Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
of the
State of Connecticut
A.C. 28606
AIMEE DUTKIEWICZ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THOMAS DUTKIEWICZ,
Defendant-Appellant,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Thomas M. Dutkiewicz, Sui Juris
P.O. Box 9775
Forestville, CT 06011-9775
860-833-4127
Table of Contents
Statement of Issues...............................................................................................................................iii
Table of Authorities..............................................................................................................................iv
PRO SE STANDARD OF REVIEW...................................................................................................vii
STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................................................................viii
CLARIFICATION ON FILING WITH THE TRIAL COURT.............................................................1
GLOBAL IMPACT STATEMENT........................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................1
ARGUMENT.........................................................................................................................................6
It is unlawful and unconstitutional for the courts, DCF and the State of Connecticut to interfere with
families just because a child witnesses events in the home...................................................................8
The Supreme Court ruled that there is a presumption that a fit parent acts in their children’s best
interests, not DCF, not the courts nor the State of Connecticut...........................................................11
Is the State of Connecticut, DCF, juvenile and family courts subject to the 4th and 14th Amendment?
..............................................................................................................................................................16
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................20
ii
Statement of Issues
1. Did the lower court without probable cause or due process impose a court order
where there was no evidence that the Defendant was unfit or incapable to deal with
2. Did the lower court fail to protect the constitutional rights of the Defendant where the
state failed to prove with the requisite proof of parental unfitness in order to
substitute the Defendant’s best interest decisions with that of the state’s?
3. Did the lower court fail to allow the Defendant to deal with his own family issues
without government interference like other issues like death of a parent, sibling or
favorite pet?
4. Did the court automatically deny the Defendant due process by issuing the
automatic court order by allowing hearsay from the State Legislator to support the
order?
5. Did the state Legislator make itself the hearer and trier of facts and unlawfully
impose its will into the judicial process by becoming the driving force of the violations
of due process?
6. Did the lower court and certainly the judiciary as a whole abdicate their constitutional
duties as the trier and hearer of facts by issuing a court order without evidence that
7. Did the lower court as well as the State Legislator show that there was imminent
iii
Table of Authorities
Cases
7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 65.04[3] (2d ed. 1995).....................ix
Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 745 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985)................................................viii
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982)..........................vi
Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975)............................vii
Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 743-44 (2d Cir. 2000)..........viii
Buffalo Forge col. V. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1981)................vii
Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985)................................................viii
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).............................vi
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)...............6
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972).................vi
Drywall Tapers & Pointers Local 1974 v. Local 530, 954 F.2d 69, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1992).......ix
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)..........................vi
Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir.
1999)...................................................................................................................................ix
iv
Good v. Dauphin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989)......................................................19
Good v. Dauphin County Social Services., 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd Cir. 1989)............................14
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972).........vi
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).................................vi
McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996)..................................vi
New York v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1977)..............................................................vii
United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999).....................................................vi
v
Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733, 739 (E.D. Mo.), aff’d, 426 U.S. 943 (1976).............viii
White v. Bloom.......................................................................................................................vii
vi
PRO SE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Defendant is pro se, the Court has a higher standard when faced with a
motion for injunctive relief, White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states:
A court faced with a motion for injunctive relief, a pro se motion, the court must read the
complaint's allegations expansively, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594,
596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972), and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they
state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263
(1972).
Pro se litigants' court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less
stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the
submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal
theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule
requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)(quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88
F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding
pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v.
The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and
papers. When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to
determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir.
1992). See also, United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has
vii
special obligation to construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian
Defendant has the right to submit pro se briefs on appeal, even though they may be
in artfully drawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v.
Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se
litigants against consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result. U.S.
Moreover, "the court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the
allegations provide for relief on any possible theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis,
526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir.
1974)). Thus, if this court were to entertain any motion, this court would have to apply the
standards of White v. Bloom. Furthermore, if there is any possible theory that would entitle
the Defendant to relief, even one that the Defendant hasn't thought of, the court cannot
Cersosimo the Supreme Court stated: It is “our established policy to allow great latitude to
a litigant who, either by choice or necessity, represents himself in legal proceedings, so far
as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party . . . .” Cersosimo v.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[I]nterim injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be
routinely granted.” Buffalo Forge col. V. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir.
1981) (quoting Medical Society of New York v. Toia, 560 F.2d 535, 538 (2d Cir. 1977)). In
viii
addition, a federal court should grant injunctive relief against a state or municipal official
“only in situations of most compelling necessity.” Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp. 733,
In this circuit the standard for injunctive relief is well established. To warrant
preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party “must demonstrate (1) that it will be
irreparably harmed in the absence of an injunction, and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success
on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the case to make
them a fair ground for litigation, and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in its favor.”
Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 743-44 (2d Cir. 2000). Where
the moving party seeks a mandatory injunction, i.e., injunctive relief which changes the
parties’ positions rather than maintains the status quo, or the injunction requested “will
provide substantially all the relief sought, and the relief cannot be undone even if the
defendant prevails at a trial on the merits,” the moving party must make a stronger showing
of entitlement. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 744 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A
mandatory injunction “should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is
entitled to the relief requested” or where “extreme or very serious damage will result from a
denial of preliminary relief.” Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 745 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted).
Although a showing that irreparable injury will be suffered before a decision on the
injunction, it is nevertheless the most significant condition that must be demonstrated. See
Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985). To demonstrate irreparable
harm, plaintiff must show an “injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and
ix
imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” Forest City
Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 1999) (Quoting
injunction, oral argument and testimony are not required in all cases. See Drywall Tapers &
Pointers Local 1974 v. Local 530, 954 F.2d 69, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1992). Where, as here, “the
record before a district court permits it to conclude that there is no factual dispute which
denied without hearing oral testimony.” 7 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
x
CLARIFICATION ON FILING WITH THE TRIAL COURT
Parenting Classes in family court due to the fact that both the statute and the automatic
court order were unconstitutional and lacked due process when anyone files for dissolution
of marriage. The motion was filed inter alia, violations of due process and other
constitutional protections in the 1st and 14th Amendment and life and liberty interests.
In resent United States Supreme Court opinions sited in this brief, the Supreme
Court has overturned 30 plus years of state case law, juvenile and family court rulings as
well as state laws and statutes. These rulings as well as this instant case that is before this
tribunal will have not only a profound impact on every father, mother and child in the State
of Connecticut. It will permanently change how the courts treat parents and children when
they are before any judge or court and how investigations are handled. No longer can the
courts or the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) deny parent their constitutional
rights and no longer can the state, the courts and the legislators presume that parents as a
class of people are unfit and that all children are presumed harmed.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the State of Connecticut like most states for the last 30 plus years has
not only violated the constitutional rights of both parent and child, they have refused to
acknowledge that parents like non-parents are entitled to their constitutional rights.
Likewise, DCF are government officials like the police and are subject to the same
Connecticut does not have a limitless ability to intrude in the lives of children and parents
by just parroting the term “best interest of the child”, “risk of harm” or has been harmed in
1
some undefined way. The following case illustrates that the State of Connecticut and DCF
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals case, Calabretta v. Floyd, 9th Cir. (1999) “involves
whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a
coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child,
and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special
exigency.”
The court did not agree that the social worker and the police officer had “qualified
immunity” and said, “the facts in this case are noteworthy for the absence of emergency.”
No one was in distress. “The police officer was there to back up the social worker’s
insistence on entry against the mother’s will, not because he perceived any imminent
danger of harm.” And he should have known better. Furthermore, “had the information
been more alarming, had the social worker or police officer been alarmed, had there been
reason to fear imminent harm to a child, this would be a different case, one to which we
have no occasion to speak. A reasonable official would understand that they could not
The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals defines the law and states “In our circuit, a
reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry. Any government
official (DCF or police) can be held to know that their office does not give them unrestricted
right to enter people’s homes at will. We held in White v. Pierce County (797 F. 2d 812 (9th
Cir. 1986), a child welfare investigation case, that ‘it was settled constitutional law that,
absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter a dwelling without a warrant even
under statutory authority where probable cause existed.’ The principle that government
officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability
2
of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established
And there we have it: “Any government official can be held to know that their office
does not give them an unrestricted right to enter peoples’ homes at will. … The fourth
Amendment preserves the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses … ’
without limiting that right to one kind of government official.” (emphasis added)
In this instant case, the trial court as well as the State of Connecticut acted outside
the law when a parent is before ANY court. Without “due process”, the State of
Connecticut acted as the hearer of facts without hearing any facts of a particular case and
presumed that every single child is harmed whether they are one-day-old or 17-years old
just because a parent files for a disillusion of marriage. Without any facts the state
presumed that all parents are unfit and incompetent when the state, through the judge,
issued an automatic court order of parenting classes. The judge abdicated his position as
the hearer and trier of facts by accepting the states false presumption that all children are
harmed and parents are unfit and incompetent to discuss family related issues. There was
no facts or conclusion of law that determined that any child was harmed nor was their
evidence that the Defendant was unfit or incompetent to handle the emotional needs of his
family.
