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Realizing Theory: The Philosophy of Science Revisited Author(s): John G. Gunnell Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 923-940 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960396 Accessed: 31/03/2009 15:36
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AR TICLES RealizingTheory: ThePhilosophy of ScienceRevisited

John G. Gunnell
State Universityof New York
issues in the philosophyof science, and the recent turn to scientificrealismin politiContemporary of the natureof theory in social scientificinquiryand an excal theory, promptboth a reconsideration aminationof currentattemptsto appropriate philosophicalargumentsin supportof images of theory claims about the exand the relationshipbetweensocial science and politicalpractice.Metatheoretical planationof social phenomenaand aboutthe possibilitiesof a criticalsocialscience are not a substitute with the practicalissue of the relationship for a substantivetheoryof social realityand a confrontation betweenpoliticaltheoryand politics.

rI'he relationshipbetween politicalscience and the philosophyof science became a matter of focused, and often polemical, discussion at the zenith of the debate during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The issue was hardly about behavioralism of political sciand pluralization resolved, but it receded with the depolarization ence duringthe postbehavioral period. It might be arguedthat this was a salutary developmentand an indicationof scientific autonomyand maturitythat allowed complicatedphilosophical the disciplineto extricateitself froma set of increasingly concerns.The naturalsciences,for problemsand to proceedwith more substantive by metaexample,arelargelyinnocentof academicphilosophyand unencumbered theoreticalanxieties about scientific knowledge. There are, nevertheless,several of the philosophyof science is timely and necessary. reasonswhy a reconsideration betweenphilosophyand socialsciFirst, the generalproblemof the relationship ence was more repressedthan fully exploredand resolved.Second, althoughmuch of the use of the philosophyof science was rhetoricaland directedtowardeither a critiqueor legitimationor the behavioralimage of science, certainideas about the logic and epistemology of science were insinuated into the practice of inquiry. Third, in both mainstreampoliticalscience and the field of politicaltheory more of the philosophyof science is once againbeing inwidelyconceived,the literature voked but with insufficientattention to the problems attending its introduction into the discourseof social science. Finally, during the last two decades, work in the philosophyof science has moved in directionsthat are not well understoodby
THE JOURNALOF POLITICS,Vol. 57, No. 4, November 1995, Pp. 923-40

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most politicalscientists, but which at the same time have raisedsignificantissues both about the nature of scientific theory and about the generalrelationshipbetween philosophyand scientificpractice. My focus is primarilyon postpositivist/empiricistphilosophiesof science and on varietiesof realism which have begun to gain the attentionof politiparticularly cal theory. Although I will defend a metatheoretical position that I will designate realism and the accountof theory that conas theoretical challenge instrumentalist I tinues to dominatesocialscience, arguethat the nascentturn to realismin political theory is anotherexampleof the tendency to indentureinquiryto philosophical argumentsthat are themselves problematicaland which subvert substantive theorizing.
THE LEGACY OF POSITIVISM AND THE POVERTY OF THEORY

Politicaltheoryand politicalsciencecontinueto be held captiveby philosophical images of science and the discursivefate of those images. Nowhere is this more evident than in the persistentinfluenceof the instrumentalistimage of scientific theory and the deductiveor covering-lawmodel of explanation.Instrumentalism characterizes theories as conceptualconstructs,inherentlyneither true nor false, for economicallydescribingand explainingan ontologicallydistinct,and experientially given and epistemicallyprivileged,realmof facts. This theory of theory was joined to the notion that scientificexplanationcan be equated with the deductive These doctrines,in varsubsumptionof singularstatementsundergeneralizations. ious but relatedversions,werethe epistemological and logicallinchpinsof the positivism and logical empiricism,and, in derivativebut pervasiveforms, they govof theoryduringthe behavioral ernedmainstream politicalscience'sunderstanding era. Today they remainsedimentedin many of the apologiesand practicesof political science including rational-choicetheory and the metatheoryof economics from which it is derived(Gunnell 1986). There were a numberof reasonswhy instrumentalism appealedto social scientists apart from the fact that for many years this philosophicalinterpretationof theory was the only game in town. First of all, the enterpriseof social science as a whole was originallygovernedby an instrumentalist perspective-its purposewas socialchange,and its standardwaspragmatic. And it waslargelya criticalendeavor devotedto the idea of factsas the foundationof science and as an antidoteto social myths. Its practicalfocus spilled over into cognitive commitments.Second, there wasa greatdealof heuristicappealin the imageof scientifictheoryas a pluralworld but useful conceptualconstructsfor exploringa publiclyacof somewhatarbitrary cessiblegiven datum.Equallyattractivewas the idea that scientificexplanation was largelya matterof semanticform such as logicallysubsumingsingularstatements undergeneralizations and operationally definingtheoreticalconcepts.This formalistic idea of science made the goal of emulatingnaturalscience seem quite feasible.

