Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila A.M. No.

09-6-8-SC RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES RESOLUTION Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Sub-committee on the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. These Rules shall take effect within fifteen (15) days following its publication once in a newspaper of general circulation. April 13, 2010. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice (on leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE P. PEREZ Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

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RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES PART I RULE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 1. Title. These Rules shall be known as "The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases." Section 2. Scope. These Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to the following: (a) Act No. 3572, Prohibition Against Cutting of Tindalo, Akli, and Molave Trees; (b) P.D. No. 705, Revised Forestry Code; (c) P.D. No. 856, Sanitation Code; (d) P.D. No. 979, Marine Pollution Decree; (e) P.D. No. 1067, Water Code; (f) P.D. No. 1151, Philippine Environmental Policy of 1977; (g) P.D. No. 1433, Plant Quarantine Law of 1978; (h) P.D. No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes; (i) R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of Planted or Growing Trees, Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School Premises or in any Other Public Ground; (j) R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act; (k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act; (l) R.A. No. 7076, Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act; (m) R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act including all laws, decrees, orders, proclamations and issuances establishing protected areas; (n) R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act; (o) R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act; (p) R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act; (q) R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;

(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act; (s) R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management Act; (t) R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource Management Act; (u) R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act; (v) R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act; (w) R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act; (x) R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill Compensation Act of 2007; and (y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; R.A. No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated in the Revised Forestry Code and Other Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A. No. 7308, Seed Industry Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High-Value Crops Development Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Act; R.A. No. 8048, Coconut Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593, Renewable Energy Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation, development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources. Section 3. Objectives. - The objectives of these Rules are: (a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology; (b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of environmental rights and duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and international agreements; (c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and redress for violation of environmental laws; and (d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments in environmental cases. Section 4. Definition of Terms. (a) By-product or derivatives means any part taken or substance extracted from wildlife, in raw or in processed form including stuffed animals and herbarium specimens.
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(b) Consent decree refers to a judicially-approved settlement between concerned parties based on public interest and public policy to protect and preserve the environment. (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.

(d) Environmental protection order (EPO) refers to an order issued by the court directing or enjoining any person or government agency to perform or desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the environment. (e) Mineral refers to all naturally occurring inorganic substance in solid, gas, liquid, or any intermediate state excluding energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal energy. (f) Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat. (g) Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. (h) Wildlife means wild forms and varieties of flora and fauna, in all developmental stages including those which are in captivity or are being bred or propagated. PART II CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 2 PLEADINGS AND PARTIES Section 1. Pleadings and motions allowed. The pleadings and motions that may be filed are complaint, answer which may include compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim, motion for intervention, motion for discovery and motion for reconsideration of the judgment. Motion for postponement, motion for new trial and petition for relief from judgment shall be allowed in highly meritorious cases or to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Section 2. Prohibited pleadings or motions. The following pleadings or motions shall not be allowed: (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint; (b) Motion for a bill of particulars; (c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, except to file answer, the extension not to exceed fifteen (15) days; (d) Motion to declare the defendant in default; (e) Reply and rejoinder; and (f) Third party complaint. Section 3. Verified complaint. The verified complaint shall contain the names of the parties, their addresses, the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for.

The plaintiff shall attach to the verified complaint all evidence proving or supporting the cause of action consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence and if possible, object evidence. The affidavits shall be in question and answer form and shall comply with the rules of admissibility of evidence. The complaint shall state that it is an environmental case and the law involved. The complaint shall also include a certification against forum shopping. If the complaint is not an environmental complaint, the presiding judge shall refer it to the executive judge for re-raffle. Section 4. Who may file. Any real party in interest, including the government and juridical entities authorized by law, may file a civil action involving the enforcement or violation of any environmental law. Section 5. Citizen suit. Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions. Section 6. Service of the complaint on the government or its agencies. - Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff is required to furnish the government or the appropriate agency, although not a party, a copy of the complaint. Proof of service upon the government or the appropriate agency shall be attached to the complaint. Section 7. Assignment by raffle. - If there is only one (1) designated branch in a multiple-sala court, the executive judge shall immediately refer the case to said branch. If there are two (2) or more designated branches, the executive judge shall conduct a special raffle on the day the complaint is filed. Section 8. Issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). - If it appears from the verified complaint with a prayer for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) that the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of the multiple-sala court before raffle or the presiding judge of a single-sala court as the case may be, may issue ex parte a TEPO effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from date of the receipt of the TEPO by the party or person enjoined. Within said period, the court where the case is assigned, shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TEPO may be extended until the termination of the case. The court where the case is assigned, shall periodically monitor the existence of acts that are the subject matter of the TEPO even if issued by the executive judge, and may lift the same at any time as circumstances may warrant. The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for the issuance of a TEPO. Section 9. Action on motion for dissolution of TEPO. - The grounds for motion to dissolve a TEPO shall be supported by affidavits of the party or person enjoined which the applicant may oppose, also by affidavits. The TEPO may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that its issuance or continuance would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant may be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer and subject to the posting of a sufficient bond by the party or person enjoined.

Section 10. Prohibition against temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. - Except the Supreme Court, no court can issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against lawful actions of government agencies that enforce environmental laws or prevent violations thereof. Section 11. Report on TEPO, EPO, TRO or preliminary injunction. - The judge shall report any action taken on a TEPO, EPO, TRO or a preliminary injunction, including its modification and dissolution, to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, within ten (10) days from the action taken. Section 12. Payment of filing and other legal fees. - The payment of filing and other legal fees by the plaintiff shall be deferred until after judgment unless the plaintiff is allowed to litigate as an indigent. It shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award. For a citizen suit, the court shall defer the payment of filing and other legal fees that shall serve as first lien on the judgment award. Section 13. Service of summons, orders and other court processes. - The summons, orders and other court processes may be served by the sheriff, his deputy or other proper court officer or for justifiable reasons, by the counsel or representative of the plaintiff or any suitable person authorized or deputized by the court issuing the summons. Any private person who is authorized or deputized by the court to serve summons, orders and other court processes shall for that purpose be considered an officer of the court. The summons shall be served on the defendant, together with a copy of an order informing all parties that they have fifteen (15) days from the filing of an answer, within which to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court and request for admission by adverse party under Rule 26, or at their discretion, make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules 27 and 28. Should personal and substituted service fail, summons by publication shall be allowed. In the case of juridical entities, summons by publication shall be done by indicating the names of the officers or their duly authorized representatives. Section 14. Verified answer. - Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of summons, the defendant shall file a verified answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. The defendant shall attach affidavits of witnesses, reports, studies of experts and all evidence in support of the defense. Affirmative and special defenses not pleaded shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. Section 15. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court shall declare defendant in default and upon motion of the plaintiff, shall receive evidence ex parte and render judgment based thereon and the reliefs prayed for. RULE 3 PRE-TRIAL Section 1. Notice of pre-trial. - Within two (2) days from the filing of the answer to the counterclaim or cross-claim, if any, the branch clerk of court shall issue a notice of the pre-trial to be held not later than one (1) month from the filing of the last pleading.

