in their efforts aimed at strengthening European and regional security and stability. By the decisions of the Supreme Council of National Defence we have already started to reshape our national security strategy and defence doctrine, setting out from Romanias new geo-strategic position and using modern concepts and solutions, in keeping with the
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization changes undergone by the armed forces in the NATO member states, such as defence sufficiency and professionalization of armed forces. Moreover, effective steps have been taken in order to enhance our participation in peace-keeping operations, which can also contribute to the development of our cooperation with NATO, as it happened in relation with the WEU, in the monitoring of the embargo enforcement of the Danube. Such operations contribute to the strengthening of solidarity in the Euro-Atlantic area as they assure a better correlation between our activities and those of NATO member states and Romania has fully fulfilled the international responsibilities incumbent on it. I believe that the forthcoming NATO summit will contribute, through the evaluation of developments over the past two years and its decisions, to the strengthening of security in Central and SouthEastern Europe and to the consolidation of NATO cooperation. As to the possibility of countries located in former Soviet area of influence to participate, in the new European context, in NATO joint security efforts, including their full membership of the Alliance, I wish to recall the statement I made in Brussels, that the final goal of Romanias cooperation with NATO is its integration in the structures of the Alliance, as a full member, when the latter considers it possible to enlarge its membership. Should the admission of new members become a timely matter, then it appears as vital for their national security that the former Eastern European countries be treated on equal footing. The drawing of demarcation lines in this region, even if only by phasing out in time the admission of the candidates, would give risk to new sources of insecurity for the temporarily postponed countries, would turn them into prisoners of a future decision depending on the good will of the former allies in the Warsaw Pact, would make it possible for that gesture to be erroneously interpreted as signaling a lack of interest towards those where it would represent a destabilizing factor in the region. Setting out from these premises, I would like to tell you that I have always appreciated the nondiscriminatory and balanced treatment you
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. and the Alliance apply to the partner countries in this region relying on the strategic NATO concept stating the indivisibility of security in Europe, a concept Romania fully subscribes to. We consider the Center and South-East of Europe as a unitary region sharing common problems and high degree of integration in terms of security. That is the reason why only nondiscriminatory treatment applied by the NATO to the new democracies in this region can strengthen the Alliances own potential. I insisted on conveying these thoughts to you, Mr. Secretary General, as an expression of the particular importance Romania and the Romanian society attach to the cooperation with the North-Atlantic Alliance, to the furthering of its values, which we entirely share and have adopted as our own. Hoping that in due time the relations between Romania and NATO will develop in such way as to enable us to fully participate in our joint security efforts, please accept the assurance of my highest consideration. Sincerely yours, Ion Iliescu His Excellency Mr. Manfred Wrner Secretary General of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization Bruxelles
ANNEX 2
Statement
Gathered today, June 21, 1995 in Snagov, the below signatories of the present Statement, found that the National Strategy on Romanias Adhesion Preparation to European Union worked out by the Commission specially established for this purpose from the representatives of parliamentary political parties, Government, academic circles, and of civil society, expressed the Romanias firm orientation of focusing its development on promoting the characteristics of a democratic society rule of law, political plurality, power division, free elections, respect of human rights, including those of national minorities, creation of an efficient and lasting market economy compatible with the European Unions principles, standards, mechanisms, institutions and policies. The national strategic objective of Romanias adhesion to European Union constitutes a crucial point of solidarity and convergence of the countrys political and social forces, representing an historical opportunity for promoting the ideals and fundamental interests of Romanian people, its identity and traditions in a wide international openness, giving the possibility of mitigating and eliminating the gaps to the advanced countries through our own efforts backed by a broad co-operation, and of modernizing Romania, according to exigencies of transition to informational society and creation, on this basis, of the conditions for rising the Romanias citizens living standard and quality of life. The below signatories support the Commissions conclusion according to which through persevering efforts there should be
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. conditions that, in the offing of the year 2000, Romania would have, as well as other associated countries, the capacity to fulfil the fundamental conditions of adhesion. The signatories of the Statement appreciate the spirit in which the working out of this Strategy and the proceedings on its substantiation took place, the entirely free confrontation of opinions in a constructive debate climate of high scientific rigor, dialogue that allowed to favor the conviction that Romanias rebirth, its general recovery has been decided now. This spirit must be promoted further on, in order to establish a climate of political realism, of active solidarity, which would direct the constructive confrontation of opinions towards the national interests, the destiny of Romania in the contemporary world. The Statement is signed by: n THE PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA - Mr. Ion Iliescu n THE PRIME MINISTER - Mr. Nicolae V\c\roiu n THE PRESIDENT OF SENATE - Mr. Oliviu Gherman n THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES - Mr. Adrian N\stase n THE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY PARTY OF ROMANIA - Mr. Oliviu Gherman and Adrian N\stase n THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (N.S.F.) - Mr. Petre Roman n NATIONAL-PEASANT CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY - Mr. Gabriel }epelea n ROMANIAN NATIONAL UNITY PARTY - Mr. Gheorghe Funar n HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION FROM ROMANIA - Mr. Bela Marko