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One might have supposed that during the last decade and one-half, after the point at which this once "receivedview" (Suppe 1977) of theory and explanation had been thoroughlychallenged(if not discredited)in both philosophyand political science, assumptionsabout the characterand demands of scientific inquiry it might be assumedthat Furthermore, transformed. wouldhavebeen significantly the generalimplicationsof being mortgagedto philosophicalaccounts of science would have been a matterof focused discussion.But, for severalreasons,these issues havebeen repressedand suppressed. First, there tends to be a culturallag between philosophyand social science. It takestime for changesin philosophyto impacton these disciplines.Second, among those who had adoptedthe positivist/empiricistvision or, more characteristically, some mediatedsecondaryor tertiaryversionof it, there was a greatintellectualand materialinvestmentthat sustainedthese images of "theoryconstruction."Third, by the fact that it was not simply these philosophical the problemwas exacerbated reconstructionsof scientific explanationthat were accepted but also an ancillary claim about the unity and hierarchyof science, which suggested that background there was a logicalcore in scientificendeavor,a method that could be isolated,appropriated,and, in varying degrees, applied. Finally, the critics of logical positivism in political science often acceded to its account of natural science and attemptedto distinguishthe methodologyof socialsciencewithoutconfrontingthe generalissue of the relationshipbetween philosophyand the practiceof inquiry. Social science continues to defer to the authorityof philosophyin a wide range in academicphilosophycontinueto producecrises of matters,and transformations in images of political theory. Yet of social scientificidentity and transformations there have been some significantchangesin the situation.Claimssuch as those of Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos(1970) were quite easily absorbedby a generalaudience and seemed to have some sort of intuitive relevancefor the social scientificenterprise. Political scientists found things in their discipline that looked like "paraMuch of the philosophy programs." digms,"and, afterall, they did have "research of science today, however,is a more technicaland specialized,and less accessible, take the position that it is best if politicalscicorpus. One could quite reasonably ence and the philosophyof science go their separateways, and I will argue,in certain respects, for the dephilosophizationof political science. The situation is, however,too complexto move simply in the directionof a no-faultdivorce. It is necessary,first of all, to engendersome skepticismaboutthe philosophyof to science. It was, originally, relationship scienceand to recognizeits problematical a type of rhetoricof inquirydevotedto the vindicationof science, to demonstrating that scientific knowledge is possible and to explicating its foundationsand the mode of its acquisition.While science was concernedwith knowing, the philosotask of knowing that phy of science embracedthe supervenientmetatheoretical whatwas.known was, in truth,known.From the beginning,this involvedpurifying and distorting science, for the sake of either defending science or establishing

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the authorityof philosophy,and eventuallythe issues were generatedmore within philosophythan science. All of this has implicationsfor attemptingto understand the natureof theorythroughthe mediumof philosophy. "Theory,"like the word "fact,"is not, primarily,a scientificterm, even though concept for talking it does occur in the languageof science. It is a metatheoretical aboutscience. We can, without a greatdeal of difficulty,tracethe history of "theory"in philosophy,but to do the samefor scientificpracticewouldbe a much more It is a mistaketo assume that science mirrors difficult,and dubious, undertaking. yet we have become almost incapableof separating philosophicalreconstructions, the two. Theory is no more a logicalor sociologicalcomponentof scientificactivity and preconthan the "politicalsystem"correspondsto an internallydiscriminated is used rather in science loosely. It element of "Theory" practice. stituted political refers, at various times and in various contexts, to big ideas, importantclaims, speculativeor unconfirmedbeliefs, universalas opposed to singularstatements, unobservables,etc. Most of the social scientific discussion about what theories are, how they relateto facts, how to understandtheir cognitive role, how to construct them, how to test them, and the like is misbegottenphilosophicaltalk. The nineteenth-centuryphilosopherWilliam Whewell once suggested that facts are facts.More recently,Goodman confirmedtheories,while theoriesareunconfirmed true theoriesarebig facts"(97). theories, and noted that "facts are small (1978) has The meaningof "theory," then, is largelya matterof legislation.There is, neverclassof propositionsor beliefsin any practice theless,a functionallydistinguishable of of knowledgethat embodies many the attributesoften equated with theory in claims, whether explicitly and forscience. These are substantiveparadigmatic in mally formulated a generalmanneror embeddedand implicit in singularstatements, about what types of things exist and the mannerof their existence, that is, whatwe might call empiricalontologiesthat constitutedomainsof facticity.Such a socialscientificview of theoriesas notion of theoryis at odds with the predominate cognitiveconstructs,but beforesuggestingwhatit would models and instrumental theory,it is necessaryto say somethingmore aboutthe recentcameanto "realize" reerof the philosophyof scienceand its relationshipto politicalscience.
POSTPOSITIVISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The discursiveuniverseof the postpositivistperiodin the philosophyof science, in politicalscience, is difficultto represent.No new regime like postbehavioralism comparableto logical positivismand logicalempiricismhas emerged. The issues that have definedthe periodare, however,very much the legacy of the revolution againstpositivism. There are two fundamentaland mutually entwined problems that have structuredthe conversation: (1) the problemof relativismand scientific truthand (2) the problemof the character and statusof scientifictheories. What Kuhn's work, and many of the subsequentand related argumentsthat characterized the next two decades, such as that of Rorty (1979), most distinctly

