Thepurposeofmetaethics

InLD
Metaethicsisusedtoderiveacertainframework. Metaethicstellsuswhichnormativeargumentscountaswarrants forastandard. Metaethicsmakesyourframeworkbetter.

Inphilosophy

Metaethicsistheareaofmoralphilosophythatseekstounderstand andexplainourmoralpractices,discourse,andjudgments. Howdoesitwork?Whatdoesitmean?Howdoweknow? Metaethicalviewstypicallydonotandshouldnothavenormative implications. Philosopherswanttobeabletopersuadeotherphilosophers. Doingnormativeethicsishard,anditusuallyinvolvesappealsto intuition.SoLDstylemetaethicsmakesthingseasier. Somemetaethicalviewsdomatchupwithparticularnormative ethicalviews. KantianconstructivismyieldsKantiandeontology. (Korsgaard) Universalprescriptivismyieldspreferenceutilitarianism (Hare) NeoAristoteliannaturalismyieldsvirtueethics(Foot)

Whythediscrepancy?

So,whatistobedone?

Grandstrategy
Myaiminthismoduleistopersuadeyouthat,contrarytowhat debatersrunningmetaethicsclaim,youcanandshoulddebatethe standardswithouthavingtoengageinmetaethics. Butdoingthisrequiressomegeneralknowledge,ability,and preparation. Thestrategycontainsafewpartsnotineverydebate,justinthe arsenal.

1)Defendingnonnaturalistcognitivism. 2)Defendingobjective,externalreasons. 3)Defendingtheimportanceofintuition. 4)Defendingtheprimacyofnormativeethicsandtheneutralityof metaethics.

Nonnaturalistcognitivism
Whatisit?

Aftergoingthroughthesecomponents,IlltalkaboutwhatIthinkthe roleofmetaethicsoughttobe.

Nonnaturalistcognitivistsbelievethattherearetruemoralclaims, andthatsuchclaimsstatefactsthatarefundamentallydistinctfrom naturalfacts. Errortheoristsbelievethattherearenotruemoralclaims. Noncognitivistsbelievethatmoraljudgmentsarenotinthe businessofstatingfactsthatcanbetrueorfalse. Naturalistsbelievethatmoraljudgmentsstatenaturalfacts.

Whyisitstrategic?

Thisviewanswersmostmetaethicalviewsthathavenormative implications. Noncognitivism,includinguniversalprescriptivism Naturalism,includingNeoAristoteliannaturalism Korsgaardcallsthisviewsubstantiverealism,whichisinconsistent withherconstructivistalternative. Ifyoucutfrontlinesdefendingthisview,youllhaveallthemajor alternativescovered,andyoullhaveanswerstoerrortheory. First,getfamiliarwiththemoralrealistsresponsetoskepticism. (Parfit,Scanlon) Convergenceinnormativeethicaltheory Disagreementdoesntmatter(epistemology) Skepticismrunstoodeep Appliestoallnormative,evenreasonsforbelieving Thatisbothabsurdandselfdefeating Analogytonumbersandmathematics Justificationmustendsomewhere Onceyoudefendtheplausibilityofirreduciblynormativefacts againstskepticism,youbasicallywinthemetaethicaldebate,but youshouldalsofrontlineagainstthebigalternatives. A2Noncognitivism(akaExpressivism) MichaelSmith,FrankJackson,andPhilipPettit Frege/Geach/SearleProblem MoralDisagreement A2SimonBlackburn A2AllanGibbard A2Naturalism MooresOpenQuestionArgument ParfitsNormativityObjectionandTrivialityObjection MoralTwinEarthArguments(Horgan&Timmons) A2FrankJackson A2PeterRailton A2NeoAristotelianNaturalism(Foot,Hursthouse)

WheredoIstart?

Objective,externalreasons

Whatisit?

Areasonisafactthatcountsinfavorofsomething.Wehave reasonsforbelieving(theoreticalorepistemicreasons)andreasons foracting(practicalreasons). Subjectivistsholddesirebasedtheoriesofreasons:reasonsare subjectgiveni.e.,ourreasonsaregivenbywhatweultimately want. Objectivistsholdvaluebasedtheoriesofreasons.Theybelievethat reasonsareobjectgiveni.e.,thatourreasonsaregivenbyfacts aboutthings.Therearefeaturesofcertainthings(items,outcomes, events,etc.)thatmakethemworthwanting. Thisislikeaskingthequestion,Wheredoesvaluecomefrom? Doesitcomefromus,ordoesitlieinthingsoutthere? Subjectivismunderlieslotsofframeworkargumentsindebate. Kantianconstructivists(orconstitutivists,orwhateverthey wanttobecallednowadays)thinkthatreasonsarethings weadoptorchoose. Gauthierassumesthatrationalityisaquestionofself interest. Harmansrelativismassumesthatpeoplesreasonsdepend onwhattheywant. Ifyoucandefendobjectivism,youcangetridofmanyalleged proofsofnormativetheories. Thenyoupushthedebatebacktothestandardsbecauseweneeda waytofigureoutwhatisobjectivelyworthpursuing. ParfitinPartOneofOnWhatMatters AgonyArgument FutureTuesdayIndifference ScanloninhisLockeLectures,BeingRealisticAboutReasons Also,lookintothedebateaboutinternalvs.externalreasons. Internalistsaboutreasonsbelievethatourreasonsmust comefromoursetofdesiresandinclinations.Bernard Williamsisaninternalistaboutreasons. Externalistsbelievethatwecanhavereasonsforthatare notincludedinourownsetofdesiresandinclinations.Derek Parfitisanexternalistaboutreasons. Thereisasimilardebateabouttheconnectionbetween motivationandjudgment. Motivationalinternalistsbelievethatmoraljudgments areintrinsicallymotivating.(MichaelSmith)