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization n GREAT ROMANIA PARTY - Mr. Corneliu Vadim Tudor n CIVIC ALLIANCE PARTY - Mr. Nicolae Manolescu n LABOUR SOCIALIST PARTY - Mr. Ilie Verde] n 93 LIBERAL PARTY - Mr. Horia Rusu n ROMANIAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL PARTY - Mr. Sergiu Cunescu n NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION - Mr. Niculae Cerveni n ROMANIAN DEMOCRATIC AGRARIAN PARTY - Mr. Victor Surdu n ROMANIA ECOLOGIST PARTY - Mr. Otto Weber n THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION FOR WORKING OUT THE NATIONAL STRATEGY ON ROMANIAS ADHESION PREPARATION TO EUROPEAN UNION - Mr. Tudorel Postolache
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Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization portionate to its military capability, geo-strategic position and demographic potential, by maintaining its commitment towards conflict prevention and crisis management. Romanias membership to NATO will also contribute to the strengthening of regional security and stability. The core of our preparation for joining NATO lies in speeding up and granting an additional coherence to restructuring and upgrading the national defence and security system in order to meet the requirements of the new European and global security environment. To this end, an approach of the risks and threats based on perceptions and joint actions is needed. Our country has to be in the position to take part in the types of missions stipulated by the Alliances New Strategic Concept. Defence reforms are necessary, as they meet objective needs and need continuity. They are implemented faster and more efficiently when the overall goal is the integration into the allied political and military system. This system gives Romania the possibility to turn to good account its potential and to better defend its security interests. The process of restructuring the armed forces will continue, aiming at improving Romanias defense capabilities, enhancing its contribution to NATO-led operations and, in view of future membership, participating to collective defense. We will allocate resources to make the national defence system compatible with that of the NATO member states and to fulfill the commitments undertaken under the Annual National Programme of preparation for NATO membership, while observing the social and economic balance. Ensuring a constant economic growth as well as the inter-ethnic and social stability will generate additional resources for this purpose and will allow us to undertake new objectives. We will participate in preparing all domestic conditions for Romania to adhere to the political, technical and status-of-forces agreements and protocols. We will give priority to the security and defense legislative package, which is developed in view to NATO membership. We will use the opportunities of parliamentarian diplomacy for securing the support of the NATO member states Parliaments for Romanias candidacy at the 2002 Prague Summit. We will participate to an open dialogue on NATO integration with the civil society and the
ANNEX 3
DECLARATION of the Political Parties Represented in the Parliament concerning Romanias Admission into NATO On the basis of a full political consensus regarding the fundamental interests of Romania, the signatories of this declaration reiterate, on behalf of their political orientations, that Romanias admission into NATO continues to be the cornerstone objective of its foreign and security policy. National security, the lasting integration of our country in the Western political system and its effective contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security and stability will be ensured for the long term by NATO membership. The preparation for NATO membership is both compatible and complementary with the EU integration process. In the spirit of its traditions and in harmony with the policy of openness and solidarity adopted by NATO after the end of the Cold War, Romania is prepared to promote and defend the democratic values which constitute the political foundation of the North-Atlantic community. Romania is preparing for its own defense, as well as for that of its future allies. Its Euro-Atlantic option is based on mutual confidence, transparency, partnership and cooperation. Romanias aspiration for NATO membership is not directed against any state. In the process of preparation for membership, Romanias conduct will be based on cooperation and solidarity, so as to avoid the competition with other aspirant countries. Based on a realistic assessment of the current domestic and international situation, the signatory parties agree that Romania can and must bring a credible contribution to strengthening European security, pro-
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. public at large, in order to maintain the support for joining NATO and to enhance the level of knowledge and understanding regarding security and defense issues. On behalf of the parliamentarian political parties which they represent, the signatories of this statement believe a Parliament decision on Romanias integration into NATO would be welcomed. They also agree on the need to improve inter-institutional co-operation for the Annual National Programme implementation process. We fully share the view that Romanias admission as a full-fledged NATO member will grant substance and credibility to the open door policy and will benefit the security of the member states, as well as that of the whole Euro-Atlantic area. Taking into consideration the populations support for the objective of Romanias integration into NATO as well as the progress achieved so far in our preparations, the signatories are convinced that EuroAtlantic integration is a catalyst for the solidarity and convergence of all political forces in promoting this national interest, reaching beyond the differences in our various political and doctrinaire views. Firmly convinced that this document serves Romanias national interest, we believe that, through persistent efforts and a genuine solidarity of the political forces, we can build a strong foundation for Romania to be invited to join NATO at the 2002 Summit. Bucharest, the 7th of March, 2001 n Social Democrat Party of Romania President - Adrian Nastase, Prime-minister n Great Romania Party President - Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Senator n Democratic Party President - Petre Roman, Senator n National Liberal Party President - Valeriu Stoica, MP n Hungarian Democratic Union from Romania President - Bela Marko, Senator
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization n Romanian Democratic Social Party President - Alexandru Athanasiu, Senator n Humanist Party of Romania President- Dan Voiculescu n Parliamentarian Group of National Minorities Leader - Varujan Pambuccian, MP
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ANNEX 4
ANNEX 5
Romanian Favourable Public Opinion for NATO Integration
Study on NATO Enlargement