The court shall schedule the pre-trial and set as many pre-trial conferences as may be necessary within a period of two (2) months counted from the date of the first pre-trial conference. Section 2. Pre-trial brief. - At least three (3) days before the pretrial, the parties shall submit pre-trial briefs containing the following: (a) A statement of their willingness to enter into an amicable settlement indicating the desired terms thereof or to submit the case to any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts; (c) The legal and factual issues to be tried or resolved. For each factual issue, the parties shall state all evidence to support their positions thereon. For each legal issue, parties shall state the applicable law and jurisprudence supporting their respective positions thereon; (d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, including depositions, answers to interrogatories and answers to written request for admission by adverse party, stating the purpose thereof; (e) A manifestation of their having availed of discovery procedures or their intention to avail themselves of referral to a commissioner or panel of experts; (f) The number and names of the witnesses and the substance of their affidavits; (g) Clarificatory questions from the parties; and (h) List of cases arising out of the same facts pending before other courts or administrative agencies. Failure to comply with the required contents of a pre-trial brief may be a ground for contempt. Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. Section 3. Referral to mediation. - At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire from the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation. Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of referral to mediation. The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-day period. Section 4. Preliminary conference. - If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance of the pretrial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following purposes: (a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement; (b) To mark the documents or exhibits to be presented by the parties and copies thereof to be attached to the records after comparison with the originals;

(c) To ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of the documents marked as exhibits; (d) To require the parties to submit the depositions taken under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the answers to written interrogatories under Rule 25, and the answers to request for admissions by the adverse party under Rule 26; (e) To require the production of documents or things requested by a party under Rule 27 and the results of the physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28; (f) To consider such other matters as may aid in its prompt disposition; (g) To record the proceedings in the "Minutes of Preliminary Conference" to be signed by both parties or their counsels; (h) To mark the affidavits of witnesses which shall be in question and answer form and shall constitute the direct examination of the witnesses; and (i) To attach the minutes together with the marked exhibits before the pre-trial proper. The parties or their counsel must submit to the branch clerk of court the names, addresses and contact numbers of the affiants. During the preliminary conference, the branch clerk of court shall also require the parties to submit the depositions taken under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the answers to written interrogatories under Rule 25 and the answers to request for admissions by the adverse party under Rule 26. The branch clerk of court may also require the production of documents or things requested by a party under Rule 27 and the results of the physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28. Section 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree. - The judge shall put the parties and their counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences. The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties in accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. Evidence not presented during the pre-trial, except newly-discovered evidence, shall be deemed waived. Section 6. Failure to settle. - If there is no full settlement, the judge shall: (a) Adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings and confirm the markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents; (b) Determine if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending before other courts and order its consolidation if warranted; (c) Determine if the pleadings are in order and if not, order the amendments if necessary; (d) Determine if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same;

(e) Consider the adding or dropping of parties; (f) Scrutinize every single allegation of the complaint, answer and other pleadings and attachments thereto, and the contents of documents and all other evidence identified and premarked during pre-trial in determining further admissions; (g) Obtain admissions based on the affidavits of witnesses and evidence attached to the pleadings or submitted during pre-trial; (h) Define and simplify the factual and legal issues arising from the pleadings and evidence. Uncontroverted issues and frivolous claims or defenses should be eliminated; (i) Discuss the propriety of rendering a summary judgment or a judgment based on the pleadings, evidence and admissions made during pre-trial; (j) Observe the Most Important Witness Rule in limiting the number of witnesses, determining the facts to be proved by each witness and fixing the approximate number of hours per witness; (k) Encourage referral of the case to a trial by commissioner under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court or to a mediator or arbitrator under any of the alternative modes of dispute resolution governed by the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution; (l) Determine the necessity of engaging the services of a qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae); and (m) Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates for continuous trial, comply with the one-day examination of witness rule, adhere to the case flow chart determined by the court which shall contain the different stages of the proceedings up to the promulgation of the decision and use the time frame for each stage in setting the trial dates. Section 7. Effect of failure to appear at pre-trial. - The court shall not dismiss the complaint, except upon repeated and unjustified failure of the plaintiff to appear. The dismissal shall be without prejudice, and the court may proceed with the counterclaim. If the defendant fails to appear at the pre-trial, the court shall receive evidence ex parte. Section 8. Minutes of pre-trial. - The minutes of each pre-trial conference shall contain matters taken up therein, more particularly admissions of facts and exhibits, and shall be signed by the parties and their counsel. Section 9. Pre-trial order. - Within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial, the court shall issue a pre-trial order setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, the evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be presented and the schedule of trial. Said order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial. Section 10. Efforts to settle. - The court shall endeavor to make the parties agree to compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition of judgment. RULE 4 TRIAL

Section 1. Continuous trial. - The judge shall conduct continuous trial which shall not exceed two (2) months from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order. Before the expiration of the two-month period, the judge may ask the Supreme Court for the extension of the trial period for justifiable cause. Section 2. Affidavits in lieu of direct examination. - In lieu of direct examination, affidavits marked during the pre-trial shall be presented as direct examination of affiants subject to crossexamination by the adverse party. Section 3. One-day examination of witness rule. - The court shall strictly adhere to the rule that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day, subject to the courts discretion of extending the examination for justifiable reason. After the presentation of the last witness, only oral offer of evidence shall be allowed, and the opposing party shall immediately interpose his objections. The judge shall forthwith rule on the offer of evidence in open court. Section 4. Submission of case for decision; filing of memoranda. - After the last party has rested its case, the court shall issue an order submitting the case for decision. The court may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda, if possible in electronic form, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date the case is submitted for decision. The court shall have a period of sixty (60) days to decide the case from the date the case is submitted for decision. Section 5. Period to try and decide. - The court shall have a period of one (1) year from the filing of the complaint to try and decide the case. Before the expiration of the one-year period, the court may petition the Supreme Court for the extension of the period for justifiable cause. The court shall prioritize the adjudication of environmental cases. RULE 5 JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION Section 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorneys fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court. Section 2. Judgment not stayed by appeal. - Any judgment directing the performance of acts for the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment shall be executory pending appeal unless restrained by the appellate court. Section 3. Permanent EPO; writ of continuing mandamus. - In the judgment, the court may convert the TEPO to a permanent EPO or issue a writ of continuing mandamus directing the performance of acts which shall be effective until the judgment is fully satisfied. The court may, by itself or through the appropriate government agency, monitor the execution of the judgment and require the party concerned to submit written reports on a quarterly basis or sooner as may be necessary, detailing the progress of the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. The other party may, at its option, submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.

Section 4. Monitoring of compliance with judgment and orders of the court by a commissioner. - The court may motu proprio, or upon motion of the prevailing party, order that the enforcement of the judgment or order be referred to a commissioner to be appointed by the court. The commissioner shall file with the court written progress reports on a quarterly basis or more frequently when necessary. Section 5. Return of writ of execution. - The process of execution shall terminate upon a sufficient showing that the decision or order has been implemented to the satisfaction of the court in accordance with Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. RULE 6 STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION Section 1. Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). - A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP and shall be governed by these Rules. Section 2. SLAPP as a defense; how alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showing the suit is not a SLAPP, attaching evidence in support thereof, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of notice that an answer has been filed. The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of the order to file an opposition within fifteen (15) days from filing of the comment or the lapse of the period. Section 3. Summary hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in nature. The parties must submit all available evidence in support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case must prove by substantial evidence that his act for the enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the protection, preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action assailed as a SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP and is a valid claim. Section 4. Resolution of the defense of a SLAPP. - The affirmative defense of a SLAPP shall be resolved within thirty (30) days after the summary hearing. If the court dismisses the action, the court may award damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit under a counterclaim if such has be en filed. The dismissal shall be with prejudice. If the court rejects the defense of a SLAPP, the evidence adduced during the summary hearing shall be treated as evidence of the parties on the merits of the case. The action shall proceed in accordance with the Rules of Court. PART III SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS RULE 7 WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Section 2. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition shall contain the following: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name and personal circumstances are unknown and uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be violated, the act or omission complained of, and the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence; (e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: (1) petitioner has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and no such other action or claim is pending therein; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of its present status; (3) if petitioner should learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, petitioner shall report to the court that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and (f) The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO. Section 3. Where to file. - The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. Section 4. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of docket fees. Section 5. Issuance of the writ. - Within three (3) days from the date of filing of the petition, if the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall give an order: (a) issuing the writ; and (b) requiring the respondent to file a verified return as provided in Section 8 of this Rule. The clerk of court shall forthwith issue the writ under the seal of the court including the issuance of a cease and desist order and other temporary reliefs effective until further order. Section 6. How the writ is served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a court officer or any person deputized by the court, who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally, the rule on substituted service shall apply. Section 7. Penalty for refusing to issue or serve the writ. - A clerk of court who unduly delays or refuses to issue the writ after its allowance or a court officer or deputized person who unduly delays or refuses to serve the same shall be punished by the court for contempt without prejudice to other civil, criminal or administrative actions.

