Logical Approach to Pragmatics

Jacek Malinowski

1 Introduction.
In 1938 Charles Morris has published the book Foundation of the Theory of Signs". He has distinguished there three areas of logical investigations: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. This book is commonly recognized as a starting point of investigations in the area of pragmatics. As the matter of fact the book of Morris don't give any contribution to pragmatics but rather indicated some problems of language understanding which cannot be handled with the semantic methods and stressed then the need to solve them other way. The concrete pragmatic investigations have been started in the 50-ties. From that time on the main results in the area has been achieved mainly by: linguistically oriented logicians and logically oriented linguists. This stress the fact that pragmatics lies on the borderline between logic and linguistics. This is not our aim to present the history of pragmatics. Let me only mention that the logicians who gave essential contribution to pragmatics were: Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Richard Montague, David Kaplan, Dana Scott, David Lewis, Max, J. Cresswell, Robert Stalnaker. The presentation of their theories of language use would need a long series of lecture. The main aim of this lecture is: | to give clear although not formal de nition of pragmatic, to explain how it is related to logic and proof that it is related very close to it; | to present the essence of the most current theory of interpretation of sentences also in commonsense language; | to give an outline of the theory of speech acts; | to present Grice's theory of conversational implicature;
This is a rst draft. Any comments are welcomed, the more critical, the better. But please don't make any citation, it is much to early for it.
1

| the proof Leach's thesis that the rules of kindness govern are more fundamental than the Grice theory.

2 What is pragmatics?
The most general de nition of semantics is that it is the study of linguistic meaning", or the study of the meaning of words and sentences. Though we may nd it easier to think of words as relating to "things" in the world, semanticists point out that many words do not in fact refer to the external world at all. So the focus of the modern subject of semantics is on the way people relate words to each other within the framework of their language. In discussing semantics, linguists normally use the term lexeme as opposed to word, so that word can be retained for the in ected variants. Thus one can say that the words walk, walks, walked, and walking are di erent forms of the same lexeme. There are several kinds of sense relations among lexemes. First is the opposition between syntagmatic relations the way lexemes are related in sentences and paradigmatic relations the way words can substitute for each other in the same sentence context. Important paradigmatic relations include: synonymy - a relation of "sameness", e.g pavement and sidewalk; hyponymy - a relation of "inclusion", e.g a cat is a type of animal; antonymy - a relation of "oppositeness", e.g big vs. small or buy vs. sell; Pragmatics is often de ned as the theory of the way we use language. Theories of pragmatics links so the language and language user while, semantics links the syntactical entities of language with their meanings. One may think that semantics su ce to use language. Thus having an appropriate semantics an competent user know meanings of words and sentences which is enough to use the language proper way. The reality appears to be much more complicated. Thus, very often, especially when commonsense language is concern, we utter sentences in the way which seems to have no relation to its meanings. Lets consider the following example: On the street somebody said to us the following sentence: 1 Would you be so kind to tell me what time is it? Logically to educated person will recognize that it is an yes-no question. 2

S he has at hand an appropriate theory of questions of this kind and know well that speaker expected from him one of the answers: yes" or know". An analysis of what is the matter of this question, even if proper, gives no chances to answer the question the proper and commonly known way. We all know that the speaker don't expect any answer of the form yes" or no". The following example seems to belong to the common experience of all teachers lecturing logic. The rules of introduction of AND and OR are obviously logically valid. Nevertheless students, especially whose not very interesting in mathematics, use without problems the former and hardly accept the later. An psychological experiment performed by Rips in MIT gave the results that the former rule is commonly accepted while the later is accepted only by 17 of respondents. AND Introduction 1.00 Or Introduction 0.17 P P Q P AND Q P OR Q What's the reasons of this di erence? It seems to be clear that the respondents don't understand the second rule proper way. More precisely the its logical interpretation is mixed up with the following pragmatic interpretation: I told , would I told then OR . The AND rule is commonly accepted because both its logical and pragmatic interpretation are valid. The pragmatic interpretation of OR rule is obviously not valid. If one tell I will come to you tomorrow" s he will rather not tell I will come to you tomorrow or in next month". Paradoxes like this one nd an illuminating solution in Grice's theory of conversational implicature which is presented later in this lecture.
P P Q