As you will see, the Supreme Court as well as the Circuit Courts has ruled
repeatedly that the intrusion on the lives of families is very narrow and restricted by the 1st,
4th, 6th and 14th Amendment. In recent rulings by the Supreme Court, both the child’s and
parents constitutional rights are triggered when ANY arm of the state starts an investigation
whether that be the police or DCF. It is does not effect the constitutional rights of parents
and children just because the state, DCF and the Attorney General’s office wrongly attempt
to circumvent, abrogate or abridge the rights of parents and children when in juvenile or
3
family court or in some administrative proceedings, constitutional protections are afforded
to all Americans.
The Supreme Court has recently overturned 30-years of state laws and statutes,
rulings by juvenile and family judges and unconstitutional behavior by child protection. Not
only did the Supreme Court reaffirm the constitutional rights of parents but they have
spanked the state of Washington for violating the constitutional rights of parents and
children. The court ruled that the “best interest of a child” standard is a constitutional right
afforded parent’s, not a judicial discretion where the court or state can substitute their
standard with the parents without due process. It is legally insufficient for the state, DCF or
juvenile and family court to substitute the parent’s best interest standard without due
process. The Defendant in this instant case is presumed fit, able and capable of handling
the physical and emotional needs of his children and does not need parenting classes. The
motivation or intention of the parenting class in the automatic court order is neither relevant
nor probable cause. The issue is that only the parent has the legal right to determine if at
For the last 30 plus years every single state has presumed parents to be unfit to
make decisions and presumed that children are harmed. Unlawfully, the State of
Connecticut like all states unlawfully switches the burden of proof on to the parents when
the burden has always been theirs. In the landmark Supreme Court ruling in Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Supreme Court ruled that this presumption against
parents was unconstitutional and that the state law as well as the lower court’s ruling in the
State of Washington was unlawful and unconstitutional. Parents do not have to prove their
fitness, innocence and this unconstitutional practice of presumption of guilt and unfitness
must stop. The state of Washington and the court presumed that they could impose their
best interest standard without the requisite proof of parental unfitness which is a due
4
process violation. Presently there is NO equal protection under the laws in Connecticut for
parents. If you are a parent vs. a non-parent you are automatically denied your
constitutional rights as a class of people by the mere fact you are a parent.
These equal protection violations are worse then the centuries of the equal
country and it does not matter your race, you automatically loose your 4th, 6th and 14th
Amendment rights. Like black Americans, the state in collusion with the Attorney Generals
Office and DCF get to choose and cherry pick what rights you will and what Federal
constitutional rights you will not get even though they lack the authority to deny, impinge,
The decision in the case of Doe et al, v. Heck et al (No. 01-3648, 2003 US App.
Lexis 7144) will affect the manner in which law enforcement, the State of Connecticut and
DCF investigations of alleged child abuse or neglect are conducted. The decision of the 7 th
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the practice of a “no prior consent” interview of a child
will ordinarily constitute a “clear violation” of the constitutional rights of parents under the 4 th
and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. According to the Court, the investigative
interview of a child constitutes a “search and seizure” and, when conducted on private
interview is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the rights of the parent,
child, and can include criminal trespassing by DCF and the police. Presently, by statute,
DCF instructs their workers to violate the rights of parents and children saying they do not
In these several cases it shows the State of Connecticut absent imminent “physical”
danger” has no jurisdiction or right to interfere with the family. They like to use some vague
5
undefined term like harm when in fact the more accurate term would be impact. In filing for
ARGUMENT
This constitutional challenge came out of the automatic court order issued by the
state legislator through the family court using the state judiciary system to compel any
parent and force parents with pains of contempt charges to take parenting classes even
The state legislator had presumed that every single child is harmed by parents
getting a divorced without any proof such a claim whether that child is 1-day-old or is 17-
years-old. The lower court quotes Representative John W. Thompson which is says in part,
“…Mr. Speaker, every year more than one million children are affected by divorce…” The
lower court failed to show how the Defendant’s 14-year-old twins is affected by the divorce
if at all, or how parenting class will ameliorate any perceived impact. The only thing the
lower court has to offer is hearsay on some arbitrary number to support a legal court order
where no evidence was presented. There is also no evidence to show to what effect if any
Hearsay statements inadmissible in family, Juvenile and Superior Court proceedings involving
children.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky vacated and remanded a decision by the Barren
Circuit Court which terminated parental rights because of sexual abuse. The court found
that a child's statements to a counselor during therapy and a physician during a physical
examination were hearsay and inadmissible at trial under the U.S. Supreme Court case,
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), because
6
the child did not testify at trial and there was no opportunity for cross-examination of the
child. Because the child's statements were inadmissible, the child welfare agency failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that the child had been sexually abused. Cite: NO.
2004-CA-001979-ME and NO. 2004-CA-002032-ME, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 163 (Ky. Ct.
App 2005)
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's order terminating
a father's parental rights to his children, based on that court's finding of neglect; the
appeals court holding that the erroneous termination order was based on inadmissible
hearsay testimony. The Court of Appeals concluded that the father adequately preserved
his objection to admission of the testimony, and consequently reversed the termination
order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Cite: No.
