NEADS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO ANSWER

BACKGROUND ISSUES

(1) NORAD's Mission: Recognizing that the officers at NEADS are probably not
the people who determine - either pre or post 9/11 - NORAD's mission, probe
with each of them their own personal understanding of NORAD's mission before
9/11. Here we want to accomplish two things: (1) test the accuracy of the
statement "Prior to 9/11, NORAD was only looking out" (as you know, I question
whether that is entirely true), and (2) assuming the statement is true, WHY was it
true? Remember, we have to provide the American people with some insight
and explanation as to why NORAD was totally facing outward, given the threats
that existed.

(2) Radar Coverage: From a technical standpoint, understand the state of radar
capabilities at NEADS - pre 9/11. Specifically, how far "in" could the officers at
NEADS "see"? What capability, if any, was there to view the same radar feeds
that FAA controllers were seeing? Understand their equipment and its limitations
pre 9/11 !n Understand what finding a primary target by using a "Z point" entails.
(NEADS Transcript 078)

(3) Training - Hijack Exercises: Understand the full extent of NEADS

participation in, and conception of, exercise scenarios involving hijacked airliners
- pre 9/11. Understand the hijack protocols pre 9/11.

(4) Training - Relationship with FAA: Probe the relationship between NORAD
and FAA pre 9/11. On what occasions did they interact? What were the
circumstances? What points of contact did NEADS have at the FAA? What was
the role of NORAD liaisons to FAA and visa versa?

(5) NEADS Command and Control Structure: Develop an understanding of

the various players and their roles on 9/11; probe how information regarding the
rapidly changing situation was passed among NEADS personnel on 9/11.

(6) Interaction/relationship between NEADS, CONR & NORAD HQ:

Understand, from NEADS perspective, the role of CONR and NORAD HQ on
9/11.

(8) Air Alert Positioning Pre 9/11: Understand how many assets at which
bases were on alert prior to 9/11. Answer the question why couldn't NORAD
draw on assets closer to the hijacked cities, even though they weren't a part of
the alert structure.
 Focus on coverage of D.C. - why wasn't Andrews an alert facility as
opposed to Langley?

OPERATIONS ON 9/11

(X) Notification 11: Official NORAD timeline cites 0840 as time of notification;
NEADS transcript records time as 0837; other FAA source? Nail down exact
time and substance of notification.

(X) Otis Scramble: Why did NEADS vector the Otis fighters over the ocean and
park them in Whiskey - rather than sending them directly to NYC?

Focus on the issue of whether the Otis fighters could have

intercepted 175, had NEADS directed them straight to the City?

(X) Resurrection of Flight 11: Where did this originate? Why did NEADS think
that AA 11 was heading toward D.C.? What was NEADS seeing/referring to?

(X) Shoot Down Order: Precisely when and how was the authority passed to
NEADS? What was the source?

(X) ROE: Determine the understanding of each facility (NEADS, CONR) as well
as the understanding of individual officials of ROEs in effect that day.

a. NORAD: When did they learn and how disseminate

b. Critical to understand from the pilots what they believed the ROEs
were at specific times. [NB: Look for Otis tapes on this; what about
Langley???]

c. Fighters from Andrews - this understanding that D.C. was a "weapons

free zone" - what does that mean in terms of ROE? DANA TRACK

(X) Communications with FAA: Was anyone at NEADS on an open

conference with anyone at the FAA? If so, who and at what time?

(X) Andrews Fighters: NEADS knowledge of and control (if any) of fighters
scrambled from Andrews.

(X) Chat Log vs. Tape Recordings: Understand the distinction between these
two types of communications; why are there no tape recordings from CONR or
NORAD HQ - similar to what we have from NEADS? Are there other tape
recordings from NEADS? What about the Battle Cab?

(X) Selfridge Fighters: Answer the question whether NORAD would have had
the assets in position to shoot down 93?
(X) Langley Fighters: Understand (1) Original routing and coordinates given to
pilots; (2) how, when and why that changed, and (3) speed requirements.

(X) SCRAMBLES: For Otis, Langley, Toledo & Selfridge, understand the precise
details of the following:

(1) Heading and coordinates given to the pilots on launch; who controlled
the pilots from each base - NEADS or FAA - and who specifically at
those facilities? What was the mission?