Whyisitstrategic?

WheredoIstart?

Theimportanceofintuition
Whatisit?

Externalistsbelievethatmoraljudgmentsneednot motivateusatall.(DavidBrink) CommonmetaethicalclaimsinLDassumeinternalism.Infact, itmightbethemostcommonassumptionofLDapplied metaethics:moralitymustguideaction. Korsgaarddefinesareasonasaconsiderationon whichyouact.No,accordingtoexternalists:itisa considerationonwhichyoushouldact.(Vellemanisnt asclearlyinternalist.Butifweinterprethisreasonas externalist,itdoesntreallytakeusanywherebecause nothingendstheregress.) ThewarrantsforGauthierappealtotheactionguiding natureofmorality. Universalprescriptivismmakesmostsenseunder internalism. Thisassumptionistypicallyoverlookedandrarelyfrontlined.

Supposeyoutakemyadviceandgoinforaregularstandards debatewithoutcomplicatedmetaethics.Howdoweknowwhat countsasawarrantforthestandard?Howdowedecidewhois right? Wecansay,decidewhoisrightbasedonwhoeverwinsthe arguments,justlikeinanyotherareaofthedebate.Buthowdowe decidethat?Theregresskeepsgoinguntil,atsomepoint,weadmit thatwerely(tosomeextent)onintuition. Intuitionsareintellectualseemings.Thinkofethicalintuitionsas analogoustoperceptualintuitions.Theycountasdefeasible evidencewhenwedonthavejustifiedbeliefsgoingeitherway. Mostbeliefsarejustifiedinferentially,i.e.,byotherbeliefs.But unlessthejustificationstopssomewhere,weendupwithskepticism. Inmathematics,itendswithaxioms. Inempiricalsciences,itendswiththereliabilityofperceptual experience. Inethics,itendswithmoralintuition. Intuitionsarebeliefsthatarenoninferentiallyjustified. Moralepistemologyisthebranchofmetaethicsthatasks,What justifiesourmoralbeliefs? Philosophersgiveanswersthatleantowardsreasonor experience,buttheyalwaysrelyonintuitionsomewhere. Ifnotintuition,whatelse?

Whyisitstrategic?

Mostnormativeargumentsappealtoethicalintuitionorfollow fromassumptionsthat,inturn,appealtointuition. Intuitionisimportanttodefendfortwokindsofappeals. Judgmentsaboutcases(Rawlsianreflectiveequilibrium firmconsideredjudgmentsinbalancewiththeoretical principles) Selfevidentprinciples Everyphilosopherinthefieldofnormativeethicsassumesthe reliabilityofintuitioninsomewayoranother. Evenstronger:rejectingintuitioncommitsusto global/radicalskepticism.

WheredoIstart?
JeffMcMahan,MoralIntuition,BlackwellGuidetoEthicalTheory FirstOrderJudgments>Theoriesbecausewerepeople beforewerephilosophers ShellyKagan,ThinkingaboutCases Theories>FirstOrderJudgmentsbecausewellnever accommodateallintuitions
In sum, the extent to which intuition is to be trustedif at all remains unsettled. Our reliance upon moral intuition remains troubling. Still, the fact remains as well that despite these questions we are all inclined to attend to our case specific intuitions. We worry when our moral beliefs run afoul of them, and we take comfort in the extent to which our moral beliefs accord with them. It may well be, as I believe, that our moral intuition deserves considerably less respect than it is normally accorded. But it is difficult to believe that we could ever make do without it altogether. No moral argumentno claim, no theorywill ever seem compelling if it has not been subjected to the testing we provide when we think about cases.

MichaelHuemer,RevisionaryIntuitionism Fourobjectionswithfiveresponses ElizabethHarman,IsitReasonabletoRelyonIntuitionsinEthics? RobertAudiandRussShaferLandau Alltheseauthorstakedifferentperspectivesontheroleofintuition inethics.Butnoneofthemcompletelydisavowit,asmetaethics debaters(claimto)doinLD. PeterSinger,inEthicsandIntuitions,claimsthatweshould notletourmoralintuitionsdistortmoralreasoningwhen thoseintuitionsreflectbiasesofourevolutionarypast. Buthestillreliesonrationalintuition,i.e.,tojustify utilitarianism.