Chapter 5: What are the implications of membership for new members, including their rights and obligations, and what do they need to do to prepare for membership? [...] A. What will be Politically Expected from the New Members 69. Commitments entered into by new member states should be the same as for present Allies, including acceptance of the principles, policies and procedures already adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time when new members join. Willingness and ability to meet such commitments, not only on paper but in practice, would be a critical factor in any decision to invite a country to join. 70. Bearing in mind that there is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance, possible new member states will, nevertheless, be expected to : - Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law; - Accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security, with each nation contributing to the security and defence
Source> Barometrul de opinie public\, Metromedia Transilvania, IMAS, IRSOP.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. from which all member nations benefit; - Be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; - Commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues, since consensus is the basis of Alliance cohesion and decision-making; - Undertake to fully participate in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the Alliance; - Establish a permanent representation at NATO HQ; - Establish an appropriate national military representation at SHAPE/SACLANT; - Be prepared to nominate qualified candidates to serve in the International Staff and in NATO agencies; - Provide qualified personnel to serve in the International Military Staff and in the Integrated Military Structure if and as appropriate; - Contribute to Alliance budgets, based on budget shares to be agreed; - Participate, as appropriate, in the exchange of Allied intelligence, which is entirely based on national contributions; - Apply NATO security rules and procedures; - Accept the Documents which provide the basis for the existing policies of the Alliance. (1) 71. The Alliance expects new members not to close the door to the accession of one or more later candidate states, as referred to also in paragraph 30 of Chapter 2. B. What will Politically Have to do Prospective New Members to Prepare for Membership 72. Prospective members will have to: - Demonstrate a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal juris-
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization dictional disputes by peaceful means, as referred to also in paragraph 6 of Chapter 1; - Show a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic freedom, social justice and environmental responsibility; - Establish an appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence force; - Undertake a commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to achieving the obligations described in section A and C. C. What Will Be Militarily Expected from the New Members 73. New members of the Alliance must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens of common security and collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and refined in subsequent Ministerial statements. 74. An important element in new members military contribution will be a commitment in good faith to pursue the objectives of standardization which are essential to Alliance strategy and operational effectiveness. New members should concentrate, in the first instance, on interoperability. As a minimum, they should accept NATO doctrine and policies related to standardization and, in addition, aim at achieving a sufficient level of training and equipment to operate effectively with NATO forces. PfP cooperation, including the Planning and Review Process, can help to improve the interoperability of Partners forces with those of NATO Allies, and aspirant new members should be expected to participate actively in PfP activities; but these are limited in scope to forces made available by Partners for cooperation in peacekeeping, humanitarian and SAR missions, and related training and exercises. D. What will Militarily Have to do Prospective New Members to Prepared for Membership 75. The ability of prospective members to militarily contribute to the collective defence and to the Alliances new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. 76. New members will need to adapt themselves to the fact that NATOs strategy and force structure are designed to exploit multinationality and flexibility to provide effective defence at minimum cost. NATO policy is therefore heavily dependent on standardization, particularly in the areas of operations, administration and material. Current NATO standardization priorities include commonality of doctrines and procedures, interoperability of command, control and communications and major weapon systems, and interchangeability of ammunition and primary combat supplies. 77. There are at present over 1200 agreements and publications that new members should undertake to comply with. Compliance should be an evolutionary and controlled process to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Alliance. Although national participation in standardization is optional, there are a number of areas, such as communication and information systems and measures to facilitate reinforcements, where military necessity requires participation. One way of achieving improved interoperability might be, for new members, to select units that can act as cornerstone units around which the rest of their forces can be developed with priority, being given to maximize these units interoperability with existing NATO units. To determine the minimum requirements necessary for operational effectiveness, a review of the STANAGs and Allied Publications is already under way. A country-by-country assessment of prospective new members standardization will also be required, based on levels of standardization displayed during the full range of PfP military and defence activities. A proposal should be developed by the Alliance in consultation with the prospective new member so that they will understand what will be expected of them. In addition, NATO schools and training will need to be developed so that the forces of new members can achieve interoperability with NATO in a reasonable time, and new members can adapt to NATO doctrine across a broad spectrum of activities. 78. Although the funding of new members enhanced interoperability is their responsibility, it poses important challenges for the
