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There are fifty-fifty chances that it will rain tomorrow, so carry half an umbrella; or
so it seemed like the strategic forecasters of the evening of the 1980s were hazarding
some guesses about the future that we are living in now. Overoptimistic and unfounded
projections were to result in a spate of euphoria typified by the closure of military bases,
defence budget cutbacks. 1 Part of the motivation for these actions was to reap a ‘peace
dividend’; for the lamb was now destined to sleep in the bosom of the lion; but partly
also, the military forces were to be reconfigured into a leaner machine capable of
exploiting the multiplier effect of emerging technologies in the world of automation. The
Gulf War was deemed to be the first major test for the new international mood as well as
for the new breed of military forces. This study examines whether at the end of that war,
it could be reasonably concluded that the conduct of warfare conformed to what came to
The study argues that, a conflict between immensely unequal adversaries makes
it difficult and facetious, to attempt to discern whether a real RMA has taken place. The
study further contends that searching for RMA in the sort of conflict like Desert Storm
unduly deflects attention from other more fundamental drivers and currents of change
that have a critical bearing on why and how wars are fought. I aver that squandering
attention on such blips as Desert Storm in which the US and her allies faced a traditional
and relatively weak adversary yields an unfounded sense of triumph that may have
1
deleterious effects on long-term preparedness of the ‘victor’ for an uncertain future, and
analysts and the policy community in the field of strategy and their enduring tendency to
reduce strategic issues to mere combat. The study advances the view that, those two
trends in warfare; particularly in the manner in which they often eclipse the social,
political and cultural undercurrents that shape modern warfare. The study briefly reflects
the military and how this undermines justifications for claims of RMA.
According to one of the initiators of the RMA debate, Andrew Marshall, RMA is:
Ever since RMA was inaugurated into policy and academic discourses, it has
become impossible flip through any recent publication in the field of defense and
Affairs’ or any such allied term as ‘military revolution’, ‘military technical revolution’,
‘information warfare’, ‘cyber war’, ‘I-led RMA’, ‘revolution in strategic affairs’, ‘software
2
warfare’, ‘precision warfare’, ‘revolution in warfare’, ‘Revolution in Security affairs’; a
ubiquity that has prompted Colin Gray to observe how ‘Everyone has a RMA story, a
cause to advance; 3 and how RMA ‘… was the most widely used, and abused, acronym
these terms that a Google search on only ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ turns up close to
10 million hits. A predominance of the United States in the debate is quite palpable, just
as much as the absence of Europe is conspicuous, not to mention other parts of the
world. 5 Although it has come to acquire its own dedicated websites and library sections,
intended to help explain the way that change comes about and to provide
and decision-makers. It has spawned a huge literature in the last twenty years or
so. But the RMA is not reality. It is no more than an approximate depiction of it’. 6
largess on "precision" Buck Rogers-type weaponry that has been less than 100 percent
effective’, 7 just like ardent critic of ‘RMAnia’, Elliot Cohen has unflatteringly referred to it
history, there has never been a major change in ‘military affairs’. According to
them, the most fundamental military affair has always been and will always
remain the pursuit of political ends through violent military means, and no amount
3
of technological development can change that. 8 In a means-ends relationship,
one can conceive of a fundamental change when the ends change, but not when
the means change as in the case of changes in the means of warfare. Moreover,
makes RMA even more incomprehensible given that what is actually changing
clausewitzians who have argued that, a revolution in military affairs can only be
logically proclaimed if ‘war is disconnected from raison d’Etat and made into a
more than anything else, they are testimony to the inchoate character of RMA both as
an analytical concept and as a management tool and the difficulty in singling out an
phenomenon that concerns not mere generalities, but a concrete historical event such
In much of the available discourse, there is no clarity on what ‘military affairs’ are
and what ‘revolution’ entails: for some analysts, the mere taking on board a handful of
reforms seems to be what revolution amounts to, yet for others being captivated by one