01-FS-1307; No. 01-FS-1320; 2005 D.C. App. LEXIS 390 (D.C. July 21, 2005)
The lower court continues and states, “…Further, the statute achieves a compelling
state interest in that it aims to maintain familial harmony through a difficult transition, a goal
articulated in Roth”. The lower court’s legal reasoning on the compelling state interest
failed to show the state has the legal right to interfere in family matters just because
children have to cope with situation like divorce, the death of a parent or some type of
serious illness within the immediate family. It’s not the state function or job to ensure and
maintain his own family despite what the state thinks. Parents do not want the state’s
unsolicited help. They want the state to mind their own business.
I am sure the lower court would make the same argument that it would not be a
constitutional violation if a child was removed from a home just because the child witnesses
domestic violence. The problem would be the court would be wrong, DCF would be wrong
7
along with the State Legislator would also be wrong and such interference would be
It is unlawful and unconstitutional for the courts, DCF and the State of Connecticut
to interfere with families just because a child witnesses events in the home.
punishing the children and the non-offending parent as stated. In a landmark class-action
suit in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, U.S. District Judge Jack
Weinstein ruled on Nicholson v. Williams, Case No.: 00-cv-2229, and upheld by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal. The suit challenged the practice of New York’s City’s
Administration for Children’s Services of removing the children of battered mothers solely
because the children saw and experienced their mothers being beaten by husbands or
boyfriends. Judge Weinstein ruled that the practice is unconstitutional and he ordered it
stopped.
domestic violence?
“Not according to Judge Weinstein’s and medical experts from Yale New Haven.”
During the trial, several leading national experts testified on the impact on children of
witnessing domestic violence, and the impact on children of being removed from the non-
mistake. A “great concern [regarding] how increased awareness of children’s exposure [to
domestic violence] and associated problems is being used. Concerned about the risk adult
domestic violence poses for children, some child protection agencies in the United States
Defining witnessing as maltreatment is a mistake. Doing so ignores the fact that large
8
numbers of children in these studies showed no negative development problems and some
maltreatment may also ignore battered mother’s efforts to develop safe environments for
Dr. Wolf testified that disruptions in the parent-child relationship might provoke fear
and anxiety in a child and diminish his or her sense of stability and self. Tr. 565-67. He
described the typical response of a child separated from his parent: “When a young child is
separated from a parent unwillingly, he or she shows distress … At first, the child is very
anxious and protests vigorously and angrily. Then he falls into a sense of despair, though
still hyper vigilant, looking, waiting, and hoping for her return …” A child’s sense of time
factors into the extent to which a separation impacts his or her emotional well-being. Thus,
for younger children whose sense of time is less keenly developed, short periods of
parental absence may seem longer than for older children. Tr 565-65. See also Ex. 141b.
For those children who are in homes where there is domestic violence, disruption of
that bond can be even more traumatic than situations where this is no domestic violence.
Dr. Stark (Yale New Haven Hospital researcher) asserted that if a child is placed in foster
care as a result of domestic violence in the home, then he or she may view such removal
as “a traumatic act of punishment … and [think] that something that [he] or she has done or
failed to do has caused this separation.” Tr. 1562-63. Dr. Pelcovitz stated that “taking a
child whose greatest fear is separation from his or her mother and in the name of
‘protecting’ that child [by] forcing on them, what is in effect, their worst nightmare, … is
Another serious implication of removal is that it introduces children to the foster care
system, which can be much more dangerous and debilitating than the home situation. Dr.
9
Stark testified that foster homes are rarely screened for the presence of violence, and that
the incidence of abuse and child fatality in foster homes is double that in the general
population. Tr 1596; Ex. 122 at 3-4. Children in foster care often fail to receive adequate
medical care. Ex. 122 at 6. Foster care placements can disrupt the child’s contact with
The state and the courts do not have a limitless undefined ability that they can
interfere with and intrude in the family arrangement just because a child feels bad. The
State of Connecticut and the courts as ruled by the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts are
compelled by the Federal Constitution to give parents their due process rights prior to such
intrusion. What is notable in Nicholson, the medical experts say from Yale who knows
more than DCF, the Legislators and the courts, “Automatically defining witnessing as
maltreatment may also ignore battered mother’s efforts to develop safe environments for
their children and themselves.” Ex. 163 at 866. This parallels the Defendant’s argument
that defining witnessing a divorce is harm to a child without due process ignores the
Defendant’s efforts to develop coping skills to offer his children. Even though the Second
Circuit has ruled on the removal of children, the State of Connecticut and DCF still violate
Coping skills in children are important and a safe guard for children as they become
adults. What is absent in this case is the fact there is no perpetrator of abuse or neglect
nor is there evidence showing any harm. When any parent is before any court they are
entitled to due process and the State of Connecticut must make their case in a case by
case basis. Painting with a broad brush about a class of people called children on its face
lacks due process especially when that brush is not based on any medical facts or specific
child. You can’t say all crows are black if half of them are white. Also presuming that all
10
parents lack the knowledge and are not fit to handle issues that may come up as a matter
of the human condition is also unconstitutional for it also lacks due process.