3 Theory of sentence interpretation.

The great part of achievements of contemporary logic comes from investigations of the language of mathematics and has been performed by mathematicians or more precisely mathematically educated logicians. As a consequence the rst order predicate language is often considered as a good rst 3

approximation of natural language. Moreover, the properties of predicate language are, in a sense, projected on natural language causing then illusion that some typical language phenomena are paradoxical. We will recall below two in uential apparent paradoxes in fact typical language phenomenon: intentionality and occasionally. Their recognizing and explanation were a milestones in the hard way from classical logic to natural language. According to Fregean paradigm of logic the meaning of a sentence is its truth value. Thus to get the meaning of a sentence it is enough interpretation of its variables. The way is then clear and direct:
r r

sentence

meaning

No doubts that when the rst order predicate language is concern no problems occur. Until late 60-ties most of logicians seemed to be unaware of how narrow part of natural language could be covered by the language of predicate logic. Classical logic satis es the principle of extensionality. Thus, the truth value of composed sentences depends only on truth values of components. In the natural language the principle of extensionality is satis ed very seldom. The sentence: 2 Kepler has known that more than 6 planets goes around the sun. is false, while 3 Kepler has known that more than 6 9. is true. As a consequence sentences build up with the operator: 4 Kepler has known that ... . doesn't satisfy the extensionality principle. Thus, components of 2, and 3 sentences 6 9" and More than 6 planet goes around the sun." are 4

both true, so according to the principle of extensionality both 2 and 3 should have the same truth value. 4 is a typical example of an intentional operator. To nd the meaning of a sentence like 2 or 3 it is not enough to compose meanings of its components. We have to proceed more complicated way than the picture above shows. The meaning of 2 depends not only on how things are but also on how they could be so, how the things are in other possible worlds. Possible world semantics invented by Saul Kripke form a powerful theoretic tool for both logical and pragmatic investigations. The great success of Kripke semantics for modal logic has been a big step forward in direction of logical pragmatics. Kripke semantics has solved the problem of meaning for intentional expressions.

sentence

,,
r

@ ,, @ @@ , , @ ,
r

possible world

@@

meaning

Other aspect of the structure of interpreting sentences has came from the study of the phenomenon of occasionally. The sentence: 5 Now I am here cannot be uttered without being true. On the other hand we wouldn't tell that it is a tautology. For such a sentences logicians has invented the notion of eternal sentences, sentences which meaning don't depend on who, when, where, and so on, utter them. The default assumption was that any sentence is fully equivalent to an eternal sentence. As a consequence, they would tell that there is no need to investigate sentences like 5. Many logicians, including so in uential as Quine, has arguing against this assumption. Nevertheless till now this assumption is still considered to be valid, especially when we teach logic to students, considering examples coming from commonsense language. From point of pragmatics it is a secondary question if 5

and in what extend, this assumption is true. The point is that occasional sentences like 5 are typical in the language use. We cannot then pretend that that don't exist considering them as special, informal or improper. It seems to be necessary for a logic of natural language to cope them directly right way. From early 70-ties on many logical solutions of the problem of occasionally has been given. David Kaplan, Robert Stalnaker, Max J. Cresswell have constructed logical systems which step by step has came closer and closer to common language use. Let me omit their details here. Roughly speaking the result was that we have to distinguish between the sentence and what is exactly said - between utterance and proposition . The way from former to later goes through the context. All the occasional utterances are context sensitive. Nevertheless, as far as I know nobody has given yet and satisfactory de nition of the context. Bar Hillel has argued has a satisfactory de nition of the context is unlikely to be given. Anyway, we can agree that the context of an utterance is determined by the circumstances of utterance. Knowing them we know the context. All this leads us to the way of proceeding depicted in the following diagram: context possible world

utterance

,,

@ ,, @@ @ ,,
r

@ @,
r

,, ,

@ ,, @ , @
r

@@

proposition

@ @

meaning

We have heard the utterance. To get know what is exactly said a proposition we need a context and then looking eventually at the appropriate possible worlds we get to be able to establish the meaning of a given sentence. One important step is missing here. A competent language user utter a sentence. We necessarily have to distinguish between a sentence as a abstract language entity and an utterance a concrete case of using a given sentence. All this leads us to the diagram above. To recall brie y the process of interpreting an utterance: An utterance is 6

said. Using context we can get to know what is exactly said. We recognize then a proposition. Then we interpret it using eventually the possible worlds go get then its meaning true of false. Lets look at the 5 in the situation we have got. Hearing it in the particular situation we get: 6 Bill Clinton is in White House on the on April 30, 2000, 14:00. It is true if Clinton had told it or false if he hadn't anyway it is not a tautology. According to the presented approach the problems in the subject are centered upon the properties of context. The central problem here is to describe the mechanism of how we use the context to nd out the proposition indented by speaker.