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precipitated werereactionsclaimingthat the objectivityof scienceand the statusof scientific truth had been undermined.What was actually undermined,however, metatheoretical claim aboutscientifictruth and objectivityas well was a particular as the idea of philosophyas the arbiterof scientificjudgment.The anxietyattending all these intimationsof relativismis reallyone revolvingaroundthe relationship Truth was betweenphilosophyand the practicesthat constituteits subject-matter. only in thattherewasa denialof philosophy'sepistemic historicizedand relativized privilege.In effect, the criteriaof scientifictruth becamethe provinceof scientific view of philosophywas complementedby the collapse practice.This underlaborer of any metatheoretical basis for the theory/factdichotomyand by the depreciation of the distinctionbetweenidealand workinglogic. Positivismhadreservedfor philosophythe role of specifyingthe universalclassof phenomenathatconstitutedthe factualfoundationsof scientificknowledge,and it pictured the logic of scientific of a universallogic that was the specialsphereof phipracticeas the manifestation losophy. Kuhn and others denied this role to philosophyby makingboth factsand logic context-variant. The traditionaldogmas of empiricismmay have been destroyedby the revolutionaries,but those who followed, as in the case of so many revolutions,were uneasy with the vacuumof authority.Popper (1970, 1972), for example,who had alwaysbeen quite at odds with the instrumentalistpropensitiesof positivism, its problematizing of theory, and idolatryof facts, was, nevertheless,one of Kuhn's harshestcritics. The underlyingconcern was not the integrity of science but the authorityof philosophy. Many of those who more explicitly participatedin the revolution were also ultimately uneasy about its "relativist"direction. If there foundationsof science accessibletranscendental were not timeless philosophically that made the history of science meaningfulas a story of the cumulativegrowth of knowledge,as the progressiverevelationof the "facts"and their relationship to one another,was there not, after all, meaning in history, something that made the succession of paradigmsintelligible and provided a basis of metatheoretical commensurability? By the beginningof the 1980s,the most commonanswerto the problemof relativism was a historicalone. Even by the early 1970s, however, the emphasishad to the issue of scishifted from the traditional focus on the context of justification entificchange.Lakatos(1970), like many others,had chargedthat Kuhn's account but it is of science made judging scientifictheories "a matterof mobpsychology," importantto understandwhat was actuallybeing said-and not said. It was not that scientific practice was lacking criteriabut rather that Kuhn left philosophy without a basis for assessing the progressof scientific truth. Lakatos, following Popper's(1965) accountof scientificprogressas the result of competitionamong theories, arguedthat ratherthan viewing the developmentof science in terms of self-contained as Kuhn did, it could be understoodas evolvingresearch paradigms, These sharedcertaincommensurable problems,theories,and other eleprograms. evaluatedwith respectto their rationality. ments which could be comparatively

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AlthoughToulmin (1972) had been a centralactorin the revolutionand emphasized the limits of philosophy,he was uneasyabout the retreatfrom an attemptto find criteriaof rationalprogress.Drawingupon imagesof evolutionary biology, he matricesin scienceare like evolvingspecies which provide arguedthat disciplinary a structure that maintains continuity between paradigmaticconceptual shifts (Toulmin 1972). Laudan's(1977, 1981) workcame still closer to recognizingthat the problemwas less one in science thanin philosophy,but his argumentswerestill framed largely in terms of the issues posed by individuals such as Popper and Lakatos.Laudanclaimedthat no philosophicalsense could be made either of the idea of scientifictruth or of the notion of science progressingin terms of an approximationto truth. Theories were not to be judged in terms of truth, confirmcriterion.He argued,much like or some other epistemological ability,falsifiability, Popper and Lakatos,that the best way to explain the evolution of science and its cognitivebasis was to view it as a problem-solving activity.Conceptualand empirical problemsgive continuityto science acrosschangesin paradigms, and they also which can be judgedaccordingto the give rise to theoriesand "research traditions" degree to which they solve scientific problems and make the world intelligible (Laudan1977, 1981). One distinctthreadin the forensicfabricof the philosophyof science duringthe last two decadeswas visible in Laudan'swork-antirealism. Althoughhis position might appearto be similarto theoreticalinstrumentalism, the differenceis crucial. Antirealism is not a cognitivedepreciation of theorybut rather,to the contrary,the view that thereis no point in askingwhatthe worldreallyis apartfromour theories or whetherour theoriesare true in some transcendental sense. It is thus not very different from Kuhn's position, even though philosopherslike Laudan are not happy with what they believe are the relativisticimplicationsof claims which suggest there are no externalconstraintsupon our beliefs (Laudan1990). Although Kuhn's argumenthas sometimes been characterizedas idealist becauseof his apotheosization of theory,his positionamountedto theoretical realism, that is, the idea that theoriesare primaryand irreducibleclaimsaboutwhat exists. He, and Feyerabend(1970), spoke, probablyinfelicitously,about facts as "theoryladen,"and therebyremainedconstrainedby the languageof the very philosophical regime that they sought to overthrow,while reversingits polarity,but what their argumentsamountedto was the abolitionof any philosophicaldistinctionbetween theories and facts. Their claims complementedthe pointed argumentsfor theoreticalrealismand the critiqueof the "mythof the given"advancedby Sellars (1963) as well as Quine's (1964) attackon such "dogmasof empiricism"as verificationismand the analytic/syntheticdichotomy. If, however, scientific truth and objectivityare defined by scientific theories, how can philosophyvindicatescience and how does it claimany authoritywith respect to the issue of scientific judgment?These questions have in large measure continued to drive the conversationin the philosophy of science during the last decade(Moser 1993),and they haveresonatedwith politicaltheoristswho confront