Section 8. Return of respondent; contents. - Within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified return which shall contain all defenses to show that respondent did not violate or threaten to violate, or allow the violation of any environmental law, rule or regulation or commit any act resulting to environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. All defenses not raised in the return shall be deemed waived. The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence, in support of the defense of the respondent. A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an admission thereof. Section 9. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: (a) Motion to dismiss; (b) Motion for extension of time to file return; (c) Motion for postponement; (d) Motion for a bill of particulars; (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; (f) Third-party complaint; (g) Reply; and (h) Motion to declare respondent in default. Section 10. Effect of failure to file return. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte. Section 11. Hearing. - Upon receipt of the return of the respondent, the court may call a preliminary conference to simplify the issues, determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions from the parties, and set the petition for hearing. The hearing including the preliminary conference shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days and shall be given the same priority as petitions for the writs of habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data. Section 12. Discovery Measures. - A party may file a verified motion for the following reliefs: (a) Ocular Inspection; order The motion must show that an ocular inspection order is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses having personal knowledge of the violation or threatened violation of environmental law. After hearing, the court may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting or

photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. (b) Production or inspection of documents or things; order The motion must show that a production order is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. After hearing, the court may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The production order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the production and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection or production and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. Section 13. Contempt. - The court may after hearing punish the respondent who refuses or unduly delays the filing of a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Section 14. Submission of case for decision; filing of memoranda. - After hearing, the court shall issue an order submitting the case for decision. The court may require the filing of memoranda and if possible, in its electronic form, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date the petition is submitted for decision. Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan. The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following: (a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage; (b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment; (c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court; (d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and (e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.

Section 16. Appeal. - Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise questions of fact. Section 17. Institution of separate actions. - The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative actions. RULE 8 WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS Section 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. Section 2. Where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred or with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Section 3. No docket fees. - The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of docket fees. Section 4. Order to comment. - If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall issue the writ and require the respondent to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto. Section 5. Expediting proceedings; TEPO. - The court in which the petition is filed may issue such orders to expedite the proceedings, and it may also grant a TEPO for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. Section 6. Proceedings after comment is filed. - After the comment is filed or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the court may hear the case which shall be summary in nature or require the parties to submit memoranda. The petition shall be resolved without delay within sixty (60) days from the date of the submission of the petition for resolution. Section 7. Judgment. - If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment. Section 8. Return of the writ. - The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ.

Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. PART IV CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 9 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES Section 1. Who may file. - Any offended party, peace officer or any public officer charged with the enforcement of an environmental law may file a complaint before the proper officer in accordance with the Rules of Court. Section 2. Filing of the information. - An information, charging a person with a violation of an environmental law and subscribed by the prosecutor, shall be filed with the court. Section 3. Special prosecutor. - In criminal cases, where there is no private offended party, a counsel whose services are offered by any person or organization may be allowed by the court as special prosecutor, with the consent of and subject to the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. RULE 10 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged, shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the complainant waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Unless the civil action has been instituted prior to the criminal action, the reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made during arraignment. In case civil liability is imposed or damages are awarded, the filing and other legal fees shall be imposed on said award in accordance with Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and the fees shall constitute a first lien on the judgment award. The damages awarded in cases where there is no private offended party, less the filing fees, shall accrue to the funds of the agency charged with the implementation of the environmental law violated. The award shall be used for the restoration and rehabilitation of the environment adversely affected. RULE 11 ARREST Section 1. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or an individual deputized by the proper government agency may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense; or (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. Individuals deputized by the proper government agency who are enforcing environmental laws shall enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court when effecting arrests for violations of environmental laws.

Section 2. Warrant of arrest. - All warrants of arrest issued by the court shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the information filed with the issuing court. RULE 12 CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF SEIZED ITEMS, EQUIPMENT, PARAPHERNALIA, CONVEYANCES AND INSTRUMENTS Section 1. Custody and disposition of seized items. - The custody and disposition of seized items shall be in accordance with the applicable laws or rules promulgated by the concerned government agency. Section 2. Procedure. - In the absence of applicable laws or rules promulgated by the concerned government agency, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The apprehending officer having initial custody and control of the seized items, equipment, paraphernalia, conveyances and instruments shall physically inventory and whenever practicable, photograph the same in the presence of the person from whom such items were seized. (b) Thereafter, the apprehending officer shall submit to the issuing court the return of the search warrant within five (5) days from date of seizure or in case of warrantless arrest, submit within five (5) days from date of seizure, the inventory report, compliance report, photographs, representative samples and other pertinent documents to the public prosecutor for appropriate action. (c) Upon motion by any interested party, the court may direct the auction sale of seized items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime. The court shall, after hearing, fix the minimum bid price based on the recommendation of the concerned government agency. The sheriff shall conduct the auction. (d) The auction sale shall be with notice to the accused, the person from whom the items were seized, or the owner thereof and the concerned government agency. (e) The notice of auction shall be posted in three conspicuous places in the city or municipality where the items, equipment, paraphernalia, tools or instruments of the crime were seized. (f) The proceeds shall be held in trust and deposited with the government depository bank for disposition according to the judgment. RULE 13 PROVISIONAL REMEDIES Section 1. Attachment in environmental cases. - The provisional remedy of attachment under Rule 127 of the Rules of Court may be availed of in environmental cases. Section 2. Environmental Protection Order (EPO); Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) in criminal cases. - The procedure for and issuance of EPO and TEPO shall be governed by Rule 2 of these Rules. RULE 14 BAIL Section 1. Bail, where filed. - Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the

accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein. If the court grants bail, the court may issue a hold-departure order in appropriate cases. Section 2. Duties of the court. - Before granting the application for bail, the judge must read the information in a language known to and understood by the accused and require the accused to sign a written undertaking, as follows: (a) To appear before the court that issued the warrant of arrest for arraignment purposes on the date scheduled, and if the accused fails to appear without justification on the date of arraignment, accused waives the reading of the information and authorizes the court to enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of the accused and to set the case for trial; (b) To appear whenever required by the court where the case is pending; and (c) To waive the right of the accused to be present at the trial, and upon failure of the accused to appear without justification and despite due notice, the trial may proceed in absentia. RULE 15 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA Section 1. Arraignment. - The court shall set the arraignment of the accused within fifteen (15) days from the time it acquires jurisdiction over the accused, with notice to the public prosecutor and offended party or concerned government agency that it will entertain plea-bargaining on the date of the arraignment. Section 2. Plea-bargaining. - On the scheduled date of arraignment, the court shall consider pleabargaining arrangements. Where the prosecution and offended party or concerned government agency agree to the plea offered by the accused, the court shall: (a) Issue an order which contains the plea-bargaining arrived at; (b) Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect of the case, if any; and (c) Render and promulgate judgment of conviction, including the civil liability for damages. RULE 16 PRE-TRIAL Section 1. Setting of pre-trial conference. - After the arraignment, the court shall set the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days. It may refer the case to the branch clerk of court, if warranted, for a preliminary conference to be set at least three (3) days prior to the pre-trial. Section 2. Preliminary conference. - The preliminary conference shall be for the following purposes: (a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the civil aspect of the case; (b) To mark the documents to be presented as exhibits; (c) To attach copies thereof to the records after comparison with the originals;

