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Sheikh Abdullah Address To Constituent Assembly Opening Address of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah to Constituent Assembly on November 5, 1951 "Mr President: Today is our day of destiny. A day which comes only once in the life a nation. A day on which to remember the hosts of those gone before us, and of those yet to come, and we are humbled by the greatness of this day. After centuries, we have reached the harbour of our freedom, a freedom, which for the first time in history, will enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir, whose duly elected representatives are gathered here, to shape the future of their country after wise deliberation, and mould their future organs of Government. No person and no power stand between them and the fulfilment of this - their historic task. We are free, at last to shape our aspirations as people and to give substance to the ideals which have brought us together here. We meet here today, in this palace hall, once the symbol of unquestioned monarchical authority, as free citizens of the New Kashmir for which we have so long struggled. I see about me in this hall, many companions- Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Harijans and Sikhs, who first trod with me that path which has brought us to this Constituent Assembly of 1951. We fought as one against tyranny and oppression. We survived privations and bitter struggles - the jails of Hari Parbat, Bahu, Badherwah and those other jails which only imprisoned our bodies but could not crush our spirit. When we look back on these years, we see how our footsteps have taken us not among the privileged, but into the homes of the poor and downtrodden. We have fought their battle against privilege and oppression and against these darker powers in the background which sought to set man against man on the ground of religion. Our movement grew and thrived side by side with the Indian National Congress and gave strength and inspiration to the people of the Indian States. I may be forgiven if I feel proud that once again in the history of this State, our people have reached a peak of achievement through what I might call the classical Kashmiri genius for synthesis, born of toleration and mutual respect. Throughout the long tale of our history, the highest pinnacles of our achievement have been scaled when religious bigotry and intolerance ceased to cramp us, and we have breathed the wider air of brotherhood and mutual understanding. Our movement to freedom has been enacted against the back-ground of this same old struggle. We stood for the brotherhood of men of all creeds, and strengthened our union

on the basis of common work and sacrifice. Against us were ranged, the forces of religious bigotry centred in the Muslim League and its satellites, and the Hindu communalists from within and without the State. Ranged against us, and often in alliance with communalism were the forces of the autocratic States, backed up on the one hand by British Imperialism, the paramount power, and on the other, by the rich landowners and other beneficiaries of Court patronage. We must remember that our struggle for power has now reached its successful climax in the convening of this Constituent Assembly. It is for you to translate the vision of NEW KASHMIR into reality, and I would remind you of its opening words, which will inspire our labours: "We, the people of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and the Frontier regions, including Poonch and Chenani Illaqas - commonly known as Jammu and Kashmir State - in order to perfect our union in the fullest equality and self determination, to raise ourselves and our children for ever from the abyss of oppression and poverty, degradation and superstition, from medieval darkness andignorance, into the sunlit valleys of plenty, ruled by freedom, science and honest toil in worthy participation of the historic resurgence of the peoples of the East and the working masses of the world, and in determination to make this our country a dazzling gem of the snowy bosom of Asia, do propose and propound the following Constitution of our State".

This was passed at the 1944 Session of the National Conference in Srinagar. Today, in 1951, embodying such aspirations, men and women from the four corners of the State in this Constituent Assembly have become the repository of its sovereign authority. This Assembly invested with the authority of a constituent body, will be the fountain-head of basic laws, laying the foundation of a just social order and safeguarding the democratic rights of all the citizens of the State. You are the sovereign authority in this State of Jammu and Kashmir; what you decide has the irrevocable force of law. The basic democratic principle of sovereignty of the nation, embodied ably in the American and French Constitution, is once again given shape in our midst. I shall quote the famous words of Article 3 of the French Constitution of 1791:"The source of all sovereignty resides fundamentally in the nation. Sovereignty is one and indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptable. It belongs to the nation". We should be clear about the responsibilities that this power invests us with. In front of us lie decision of the highest national importance which we shall be called upon to take. Upon the correctness of our decisions depends not only the happiness of our land and people now, but the fate as well of generations to come. What then are the main functions that this Assembly will be called upon to perform?

One great task before this Assembly will be to devise a Constitution for the future governance of the country, Constitution-making is a difficult and detailed matter. I shall only refer to some of the broad aspects of the Constitution, which should be the product of the labours of this Assembly. Another issue of vital importance to the nation involves the future of the Royal Dynasty. Your decision will have to be taken both with urgency and wisdom for on that decision rests the future form and character of the State. The third major issue awaiting your deliberations arises out of the Land Reforms which the Government carried out with vigour and determination. Our "land to the tiller" policy brought light into the dark homes of the peasantry; but, side by side, it has given rise to the problem of the landowners demand for compensation. The nation being the ultimate custodian of all wealth and resources, the representatives of the nation are truly the best jury for giving a just and final verdict on such claims. So in your hands lies the power of this decision. Finally, this Assembly will after full consideration of three alternatives that I shall state later, declare its reasoned conclusion regarding accession. This will help us to channelise our energies resolutely and with greater zeal in direction in which we have already started moving for the social and economic advancement of our country. To take our first task, that of Constitution-making we shall naturally be guided by the highest principles of the democratic constitutions of the world. We shall base our work on the principles of equality, liberty and social justice which are an integral feature of all progressive constitution. The rule of law as understood in the democratic countries of the world should be the cornerstone of our political structure. Equality before the law and the independence of the Judiciary from the influence of the Executive is vital to use. The freedom of the individual in the matter of speech, movement and association should be guaranteed; freedom of the Press and of opinion would also be features of our Constitution, I need not refer in great detail to all these rights and obligations, already embodied in NEW KASHMIR, which are integral parts of democracy which has been defined as "an apparatus of social organisation where in people govern through their chosen representatives and are themselves guaranteed political and civil liberties". You are no doubt aware of the scope of our present constitutional ties with India. We are proud to have our bonds with India, the goodwill of whose people and Government is available to us in unstinted and abundant measure. The Constitution of India has provided for a federal union and in the distribution of sovereign powers has treated us differently from other constituent units. With the exception of the items grouped under Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication in the Instrument of Accession, we have complete freedom to frame our Constitution in the manner we like. In order to live and prosper as good partners in a common endeavour for the advancement of our peoples, I would advise that, while safeguarding our autonomy to the fullest extent so as to enable us to have the liberty to build our country according to the best traditions and genius of our people, we may also buy suitable constitutional arrangements with the

Union, establish our right to seek and compel Federal co-operation and assistance in this great task, as well as offer our fullest co-operation and assistance to the Union. Whereas it would be easy for you to devise a document calculated to create a framework of law and order, as also a survey of the duties and rights of citizens, it will need more arduous labour to take concrete decisions with regard to the manner in which we propose to bring about the rapid economic development of the State and more equitable distribution of our national income among the people to which we are pledged. Our National Conference avows its faith in the principle that there is something common to men of all castes and creeds, and that is their humanity. That being so, the one ailment which is ruthlessly sapping the vitality of human beings in Jammu and Kashmir is their appalling poverty, and if, we merely safeguard their political freedom in solemn terms, it will not affect their lives materially unless it guarantees them economic and social justice. NEW KASHMIR contains a statement of the objectives of our social policy. It gives broadly a picture of the kind of life that we hope to make possible for the people of Jammu and Kashmir and the manner in which the economic organisation of the country will be geared to the purpose. These ideals you will have to integrate with the political structure which you will devise. The future political set-up which you decide upon for Jammu and Kashmir must also take into consideration the existence of various sub-national groups in our State. Although culturally diverse, history has forged an uncommon unity between them; they all are pulsating with the same hopes and aspirations, sharing in each others joys and sorrows. While guaranteeing this basic unity of the State, our Constitution must not permit the concentration of power and privilege in the hands of any particular group or territorial region. It must afford the fullest possibilities to each of these groups to grow and flourish in conformity with their cultural characteristics, without detriment to the integral unity of the State or the requirements of our social and economic policies. Now let us take up an issue of basic importance which involves the fundamental character of the State itself. As an instrument of the will of a self determining people who have now become sovereign in their own right, the Constituent Assembly will now re-examine and decide upon the future of the present ruling dynasty, in respect of its authority. The present House of the Rulers of our State based its claim to authority on the treaty Rights granted to it by the British Government in 1846. To throw light on the nature of these rights it will be helpful to recall that the British Power, in its drive for territorial expansion, achieved its objectives through a network of alliances with the Indian Princes, subsidiary and subordinate, offensive and defensive. This mutually helpful arrangement enabled the British to consolidate their power, and strengthened the grip of the Princes, giving them military help in the event of rebellion by their exploited subjects. The Butler Committee Report on Treaty Rights in 1929 bears ample testimony to this it says;

"The duty of the Paramount Power to protect the State against rebellion and insurrection is derived from the clauses of treaties and sanads, from usage and from the promise of the King Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes..... The promise of the King Emperor to maintain unimpaired the privileges, rights and dignities of the Princes carries with it a duty to protect the Prince against attempts to eliminate him and substitute another form of Government". In recognition of their services to the British Crown, the Indian Princes earned the rewards of a limited sovereignty over their States under the Protection and suzerainty of the Paramount power. It was in this way that their rights, privileges and prerogatives were preserved. Thus the pioneers of the British Imperialism subjugated India aided by the Indian Princes. This was hardly diplomacy; it amounted to fraud and deceit; Mutual agreements arrived at for such ignoble purposes were invested with the sanctity of treaties. And it is from such "treaties" that the Princes claimed their right to rule. Our own State provides a classic example of this. One glance at a page of our history will lay bare the truth. The State of Jammu and Kashmir came to be transferred to Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846, after the Sikh Empire began to disintegrate. His failure to render competent assistance to the Sikh armies was duly noticed by the British as also his willingness to acknowledge their authority. This paved the way for the total occupation of Northern India by the British who were not slow in recognising Maharaja Gulab Singhs services to them. In reward they sold him the territory of Jammu and Kashmir for 75 lakhs of rupees, and, in the Treaty of Amritsar, the British Government made over the entire country independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs mail of his body". In this way, the entire population of Jammu and Kashmir State came under his absolute authority. The peculiar indignity of the transaction naturally offended the national self respect of our people who resisted the occupation of their country. But the direct intervention of the British troops helped the Maharaja to take possession of the territory. This event in the history of the State had catastrophic consequences for the people. The old feudal order which was bad enough, gave way to more exacting rule, in which the Maharaja assumed all proprietary rights over land. The entire State was plunged into a chaotic economic condition, aggravated by a heavy stale of taxation, tributes and levies which were required to make up for the money given by the Maharaja to the British. This unrelieved despotism reduced the bulk of the people to the level of serfs. There was general impoverishment. In 1848 some 4,000 artisans started on a trek to Lahore, with the object of permanently settling there. Even the British counselled the Maharaja to loosen his grip so as to avoid a total collapse of his administration. Perhaps the forefathers of the great poet-philosopher son of Kashmir, Iqbal, were also part of the same trail of migrants who left the State at this time. When his agony over the fate of

the people of his home land burst out in immortal verse, his feelings are echoed within the heart of every Kashmiri: "O Wind, if you pass through Geneva, give this message to the comity of the people of the world. They sold the peasant, his field, his property and the roof over his head, in fact, they sold the entire nation and for what a paltry price!"

Two Invested with this absolute authority acquired in 1846, the present ruling dynasty was in power for one hundred years. This sad and stern century of servitude has stultified the growth of our people, leaving them in the back waters of civilisation. While in British India, and even in some of the Indian States, many a measure of reform was introduced to alleviate the misery of the people, in this State the unenlightened absolutism of the Rulers drove them deeper and deeper into deeper into poverty and degradation. When conditions became increasingly intolerable they made determined efforts to wrest power from the hands of the Ruler.

By 1947, India had achieved independence and reached one of her historical watersheds. It was clear that with the withdrawal of the Paramount Power, the treaty rights of the Indian Princes would cease. Sovereignty in that case should revert to the people; they wished therefore to be consulted about the arrangements to be made with regard to the transfer of power. But a strange situation arose. The Cabinet Mission, while admitting the claims of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League in British India, completely refused a similar representation of the State's people who would not allow the right of the Princes to speak on their behalf. In our own State, the National Conference have made it clear as early as February 10, 1946 that it was against any further continuance of the treaty rights of the Princes which has been "made in times and under circumstances which do not obtain now and which have been framed without seeking the consent of the State peoples. Under such circumstances, no treaties or engagements which act as a dividing wall between their progress and that of their brethren in British India can be binding on the people" It was in this connection that I invited the attention of the Cabinet Mission to the standing inquiry of the Treaty of Amritsar, and sought its termination. I wrote to the Cabinet Delegation that: "as the mission is at the moment reviewing the relationship of the Princes with the paramount power with reference to treaty rights, we wish to submit that for us in Kashmir re-examination of this relationship is a vital matter because a hundred years

ago in 1846 the land and people of Kashmir were sold away by the British for 50 lakhs of British Indian Rupees. The people of Kashmir are determined to mould their destiny and we appeal to the Mission to recognise the justice and strength of our cause". In the Memorandum submitted to the Cabinet Mission later by the National Conference, the demand for independence from autocracy was reiterated: "Today the national demand of the people of Kashmir is not merely the establishment of responsible Government, but their right to absolute freedom from autocratic rule. This immensity of the wrong done to our people by the sale deed of 1846 can only be judged by looking into the actual living conditions of the people. It is the depth of our torment that has given strength to our protest". The indifferent attitude of the Cabinet Mission to the claims of the States people convinced us that freedom would not be given to a hundred million people who were to be left to groan under the heel of autocratic rulers. Consequently the National Conference gave a call to the people to prepare themselves for fresh ordeals and new responsibilities in the final bid for the capture of power from the hands of autocracy. This call came on the eve of the transfer of power in India and was therefore in keeping with the spirit of the times. The partition of India in 1947 brought many new problems and developments in its wake. In Kashmir, the very foundations of the administration began to shake, and the Government made frantic efforts to patch up the cracking structure. Its incompetence had become glaring. With the tribal raids on the State in October 1947, it was obvious that the Maharajahs authority had ceased to function and the real power lay in the hands of the peoples organisation, the National Conference. Even at this hour of grave national danger, the Ruler failed to see the wisdom of taking this organisation into his confidence and he preferred escape to the dignity of a formal surrender. When the situation became critical, the unprecedented pressure of the people forced him to call upon the representatives of the National Conference to deal with the emergency, when he himself had failed to handle the affairs of the State effectively. The emergency Administration in the State marked in effect a revolutionary transfer of power from the Ruler to the people. It was however the Proclamation of March 5, 1948 which constituted the first step towards the completion of the national emancipation. On this day, I, as leader of the largest party of the State, was entrusted with its Government, being assisted by a Cabinet with full powers to run the administration. The Maharajas authority was limited to that of a constitutional ruler; making it imperative upon him to consult his Government on any issues relating to the governance of the State This was obviously an interim measure. The Cabinet of the peoples representatives thus chosen functioned with the support and co-operation of the National Conference, but with the passage of time it became clear that the Maharaja