4 Speech acts.
Logic investigates sentences in the logical sense" thus sentences to which one can correspond the truth values in a natural way. During a very long period logicians seemed to be unaware of the fact that the scope of the sentences in the logical sense form just a small part of the set of all sentences. Two books: the rst by John L. Austin's How to do things with words" and Speech acts" by J. Searle were a milestones on the way from classical logic to the logic of the broadly understood language. We will present there some version of their theories which is competitive to the results achieved by the founding fathers. However, this versions seems to keep their main ideas unchanged. Let us start however with some backgrounds of the subject. People use language to accomplish many kinds of acts, broadly known as speech acts, as distinct from physical acts like drinking water or mental acts like thinking about drinking water. Speech acts include asking for a glass of water, in addition to making promises, issuing warnings or threats, giving orders, making requests for information, and many others. In all European and most world's languages three type of speech acts can be realized in the syntactic way. The speech act of assertion is realized by the declarative sentences although not all the declarative sentences expresses an assertion, such a sen7

tences conveys information, and are true or false, so they are the sentences in the logical sense. Example: 7 Jenny got an A on the test, Interrogative sentences expresses the questions. They form acts of requiring information, like the sentences below: 8 Did Jenny get an A on the test? Orders and requests are expressed by means of imperative sentences. They cause others to behave in certain ways: 9 Get an A on the test Although assertions, questions and orders are fairly universal, and most of the world's languages have separate syntactic constructions that distinguish them, other speech acts do not have a syntactic construction that is speci c to them. Consider the English sentence, 10 If you cross that line, I'll wipe that smile right o your face! Most English speakers would have no trouble identifying such an utterance as a threat, but it is clear that if-constructions are not speci c to the speech act of threatening. Such a construction might also express a promise, as in: 11 If you work hard all week, I'll give you a bonus! A consideration of the syntactic means available for expressing the various speech acts leads us to see that even for the three basic speech acts laid out above, speakers may choose means of expression other than the basic syntactic type associated with the speech act in question. One subtype of direct speech acts exists in English and in many other languages, and allows us to expand the kinds of direct speech acts we can make beyond the three basic types that have their own special syntax. These are the direct speech acts that use performative verbs to accomplish their ends. Performative verbs can also be used with the three basic speech act types as exempli ed in 12 - 14, associated with making statements, requests and commands respectively: 8

12 I assert that Jenny got an A on the test. 13 I ask you who took the photos. 14 I order you to close the window. To these can be added performative verbs that allow us to directly convey promises, threats, warnings, etc. 15 I advise you to keep up the payments on your car. 16 I warn you not to step across this line. 17 I promise you that I will pay the money back by the end of the month. 18 I bet you a dollar that it'll rain on the parade. In the last sentence, the utterance of the sentence actually accomplishes the act of betting possibly along with setting aside the money for the bet, and as such, it belongs to the class of ceremonial utterances that accomplish other kinds of changes in the world: 19 I now pronounce you husband and wife. 20 I name this ship Sojourner. 21 I dub thee Sir Galahad. It is clear that not all uses of verbs that can be performative are actually performative in particular utterances. For example, if we change the person or the tense in any of the last seven sentences, they are no longer performative: 22 He advises you to keep up the payments on your car. 23 I named this ship Sojourner. In both these cases, the utterance simply reports, and does not accomplish the act of advising or of naming. A test of whether or not a particular sentence is a performative utterance is whether or not you can insert hereby 9