Otis Issues: Situational awareness of 11; id techs still trying to

locate primary target. Planes airborne for 4-5 minutes then order to
change course. WHY change? What was the consequence?

Langley Issues: What was the target for which these fighters were
launched? SHOW DOCS AND CONFRONT WITH TESTIMONY
FROM HEARING AND NEADS TRANSCRIPT

(2)

REPORT POSSIBLE HIJACK:

Plane to D.C.
American
Tail number that is 11
Statement about the first one still being airborne

Launch Langley (9:24-9:33)

to Baltimore to cut off plane moving south to D.C.
somewhere in this comes real knowledge (9:33) from Dulles Tower (my god
plane to D.C.); very quick order to redirect Langley fighters to D.C. - arrived after
crash

(X) Lat/Lon vs. Vortex Markers: FAA and NORAD speak different languages.
NORAD could not get a fix on the hijacked aircraft because FAA was passing
along Vortex geographic markers and
(2) Did anyone at Indy contact NORAD or the military?

(3) Exactly what steps did Indy controllers take to try and determine the fate of
Flight 77? Why did no one "see" the primary target that was 77 when it
reemerged on radar at 0910?

(4) What notifications were made to whom and when?

(5) What was the miscommunication that led to the "confirmation" of Flight
77 down over Ashland, Kentucky?

- Did anyone at Indy know or suspect that the hit at the Pentagon
was Flight 77?

(6) When did Indy receive confirmation that Flight 77 had hit the Pentagon?

(7) Why did all the controllers amend their statements?

GENERAL "POLLING" QUESTIONS

(1) On 9/11, was the controller aware of the potential for a suicide hijacking
scenario,? To your knowledge, were others in the FAA aware of the
potential for a suicide hijacking scenario?

(2) On 9/11, what type of exercises - sponsored by either FAA, FEMA, DoD,
or some combination thereof- related to hijackings had the controller ever
participated in?

(3) On 9/11, how would a controller have detected a hijack situation?

(4) On 9/11, what procedures would a controller have followed in a hijack

situation?

(5) On 9/11, was the controller familiar with NORAD? If so, how would
he/she have contacted NORAD and under what circumstances?
INTERVIEW OUTLINE

I. Introduction of Commission

Who are we? The September 11 Commission is an independent,

bipartisan Commission created by Congress and the President to
investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 9-11 attacks
and make recommendations to prevent and prepare for future terrorist
attacks. There are 10 Commissioners, 5 Republicans and 5
Democrats, and a professional staff of about 50 people. The staff is
divided into different teams that are examining different issues - for
example, there is a team that is concentrating just on immigration
issues, there's a team that is examining terrorist financing - how the
hijackers got their money - and there is a team that is looking the
intelligence issues at the FBI & CIA.

We are part of the team that will be writing the story of what happened
on 9/11 - for example, what happened on the planes, what did the
military\NORAD do in response, what did the FAA do, and what the
first responders - police and fire fighters - did on 9/11. We are to tell
the story of what worked and what didn't work. Our report is due to
come out at the end of next May. Hopefully it will accomplish at least
two things: (1) first, it will get the facts straight; that is, the Commission
will write the definitive story of what happened on 9/11; and (2) it will
make thoughtful recommendations on how we as a nation can avoid
this type of tragedy again.

Why do we want to talk to you? Our team will be interviewing

virtually every person who was directly involved with the hijacked
aircraft on 9-11. So within the FAA that means all the air traffic
controllers, supervisors, administrators at the ROCs, people at the
Command Center and those at Headquarters who were involved with
the crisis on 9/11. In addition, we will be going out to NORAD, talking
to the pilots, the controllers, and the other military personnel who were
engaged in the air defense response that day. So you're not alone -
we are by no means singling out this Center for attention.