could not reconcile himself to this democratic system of Government. He put positive impediments in the way of the Government. These threatened to block much needed reforms in various spheres of administration. It was, therefore natural that following disagreement between him and the Government on matters of policy, that he should disconnect himself from the administration and leave the State. His young son Yuvaraja Karan Singh thereupon became the Regent and functioned as Constitutional Head of the State. Today, the Constituent Assembly having met, the time has come for the peoples representatives to make fundamental decision about the future position of the present dynasty. It is clear that this dynasty can no longer exercise authority on the basis of an old discredited treaty during my trial for sedition in the "Quit Kashmir" movement I had clarified the attitude of my party when I said: "The future constitutional set up in the State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot derive authority from the old source of relationship which was expiring and was bound to end soon. The set up could only rest on the active will of the people of the State, conferring on the Head of the State the title and authority drawn from the true and abiding source of sovereignty, that is the people". On this occasion, in 1946, I had also indicated the basis on which an individual could be entrusted by the people with the symbolic authority of a Constitutional Head:"The State and its Head represent the constitutional circumference and the centre of this sovereignty respectively, the Head of the State being the symbol of the authority with which the people may invest him for the realisation of their aspirations and the maintenance of their rights". In consonance with these principles, and in supreme fulfilment of the peoples aspirations, it follows that a Constitutional Head of the State will have to be chosen to exercise the functions which this Assembly may choose to entrust to him. So far as my party is concerned, we are convinced that the institution of monarchy is incompatible with the spirit and needs of modern times which demand an egalitarian relationship between one citizen and another. The supreme test of a democracy is the measure of equality of opportunity that it affords to its citizens to rise to the highest point of authority and position. In consequence, monarchies are fast disappearing from the world picture, as something in the nature of feudal anachronisms. In India, too, where before the partition, six hundred and odd princes exercised rights and privileges of rulership, the process of democratisation has been taken up at present hardly ten of them exercise the limited authority of constitutional heads of State. After the attainment of complete power by the people, it would have been an appropriate gesture of gratitude to recognise the Maharaja as the first constitutional

head of the State. But I am sorry to say that the Maharaja has lost confidence of all the sections of the people. His incompetence to go along with the changed times and his obscurantist views on important matters indicate that he is not fit to hold office of the highest democratic ruler of the State. Moreover, his previous actions as the ruler have proved that he is not able to act responsibly and impartially. People of this land still remember with pain and anguish that crucial time when the Maharaja did not come to their help. They also remember his inefficiency when he failed to protect a section of the people of Jammu. St. Thomas Acquinos has in the 13th century described in the following words the fall out of the actions of a ruler insensitive to his responsibilities: "A King who shuts his eyes on his responsibilities loses the right to be obeyed by his subjects. To oust such a king would not be a revolt because he is himself a rebel whose ouster is the right of the people. It would be right to reduce his powers so that he does not misuse these. All the political power is derived from the people. It is thus imperative that they or their representatives make all the laws. Depending on the wishes of another individual will never provide security to us" Considering the earlier conduct of the Maharaja, it can not be even thought of to share the States Government with him. I am sure that no one from amongst us is interested in any personal dispute with the Maharajas family. For running the affairs of the State it is important to view everyone impartially. Our decisions should not be clouded with personal animosity and misunderstanding. Association with Yuvraj Karan Singh for the last few years has impressed me and my colleagues in the Government about his intelligence, farsightedness and desire to serve the country. These qualities of the Yuvraj make him to be honoured with being the first duly elected ruler of the State. There is no doubt that Yuvaraj Karan Singh in his capacity as a citizen of the State, will prove a fitting symbol of the transition to a democratic system in which the ruler of yesterday becomes the first servant of the people, functioning under their authority, and on their behalf. The next issue before us is that of the compensation which we should or should not grant to those landowners who have been expropriated during the putting into operation of the "land to the tiller" legislation, under which land was given or given back to the man who actually cultivates it. It is not possible for you to consider this question dispassionately unless you understand something of the history of land tenure in the State. For us the well being of the peasants who form the vast majority of the population of this country is a top priority; we realise that on a sound organisation of agriculture, and the elimination of debt and the evils of landlordism their ultimate welfare depends. We sincerely believe that our body politic cannot be healthy as long as there exists here an army of men doing little or no work and getting easy remuneration for it, and as long as we perpetuate the dangerous age old class division of our society that landlordism breeds. Our attempt

has been to make our land dwellers contented. We set about this fundamental reform in the following way.

Three On Martyrs Day, the 13th of July 1950, the Government declared its policy of liquidating the big landed estates and transferring land to the tillers of the soil. On the 17th of October, 1950 was enacted the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act. By this Act, the right of ownership in respect of lands in excess of 22/3-4 acres of land excluding orchards, grass and fuel reserves, was abolished and such land was decreed and transferred to the actual tillers to the extent of their possession. In this way, the right of the cultivator to the ownership of land in his possession was recognised and enforced and no new class of intermediaries or rent receivers was allowed to come into being. The abolition of landlordism is thus an accomplished fact and there is no going back on the decision already taken. The Big Landed Estates Abolition Act however, provides for the Constituent Assembly to settle the question of compensation with respect to the land from which expropriation has taken place. That question is now before you for decision. The system of individual ownership of land is of modern growth and originally, the land belonged in common to communities of kinsmen or to the State. Before the British rule, the proprietors were by no means the real owners of the soil and of all methods for the collection of revenue during that time the most noteworthy was that of collecting it direct from the cultivators through the Headmen of the villages. There is very little evidence to show that, in Mogul and Sikh times, there were many rent paying tenants. The Ain-i-Akbari not only contains no regulations about tenants, but also recognises no intermediary between the cultivator and the State Nevertheless, there were some types of intermediaries in the pre-British period and also in later times and it is the existence of these intermediaries which led to the development of landlordism in the State. The revenue farmers were one class of such intermediaries and so were the different privileged classes of assignees,jagirdars, muafidars and mukarraridars, all enjoying feudal concession, which were created during the Mogul and the Sikh times and also during the Dogra Rule. In the Jammu Province ownership of land was granted by State Deeds during the Sikh Rule and the earlier period of the Dogra Rule. In the Kashmir Province, the ownership of land was held by the Ruler since 1846, when Maharaja Gulab Singh purchased Kashmir from the British. It was in 1933 as a result of the pressure of public opinion than proprietary right in land was conferred on the landholders in the Kashmir province including the Frontier Districts, but this concession to mass demand for transfer of proprietorship of land to the actual cultivators was reduced to a fiction in as much as large tracts of land, granted by earlier Rulers to influential persons. Rajas and Dewans by State Deeds were construed and acted upon as grants of the right of proprietorship

in land. In this manner were created big proprietors who did not cultivate their lands themselves, but had tenants who paid them rent in cash and kind. The small peasant proprietor who cultivated land with his own hands also existed, but there were cases where the cultivators who had originally acquired holders, right and were recorded as such were relegated to the position of tenants by the right of land holding being granted by the Ruler to some of his favourites who did not cultivate the land themselves and were pure and simple rent receivers. While the land settlement in the State was rightly made with the peasant proprietors, the settlement with the intermediary proprietors was not made on their recognition as proprietors of the soil, but because of certain political and financial reasons. It was well understood even by the successive Settlement Officers and Settlement Commissioner in the State that though the intermediary proprietors were to be declared the proprietors of the soil, their tenants really were no ordinary tenants, but were, in most cases, the original and hereditary possessors of the soil. The First Regular Settlement conducted in the State had perhaps nothing to do with the determination of the historical and accurate theory of the intermediary proprietors, position, nor was its function to confer on the proprietors a position comparable to what they originally were. It appears that the task of the settlement authorities was only to legalise all the original acts of illegality and usurpation by which intermediary revenue farmers or rent receivers had assumed great power and influence in the period of disorder, before a proper Revenue Administration came to the country. At the First Regular Settlement the area of land not under cultivation was very large. In 1891 AD when the late Sir Walter Lawrence was in the State every inducement was given to the cultivators to till the land and in this way large tracts of State land where brought under cultivation. But even such lands as had been reclaimed and brought under the plough by the cultivators where gifted away in proprietary right to influential person. There were grants of land known as chaks made under orders No. 5 and 6, otherwise known as the Pratap Code. All these grants were subject to substantial concession in land revenue. There were grants of different kinds, as for instance, State Officials Grant, Grants in perpetuity, Hindu Grants and others. The vast majority of these concessionistland holders obtained their grants by virtue of the high positions they had acquired. The grants under the Pratap code were entirely made to the clan and the kinsmen of the Royal House in whose favour were also released some State Forest Reserves and cultivable areas in some Game Reserves. With the demarcation of forests in the State, s everal areas were excluded from the forests and let out for cultivation and for purposes of agriculture. State lands were similarly permitted to be used as Grazing Ground. The reclaimed land out of the Wular Lake, and in and around the Dal Lake, which was owned by the State, was also released for cultivation. And then under Raj Tilak Boon No. 4 about 26 years ago, State waste lands were granted as Village Commons equivalent to the aggregate cultivated land of each village, with the same rights as the landholders enjoyed in respect of their existing holdings. Even after the First Regular Settlement, many estates were sold to speculators or given over to those who were prepared to meet the land revenue demand in cases where default was made by actual cultivators, and the right to own land was recognized as that of the

revenue-payer as against the actual cultivator who defaulted. The non-cultivating landowners leased out their interests and the middle-men leased it out in turn, creating a long chain of rent-receivers and rent-payers, who intervened between the State and the actual cultivators. It will thus be seen that a substantial portion of the landed property came to be owned from such land as was the property of the State before and in every case the acquisition of land was free from any encumbrance or payment of any consideration. It is in the light of this historical background, therefore, that the Honble Members of this House shall have to consider whether there is any justification for payment of any compensation to such land-owners for lands from which they are ex-propriated under the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act. Finally we come to the issue which has made Kashmir an object of world interest, and has brought her before the forum of the United Nations. This simple issue has become so involved that people have begun to ask themselves, after three and a half years of tense expectancy. "Is there any solution?" Our answer is in the affirmative. Everything hinges round the genuineness of the will to find a solution. If we face the issue straight, the solution is simple. The problem may be posed in this way. Firstly, was Pakistans action in invading Kashmir in 1947 morally and legally correct, judged by any norm of international behaviour? Sir Owen Dixons Verdict on this issue is perfectly plain. In unambiguous terms he declared Pakistan an aggressor. The legality of the accession has not been seriously questioned by any responsible or independent person or authority. These answers are obviously correct. Then where is the justification of treating India and Pakistan at par in matters pertaining to Kashmir? In fact, the force of logic dictates the conclusion that the aggressor should withdraw his armed forces, and the United Nations should see that Pakistan gets out of the State. In that event, India herself, anxious to give the people of the State a chance to express their will freely would willingly co-operate with any sound plan of demilitarisation. They would withdraw their forces, only garrisoning enough posts to ensure against any repetition of that earlier treacherous attack from Pakistan. These two steps would have gone a long way to bring about a new atmosphere in the State. The rehabilitation of displaced people, and the restoration of stable civic conditions would have allowed people to express their will and take the ultimate decision. We as a Government are keen to let our people decide the future of our land in accordance with their own wishes. If these three preliminary processes were accomplished, we should be happy to have the assistance of international observers to ensure fair play and the requisite conditions for a free choice by the people.

Instead invader and defender have been put on the same plan. Under various garbs, attempts have been made to side track the main issues. Sometimes, against all out ideals of life and way of living attempts to divide our territories have been made in the form of separation of our State religion-wise, with ultimate plans of further disrupting its territorial integrity. Once an offer was made to police our country with Common-Wealth forces, which threatens to bring in Imperial control by the back door. Besides the repugnance which our people have, however, to the idea of inviting foreign troops on their soil, the very presence of Common Wealth troops could have created suspicion among our neighbours that we were allowing ourselves to be used as a base of possible future aggression against them. This could easily have made us in a second Korea. We have watched all this patiently; but we cannot be indifferent to the growing sufferings of our people we cannot any longe r tolerate being bandied about and left with an indefinite future. Not only has our patience been tried to its limits, but our selfrespect has been challenged by allegation that we are the "stooges of India", and nobodies in our own land, that our influence rests on Indian bayonets, that we are running a Police State and various other taunts and fantastic allegations. We, therefore, thought it best to call upon our own people to declare what future they seek. At last we, in October 1950 decided to convoke a constituent Assembly which would pronounce upon the future affiliations of our State. We were, and are, convinced that whatever some groups or individuals in the world outside might have to say about this decision of ours there are in every country many people who have faith in justice and straightforward dealing.