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization Alliance as a whole. There is a military imperative to achieve the minimum level of interoperability required for military effectiveness as quickly as possible. There is also a political imperative to demonstrate intra-Alliance cohesion, to ensure that new members feel that they are fully participating in the Alliance and to enable them to make an equitable contribution to collective defence at an early stage. In principle, both objectives should be achieved within the existing arrangements for funding Allies development, procurement, infrastructure and other costs (i.e. using national resources and the Security Investment Programme as appropriate). [...]
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Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other
ANNEX 6
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council,NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994 Partnership for Peace: Invitation We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation. Partnership for Peace:Framework Document 1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace. 2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control. 3.
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives: a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces; c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as
4.
5.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings: - those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises; - they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part; - they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes; - those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability; - building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces; - they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/ Partnership for Peace. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization Alliance will: - develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces; - promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
6.
8.
7.
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Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization Implementation
ANNEX 7
4. The Membership Action Plan, which is a practical manifestation of the Open Door, is divided into five chapters. These chapters are: I. II. III. IV. V. Political and Economic issues Defence/Military issues Resource issues Security issues Legal issues
Membership Action Plan (MAP) 1. The door to NATO membership under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains open. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), building on the Intensified, Individual Dialogue on membership questions, is designed to reinforce that firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership. It must be understood that decisions made by aspirants on the basis of advices received will remain national decisions undertaken and implemented at the sole responsibility of the country concerned. 2. The programme offers aspirants a list of activities from which they may select those they consider of most value to help them in their preparations. Active participation in PfP and EAPC mechanisms remains essential for aspiring countries who wish to further deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance. 3. Any decision to invite an aspirant to begin accession talks with the Alliance will be made on a case-by-case basis by Allies in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Madrid Summit Declaration, and the Washington Summit Declaration. Participation in the Membership Action Plan, which would be on the basis of self-differentiation, does not imply any timeframe for any such decision nor any guarantee of eventual membership. The programme cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership.
Within each, the MAP identifies issues that might be discussed (non-exhaustive) and highlights mechanisms through which preparation for possible eventual membership can best be carried forward. The list of issues identified for discussion does not constitute criteria for membership and is intended to encompass those issues which the aspiring countries themselves have identified as matters which they wish to address. 5. Each aspiring country will be requested to draw up an annual national programme on preparations for possible future membership, setting objectives and targets for its preparations and containing specific information on steps being taken, the responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific aspects of those preparations. It would be open to aspirants to update the programme when they chose. The programme would form a basis for the Alliance to keep track of aspirants' progress and to provide feedback. 6. Meetings will take place in a 19+1 format in the Council and other bodies and in NATO IS/NMA Team formats as appropriate. 7. Feedback and advice to aspirants on MAP issues will be provided through mechanisms based on those currently in use for Partners, 19+1 meetings and NATO Team workshops. These workshops will be held, when justified, to discuss particular issues drawn from the MAP. [...] 9. Each year the Alliance will draw up for individual aspirants a report providing feedback focused on progress made in the areas covered in their annual national programmes. This document would form
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. the basis of discussion at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the aspirant country. The report would help identify areas for further action, but it would remain at the aspirant's discretion to commit itself to taking further action. I. Political and Economic Issues 1. Aspirants would be offered the opportunity to discuss and substantiate their willingness and ability to assume the obligations and commitments under the Washington Treaty and the relevant provisions of the Study on NATO Enlargement. Future members must conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble. 2. Aspirants would also be expected: a. to settle their international disputes by peaceful means; b. to demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and human rights; c. to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations; d. to establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their armed forces; e. to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN; f. to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions and by promoting stability and well-being; g. to continue fully to support and be engaged in the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace; h. to