(d) To ascertain from the parties the undisputed facts and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents marked as exhibits; (e) To consider such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the case; (f) To record the proceedings during the preliminary conference in the Minutes of Preliminary Conference to be signed by the parties and counsel; (g) To mark the affidavits of witnesses which shall be in question and answer form and shall constitute the direct examination of the witnesses; and (h) To attach the Minutes and marked exhibits to the case record before the pre-trial proper. The parties or their counsel must submit to the branch clerk of court the names, addresses and contact numbers of the affiants. Section 3. Pre-trial duty of the judge. - During the pre-trial, the court shall: (a) Place the parties and their counsels under oath; (b) Adopt the minutes of the preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings, confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents, and list object and testimonial evidence; (c) Scrutinize the information and the statements in the affidavits and other documents which form part of the record of the preliminary investigation together with other documents identified and marked as exhibits to determine further admissions of facts as to: i. The courts territorial jurisdiction relative to the offense(s) charged; ii. Qualification of expert witnesses; and iii. Amount of damages; (d) Define factual and legal issues; (e) Ask parties to agree on the specific trial dates and adhere to the flow chart determined by the court which shall contain the time frames for the different stages of the proceeding up to promulgation of decision; (f) Require the parties to submit to the branch clerk of court the names, addresses and contact numbers of witnesses that need to be summoned by subpoena; and (g) Consider modification of order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense. Section 4. Manner of questioning. - All questions or statements must be directed to the court. Section 5. Agreements or admissions. - All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pretrial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in Section 1, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court shall be approved by the court.

Section 6. Record of proceedings. - All proceedings during the pre-trial shall be recorded, the transcripts prepared and the minutes signed by the parties or their counsels. Section 7. Pre-trial order. - The court shall issue a pre-trial order within ten (10) days after the termination of the pre-trial, setting forth the actions taken during the pre-trial conference, the facts stipulated, the admissions made, evidence marked, the number of witnesses to be presented and the schedule of trial. The order shall bind the parties and control the course of action during the trial. RULE 17 TRIAL Section 1. Continuous trial. - The court shall endeavor to conduct continuous trial which shall not exceed three (3) months from the date of the issuance of the pre-trial order. Section 2. Affidavit in lieu of direct examination. - Affidavit in lieu of direct examination shall be used, subject to cross-examination and the right to object to inadmissible portions of the affidavit. Section 3. Submission of memoranda. - The court may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda and if possible, in electronic form, within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date the case is submitted for decision. With or without any memoranda filed, the court shall have a period of sixty (60) days to decide the case counted from the last day of the 30-day period to file the memoranda. Section 4. Disposition period. - The court shall dispose the case within a period of ten (10) months from the date of arraignment. Section 5. Pro bono lawyers. - If the accused cannot afford the services of counsel or there is no available public attorney, the court shall require the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to provide pro bono lawyers for the accused. RULE 18 SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY Section 1. Subsidiary liability. - In case of conviction of the accused and subsidiary liability is allowed by law, the court may, by motion of the person entitled to recover under judgment, enforce such subsidiary liability against a person or corporation subsidiary liable under Article 102 and Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. RULE 19 STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL CASES Section 1. Motion to dismiss. - Upon the filing of an information in court and before arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal action is a SLAPP. Section 2. Summary hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in nature. The parties must submit all the available evidence in support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case must prove by substantial evidence that his acts for the enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the protection, preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action assailed as a SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP.

Section 3. Resolution. - The court shall grant the motion if the accused establishes in the summary hearing that the criminal case has been filed with intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights. If the court denies the motion, the court shall immediately proceed with the arraignment of the accused. PART V EVIDENCE RULE 20 PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE Section 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it. The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt. Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected. RULE 21 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Section 1. Photographic, video and similar evidence. - Photographs, videos and similar evidence of events, acts, transactions of wildlife, wildlife by-products or derivatives, forest products or mineral resources subject of a case shall be admissible when authenticated by the person who took the same, by some other person present when said evidence was taken, or by any other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. Section 2. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. RULE 22 FINAL PROVISIONS Section 1. Effectivity. - These Rules shall take effect within fifteen (15) days following publication once in a newspaper of general circulation. Section 2. Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner, except as otherwise provided herein. SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES Chairperson CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO

Members JUSTICE PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. JUSTICE DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JUSTICE LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JUSTICE MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ (RET.) COMMISSIONER MARY ANN LUCILLE L. SERING JUDGE MYRNA LIM-VERANO ATTY. ASIS G. PEREZ Secretary ATTY. ABEGAIL T. SZE Asst. Secretary ATTY. FERMIN NESTOR A. GADRINAB Secretariat ATTY. MARIA CAMILLE G. LANTION JAMES CHRISTIAN A. BITANGA, ESQ. MS. LIDA A. PILAPIL MS. CLARITA T. ESCARDA

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (25 September 2007) THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order: a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party;

b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established herein. SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred. SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately. SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following: a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner; b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and f. The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following: a. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; b. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; c. All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and d. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken: i. ii. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

iii. iv. v. vi.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived. SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. Motion to dismiss; Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; Dilatory motion for postponement; Motion for a bill of particulars; Counterclaim or cross-claim; Third-party complaint; Reply;

h. i. j. k. l.

Motion to declare respondent in default; Intervention; Memorandum; Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.

SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte. SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as petitions for habeas corpus. SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs: (a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge. (b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties. (d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of the respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section. A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent. SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine. SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases. SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case. The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year. SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo. SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights recognized and protected by the Constitution. SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule. SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate courts. SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA RESOLUTION Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Courts consideration and approval the proposed Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same. This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. January 22, 2008. (Sgd.) REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice (Sgd.) LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice (Sgd.) ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice (Sgd.) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice (Sgd.) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice (Sgd.) DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice (Sgd.) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO JR. Associate Justice (Sgd.) RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. Associate Justice (Sgd.) CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice (Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice (Sgd.) RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice (Sgd.) ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice (ON OFFICIAL LEAVE) MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice (Sgd.) ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice (Sgd.) LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

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THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge. When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored. The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.

SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable. SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance. SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions. SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply. SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following: (a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and others; (b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the petition; (i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;

(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or information; and, (iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and, (c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding. A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court. SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or privileged character. Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited: (a) Motion to dismiss; (b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings; (c) Dilatory motion for postponement; (d) Motion for a bill of particulars; (e) Counterclaim or cross-claim; (f) Third-party complaint; (g) Reply; (h) Motion to declare respondent in default; (i) Intervention; (j) Memorandum; (k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and (l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order. SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence. SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied. Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days. SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent. The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ. SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly. SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order. The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases. SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions. SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action. When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition. SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case. The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data. SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.

SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation. [PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008] Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners, vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents. DECISION PUNO, C.J.: While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court. This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents." This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5 While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as AmparoPetition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted

the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8 On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the AmparoRule and further resolved, viz: WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9 On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz: ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED. The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED: 1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein; 2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision. 3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision. The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive. SO ORDERED.10 Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents: Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of theirbarangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11 On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground

face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. 12 Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13 The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14 The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15 In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17 On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18 The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying

that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20 For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. 21 Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in thatbartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23 For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24 At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. 25 One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26 From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27 Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz: Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?" Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..." Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. 29 When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. 32 One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. 33 After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34 After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.35 The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36 After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37 On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39 Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41 From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42 In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp,viz: Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy. Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas. Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito. Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy. May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita. xxx xxx xxx Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43 On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44 Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. 45 Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain. At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46 Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He

first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.47 Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz: 13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48 Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that: 7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines; 8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the AmparoRule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP: (1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49 Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following: 3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners. 3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit. 3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ ofAmparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters. 3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ ofAmparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the Supreme Court. 3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50 Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino, which averred among others, viz: 10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive; 11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan; 12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and Merino.51 It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52 Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54 On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58 Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. 62 Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65 Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68 As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted: III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on

14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU). a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims. b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU. c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers. d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers. f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member. IV. DISCUSSION 5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation. Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned. V. CONCLUSION 6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge. VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69 In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70 The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis. On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." 76 The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. 78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges

the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz: The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80 Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.82 The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85 In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights. 87 In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89 While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or

liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 91 The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion. With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz: The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94 In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz: Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof . (emphasis supplied) Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims bysubstantial evidence. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied) Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100 We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz: ...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries. We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated... Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause. In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were

boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52) However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture. It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established. xxx xxx xxx As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101 We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. 107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108 With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as

physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111 Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty" 114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116 In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security. Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge... At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:118 The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The

constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied) While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123 A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." 125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied) In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied) The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, acause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to wellfounded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127 Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of

physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129 Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz: (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed. Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations. An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz: ...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in question. xxx xxx xxx ... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations. 131 (emphasis supplied) The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz: ...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. 133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz: (The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.135 This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz: The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied) The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state;Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz: ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied) Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security. First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security. While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him. This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz: Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148 The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others. Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.

These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo. Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents. In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo. Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government. In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military. Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question. First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court. Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas. Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown. Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz: Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control... In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoenapertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..." Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters." With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ ofAmparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death. On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The

list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary. In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed. SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

WE CONCUR: LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997 WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity." Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute settlement. After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body the World Trade Organization with the signing of the "Final Act" in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its members. 1 Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . . . , (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . . . , and (the attraction of) more investments into the country." Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the Philippines and this is of special interest to the legal profession will benefit from the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage. The Petition in Brief Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods." Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December 14, 1994. The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of The Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity). By signing the Final Act, 2 Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the President of the Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution." On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5 On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137et seq. of Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows: ANNEX 1 Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Agriculture Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement on Textiles and Clothing Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of he General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on Tariffs and Trade 1994 Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection Agreement on Rules of Origin Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating

Measures Agreement on Safeguards Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ANNEX 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ANNEX 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of Ratification, declaring: NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause thereof. To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and "the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof." On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter documents as follows: The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries, notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement. The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service. On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper, hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements. During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:

(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and (b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible. After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations , and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997. The Issues In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as follows: A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable. B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization or of the validity of the concurrence. C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is "vested in the Congress of the Philippines"; E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power. F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the several issues raised by petitioners into the following": 10

1. Whether or not the provisions of the "Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement" cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. 3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. 4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate "in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization" implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act. By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus: (1) The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue; (2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense of estoppel; and (3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General. During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11 To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are: (1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION? (2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS? (4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE? (5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES? The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy? In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." 13 The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, 17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition andmandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation. We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies,

quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes. Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition. Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. Specifically, the "flagship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows: Article II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES xxx xxx xxx Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. xxx xxx xxx Article XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY xxx xxx xxx Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive. Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum: 19 a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for brevity): Article 2

National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions. 1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article II or Article XI of GATT 1994. 2. An illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied). The Annex referred to reads as follows: ANNEX Illustrative List 1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require: (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its local production; or (b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports. 2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict: (a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local production that it exports; (b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or (c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal Documents, p. 22125, emphasis supplied). The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis supplied). (b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for brevity) : Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property. . . (par. 1 Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied) (c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services: National Treatment 1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services and service suppliers . 2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers. 3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p. 22610 emphasis supplied). It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by Filipinos." The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization. We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments. Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco. 22These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation." In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement the, thus: On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be selfexecuting principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2). The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of board constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making." Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion inOposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 26 explained these reasons as follows: My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment grating all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court

should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss. It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: Sec. 1. . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene. Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to Attain Balanced Development of Economy On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read: Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . . xxx xxx xxx Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national economic development, as follows: 1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; 2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people; and 3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged. With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality ad reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices." It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are. All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council. WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast, except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a member which would require three fourths vote. Amendments would require two thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. 33 Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international tradecommensurate with the needs of their economic development." These basic principles are found in the preamble34 of the WTO Agreement as follows: The Parties to this Agreement, Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development, Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system, . . . (emphasis supplied.) Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six (6) years while developing countries including the Philippines are required to effect an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years. In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce domestic support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years. In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such reduction. Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion. Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" 35 does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy: Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities. 36 The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.

Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire. Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the public at large. Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to reality? Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will as promised by its promoters expand the country's exports and generate more employment? Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public? The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of discretion. Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council? It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and respected jurist 38 explains: The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation .

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40 More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." 45 By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations.46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here." 47 UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in expenditures for the peacekeeping operations of the organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations" under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory. Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction" of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter, such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article 103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present charter shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a member the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor. Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts both bilateral and multilateral that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows: (a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention, wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines. (b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income. (c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double taxation. (d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation. (e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies arriving with said aircrafts. (f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil. (g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.

(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days. (i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59 days. (j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and related charges. (k) Multilateral convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach "of international obligation." In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT. International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the smaller country's market. 48 The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations." Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 49 intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. 50 To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, 51 it will be fruitful to restate its full text as follows:

Article 34 Process Patents: Burden of Proof 1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process: (a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new; (b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used. 2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b) is fulfilled. 3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account. From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (not the words "in the absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product. Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process. The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was made by the patented process. The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or utility model, thus: Sec. 60. Infringement. Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute evidence of copying . (emphasis supplied)

Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process in NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue derogation of legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial. 52 Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents Contained in the Final Act Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate. "A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 56 The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service

suppliers, temporary entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the normal course of business." 57 On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as follows: Article II Scope of the WTO 1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement. 2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and 3, (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members. 3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as "Plurilateral Trade Agreements") are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or rights for Members that have not accepted them. 4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1994") is legally distinct from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as "GATT 1947"). It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 59 the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 60 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified. And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new . . . is he making a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission? MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday? Senator Taada, please. SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services. I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos . SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina. SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the participants. In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote : By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures . In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act itself . Thank you, Mr. Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales. SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterday's session and I don't see any need for repeating the same. Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela . THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make any comment on this?

SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make. Epilogue In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 61 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 63 In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64 It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no "patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result. Footnotes 1 In Annex "A" of her Memorandum, dated August 8, 1996, received by this Court on August 12, 1996, Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations, World Trade Organization and other international organizations Lilia R. Bautista (hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper") submitted a "46-year Chronology" of GATT as follows: 1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in the first multilateral trade negotiations and a set of rules designed to prevent these concessions from being frustrated by restrictive trade measures. The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the Preparatory Committee established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft the charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was envisaged as the final leg of a triad of post-War economic agencies (the other two were the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction later the World Bank). In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided to negotiate tariff concessions among themselves. From April to October 1947, the participants completed some 123 negotiations and established 20 schedules containing the tariff reductions and bindings which became an integral part of GATT. These schedules resulting from the first Round covered some 45,000 tariff concessions and about $10 billion in trade. GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into effect the commercial-policy provisions of the ITO. In November, delegations from 56 countries met in Havana, Cuba, to consider the to ITO draft as a