Four I have no doubt that our considered views will be understood and supported by freedom-loving, peace-loving and democratic minded people all over the world. I am sure too that Almighty God who guards all just causes will bestow His blessings upon us and guide our footsteps towards correct and honest ends. The problem, then, of accession has to be considered against the background of history in particular of the immediate past consequent on the British quitting India disappearance of the Paramount Power. The end of the War brought to a head the question of Indian freedom. Let me recapitulate. The Cabinet Mission was sent to India to hammer out plans for the transfer of power. This Mission had a series of consultations with parties and leaders of opinion in British Indian but refused to agree to the people of the Indian states being represented by their popular leaders and instead backed up their old allies, the Indian Princes. I and my colleagues had at that time raised our voice against this attitude in the following words of our Memorandum.

"The fate of the Kashmiri nation is in balance and in this hour of decision we demand our basic democratic right to send our selected representatives to the constitution making bodies that will construct the framework of Free India. We emphatically repudiate the right of the Princely Order to represent the people of the Indian States or their right to nominate their personal representatives as our spokesmen" I have no doubt in my mind that if popular representatives from the Indian States had been included in the discussions they would have certainly helped in having many controversial issues resolved fairly and smoothly. But that was not to be. To our misfortune and to the misfortune of millions of people in India and Pakistan, the Cabinet Mission as well as the Indian Political Parties seemed to have been swayed by various conflicting considerations, with the result that the Indian sub-continentally which had acquired an organic unity through ages of social, cultural and economic intercourse, was suddenly vivisected into the two Dominions of India and Pakistan. I need not relate here the horrors that followed this unnatural operation. Millions of hearts in both countries still ache with wounds that will not heal. The agony of this change over became all the more intense as a result of the position in which the Indian States were left Under the Indian Independence Act of the British Parliament, the Paramountcy of the British Crown, against which the princes had been leaning, lapsed, and it was made clear that it would not be transferred to either of the succeeding Dominions. There were three alternative courses open to them. They could accede to either of the two dominions or remain independent. This gave the Princes, themselves the option to decide the fate of their States. Following the announcement of the "Mountbatten Plan" on June 3, some of the Indian States acceded to Pakistan and some to India by means of Instruments of Accession executed through their Princes. There were also some who entered into Stand still Agreements with either or both pending finalization of their decisions. "The betrayal of the interests of the States people had been expected following the rejection of the Memorandum of the National Conference, and so we in Kashmir decided to place the issue before the people themselves". This is how our well-known "Quit Kashmir" agitation began. The National Conference once again led the people through a great struggle, and once again the Ruler tried to curb it, this time with unprecedented severity. But when a whole people is on the move it is not possible to repress them and they do not stop until they wrest freedom and justice for themselves from the unwilling hands of those above them. The crucial date of Indian and Pakistani Independence, therefore, came when I and my colleagues were still behind prison bars. The whole sub-continent was in a state of high tension and disturbance. If at that time, the Head of the State of Jammu and Kashmir had even the slightest sense of realism or a proper awareness of the danger lurking in the situation, he would have immediately taken the people into his confidence. By

associating their representatives with administration. I am sure many of the complications that arose later could have been avoided. Instead of that, the Maharajahs Government entered in a stand still agreement with Pakistan, and this was accepted without question by that Dominion. A similar arrangement was suggested to India, also, but it is noteworthy that the Government of India insisted that it could not consider any agreement entered into by the Government of the State valid until it had the approval of the peoples representatives. While the leaders consistently refused to recognise the vital issue of accession without first securing the approval of his people, the Muslim League and the Pakistan Government supported the claims of the Rulers to speak for their states. The late Mr Jinnah took the position that after the lapse of Paramountcy, the Princes were completely independent and that they could themselves determine what relations they should have with the two Dominions. Throughout the struggles that the people of Kashmir waged against autocracy, we should never forget that the Muslim League leadership had completely disassociated itself from them and that; during the upsurge of 1946, their local party organs had assisted the administration to suppress the movement. At this crucial time, then, Pakistan was under strict cover of secrecy, perfecting her own plans, and the Dawn, the Muslim League's official organ in Karachi, was appealing to the Maharajah to accede to Pakistan on the grounds that he would have far greater freedom there than in India. It was at this stage, taking advantage of the isolation of the Kashmiris from the rest of the world, that Pakistan imposed an economic blockade upon us with a view to starve us into submission. Attempts were made even to excite communal hatred to disrupt our peaceful civic life. Even in the face of such provocation, the National Conference, I am proud to say, took an objective and democratic stand immediately on my release from imprisonment. I clarified the issue at a mass meeting in Srinagar. The first and fundamental issue before us was the establishment of a popular Government. Our objective might be summarised a "Freedom First". Then alone could we as a free people decide our future associations through accession. I also made it clear that the National Conference would consider this issue without prejudice to its political friends and opponents, and strictly in accordance with the best interests of the country as a whole. I said that, in the state of tension and conflict that obtained both in India and Pakistan, it was difficult for the people here and now to predict what the final shape of both would be. You will realise, therefore, that we could not be accused of being partial to one side or the other. During that period we openly discussed the matter with representatives of the Muslim League who had come to Srinagar for this purpose. We even sent one of our representatives in Lahore to acquaint the authorities in Pakistan with our point of view. We were thus still struggling against autocracy and for freedom when the State was suddenly invaded from the side of Pakistan.

The overwhelming pressure of this invasion brought about a total collapse of the armed forces of the State as well as its administrative machinery, leaving the completely defenceless people at the mercy of invaders. It was not an ordinary type of invasion, in as much as no canons of warfare were observed. The tribesmen who attacked the State in thousands, killed, burnt, looted and destroyed whatever came their way and in this savagery no section of the people could escape. Even the nuns and nurses of a Catholic Mission were either killed, or brutally maltreated. As these raiders advanced towards Srinagar, the last vestige of authority, which lay in the person of the Maharaja, who suddenly disappeared from the Capital. This created a strange vacuum, and would have certainly led the occupation of the whole State by Pakistani troops and tribesmen, if, at this supreme hour of crisis, the entire people of Kashmir had not risen like a solid barrier against the aggressor. They halted his on rush, but could not stop him entirely as the defenders had not enough experience, training and equipment to fight back effectively. There is no doubt that some of them rose to great heights of heroism during these fateful days. Who can help being moved by the saga of crucified Sherwani, Abdul Aziz Brigadier Rajendra Singh, Prempal Sardar, Rangil Singh early Militia boys like Pushkar Nath Zadoo, Somnath Bira, Ismail, among scores of other named and unnamed heroes of all communities. But we, though rich in human material, lacked war equipment and trained soldiers. When the raiders were fast approaching Srinagar, we could think of only one way to save the State from total annihilation - by asking for help from a friendly neighbour. The representative of the National Conference, therefore flew to Delhi to seek help from the Government of India. But the absence of any constitutionalties between our State and India made it impossible for her to render us any effective assistance in meeting the aggressor. As I said earlier, India had refused to sign a standstill Agreement with the State on the ground that she could not accept such an Agreement until it has the approval of the people. But now, since the peoples representatives themselves sought an alliance, the Government of India showed readiness to accept it. Legally the instrument of Accession had to be signed by the Ruler of the State. This the Maharajah did. While accepting that accession, the Government of India said that she wished that "as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the States accession should be settled by reference to the people". Actuated by a sincere desire to avoid bloodshed and further conflict, the Government of India approached the Security Council in 1948, with a complaint against Pakistan. The request was simple. The contention of India was that Pakistan was responsible for the invasion of Kashmir and was continuing to help the raiders, who had been employed as mercenaries for this purpose. And it was further said that legally bound as India was to clear the Jammu and Kashmir State of raiders, she might be constrained to pursue the invaders to their bases in Pakistan, which might lead to a still bigger conflagration. India, therefore wanted the Security Council to dispose of the case as quickly as possible in the interest of peace. If this had been done, conditions would have ipsofactocome into being when the people of Jammu and Kashmir would have expressed their will with

regard to the continuance of the accession to the Dominion they had joined. This was not to be. This is the essential background which we must fully take into account. Now I shall indicate some of the considerations which should be kept in view when you the Honble Members of this August Assembly, shoulder the grave responsibility of giving your considered opinion on this issue of accession which effects not only the present generation of our people but generations yet to come. The Cabinet Mission Plan has provided for three courses which may be followed by the Indian States when determining their future affiliations. A State can either accede to India or accede to Pakistan but, failing to do either, it still can claim the right to remain independent. These three alternatives are naturally open to our State; While the intention of the British Government was to secure the privileges of the Princes; the representatives of the people must have the primary consideration of promoting the greatest good of the common people. Whatever steps they take must contribute to the growth of a democratic social order where in all invidious distinctions between group of creeds are absent. Judged by this supreme consideration, what are the advantages and disadvantages of our States accession to either India or Pakistan, or of having an independent status? As a realist I am conscious that nothing is all black or all white, and there are many facts to each of the propositions before us. I shall first speak on the merits and demerits of the States accession to India. In the final analysis, as I understand it, it is the kinship of ideals which determines the strength of ties between two States. The Indian National Congress has consistently supported the cause of the States peoples freedom. The autocratic rule of the Princes has been done away with while the representative governments have been entrusted with the administration. Steps towards democratisation have been taken and these have raised the peoples standard of living, brought about much needed social reconstruction, and, above all built up their very independence of spirit. Naturally, if we accede to India there is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during the last four years, the Government of India has never tried to interfere in our internal autonomy. This experience has strengthened our confidence in them as a democratic State.

Five The real character of a State is revealed in its Constitution. The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bedrock of modern democracy. This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir can not have security in India, where the large majority of the population are Hindus. Any unnatural cleavage between religious groups is the legacy of Imperialism, and no modern State can afford to encourage artificial divisions if it is to achieve progress and prosperity. The Indian

Constitution has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious State, which is a throwback to medievalism, buy guaranteeing the equality of rights of all citizens irrespective of their religion, colour, caste and class. The national movement in our State naturally gravitates towards these principles of secular democracy. The people here will never accept a principle which seeks to favour the interests of one religion or social group against another. This affinity in political principles, as well as in past association, and our common path of suffering in the cause of freedom, must be weighed properly while deciding the future of the State. We are also intimately concerned with the economic well-being of the people of this State. As I said before while referring to constitution-building, political ideals are often meaningless unless linked with economic plans. As a State, we are concerned mainly with agriculture and trade. As you know, and as I have detailed before, we have been able to put through our "land to the tiller" legislation and to make it a practical success. :Land and all it means is an inestimable blessing to our peasants who have dragged alone in servitude to the landlord and his allies for centuries without number. We have been able under present conditions to carry these reforms through; are we sure that in alliance with landlord ridden Pakistan, with so many feudal privileges intact that this economic reforms of ours will be tolerated? We have already heard that news of our Land Reforms has travelled to the peasants of the enemy-occupied area of our State who vainly desire a like status, and like benefits. In the second place, our economic welfare is bound up with our arts and crafts. The traditional markets for these precious goods, for which we are justly known all over the world, have been centred in India. The volume of our trade, inspite of the dislocation of the last few years, shows this. Industry is also highly important to us. Potentially we are rich in minerals, and in the raw materials of industry; we need help to develop our resources. India, being more highly industrialised than Pakistan, can give us equipment, technical services and materials. She can help us in marketing, many goods also which it would not be practical for us to produce here-for instance, sugar, cotton, cloth, and other essential commodities-can be got by us in large quantities from India. It is around the efficient supply of such basic necessities that the standard of living of the man-in-the-street depends. I shall refer now to the alleged disadvantages of accession to India. To being with, although the land frontiers of India and Kashmir are contiguous, an allweather road-link as dependable as the one we have Pakistan does not exist. This must necessarily hamper trade and commerce to some extent, particularly during the snowy winter months. But we have studied this question, and with improvements in modern engineering, if the State wishes to remain with India the establishment of an all-weather stable system of communication is both feasible and easy. Similarly, the use of the State rivers as a means of timber transport is impossible if we turn to India, except in Jammu where the river Chenab still carries logs to the plains. In reply to this argument, it may be pointed out that accession to India will open up possibilities of utilising our forest wealth for industrial purposes and that, instead of timber, finished goods, which

will provide work for our carpenters and labourers, can be exported to India where there is a ready market for them. Indeed in the presence of our fleets of timber carrying trucks, river-transport is a crude system which inflicts a loss of some 20% to 35% in transit. Still another factor has to be taken into consideration. Certain tendencies have been asserting themselves in India which may in the future convert it into a religious State wherein the interests of Muslims will be jeopardised. This would happen if a communal organisation had a dominant hand in the Government, and Congress ideals of the equality of all communities were made to give way to religious intolerance. The continued accession of Kashmir to India should, however, help in defeating this tendency. From my experience of the last four years, it is my considered judgement that the presence of Kashmir in the Union of India has been the major factor in stabilising relations between the Hindus and Muslims of India. Gandhiji was not wrong when he uttered words before his death which paraphrase; "I lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help" As I have said before, we must consider the question of accession with an open mind, and not let our personal prejudices stand in the way of balanced judgement. I will now invite you to evaluate the alternative of accession to Pakistan. The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim State, and a big majority of our people being Muslims the State must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim State is of course only a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal State in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power. In addition to this, the appeal to religion constitutes a sentimental and a wrong approach to the question. Sentiment has its own place in life, but often it leads to irrational action. Some argue, as supposedly natural corollary to this, that on our acceding to Pakistan our, annihilation or survival depends. Facts have disproved this. Right thinking men would point out that Pakistan is not an organic unit of all the Muslims in this subcontinent. It has on the contrary, caused the dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistan at least a thousand miles apart from each other. The total population of Western Pakistan which is contiguous to our State, is hardly 25 million, while the total number of Muslims in India is as many as 40 million. As one Muslim is as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslim if they are worried by such considerations should choose the forty millions living in India. Looking at the matter too from a more modern political angle; religious affinities alone do not and should not normally determine the political alliances of State. We do not find a Christian block, a Buddhist block, or even a Muslim block, about which there is so much talk nowadays in Pakistan. These days economic interests and a community of political ideals more appropriately influence the policies of States. We have another important factor to consider, if the state decides to make this the predominant consideration. What will be the fate of the one million non Muslims now in