show a commitment to promoting stability and wellbeing by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization 3. Moreover, aspirants would be expected upon accession: a. to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security; b. to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance through the sharing of responsibilities, costs and benefits; c. to commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus on all issues; d. to undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the Alliance; e. to commit themselves to the continued openness of the Alliance in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Madrid and Washington Summit Declarations. Implementation 4. Aspirants will be expected to describe how their policies and practice are evolving to reflect the considerations set out above (in paragraphs 1-2 above), and to provide their views on, and substantiate their willingness and ability to comply with other parts of the NATO "acquis", including the NATO Strategic Concept, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Ukraine Charter. 5. Aspirants would be expected to provide information on an annual basis on the state of their economy, including main macro-economic and budgetary data as well as pertinent economic policy developments. 6. Aspirants would be asked to provide a written contribution to the NATO Team, which would then be passed directly on to the Allies for their comments. After appropriate consultation in the Alliance, the NATO Team would then convene a meeting to discuss the contribution provided and relevant political issues. Such meetings would be held yearly; additional meetings could be convened upon mutual agreement. 7. An annual Senior Political Committee (Reinforced) meeting will be held to provide direct feedback from Allies to individual aspirants.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. II. Defence/Military Issues 1. The ability of aspiring countries to contribute militarily to collective defence and to the Alliance's new missions and their willingness to commit to gradual improvements in their military capabilities will be factors to be considered in determining their suitability for NATO membership. Full participation in operational PfP is an essential component, as it will further deepen aspirants' political and military ties with the Alliance, helping them prepare for participation in the full range of new missions. New members of the Alliance must be prepared to share the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits and burdens of common security and collective defence. They should be expected to subscribe to Alliance strategy as set out in the Strategic Concept and as laid out in other Ministerial statements. 2. Aspirants would be expected upon accession: a. to accept the approach to security outlined in the Strategic Concept; b. to provide forces and capabilities for collective defence and other Alliance missions; c. to participate, as appropriate, in the military structure; d. to participate, as appropriate, in the Alliance's collective defence planning; e. to participate, as appropriate, in NATO agencies; f. to continue fully to support PfP and the development of cooperative relations with non-NATO Partners; g. to pursue standardization and/or interoperability. Implementation 3. The following measures are designed to help aspirants develop the capabilities of their armed forces, including by enhancing interoperability, to be able to contribute to the effectiveness of the Alliance and thus demonstrate their suitability for future membership. The measures build where possible on extant initiatives.
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization a. Aspirants will be able in accordance with existing PfP procedures to request tailored Individual Partnership Programmes to better focus their participation in PfP directly on the essential membership related issues. Within each IPP, certain generic areas would be marked as being essential for aspirants, and aspirants would be invited to give due priority to those areas of cooperation. b. Annual Clearinghouse meetings for aspirants in a 19+1 format would be developed to help coordinate bilateral and multilateral assistance and maximise their mutual effectiveness to better assist them in their preparations for membership. c. Within the general framework of the expanded and adapted PARP and in accordance with PARP procedures, planning targets specifically covering areas most directly relevant for nations preparing their force structures and capabilities for possible future Alliance membership will be elaborated with aspirants. Aspirants will undergo a review process on their progress in meeting these planning targets. d. These planning targets will be established on the basis of consultations between each aspiring country and NATO and may be applied to any component of their force structures, rather than solely to their PfP-declared forces. e. PARP Ministerial Guidance will include approaches and specific measures which aspirants might adopt, in the context of the MAP, to prepare their forces for possible future NATO membership. f. The PARP Survey will be used for aspirants to seek more information and data in a number of areas, for example, general defence policy, resources, and present and planned outlays for defence. g. As a sign of transparency, and in accordance with PARP procedures: aspirants will be encouraged to circulate individual PARP documents to other aspirants in addition to circulating them to NATO Allies; and aspirants will be encouraged to invite, in particular, other aspiring countries to participate in the review process on planning targets. h. Aspirants will be invited to observe and participate in selected,
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. clearly defined phases of NATO-only exercises when Council decides to open these in accordance with current procedures. Priority consideration will be given to ensuring exercise effectiveness. i. Any future NATO facilities established for the assessment of Partner forces for NATO-led peace support operations and of Partner performance in NATO/PfP exercises and operations will be used to assess the degree of interoperability and the range of capabilities of aspirants' forces. If these assessment facilities are extended to encompass forces beyond those for peace support operations, they will be used to assist aspirants. j. Appropriate use may be made of simulation technology for training forces and procedures. III. Resource Issues 1. New Alliance members would be expected to commit sufficient budget resources to allow themselves to meet the commitments entailed by possible membership. National programmes of aspirants must put in place the necessary structures to plan and implement defence budgets that meet established defence priorities and make provision for training schemes to familiarise staff with NATO practices and procedures in order to prepare for possible future participation in Alliance structures. [...] IV. Security Issues 1. Aspirants would be expected upon accession to have in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of the most sensitive information as laid down in NATO security policy. Implementation 2. Appropriate courses may be made available, on request, to aspiring countries on Personnel, Physical, Document, Industrial Security