before the verb. If the resulting sentence doesn't make sense, it is not a performative: 24 I hereby name this ship Sojourner; but 25 *I hereby named this ship Sojourner. In order to "do things with words", certain things must be true of the context in which speech acts are uttered. In other words, a sentence must not only be grammatical to be correctly performed, it must also be felicitous. Lets consider three types of felicity conditions: Preparatory conditions, such as that the person performing the speech act has the authority to do so, that the participants are in the correct state to have that act performed on them, and so on the marriage performed by an utterance like 19 cannot happen unless the participants are of age, and not already married, and unless the person who says the words has the authority to marry people. Conditions on the manner of execution of the speech act, such as touching the new knight on both shoulders with the at blade of a sword while intoning the words in 21; and Sincerity conditions, obviously necessary in the case of verbs like apologize and promise. Some of the felicity conditions on questions and requests as speech acts are as follows, where "S" = speaker; "H" = hearer; "P" = some state of a airs; and "A" = some action. 26 S questions H about P. a. S does not know the truth about P. b. S wants to know the truth about P. c. S believes that H may be able to supply the information about P that S wants. 27 S requests H to do A. a. S believes A has not yet been done. b. S believes that H is able to do A. c. S believes that H is willing to do A-type things for S. d. S wants A to be done. We can see what happens when some of these conditions are absent. In classrooms, for example, one reason that children may resent teachers' 10

questions is that they know that there is a violation of A.1: the teacher already knows the answer. A violation of B.2 can turn a request into a joke: "Would you please tell it to stop raining?" Elementary utterances are of the form  , where is an illocutionary force, and is a proposition, which establish a content of the utterance. Thus 7, 8 and 9 have the same propositional content supposing that 9 is addressed to Jenny and three di erent illocutionary forces. Those content is a proposition describing the fact hat Jenny has received an A on the test. Any illocutionary force is consist of the following six components: illocutionary point: direction to t between words and worlds, in the case of 27 it relay on making hearer will take care to change a present state of a airs in appropriate manner.
F P F P

mode of achievement: of illocutionary point an illocutionary point might be achieved on many ways. A mode of achievement distinguish all of modes corresponding to given illocutionary force. Mode of achievement allow us to distinguish between request" and command" illocutionary forces with the same illocutionary force. content conditions de ne the domain of the operator of illocutionary force. In our example a content should describe some future state of a airs.
F

preparatory conditions A preparatory condition in 27 say that speaker is convinced that hearer's help will be up to himself. sincerity conditions describe mental states propositional attitudes of speaker appropriate for a given illocutionary force. In 27, it said that speaker really want hearer will do what speaker ask him to do. degree of strengthening the mental states of sincerity occurs with di erent strengthenings in di erent illocutionary forces. Degree of strengthenings try to measure" them. An illocutionary point is, in a sense, most important here. It allows us to give an interesting logical classi cation of speech acts. Any utterance is giving a link between world and language. In a rst approximation a type of utterance is determined by the direction to t between them i.e. between world and word. There are four possible illocutionary points. An 11

assertive illocutionary point: Any utterances with this point thus assertion, predictions, suppositions, doubts for example are utter with the aim to t the content of utterance to the appropriate state of a airs in the world. So, a speaker is going to t the content of an utterance to the world. Thus any assertive utterances have direction to t word to world". An opposite direction: world to word" possesses all commissive and directive illocutionary forces thus command, promises, threats requirements, questions, begs for example. A speaker who utter herself with this point is intended to cause an appropriate change of the world being intended to act in an appropriate way commissive speech acts or wanting to make somebody to take care about an appropriate change of the world directive speech acts. An double sided direction to t between world and word is an illocutionary point of most of the utterances constructed by means of performatives. Baptizing, nominating, naming, appointing are examples of illocutionary forces with double sided illocutionary point. Their common feature is that the speaker change the state of world by uttering with this illocutionary point. The fourth empty sided" illocutionary point occurs in all utterances which are designed to express speaker's psychic states like: How that you came" for example. Illocutionary counterpart of the notion of true sentences is the notion of performed utterance. We will say that an utterance   is performed by speaker in a given situation i : 1. Speaker achieve an illocutionary point of an illocutionary force with content in mode which agree with mode of achievement of , and ful lls content conditions, of in a given situation; 2. Speaker presupposes all propositions determined by preparatory conditions for . 3. Speaker express with degree of strengthening of all mental states determined by sincerity conditions of .
F P i F P F P F P F F

Lets look on the components of an illocutionary force from an uniform point of view using for it a bit of formalities. Mode of achievement is a function , which to any situation and proposition correspond value of success or insuccess.
h h

:  3
I U

i; P

 7,! f

S; S =

12

the function divide the set of all situation into two subsets: A set of situation in which given utterance is performed according to mode of achievement value of success, a set of situations in which given utterance is not performed or performed with violation of mode of achievement value of insuccess.
I