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the problemof the relationshipbetween social science and politics. Both realism attemptto provideanswers,but if we are to considerthe implicaand antirealism tions of these arguments for social science, it is necessary to bring them into sharperrelief (French, Vehling, and Wellstein 1988). Much of the contemporary discussion, however, takes place within a context that would strain the attention span and competence of many of the most intrepid social scientific pilgrims in searchof the grailof science.
THE FACES OF REALISM

the earlierconSome of the recentworkin the philosophyof scienceperpetuates of theories. While logical empiricismoften neglected cern with the formalization framework of classiactualtheoriesand squeezedits analysisinto the Procrustean cal logic, the new style concentrateson the developmentof a semanticaccountof the structureof specific theoriesin the naturalsciences (Suppe 1989;Stegmuller however,arestill absorbedwith underwriting 1976).Otherrealistsand antirealists, science and establishingthe authorityof philosophy,and this continuesto be a literatureto which politicaltheoristsare attracted. There are, as the philosopherPutnam(1987) has suggested, "manyfaces of realism," and, over a period of years, he has representedseveral of these visages. or ontologicalrealismoffersthe (Harre1986),metaphysical Among the "varieties" strongestprofile.It views its taskas savingreality,and scientifictruth, from philosophicaltrendsthat putativelyendangerthem. Latent in such a position,however, are the assumptionsthat philosophyhas a decisive role in constitutingrealityand truth and that realityis itself some kind of philosophicalobject. Trigg (1989), for example,claimsthat truthand whatwe believe or "whatrealityis and how we conceive it arealwaysseparatequestions"(xi). This kind of argumentgains its force by moving backand forth between a context in which the point makessense and one in which it does not. The claim that theodifferentis cogent withina particular conceptsand realityare fundamentally retical discourse and community of scientific practice, but as a philosophical proposition,this attemptto dispel unnaturaldoubts is empty. This brandof realism is motivated,however,by the idea of philosophyas a kind of supersciencethat world. It both validatesscience and empowa timeless transcontextual guarantees ers itself by accessinga world or virtualrealitythat is constantand not hostageto Rorty,Goodman,and otherswho changingideas. It is not only Kuhn, Feyerabend, are deemed too weak to hold on to truth and reality but a varietyof those who, while maintainingan idea of realityas a regulativeideal object, would admit to an ultimateinabilityto peer throughthe screenof our concepts(Rescher1987).There is also an uneasinessabout the holistic account of theory and fact in the work of Quine (1969) as well as about the claims of philosopherssuch as Davidson (1984) who would collapserealityand concepts,or the worldand our beliefs aboutit, in a nonidealistmanner.What strong realismmay offer, however,is some insight into

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the deficienciesof empiricismand other formsof epistemological foundationalism. Empiricism,with all its talkaboutfactsand observation, is sometimesconstruedas a kind of realism,but, as hard-corerealistsfromLenin (1950) onwardhavepointed out, it is groundedin regressiveidealist premisesthat make realityelusive by reducing it to sensory experience (Hindess 1971; Putnam 1987). Yet realism perpetuatesthe idea of realityas a philosophical datum. Putnam(1978, 1981, 1983, 1988, 1990)has moved from metaphysical realismto "internal" or "pragmatic" realism.The latter, however,is an ambivalentposition thatoften seems to be little more thana modulatedclaimof epistemological faithin the face of the fact of conceptualrelativism.His argumentis that while our concepts are relativeto theoreticaland culturalcontexts and while the "world"does not determinewhat we can say about what exists, we must assume, on pragmatic grounds,that truth and falsityare not just a matterof decisionand that there is an externalrealitythat constrainsour conceptualchoices. Putnamcannotseem to exorcize the fear that philosophymight endangerthe claim of scientificreason,but realismis maintainedonly in historicizedform. Once we give up the correspondence theory of truth, however, "thereremains no possibility a robust of precluding relativism at thecenter of thephilosophy of science" (Margolis1986, 133). There are many subtle variationsbetween argumentsthat are usually understood as belongingto the yet narrower class of scientific realism,but thereis a common core of concernand commitment,as well as argumentative strategy(Glymour 1980;Newton-Smith 1981;Miller 1987).The principalconcernis still to justify,as its proponentsbelievemanypostpositivistshave failedto do, the belief thatscience is progressive.Since progressseems to be inherentin science's ability to predict and control, or its experimental"realization" of theoreticalentities, unless, as the slogan goes, science is a "miracle," it is necessary,they claim, to embracethe assumptionthat scientifictheoriesareat leastapproximately true and in some important sense referential.Many such accountsemploy some form of retroductiveor abductiveargument,both with respectto the truth of theoriesand the progressof science, which purportedlymakesepistemological realisma kind of empiricalhypothesis that is confirmedby the practice and history of science (Leplin 1984; Mackinnon1974, 1978;Hacking 1983;Harre 1986). Despite its emphasison a world beyond theory, contemporary realismis very much rooted in an antipositivist(anti-instrumentalist, anti-idealist)position, and most of its adherentsbelieve that antirealismimplies a swing back towardpositivism. Antirealists,however,equallyabjurethe legacyof positivismand maintain that realismis still taintedwith its premises.The exactdividingline betweenthese positions is often difficult to specify (Wright 1987)-even for the partiesto the debate. Most antirealists, such as Dummett (1978), who introducedthe term, will allow that theorieshave truth-valuesin that they are effectivelydecidable.Truth, in this view, is what can be justifiablyasserted,and realityis a function of acceptedevidence. They maintainthat the ideathat realism,as an epistemological claim,canbe