Parents are already presumed to take care of all of the child’s medical, emotional
and psychological needs. The Defendant has done fine without the help of the government
and does not need them to assist him in the care of his children. The Defendant did not
need assistant from the State of Connecticut when he had thyroid cancer. The Defendant
did not need the state’s help when his daughter died of SIDS (Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome) when his son was present. The Defendant did not need help when his twins
were born 4-months early where his son was 15 oz. and was born dead and died a second
time and brought back to life. The Defendant did not need the states help when the other
twin needed a heart operation at this premature state. The Defendant didn’t need the
state’s interference when the mother of the twins almost died twice due to the
The state feels it has the right to circumvent and abridge the rights of parents to
handle their own issues in a loving and caring environment. Merely parroting the term
like the 4th and 14th Amendment for which the state is compelled to legally overcome and
they must meet this burden. For the last 30 plus years the state has been getting away
with denying the constitutional rights to parents and children with junk science and bad
The Supreme Court ruled that there is a presumption that a fit parent acts in their
children’s best interests, not DCF, not the courts nor the State of Connecticut.
The United States Supreme Court has stated: "There is a presumption that fit
parents act in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602; there is
normally no reason or compelling interest for the State to inject itself into the private realm
11
of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions regarding their
children. Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 304. The state may not interfere in child rearing
decisions when a fit parent is available. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Consequently, the State of Connecticut can not use the “best interest of the child”
standard to substitute its judgment for a fit parent and parroting that term is “legally
insufficient” to use in the court to force parents to follow some arbitrary standard, case plan
or horse and pony show. The State cannot usurp a fit parent’s decision making related to
parental spending for their children, i.e. child support without either a demonstration the
parent is unfit or there is proven harm to the child. In other words, the state and Child
Protective Services can not impose a standard of living dealing with the rearing of children.
When they violate this fundamental right, they would be intruding on the family’s life and
liberty interest. The 1st Amendment bars such action because the rearing of children and
the best interest of children is often based on ones religious beliefs, i.e. the separation of
church and state. By the state imposing any standard of living or the rearing of children,
they are putting forth a religious standard by their actions i.e. how you act, what to feed the
child, how to dress the child, whether or not to home school and so on. The courts and the
state lack jurisdiction on what goes on in the house even though they disagree with the
choices made by parents, the Defendant terms this “parental immunity.” It’s none of the
state’s business on how you are to raise your children. In other words, they can not falsely
accuse parents of abuse or neglect just because they disagree with the method of child
State Law provisions mandate that the State invade the family, through the judiciary,
to examine, evaluate, determine and conclude the terms and nature of the interpersonal
relationship, spousal roles, spousal conduct, parental decision making, parenting conduct,
12
charitable contributions and most importantly the intimate emotional, psychological and
physical details of the parties and family during their marriage granting the judiciary a broad
range of discretion to apply a property stripping statute with a standard of equity. This
would be an abuse of the judicial power and the judicial system to intrude into U.S. citizen’s
lives and violate their privacy rights. It is not the state’s right or jurisdiction to examine the
day to day decisions and choices of citizens and then sit there in judgment and then force
parents to follow conflicting standards with threat of harm for noncompliance i.e. abduction
of children.
Right to Privacy. This fundamental Right to Privacy encompasses the Privacy Protected
Zone of Parenting. The Plaintiff asserts that DCF policy and Connecticut General Statutes
impermissibly infringe the Federal Right to Privacy to the extent they mandate the parent to
support his or her children beyond a standard to prevent harm to them. They substitute the
State s judgment for the parent’s judgment as to the best interest of his or her children.
The challenged statutes do not mandate a review to determine if demonstrable harm exists
to the children in determining the amount of support that the parent must provide.
The State is not permitted and lacks jurisdiction to determine care and maintenance,
i.e. spending, i.e. child discipline, decisions of a fit parent based on his or her income in an
intact marriage other than to prevent harm to a child. There is no basis for the State to
have a statute that mandates a fit divorced parent should support their child to a different
standard, i.e. the standard of the best interests of a child. Furthermore, the State must not
so mandate absent a demonstration that the choice of support provided by the parent has
The U.S. Supreme Court has mandated that the standard for the State to intrude in
parenting decisions relating to grandparent visitation is no longer best interests of the child.