Similar structure have sincerity condition, mode of achievement, preparatory conditions and degree of strengthening. An illocutionary point, although, in principle, most important, is only a special case of the mode of achievement and could be easily reduced to it. All the functions de ning the properties above have the same structure. They design a set of situations in which appropriate conditions are ful lled. In situation semantics it is quite common assumption that situation is identi ed with the set of propositions which are satisfy in it. Lets assume that a satis ability relation j= is given. We read it as follows: a proposition is true in situation i j= . If we would identify a situation with the set of true sentences then a relation j= is identical to relation of belonging. j= i 2 . Situation is identical with i
P s s P s P P s s s
0

f 2 : j= g = f 2 : j= g
P U s P P U s
0

Assuming the condition above we can replace all the conditions given by: mode of achievement and preparatory conditions and sincerity conditions, illocutionary point and degrees of strengthening to the following one essential condition. Given a set of possible situations , set of propositions , and relation j= of satis ability. An essential condition of performing an utterance with illocutionary force we will call a function ~ , which to any pair   2  correspond a set of propositions ~    . We will say that an utterance ful lled in its essential condition i for any 2 ~  , j= . A domain of an illocutionary force we will call any set of propositions F  . We are now able, to formulate a de nition of performed utterance.
I U F F s; P I U F s; P U s Q F s; P s Q F D U

An utterance   is performed in i an utterance   ful lls in an essential condition of and belong to the domain F of .
F P s F P s F P D F F

An illocutionary force 1 we will call stronger than an illocutionary force and any situation ~2    2 i F2  F1 , and for any proposition
F D D P s F s; P

13

F1 s; P F

~  . So, an illocutionary force 1 is stronger than an illocutionary force 2 i their domains included in themselves in proper manner, and essential condition of 2 is a logical consequence of essential conditions of 1 .
F F F

5 Gricean Conversational Maxims.

The work of H.P. Grice takes pragmatics farther than the study of speech acts. Grice was a student of conversation, and he enunciated the basic principle that, outside of the theater of the absurd, most conversationalists seem to hold to: the Cooperative Principle. It has four sub-parts or maxims, that conversationalists are enjoined to respect. A The maxim of quality. Speakers' contributions ought to be true. B The maxim of quantity. Speakers' contributions should be as informative as required; not saying either too little or too much. C The maxim of relevance. Contributions should relate to the purposes of the exchange. D The maxim of manner. Contributions should be orderly and brief, avoiding obscurity and ambiguity. The maxims works in two modes: the speaker mode and the hearer mode. The speaker mode has a normative sense: Do formulate an utterance so way to keep all the maxims. The hearer mode is more sophisticated: When interpreting an utterance remember that an speaker kept all the maxims. So when you nd out that an speaker has outed some maxims you have to interpret an utterance anew. Lets consider two examples: S: Where is Bill? H: There is a yellow Porsche outside Sue house. S: Can you tell me the time? H: Well, the mail has just come In both examples the simplest hearer interpretation of what H has told is that he did break the communication. So, according to the hearer mode of exploiting the maxims of relevance S should interpret the utterance anew 14

appealing to their common knowledge that Bill is a fried of Sue and has a yellow Porsche or that postman comes always at 11 am. Grice was using observations of the di erence between "what is said" and "what is meant" to show that people actually do follow these maxims in conversation. We can see how this works in considering the maxim of quantity at work in the following made-up exchange between parent and child: Parent: "Did you nish your homework?" Child: "I nished my algebra". Parent: "Well, get busy and nish your English, too!" Further proof is that when people "violate" or " out" these maxims, particular meanings are conveyed. It is certainly possible that the child could come back and typically in a teasing tone say that he had also nished all his other subjects. After all, he did not say he had not nished the rest of his homework. If you were to hear someone described as having "one good leg", you would be justi ed in assuming the person's other leg was bad, even though nothing particular had been said about it. Conversationalists are justi ed in making the inferences they typically do, because they as well as Grice have understood the di erence between "what is said" and "what is meant". The maxim of manner is crucial for understanding the di erence between the following two utterances: Miss Singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to the score of an aria from Rigoletto. Miss Singer sang an aria from Rigoletto. manner The content of both the sentences is more or less the same. The later utterance expressed it direct way. While interpreting the former utterance hearer must ask herself why the speaker expresses so simple matter in so complicated way. The hearer mode of maxim of manner cause that there must be some reasons for such a way of utterance. Thus, the speaker like to avoid of using the word sing, stressing that it isn't sing what Miss Singer is doing. This means miss Singer is bad singer. This volume is well-bound, and free of typographical errors. 15

This example outs the maxim of quantity saying less than is normal for a book review, and probably the maxim of relevance as well, since binding and typographical errors are less signi cant to potential readers than the book's contents. What is implicated is: This volume stinks!". Using maxim of quantity utterance John has three cows" entails that John has exactly three cows.