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testedby the historyand practiceof science, whatLaudanhas dubbed"convergent epistemologicalrealism,"is in fact and in principle incorrectand futile (Laudan 1981). Furthermore,much of actual scientific practice,they suggest, is based on arenecessarantirealist premises;thatis, it does not assumethat good explanations ily and/or literallytrue. Being true, they argue,is not the answerto the questionof why theories are successful, and there is no way that success can be parsedas an explanation. Probablythe leading antirealistaccount of science, and certainlythe center of much of the recent controversy,is that of Van Fraassen(1980; Churchlandand Hooker 1985). He holds that theoreticalclaims, by which he largelymeans claims about unobservables,are meaningful, have truth-value, are to be literally construed, and cannotbe reducedto observables.Thus, it could be suggestedthat in of theory,he is a theoreticalrealtermsof the older debateaboutthe interpretation But he also arguesthat a theory need not be ist as opposed to an instrumentalist. true to be good, that is, solve problemsand save the phenomena,and this makes or methodological antirealist. him, like Laudan,an epistemological So, how do we assess all this, and what does it have to do with politicalscience and political theory?There is one importantlesson to be learnedfrom the latest and the kind of empiricism chapterin the philosophyof science. Instrumentalism, in which it was rooted, has been even further underminedas an account of scientific theory. No longer can the discipline turn, with any sort of philosophical credibility,to this image as a descriptionor prescription.This signals a crisis of identity for theoryand theorizingin politicalscience as well as the other socialsciences that haveembracedit in both principleand practice.Many of today'srealists and antirealistsin the philosophyof science are, in an importantsense, theoretical realists,and this should provide an incentive to jettison instrumentalismand to "realize"theory-to think about where and what it is and about what it would mean to createit. We must, however,be candidaboutthe theoreticalinhibitionsin social science. It is difficult,in this cognitivelyinsecureand theoretically nonhegemonicworld,to engage in theorizing without trepidationand guilt. This tends to perpetuatea rhetoricof inquiryto which the literatureof philosophylends itself. And the fact that the practical authorityof socialscienceultimatelyrestson its cognitiveauthority only accentuatesthe dilemma.Politicaltheoristsare once againrepairingto the of the philosophyof scienceto seek a rationalefor the practiceof inquiry, literature to find a way to createtheory, or to solve the dilemmaof the relationshipbetween social science and its subjectmatter.The danger,however,is that of substituting metatheoryfor theory and committing the same type of mistakeinherent in the adoptionof instrumentalism. One impetusbehind this latest involvementwith the philosophyof science is to providesome sort of coherencewithin the highly pluralisticworldof researchthat era as well as to reconcilehumanisticand scihas emergedin the postbehavioral entific modes of analysisor empiricaland interpretivemethods. Is there not a real

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world to which all these approachesrefer and in terms of which the results and progressof inquiry as a whole can be judged?And given the current skepticism about the foundationsof knowledgeengenderedby postmodernismand other dimensions of contemporaryphilosophy, how is it possible to justify the cognitive of second-orderdisciplines? aspirations claimsthat supportpractical One significantattempt to adaptpostpositivistargumentsin the philosophyof those of Popper, Lakatos,and Laudan,to an analysis naturalscience, particularly of politicalscience is representedin the work of Ball (1987), Farr (1987), Dryzek (1986, 1988), and Leonard.They seek to turn politicaltheory away from an emphasison generallaws and towardan examinationof operativemethodologiesand researchprogramsaddressedto concretehistoricallysituatedproblemsthat can be and "progress" evaluated,at least in a limitedmanner,with respectto "rationality" (Dryzek 1986). They also see realismas returningpoliticalscience to an emphasis causes and agents. Similarargumentssuggest that modest or "conon particular modes of disciplinary distinguishable crete"theoriesare embeddedin analytically inquiry (Lane 1990). This work is much more reflectiveabout the use of philosophicalaccountsof science, but it still tends to beg some dimensionsof the quesbetweensocialscience and philosophy(Gunnell 1990).The tion of the relationship principal uses of realism among political theorists reflect a somewhat different agenda.
REALISM AND SOCIAL THEORY

There have, at this point, been few systematicexcursionsby politicaltheorists into the realmof realism(e.g., Keat and Urry 1975;Outhwaite1975).My concern is not to survey and analyzethese somewhattentativeexplorations(Layder 1990) but ratherto focus on one salient exampleand to bring the underlyingissue into focus beforethis routebecomesa popularitinerary. Realismin the philosophyof science and broaderkinds of philosophicalrealism in a numberof fields,such as moraland legaltheory(Gillespie 1986;Sage-McCord 1988;Fuller 1988;Brink 1989;Tannsjo 1990), are appealingto social science and politicaltheorybecausethey seem to offer the hope of criticalpurchaseand a grasp of the foundationsof judgmentin, and with respect to, their subjectmatter.And almostinvariably,those elements in philosophywhich are deemed relativisticand which seem to threatenor diminish the idea of philosophicalauthority,must be tamed or amended.What is really at issue, however, is the relationshipbetween first- and second-orderdiscourses(Gunnell 1993b). Although this is a practical, solution, political historical,and sociologicalproblemwithout any metatheoretical to the of a answer. idea philosophical theoryremainsbound Realismin politicaltheoryhas largelytakenthe form of "criticalrealism"(Isaac 1990). Although this position draws on ideas associatedwith certain aspects of metaphysicaland scientific realism, it is also part of a family of metatheoretical claims, both in the philosophyof social science and in social and politicaltheory