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Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57; 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). This court should recognize the
changed standard of State intrusion in parenting should also apply to the context of parents
care, control, and maintenance, i.e. spending, i.e. child discipline decisions, on behalf of his
or her children.
This court made a correct ruling in Lovan C. v. Department of Children and Family
86 Conn. App. 290 (2004) and is supported by the 9th Circuit where the court ruled that
Another recent 9th Circuit case also held that there is no exception to the warrant
requirement for social workers in the context of a child abuse investigation. ‘The
[California] regulations they cite require social workers to respond to various contacts in
various ways. But none of the regulations cited say that the social worker may force her
way into a home without a search warrant in the absence of any emergency.’ Calabretta v.
Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999) Calabretta also cites various cases form other
jurisdictions for its conclusion. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs., 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd
Cir. 1989) held that a social worker and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity
for insisting on entering her house against the mother’s will to examine her child for bruises.
Good holds that a search warrant or exigent circumstances, such as a need to protect a
child against imminent danger of serious bodily injury, was necessary for an entry without
consent, and the anonymous tip claiming bruises was in the case insufficient to establish
special exigency.
The 9th Circuit further opined in Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000), that
‘[b]ecause the swing of every pendulum brings with it potential adverse consequences, it is
important to emphasize that in the area of child abuse, as with the investigation and
prosecution of all crimes, the state is constrained by the substantive and procedural
guarantees of the Constitution. The fact that the suspected crime may be heinous –
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whether it involves children or adults – does not provide cause for the state to ignore the
rights of the accused or any other parties. Otherwise, serious injustices may result. In
may have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire
family. Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where
There you have it, the failure of the juvenile and family courts as well as DCF and
the Legislators to abide to ALL constitutional constraints can harm both the child and family.
The lower court in this instant case failed to show by what authority does the State of
Connecticut, DCF, juvenile and family court are allowed to violate the Federal constitutional
rights of children and parents. The only thing the court has to offer is bad rulings which
support the violation of the constitutional rights of parents. The court also parrots that the
state has a compelling interest which is legally insufficient to abrogate or abridge the
constitutional rights of children and parents. There is something called due process before
the state can interfere with any child or the parent’s ability to deal with any situation that
occurs within the family arrangement. The state can not influence what a parent is what to
This compelling interest that is quoted must be supported by evidence that a child in
the case of the Defendant was a victim of a crime of abuse or neglect and neither took
place. Under the Constitution, the court must presume that the child was never harmed
and that the parent is fit and innocent. There is no compelling interest by the state if there
is no evidence that a child has been harm and in the case of the Defendant no evidence
has been presented. Connecticut General Statute §§ 46b-69b fails to show exactly how a
child is harmed whether that child be 1-day-old or 17-years-old or that a child is ever
harmed at all.
15
There is the hundred thousand dollar question, where does this compelling interest
by the state start and stop? According to the lower court there is no definition on what is or
Children and Family 86 Conn. App. 290 (2004) that there is no definition on harm. The
Even if they can prove there is a compelling state interest, the U.S. Supreme Court
clearly states that the state, DCF and juvenile and family court have the full weight of the
Is the State of Connecticut, DCF, juvenile and family courts subject to the 4th and 14th
Amendment?
Yes they are as well as other constitutional prohibitions. The Fourth Amendment is
neglect as are all “government officials.” This issue is brought out best in Walsh v. Erie
unconstitutional for the police who are government officials, likewise it is for DCF
The social workers, Darnold and Brown, argued that “the Fourth Amendment was
not applicable to the activities of their social worker employees.” The social workers
claimed, “entries into private homes by child welfare workers involve neither searches nor
seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and thus can be conducted without either a warrant
or probable cause to believe that a child is at risk of imminent harm.” The court disagreed
and ruled: “Despite the defendant’s exaggerated view of their powers, the Fourth
Amendment applies to them, as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose
request to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door.” The Court
also stated “The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
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applies whenever an investigator, be it a police officer, a DCF employee, or any other agent
(Emphasis added) Darnold and Brown’s first argument, shot down by the court. The social
workers then argued that there are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, and that the
situation with the Walsh children was an “emergency.” Further, the “Defendants argue their
entry into the home, even absent voluntary consent, was reasonable under the
circumstances.” They point to the anonymous complaint about clutter on the front porch;
led Darnold and Brown reasonably to believe the Walsh children were in danger of
imminent harm. (This is the old “emergency” excuse that has been used for years by social
workers.) The Court again disagreed and ruled: “There is nothing inherently unusual or
dangerous about cluttered premises, much less anything about such vaguely described
conditions that could manifest imminent or even possible danger or harm to young children.