Theprimacyofnormativeethicsandtheneutralityof metaethics
WhyshouldIbeinterested?

Thiskindofargumentisgoodbecauseitsaysthatonlysome kindsofintuitionarereliable,andthenyoucanuse argumentsappealingtothosekindsofintuition.

Debatersoftenarguethatmetaethicscomesfirst. Ifyoudenythatclaim,youcanproceedwiththeregular standardsdebatewithoutcaringaboutmetaethics. Debatersusemetaethicstojustifynormativeclaimsortoexclude theiropponentsstandards. Theprimacy(orautonomy)ofnormativeethicssaysthatwecando moraltheorizingwithoutfirstsettlingorevenconsideringabstract questionslikethemetaphysicsofvalue. Theneutralityofmetaethicssaysthatmetaethicaltheoriesshould notinfluenceournormativeviews;instead,theyshouldremain impartial. Youcanruntheseargumentstoestablishtwoimportantpoints. First,itisperfectlyacceptable(andprobablypreferable)todebate thestandardwithoutengaginginabstractmetaethics. Second,itisactuallyastrikeagainsttheirmetaethicaltheorythatit tellsuswhichnormativejudgmentstomake. Agoodanalogyisthatmetaethicsshouldstandtoethicsas semanticsstandstoordinarylanguage.

Whatisit?

Howdoyoudoit?

WheredoIstart?

DavidEnoch,HowObjectivityMatters,whichmakesafirstorder moralobjectiontononneutralmetaethics. Foracontrastingview,seeFantl,IsMetaethicsMorally Neutral? JamesDreier,MetaEthicsandNormativeCommitmentin responsetoRonaldDworkin,ObjectivityandTruth:YoudBetter BelieveIt SpecificallyappliedtoKorsgaard:NadeemHussainandNishiShah, MetaethicsandItsDiscontents:ACaseStudyofKorsgaard Rawls,Nozick,Nagel,Scanlon,andGewirthhavehadthingstosay aboutthesepointsalongtheway Theauthorsinthesection(above)onintuitionwillsometimesargue thatintuitionsaboutconcretethingslikeappliedethicsaremore reliable,andlesslikelytosystematicallymesseverythingup,than intuitionsaboutreallyabstractthingslikemetaethics. Alsoresearchfictionalism(RichardJoyce)

WhatistheproperroleofmetaethicsinLD?
Metaethicsshouldtakeabackseattonormativeethics. Insomecases,withverypositionalargumentsforthestandard, metastandardsmakesense,buttheyneednotbedistinct metaethicalviews.
Simplicity(Kagan,Pettit)vs.complexity(Nagel)

Answeringmetaethics(crossappliedfromearliermetaethics module)
Generaltips
Neverbethefirsttouseunexplainedjargon. Alwayscreatesafetynets.Arguethatyourstandardbetterfitsthe metaethicaltheory. Askwhetheryoureallyneedtoanswerthemetaethicalframework. StepOne:Classifytheviewwhileyouropponentisreadingthecard. Idontmeanopen/closedhere.Youropponentis(probably) atleastconstruingitasaclosedview;otherwise,they (probably)wouldntberunningit. Imeanclassificationbymetaethicalcamp.Istheauthor advancingakindofnoncognitivism,orconstructivism,or naturalism,orwhat? Ithelpstoknowauthorsandviewsintheliteraturesoyou candothisquickly. Dontworryifyoucantfigureitout.Thisstepisjusta shortcut.Youcanthenturntothesecondstep. StepTwo:GrillyouropponentonitduringCX. Callfortheevidence,andaskwhatwordsorphrasesmean. Askforwarrants,andaskforclarification. Usetheiranswerstoidentifyassumptions. Example:IfyouaskwhatGauthiermeansbyrational, youllprobablygetananswerthatassumesaSelf InterestTheoryofrationality. Youcanthenfigureoutwhetheryouwanttorefutethecard byansweringthegeneralview,orbyundermininga particularassumptionofthecard.(Oryoucandoboth.) Lotsofpeoplearebadatexecutingthefirstoptionbecause theycantexplainwhysuchandsuchcardcommitsthemto soandsotheory.

Bottomupapproachisthewaytofindthesearguments Bookstendtogoinmoredepthsotheyaremorelikelytoexplain whyparticularwarrantsforthestandardmatter

Steps

Butlotsofpeoplearealsobadatexecutingthesecond optionbecausetheycantexplainexactlyhowsuchandsuch cardmakessoandsoassumption. Ineithercase,youneedtogiveanalyticalexplanations beforeandaftereachofyouranswerstoconnectyour objectiontotheircard.Mostimportant:rhetoriccapture. Usetheircardsrhetorictosignpostyouranswers.