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and explaina middle groundbetweenwhatis often calledunderstanding that seek. ing social phenomenaand at the same time seek to providea theoreticalbasis for criticalinquiry.Habermas'swork (1984) probablyrepresentsthe most prominent of manysimilar exampleof this genre,but the basic patternhas been characteristic (Apel 1985) and more derivativeexercises (Bernstein 1975, 1983; Giddens 1976, 1977). Critical realism is also closely related to the continuing philosophicalattempt, in reactionto the workof Kuhn, Winch (1958), and now Rortyand various from relativism(Wilson 1970; to rescuerationality dimensionsof postmodernism, Hollis and Lukes 1983; Macdonaldand Petit 1981; Meiland and Krausz 1982; Krausz1989). It should not be surprisingthat philosophicalrealismand Marxismhave been closely linked.The idea that Marx'sclaimsabouthistoryand socialstructurewere merely useful constructswas not congenial.Marxismqualifiesas a theory in the sense that I have attemptedto legislatethat concept, but it has never been able to free itself from the need for metatheoreticalvindication, since it has remained highly contested and much more a theoreticaldiscoursethan an institutionalized science. Furthermore,since its concerns were critical as well as explanatory,its truth was not simply a matterof internalconsensusbut a practicalproblemof its relationshipto sociallife that requiredestablishingits cognitiveauthority. The main tributaryof realismin social science and the philosophyof social science has had a strong Marxist current despite various eddies (Althusser 1969; Hindess 1971). Yet while the connectionbetween ideologicaland metatheoretical and althoughthe rhetoricof inquirymay always positionsis quite understandable, be an importantcomponentof socialtheory,the projecthas been derailed,and this derailmentis symptomaticof a more generalproblem.It becamederailedwhen the epistemologicaldefense of Marxismwas cut loose from its theoreticaland practiacademicexercise. Bhaskar's(1973, 1979, cal roots and became a metatheoretical It 1986)workhas been both influentialand typicalwithinthe currentconversation. seeks to justify a criticalsocial science on Marxistor post-Marxistgroundswhile negotiatedsettlementbetweenthe dominantmetasearchingfor a philosophically theoriesof socialscientificexplanation. empiricismand his Both Bhaskar's (e.g., 1973, 1979, 1986)critiqueof traditional if not particularly are even cogent, defense of realismas a philosophyof science somewhere between ideooriginal,but his workinhabitsa discursivedemimonde to specify. is difficult logical rhetoricand academicanalysis where the audience collage. Extractsfrom everyone from The argumentis a kind of metatheoretical moarejoinedin an epistemological academicians Platoand Marxto contemporary than analyzedand exsaic. Argumentsare more summarizedand characterized plored,and there is a conflationof issues at variouslevels of discourse.In this sort of intellectualtour de force, all things are possible. Hermeneuticsand structuralism, theory and practice, natural science and social science, rationalismand and theoryand epistemologyarereconciledand compoundedinto a forrelativism, mula that promises,in the end, nothing less than "humanemancipation."

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Bhaskar acceptsthe postpositivistclaimthat the "world"that science projectsis inevitably,in effect, a discursiveartifact,yet he calls for a realist philosophythat of inquiryand would posit the existenceof objectsindependentof any framework forestallrelativism.Bhaskar'sreservationsabout this direction in postpositivism are, however, skewed from the beginningby his fixationon the worry that arguments such as that of Kuhn cannot explain how there can be a resolution of a Like manyothercriticismsof Kuhn, this is an instance conflictbetweenparadigms. of situatinghis work in the midst of the very problemto which he denied philoanswerto the questionof how sophicalmeaning,thatis, providinga metatheoretical truth is possiblein science and why one theoryis chosen over another. revolutionin the phiAs much as Bhaskar (1986) agreeswith the "antimonistic" losophy of science, he claims that it cannot deal with change and amounts,in the end, to "subjective superidealism" (2). What he fails to note is that the point of the revolutionwas not to assertthat science lacksa basis of judgmentbut ratherthat there are no generalphilosophicalor epistemological,that is, external,criteriafor accountingfor scientificchange,and that scientifictruth is immanentin scientific practice.Bhaskar, however,pointedlyclaimsthat the issue of realityand truthcannot be left to scienceand scientifictheory,and his entailedconclusionis that political judgmentcan be trumpedby social science. What appearsas a concern about judging competing claims withinscience is really a concern about judgmentsregardingappearance and realitybetween socialscience and its subjectmatter. realism"that standsapartfrom What is required,he argues,is a "metaphysical the content of any particularscientific theory. Philosophy, he insists, treats the (Bhaskar1986, 12), very same world as the sciences but only "transcendentally" and the suggestionis that social theory, in a parallelmanner,is a transcendentally conductedformof socialaction.Althoughphilosophyis constrained by the parameters and content of science, it must at the same time go beyond scientificpractice and demonstratehow science is possible. This is, accordingto Bhaskar(1986), a Kantian foundationalistproject which proceeds by an "immanentcritique" of other philosophicalpositions(14). This line of argumentholds that "a realistphilosophyof science and a qualified or criticalnaturalismprovidesthe best metatheoretical framework" for social science (Outhwaite1987), but the questions that must be posed with respect to this projectarewho, in principle,needs this scientifictheologyand to whomis this plea for philosophyas a kind of superscienceaddressed.The epistemological claimsare both compromisedand theoretically underdetermined, and thereis little in the way of an argumentthat can be distinctlyjoinedat any point. Bhaskar's work,however, is viewed favorably by a numberof theoristssuch as Manicas. Manicas (1987) argues,effectively, that social science has, in terms of both its self-imageand practice,bought into a bankruptphilosophicalempiricismthat has inhibited its development into a theoreticallygrounded explanatoryenterprise. While it would seem logical that his remedy would be to offer a theory of social account of social scientific reality, he instead presents basicallya metatheoretical