If household ‘clutter’ justifies warrantless entry and threats of removal of children and arrest
or citation of their parents, few families are secure and few homes are safe from
unwelcome and unjustified intrusion by state officials and officers.” The Court went on to
rule, “They have failed to show that any exigency that justifies warrantless entry was
necessary to protect the welfare of the plaintiff’s children. In this case, a rational jury could
find that ‘no evidence points to the opposite conclusion’ and a lack of ‘sufficient exigent
circumstances to relieve the state actors here of the burden of obtaining a warrant.’ The
The social workers, Darnold and Brown, then argued that they are obligated under
law to investigate any reported case of child abuse, and that supersedes the Fourth
17
Amendment. The social workers argued, “Against these fundamental rights, the
defendants contend that Ohio’s statutory framework for learning about and investigation
allegations of child abuse and neglect supersede their obligations under the Fourth
Amendment. They point principally to § 2151.421 of the Ohio Revised code as authority for
their warrantless entry into and search of the plaintiff’s home. That statute imposes a duty
on certain designated professionals and persons who work with children or provide child
care to report instances of apparent child abuse or neglect.” This is the old “mandatory
reporter” excuse.
The Court disagreed and ruled: “The defendant’s argument that the duty to
investigate created by § 2151.421(F)(1) exempts them from the Fourth Amendment misses
the mark because, not having received a report described in § 2151.421(A)(1)(b), they
were not, and could not have been, conducting an investigation pursuant to §
2151.421(F)(1).” The social worker’s third argument, shot down by the court.
The Court continues with their chastisement of the social workers: “There can be no
doubt that the state can and should protect the welfare of children who are at risk from acts
of abuse and neglect. There likewise can be no doubt that occasions arise calling for
immediate response, even without prior judicial approval. But those instances are the
exception. Otherwise child welfare workers would have a free pass into any home in which
medical care and, thus perception that children may be at some risk.” The Court continues:
“The anonymous phone call in this case did not constitute a ‘report’ of child abuse or
neglect.” The social workers, Darnold and Brown, claimed that they were immune from
liability, claiming qualified immunity because “they had not had training in Fourth
Amendment law.” In other words, because they thought the Fourth Amendment did not
they thought the social workers were not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and they were
just helping the social workers. The Court disagreed and ruled: “That subjective basis for
their ignorance about and actions in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not relieve
them of the consequences of that ignorance and those actions.” The Court then lowers the
boom by stating: “The claims of defendants Darnold, Brown, Chandler and Kish of qualified
A police officer and a social worker may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure
in a suspected child abuse case absent exigent circumstances. Defendants must have
reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy and that the intrusion is
child neglect or child abuse case at a home are governed by the same principles as other
searches and seizures at a home. Good v. Dauphin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989)
extends beyond criminal investigations and includes conduct by social workers in the
In this instant case, the State of Connecticut, DCF and the juvenile and family courts
do have an exaggerated view of their powers and have acted outside the law and
jurisdiction interfering in family matters. The state does not have a compelling interest in
violating the rights of family every time a child feels bad or bumps their knee.
The State of Connecticut’s argument that parental classes are needed becomes a
moot point and a non issue because if both parents agree parenting classes are not
needed the judge can waive the classes. The court can also determine that participation is
not necessary. Even if parents are forced to take the class, they can just throw out the
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garbage put out by those who promote the classes for profit and raise their children the way
they want. The classes are a waste of money and the time parents put into it.
In C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b, there is another constitutional violation where it states that the
court is authorized to require an investigation by DCF in any family relations case. The
state can’t authorize the unlawful entry into American’s home just because a parent files for
dissolution of marriage. This fishing expedition into the private lives of families has already
been ruled unconstitutional. Unless the child is in imminent “physical” danger, such an
order is unlawful and unconstitutional. As stated in previous case law, the judge is confined
to the 4th and 14th Amendment to enter any home regardless how benign it may appear and
unless he or she can legally overcome the 4th and 14th Amendment, the warrant can not go
forth. C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b clearly instructs judges to abrogate and abridge the 4th and 14th
Amendment of both child and parent. Parents may assert their children’s 4th Amendment
claim on behalf of their children as well as asserting their own 14th Amendment claim.
193 F.3d 581, 602 (2nd Cir. 1999). F.K. v. Iowa district Court for Polk County, Id.”
Conclusion
who are physically abuse and physically neglected. As ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court
and the Circuit Courts of Appeal, government intrusion is very narrowly defined and subject
to the 4th and 14th Amendment. The state does not have lawful right to push parent’s
constitutional rights into the gutter just because they are parents and that the end justifies
the means. Clearly there are events that happen in families like deaths of loved ones and
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other serious issues where the state has no right to cross into. The Defendant calls this
The issue before the Supreme Court was not what was in the best interest of the
child, but who had the lawful right to define that best interest standard and the court
concluded that the parent was, not the state. And the court continued saying that if the
state were to intervene, there was a constitutional threshold called the 4th and 14th
Amendment.