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization and INFOSEC. Individual programmes for aspirants may be developed as warranted. The NATO Security and Special Committees may wish to meet with aspirants, whenever they judge it necessary or useful. V. Legal issues 1. In order to be able to undertake the commitments of membership, aspirants should examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within NATO. This should enable aspirants to scrutinize domestic law for compatibility with those NATO rules and regulations. In addition, aspirants should be properly informed about the formal legal process leading to membership. [...]
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ANNEX 8
Expectaions concerning the integration in European Union
What is the most important problem in Romania?
When Romania will enter the European Union?
Source> Barometrul Politic Na]ional - iunie-iulie 2002, Metro Media Transilvania, in www.mmt.ro Source> Barometrul Politic Na]ional - Iunie-Iulie 2002, Metro Media Transilvania, in www.mmt.ro
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ANNEX 9
What chances has Romania to enter NATO?
ROMANIAS ANNUAL NATIONAL PLAN OF PREPARATION FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP 2002-2003 * EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ANP IV marks a change compared with previous plans drafted by Romania as it takes into account the new security environment and details our countrys present and future contribution to the global coalition against terrorism. Combating terrorism, and organised crime that supports terrorist networks, is one of the main focuses of ANP IV. ANP IV has been drafted during the preparations for the NATO Prague Summit. Therefore, the Plan takes into consideration the fact that Romania has pledged to subscribe to all the decisions that will be taken in Prague, and is prepared to contribute to NATOs new capabilities. Romania shares the view that continuation of the MAP process will assist MAP countries in accelerating their preparations for membership and will ensure that new members will be better prepared to contribute effectively to the Alliance. Continuation of the MAP process is key to maintaining the cohesion, relevance and efficiency of the enlarged Alliance. It is also paramount to a smooth integration of the new members into the Alliance. Chapter I Political and economic issues This chapter concentrates on steps to be taken by the Romanian
_______ * Romanias Annual National Plan of Preparation for NATO Membership 2002-2003 in www.mae.ro
Sources> Barometrul Politic Na]ional - Iunie-Iulie 2002, Metro Media Transilvania, in www.mmt.ro
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. government as part of the comprehensive process of internal reform. All relevant objectives especially under this, as well as under the other chapters, are consistent with measures to be taken for EU membership. Chapter I refers to aspects of foreign policy, measures undertaken by the Romanian government to strengthen national institutions responsible for the implementation of the objectives assumed under the Agenda for reform, as well as economic development. With regard to Romanias foreign policy, a consistent record of achievements in promoting security and stability in the region of South East Europe and further on is presented. The steady effort of the Government to harmonize national positions with NATO and EU member states is also underscored. Compared to the previous document, ANP IV places a higher emphasis on Romanias actions and objectives with regard to neighbouring areas to the East, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, the Black Sea region, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Internally, the implementation of relevant legislation in priority fields of action like the fight against corruption, strengthening the rule of law, freedom of expression etc. follows the adoption of these laws which was priority issue in the third cycle of the ANP. The work of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office which became fully operational on 1st September this year is also an important landmark that is covered in this chapter. The robust economic growth in 2001 (GDP increased by 5.3%) and the positive trend of other indicators place Romania on the path of sustainable development. A consistent macroeconomic policy mix has been implemented, continuing gradual deflation and maintaining external balances. The need to promote a cautious fiscal policy led to reducing the general consolidated budgetary deficit from 3.3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 2.9 percent in 2002 and to an anticipated 2.65 percent in 2003. The inflation rate is projected to decrease further, down to one digit by 2004. The strategic options of the Government on short and medium term focus on accelerating privatization and restructuring, strengthening financial and banking sectors reform, improving the business environment, increasing competition, attracting more foreign