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explanationand its practicalrole. He argues, much like Habermas,that an interpretivesocial science (such as Winch 1958) is too aloof and underminesany distinction.We must, Manicas suggests, find a way "to ac"appearance/reality" circle'and, at the same time, to sustainthe possibilityof cricept the 'hermeneutic standpoint,but to that there is no neutralor transcendental tique;to acknowledge in its implicahold also that explanatory social theory"(268) can be emancipatory social science would in turn reconcileagency tions. And an adequateexplanatory factors. and structure,and meaningand cause,as explanatory Calling upon Giddens (1976, 1977), Bhaskar, or Habermas for support, as Manicasdoes, is of little help, since their patternof argumentpresents the very same difficulties.And attempting,at the same time, to gloss over differencesbetween these individualsonly pushes the position to a higher level of abstraction. Manicas(1989) does, however,nudge us, at leastimplicitly,in the directionof "realizing"theory.He arguesthat if we are, for example,to makesense of "causality," or regwe must stop thinkingof it in a Humeanempiricistmanner,as correlations ular relationsbetween events, and, instead,as propertiesof things that "exist and operatein the world"(187), but he then begins to confuse theoryand metatheory. Manicas focuses on structure.This emphasis derives from several sourcesincludingthe prominenceof this conceptin scientificrealism,the hope of defining the appearance/reality distinctionin a neo-Marxistsense, and the workof Giddens between metatheoretical and others who have attemptedto find complementarity accountsof agencyand structure.Why, exactly,structureis equatedwith socialreality, or presentedas the basic explanatoryfactor, is not entirely clear, but more importantis the fact that he does not develop any theory of social structurebut image of structuralexplanation.Manicasalso cononly a generalmetatheoretical fuses theories,or accountsof the natureof socialreality,with what might be called of phenomena.He arguesthat just as the structuralprophistoricalconfigurations erties of the naturalworld explainwhy events happenin the way that they do, soThus, for example, cial structuresor structuredpracticesact as causalmechanisms. Manicas(1989) suggeststhat "we need a theoryof schools, the structuringof their practices,and the relationof these to causallyrelevantother structures,the class structure,the state, etc." (193). This analogy,however,does not work.First of all, it is not clearhow the particular things he designatesas structuresacquirethe privileged position he attributesto them, but, more importantly,the specificationof situatedstructures,and claimsabouthow they relateto other structuresand to social events, do not equatefunctionallyto theoriesin naturalscience. What Manicas refers to as a theory would be better labeled a hypothesis and in naturalhistory which in turn might be predicated equated to generalizations upon theoriesin naturalscience.Theories in naturalscience arenot, strictlyspeakarespecificclaimsgroundedin theoExplanations ing, in themselvesexplanations. ries. Theories tell us what, universally,is in the world and the manner of its behavior.Explanations (of why, for example,people at varioustimes and placesdo what they do) refer to the kinds of things and relationsbetween things posited by