whole. After long and difficult negotiations, some 53 countries signed the Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter in March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from governments to ratification and, in the end, the ITO was stillborn, leaving GATT as the only international instrument governing the conduct of world trade. 1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered into force. The 23 founding members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. The first Session of the Contracting Parties was held from February to March in Havana, Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim Commission for the ITO, which served as the ad hoc secretariat of GATT, moved from Lake Placid, New York, to Geneva. The Contracting Parties held their second session in Geneva from August to September. 1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second Round of trade negotiations, held from April to August at Annecy, France, the contracting parties exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions. At their third Session, they also dealt with the accession of ten more countries. 1950 Third Round at Torquay. From September 1950 to April 1951, the contracting parties exchanged some 8,700 tariff concessions in the English town, yielding tariff reduction of about 25 per cent in relation to the 1948 level. Four more countries acceded to GATT. During the fifth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United States indicated that the ITO Charter would not be re-submitted to the US Congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO would not come into operation. 1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was completed in May and produced some $2.5 billion worth of tariff reductions. At the beginning of the year, the GATT commercial policy course for officials of developing countries was inaugurated. 1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in International Trade in October. Known as the "Haberler Report" in honour of Professor Gottfried Haberler, the chairman of the panel of eminent economists, it provided initial guidelines for the work of GATT. The Contracting Parties at their 13th Sessions, attended by Ministers, subsequently established three committees in GATT: Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating conference; Committee II to review the agricultural policies of member governments and Committee III to tackle the problem facing developing countries in their trade. The establishment of the European Economic Community during the previous year also demanded largescale tariff negotiations under Article XXIV: 6 of the General Agreement. 1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in September and was divided into two phases: the first was concerned with negotiations with EEC member states for the creation of a single schedule of concessions for the Community based on its Common External Tariff; and the second was a further general round of tariff negotiations. Named in honour of US Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon who proposed the negotiations, the Round was concluded in July 1962 and resulted in about 4,400 tariff concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.

1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton textiles was agreed as an exception to the GATT rules. The arrangement permitted the negotiation of quota restrictions affecting the exports of cotton-producing countries. In 1962 the "Short Term" Arrangement became the "Long term" Arrangement, lasting until 1974 when the Multifibre Arrangement entered into force. 1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial level, a Trade Negotiations Committee formally opened the Kennedy Round in May. In June 1967, the Round's Final Act was signed by some 50 participating countries which together accounted for 75 per cent of world trade. For the first time, negotiations departed from the product-by-product approach used in the previous Rounds to an across-the-board or linear method of cutting tariffs for industrial goods. The working hypothesis of a 50 per cent target cut in tariff levels was achieved in many areas. Concessions covered an estimated total value of trade of about $410 billion. Separate agreements were reached on grains, chemical products and a Code on Anti-Dumping. 1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the accession to the general Agreement of many newly-independent developing countries. In February, the Contracting Parties, meeting in a special session, adopted the text of Part IV on Trade and Development. The additional chapter to the GATT required developed countries to accord high priority to the reduction of trade barriers to products of developing countries. A Committee on Trade and Development was established to oversee the functioning of the new GATT provisions. In the preceding year, GATT had established the International Trade Centre (ITC) to help developing countries in trade promotion and identification of potential markets. Since 1968, the ITC had been jointly operated by GATT and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was launched by Ministers in September at the Japanese capital. Some 99 countries participated in negotiating a comprehensive body of agreements covering both tariff and non-tariff matters. At the end of the Round in November 1979, participants exchanged tariff reductions and bindings which covered more than $300 billion of trade. As a result of these cuts, the weighted average tariff on manufactured goods in the world's nine major industrial markets declined from 7.0 to 4.7 per cent. Agreements were reached in the following areas: subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, import licensing procedures, government procurement, customs valuation, a revised anti-dumping code, trade in bovine meat, trade in dairy products and trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete result of the Round was the reduction of import duties and other trade barriers by industrial countries on tropical products exported by developing countries. 1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, otherwise known as the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), entered into force. It superseded the arrangements that had been governing trade in cotton textiles since 1961. The MFA seeks to promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of trade in textile products while at the same time avoiding disruptive effects in individual markets and lines of production. The MFA was extended in 1978, 1982, 1986,

1991 and 1992. MFA members account for most of the world exports of textiles and clothing which in 1986 amounted to US$128 billion. 1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in nearly ten years, the GATT Ministers in November at Geneva reaffirmed the validity of GATT rules for the conduct of international trade and committed themselves to combating protectionist pressures. They also established a wide-ranging work programme for the GATT which was to lay down the groundwork for a new Round 1986. The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade Ministers meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, launched the eighth Round of trade negotiations on 20 September. The Punta del Este Declaration, while representing a single political undertaking, was divided into two sections. The first covered negotiations on trade in goods and the second initiated negotiation on trade in services. In the area of trade in goods, the Ministers committed themselves to a "standstill" on new trade measures inconsistent with their GATT obligations and to a "rollback" programme aimed at phasing out existing inconsistent measures. Envisaged to last four years, negotiations started in early February 1987 in the following areas tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safe-guards, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in counterfeit goods, and trade-related investment measures. The work of other groups included a review of GATT articles, the GATT dispute settlement procedure, the Tokyo Round agreements, as well as the functioning of the GATT system as a whole. 1994 "GATT 1994" is the updated version of GATT 1947 and takes into account the substantive and institutional changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round GATT 1994 is an integral part of the World Trade Organization established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that there be a one year transition period during which certain GATT 1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those of the World Trade Organization. 2 The Final Act was signed by representatives of 125 entities, namely Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentine Republic, Australia, Republic of Austria, State of Bahrain, People's Republic of Bangladesh, Barbados, The Kingdom of Belgium Belize, Republic of Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, European Communities, Republic of Fiji, Finland, French Republic, Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Hellenic Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, State of Kuwait, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality of Liechtenstein, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Macau, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Malaysia, Republic of Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Mauritius, United Mexican States, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of Mozambique, Union of Myanmar, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Republic of Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Potuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Rwandese Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Republic of Surinam, Kingdom of Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden,

Swiss Confederation, United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Togolese Republic, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Zaire, Republic of Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe; see pp. 6-25, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 3 11 August 1994 The Honorable Members Senate Through Senate President Edgardo Angara Manila Ladies and Gentlemen: I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay Round Final Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro for the Philippines on 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development. The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly agricultural and industrial products. These concessions may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member of the World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional export from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase in exports that the Philippines may experience. The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g. professional services and construction services), crossborder supply (e.g. computer-related services), consumption abroad (e.g. tourism, convention services, etc.) and commercial presence. The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on anti-dumping and countervailing measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing the costs ad uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same time providing means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves against unfair imports. Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property rights is expected to attract more investments into the country and to make it less vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners (e.g. Sec. 301 of the United States' Omnibus Trade Law). In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid Agreement is enclosed.