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization investments. As the Romanian economy moved towards becoming a functional market economy, the average growth in GDP is expected to be more than 5% annually during 2002-2005, thus reducing the gap with the developed countries. Chapter II Defence Issues This chapter concentrates on the achievements of the previous cycle and sets out the objectives for the 4th cycle. During the 3rd MAP cycle, Romania continued to drive forward with the utmost vigour the reform and restructuring of its Armed Forces. It concentrates on increasing their level of interoperability, effective participation alongside NATO forces in peace support operations, and in the international campaign against terrorism. The MAP formula will continue to be the key instrument for reform during the next cycles and it will remain a fundamental planning tool in Romanias reform and restructuring process. The 3rd MAP cycle was particularly important in adopting a qualitative approach focused on capabilities. A holistic review of the armed forces was launched, taking into account the new strategic environment and the fight against terrorism, to build a flexible structure that meets national defence and NATO requirements using smaller, bettertrained, better-equipped and more mobile forces. This review is almost complete and envisages a gradual decrease in the force size by 2007 to 75,000 military personnel and 15,000 civilians. The most significant achievements include the following: - Disestablishing more than 100 structures, restructure other 300 and make operational 2 brigades (to be continued during the 4th MAP cycle), the Main Operational Air Centre, one air base, one ships squadron. - Maintaining/increasing the interoperability level of the forces earmarked for NATO. - Increasing participation with more than 100% in KFOR and SFOR, and participate in ISAF and Enduring Freedom Operation with more than 450 troops. - Improving the officers/NCOs ratio from 1/1.14 to 1/1.23 by further reducing the number of senior officers and training NCOs.
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Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D. - Implementing a western style planning, programming, budgeting and evaluating system. - Improving our space management by continuing the implementation of the Air Surveillance Operational Centre (ASOC). - Acquiring modern NATO compatible communication radios for units earmarked for NATO-led PfP operations, and continue the implementation of the Romanian Armed Forces Communication System (STAR). The 4th MAP cycle will continue to devote resources to the priority areas identified in previous MAP cycles, assuming new objectives that will focus on ensuring that our forces are fully able and ready to assume the responsibilities and accomplish the tasks associated with Alliance membership. Areas of particular importance are: force restructuring and operationalization, increasing the interoperability with NATO, human resources management, air space management and air defence, participation in NATO-led PfP operations and multinational formations. In addition, we will assume objectives in areas that address especially the development of some new capabilities in line with the new security requirements following the September 11th events, such as: host nation support, personnel training, fight against terrorism and capabilities to counter terrorism, NBC defence capabilities, logistics and force sustainability in the theatre. In order to ensure that the defence budget can properly support these objectives, a budget profile reflecting 2.38% of GDP was established for 2002 and it will remain at this level during the period 2003 - 2005. Chapter III Resources This chapter focuses on the resources of defence and describes the new law of public finances that was approved and will enter into force on 1st January 2003. This will allow the split of the defence budget into eight major programs (land forces, air forces, navy, communications and automated data processing, central administration, logistics, intelligence, international activities), to which a new one (general staff/strategic management) was attached and will be financed starting with the year 2003. The planning and programming process was improved by establishing a budgetary profile of 2.38% of the GDP for
Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization the period 2003-2005. The defence budget for 2003 amounts to 1,091.1 mil USD in cash contribution and 106.6 mil USD in non-cash allocations. Chapter IV Security Issues This chapter sets out the arrangements for the protection of classified information, according to NATO standards. It covers the development of the necessary legislative and institutional framework as well as the implementation of protective security measures adjusted to the Euro-Atlantic pattern and criteria of exigency. It describes the establishment of the National Registry Office for Classified Information (NROCI) as well as other structures and modalities to ensure proper management of classified data and vetting of personnel in accordance with NATO standards. The public awareness activities on the responsibilities involved by the status of being a NATO member and the promotion of a security culture will be continued. Chapter V Legal Issues No amendments to the Romanian Constitution are needed prior to accession to the Alliance. However, Romania is reviewing its current legislation to identify any amendments, which could be needed in order to ensure a smoother NATO integration. Romania will also simplify the procedures allowing the deployment of Romanian forces abroad and the transit of NATO troops on the Romanian territory. During the 4th cycle priority will be given to finalizing and submitting for adoption the following laws: the National System for Action in civil crises management cases; the preparation of the national economy and state territory for defence; the preparation of the population for defence. _______________
1) NROCI is organized and functioning as national security authority of Romania dealing the protection of all classified information. It is a public institution subordinated to the Government of Romania. All the attributions of the National Security Authority (NSA), established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Government Decision nr. 864/2000) will be assumed by the NROCI until November 23, 2002.
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NO. OPERATION/ COUNTRY ORGANIZATION/ TOTAL MISSION COALITION 10 KFOR Kosovo NATO 218 PERIOD December 2000/ December 2001 present day 1990 - present day 1996 - present day 1991 - present day 2002 - present day 1999 - present day 2001 - present day
ANNEX 10
11 12
UNMEE MONUC UNIK UNMIBH UNMIK OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje
Eritrea Congo
UN UN
8 26 5 18 185 10
Romanian Participation in PSO-s Under the Aegis of UN, NATO, OSCE and in the Fight Against Terrorism as of 15 August 2002 *
NO. OPERATION/ COUNTRY ORGANIZATION/ TOTAL MISSION COALITION 1 2 DESERT STORM OSCE MISSION TO MOLDOVA UNSOM II UNAMIR UNAVEM III MONUA ALBA IFOR SFOR Kuweit Moldova COALITION OF THE WILLING OSCE 384 24 PERIOD
13 14 15
Iraq-Kuwait UN Bosnia
Herzegovina
UN UN OSCE
Kosovo FYROM
February 1991 1992 - 1993
16
17 Somalia Rwanda Angola Angola Albania Bosnia