appears to be missing in most of the RMA discourse is the basic notion that first,
revolution entails ‘change of a system’ but not merely ‘change in a system’; second, in a
point made by Gray ‘… the political level is the only level that gives meaning to military
behaviour’. 10 It is the primacy of the ‘political’ that the current RMA debate particularly
4
on events in the Gulf, is not oriented to accommodate. As a consequence, that debate
has not yet been able to shed sufficient light on the fundamental changes Desert Storm
writing this script imposes, I would make the ‘experience of the Gulf war’ more
pugilist knocks out some rather cocky light feather-weight ‘opponent’, followed by eternal
proclamations by the victor that his skills have undergone a stupendous improvement of
revolutionary proportions. Borrowing from Gray’s specific caution to the Desert Storm
‘victor’,
can only be judged by the test of battle, and possibly not even then, if the terms of
That caution poignantly highlights the rather astonishing disregard for the
lopsided nature of a contest in which the only superpower with a population of 249
million, bolstered by finances, matériel and manpower of most of the world’s lesser
powers faced off with a solitary Third World country of 18 million people, 12 whose 1989
Gross Domestic Product was $38,000 million. 13 13,470% lower than $5,156,440 million
for the United States and a Gross National Product equal to Portugal’s and about 30% of
the defence budget of the U.S. it was confronting. 14 Very clearly, the United States was
then and still remains a hyper power whose ‘…. military superiority is so great that in the
5
rankings of all the world's militaries, the U.S. is not only in first place; the next dozen or
The point here is that, interstate warfare is not just a violent altercation between
the armed forces of the respective disputants but is above all else a contest between the
total capabilities of each of the conflicting nation states, including what each one of them
can muster in form of human resources, diplomatic leverage, financial and economic
focuses exclusively on the events on the battlefield, as we see with the RMA debate,
completely misses this point and in the process makes faulty deductions.
Some have justifiably argued that the Gulf War ‘… provided no genuine test of US
fighting power and should not be permitted whatsoever to serve as a model for the
future’, 16 because it was in fact less of a revolution, but merely ‘the mother of all military
anomalies’. 17 In a similar tone, Walker observes that, Desert Storm was an anomaly,
and that the United States ‘…cannot count on each future enemy to be as poorly led,
equipped and deployed as the Iraqis’. 18 According to such analysis, most of the lessons
(the RMA ones inclusive) being drawn from the Gulf War experience are little more than
self-evident platitudes on what was already common knowledge about the strengths and
weaknesses of the U.S. military machine. Even America’s (first) Cold War foe has
voiced some caution to the US generals. A Russian analysis of the appraisals of the
‘After all, to be objective, they were employed essentially under ideal conditions,
essence, the coalition conducted wide-scale testing of new and promising models
6
of weapons and military equipment … under conditions close to those of the
proving ground’ 19
Moreover, much of what is often cited as post-Gulf War RMA is very much a
function of the deceptively heartening outcome of the lopsided conflict, giving reason to
Inman et al to correctly caution that ‘the first lesson of the Gulf War is to be wary about
drawing any so-called lessons of the Gulf War’, 20 mirroring Walker’s assertion in his
paper already referred to that, warning against ‘…drawing false conclusions in a war
fought against unwilling, poorly led opponent fighting with yesterday's equipment’. 21
This partly mirrors the view of a French commentator who points to the need to ‘…avoid
overestimating a phenomenon that benefits from high visibility in part because of the
Attempts to read into the experience of the Gulf War any sort of RMA, especially
‘In truth’, asserts Bacevich, ‘as currently touted by soldiers, the very concept of a Military
Revolution is profoundly reactionary’. 23 According to this view, the RMA debate is being
paraded to perpetuate elements of the status quo most cherished by the military
profession, ignoring change with which the military establishment would otherwise be
uncomfortable, and to ward off threats to the prerogatives and autonomy claimed by the
military profession; hence the need to keep observers hypnotized with picking
7
revolutionary nits form the Gulf War ‘hollow victory’ as Jeffrey Record dubbed the
outcome of Desert Storm in his similarly titled 1993 analysis already referred to above.