Very truly yours, (SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMO S 4 11 August 1994 The Honorable Members Senate Through Senate President Edgardo Angara Manila Ladies and Gentlemen: I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay Round Final Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro for the Philippines on 13 April 1994 in Marrakech (sic), Morocco. Members of the trade negotiations committee, which included the Philippines, agreed that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services embody the results of their negotiations and form an integral part of the Uruguay Round Final Act. By signing the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Philippines, through Secretary Navarro, agreed: (a) To submit the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution; and (b) To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development. The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly agricultural and industrial products. These concessions may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member of the World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional export revenues from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase in the exports that the Philippines may experience. The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g., professional services and construction services),

cross-border supply (e.g., computer-related services), consumption abroad (e.g., tourism, convention services, etc.) and commercial presence. The clarified and improved rules ad disciplines on anti-dumping and countervailing measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing the costs and uncertainty associated with exporting while at the same time providing a means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves against unfair imports. Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property rights is expected to attract more investments into the country and to make it a less vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading partners (e.g., Sec. 301 of the United States Omnibus Trade Law). In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as embodied in the Uruguay Round Final Act and forming and integral part thereof are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid Agreement is enclosed. Very truly yours, (SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMO S

5 December 9, 1994 HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA Senate President Senate Manila Dear Senate President Angara: Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 26 (2) Article VI of the Constitution, I hereby certify to the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083 entitled: CONCURRING IN THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

to meet a public emergency consisting of the need for immediate membership in the WTO in order to assure the benefits to the Philippine economy arising from such membership. Very truly yours, (SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMO S 6 Attached as Annex A, Petition; rollo, p. 52. P.S. 1083 is the forerunner of assailed Senate Resolution No. 97. It was prepared by the Committee of the Whole on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade chaired by Sen. Blas F. Ople and co-chaired by Sen. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; seeAnnex C, Compliance of petitioners dated January 28, 1997. 7 The Philippines is thus considered an original or founding member of WTO, which as of July 26, 1996 had 123 members as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belguim, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chili, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Community, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Honkong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands for the Kingdom in Europe and for the Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Annex A, Bautista Paper,infra. 8 Page 6; rollo p. 261. 9 In compliance, Ambassador Bautista submitted to the Court on August 12, 1996, a Memorandum (the "Bautista Paper") consisting of 56 pages excluding annexes. This is the same document mentioned in footnote no. 1. 10 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 13; rollo, p. 268. 11 Cf . Kilosbayan Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995 for a discussion on locus standi. See also the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 473, April 6, 1995, as well as Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386, 414, December 23, 1994.

12 Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974, cited in Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, 795, September 26, 1991. 13 Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993. 14 See Taada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051 for a discussion on the scope of "political question." 15 Section 1, Article VIII, (par. 2). 16 In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993, entitled "Supreme Court Potential Tyrant?" Senator Arturo Tolentino concedes that this new provision gives the Supreme Court a duty "to intrude into the jurisdiction of the Congress or the President." 17 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 436. 18 Cf . Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989. 19 Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 204-206. 20 Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1. p. 146. 21 Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the 1987's. 22 Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116. 23 Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing." 24 246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995. 25 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991. 26 224 SCRA 792, 817, July 30, 1993. 27 Sec. 10, Article XII. 28 Sec. 12, Article XII. 29 Sec. 19, Art. II. 30 Sec. 13, Art. XII. 31 G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, pp. 13-14. 32 Sec. 1, Art. XII.

33 Bautista Paper, p. 19. 34 Preamble, WTO Agreement p. 137, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Emphasis supplied. 35 Sec. 19, Article II, Constitution. 36 III Records of the Constitutional Commission 252. 37 Sec. 13, Article XII, Constitution. 38 Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 13, quoting his own article entitled, "A Quintessential Constitution" earlier published in the San Beda Law Journal, April 1972; emphasis supplied. 39 Par. 4, Article XVI (Miscellaneous Provisions), WTO Agreement, p. 146, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 40 Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; rollo, p. 219. 41 Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution. 42 Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article VI, Constitution. 43 Sec. 2, Article II, Constitution. 44 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 55. 45 Salonga and Yap, op cit 305. 46 Salonga, op. cit., p. 287. 47 Quoted in Paras and Paras, Jr., International Law and World Politics, 1994 Ed., p. 178. 47-A Reagan vs. Commission of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968, 973, December 27, 1969. 48 Trebilcock and Howse. The Regulation of International Trade, p. 14, London, 1995, cited on p. 55-56, Bautista Paper. 49 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445. 50 Item 5, Sec. 5, Article VIII, Constitution. 51 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445. 52 Bautista Paper, p. 13. 53 See footnote 3 of the text of this letter.

54 Salonga and Yap, op cit., pp. 289-290. 55 The full text, without the signatures, of the Final Act is as follows: Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 1. Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, representatives of the governments and of the European Communities, members of the Trade Negotiations Committee, agree that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in the Final Act as the "WTO Agreement"), the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as annexed hereto, embody the results of their negotiations and form an integral part of this Final Act. 2. By signing to the present Final Act, the representatives agree. (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions. 3. The representatives agree on the desirability of acceptance of the WTO Agreement by all participants in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter referred to as "participants") with a view to its entry into force by 1 January 1995, or as early as possible thereafter. Not later than late 1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance with the final paragraph of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declarations, to decide on the international implementation of the results, including the timing of their entry into force. 4. the representatives agree that the WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance as a whole, by signature or otherwise, by all participants pursuant to Article XIV thereof. The acceptance and entry into force of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement included in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Plurilateral Trade Agreement. 5. Before accepting the WTO Agreement, participants which are not contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade must first have concluded negotiations for their accession to the General Agreement and become contracting parties thereto. For participants which are not contracting parties to the general Agreement as of the date of the Final Act, the Schedules are not definitive and shall be subsequently completed for the purpose of their accession to the General Agreement and acceptance of the WTO Agreement. 6. This Final Act and the texts annexed hereto shall be deposited with the DirectorGeneral to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade who shall promptly furnish to each participant a certified copy thereof. DONE at Marrakesh this fifteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and ninetyfour, in a single copy, in the English, French and Spanish languages, each text being authentic.

56 Bautista Paper, p. 16. 57 Baustista Paper, p. 16. 58 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. I, pp. 137-138. 59 See footnote 3 for complete text. 60 Taken from pp. 63-85, "Respondent" Memorandum. 61 Zarate vs. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996. 62 San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138, 144, May 15, 1991; Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA 444, 458 March 20, 1991; Simon vs. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410, November 5, 1992; Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, 136, November 27, 1992. 63 Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 94, December 4, 1990. 64 Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." 65 Reader's Digest, December 1996 issue, p. 28. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. P-97-1247 May 14, 1997 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I.1 No. 95-71-P) NARITA RABE, complainant, vs. DELSA M. FLORES, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, respondent. PER CURIAM: In an administrative complaint for "Conduct Unbecoming a Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority" dated August 18, 1995, Complainant Narita Rabe, 2 by counsel, charged Respondent Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, as follows: 3 (Mrs.) Flores took advantage of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at the extension of the Public (sic) Market when she is (sic) not a member of our client's association and was never a party to Civil Case No. 89-23. She herself knows (sic) that the stalls in the said area had already been awarded to our client's members pursuant to the decision of the court on October 30, 1991. Worse, she took the law into her hands when she destroyed the stall of our client and brought the materials to the police station of Panabo, Davao.

After respondent filed her answer, the Court issued a Resolution dated January 17, 1996, absolving her of the charge. In the same resolution, however, the Court required respondent to explain why she should no be administratively dealt with for the following: 4 . . . a) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991 issued by Atty. Victor R. Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court, that she started performing her duties as (an) interpreter on May 16, 1991 when (1) according to a certification dated June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal Treasurer, Panabo Davao, she was employed in the office of the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991 with her last salary being paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (2) she took her oath of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17, 1991; b) why she did not report said business interest in her sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994; c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office; and d) why she has indicated in her DTRs for August 1995 that she worked on August 15-18, 21, 2325 and 28-31 and fore September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one (21) working days when her Contract of Lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo for the market stall in its Section 7 clearly states that she has to personally conduct her business and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be canceled as per its Section 13. Respondent Flores, in a letter dated February 13, 1996, explains that, as stated in the certification of Atty. Ginete, she assumed her job in the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao on May 16, 1991, in compliance with the directive from this Court for her to start working on the said date. Respondent further states that "even prior to said date (May 16, 1991)" she already reported to the court in order to familiarize herself with the scope of her duties. 5 Respondent Flores also admits that she had received from the municipality a salary for the period May 16 1991 May 31, 1991, notwithstanding her transfer to the judiciary on May 16, 1991. She submits, however, the following justification: 6 I admit that I received my last salary in the amount of One Thousand and 80/100 (P1,000.80) Pesos from the Local Government Unit from May 16-31, 1991 but farthest from my mind is the intent to defraud the government. It was my desire all the time to refund the amount the moment my salary is received from the Supreme Court, unfortunately more often than not (the salary) is received three or four months after assumption of office. As we all know the month of May and June is the time we enroll our children in school thus the money I got that month from the Local Government Unit came handy in defraying registration expenses of my four children. The passage of time coupled with some intervening events, made me oblivious of my obligation to refund the money. However, when my attention was called on the day I received the copy of the resolution, I took no time in refunding the same. Respondent alleges that the certification of Municipal Treasurer Jose V. Avenido is inaccurate because it was on January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment Clerk I. 7 According to respondent, she took her oath on June 17, 1991, simply because it was on that date that she received a copy of her oath form. 8