our State? As things stand at present, there is no place for them in Pakistan. Any solution which will result in the displacement or the total subjugation of such a large number of people will not be just or fair, and it is the responsibility of this House to ensure that the decision that it takes on accession does not militate the interests of any religious group. As regards the economic advantages, I have mentioned before the road and river links with Pakistan. In the last analysis, we must however remember that we are not concerned only with the movement of people but also with the movement of goods and the linking up of markets. In Pakistan there is a chronic dearth of markets for our products. Neither, for that matter, can she help us with our industrialisation, being herself industrially backward. On the debit side we have to take into account the reactionary character of her politics and State politics. In Pakistan, we should remember that the lot of the States subjects has not changed and they are still helpless and under the heel of their Rulers, who wield the same unbridled power under which we used to suffer here. This clearly runs counter to our own aspirations for freedom. Another big obstacle to dispassionate evaluation of her policies is the lack of a constitution in Pakistan. As it stands at present, this State enjoys the unique position of being governed by a Constitution enacted by an outside Parliament which gives no idea whatsoever of the future shape of civic and social relations. It is reasonable to argue that Pakistan cannot have the confidence of a freedom-loving and democratic people when it has failed to guarantee even fundamental rights of its citizens. The right of selfdetermination for nationalities is being consistently denied and those who fought against Imperialism for this just right are being suppressed with force. We should remember Badshah Khan and his comrades who laid down their all for freedom, also Khan Abdus Samad Khan and other fighters in Baluchistan. Our national movement in the State considers this right of self-determination inalienable, and no advantage however great, will persuade our people to forego it. The third course open to us has still to be discussed. We have to consider the alternative of making ourselves an Eastern Switzerland, of keeping aloof from both States, but having friendly relations with them. This might seem attractive in that it would appear to pave the way out of the present deadlock. To us as a tourist country it could also have certain obvious advantages. But in considering independence we must not ignore practical considerations. Firstly, it is not easy to protect sovereignty and independence in a small country which has not sufficient strength to defend itself on our long and difficult frontiers bordering so many countries. Secondly, we must have the good-will of all our neighbours. Can we find powerful guarantors among them to pull together always in assuring us freedom from aggression? I would like to remind you that from August 15 to October 22, 1947, our state was independent and the result was that our weakness was exploited by the neighbour with whom we had a valid Standstill Agreement. The State was invaded. What is the guarantee that in future too we may not be victims of a similar aggression?

I have now put the pros and cons of the three alternatives before you. It should not be difficult for men of discrimination and patriotism gathered in this Assembly to weigh all these in the scales of our national good and pronoun where the true well being of the country lies in the future. Mr President, it will be befitting here if I on this solemn occasion remember the last words of one of our martyrs which still ring in my ears. In 1931, the State Police had fired on our demonstrators, and many lay wounded and dying in the grounds of the Jamia Mosque. One man, supported by his old mother and young wife, was nearing his last breath, and he comforted them in their misery, forgetting his own. Then he called for me. When I came to him he looked me straight in the eyes and said. "We have done our duty. Now it is for you and the nation to carry it through to a successful end". Perhaps the spirit of that hero is in this Hall today to see one fulfilment of his dreams of this land of Kashmir. Today is a day of fulfilment for all - a day when we finally and triumphantly assert our right to decide our own future, free from threats of force and outside dictation. On this historic day, we remember the Prime Minister of India, our cherished friend and never-falling comrade on this difficult journey and, besides, an illustrious son of Kashmir, the many friends in India and some even in Pakistan, who in the years before partition, helped us forward. We remember the Ahrars who went to jail in their thousands for us; Badshah Khan and our friends of the frontier, now in jails and fighting for their own freedom. Nor can we ever forget our kith and kin across the cease-fire line who are at present living under the heel of the enemy. Their welfare is always dear to us and we shall continue to regard them as an integral part of ourselves. For twenty years, Mr President, we have journeyed to this day and our criterion in all we do must be the welfare of our people. This consideration alone must guide our decision. Now again, I have put my deepest thoughts before you and may God in His mercy, lead us all forward on the right path.

http://www.kashmir-information.com/pastpresent/chapter12.html M. L. Koul, Kashmir: Past and Present Chapter 12: Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq There is no denying the fact that Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq was soft, sophisticated, cultured and educated. He had a reputation for honesty and unlike other National Conference stalwarts he was not wedded to corruption and under-hand means of amassing wealth. He was a Marxist and had contacts with the Marxists of all hues within the country. He had the distinction of leading a brilliant group of young communists (Hindus) within the National Conference. As an ideologue of National Conference, he was seriously heard by all hues of politicians. That he was a man of conviction is the general assessment made by various levels of people having come into contact with him. Being essentially an arm-chair politician, G.M. Sadiq was absolutely lacking in dynamism and mobility, stamina and grit. Though proverbially honest, yet he failed to give the state an administration which could be termed as clean, free from corruption and communalism. Aware of the interference in governmental affairs by Miss Mahmooda Ahmad Ali Shah, said to be his wife, he allowed her to grow as a parallel centre of power. Even his sister, Zainab Begum, could not resist from interfering in administrative affairs. G.M. Sadiq for his sterling qualities of head and heart enjoyed immense popularity with the Kashmirian Hindus, who supported him in his political wrangles against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. That he would be soft and considerate to them was belied by his pursuit of discriminatory policies against them. There was no letup in the policy of harassment and economic squeeze of the Kashmirian Hindus. The Muslims continued to be his utmost concern and the Hindus were virtually consigned to backwaters with not even subservient role to play. It was G.M. Sadiq who formalised the blatant discrimination of the Kashmirian Hindus by the issuance of an order reserving 30% of job slots, promotions and admissions to training and technical institutions for the Kashmirian Hindus and 70% for the Kashmirian Muslims. The saidorder was not accepted by the Islamised bureaucracy, which consistently pursued the policy of putting the Kashmirian Hindus to an agonising economic squeeze. Discrimination went on trampling upon the rights of the minorities. No political leader except G.M. Sadiq dared resort to such a measure based on flagrant communal considerations and sectarianism. The order proved a land-mark in the history of discrimination and relentless elimination of the Kashmirian Hindus. Violative of the constitutional provisions, the orders were outrageously communal making religion as a determining factor for entry into services and admissions into professional colleges. What was shocking that such orders were issued at the behest of G.M. Sadiq, who had pretensions to secular and progressive credentials. The Kashmirian Hindus did not take orders lying down, but opposed it tooth and nail. They termed the orders as black orders contravening the constitutional tenets and provisos. The Hindus upheld merit and academic

achievements as the determining factors of recruitment in services and admissions to professional colleges and technical institutions. Exposing the communal hue and underpinnings of the said order, the Kashmirian Hindus rammed it home to the National Conference leadership that it belied the promises held out to them in the blue print of 'Naya Kashmir', essentially a document of secularism upholding evenhanded treatment to all communities without religious considerations. Thus, G.M. Sadiq was held guilty of axing and eroding the very ideals which he had cherished all through his political career. By the issuance of such an order, he appeared no different from Bakshi, who granted admission to the Muslim boys and girls without suffering any rigours of test and interview, from Sheikh Abdullah, who heralded the process of supersessions, from Mir Qasim, who grabbed small holdings of land from the Kashmirian Hindus, from Farooq Abdullah, who led to the hounding out of the minorities from their home-land by feeding and shielding communally tilted secessionist forces. Let it be known that the Islamised bureaucracy never put 30% reservations for the Kashmirian Hindus into actual practice. It only threw crumbs and left-overs to them and hired and fired at will and whim. The educational institutions and other departments in the state were starved of trained and qualitied teachers and staff. Appointments to various job-slots were not made or deferred only because most of the applicants happened to be the Kashmirian Hindus, who as a matter of state policy were to be sidelined. The crusade in Kashmir has been against merit, academic achievements, and scholarship. Impeccable academic credentials never formed a plank for entry into state services or admission in the professional colleges. Many a Hindu bright has lost careers. A Muslim boy or girl with very low percentage of marks finds admission in various professional colleges. What has been the travesty of justice is that many Muslims with no background knowledge of science were admitted to engineering and medical colleges. That admissions to various study programmes and entry into job slots are determined by the population ratio of a particular community has been the Muslim approach to the entire gamut of the problem. l G.M Sadiq proved the worst for the Kashmirian Hindus, not only that they were subjected to the atrocious discrimination on religious grounds but were also openly assaulted and hurt inflicted on them. On 11th September, 1964, a group of Muslim boatment dared construct a shed on a piece of land owned by a Kashmirian Hindu. Objecting to the illegal act of raising a shed on the piece of land, the Hindu family had to face an avalanche of hostility on part of Muslims got collected in hordes from the area only to launch a physical assault on the members of the family. Men were severly beaten and roughed up, women were dragged out of their houses suffering grievous injuries and their gold ornaments snatched. Taking it as a Jehad against the infidels, all Muslims losing cool and sanity stood as monolith to grab the piece of land owned by a Hindu. The culprits were not arrested nor were they punished for the unlawful act. The Muslims as a matter of rule were beyond the purview of law. The whole atrocity was brought to the notice of the Chief Minister, G.M. Sadiq, who had full faith in rule of law but never moved in the direction of establishing rule of law in the state he ruled.

A representation was also submitted to the Prime Minister of India bringing the lawless conditions prevailing in the state to his notice. But nothing transpired. The boatmen with the support of their co-religionists proved a menance for the Kashmirian Hindus in the area subjecting them to a barrage of abuse, harassment and intimidation and the law enforcing agencies maintaining strong silence. The entire situation bordering on communal clashes were reported in a local Daily and the Government went to the extent of arresting three journalists and stopping the publication of a daily paper. The policy of discrimination concertedly pursued by the Islamised bureaucracy of the state caused an immeasurable frustration and despair in the Hindu boys and girls of the Valley of Kashmir. Twenty Hindu boys and girls having been ignored for admissions to the professional colleges, despite their merit and achievements, declared their conversion to Islam as the state was not only pro-Muslim, but seemed to be pro-Muslim. A Sikh boy also expressed the same view and was ready to accept Islam.3 The policy of relentless persecution of non-Muslim ethnic groups was vigorously pursued to eliminate them or force them to get converted to Islam. Such developments culminated in the regime of G.M. Sadiq, who perhaps contributed to the view-point of 'religion being opium for the masses', yet he pursued a policy based on religious discrimination investing it with legitimacy and sanctity. G.M. Sadiq in the name of normalisation made a truce with the rabid Muslim forces working for discrimination and secessionism. He lent them a new lease by loosening the grip over their antinational activities, thus emboldening them for waging a war on the minorities, who have all along been the soft targets of the Muslim bigotry. Allowing the rabid Muslims to creep into the state administration, Sadiq practically allowed the state machine to slip into the hands of antinational and non-secular forces. The Jamaat-i-lslami had been in the process of spreading its tentacles by establishing its support-base in a number of pockets. The Madrasas run by the rabid organisation were getting government grants and thus were busy in vitiating the entire sociopolitical fabric of the state. Most of the government run schools were stafted by men and women owing allegiance to the Jamaat-i-Islami enjoying political patronage. The organisation spreading communal canker was working slowly, but surely. No positive and purposive steps were taken to meet the challenge and countcract the vicious propaganda of the Jammat-i-Islami, which was directly affiliated to the Jamaat-i-lslami of Pakistan. Jamaat-oriented cadre had been in the process ot sneaking into administration and police. Pandit Rishi Dev,4 a veteran leader of the congress in Kashmir, posed the problem of a Kashmirian Hindu teacher to G.M. Sadiq holding the portfolio of Education. The paralysed parents of the teacher had been confined to bed for a long time. Being the only son, the unfortutlate couple needed his care and attention. Pandit Rishi Dev requested the Chief Minister to transfer the teacher to his native hamlet or a nearby village. What Sadiq did was to ask the Hindu leader to deposit the application with his secretary. The same was done. Meanwhile a Molvi flaunting long beard hailing from Rishi Dev's village was led into the Chief Minister's chambers. He was cordially received and requested the Chief Minister to appoint his daughter, a middle pass, to the post of a teacher. His application was taken. To Rishi Dev's consternation, within a week's time, the Molvi's daugllter was sent the appointment letter and the Hindu teacher

was not transferred on humanitarian grounds. And this testifies to the instinctive hatred which the Muslims of all complexions harboured for the Kashmirian Hindus. Miss Mahmooda Ahmad Ali Shah, the virtual ruler in the times of G.M. Sadiq, was out to destroy the service career of a Hindu professor when he stopped coaching a close relation of G.M. Sadiq in the college hostel.5 The girl hailing from Palhalan, district Baramulla, was below average with no learning capacities and the professor feared that he might be harassed for the below normal performance of the girl in exams. That was what led the professor to stop from going to the hostel for coaching the girl. He was persuaded to resume the coaching, but the professor stuck to his guns and showed his inability to resume it. It was sufficient to offend Miss Mahmooda, the principal of the college. Within days he was involved in a case of moral turpitude and suspension orders followed. Mr. Noor-ud-din, the vice-chancellor of the Kashmir University, was appointed as an enquiry officer to probe the whole affair. He paid a visit to the college and on preliminary enquiries dismissed the whole case as personal vendetta and gave a clean chit to the professor, who was transferred from women's college, Srinagar. The tragedy of the Kashmirian Hindus is that they as a matter of state policy are to be discriminated and hounded out at every level, but are first coaxed and then ordered and coerced to teach the sons and daughters and very close relatives of the Muslims in corridors of power. Why they do not depend on the Muslims now manning all educational institutions in the state needs be researched. G.M. Sadiq in pursuit of discriminatory policies virtually brought about the death of the educational institutions as vibrant, open and wholesome places shaping the maleable human material for higher achievements and healthy roles. The teachers moulding the human material were discriminated on religious grounds and their ambitions for career building stifled. The same discriminatory policy was pursued in the institutions of higher learning. And the State Public Service Commission came handy for serving the ends of divisive communalism. The Commission has all along been staffed by men and women, who have risen to top echelons only through the policy of manipulation and discrimination. Objectively speaking, it appears that the Commission is under an oath to serve the Muslim ends and interests. It knows the alchemy to transform gold into dross and dross into gold. The Commission has a gory history of slaughtering the careers of brilliant young men and women, mostly Hindus. To serve the Muslims, it has established a permanent liaison with the professors of the Aligarh Muslim University, who are favourably inclined to uphold the Muslim interests at the expense of other ethnic groups. And Mr. Bakar is the only star in the firmament of the Indian Academics. He is an expert for all levels of appointments. The crux of the intent is that men of such hue are convenient to handle while scholars from other universities are too tough to be handled to meet sectarian ends. Pursuing a policy of blatant discrimination the State Public Service Commission has set new records in the book of discrimination when a Muslim lecturer in physics with 5 years of total service was pushed over the head of Prof. T.N. Kilam on the verge of retirement. The criteria framed by the state government and the Commission were discriminatory and arbitrary. Rating scales were such as would benefit the Muslims only. Basic parameters of merit, academic achievements and experience were distorted and left out as redundant. The rumour mill had it