6 Conversational rules of kindness.

In 1983 G. Leech has proposed a theory of conversational implicature based on some rules of kindness. Without being kind we would, in principle, tell all the true independently of what kind of feelings it cause in the hearer. Everyday commonsense discourses are organized other way. We don't tell all the truth. We usually divide the truth into pleasant to hearer and the unpleasant one. We utter it then in a non symmetric way. Roughly speaking we tell what is pleasant and try to avoid telling what is unpleasant. Leech succeed arguing that all Grice's conversational maxim are governed by the following maxims of kindness. No Grice's maxim tell us why we use 1 instead to use more direct: 28 What time is it? That is common that we don't like to be seen as an unkind person. Uttering 1 we wont to stress that we are kind, and know that s he has his own matters to do but if s he would nevertheless tell us the time we would appreciate it. Leech maxims us just about such a kind of thinking. The main idea of the maxims is that the speaker act so way to mini-max point in the two dimensional plane of a scale appropriate to a given maxim. Three di erent although similar scales occur in maxims. Perhaps it is better to consider instead one common scale of expenses and pro ts. Some mis ts may occur then, especially in agreement maxim. On the other hand we will get then an uniform point of view of the theory. All the maxims work the following way: Let your utterance to act so way to achieve maximum pro ts for hearer even it will make maximum expenses for speaker. A. Tact Maxim works for directive or commissive utterance. It work in the scale: expenses - pro ts: Minimum expenses for hearer with maximum pro ts 16

for him. So we will tell: 30 Help yourself once more. and rather not 31 I will help yourself once more. B. Generosity Maxim works also for directive or commissive utterance and also work in the same scale of expenses and pro ts: minimum pro ts for me and maximum expenses for me, so we will tell: 32 Have you something against a cup of tee? and rather not 33 I have nothing against a cup of tee. C. Approbation Maxim works in expressive or assertive utterance. in the scale of objections - praises: Minimum criticizing of hearer and maximum of praises of hearer. So, we tell: 34 Oh, how terri c dinner you have prepared and not 35 Oh, how untasty dinner you have prepared D. Modesty Maxim works also in expressive or assertive utterance in the scale of objections and praises: minimum praises for speaker and maximum of criticizing of speaker. We tell" 36 It was silly of me. but not 36 It was silly of you. E. Agreement Maxim applies for assertive utterances in the scale of nonagreement - agreement: minimum of nonagreement between speaker and hearer and maximum of agreement between them. So we tell: 37 It is an interesting exhibition. and not 38 This exhibition wasn't interesting. F. Sympathy Maxim applies also for assertive utterance in the scale reluctance - kindness: minimum of reluctance between speaker and hearer and maximum of kindness between them. We tell then: 17

39 I am so sorry that your cat has die. but not 40 I am so glad that your cat has die. No doubts that logicians may have objections against Grice's theory and even more objections against Leech's one. Both of them are not only nonformal, the more, they are not formalizable. To be honest one should even admit that they are unclear. It seems that the proper answer for the objects is the following: All the logical systems are charmingly precise, nevertheless they are completely unable not only properly explain but even to recognize a large number of typical language phenomena. Isn't it good enough reason to start considering that those problems are to hard to solve them at once in the formal way. Perhaps the best strategy is to approach them approximatively. The rst step is then unformal and perhaps not quite clear. Nevertheless a study of both Grice's and Leech's theories give an impression that there is something very new and deep inside. In some extend the similar remarks can be applied to all the pragmatic subjects presented above. One should admit that no one of the problems presented above is solved in the good enough way, on the other hand all those problems seems to be urgent and some step in direction to get them solved is made here. This is why all the results gathered above together may be considered at the same extend as satisfactory results of research and as research project which present just a recognition by a ght" of an area quite unknown for logicians.

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