Respondent avers that she did not divulge any business interest in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she "was never engaged in business during said period although I had a stall in the market." 9 Respondent further avers that her Daily Time Record indicated that she held office on August 15, 18, 21, 23 to 25 and 28, 31 and all the working days of September, 1995 "because in truth and in fact . . . (she) did hold office on those days." This was because her contract of lease with the Municipal Government of Panabo was never implemented as it became the subject of "Civil Case No. 95-53 Panabo Public Market Vendors Assn. Inc. and Pag-ibig Ng Gulayan Ass. Inc. Vs. Municipality of Panabo, et. al., for Declaration of Nullity of Mun. Ord. No. XLV, Series of 1994." 10 The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its report, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and failure to report her business interest, and recommended that the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The Court finds that the report and recommendation of the OCA is in accord with the evidence and the law. We hold the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. Respondent's misconduct is evident from the records. By her own admission, respondent had collected her salary from the Municipality of Panabo for the period of May 16-31, 1991, when she was already working at the RTC. She knew that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal government, but she took it just the same. She returned the amount only upon receipt of the Court Resolution dated January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later. We cannot countenance the same. Respondent's conduct is plain dishonesty. Her explanation, as observed earlier, is unsatisfactory. Her overriding need for money from the municipal government, aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a salary not due her. We sympathize with respondent's sad plight of being the sole breadwinner of her family, with her husband and parents to feed and children to send to school. This, however, is not an acceptable excuse for her misconduct. If poverty and pressing financial need could justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt long ago. A public servant should never expect to become wealthy in government. But there is really more to respondent's defense of poverty. If respondents was just driven by dire pecuniary need, respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution dated January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it. Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or acceptable explanation. In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Imus, Cavite, 11 this Court ruled that a sheriff who failed to issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really wanted to misappropriate the said amount." Inevitably, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 12 We have repeatedly held that although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good

moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. 13 This Court, in JPDIO vs. Josephine Calaguas, Records Officer, OCC, MTCC, Angeles City , 14 held: The Court must reiterate that a public office is a public trust. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and should be made accountable to all those whom he serves. Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."15 Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is dismissal, even for the first offense. 16Accordingly, for respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal. Apart from the above finding, we also note the contradiction between the certification issued by Municipal Treasurer Jose Avenido stating that respondent had worked as an assessment clerk in his office up to June 3, 1991, and the certification of Clerk of Court Victor Ginete stating that respondent started working as an interpreter on May 16, 1991. Although specifically asked by the Court to explain this contradiction, respondent could only state that the certification of the treasurer is inaccurate because she assumed her position as Assessment Clerk on January 25, 1990 and not on February 1, 1990 as written in the said certification. Respondent, however, failed to explain the gravamen of the inquiry, i.e., that she was certified to be still connected with the Municipal Government of Panabo on June 3, 1991, notwithstanding her assumption of her post in the Regional Trial Court as early as May 16, 1991. To the mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this discrepancy is consistent with her failure to satisfactorily explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she was not entitled to. Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious design to hold two positions at the same time. Aside from dishonesty, however, respondents is also guilty of failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business interests. Respondent herself admitted that she "had a stall in the market." The Office of the Court Administrator also found that she had been receiving rental payments from one Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market stall. That respondent had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Her failure to do so exposes her to administrative sanction. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interest. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him." In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713. The respondent's claim that her contract of lease of a market stall was never implemented because it became the subject of a civil case, fails to convince us. We agree with the finding of the OCA on respondent's guilt for this separate offense. It is a finding, which further supports its recommendation for respondent's dismissal, to wit: 17

The case respondent is referring to was filed in 1995. This can be seen from the number of the case which is 95-93. Earlier than the filling of the case, respondent was already collecting rentals as early asFebruary 22, 1991 from one Rodolfo Luay who was operating a business without the necessary license. Respondent should have, therefore, indicated in her "Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the Government Service" for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 that she had a market stall in the Public market of Panabo, Davao. She admits that she never indicated such in her sworn statements. As this Office had earlier stated in its Memorandum dated November 10, 1995 filed in connection with the instant complaint: Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, or both. But even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against the offender, the offender can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven. Respondent 201 file speaks for itself. Furthermore, respondent should have divested herself of her interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic) office. She has not. The penalty for non-disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is the same. (Citations omitted.) In her explanation, respondent maintains the position that she has no business interest, implicitly contending that there is nothing to divulge or divest from. As discussed above, respondent had a business interest. We do not find her administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in general, to divest themselves of business interests upon assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to avoid conflict of interests. 18 In the absence of any showing that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest, divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case, it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in the regulation of public market, nor does it concern itself with the activities thereof. While respondent may not be compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had the legal obligation of divulging it. WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa M. Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service with FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with PREJUDICE to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Office of the Court Administrator, Informal Preliminary Inquiry.

In Complainant Rabe's separate affidavit, she made the following allegations: xxx xxx xxx

That on August 14, 1995 at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mrs. Delsa Flores, a Court Interpreter at the Regional Trial Court of Panabo, Davao, went to the stall I occupied and while there, she made several defamatory utterances against me in a very menacing, arrogant and threatening manner and in the visayan dialect, as follows: Putang ina mo ka, akoa nin pwesto, wala kay ulaw, wala kay batasan, mangingilog ug pwesto That Mrs. Flores attempted to inflict injury upon me by scratching my face but I was able to evade and with the timely intervention of Mr. Espiridion Vivas; That Mrs. Flores made the foregoing remarks and other remarks of the same import for several times in a very loud voice while walking to and fro; That Mrs. Flores challenged me to a fist fight and destroyed the stall I occupied by removing the wooden fence and the GI sheets with the help of her husband; loaded the materials on a motor vehicle; and brought them to the police station of Panabo; That Mrs. Flores committed the aforementioned acts during office hours and in such conduct unbecoming a government employee; xxx
3

xxx

xxx

Rollo, p. 2. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid. Ibid. Respondent's explanation, p. 2; rollo, p. 50. Ibid. A.M. No. P-95-1133, April 26, 1996. Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.

10

11

12

13

Legaspi vs. Garrete, 242 SCRA 679, 701, March 27, 1995 citing Montemayor vs. Collado, Adm. Matter No. 2519-MJ, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 258, 264; Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao vs. Tupas, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-87-141; July 12, 1989, 175 SCRA 292, 296; Leynes vs. Veloso, Adm. Matter No. 689-MJ and Virrey vs. Veloso, Adm. Matter No. 809-MJ, the two latter cases promulgated on April 13, 1978, 82 SCRA 352, 328.

14

A.M. No. P-95-115, May 15, 1996. Section 27, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

15

16

Section 23 (a), Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 Known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other Pertinent Civil Service laws.
17

Pages 6-7 of the Memorandum of the Court Administrator dated November 27, 1996, on this case.
18

Section 9 of RA 6713 provides: "A public official or employees shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption."