When unfairness matters most: supervisory violations of electronic monitoring practices

David Zweig and Kristyn Scott, Department of Management, University of Toronto at Scarborough Human Resource Management Journal, Vol 17, no 3, 2007, pages 227247

This study examined the effects of different sources of monitoring information, quality of treatment and quality of decision-making manipulations on perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with monitoring. Drawing on Blader and Tylers four-component model of fairness, participants were asked to rate their perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and intentions to comply with electronic performancemonitoring policies that originated from formal organisational policies or from their direct supervisors. Results indicated that procedural justice violations originating from the supervisor (vs. formal organisational policy) led to lower perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with monitoring. Furthermore, the effect of procedural justice violations on compliance with monitoring was mediated by perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with monitoring. The present research has theoretical and practical implications for the design, implementation and communication of organisational electronic monitoring practices. Contact: David Zweig, Department of Management, University of Toronto at Scarborough, 1265 Military Trail, Toronto, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada. Email: zweig@utsc.utoronto.ca INTRODUCTION or three decades, researchers have been asking whether or not organisations should be monitoring the activities of their employees electronically. Proponents of electronic performance monitoring (EPM) suggest that practices such as listening in on phone calls with customers or counting keystrokes ensures accuracy and removes bias when assessing employee performance (e.g. Grant and Higgins, 1991). Detractors point to the negative consequences of electronic monitoring such as increased stress and lower quality performance (e.g. Davidson and Henderson, 2000). Between these two poles, researchers that are caught amid the need to help organisations enhance their effectiveness and the desire to respect employee rights have identied fairness and privacy as necessary conditions for limiting negative reactions while allowing organisations to benet from monitoring efforts (e.g. Eddy et al., 1999; Ambrose and Alder, 2000). Given that an estimated 76 per cent of companies in the United States engage in regular electronic monitoring of their employees (American Management Association, 2005), the need to understand how monitoring policies inuence employee reactions becomes increasingly important. Recent investigations have found support for the dual roles played by privacy and fairness in predicting reactions to electronic monitoring (e.g. Alge, 2001; Zweig and
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Webster, 2002). However, few investigations have examined the source of monitoring information (e.g. the supervisor vs. formal organisational policies) in predicting reactions to EPM. Rather, previous studies have either presented information on EPM procedures as originating explicitly from the organisation or have confounded the source of these procedures as being determined by the organisation and administered via an agent of the organisation (e.g. Alge and Ballinger, 2001; Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002). Emerging evidence in the justice literature suggests that the source of justice information is important (e.g. Blader and Tyler, 2003a,b). The same could be true in a monitoring context (Alder and Ambrose, 2005a). The source of monitoring information, when coupled with monitoring practices that either respect or violate perceptions of fairness, could result in different reactions to monitoring. For example, being told by your supervisor that it is up to him/her to decide how monitoring will take place or that you have no opportunity to appeal any decisions based on monitoring data might elicit stronger reactions than being informed in writing that formal organisational monitoring policies prohibit appeals to performance-appraisal decisions. The primary purpose of this investigation was to examine the effects of different sources of monitoring information on perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and compliance with monitoring. Drawing on Blader and Tylers (2003a) four-component model of procedural justice, which suggests that people are inuenced by the type of procedure (quality of decision making, quality of treatment) they receive from formal (organisational policies) and informal (supervisory) sources, we investigated source differences in the context of procedural manipulations to monitoring practices. Specically, in this study, participants received information indicating (1) the source of monitoring-practice information (formal organisational policies vs. supervisors); (2) the type of procedure (quality of decision making vs. quality of treatment),1 and (3) the fairness of procedure (fair vs. unfair). In addition, we investigated the effects of monitoring-source information, type of monitoring procedures, and the fairness of treatment on intentions to comply with monitoring, as mediated by fairness and satisfaction perceptions. In this article, we rst discuss Blader and Tylers (2003a) four-component model of procedural justice, specically as it applies to monitoring. We then discuss how the various components of the model may interact to predict perceptions of monitoring. Finally we present a study that offers a preliminary examination of the role that source of monitoring information may play in examining reactions to electronic monitoring. Source distinctions Blader and Tyler (2003a) suggest that procedural fairness evaluations emerge from two sources formal inuences on fairness (official organisational rules and procedures), and informal inuences on fairness (supervisory actions). Drawing from research uncovering differences found in perceived organisational versus supervisory support (Hutchinson, 1997), and citizenship behaviour directed at the organisation versus the supervisor (Williams and Andersen, 1991), Blader and Tyler (2003a) suggest that employees can form related but distinct perceptions of fairness depending on the source of treatment. In other words, an employee can experience
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negative reactions to an unfair supervisor but still perceive the organisations procedures to be fair. However, early conceptualisations of procedural justice focused on the inuence of formal rules and policies (e.g. Thibault and Walker, 1978). One noteworthy exception to this is Cobb et al. (1997), who found that employee perceptions of procedural justice are determined independently and jointly by both formal policy and supervisors. With the exception of Cobb et al. and a few studies (e.g. Bies, 2001; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002), most subsequent procedural justice research has continued to examine fairness perceptions through the lens of formal policies and procedures. Research examining antecedents of and reactions to EPM has also continued to emphasise formal organisational policies, especially when focusing on perceptions of fairness. For example, Ambrose and Alders (2000) fairness-based model of EPM does not identify the source of monitoring information as a key variable in predicting reactions to monitoring. Although Alder and Ambrose (2005a,b) do propose and examine the source of monitoring information as an important determinant of reactions, more recent investigations continue to present monitoring practices as originating from formal organisational policies or do not clearly distinguish the entity responsible for determining how monitoring will take place. Alge and Ballinger (2001) presented participants with an employee orientation brieng form that described the monitoring practices as originating from the institution, and Hovorka-Mead et al. (2002) portrayed the supervisor as the agent of formal organisational monitoring policies. In practice, however, it is likely that both situations exist. In some organisations, monitoring practices might be explicitly proscribed in formal organisational policies. Other organisations might implement a monitoring framework, but leave the day-to-day administration of the programme up to the discretion of individual supervisors. Either scenario might lead monitored employees to form different perceptions of fairness and satisfaction. Indeed, Blader and Tyler (2003b) found that informal sources of information (e.g. the supervisor) elicited strong fairness effects. In other words, procedures were judged to be more fair or unfair if implemented by the supervisor. Procedural distinctions Apart from source distinctions, the procedures used in an organisation are recognised as a key determinant of reactions to EPM (e.g. Ambrose and Alder, 2000). Mirroring fairness research in general, voice or the ability to provide input into the decision-making process (Thibault and Walker, 1975), continues to be one of the most frequently studied procedural variables in EPM research (e.g. Alge, 2001; HovorkaMead et al., 2002). Indeed, allowing people to have input into the implementation of the monitoring system enhances perceptions of fairness (e.g. Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002). Yet, as suggested in a recent meta-analysis of fairness research (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001, p. 308), although we have enough data on voice, we do not know enough about other aspects of organisational practices, indicating a need to examine procedures more broadly. In practice, most new employees must accept organisational policies that are already in place. Employees entering an electronically monitored environment will not be offered opportunities to voice their opinions about the previously established procedures for monitoring. Thus, it might be more important to ensure that
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procedures are in place to allow for appeals of decisions based on monitoring data. Consistent with this assertion, correctability, or the principle that procedures should contain some provision for correcting bad decisions (Leventhal, 1980), might be a more important concern than voice for employees. Accordingly Ambrose and Alder (2000) proposed that giving employees an opportunity to challenge the computermonitoring system would lead to greater perceptions of fairness. Providing people with justications for monitoring has also led to more favourable fairness perceptions (Stanton, 2000; Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002; Zweig and Webster, 2002). Yet, other procedural concerns related to the quality of treatment offered to employees merit attention. Monitoring systems designed to enhance the quality of treatment employees receive are proposed to result in more favourable perceptions of fairness (Alder and Ambrose, 2005a). This is because silent EPM, or being unaware of when you are being monitored, is viewed as tantamount to spying (Picard, 1994). As an example, people might make inferences about the quality of treatment based on how the monitoring system is designed. For instance, systems that are designed to provide employees with information about when they will be monitored may lead to more favourable perceptions about the quality of treatment offered by the organisation. Indeed, Carayon (1993) found that when participants were aware of when they were being monitored, they reported feeling less stress, and Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) found that participants who knew exactly when they were being monitored expressed higher feelings of personal control. Furthermore, Hovorka-Mead et al. (2002) found that giving people advance notice of monitoring led to greater perceptions of fairness. In sum, evidence suggests that giving people voice, offering justications and implementing monitoring practices that enhance both quality of treatment and decision making leads to greater perceptions of fairness. However, little empirical support exists to suggest that one fairness element is more critical than another in inuencing fairness perceptions. One notable exception is Blader and Tyler (2003b), who found larger effects for quality of treatment (e.g. respecting employee rights) manipulations than for quality of decision-making manipulations (e.g. consistency, appeals) on perceptions of fairness. Fairness heuristic theory (e.g. van den Bos et al., 2001) suggests that people seek information about their inclusion or exclusion from their social unit. Procedures that provide information on the quality of treatment offered to employees might be more salient and more interpretable to people than concerns about appealing decisions based on monitoring data. This is because the electronic monitoring practices signal the overall level of respect the organisation provides employees, not just whether appeals are permitted. For example, if the characteristics of the monitoring system do not convey respect by prohibiting people from providing consent prior to being monitored, this may also signal to the employee that the decisions made with that data may also be biased. As such, we propose that, although quality of decision making is important, quality of treatment concerns may trigger further questions about decision making, thus making treatment a more proximal determinant of fairness and satisfaction.2 Beyond fairness and satisfaction perceptions, another important outcome of organisational monitoring is compliance (Bennett and Robinson, 2003). In establishing a direct relationship between organisational practices and compliance intentions, Spitzmueller and Stanton (2006) found that employees attempt to actively
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resist organisational monitoring practices. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that non-compliance, or deviance (Bennett and Robinson, 1995), is inuenced by perceptions of fairness. For example, Greenberg (1993) found that procedural injustice impacts behaviours such as theft among employees. Therefore, we propose that the type of monitoring procedure and the fairness of that procedure might also inuence employee motivation to comply with monitoring. As such, we propose a two-way interaction between type of procedure (quality of decision making vs. quality of treatment) and fairness of procedure (fair vs. unfair) on perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and compliance with monitoring as follows:
Hypothesis 1: EPM will be perceived as more fair, and will lead to greater perceptions of satisfaction and more compliance when people are permitted to consent to monitoring (fair quality of treatment) as opposed to when they are provided opportunities to appeal decisions based on monitoring information (fair quality of decision making) or are not provided with an opportunity to consent or appeal.

The interactive effects of source, type of procedure and fairness of procedure As stated earlier, Blader and Tyler (2003b) found support for a four-component model of procedural fairness that distinguishes between the quality of decision making and quality of treatment, and between formal (organisational) and informal (supervisor) sources of fairness information. Although Alder and Ambrose (2005a) proposed that the source of feedback would inuence reactions to monitoring, no previous research has examined the interaction of source, type of procedure and fairness of the procedure in the electronic-monitoring context. Accordingly, we hypothesise that these components will interact to inuence perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and compliance. Support for this proposition comes from fairness heuristic theory (e.g. van den Bos et al., 2001), which suggests that, in the absence of outcome information, people will look to the procedures to determine the fairness of organisational policies. Further, fair procedures are related to organisational-level outcomes (e.g. satisfaction with organisation: van den Bos et al. (1998); and sabotage: Ambrose et al. (2002). As such, compared to supervisory statements, fair institutionalised policies should provide stronger evidence that organisational procedures are fair. Conversely, fairness perceptions should be lowest when procedures are violated via the decision-making practices of supervisors. This is because the supervisor is using his or her own discretion as both an agent of the organisation, and is acting as a source of information about the quality of decision making and treatment accorded to employees by the supervisor him or herself. Based on the evidence presented previously, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2: Source of monitoring information will moderate the relationship between type of procedure and fairness of procedure such that perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and intentions to comply with monitoring will be lower when supervisors convey unfair decision-making procedures.

The mediating effects of fairness and satisfaction on compliance The relationships between organisational activities and compliance, and the inuence of fairness perceptions on theft have been well established (e.g. Greenberg,
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1993; Spitzmueller and Stanton, 2006). However, Bennett and Robinson (2003) suggest that researchers need to investigate the impact of procedural injustice on deviant behaviours other than theft. Because non-compliance with organisational policies can be construed as deviance (Bennett and Robinson, 2003), we propose that perceptions of fairness and satisfaction will mediate the relationship between source, type of monitoring procedures, fairness of the procedure and intentions to comply with monitoring. Although research has not examined this possibility directly, Zweig and Webster (2002) found that perceptions of fairness mediated the relationship between monitoring system characteristics and outcomes such as attitudes towards monitoring. It is therefore reasonable to expect that unfair organisational monitoring practices enacted by supervisors might lead to greater intentions to resist monitoring efforts because they are perceived to be unfair. As such, we hypothesise the following:
Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of fairness and satisfaction will be positively associated with compliance in monitoring and will mediate the relationships between source, type of procedure, fairness of procedure and compliance with monitoring.

Drawing upon Blader and Tyler (2003a,b) and Alder and Ambrose (2005a,b), this current study adds to the literature on EPM and fairness by incorporating the source of the monitoring-policy information to understand reactions to EPM policies. Furthermore, we are responding to the call of justice researchers (e.g. Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001) by examining reactions to procedural criteria other than voice. METHOD Participants A total of 111 senior undergraduate students enrolled in three different upper-year management courses completed the study. The average age of the participants was 21 years (SD = 1.71) and females comprised 64 per cent of the sample. Forty-one per cent of the participants were enrolled in a co-operative education programme. Approximately one third of the participants (32 per cent) reported experience working in an electronically monitored environment, and of this group, 13 per cent reported between one and ve years of experience working in a monitored environment. Procedure The study design was a 2 (source: organisation vs. supervisor) 2 (type of procedure: quality of decision making vs. quality of treatment) 2 (fairness of procedure: fair vs. unfair) between-subjects factorial design. Participants randomly received one of eight scenarios in which they were asked to assume the role of a customer service representative working in an electronically monitored environment. The source of monitoring-policy information, the procedures with which they were monitored and whether the procedure was fair or unfair, varied by scenario. For example, in the supervisor as source, quality of decision making, unfair procedure condition, participants read the following:
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Your direct supervisor has decided to use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance. According to your supervisor, you will not have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring, nor add your input into the performance appraisal. You cannot appeal or challenge any decision made by your direct supervisor based on the monitoring data.

In contrast, participants in the organisation as source, quality of decision making, fair procedure condition read the following (see Appendix 1 for a full description of the manipulations):
According to the organisations policies, the data gathered via electronic monitoring will be used to assess your performance. Also, the policies state that you will have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring, and you can add your input into the performance appraisal. The organisations policies state that employees can appeal or challenge any decision based on the monitoring data.

Dependent variables Fairness perceptions Two items assessing fairness were adapted from Alge (1999), (e.g. How fair are the methods used to monitor and assess your performance?). The rating scale ranged from Not at all Fair (1) to Extremely Fair (7). Internal consistency reliability for these two items was 0.75, and the items were collapsed to create an average measure of fairness. Satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes Two items assessed satisfaction with monitoring. However, internal consistency reliability for these items was relatively low (a = 0.60) and an examination of the item wordings suggested a difference in focus. For example, one item, How satised would you be with the methods used to monitor your performance?, assessed satisfaction with monitoring methods. Another item, To what extent would you be satised with your performance appraisals if they were to be based on electronically monitored data? assessed satisfaction with monitoring outcomes. Satisfaction is often broken down into specic facets (e.g. satisfaction with supervision, pay; Nagy, 2002 and Thorsteinson, 2003) that correlate with multi-item measures of overall job satisfaction. Therefore, a decision was made post hoc to split the items to assess satisfaction with methods and satisfaction with outcomes and to conduct separate analyses on each. Compliance with monitoring Three items assessing compliance were adapted from Spitzmueller and Stanton (2006), (e.g. I would accept electronic monitoring and make no efforts to try and prevent my activities from being monitored). The rating scale ranged from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). Internal consistency reliability for these three items was 0.68, and the items were collapsed to create an average measure of compliance.
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RESULTS Manipulation checks For each of the three independent variables, there were two manipulation checks asking respondents about the information given in the scenarios. For example, the source manipulation checks asked participants to indicate whether or not the information came from the organisation or the supervisor. The quality of decision making manipulation check asked participants to identify whether or not they had the opportunity to appeal any decisions based on monitoring data. The manipulation was considered successful when the correct item for each independent variable was identied. On average, participants correctly responded to the manipulation check items 83 per cent of the time. Furthermore, there were no notable differences between the scenarios or independent variables in the likelihood of incorrect responses. Analyses excluding cases where manipulation checks were incorrect did not change the pattern of the results to be presented later. Thus, all participants were included in the analysis to maintain equivalent sample sizes between the conditions. Analyses Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on all the dependent measures. The analysis revealed a signicant main effect of fairness, F (5, 96) = 4.43, p < 0.01, a signicant two-way interaction between procedure and fairness, F (5, 96) = 2.98, p < 0.01, and a signicant three-way interaction between source, procedure and fairness, F (5, 96) = 2.66, p < 0.05. Given that the MANOVA indicated signicant differences across the study conditions, univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted on all of the dependent variables with a Bonferroni corrected alpha (a = 0.04; see Table 1). Fairness perceptions Hypothesis 1 predicted a two-way interaction between type of procedure and fairness. A signicant main effect was found for fairness, F (1, 103) = 11.15, p < 0.01, such that fair procedures were perceived to be signicantly more fair than unfair procedures. Furthermore, a signicant two-way interaction was found between fairness and type of procedure, F (1, 103) = 5.10, p < 0.05. However, contrary to the hypothesis, participants in the unfair condition who were given information about the quality of decision making perceived the monitoring system to be signicantly less fair (M = 2.90) than those in the other three conditions (treatment fair, M = 3.91; treatment unfair, M = 3.69; decision making fair, M = 4.07, respectively). Supporting Hypothesis 2, these results were qualied by a marginally signicant three-way interaction found for source, type of procedure and fairness, F (1, 103) = 3.19, p = 0.077. Breaking down the three-way interaction into its component two-way interactions reveals that there were no appreciable differences in the means for participants receiving fairness information from the organisation; participants in this condition viewed the system as being similarly fair or unfair for both procedural manipulations. However, there was a signicant two-way interaction for participants receiving fairness information from a supervisor, F (1, 48) = 8.86, p < 0.01, such that participants in the unfair condition who received the information about decision
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 2007 The Authors.

TABLE 1 Analysis of variance for source, type of procedure and fairness of procedure on dependent measures
Fairness perceptions F 1.68 2.34 0.02 1 4.28** 0.04 1 1.07 0.01 1 2.43 0.02 1 0.67 0.01 0.01 h2 df F df F h2 h2 df 1 1 Satisfaction with monitoring procedures Satisfaction with monitoring outcomes Compliance with monitoring F 0.00 5.94** h2 0.00 0.05

Source

df

Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

1 1.93 0.298 5.10 3.19* (1.16) 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 1 1 1 1 103 0.26 0.56 2.12 0.02 (1.91) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 1 1 1 1 102

11.15***

0.10

10.04***

0.09

4.39** 0.65 0.68 4.49** 6.42** (1.74)

0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06

1 1 1 1 1 103

5.85** 0.07 0.66 5.22** 0.51 (1.36)

0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01

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Source: organisation vs. supervisor (A) Quality of decision making vs. quality of treatment (B) Fair vs. unfair procedure (C) AB AC BC ABC Error

1 1 1 1 103

Note: Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean squared error. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.001.

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FIGURE 1 Interaction of source of procedure, type of procedure, and fairness of procedure on fairness perceptions
Source: Organisation
4.2
perceived fairness

4 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 3 fair unfair quality of decision making quality of treatment

Source: Supervisor
4.5
perceived fairness

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 fair unfair quality of decision making quality of treatment

making from a supervisor (M = 2.38), perceived the monitoring system to be less fair than those in the other three conditions (treatment fair, M = 3.80; treatment unfair, M = 3.83; decision making fair, M = 4.03, respectively: see Figure 1). Satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes A signicant main effect for type of procedure was found for satisfaction with monitoring methods, F (1, 103) = 4.28, p < 0.05, such that participants were more satised with monitoring procedures when provided information about quality of treatment. A signicant main effect for fairness was also found, F (1, 103) = 10.04, p < 0.01, suggesting that fair procedures led to more satisfaction with monitoring methods than unfair procedures. Satisfaction with monitoring outcomes yielded different results. A signicant main effect was found for fairness, F (1, 102) = 4.39, p < 0.05, such that fair procedures lead to signicantly more satisfaction with monitoring outcomes than unfair procedures. A signicant two-way interaction was also found between fairness and type of procedure, F (1, 102) = 4.49, p < 0.05, such that participants in the unfair condition who received information about decision making were signicantly less satised with monitoring outcomes (M = 2.63) than those in the other three conditions
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FIGURE 2 Interaction of source of procedure, type of procedure and fairness of procedure on satisfaction with monitoring outcomes
Source: Organisation
satisfaction with monitoring outcomes

4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 fair unfair quality of decision making quality of treatment

Source: Supervisor
satisfaction with monitoring outcomes

4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 fair unfair quality of decision making quality of treatment

(treatment fair, M = 3.44; treatment unfair, M = 3.44; decision making fair, M = 3.72, respectively). These results were qualied by a signicant three-way interaction between source, type of procedure and fairness, F (1, 102) = 6.42, p < 0.05. An examination of the means suggests that, similar to the results found for perceptions of fairness, participants in the unfair condition who received the information about decision making from a supervisor (F (1, 48) = 8.12, p < 0.01; M = 2.42) were signicantly less satised with monitoring outcomes than those in the other three conditions (treatment fair, M = 2.80; treatment unfair, M = 3.66; decision making fair, M = 3.93: see Figure 2). Compliance with monitoring A signicant main effect was found for fairness F (1, 103) = 5.85, p < 0.05, such that fair procedures were rated as leading to signicantly greater intentions to comply with monitoring than unfair procedures. Further, a signicant main effect was found for type of procedure, F (1, 103) = 5.94, p < 0.05, such that compliance with monitoring was greater when participants were provided information about quality of treatment. These results were qualied by a two-way interaction between fairness
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FIGURE 3 Interaction of type of procedure, and fairness of procedure on compliance with monitoring.
4.5
compliance with monitoring

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 fair unfair quality of decision making quality of treatment

and type of procedure, F (1, 103) = 5.22, p < 0.05, such that participants in the unfair condition who received information about the quality of decision making were signicantly less likely to comply with monitoring outcomes (M = 2.84) than those in the other three conditions (treatment fair, M = 3.94; treatment unfair, M = 3.90; decision making fair, M = 3.90: see Figure 3). Mediation analyses To test Hypothesis 3, we conducted a series of regression analyses, as outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), to explore whether the relationships between the predictors and compliance with monitoring were mediated by perceptions of fairness and satisfaction. However, as indicated previously, the source of monitoring information was not signicantly related to compliance, violating a necessary precondition for mediation analysis. Therefore, we did not include the source manipulation in our analysis. As shown in Figure 4, the results indicate that the relationship between fairness of the procedure and compliance with monitoring is mediated by participants perceptions of fairness, satisfaction with monitoring methods and satisfaction with monitoring outcomes. That is, whereas the effect between fairness and compliance with monitoring was signicant (b = 0.23, p = 0.01), the effect is no longer signicant when fairness perceptions (b = 0.04, p > 0.05), satisfaction with monitoring methods (b = 0.05, p > 0.05) and satisfaction with monitoring outcomes (b = -0.14, p > 0.05) are controlled. Tests of the signicance of the reduction between the indirect and direct effects (Sobel, 1982) revealed signicant decreases in the effect sizes (z = 3.54, p < 0.001 for fairness; z = 2.79, p < 0.05 for satisfaction with monitoring methods; z = 2.04, p < 0.05, for satisfaction with monitoring outcomes, respectively). We conducted a similar analysis with type of procedure. However, the effect of type of procedure on compliance did not differ statistically before and after the fairness and satisfaction variables were controlled.
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FIGURE 4 Path analysis depicting the mediating role of a) fairness, b) satisfaction with monitoring methods, and c) satisfaction with monitoring outcomes in the link between fairness of procedure and compliance with monitoring

a) .32**
fairness perceptions

.5 8 **

fairness of procedure

(.23*) .04

compliance with monitoring

b) .29**
satisfaction w/monitoring methods

.6 0 **

fairness of procedure

(.23*) .05

compliance with monitoring

c) .21*

satisfaction w/monitoring outcomes

.43**

fairness of procedure

(.23*) .14

compliance with monitoring

(Note: Numbers on paths are betas. Fairness of procedure: 0 = fair, 1 = unfair. The total effect between the predictor and criterion (i.e. before controlling for the mediator) is given inside the parentheses; the direct effect (i.e. after controlling for the mediator) is given outside the parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.001.)

DISCUSSION The goal of this study was to examine the effects of different sources of monitoring information on perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and compliance with monitoring. Our results suggest that the source of electronic-monitoring information is important. Specically, receiving information about monitoring policies from the organisation or
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the supervisor can lead to different perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with monitoring. When participants were told that the supervisor would not permit appeals of decisions, perceptions of fairness were lower and participants were less satised with monitoring compared to participants who received information about appeals via formal organisational policies. These ndings provide support for Blader and Tylers (2003a) four-component model of fairness, and provide additional support to Alder and Ambrose (2005b) who found that supervisor-mediated feedback enhanced the perceived fairness of both destructive and constructive feedback. Further, by investigating procedural fairness issues other than voice, we are responding to calls for more research into other important procedural issues (e.g. Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). This extends both the justice literature in general and the EPM literature in particular. We discovered that quality of decision making (specically in terms of appeals) is important to peoples perceptions of fairness. If people do not have the opportunity to appeal decisions based on monitoring data, they will not perceive the EPM system to be fair. This effect is even more pronounced when the source of unfairness information is the supervisor. Our results also suggest that people will convey intentions to resist monitoring when monitoring practices are construed as unfair. Further, the effect of unfair procedures on compliance with monitoring was mediated by perceptions of fairness. Satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes are also related to peoples intentions to resist monitoring when treatment is unfair. These results add to the existing literatures on procedural justice and deviance (e.g. Greenberg, 1993), and compliance in monitoring contexts (e.g. Spitzmueller and Stanton, 2006) by identifying unfair treatment as a trigger for resistance and lowered intentions to comply with monitoring. Drawing on Blader and Tyler (2003b), who found larger effects for procedural manipulations that violated quality of treatment (e.g. employee rights), we proposed that concerns about giving consent to electronic monitoring would be more salient than concerns about appealing decisions based on monitoring data. However, in a monitoring context, our participants indicated quality of decision making was important when forming their perceptions towards monitoring. Fairness heuristic theory (e.g. van den Bos et al., 2001) offers a potential explanation for these results. Being denied the opportunity to appeal monitoring decisions conveys more information about the potential favourability of the outcome than does being denied consent over when monitoring will take place. For example, not having the right to appeal decisions based on monitoring data conrms that there is no recourse in the event of a negative outcome. In contrast, not having the right to consent to monitoring does not guarantee that the outcome will be unfavourable. Consequently, a lack of opportunity for appeals and the corresponding belief that outcomes are likely to be negative, might lead to less positive perceptions of fairness and satisfaction. These differences, combined with our results, point to the need for future research to investigate the direct effects assigned to procedural justice criteria in different contexts. Along with the relative importance of different procedural justice criteria, we were also interested in investigating whether violations of facets of procedural justice (e.g. treatment concerns) would inuence other procedural justice criteria
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(e.g. decision making) that were not directly manipulated. As such, we examined an item in the questionnaire completed by participants in order to assess overall perceptions of respect. Contrary to expectations, we found that perceptions of respect, while generally low across all conditions, were lowest when the supervisor prohibited appeals. In other words, although participants perceived the level of respect accorded by the monitoring system to be low (regardless of condition), participants perceived the system to demonstrate very low levels of respect when the supervisor compromised the quality of decision making by denying the right to appeal. One potential explanation for this is that supervisory violations of fairness might not only convey that decision making is unfair, but that this perception may also extend to the treatment they receive from the supervisor and the organisation. As stated earlier, this suggests a spillover effect from quality of decision making to quality of treatment even in the absence of information about quality of treatment. Although not the primary purpose of this investigation, future research should consider that perceptions of specic justice criteria may not operate orthogonally and examine the interactive effects of different types of procedural violations. The theoretical and practical implications of this study must be weighed against its limitations. First, we used scenarios to conduct research on this sensitive topic. However, the scenario method can be particularly informative where the goal is to understand sensitive psychological processes such as privacy (Greenberg and Eskew, 1993). Furthermore, we followed Greenberg and Eskews recommendations to enhance the realism of the scenarios. Although scenarios offered us control over the variables of interest, we do not know if perceptions would be different had our participants experienced a real employee-monitoring system. However, we would expect the results to be even more pronounced in eld settings where the psychological effects of being monitored are more salient. Second, we used upperyear management students as participants in this study. However, generalisability and external validity concerns are partially mitigated by the fact that over 40 per cent of our participants were enrolled in a co-operative education programme and one third of our participants have or were currently working in electronically monitored environments. Although not all of our participants had direct experience working in an electronically monitored environment, this situation likely mirrors real-world conditions in that most employees entering a monitored work environment have probably never worked in one before. Finally, although unintentional, the reliance on single-item measures of satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes could raise a concern about the validity of our ndings. However, Wanous et al. (1997) suggest that single-item measures are adequate if the construct being measured is sufficiently narrow or is unambiguous to respondents. Further, Nagy (2002) found that single-item measures of facet job satisfaction were signicantly correlated with multi-item measures of the same constructs. Gardner et al. (1998) also found that traditional multi-item scales did not outperform single-item scales. Thus, we believe that our single measures of the two satisfaction variables are sufficiently straightforward to capture perceptions of satisfaction with EPM methods and outcomes. Nevertheless, where appropriate, future studies should develop multiple items for these variables. Finally, we did not allow our participants to respond to every possible
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combination of conditions. Although we found signicant differences among the conditions, a policy capturing design would further elucidate the relationships between the study variables. Future research should continue to investigate the source of monitoring-policy information as a key moderator of fairness and satisfaction perceptions of EPM. We chose only two specic fairness variables for this initial examination; other procedural antecedents of fairness perceptions must also be investigated in this context. For example, receiving fairness information from the supervisor might raise issues around the consistency of treatment across employees. Inconsistent treatment could result in even lower perceptions of the quality of decision making and the quality of treatment. Future research examining the additive and interactive effects of multiple fairness violations would also add to our understanding of how different procedural antecedents interact to predict outcomes. Furthermore, potential mediators of source effects such as perceptions of organisational support and leadermember exchange (e.g. Masterson et al., 2001) must also be examined in the electronic-monitoring context. The present study offers some new directions for research on electronic monitoring. This study provides empirical support for some elements of Ambrose and Alders (2000) justice-based model of EPM and Alder and Ambroses (2005a) integrative model of reactions to computer performance monitoring. Specically, people will perceive the opportunity to appeal decisions based on monitoring data and the opportunity to provide consent to be monitored as more fair. Furthermore, supporting Alder and Ambrose (2005b) and Blader and Tyler (2003a,b), this research conrms that the source of fairness information is an important moderator of fairness perceptions. Given the rapid rise in workplace electronic monitoring (American Management Association, 2005), employees must expect that they will be electronically monitored. Thus, it becomes increasingly important to consider how organisational monitoring policies are communicated to employees. Our results suggest that it is paramount for HR practitioners to consider the following. First, employees should have the opportunity to voice their opinions in reference to the monitoring system (e.g. Alge, 2001). For example, in an organisation about to implement such a system, this may take the form of an organisation-wide survey allowing employees to provide their input into the system design. In addition, organisations with these systems in place may do well to consider building in a procedure for employees to appeal decisions made on the basis of monitoring. Our research suggests this might be more important than voice and might increase compliance with fair monitoring practices. Further, as demonstrated by research on advance notice (e.g. Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002), it is important to let employees know when they will be monitored. However, our research suggests that beyond advance notice of monitoring, employees should be offered the opportunity to consent to monitoring before it takes place to enhance quality of treatment perceptions. Finally, it is important to formalise monitoring practices in organisational policies and communicate the policies to employees. If the supervisor acts as the agent of the organisation in communicating monitoring policies, unfair practices might not only convey that decision-making procedures are unfair, but also that employees are not valued by the organisation.
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Acknowledgements The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council provided nancial support for this research. We would like to thank Jane Webster for her comments on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1. There does exist some disagreement in the justice literature in terms of whether justice is best conceptualised as a two-, three-, or four-factor model (e.g. Colquitt et al., 2001). Indeed, many justice researchers consider quality of treatment concerns to fall under the construct of interactional justice (e.g. Bies and Moag, 1986; Bies, 2001). Because this article uses Blader and Tylers (2003a) model as a framework, we adopt their structure and consider quality of treatment to be a subset of procedural justice. 2. Although it has been suggested, and demonstrated, that satisfaction is predicted by distributive justice (e.g. Greenberg, 1994), Masterson et al. (2001) found that satisfaction was related to both procedural and interactional justice. Other researchers have found similar results for the relationship between procedural justice and satisfaction (e.g. Cropanzano et al., 2002; Irving et al., 2005). In addition, a recent examination of the effects of distributive and procedural justice on satisfaction indicated that procedural justice was a stronger predictor than was distributive justice (Clay-Warner et al., 2005). REFERENCES
Alder, G.S. and Ambrose, M.L. (2005a). Towards understanding fairness judgements associated with computer performance monitoring: an integration of the feedback, justice and monitoring research. Human Resource Management Review, 15: 4367. Alder, G.S. and Ambrose, M.L. (2005b). An examination of the effect of computerized performance monitoring feedback on monitoring fairness, performance, and satisfaction. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97: 161177. Alge, B.J. (1999). The role of fairness and privacy in electronic performance monitoring and control systems: some preliminary ndings. Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Chicago, IL, August. Alge, B.J. (2001). Effects of computer surveillance on perceptions of privacy and procedural justice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86: 7, 797804. Alge, B.J. and Ballinger, G. (2001). Electronic workplace surveillance: the effects of advanced notice and task discretion on perceptions of privacy and procedural justice. Paper presented at the 2001 Meeting of the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, San Diego, CA, April. Ambrose, M.L. and Alder, G.S. (2000). Designing, implementing, and utilizing computerized performance monitoring: enhancing organizational justice, in G.R. Ferris (ed.), Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management, Vol. 18, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 187219. Ambrose, M.L., Seabright, M.A. and Schminke, M. (2002). Sabotage in the workplace: the role of organizational justice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 89: 1, 947965. American Management Association (2005). Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance Survey, New York: AMA.
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APPENDIX 1 Scenarios Quality of Treatment Conditions: Imagine that you are a Customer Service Representative working in the call center of a large computer manufacturing rm. You work with 40 other customer service representatives taking service and support calls from clients. Recently, the organisation announced that it will be instituting an electronic monitoring system to record the quality and length of Customer Service Representative telephone conversations and to monitor your prociency in handling customer complaints and addressing customer needs. In other words, the organisation will monitor your conversations with customers, record the time spent on customer calls and monitor the time you spend off task (not taking customer calls). Fair Treatment, Organisation: According to the organisations policies, you will be monitored at pre-determined times throughout the day. However, the organisations policies also state that your consent to be monitored is required. Monitoring will take place only with your knowledge or prior consent. The organisation will use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance. Unfair Treatment, Organisation: According to the organisations policies, you will be monitored at pre-determined times throughout the day. The organisations policies also state that your consent to be monitored is not required. Monitoring will take place at any time throughout the day without your knowledge or prior consent. The organisation will use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance. Fair Treatment, Supervisor: According to your supervisor, you will be monitored at pre-determined times throughout the day. Your direct supervisor does need to ask you for your consent to be monitored. Monitoring will only take place with your knowledge and prior consent given to your supervisor. Your direct supervisor will use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance. Unfair Treatment, Supervisor: According to your supervisor, you will be monitored at pre-determined times throughout the day. Your direct supervisor does not need to ask you for your consent to be monitored. Monitoring will take place at any time throughout the day at the discretion of your supervisor without your knowledge or prior consent. Your direct supervisor will use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance.
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Quality of Decision-Making Conditions: Imagine that you are a Customer Service Representative working in the call center of a large computer manufacturing rm. You work with 40 other customer service representatives taking service and support calls from clients. Recently, the organisation announced that it will be instituting an electronic monitoring system to record the quality and length of Customer Service Representative telephone conversations and to monitor your prociency in handling customer complaints and addressing customer needs. In other words, your conversations with customers, the time spent on customer calls and the time you spend off task (not taking customer calls) could be monitored. Fair Treatment, Organisation: According to the organisations policies, the data gathered via electronic monitoring will be used to assess your performance. Also, the policies state that you will have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring, and you can add your input into the performance appraisal. The organisations policies state that employees can appeal or challenge any decision based on the monitoring data. Unfair Treatment, Organisation: According to the organisations policies, the data gathered via electronic monitoring will be used to assess your performance. Also, the policies state that you will not have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring, nor add your input into the performance appraisal. The organisations policies state that employees cannot appeal or challenge any decision based on the monitoring data. Fair Treatment, Supervisor: Your direct supervisor has decided to use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance. According to your supervisor, you will have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring, and add your input into the performance appraisal. You can appeal or challenge any decision made by your direct supervisor based on the monitoring data. Unfair Treatment, Supervisor: Your direct supervisor has decided to use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance. According to your supervisor, you will not have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring, nor add your input into the performance appraisal. You cannot appeal or challenge any decision made by your direct supervisor based on the monitoring data.

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