that the professors recommended for promotion and subsequently promoted were of the 'chikan brand'. Chikan was a rabid Muslim, corrupt and communal, got rehabilitated by Sadiq under the policy of 'normalisation' and was placed on the Public Service Commission. Not taking the tyranny lying down, the Kashmirian Hindus were in the vanguard of the battle for restoration of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution. A writ petition was filed in the State High Court against the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The case was fought by the State Government on the basis of the norms fixed by the government ignoring the genuine parameters. The Hon'ble Justice Murtaza Fazli Ali struck down the promotions stressing that he was yet to 'learn of an alchemy transmuting gold into dross and dross irto gold."' Such a policy of discrimination was consistently pursued in all departments of the government trampling upon the rights of the Hindus. The Muslim rulers conveying to the Muslims that they were fostering their interests and the Kashmirian Hindus banking only on constitutional remedies. In fact, in face of such tyranny, it were the constitutional guarantees only that had been sustaining the Kashmirian Hindus till they were forced to march out of their land of birth. Kashmiri Pandit Agitation It was only in the regime of G.M. Sadiq that a poor and destitute Hindu girl was abducled, converted to Islam and married to a Muslim boy. Living a life of extreme poverty, she was obliged to take up a petty job in the co-operative department. A Muslim boy worked in the same department and for one reason or the other, blackmailed her with the aid of other Muslims working in the same department. The Muslim boy got her pay stopped and put her on duty at odd hours. He having misappropriated some money from the department did not suffer suspension or enquiry, But his officer, also a Muslim, paid off the cash and abetted the boy in black-mailing the girl. The boy emboldened by the abettment of his Muslim colleagues made off with the girl. The mother of the girl reported the matter to the local police station. The abductor and the abducted girl were finally traced by the police to a house at Wazapora, a den of rabid Muslims owing allegiance to Pakistan. The preliminary investigation was conducted by the Muslim officer at Maharaj Gunj, not at Rainawari, where the FIR was filed. Be it said that the police station at Rainawari was headed by a Hindu. The girl was later shifted to the Police Station at Khanyar, a Muslim dominated locality, where not a single Hindu lives. It was done only to facilitate the abductor to meet the girl quite frequently and finally the girl was handed over to the Muslim criminal illegally without completing all formalities including the radiological examination. The-government was extremely cautious in not associating any Hindu with the investigation. The mother was allowed to see her daughter only under the police surveillance. No member of the Hindu community was allowed to meet the girl in camera. The police did not take the case to a court of law and assigning judicial powers unto itself decided to allow the abducted girl to live with the abductor. The age of the girl was not properly ascertained and rumour mill had it that the Muslim officer investigating the case accompanied the abductor and the abducted girl to the abductor's residence where he was treated to a delicious dinner. Agitated over the scandalous role of Islamised police machinery there was a spontaneous reaction and deep-seated resentment among the public.7

The Kashmiriian Pandit agitation exposed to the hilt the secular credentials of the Muslims in general and G.M. Sadiq in particular. The Muslims lost all elements of rationality and let loose a reign of terror only to silence the Hindu protest against the forcible conversion and subsequent marriage to a Muslim of a Hindu girl living in indigent conditions. G.M. Sadiq utterly failed to curb the Muslim bigotry, which he fuelled by aligning himself with the forces of obscurantism and medievalism. The police forces already Islamised inflicted unprecedented brutalities on the Kashmirian Hindus, who were put to bullets, teargassed and lathi-charged. Indiscriminate arrests were made by passing all constitutional guarantees. The publication of newspapers was banned by the government including the official organ of the Hindu community. Their editors were unlawfully detained. Acid was thrown on women protesting against the severe onslaught launched against them violating their honour and dignity as members of a civilised polity. The police brutalities were harrowing and bone-chilling. The Report of the Kohli Commission in this behalf is revealing. The government for fear of reprisals and exposure suppressed the entire Report and never put it before the public gaze and constitutionally framed fora. The two Ministers of the Sadiq Cabinet, Pir Giyas-ud-Din and Noor Mohammad, in complicity with Abdul Ahad Burza, a close relative of the Chief Minister, distributed money and liquor among the Muslim rabids only to organise a massive demonstration against the Kashmirian Hindus, who had been wronged and denied the right to live with honour and dignity. The procession comprising all hues of Muslim rabids raised Islamic war-cries, archaic and volatile only to coerce the Hindus into submission. The frenzied crowds yelled, "We are fighting infidels'.8 The Muslim crowds looted and plundered the properties of the Kashmirian Hindus and finally set them ablaze.9 Be it said that loot and plunder are an essential part of the Muslim ethos. The Muslims losing traces of sanity stabbed two youngmen, H. N. Mattoo and Avtar Krishnan Khashoo to death. Gopi Nath Handoo was wounded and killed. In all nine Hindus were killed in police brutalities or in communal madness.l0 The funeral procession of Maharaj Krishan Razdan and Lassa Koul Badam, who fell to police bullets, was pelted at by the Muslims. A big contingent of the Kashmir Armed police in plain clothes also took part in pelting stones at the funeral procession at Karan Nagar in the city of Srinagar.11 Zainab Begum, the sister of G.M. Sadiq, was the person, who bitterly opposed the suggestion to hand over the abudcted girl to a third party as a prelude to the solution of the vexatious problem. 12 The close relatives of the Chief Minister were in the vanguard of the Muslim communalists, who had waged war on the Kashmirian Hindus, demanding stern action against the partisan role of the police machine and more than most protection of their women-folk. l3 The memorandum submitted to the then Home Minister, Y.B. Chavan, thoroughly exposed the bankruptcy and hollowness of the Muslim mind. The Kashmirian Hindus, who do not keep a knife in their homes and are universally known for non-violence, were accused of having piled up arms and arnmunition in temples and residential quarters. Who had sent the arms? Who had received the arms? Did the police authorities recover arms and ammunition from a single temple? If arms and ammunition were recovered from temples and residential quarters, did the

police prepare their inventories and file FIRs? Were the cases filed against the accused? The Muslims through the memorandum also made a reference to the seizure of the truck-loads of armaments and the Hindus subjecting the Muslim crowds to atrocities.l4 The same propaganda spree was launched by the Plebiscite Fronters, who pioneered communalism, secessionism and separatism in the state. The fact of the matter remains that the government circles in collaboration with the Muslim bigots launched a campaign of calumny, hatred and disinformation against the Kashmirian Hindus. The Muslims with low levels of rational analysis and prone to religious frenzy took the contents of the false propaganda for granted and rallied behind the forces of hatred and bigotry for waging war against the Kashmirian Hindus. The present day Muhta Khans resort to his strategy to exterminate infidelity from Kashmir. That the miniscule minority of Hindus had posed a threat of annihilation to the Muslim majority was nothing but ironical. All the same the Muslims believed that myth. What a naivity ! The Kashmiri Pandit Agitation ended leaving a trail of bitterness resulting in the segregation of the two communities of the Hindus and the Muslims. The credibility of the Congress as an organisation upholding secularism and democracy as cherished values suffered a nose-dive. Completely identifying itself with the forces of Muslim reaction, it sufficiently pointered to the ominous developments that were in store for the polity of Kashmir at large. Under the facade of 'normalisation' and 'democratisation', the forces of disruption, secession and communal hatred, though temporarily and half-heartedly put to leash by the Bakshi government, were allowed to get unleashed and given a long rope to resurge and re-generate a movement drawing support from the masses at an unprecedented scale. Men of dubious character having forged links with elements from across the border were rehabilitated and placed at key-slots in the administrative setup. The process of anti-national elements sneaking into the administrative machine gained momentum. The Chief Minister shut up in his drawing room weaving political phantasies perceptibly allowed the entire state machine to slip into the lap of Plebiscite Fronters and pro-Pak elements leaving a deep-seated negative of impact on the nationalists and democrats working for unity, solidarity and comrnunal peace and amity. The Congress pandering the Muslim frenzy that automatically touches immeasurable heights on an issue like the conversion and marriage of a Hindu girl to a Muslim resorted to the mean strategy of coercing the Hindu minority into subjugation and surrender by mobilising the frenzied Muslim hordes on the staple diet of jehad (religious war) against the infidels (kafirs). The rabid communal elements operating with absolute freedom with the entire Congress government at the fuelling end repeated history for the Kashmirian Hindus subjecting them to loot, murder and arson. Notes and References 1. Plebiscite Front Resolution. 2. P. L. Koul, Crisis in Kashmir. 3. Report published in Daily Pratap. 4. Interview with Pt. Rishi Dev, a veteran Congress leader, whose entire structural property was set ablaze by the Muslim terrorists. 5. Interview with the Teachers Forum. 6.

Judgment on writ petition filed by College Teachers in the J & K High Court. 7. Wail of the Vale, issued bv the Hindu Action Committee. 8. Ibid. 9. lbid. 10. lbid. 11. lbid 12. P.L. Koul, Crisis in Kashmir. 13. Wail of the Vale. 14. The Memorandum of 'Respectable (Muslim) citizens of Kashmir'. submitted to Home Minister of India, Y.B. Chavan.

Peer Giasuddin, Understanding the Kashmiri insurgency

http://www.countercurrents.org/nyla130811.htm Nyla Ali Khan, Construction Of A Unique Kashmiri Identity: Awakening or Disaster, 13 August, 2011.

As a Kashmir observer and someone who has been writing on Kashmir for a while, I am of the opinion that L. K. Advani's recent attempt to resuscitate the ultra right-wing nationalism of the BJP is ludicrous. Such right-wing propaganda ought to be challenged by the intelligentsia, not just Kashmiri, but mainstream Indian as well. It might not be a bad idea for Advani and his cohort to take a quick history lesson. It is a bit presumptuous of me to assume that Advani would unlearn his old methods by reading my piece, but I shall take the liberty of indulging myself. Reading this write-up would enable his ilk to, perhaps, fathom the construction of a nationalism which erased the denigration of the past, and created a space for democratic (a foreign term for some mainstream political organizations) debate. The following is an excerpt from my book, Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir : Between India and Pakistan . Despite the support that the Quit Kashmir movement launched by Abdullah's cadre received from various regional councils and state Congress committees, the movement was crushed tactically and militarily. On 20 May 1946 , speaking at a public rally at the Shahi Masjid (mosque), Srinagar , Abdullah thunderously condemned the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar, which had legitimized the Dogra possession of Kashmir (Copeland 1991: 251). In addition to the brutal opposition that the NC encountered from the Dogra regime, it faced vociferous resistance from a section of the MC leadership who vehemently opposed any attempt to create a syncretism that would bridge the divide between Hindus and Muslims. As the NC made its support of secular principles and its affiliation with the All India National Congress more forceful, the gulf between the upholders of secularism and the guardians of an essential Muslim identity became wider. The communally oriented group characterized itself as the Muslim segment of society attempting to undermine the political dominance of the Dogra maharaja and create an Islamic theocracy governed according to Islamic laws and scriptures. Despite its tenacious hold on secular principles, the NC found itself gasping for breath in the quagmire created by the maharaja's duplicitous policies. For example, the maharaja's government had passed a special ordinance introducing two scripts, Devanagari and Persian, in Kashmir 's government schools, and, under the Jammu and Kashmir Arms Act of 1940, had prohibited all communities except Dogra Rajputs from owning arms and ammunition. Such communally oriented policies created a rift between the Muslim leadership of the NC and their Hindu colleagues. The rift within the organization was further widened by Ali Mohammad Jinnah's insistence that Abdullah extend his support to the Muslim League and thereby disavow every principle he had fought for. Abdullah's refusal to do so sharpened the awareness of the Muslim League that it would be unable to consolidate its political position without his support. Initially, the Congress supported the Quit Kashmir movement and reinforced the position of the NC on plebiscite. The Congress advised the maharaja, right up to 1947, to gauge the public mood and accordingly accede to either India or Pakistan . Nehru's argument that Kashmir was required to validate the