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the theory. What is missing in Manicas'sformulation,as in most of the literature on which he draws,is a "real"theoryof humanactionand humanpractice.What, importantis his strucfor example,in Marx'swork,makesstructuralexplanations turaltheory of history and society. And the basis of Marx'sclaim to science is his accountof the way the world argumentthat his theory is a true and demonstrable reallyis-not that his explanationis based on structures.Similarly,the emphasis on structurein contemporaryscientific realism is a consequenceof the fact that manyscientifictheoriesposit structuresas the furnitureof the naturalworld-not becausescientificexplanation is, as such, structural. Shapiro(1990) has also attemptedto drawupon realismas the basis of a critical bite."His PoliticalCriticism (1990) posturethat would give politicaltheory"critical is, however,somewhatinfelicitouslytitled. It is not a criticaldiscussionof issues in politics;it is not aboutcriticismin politics;it does not seek to distinguishpolitical criticism from other forms; and it does not deal with the actual relationshipbetween politics and externalcriticaldiscourses.It is primarilyanothereffort to recin philosophyand politicaltheoryand to oncile foundationalism and contextualism ameliorate the perceiveddangersof relativism.His versionof "criticalnaturalism" or "pragmatic intervention,does not emerge realism,"even as a metatheoretical of a theory that would supportthe epistevery clearly,and there is no elaboration with the undermologicalcommitments.There is also no extendedconfrontation lying practicalproblemof the relationshipbetween second-orderanalysis(critical or otherwise)and first-orderactivitiessuch as politics. Critical realism, genericallyconceived, remains a very loose metatheoretical familythat is difficultto pin down, and, despite the efforts to articulateits contribution (Isaac1987), it is even more difficultto specify exactlywhat its significance may be. In orientation,it is committedto a historicaland hermeneuticview of soit acceptsepiscial realityyet one that is consistentwith a notion of causalanalysis; temologicalrelativismbut insists on an objective ontologicalrealm as a basis of claims to truth; it emphasizeshuman agency but also the mannerin which social structuresdetermineaction;it is a compositepositionemergingfroma critiqueand it often has roots in Marxismand alsynthesisof diversephilosophicalarguments; lied ideas of critical social analysis but seeks to overcome certain elements of Marxist essentialism;it is postmodernistin its skepticismabout foundationsbut wishes to constrainthe relativismthat it worriesis inherentin this line of thinking. pluralism,but it is also a Abstractedin this way, it is the height of epistemological very porousposition. As Isaac(1990) notes, "criticalrealismis essentiallyan academicphilosophical discourse"(13), and, it might be added, one that embodies all the ambiguitiesof that genre when presentedas a criticalsocial theory.The virtuesof the turn to realismarethatit emphasizes the limitations of traditional andmovesin the empiricism directionof confrontingthe most fundamentalproblemin social science: that of coming to grips with the historicallysituatedpracticalrelationshipbetweensocial science and its object of inquiry.But it also continuesto exemplifythe dangersof metatheoretical seduction.In the end, manyof its advocatessubstitutemetatheory

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for theoryand reduce the practicalproblemof the relationshipbetweensocial sciissue. As Isaac(1987) notes, "realismopens ence and politics to an epistemological up a numberof importantpossibilitiesin politicaltheory,"but it is not a "substitute" for the study of politicalreality(200).
THEORETICAL REALISM AND SOCIAL REALITY

critical,etc.) is descriptive,prescriptive, Any socialscientificclaim(explanatory, and political reality about social in propositions theoretical ultimately grounded proposito those back pushed ultimately are if contested, claims, things. Particular the founbut foundations, so to speak, without, science tions. There is no social in contemporary dations are theories and not metatheories.Antifoundationalism philosophy is, properlyunderstood,an argumentabout the limits of philosophy practicesof life andknowledge.We should, (epistemology)-not aboutsubstantive I suggest, be theoreticalrealistsin that we should recognizethat scientifictheories arerealisticclaimsaboutthe world-are constitutiveof "theworld"as well as constitutiveof scientificpractice. Theoreticalrealismis inherentin the practiceof science, and, as a philosophical position, it involves the claim that truth is not an object or datumto which statements should correspond,but a concept applied to what in any practiceare the statementstakenas reflectingjustifiedbelief. As Goodman(1978) notes,
we protestbelongsto a worldof The uniformityof naturewhich we marvelat or the unreliability our own making.... While we mayspeakof determiningwhatversionsareright as learningabout the "world,"the worldsupposedlybeing that which all right versionsdescribe,all we learnabout the world is containedin these right versions of it; and while the underlyingworld, bereft of these, need not be denied to those who love it, it is perhapson the whole a worldwell lost. (10, 97)

Realizingtheory,then, requiresthat we embracetheoreticalrealismas both a pracattitude. tical and metatheoretical This would involvemakingand reflectingupon, in some systematicand detailed manner,claims about social realityand human action (Gunnell 1981, 1986). It is theory that has attendedHabermas's indeed strikingthat with all the commentary of communicative action,hardlyany has been addressedto the elementsand structure of the theory. But both his concernand that of those who have addressedhis work have been less with the natureof action than with the role of social science metatheoretical. and its claimto authority.Thus, the concernshavebeen primarily The issue of the criticalfunction of a social science is not, however,a matterthat It is a practicalmatterof the commitmentsand accan be solved metatheoretically. betweenacademicand politicaldisand of the relationship tions of its practitioners course in a particularsocial and historicalcontext. "Strong"epistemologiesand enthusiasmarenot the basisof a criticalsocialscience. epistemological The criticalfunctionof a social science is also not basicallya theoreticalmatter, even though certaintheories might be construedas having greatercriticalimplications. All theories, and logically entailedsingularclaims, are inherentlycritical in that they potentiallychallengeother accountsof the way things are, whetherin

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claimspredicatedon natureor sociallife. Socialscientifictheoryand the particular it are,in principle,nearlyalwaysa challengeto the imageof realityembodiedin the activitiesthat are the objectof inquiry.The extent to which social science can be a critical practicein more than an academicsense, institutionalizedas it is, in the United States, within a highly professionalizedand insulated scholarlycommunity to whose demands it is most immediatelysubservient,is a complex matter (Gunnell 1993a). submitted 30 March1995 Manuscript 10 April 1995 Final manuscript received

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John G. Gunnell is professorof politicalscience, State Universityof New York, Albany,NY 12222.