Herzegovina
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
UN UN UN UN European coalition NATO NATO
400 5
1993-1994 1994
OSCE Mission Georgia to Georgia OSCE Mission Kosovo in Kosovo Albania
OSCE OSCE OSCE
4 19 3
1999 - present day 1999 - present day 2002 - present day 2002 - present day
18
100+ May/June 1995 750 + June/May 1997 900 400 + 200+ 122 June 1997 August 1999 April-July 1997 March - October 1996 July/December 2000 - present day
19 OSCE Presence in Albania 20 OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 21
The OSCE Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Bosnia
Herzegovina
_______ * Romanian Participation in PSO-s Under the Aegis of UN, NATO, OSCE and in the Fight Against Terrorism as of 15 August 2002 in www.mapn.ro, www.mae.ro
22
OSCE Mission BosniaOSCE to Bosnia and Herzevogina Herzevogina OSCE Chechnya OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya
2002 - present day 2002 - present day
76
77

NO. OPERATION/ COUNTRY ORGANIZATION/ TOTAL MISSION COALITION PERIOD 2002 - present day 2002 - present day
23 OSCE
24
25 26
Croatia Mission to Croatia Personal Nagorno Representativ Karabakh e of the CIO on the Conflict Dealt with by the Minsk Conference Afghanistan "ISAF" Operation Operation "Enduring Freedom"
Afghanistan
OSCE
OSCE
Coalition of the Willing Coalition of the Willing
57 411
February 2002 present day July 2002 - present day
Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History ROMANIA, Bucharest, 70100 6 Constantin Mille Street, sector 1 Tel. +40 21 315 17 00 Fax. +40 21 411 22 01 e-mail: ipsdmh@ro.pims.org; ispaim@ro.pims.org www.ispaim.ro Desktop publishing - I.P.S.D.M.H. Printed by Military Publishing House
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OCCASIONAL PAPERS No.

ROMANIAS WESTERNIZATION AND NATO MEMBERSHIP - A HISTORICAL APPROACH -

Romanias Ministry of National Defense

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

Romanian Favourable Public Opinion for NATO Integration

Study on NATO Enlargement

Source> Barometrul de opinie public\, Metromedia Transilvania, IMAS, IRSOP.

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization Implementation

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

What is the most important problem in Romania?

When Romania will enter the European Union?

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

What chances has Romania to enter NATO?

Brig.Gen. MIHAIL E. IONESCU, Ph.D.

Romanias Integration into NATO and Westernization

UNMEE MONUC UNIK UNMIBH UNMIK OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje

February 1991 1992 - 1993

17 Somalia Rwanda Angola Angola Albania Bosnia

UN UN UN UN European coalition NATO NATO

OSCE Mission Georgia to Georgia OSCE Mission Kosovo in Kosovo Albania

OSCE OSCE OSCE

19 OSCE Presence in Albania 20 OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 21

The OSCE Federal Republic of Yugoslavia