secular credentials of India was a later development. Jinnah refuted the notion that Pakistan required Kashmir to vindicate its theocratic status and did not make an argument for the inclusion of Kashmir in the new nation-state of Pakistan right up to the eve of partition. As Behera (2006) writes, If Kashmir was integral to the very idea of Pakistan , it is difficult to see why the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference did not ask the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan until as late as 25 July 1947 . The Congress's support to and furtherance of partition, however, eroded the notion of a united India . Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, on the contrary, was ambivalent about the partition because he did not agree with the rationale of the two-nation theory. He was equally ambivalent about acceding to India , because he felt that if that choice was made, Pakistan would always create juggernauts in the political and economic progress of Kashmir . As for the idea of declaring Kashmir an independent state, he recognized that to keep a small state independent while it was surrounded by big powers was impossible (Abdullah 1993: 60). Was Abdullah willing to concede the necessity of political compromise and accommodation? Did Abdullah draw attention to the political, cultural, and territorial compromises that the autonomy model might entail? He did categorically declare that Neither the friendship of Pandit Nehru or of Congress nor their support of our freedom movement would have any influence upon our decision if we felt that the interests of four million Kashmiris lay in our accession to Pakistan (quoted in Brecher 1953: 35). The decision to accede to either India or Pakistan placed Maharaja Hari Singh in a dilemma. On the one hand, if the state acceded to India , the maharaja would be forced to hand over the reins of political power to an organization that had vociferously opposed his regime, the Congress, and the NC. On the other hand, if the state acceded to Pakistan , the maharaja's Dogra Hindu community would find itself in a position of subservience. Consequently, the maharaja disregarded the advice of the Congress and the British about the infeasibility of independence and opted for that choice because it would allow him to maintain his political paramountcy. He was unable to recognize how independence would enhance the political and military vulnerability of the state. Hari Singh's decision to maintain his political paramountcy was supported by Pakistan , but not by India . Standstill Agreement On 15 August 1947 , Maharaja Hari Singh's regime ratified a standstill agreement with the government of Pakistan . This agreement stipulated that the Pakistan government assume charge of the state's post and telegraph system and supply the state with essential commodities. Given the political and personal affiliations of the Congress with the NC and its antipathy toward monarchical rule, the maharaja and his cohort considered it worthwhile to negotiate with Pakistan 's Muslim League in order to maintain his princely status. But this already tenuous relationship was further weakened after the infiltration of armed groups from Pakistan into J & K. After Pakistani armed raiders and militia attempted to forcefully annex Kashmir on 22 October 1947 , the maharaja did a political volte-face by releasing NC leaders from prison, seeking Indian military help to keep the Pakistani forces at bay, and acceding to India in order to protect his own security and interests. Subsequent to his release after sixteen months of incarceration, Sheikh Abdullah delivered a speech at a public rally at the Hazratbal shrine where he declared the establishment of a popular government to be the priority and primary concern of the people of Kashmir , and relegated the accession issue to the background.

Invasion by Pakistani Tribal Militia and Military Leaders The validity of the division of India into the nation-states of India and Pakistan along religious lines was unequivocally challenged by Sheikh Abdullah: My organization and I never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We did not believe in the twonation theory, or in communalism. . . . We believed that religion had no place in politics (Abdullah 1993: 86). Abdullah's noncommunal politics were vindicated by the ruthlessness of the Pakistani tribal raiders' miscalculated attack, which drove various political forces in the state to willy-nilly align themselves with India . Although the raiders, or Qabailis , were unruly mercenaries, they were led by well-trained and well-equipped military leaders who were familiar with the arduous terrain, and the raiders launched what would have been a dexterous attack if they had not been tempted to pillage and plunder on the way to the capital city, Srinagar (Dasgupta 1968: 95). En route to Srinagar , the tribal raiders committed heinous atrocities: they raped and killed several Catholic nuns at a missionary school, and tortured and impaled an NC worker, Maqbool Sherwani (Copeland 1991: 245). The brutal methods of the raiders received strong disapprobation from the people of the Valley who had disavowed a quintessentially Muslim identity and replaced it with the notion of a Kashmiri identity. This political and cultural ideology underscored the lack of religious homogeneity in the population of Kashmir . The raiders antagonized their coreligionists by perpetrating atrocities against the local populace, including women and children. The undiplomatic strategies of the tribal raiders and Pakistani militia expedited the attempts of the All India National Congress to incorporate Kashmir into the Indian Union. Validity of the Provisional Accession to India and Role of the United Nations On 26 October 1947 , Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession to India , officially ceding to the government of India jurisdiction over defense, foreign affairs, and communications. The accession of J & K to India was accepted by Lord Mountbatten with the proviso that once political stability was established in the region, a referendum would be held in which the people of the state would either validate or veto the accession. After signing the Instrument of Accession, the maharaja appointed his political adversary, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, as the head of an interim government. The political monopoly of the NC was bolstered by the organization of a National Militia, which was established by Abdullah's trusted lieutenants, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and G.M. Sadiq. In keeping with Abdullah's socialist politics, this organization had a women's wing as well, which I discuss at length in chapter five. I provide oral testimonies from two of three surviving members of the women's militia, in chapter five, about the political and cultural initiatives taken by them during the Pakistani tribal invasion. Bose (2003: 36) observes that on 27 October, Abdullah told a correspondent of The Times of India that the tribal invasion was a pressurizing attempt to terrorize the people of the state and, therefore, needed to be strongly rebuffed. Pakistan 's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, termed the accession of J & K to India fraudulent and declared that the very existence of Pakistan was a sore spot for India (quoted in Dasgupta 1968: 36). On 2 November 1947, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of independent India, reiterated his government's pledge to not only the people of Kashmir, but also to the international community, to hold a referendum in Indian and Pakistani-administered J & K under the auspices of a world body like

the United Nations, in order to determine whether the populace preferred to be affiliated with India or Pakistan. Nehru emphasized this commitment several times at public forums over the next few years. In January 1948 India referred the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations (Rahman 1996: 15 19). Prime Minister Nehru took the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir beyond local and national boundaries by bringing it before the UN Security Council and seeking a ratification of India 's legal claims over Kashmir . The UN reinforced Nehru's pledge of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir , and in 1948 the Security Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to play the role of mediator in the Kashmir issue. The UNCIP adopted a resolution urging the government of Pakistan to cease the infiltration of tribal mercenaries and raiders into J & K. It also urged the government of India to demilitarize the state by withdrawing their own forces from J & K and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of civil power in the maintenance of law and order. The resolution proclaimed that once these conditions were fulfilled, the government of India would be obligated to hold a plebiscite in the state in order to either ratify or veto the accession of J & K to India (Hagerty 2005: 19). Sir Zafarulla Khan, Pakistan's minister of foreign affairs, while discussing the volatile Kashmir issue at the UN on 16 January 1948, said that the maharaja's government had attempted to brutally quell the spirit of revolution in Kashmir: They were mowed down by the bullets of the State Dogra troops in their uprising but refused to turn back and received those bullets on their bared breasts (United Nations Security Council: 65). This political stalemate led to the resumption of bitter acrimony in 1948. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's NC voiced its disillusionment with the wishy-washy role of the UN Security Council. It expressly declared on 22 April 1948 that the Security Council resolution was yet another feature of power politics on which the Security Council has embarked ever since its inception. Abdullah condemned the machinations of imperialist powers like the United States and the United Kingdom , which saw Kashmir only as the neighbour of Russia and therefore an essential base in the encirclement of Russia for future aggression (Krishen 1951: 1920). A provisional cessation of hostilities, however, occurred in January 1949, with the establishment of a political and military truce. The ceasefire line left the Indians with the bulk of Jammu and Kashmir 's territory (139,000 of 223,000 square kilometres, approximately 63 per cent) and population. The Indians had gained the prize piece of real estate, the Kashmir Valley , and they also controlled most of the Jammu and Ladakh regions. These areas became Indian Jammu and Kashmir (IJK). The Pakistanis were left with a long strip of land running on a northsouth axis in western J & K, mostly Jammu districts bordering Pakistani Punjab and the NWFP . . . a slice of Ladakh (Skardu), and the remote mountain zones of Gilgit and Baltistan (the Northern Areas or NA). (Bose 2003: 41) The de facto border carved in 1949 worked to India 's territorial and political advantage. The president of the UN Security Council, General A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada , endeavored to outline proposals to resolve the dispute. He proposed a program of gradual demilitarization and withdrawal of regular Indian and Pakistani forces, which were not required for the purposes of maintaining law and order from the Indian side of the cease-fire line. He also proposed

disbandment of the militia of J & K, as well as of forces in Pakistani-administered Azad Kashmir . McNaughton recommended continuing the administration of the Northern Areas (NA) by the local authorities, subject to UN supervision. He recommended the appointment of a UN representative by the secretary general of the UN, who would supervise the process of demilitarization and procure conditions necessary to holding a fair and free plebiscite (Das 1950). Although McNaughton's proposals were lauded by most members of the Security Council, India stipulated that Pakistani forces must unconditionally withdraw from the state, and that disbandment of Pakistani-administered Kashmir troops must be accomplished before an impartial plebiscite could be held (Rahman 1996: 9091). In the interests of expediency, the UNCIP appointed a single mediator, Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan , Australian jurist and wartime ambassador to the United States , to efficiently resolve the conflict. A meeting of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's National Conference was convened on 18 April 1950, in order to pass a resolution expressly warning the United Nations to take cognizance of Pakistan's role as the aggressor (Korbel 2002: 170). The Communist writer Rajbans Krishen wrote an entire book to establish that the UN, its Commission, and its representative, Sir Owen Dixon, were instruments of the United States and the United Kingdom to annihilate the progressive movement pioneered by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in order to create in Kashmir, with the aid of Indian and Pakistani capitalists, a military base for an attack on the Soviet Union (ibid.: 257). The Communist leader in Kashmir , G.M. Sadiq, underscored the skepticism prevalent in Kashmir at the time: . . . the time has come for India to withdraw the Kashmir question from the Security Council . . . [as] the Kashmiris realized that the talk of fair plebiscite was a mere smokescreen behind which the Anglo-American powers were planning to enslave the Kashmiris. Nothing will suit them better than the faade of trusteeship in Kashmir behind which they can build war bases against our neighbours [ sic ]. ( Delhi Express , 1 January 1952) Even as Abdullah was aware of the infeasibility of withdrawing the Kashmir issue from the UN, the NC reiterated its commitment to securing the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir . It was suspicious of the UN, which was subservient to the hegemony of the United States and the United Kingdom and flinched when it came to holding a plebiscite in Kashmir (Korbel 2002: 259). Abdullah declared that if a plebiscite was held in Kashmir and the people of Kashmir did not validate the accession to India that would not imply that, as a matter of course Kashmir becomes part of Pakistan . . . . It would regain the status which it enjoyed immediately preceding the accession [i.e., independence] ( The Hindu , 26 March 1952). In 1949 Abdullah candidly told Michael Davidson, correspondent of the London Observer , that, Accession to either side cannot bring peace. We want to live in friendship with both the Dominions (quoted in Saxena 1975: 33). The distrust that pervaded the Kashmir political scene was outlined by the Communist paper People's Age , which assessed the report of the United Nations Commission to the Security Council as an instrument of the political intrigues and machinations of imperialist powers against the engendering of democracy in J & K. It was critical of the complicity of Pakistan with these powers to destroy the beginnings of a democratic mass movement. It evaluated the attempt of the

United States and the United Kingdom to preside over a purportedly free and fair plebiscite that would be held under the direction of the military and political agents of American imperialism, masked as the UNO Commission officers, as a strategy on their part to create and secure war bases on the subcontinent against the Soviet Union and China (Krishen 1951: 38). As a placatory measure, in 1949 the UNCIP declared that the Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a person of high international standing (Dasgupta 1968: 40203). Needless to say, the plebiscite was never held. The inability of the Indian government to hold a plebiscite is regarded by the Pakistani government and by proindependence elements in Kashmir as an act of political sabotage. The Indian government has been rationalizing its decision by placing the blame squarely on Pakistan for not demilitarizing the areas of J & K under its control, which was the primary condition specified by the United Nations for holding the plebiscite. Josef Korbel, the Czech UN representative in Kashmir, observes that ten weeks after the Security Council had passed an injunction calling on both India and Pakistan to demilitarize the Kashmir region within five months, Sir Owen Dixon found that not an iota of work had been done in that regard. Although both parties had agreed to hold a plebiscite in the state, they had failed to take any of the preliminary measures required for a free and fair referendum. Sir Owen Dixon, therefore, decided to take matters into his own hands and asked for the unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani troops. This was followed by a request to both countries to enable the demilitarization of Kashmir . The then prime minister of Pakistan , Liaquat Ali Khan, agreed to initiate the process by calling for the withdrawal of his troops. But this request, which would have enabled the maintenance of law and order, was denied by India (Korbel 2002: 171). The rationale that India provided for its denial was the necessity to defend Kashmir and maintain a semblance of order. India vehemently opposed any proposal that would place Pakistan on the same platform as India , and that would not take into account the incursion of Kashmir territory by Pakistani militia and tribesmen. In order to neutralize the situation, Sir Owen Dixon suggested that while the plebiscite was being organized and held, the entire state should be governed by a coalition government, or by a neutral administration comprising nonpartisan groups, or by an executive formed of United Nations representatives. But his proposal did not meet with the approval he expected. He noted, in 1950, that the Kashmir issue was so tumultuous because Kashmir was not a holistic geographic, economic, or demographic entity, but, on the contrary, an aggregate of diverse territories brought under the rule of one maharaja (Schofield 2002: 410). In a further attempt to resolve the conflict, Sir Owen Dixon propounded the trifurcation of the state along communal or regional lines, or facilitating the secession of parts of the Jhelum Valley to Pakistan (Ganguly 1997: 34, 4357; Rahman 1996: 4). Despite the bombastic statements and blustering of the governments of both India and Pakistan , however, the Indian government has all along perceived the inclusion of Pakistani-administered J & K and the NA into India as unfeasible. Likewise, the government of Pakistan has all along either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged the impracticality of including the predominantly Buddhist Ladakh and predominantly Hindu Jammu as part of Pakistan . The coveted area that continues to generate irreconcilable differences between the two governments is the Valley of Kashmir . Dixon lamented:

None of these suggestions commended themselves to the Prime Minister of India. In the end, I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled. ( The Statesman , 15 September 1950) Sir Owen Dixon nonetheless remained determined to formulate a viable solution to the Kashmir issue and suggested that a plebiscite be held only in the Kashmir Valley subsequent to its demilitarization, which would be conducted by an administrative body of UN officials. This proposal was rejected by Pakistan, which, however, reluctantly agreed to Sir Dixon's further suggestion that the prime ministers of the two countries meet with him to discuss the viability of various solutions to the Kashmir dispute. But India decried this suggestion. A defeated man, Sir Dixon finally left the Indian subcontinent on 23 August 1950 (Korbel 2002: 174). There seemed to be an inexplicable reluctance on both sides, India and Pakistan , to solve the Kashmir dispute diplomatically and amicably. Sir Dixon's concluding recommendation was a bilateral resolution of the dispute with India and Pakistan as the responsible parties, without taking into account the ability of the Kashmiri people to determine their own political future. After Dixon 's inability to implement conflict mitigation proposals, Frank Graham was appointed as mediator in 1951. Graham proposed the following: a reaffirmation of the cease-fire line; a mutual agreement that India and Pakistan would avoid making incendiary statements and that would reassert that Kashmir's future would be decided by a plebiscite; and steady attempts at demilitarization. But he was unable to dispel the doubts raised by the governments of India and Pakistan on securing the approval of both governments on a strategy for withdrawal of forces from the state, and agreement of both governments on a plebiscite administrator (ibid.: 23940). Given the unviability of its proposals, the UN soon bowed out of the political quagmire, leaving an unhealed wound on the body politic of the Indian subcontinent: the Security Council resolutions affirming that the future of the state should be decided by its denizens. Jawaharlal Nehru's Stance vis--vis Plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir In August 1952, Nehru declared in the Indian parliament: We do not wish to win people against their will with the help of armed force; and if the people of Kashmir wish to part company with us, they may go their way and we shall go ours. We want no forced marriages, no forced unions (Bhattacharjea 2008: xiv; Lamb 1991: 4647). But, once again, he equivocated and sought to capitalize on the formation of the de facto border by declaring in 1955 that he had asked his Pakistani counterparts to consider resolving the Kashmir issue by converting the de facto border into a permanent international one between the two nation-states. Nehru's endeavor to renege on his oft-repeated promise of holding a plebiscite created a hostile obstinacy in Pakistan . After the troubling failure of Sir Dixon's various proposals, the London Times ( 6 September 1950 ) observed: Like most great men, Nehru has his blind spot. In his case it is Kashmir , the land of his forebears which he loves like a woman. Because he is not amenable to reason on this subject, but allows emotion to get the better of common sense, Kashmir remains a stumbling block in the

path of IndoPakistan friendship. So long as it is so India 's moral standing is impaired, her will to peace is in doubt, and her right to speak for Asia is questioned by her next-door neighbor [ sic ]. Critics may well ask, if self-determination under United Nations auspices is valid for Korea [as India advocates], why is it not valid for Kashmir ? Nehru's sentimentalism and vacillation regarding Kashmir , perhaps, played a large role in keeping this issue of international dimensions in limbo. The Kashmir dispute has thus remained troublingly infantile in its irresolvability. The remushrooming of the separatist movement in Kashmir in 1989 and the subsequent creation of a political vacuum has allowed the insidious infiltration of distrust and suspicion into the relationship between Kashmir and the two nuclear powers in the Indian subcontinent, India and Pakistan . Legitimacy of Article 370 All doubts about the attenuation of Article 370 were removed when the ruling faction of the NC, led by Sadiq, heralded the dissolution of the party and its subsequent integration into the Indian nationalist Congress Party. This attempt at discounting a historic political movement that foregrounded a separate Kashmiri identity was an exclusionary tactic deployed by the Union government. The Congress Party's working committee unhesitatingly accepted the integration of the NC (Sadiq faction or Democratic National Conference) into it. This substantive development proclaimed the victory of the Hindu nationalist project in Indian-administered J & K, which had sought the subsumption of religious minorities into a centralized and authoritarian state since the 1940s. The furtherance of the Hindu nationalist agenda in the state was enabled by the complicity of one of the architects of democracy and secularism, Jawaharlal Nehru. His adherence to the unitary discourse of nationalism galvanized the suppression of demands for the autonomy of the Indian-administered J & K state (Puri 1995: 89). These integrative and centralist measures were met with massive opposition, which the Indian government suppressed with bloody maneuvers. The volcanic nature of the protests in the Valley gave a veneer of legitimacy to its action of large-scale repression of leaders of the Plebiscite Front. Abdullah was also arrested, for the umpteenth time, under the Defense of India Rules, to further hush the voices of dissent. The uproar in Kashmir was an opportune moment for Pakistan to jump in the fray; this augmented the unrest and led to an IndiaPakistan war in 1965 (see Dasgupta 1968). The flames of discontent in Kashmir were fanned by Pakistan , which expected cooperation from the Muslims of the Valley. But it ended up being disappointed because the Kashmiri populace did not get involved in the war on a massive scale. The mindset of the Kashmiri people, which the Indian government had culpably ignored, was articulated by Prem Nath Bazaz ([1967] 2005: 99100), who like Nehru, as I have mentioned in earlier chapters, was of Kashmiri Pandit descent and an eminent advocate of socialist democracy: An overwhelming majority of them [Kashmiri Muslims] are not happy under the present political set-up, and desire to be done with it. But they are reluctant to bring about change through warfare and bloodshed. The nonaggressive and compliant attitude of the Kashmiris prior to the resurgence of violent secessionist movements in 1989 has been highlighted by other writers as well. Eminent political and social activists such as the aforementioned Prem Nath Bazaz, Jayaprakash Narayan, and others, conceded that India 's image as a secular democracy had been tarnished by its repressively undemocratic tactics in the state (ibid.; see also, Akbar 1985).

Nyla Ali Khan is the author of The Fiction of Nationality in an Era of Transnationalism ( New York : Routlege, 2005) and Islam, Women, and Violence in Kashmir ( New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). She is alsoa a Visiting Professor, Department of English , University of Oklahoma

http://www.frontline.in/navigation/? type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl2518/stories/20080912251808000.htm Frontline, Volume 25 - Issue 18 :: Aug. 30-Sep. 12, 2008. BROUGHT TO HEEL A.G. NOORANI Kashmir has still not forgiven New Delhi for what it did on August 9, 1953. SHEIKH ABDULLAH said at the second session of the Jammu and Kashmir State Peoples Convention on June 8, 1970: The final break in our relations came in 1953 when Pandit Jawaharlal suggested that I should get the accession ratified by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. This change in his attitude baffled me for he had himself opposed it in the past I strongly advised him against such a step. This led to my removal from the premiership of the State and long imprisonment without trial. New Delhi began moves to bring the rebel to heel. Srinagar began groping for an accord that would confer finality. The Hindu reported on April 27, 1953, that the Sheikh was planning to bring about a federal polity comprising five units the Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Poonch and Gilgit in an Autonomous Federated Unit of the Republic of India. Incidentally, even at the convention in 1970, he scolded a member, Ali Shah, for advocating accession to Pakistan. He must be prepared to concede the same right to his Hindu neighbour if he believes his salvation lies in joining with India. There must be no partition: Kashmir is homeland of us all, whether Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, or Buddhists. While Jawaharlal Nehru kept pressing Abdullah to implement the Delhi Agreement (that is, ratify the accession), Abdullah began consultations on possible solutions transparently. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, D.P. Dhar and G.M. Sadiq kept Nehru informed behind the Sheikhs back, though their leader himself kept Nehru in the know. On May 18, 1953, members of the working committee of the National Conference (N.C.) appointed an eight-member committee to explore avenues of a settlement. Its members were Sheikh Abdullah, G.M. Sadiq, Maulana Mohamed Saeed Masoodi, Sardar Budh Singh, Mirza Mohammed Afzal Beg, Pandit Girdharilal Dogra, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and Pandit Shamlal Saraf. Nehru, who was in Kashmir from May 23 to 25, was fully informed about the deliberations. Here is an extract from the minutes of the committees final session held on June 9, 1953. As a result of the discussions held in the course of various meetings, the following proposals only emerge as possible alternatives for an honourable and peaceful solution of [the] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan:

(a) Overall plebiscite with conditions as detailed in the minutes of the meeting dated 4th June, 1953 [this, apparently, was a reference to Maulana Masoodis suggestion that the choice of independence be offered in the plebiscite]; (b) Independence of the whole State; (c) Independence of the whole State with joint control of foreign affairs; (d) Dixon Plan with independence for the plebiscite area (region-wise disposition of the State). Bakshi Saheb was emphatically of the opinion that the proposal (d) above should be put up as first and the only practicable, advantageous and honourable solution of the dispute. Maulana Saeed, however, opined that the order of preference as given above should be adhered to. What G.M. Sadiq then said is worth recalling: If an agency consisting of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Soviet Russia and China could be created to supervise and conduct the plebiscite, I would suggest that we should immediately ask for an overall plebiscite. Failing this, we may ask for a supervision commission representing all the Members of the Security Council for ensuring free and fair plebiscite in the State. He was close to the Communist Party of India (CPI) and wanted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be represented on the commission. Most of the leaders of the N.C. were pro-Left. In June 1953, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad visited Kashmir and was apprised of these developments. Early in July 1953, Nehru was informed about the decision (see Sheikh-Sadiq Correspondence: August-October, 1956, published by Mridula Sarabhai, New Delhi). Nehru read the minutes and was greatly disturbed by the Sheikhs attitude. If Bakshi and Sadiq did not worry him with their emphatic support for plebiscite, it was because he knew they were dissimulating and playing for time. An angry correspondence with the Sheikh followed. Sheikh Abdullahs wanton rudeness to Azad in Srinagar did not help. A letter which Azad wrote to Abdullah on July 9, 1953, reveals that the Sheikhs fears were not unfounded after all. He offered to make Article 370 permanent, as if it was not meant to be so, until replaced by a final accord. The Sheikhs reply of July 16 pointed out that any final settlement required both a Union-Kashmir accord on autonomy and an India-Pakistan accord on the States future. I hope you are not unaware of the fact that even after Delhi Agreement responsible spokesmen of the Government of India declared that their ultimate objective was to secure complete merger of State with India and that they waited for appropriate time and conditions to bring that about. These statements reveal that Delhi Agreements could not provide a basis to finalise relationship between India and Kashmir; but that they provided temporary arrangements to finalise accession. The only difference between the Government of India and different elements in the country on the issue is whether to bring about the merger of the State with India now or after some time I am very happy to hear from you that the Government of India is willing to declare that the special position given to Kashmir will be made permanent and that the Government of India will be bound by it without any conditions. If such a declaration had been made at an appropriate time, it would undoubtedly have strengthened our hands and unified various organisations and

public opinion in the State. (Kashmirs Special Status; All J&K National Conference, 1975; pages 22-24). In July 1953, it was too late and too little: You would appreciate that without such [the peoples] support, this declaration would not suffice to dispel the fears that have arisen in the minds of the people of Kashmir. Since Kashmirs accession to India in 1947, the Sheikh had tried valiantly to win over the people to his way of thinking accession to India; but he failed. The Maharaja, his friends in New Delhi, Vallabhbhai Patel, the Intelligence Bureaus B.N. Mullik, and the Sangh Parivar did everything that would weaken his hands. Their opposition to autonomy strengthened separatism. For reasons of his own, Nehru pressed him to ignore the people (for whom he had scant respect anyway: soft and addicted to easy living) and, in effect, serve as New Delhis man. This Sheikh Saheb stoutly refused to do. It was from the people that he had drawn sustenance all his life. The facts totally belie the charges, so common in our political culture personal ambition and foreign inspiration. He was driven to take the stand he took in 1953. The entire chain of events was indigenous and open throughout. Since Adlai Stevenson visited Srinagar in 1953, it was convenient to name him as agent provocateur. In a letter to his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit on October 3, 1953, Nehru wrote: As for Adlai Stevenson, I do not think that he is to blame in any way (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 24, page 388). But the damage was done. It created a rift between the Sheikh and the Left, which was never healed though Hiren Mukherjee and Harkishan Singh Surjeet did their best to heal it. In domestic politics, Nehru emerged stronger after the crisis. Internationally, Indian prestige suffered. Fateful step Kashmir has still not forgiven New Delhi for what it did on August 9, 1953. Impetuous as he was, Nehru had panicked. He knew that Sheikh Abdullah was stoutly opposed to accession to Pakistan. He had no place there. Nehru could have settled with both the Sheikh and Pakistan on a basis other than plebiscite. He would panic, likewise, in 1959 when China asserted that there existed a boundary dispute. He thought it meant reopening the entire boundary. In reality, it meant giving up the Aksai Chin alone, not the McMahon Line. Popularity and power meant more to him than hagiographers admit. In the result, he sacrificed the national interest. With greater courage, he could have led and retained power, settled Kashmir and the boundary dispute and remained Prime Minister. It is a terrible legacy that he bequeathed to India. Tragically, on July 31, 1953, Nehru took the fateful step. Mullik wrote in his memoirs My Years with Nehru: On 31 July Mehra [D.W. Mehra, Mulliks Deputy] and I met the Prime Minister he came to the point that there was no other alternative but to remove Sheikh Abdullah and install Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed in his place. he warned that we must be prepared for the worst, because the Sheikh undoubtedly had a large following in the Valley. Mehra should assume control of the State police, even become Chief Executive if need be (page 42). On the same day, July 31, he prepared a statement which M.O. Mathai recorded. It contained his written instructions for the Sheikhs dismissal, outlining the very steps that were taken later: A brief memorandum might be prepared and placed before the [State] Cabinet. The Head of the

State should ask for the resignation of those who disagreed. If the resignations are not forthcoming, he should have an order ready for the dismissal of the government. Also, such assistance as may be considered necessary for the maintenance of law and order should be available from Delhi, of course. Hence, the alert to the Army. It will be desirable to prepare the ground for this with prominent members of the Executive of the Party (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 23; pages 302-4). Gulmarg on August 9. Karan Singhs order of dismissal cited, astonishingly, discord in the Cabinet as ground for the dismissal a ground whose absurdity faction-ridden Cabinets galore have since demonstrated at the Centre and in the States. The aftermath was described in detail in the Report on Kashmir by Sadiq Ali and Madhu Limaye (A Praja Socialist Party Publication; February 1954). They had spent a fortnight in Kashmir from September 25, 1953. People had not reconciled themselves to the change despite brutal repression. Bakshis own house was attacked. He was nervous and wanted to step down. Sadiq dissuaded him (My Life; Mir Qasim; page70). Indira Gandhi disapproved To one and all, Nehru flatly denied that he was responsible for the Sheikhs dismissal, let alone his arrest. He told the President on August 9: We did not wish to interfere in any way with these internal happenings... The Sadar-i-Riyasat [Karan Singh] has acted on his own responsibility in this matter. Parliament was given the same line on August 10: Our advice was neither sought nor given. So were the Chief Ministers on August 22, with a defence of the arrest as well (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 23, pages 309 and 312). Nehrus letter to Indira Gandhi on August 9 was no more candid. She wrote from Zurich on August 10: It is a heart-breaking thing to happen I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness It is like cutting a part of oneself (Two alone, Two Together edited by Sonia Gandhi; page 546). She clearly disapproved of her fathers action. She said as much when this writer met her in December 1967. Her opinion is significant for she was well aware of the background. Now for the document that has come to light. It not only vindicates her judgment but exposes the callousness and cynicism of those who dismissed the Sheikh. The writer is indebted to that fine institution, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, for providing him a copy at his request. It is a note by Nehrus Private Secretary, M.O. Mathai, dated September 12, 1953, addressed to Indiraji. It was marked Top Secret and Confidential. He emphasised, I have typed this myself. Indira wanted to meet Sheikh Saheb in prison, soon after her return from Europe. She would not have thought of this if any of the wild charges levelled against him had a particle of truth. Predictably, Mathai dissuaded her and enlisted V.K. Krishna Menons help. Mathai began: I have given considerable thought to your proposal to meet Sheikh Abdullah. He then proceeded to dissuade her, in four foolscap pages: You said that in whatever you talk to

Sheikh Abdullah, he will trust you it implies that you trust him too. What followed fully exposed the falsity of the charges: I do not believe that Sheikh Abdullah deliberately intended to switch on his band-wagon to Pakistan. Any person accusing him of that is not only doing him an injustice but is also spoiling our own cause. However, it is a patent fact that the speeches and activities of Sheikh Abdullah during the past few months have had the effect, direct and indirect, of encouraging the pro-Pakistani elements among the Muslim population of the State. It was Sheikh Abdullahs activities, assisted by those of Afzal Beg, that made the dormant proPakistani elements highly vocal and encouraged them to function in the open freely. Undesirables infiltrated a charge Nehru himself never made. Nehru was not influenced by others. It is in the context of sheer self-interest and self-preservation, which are bound up with certain basic principles we have proclaimed, that we have to view and deal with the Kashmir question raison detat. He listed the objections embarrassment to the present regime in Kashmir (your meeting might even unnerve them); the press will discover; the Sheikhs reaction and the attitude of Begum Abdullah. Fundamentally, you should consult PM [Prime Minister Nehru] about your idea of meeting Sheikh Abdullah secretly. If he agrees with your proposal, then in order to have any worth-while talk with Sheikh Abdullah, you should have a very clear idea as to what the Government of Indias intentions are in regard to Kashmir policy in regard to both the immediate present and the long-term one. She could not play a lone hand opposed to Nehrus line. What could she offer? Sheikh Abdullah was indeed an acquisition from the political point of view an admission that he represented the people. But would he forgive us now? Krishna Menon called him a Trotsky. Mathai, who had recorded Nehrus orders on 31 July, wrote: It will be psychologically wrong for Sheikh Abdullah to be reinstated in Government until the Kashmir problem is finally solved in all its aspects including the international aspect. This is precisely the advice Karan Singh offered to Nehru on January 11, 1956, and was snubbed by him the very same day: You say that it would be desirable to keep him in detention till it is found possible to declare that the Kashmir dispute is finally closed In fact, so long as Sheikh Abdullah is in prison, the dispute will not be finally closed. It is only when he has been released and we have faced the consequences of that release and survived them, that it will be possible for the situation to develop towards a final end (Karan Singh; Jammu & Kashmir 1940-64: Select Correspondence; page 187). Harsh treatment in jail Nehrus strategy of wearing out his prisoner did not work. It required the upheaval of the Bangladesh war and the Shimla Pact to persuade the Sheikh to yield in the accord with Indira Gandhi in 1975. To imprison the man was bad enough. Worse still, he was subjected to harsh treatment. Nehru even opposed permission for interviews (September 1). Sheikh Abdullah asserted his right to attend the Constituent Assemblys meetings. Nehru told Bakshi on October 2: This is a matter entirely in the discretion of Kashmir Government and would not be proper for me to intervene in any way. I would suggest, however, that all detenue members of Constituent

Assembly should be given opportunity to send any written memorandum should they so desire it. It was a devious way of disapproving any permission to Abdullah to attend the meetings. He declined to respond to a message from Abdullah, but I sent [him] a message in regard to it. Finally, Sheikh Abdullah wrote to him on March 18, 1955, asking to be informed what sins he had committed. Nehrus reply of April 8 harked back to his Note of August 25, 1952: You had decided to pursue a line of action which appeared to me to be very harmful for the future of Jammu and Kashmir (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 28, page 35). He was being punished for taking Nehru at his word and asking him to fulfil the pledges he had made publicly and repeatedly to the people of Kashmir. To Rajaji, Nehru belatedly alleged, on February 4, 1955, that the Sheikh had talked of blood and thunder and setting fire to the Kashmir Valley and so on. Nehru never confronted the Sheikh with this charge publicly or in private, to seek his explanation. It was mean to write he is living in very great comfort with all kinds of facilities (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 36, page 324). Evidently, Nehrus famed passion for practising economy in household expenses extended with equal ardour to practising economy with truth. Soon Nehru had a problem with Bakshi and Karan Singh. They resented his joint communique with Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of Pakistan on August 20, 1953, promising, once again, plebiscite in Kashmir. Bakshi resigned. Nehru sent A.P. Jain to explain his calculations, which he laid bare in a letter to Karan Singh on August 21: But for some kind of an agreement between us and Pakistan, the matter would inevitably have been raised in the UN [United Nations] immediately and they might well have sent down their representative to Kashmir. All this again would have kept the agitation and made it glow. It is all these considerations that made us agree to the statement that has been issued (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 23, page 346). Jain corroborates this (Kashmir, page 73). Nehru simply wanted to buy time. He settled neither with the Sheikh nor with Pakistan. The record brings out two features in bold relief. Nehru knew that it was the Sheikh who represented the peoples feelings, not Bakshi & Co., and that the people would protest. Hence the precautions on which he insisted. Secondly, Nehru and his associates acted covertly; the Sheikh was transparency itself. The letters he wrote to Masoodi, the N.C.s general secretary then in Delhi, on August 6 and 8, 1953, said: There is nothing to worry about. Indeed, only a few days before the coup, Bakshi said at Mujahid Manzil in Srinagar that while every Muslim had five articles of faith he had six, the sixth being his loyalty to Sheikh Saheb. On August 4, Sadiq and Bakshi voiced reservations on their own proposals to the eight-man committee, evidently emboldened by Nehrus decision of July 31. The Sheikh thereupon convened a meeting of the working committee and general council of the N.C. on August 24 and 29, respectively, and rejected their pleas for postponement of the meetings. He did not suspect a conspiracy. The draft of a speech he was to deliver to an Id congregation on August 21 was also made available to the Centre. He affirmed the Delhi accord and criticised Pakistan, but pleaded for a settlement to ensure finality. He was arrested on August 9. On January 6, 1958, the Sheikh was released from jail. On April 11, 1958, he wrote to Nehru: In spite of all that has happened since August 1953, I still believe that the key of the solution lies in your hands and I appeal to you not to be deceived by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and his

other supporters in pursuing a policy which, in the end, is bound to prove disastrous for all. He was re-arrested on April 29, 1958, by D.W. Mehra, then Inspector-General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir. On May 17, 1958, the government ordered the prosecution of 25 persons for the offence of conspiracy to overthrow the state by use of force. The Sheikh was not cited as one of the accused. On October 23, 1958, however, a police complaint was filed and he was also included among the persons accused of conspiracy. The specific charge against Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues was that they, from August 9, 1953, to April 29, 1958, conspired to overawe by means of criminal force and show of criminal force the legally and constitutionally established Government of Jammu and Kashmir and facilitating the wrongful annexation of the Jammu and Kashmir State by Pakistan. Mullik was asked to build up the case. Nehrus approval was implicit. The date chosen, August 9, 1953, implies a conspiracy hatched in prison and none before that date. Not for the last time, a police officer gave false information and was accepted as a partner in decision-making. Mullik replicated this role on China, with equal disaster. Later, in the Sessions Court, the charge of waging war was also added. In January 1962, the accused were committed to stand trial in the Sessions Court. Proceedings in the Session Court began only on September 9, 1962, and went on calculatedly at a snails pace. The case was necessary to rebut international criticism of imprisonment without trial. It was withdrawn and Sheikh Abdullah, Beg and others were released on April 8, 1964. The friends of old met. Nehru invited Sheikh Saheb to be his guest. With Nehrus approval, he went to Pakistan on May 24, 1964, and met President Ayub Khan. At Rawalpindi, on May 26, he announced that Ayub Khan had accepted Nehrus invitation to visit Delhi for talks in June. The next day, on May 27, Jawaharlal Nehru breathed his last. Sheikh Saheb sobbed inconsolably at his funeral. His dreams lay shattered. Meanwhile, Bakshi and Sadiq had fallen out. On October 11, 1964, the Sheikh condemned Bakshis arrest before he could move a motion of no-confidence against Sadiq in the Assembly. The boulder that was thoughtlessly let loose from the top of a hill on August 9, 1953, wreaked havoc and continues to roll. It will be stopped only by a Union-Kashmir accord based on the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and an India-Pakistan accord based on the solid Manmohan Singh-Musharaff consensus. There must be full restoration of Article 370. Its erosion had begun in Nehrus days. Also, New Delhi must give up the business of Ministrymaking in Srinagar whether through the Congress or the intelligence services or both. One man kept his head in all these years Rajaji, the wisest of them all. Mullik records: When some months later, I met Sri Rajagopalachari at Madras (he was then the Chief Minister), he asked me why it had become necessary to arrest Sheikh Abdullah. I narrated to him all the circumstances which had led to his arrest. Rajaji said that the Sheikh should have been given a third alternative of autonomy or even semi-independence and the door should not have been shut

against him. He apprehended that continued uncertainty and unrest would prevail in the valley (Mullik, page 47). It still does. Rajaji played a significant role in 1964. The Sheikh called on him in Chennai for advice. Rajaji remained an advocate of conciliation until his death. Now, 55 years later, there is no sign that any lessons have been learnt from the tragic chain of events that were begun on August 9, 1953. As the poet said, Kuch aise bhi manzar hai twarikh ki nazron mein/Lamhon ne khata kithi sadion ne saza pai (There are some happenings in the eyes of history/When moments lapsed in sin and centuries bore the punishment).

Mir Qasim, My Life and Times, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1992. Joined in Srinagars S.P. College an Hindu Principal was replaced by DR. Mohamud Din Taseer for Lahore in 1941 A section of teachers, mostly non-Muslims, opposed the induction of Dr. Taseer and incided non-Muslim students to mobilie their support. On the other hand, the supporters of DR. Taseers appointment set up a Muslim Bloc with me as its Secretary Taseer joined The objectives of the Muslim Bloc had alreadybeen achieved when Sheikh Abdullah got wind of it and visited our college to enquire about this organisation. He met me (before that he had already made enquires about me) and was satisfied that the organisation was just a momentary reaction to an emotive development. He smelt communalism in its name and advised us to wind it up now that we had got what we wanted. That was done. [14] Battle of processions in Srinagar in the early 40s It happened during Id-ul-Milad (Prophets Birthday) when he National Conference took out a procession. To outmatch this procession, Maulvi Yusaf Shahs Muslim Conference organised a more impressive one. Taking it as a challenge, Sheikh Abdullah asked Maulana Mir Waiz Ghulam Nabi Hamdani to take out a procession. The National Conference fully participated in Maulana Hamdanis procession which eclipsed the effects of the one organised by the Muslim Conference. [15] Jinnah visits Kashmir In 1944, an event of great national importance took place. It was the visit in June that year of the Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah to Srinagar. For many Muslims, Mr. Jinnah had descended on [15-16] the subcontinent as the Messiah but not so for the Muslim majority State of Jammu and Kashmir. He had been a supporter of the Maharaja against the oppressed Muslims of the State, but as the possibility of the creation of Pakistan began to crystallise, he turned his attention to these oppressed souls without regretting his earlier stand. Sheikh Abdullah...organised a grand reception at Qazigund which is just near the entry point of the Banihal tunnel. By organising this reception, the Sheikh wanted to give a demonstration of Kashmirs hospitability in recognition of Mr. Jinnahs political stature, but without subscribing to his (Jinnahs) political philosophy... [16] At a reception given to Mr. Jinnah in Srinagar the differences between the National Conference and the Muslim League came out into the open. How acute were the differences clear from the fact that the reception was followed by a demonstration against Mr. Jinnah, who had to seek Government protection to leave the State in a huff. I must say Sheikh Abdullah was te only Muslim leader and Kashmir the only Muslim majority State to defy the onslaught of Mr. Jinnah. In the North-West Frontier Province, where the powerful Khan brother sstood against Mr. Jinnahs philosophy, could not carry all the Pathans with them. [16]

I was not much convinced of the logic that the NC wanted to show Kashmirs hospitality to Mr. Jinnah while disagreeing with what he stood for This event gave me boldness to differ with the top leadership of the party [16-17]