Just like, and possibly, because the defence analytical community have no single
definition of RMA, they are equally not agreed on past instances of transformations that
can be truly characterised as cases of RMA. While Murray and Galdi enumerate as
many as ten past military revolutions 24 , Buzan and Herring claim that there has been
only one, namely, the transition during the course of the 19th Century ‘from occasional to
frequent change in military technology’. 25 Bacevich holds that there have been two
genuine revolutions that have shaped war in modern times and for which military
professionals never devised meaningful responses; the first being the advent of total war
with the creation of nuclear weapons as its apogee and the second, a corollary of the
first, the proliferation of atomised war: terror, subversion, insurgency and ‘people’s war’.
As Snow observes, the fruits of what ever it is that pundits and analysts have dubbed
low-level warfare, such as classical insurgency and the more chaotic pattern of new (sic)
One can only conclude that the aim of today’s RMA is to dismiss the problems
posed by the two genuine revolutions Bacevich points out above as immaterial.
However, any attempt to brush off the ever-lingering potential of nuclear war as irrational
Desert Storm is historically sandwiched between Saigon and Mogadishu and overlain by
the ever-present possibility of a confluence between terror and WMD, a combination that
leaves no justification at all to eternally ruminate over the Saddam-like adversary that
might never feature again, however sweet it may have felt to neutralize him. This is not
8
to discount the true significance of the technologies that the information age promises:
It is to draw attention to two issues that this writer considers crucial. First is Bacevich’s
observation that, ‘…if forces designed and equipped in compliance with the dictates of
the future are ill-suited for dealing with civil wars, ethnic conflict, failed states, and terror,
then they are of limited utility in the world as it exists’. 27 Similarly, Hammes holds that,
the DOD stands to lose its war fighting dominance because it does not want to deal with
the manpower intensive, low-technology conflicts, the fourth generation wars (4GW) that
are actually taking place around the world, instead being more comfortable to theorize
attributes this tendency partly to the RMA-related complacency and biases that have
been borne out of the success in the wars with Iraq. Second, the military professionals
need to be alerted that they can not have their cake and eat it. They have to take note
of the fact that, those same transformations that are fomenting a ‘brave new world’ for
humanity, the soldiery inclusive; by furnishing us with new technologies, changing the
way of producing wealth and the methods of making war have cross cutting influences
The transformations pointed out above are negating the very foundation on which
was crafted the industrial age war machine that triumphed in the Gulf War, which the
current crop of defence thinkers are accustomed to and dearly cherish. As the Tofflers
convincingly argue, the post industrial era, that is, the information age will dictate its own
Tofflers, an industrial age military that seems to want to benefit from information age
technologies while continuing to fight industrial age wars such as Desert Storm is akin to
the individual who wishes to enjoy the honor of inhabiting paradise while continuing to
9
wallow in the base pleasures of worldly existence. The reality remains that, the
information age will leave no room for such ambivalence: it is a comprehensive culture
that will have to be embraced in its entirety. Leveraging the benefits of improvements in
information will be like establishing a new invention. What the general of yesterday has
to know is that, ‘[T]o establish a new invention … is like establishing a new religion—it
to fighting the last war may be failing to make the choice between being destroyed or
counterrevolutionaries. What may turn out to be the major handicap in the long run is,
‘US forces are now sized and structured according to a gulf war yardstick. New
Gulf wars. Acceptable casualty levels are judged against a 1991 benchmark’. 31
This stands out as a recipe for future debacles, and a consequence of unjustifiable and
RMA.
The Combat Bias in the RMA Debate: Seeing the Forest for the Trees
What is most notable about much of the RMA debate and specifically the one
regarding the Gulf War is its combat bias, almost giving the impression that all there is to
‘military affairs’ is the violent act of ‘killing certain people and breaking certain things’ as
the common adage goes in American military circles. This combat bias may be
10
testimony to the preponderance of United States military thought in the debate as a
result of which it has been exclusively coloured by the ‘American way of War’, mostly so
in the wake of such a long awaited decisive victory that the standoff in Gulf was to bring.
Colin Gray rhetorically and rightly asks, ‘If the best and the brightest among
defense professionals focus upon the tactical level of analysis that the RMA debate
encourages, who minds the store of strategy and statecraft?’ and further points out how
‘The excitement of the RMA debate, and the razzle-dazzle of the promise of cyber-
shaped and led forces, are directing intellectual traffic into the fascinating but secondary
zone of ‘how to fight’, strictly tactical issues. 32 Therein lies the fundamental feebleness
of the RMA debate: the lack of strategic utility; a problem that Lawrence Freedman
highlights extensively by urging for the elevation (if not emancipation) of the debate to
‘[T]he Revolution in Strategic Affairs’ in his similarly titled paper. 33 This is not to attempt
to discount the import of tactics, which as some would argue, hold a superior position in
the tactics-strategy nexus. 34 Tactics matter and it is at the tactical level that military
machines are called upon to justify their existence, and if key battles are lost, strategy
will not serve any purpose. However, this should not be a cause to transmute tactical
matters into a fetish, as Gulf War analyses on RMA have tended to do.
synonymous with technology; causing the tendency for analysts to ask the wrong
question: ‘Which weapons won the war?’ instead of posing the question, ‘With which
11
I would argue that dwelling on the first question as currently is the trend yields an
inaccurate impression of what went on in the Gulf War and indeed, whether there is a
RMA. In the first instance, war is a political, social and cultural phenomenon and not
only a military one and secondly, even within the military sphere there are such critical
doctrine. 35 The current tendency is to ignore those factors. This is not to simply deny
technology its rightful place in the conduct of warfare, but rather to caution the
incorrigible technophile against over glorifying gadgets and gizmo, to the point of
obscuring the limitations of technology, as the RMA debate has tended to do.
More to that, the excessive interest analysts have in the part played by
technology in the Gulf War is largely a function of the overall outcome of the conflict.
munitions, were first effectively employed in Vietnam but their achievements were
the Gulf War had not been what it turned out to be, there is a likelihood that a discussion
on what went right, RMA inclusive would never have arisen. To underline a few
examples of this, the US Patriot antimissile defense system performed far less
effectively than originally advertised, against the Iraqi scud that in technological terms
represented a mediocre upgrade of the 50 years old German V-2 fame of World War II,
In addition, despite Air Force claims that the Gulf War vindicated the utility of the
B-2 bomber, that rather costly platform was designed to deliver nuclear ordnance on
targets in the defunct Soviet Union and had little utility for conventional bombardment as
12
it was put to in the Gulf. Other doubts on the efficacy of the strategic air campaign have
been raised by Gartner et al who estimate that 50-70% of all Iraqi armor and 60% of the
artillery destroyed in the whole campaign were knocked out by tanks and Army
helicopter gun-ships but not airplanes as the air power evangelicals of the RMA debate
tend to claim. 36
Besides that, Cohen points out how ‘most of the ordnance in the Gulf War
1970s or in some cases 1960s’, leaving one wondering whether Desert Storm weaponry
was indeed the dawn of a future era of smart weapons as RMA evangelists would like to
argue, or the noon of trends that had been unfolding for decades. Thus, Cohen goes
ahead to ask: ‘This being so, whence comes the contention that United States is
such as the F-15E had difficulty distinguishing tanks from trucks at tactical
distances. 38
But worst of all, that paraphernalia of weaponry did not; in this case, have to
operate against any countermeasures: the weather, dust and smoke Hanlon pointed out
above were not Iraqi countermeasures. This makes it impossible to envision the efficacy
of those technologies if the US and her allies had faced, not the scarecrow military of
some Third World country, but the forces of a peer competitor, in an environment
13
There are also questions as to why, with all the revolutionary improvements in
battlefield technologies friendly fire would cause nearly a third of all casualties suffered
by coalition forces. 39
Technology-biased promoters of a post-Gulf war RMA also hold that such new
Armour for the US M1A1 tank and thermal sights are features of the revolution, a view
which, according to some analysts, does not tally with the facts. For example, Biddle
shows that, during Desert Storm, the US Marine Corps was equipped mainly with 1960s-
era M60A1 tanks and fought through actively resisting Iraqi armored units but incurred
fewer losses than the better equipped Army. 40 It may therefore be imprudent
overemphasize the technological aspects of the conduct of the campaign as the bulwark
Analysis of the outcome of the Gulf War and whatever radical changes it may
signify goes further to highlight the enduring weaknesses of dominant historiography and
strategic studies, namely eurocentricism - the excessive and rather stultifying focus on
Europe and the United States, and the assumption that ‘other societies and states
the ‘west and the rest’ myopia has been accentuated by the RMA debate.
And yet, RMA does not present as a truly Eurocentric cliché. Assuming there is
agreement that there has been a revolution, and consensus on what it is that we really
14
mean by ‘Military Affairs’, we would also have to search for a clear notion of who the
military affairs we are making reference to belong, and once we’ve done that the next
CONCLUSION
comprehensively mismatched adversaries is not a prudent reference point that the victor
in such a confrontation can use to make any meaningful deductions on the efficacy of
all about precise bombardment. Superior operational artistry and preeminent fighting
military organization. The position of this writer remains that, revolution is a process that
random harvest of innovations, however revolutionary the latter may be. Military
improvements evidenced on the coalition side in the Gulf War fall way short the radical
vacuum. The same factors that may be leading to radical changes in the workings of the
military are also transforming the nature of other institutions and of society in general.
The feedback loops form the crosscutting transformations elsewhere will be the real
instigators of any thing like an RMA and not just a handful of adjustments in the conduct
of combat operations. The continued disregard of that fact will only make the key actors
in the Gulf comparable to early man stumbling upon gunpowder but still wishing to retain
15
his home in the caves. Desert storm will then, far from being the harbinger of a
civilization fighting a kind of war that may never feature again. That will leave any
references to a revolution rather far-fetched, given that rear guard actions are by their
NOTES
1
In the US, the defence budget peaked at 7% of GNP during the Reagan Administration in the
mid 1980s and the 1990s were to see it being halved to 3.0-3.5%.
2
Jeffrey Mckitrick; James Blackwell; Fred Littlepage; George Kraus; Richard Blanchfield; and Dale
Hill, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’ in Schneider, Barry and Grinter Lawrence E., eds., Battlefield of the
Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues (Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1995), 65.
3
Colin S Gray (1996), The American Revolution in Military Affairs: An Interim Assessment
(Camberley, Surrey, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute), 31.
4
Colin S Gray, Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The
Sovereignty Of Context (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2006),
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB640.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2008, p.i
5
Within the United States, RMA gained currency after the end of the (first) cold war with the
inspiration of Department of Defense officials like Andrew Marshal of the Office of Net Assessment and
Admiral William Owens , formerly of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The term is also claimed to have as its
precursor the Soviet coinage of the late 1960’s, Military Technical Revolution (MTR) that filtered down to
the United States in the 1980s, giving birth to what became known as ‘AirLand Battle’, Follow on Forces
Attack (FOFA) and Maritime Strategy (Patrick Bratton 'France and the Revolution in Military Affairs',
Contemporary Security Policy, 2002, 23:2, 87 – 112; p. 88).
6
David Mets, ‘The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in
Military Affairs’, presentation at the Society for Military History annual conference at the University of
Calgary, 25 May 2001, cited in Bratton, ibid, p.89.
7
The Dubious Genius of Andrew Marshall, The American Prospect, February 15, 2001,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_dubious_genius_of_andrew_marshall
8
Cited in Gongora and Riekhoff, 2000, p. 2
9
Ibid.
10
Gray, 1996, op cit p. 34
11
Gray, op cit p.ii;
12
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (1991), World Devlopment
Report, 1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 205, at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/11/17/000009265_3981005112648/Render
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf; accessed on 19 August 2008
13
Charles Duelfer, ‘Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central
Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction; 2004
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html, accessed on 19 February 2008.
14
World Bank op. cit., p. 209.
15
Cited in Bacevich, 1994, op cit.
16
Jeffrey Record, (1993), Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, DC:
Brassey’s, U.S. Inc, 1993), p. 135.
17
David H Hackworth, ‘Lessons of a Lucky War’, Newsweek Magazine, March 11th, 1991 p. 49;
cited in Record, ibid.
18
Mark H Walker, ‘Fragile Victory’; Paper submitted to the Faculty of Naval War College in partial
fulfilment of the requirements of the Operations Department, June 1994 (Newport, R.I.: United States
Naval War college, 1994), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA279586&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, accessed on 17 August 2006, p.26.
19
Ibid, p. 135.
20
Bobby R Inman; Joseph S Nye; William J Perry and Roger K Smith, ‘Lessons of the Gulf War’
Washington Quarterly, 1991, Vol. 15, No 68.
16
21
Walker, op cit, p. ii
22
Francois Gere, ‘RMA or New Operational art?: A View from France’ in, Thierry Gongora and
Harald von Riekoff, eds., Toward a revolution in Military Affairs?: Defence and Security at the Dawn of the
Twenty-First Century (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000), pp. 129-138; p.129.
23
A. J. Bacevich, ‘Preserving the Well-Bred Horse’, The National Interest, 1994, No. 37, (pp. 43-
49) , p. 47, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_n37/ai_16315044, accessed on 20 July
2008.
24
See: Williamson Murray, ‘Thinking about Revolutions in Military Affairs’, Joint Force Quarterly
No. 16 (Summer 1997): 69–76 and Theodor W Galdi, Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts,
Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues, 1995, http://www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/rma/crs95-
1170F.htm, accessed on 18 July 2008.
25
Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, ‘The Arms Dynamic in World Politics’ (Boulder, CO.: Lynne
Rienner, 1998), p.11.
26
Donald M Snow, The Shape of the Future: World Politics in a New Century (New York: M.E.
Sharpe, 1999), p. 43.
27
Bacevich, op cit, p.49
28
Thomas X Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St Paul, MN.:
Zenith Press, 2006), p. xii.
29
Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York: Bantam, 1980) and Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War
and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (London: Warner Books, 1993).
30
I. B. Holley, ‘Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft’ Air University Review Vol. 35,
No. 6, 1983; pp. 2-11, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/Sep-
Oct/holley.html, 22 July 2008
31
Steven Biddle, ‘Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict’
International Security, Vol. 21, 1996, No. 2. (pp. 139-179), P. 143,
http://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html, accessed on 18 July 2008.
32
Gray 1997, op cit., p. 33.
33
Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper No. 318 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998).
34
(Cited in Gray, op cit.)
35
Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), p. 101.
36
They also make further reference to the tendency for commentators on the air campaign in the
Balkans who claim that the air strikes brought Serbs to the negotiating table without the commitment of
ground troops, while it is known that 100,000 Croatian troops did advance into Serbian held territory to
consolidate the impact of the bombings. Likewise, they note that in spite of the ‘decisive’ six-week air
campaign in the Gulf, the land battle of old still had to be fought Heinz Gartner; Adrian Hyde –Price; and
Erich Reiter eds., (2001), Europe’s New Security Challenges (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 78.
37
Eliot A Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare?’, Foreign Affairs, 1996 Vol. 75, No. 2 (pp. 37-54), p.39
38
Michael O'Hanlon , "Beware the 'RMA'nia'," Paper presented at National Defense University, 9
September 1998, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/1998/0909defense_ohanlon.aspx, accessed on 17
February 2008.
39
Earl H Tilford, Jr., ‘The meaning of Victory in Operation Desert Storm: A Review Essay’, Political
Science Quarterly, 1993, Vol. 108, No. 2. (pp. 327-331), 327
40
Some of the Marine units conducted their operations in dated wheeled, thin-skinned light
armoured vehicles and the Army deployed thousands of lightly armoured M2 and M3 Bradleys that saw a
lot of action yet suffered few casualties (Steven Biddle, ‘Land Warfare: Theory and Practice’ in Baylis,
John et al, eds. Strategy in the Contemporary World : An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford : Oxford
University Press, 2002) pp. 91-122; p.105).
41
Jeremy Black , Rethinking Military History (Routledge: Oxford, 2004), 67.
17