It’s one thing for the state to implement safety equipment like car seats, seat belt
and other safety devices. It’s totally another thing to deny the constitutional rights of
parents when their in court or subject to an investigation. So to say the state has the right
For 30 plus years the courts, DCF and the State Legislators wrongfully assumed that
parents were not entitled to their constitutional rights as long as there was a child in the
home. Well, they assumed wrong. There is clearly an equal protection violation when you
tell one government official like the police that they need a lawful warrant and then tell
another government official like DCF or the juvenile and family courts they do not have to
In the cases sited as well as the ones in the Appendix turned on the fact the States
failed to prove their case. The courts also ruled that the states along with child protection
violated the constitutional rights of both child and parents regardless if the case was in
family or juvenile court. The states also failed to overcome their burden in the search and
seizures requirements. The state along with child protection is not given a pass on
overcoming the parent’s constitutional rights. If it’s unconstitutional for the police, likewise it
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Legislators and Child Protection love to connect dots that can never be connected or
in other words, cause and effect. Such was the case in every case sited where they
attempted to say all children were harmed because . . . fill in the blank.
This fraudulent attempt even occurred in the case called State of Connecticut v.
Judith Scruggs were the state and DCF very fraudulently attempted to connect a messy
home with the suicide and harm to Judith’s son Daniel who hung himself due to bullying.
The Appellate court got that right and overturned that conviction because the State of
Connecticut and DCF had NO experts that could support their erroneous fabricated
opinion. The undersign filed an Amicus brief with the court pointing out DCF’s fraudulent
attempt to sway the court without showing proof how a messy home harms a child.
To say that a child was impacted or harmed requires an expert opinion in a specific
case. For legislators to support a statute with baseless opinions as medical fact when in
fact it is a medically baseless opinion, it is fraud upon the court. In fact it is and was
medical malpractice on the part of the state whether from DCF or the legislator when they
The judicial system must continually challenge the opinions of DCF and the
Legislators and not accept them as medical fact because none are experts and unqualified
to give an expert opinion. Parents are entitled to their due process along with their rights
It’s very simple, unless the child is in imminent “physical” danger the state and DCF
has NO jurisdiction to violate the rights of parent and children. Nor do they have the right to
question children or force parents to do something against their will. The mere possibility
or risk of harm does not constitute an emergency or exigent circumstance that would justify
a forced warrantless entry and a warrantless seizure of a child. Hurlman v. Rice, (2nd Cir.
1991)
22
Like adults, children cope and adjust with all kinds of tragedies, hardships and
events that occur within the family and most children overcome these events in their lives
and they use these coping skills as they grow older. Parents decide if any intervention of
classes or therapy are needed for the family or children not some heartless government
statute. These unlicensed social workers at DCF would have you believing and going to
therapy for every live problem you may have because their social agenda is to fix the world
according to them.
69b be AFFIRMED in that C.G.S. §§ 46b-69b is unconstitutional for it lacks many things
inter alia the lack of due process, 4th and 14th Amendment violations and what is contained
The State of Connecticut needs to bring their present day statutes and law in line
with the U.S. Supreme Court opinions as well as the Circuit Courts. The Defendant knows
that the cases sited as well as this ruling will significantly change the way courts view
parents and children rights and the way courts rule. This ruling will compel the lower courts
to hold the state and DCF accountable for violating the constitutional rights of both child
and parent. That the state has the right to initiate an investigation but the Federal
Constitution dictates how that investigation is to be executed. It will also compel the state
All of the Table of Authorities comes from Appendix. The Appendix is a parental
rights handbook that has been circulated throughout the United States to attorneys and
their clients.
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DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
______________________________
Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se
P.O. Box 9775
Forestville, CT 06011-9775
(860) 833-4127
24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE PURSUANT TO §62-7
This is to certify that the Defendant has caused a copy of the above-named document was
mailed by first class mail to the following interested persons on April 28, 2007.
State of Connecticut
At New Britain
Superior Court
20 Franklin Square
New Britain, CT 06050
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
______________________________
Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se
P.O. Box 9775
Forestville, CT 06011-9775
(860) 833-4127
25
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO §66-3
I certify that the foregoing document complies with the provisions of P.B. §66-3 in that the
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
______________________________
Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se
P.O. Box 9775
Forestville, CT 06011-9775
(860) 833-4127
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of the Defendants-Appellants complies in all
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
______________________________
Thomas Dutkiewicz, Pro Se
P.O. Box 9775
Forestville, CT 06011-9775
(860) 833-4127
26