What kinds of questions will we be asking? Well, I have had a

chance to read the personnel statement you filled out after 9/11 and
review the transcript of the ATC recordings that day. So I will probably
ask you some questions about each of those. In addition, I am very
interested in hearing your thoughts on worked well on 9/11 - in terms
of your Center - and what didn't work as well. Finally, we are
interested in your thoughts and recommendations about the changes
that have been made since 9/11, and what more you think needs to be
done.
 Let me emphasize that we are not investigating you personally, we are
not prosecuting anybody. Our policy is to tape interviews because as I
said, we are trying to ensure that what we write is factually correct, and
we have to interview hundreds of people.

Now, before we start let me ask if you any questions about what I said
or about what we're doing here today. Also, as a preliminary matter
let me ask did anyone discuss the subject matter of today's interview
with you prior to today? If so, who? Did anyone at the FAA or
elsewhere instruct you not to discuss or to discuss certain subject
matters today? If so, who? What subject matters?

II. Employee Background

Tell me a little bit about your background (e.g., how long you've been a
controller, how long with FAA, what positions, etc.)

III. Job Description (General)

(1) On 9/11 how would you have described your duties and responsibilities
as a controller?

How many aircraft do you typically handle in a day? In a morning?

How is your Center organized? Role of supervisors/managers?

Role of Radar Associate?

Explain the process whereby Positions are assigned to controllers

and controllers relieve one another of Positions.

How/when do you interact with the airlines?

How/when do you interact with the Command Center? With HQ?

(2) How have those responsibilities changed since 9/11?

(May want to address later in interview)

(3) From a technical standpoint, explain to me what information you're

seeing when you look at your scope.

What information is typically displayed in the data block? Do

different controllers have different settings or is the display
consistent throughout a facility?
 Mode 3 = beacon = transponder? Difference between flight number
and Mode 3? When and why would a controller ask an aircraft to
squawk a different Mode 3?

What does it mean to say an aircraft has gone into "coast"? Is that
the same as saying an aircraft is a primary target?

How do you know when an aircraft deviates from its authorized

course? Does the data block start to blink or something?

What controls do you have to change/alter the format of the

display? (i.e. query data for more info)

Who else - within FAA or elsewhere -is seeing this same

information? Can other ARTCC/TRACON/ATCT facilities or the
Command Center also see this data? Will it be displayed
differently?

Describe to me what happens when there is a technical failure and

you lose data display. Does this happen for individual flight
information of would the whole system go down? Describe other
circumstances where you may lose flight tracking data.

What capabilities, if any, do you have to determine the altitude and

speed of an aircraft in the absence of a transponder signal? Would
other controllers in the system (i.e. TRACON controllers) be able to
discern altitude from their display?

IV. Training & Procedures Related to Hijackings

Procedures on 9/11
(1) If you can think back to what you knew on 9/11, versus what you know
now, at that time what was your understanding of the procedures you
were to follow in a hijack situation? What was your understanding of the
protocol for hijackings?

(2) How did you know that this was the protocol? Where was it written
down? Was this subject "taught" or included as part of your training?
Please describe your training on this issue.

(3) On 9/11, what were the manuals/documents you would have turned to
for guidance in a crisis? Where would these documents have been
located? On 9/11, to your knowledge did anyone refer to these manuals
for instruction?

(4) On 9/11, how would you have detected a hijacking situation?

Nordo Aircraft
Prior to 9/11, what did you do if an aircraft was not communicating
with an FAA facility? What was the SOP? Where was that
procedure written down?

Prior to 9-11, how often would you lose radio contact with an
aircraft? What are the reasons why you would lose contact with an
aircraft? (e.g. mechanical failure)

Prior to 9-11, what is the longest passage of time that you lost radio
contact with a commercial aircraft? What is the longest time one of
your colleagues has lost radio contact with a commercial aircraft?

Non-Transponding Aircraft

Prior to 9-11, what would you have done if an aircraft stopped

transmitting its transponder code? [Understand as a technical
matter how he/she would know that is what had occurred]

Prior to 9-11, how often would you lose the transponder signal (i.e.,
mode three code) of a commercial aircraft? How often was the loss
of transponder signal attributable to mechanical or technical
failures?

Was there any mechanical device or method to determine the

altitude of a commercial aircraft that is NORDO with no transponder
signal? What about the speed of such an aircraft? The direction?

Prior to 9-11, in your handling of commercial aircraft, what is the

longest period of time that an aircraft has been without a
transponder signal? If you are aware, what is the longest period of
time during which one of your colleagues has handled a
commercial aircraft with no transponder signal?

Course Deviation

Prior to 9-11, what was FAA SOP for handling a commercial aircraft
that deviated slightly from its intended course? About how often
would this occur?

What about an aircraft that deviated substantially from its intended

course? How often did this happen? Prior to 9-11, how many
times have you handled a commercial aircraft that deviated
substantially from its intended course? What were the reasons for
the aircraft's deviation?
 Prior to 9-11, how many times have you handled a commercial
aircraft that deviated substantially from its intended course and was
NORDO? What were the circumstances that caused such events?

Prior to 9-11, how many times had you handled a commercial

aircraft that deviated substantially from its intended course, was
NORDO and without a transponder signal? What were the
circumstances that caused such events?

Procedures Post 9/11

(1) What is your understanding today of the procedures to follow in a
hijacking situation?

Exercises
(1) On 9/11, what type of exercises - sponsored by either FAA, FEMA,
DoD, or some combination thereof- related to hijackings had you ever
participated in? If you have never participated in an exercise involving a
hijack scenario, are you aware of others who have?

(2) Prior to 9/11, had you heard of or were you aware that others within
FAA were aware of the potential for a suicide hijacking scenario?

(3) What is your understanding of the SCATANA procedure? Have you

ever participated in a SCATANA exercise?

V. Events of 9/11

(1) Describe in your own words what happened in this Center on 9/11.

(2) REFER TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR EACH CONTROLLER

(3) General Areas to Cover

Situational Awareness on 9\11

(1) What specifically did you know about other aircraft that were hijacked
and/or had hit the WTC in NY? Who told you this information? Can you
place when you knew this information?

(2) Did any of the controllers involved with 77 know or suspect that the
aircraft that hit the Pentagon was Flight 77?

Contacts\familiaritv with NORAD

(1) On 9/11, were you familiar with NORAD? What was your
understanding of the role NORAD was to play in a hijacking?
 (2) Did you or anyone you know of in the Center contact NORAD on 9/11?
Would you have known who and how to contact NORAD on 9/11?

(3) What is your view today of the FAA's relationship with NORAD?

Grounding All Flights

ADD QUESTIONS

Miscellaneous
(1) In terms of crisis management and response, what do you think
worked well on 9/11? What failures do you see that occurred that day?

(2) How would you describe FAA's preparedness today for another
hijacking incident? What are the outstanding weaknesses?

(3) If you were a member of the 9/11 Commission, looking at the aviation
issues, what recommendation(s) would you have to make the system
safer?

(4) Are you aware of any write up - any report, any memo, any document
whatsoever - produced by the FAA - either by this facility or another
facility - that addresses the performance of the FAA on 9/11?

VI. Wrap Up

Thank you for your time. Do you have any questions for me? If you think
of anything to add, here is my card, please feel free to give me a call
anytime.

10
 77 SPECIFIC NOTES

John Thomas (DJH)

Operations Manager

0855-0900: Informed of explosion at WTC; from picture looked like maybe a

plane

(1) DID YOU HAVE VOLUME ON THE TV? (ANNOUNCERS WERE

SAYING PLANE HAD HIT)

0900: Walked over to air traffic manager - interrupted by ops supervisor who
said AA77 Nordo; during conversation people shouted they had observed an
aircraft crash into second tower. (Get exact time from CNN tapes)

(2) WHO WAS THE OPS SUPERVISOR WHO INFORMED YOU? WHAT
EXACTLY DID HE/SHE SAY? WERE YOU ADVISED THAT 77 HAD
STARTED A TURN (OR "SOUTHWESTERLY HEADING") BEFORE IT
WENT INTO COAST?

Told supervisor to make calls forward along route of flight to block airspace

0903-0910: Selected "All Primary" button on scope to see if there were any
primary targets

(3) EXPLAIN ALL PRIMARY BUTTON.

Note: Transponders must fail occasionally (or perhaps more often) - if
not, why would first action be to look at primary targets?

(4) WHAT DIRECTION WERE YOU LOOKING FOR PRIMARY

TARGETS?

(5) DID YOU SEARCH FOR PRIMARY TARGETS AFTER 0910? IF

NOT, WHY NOT?

(6) DID YOU ASSIGN OTHER CONTROLLERS TO CONTINUE

LOOKING ON PRIMARY?

(7) WHAT ARE THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE REASONS A PLANE

WOULD DISAPPEAR FROM RADAR?

(8) IS THERE ANY WAY FOR A PLANE TO PURPOSEFULLY "MASK"

ITSELF FROM PRIMARY RADAR - IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE
HIJACKERS HAD TRIED TO DISAPPEAR FROM RADAR

11
 ALTOGETHER, AS OCCURRED WITH FLIGHT 77, COULD THEY HAVE
DONE IT?

(9) IS THE AREA OVER WHICH 77 DISAPPEARED, AN AREA KNOWN

TO HAVE WEAK RADAR COVERAGE? HAVE PLANES DISAPPEARED
FROM THERE BEFORE? IF SO, GIVE DETAILS AND EXPLAIN HOW
OFTEN.

0905: Paged ZID-505 to request help gathering voice recording and NTAP data

(10) WHAT IS NTAP DATA? WHAT WILL THIS INFORMATION TELL

YOU?

0905: Told air traffic manager to call Command Center - said that in light of NY it
could be a hijack.

0910: I called AGL; lost radar and voice communications with AAL77; AA had
reported that another aircraft had been hijacked

(11) HOW DID YOU KNOW AA HAD ADVISED THAT THEY HAD
ANOTHER AIRCRAFT HIJACKED?

(12) DID YOU TELL ROC YOUR SUSPICION (ABOVE) THAT 77 MAY
BE HIJACKED?

(13) WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING THE ROC WAS GOING TO

DO WITH YOUR INFORMATION?

(14) WHY DID YOU NOTIFY COMMAND CENTER BEFORE ROC? WHO
NOTIFIED THE COMMAND CENTER?

(15) WAS THERE ANY MENTION OF THE MILITARY OR NORAD? DID

YOU HAVE A MILITARY SPECIALIST? WHAT ABOUT USING HIM TO
MAKE CONTACT?

0910-0915: Asked TMU personnel to call AF search & rescue and advise of
missing aircraft

0915: Called West Va State Police to advise of missing aircraft

0920-0925: Called ZAU Operations Manager to advise of growing concern that

AAL77 may have been hijacked and he should be on lookout - "My own thoughts
were concerned with Sears Tower"

(16) WHAT DIRECTION DID YOU THINK 77 WAS HEADING?

12
 (17) WERE YOU STILL LOOKING FOR IT ON RADAR?

(18) DID YOU THINK TO ALERT OTHER CENTERS WITH SAME

MESSAGE?

0940: Notified the Pentagon had been hit

(19) WHO TOLD YOU?

(20) DID YOU THINK IT WAS 77 THAT HIT IT?

(21) WERE YOUR EMPLOYEES STILL LOOKING FOR 77 AT THAT

TIME?

MISCELLANEOUS

(1) WHY DID YOU AMEND YOUR STATEMENT ON 5/07/02?

(2) SEARCH& RESCUE STORY: EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE

SERIES OF EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE FALSE REPORT THAT A PLANE
WAS DOWN OVER THE KENTUCKY BORDER.

(3) NORAD QUESTIONS - HIT HARD

(4) NOTIFICATION CHECK LIST: ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE FAA FORM
ENTITLED "FACILITY ACCIDENT/INCIDENT NOTIFICATION RECORD"?

EXPLAIN WHAT IT IS. IS THIS SUPPOSE TO BE SOMETHING THAT

IS FILLED IN CONTEMPORANEOUS TO THE INCIDENT OR
AFTERWARD? IN OTHER WORDS, IS IT A WORKING CHECKLIST TO
RUN THROUGH IN AN EMERGENCY?

DID THIS FACILITY COMPLETE THIS FORM ON 9/11? IF NOT, DID ID

FOLLOW SO ME OTHER PROCEDURE?

DID YOU OR OTHERS AT THIS FACILITY NOTIFY THE WOC

DIRECTLY?

(5) AS A MANAGER OF THIS FACILITY, DID YOU INSTITUTE ANY CHANGES

AFTER 9/11 (ASIDE FROM THE OVERRALL FAA CHANGES)

(6) AFTER ACTION REPORTS: TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, DID ANYONE IN

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL - EITHER AT THE ROC OR AT HEADQUARTERS
OR ANOTHER SENIOR LEVEL, EVER DO ANY SORT OF WRITE UP WHICH
ASSESSED THE ATC ACTIONS ON 9/11 ?

13
(7) WHAT DOCUMENTS, IF ANY, DID YOU PREPARE AFTER 9/11 RELATED
TO THE EVENTS OF THAT DAY?

(8) DAILY RECORD OF FACILITY OPERATIONS: WE HAVE TWO, AREA 3

AND "E DESK" - ARE THERE OTHERS? NO ENTRIES ABOUT OTHER
HIJACKINGS, VERY LITTLE ABOUT 77 -

(9) NEADS LOG ENTRY - NOTIFICATION AT 0924: WERE YOU ASKED

ABOUT THIS ENTRY? WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THE SOURCE OF IT?

(10) AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT PRELIMINARY NOTICE: SHOW 93

DOCUMENT - WAS SOMETHING SIMILAR TO THIS PREPARED FOR 77?

(11) CERTIFICATION: WHY DID KATHRYN HUGHES PREPARE AND SIGN

THE INDEX OF MATERIALS FOR THE ACCIDENT REPORT?

(12) WHEN WERE YOU ASKED TO PULL TOGETHER ALL DOCUMENTS AND
TAPES RELATED TO 77? WHO DID THEY GO TO?

(13) CONFERENCE WITH COMMAND CENTER: WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN

ON IT FROM INDY?

Linda Marie Povinelli (DJH)

Operations Supervisor

Paged while in Supervisor's Office (HER OFFICE OR ANOTHER

SUPERVISOR?); Spoke to John Thomas who said aircraft lost radar and
frequency; Returned to Area 3 operations immediately; CIC - Dick Byard -
briefed on lost radar and radio contact

(1) WHAT DID BYARD TELL YOU ABOUT FLIGHT 77? DIRECTION IT
WAS HEADING?

(2) WHAT DID THOMAS DIRECT YOU TO DO?

(3) WHAT DID YOU KNOW AT THIS POINT ABOUT OTHER HIJACKED
AIRCRAFT AND/OR HITS ON WTC? FROM WHOM?

(4) WAS THERE A TELEVISION ANYWHERE AROUND YOU?

0900: (or "sometime shortly thereafter") - called military ops specialist (Kevin
Schott) and asked him to call search and rescue

(5) WHY WAS YOUR FIRST CALL TO SEARCH AND RESCUE?

0903: called AAL dispatch and talked to Jim McDonald; will get back

14
 (6) DID MCDONALD TELL YOU HE WAS ALSO SPEAKING TO HNN RA
(SCHIFANO)?

(7) HOW DO YOU KNOW YOU PLACED THIS CALL AT 0903? HOW
DO YOU KNOW SPECIFICS OF OTHER TIMES?

0907: Called LEX APCH (??) to search for extra beacon codes; on hold; hung up

(8) WHAT IS THIS A REFERENCE TO?

0914: ("either before or right after") - received return call from McDonald; said
another plane hijacked and hit WTC; "he thought AAL77 had also been done as
such." "I recall stating that there had not been sufficient time for that to occur
why AAL77 and that we were still looking for them."

(9) SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: WHAT DID YOU KNOW ABOUT

OTHER HIJACKINGS/WTC HITS BEFORE THIS TIME?

(10) WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THE LAST SENTENCE - NOT

SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THAT TO OCCUR?

0914: Called ZDC to coordinate routes for aircraft eastbound; terminated call
when heard AAL 77 on guard frequency. It was AAL683 trying to raise AAL77.

0916: Called ZDC again; realized I had incorrect area; tried again; shared that we
had lost AAL77, trying to track down, "I requested that should AAL77 or
something come up on AAL77 with ZDC, please let us know as we had not
confirmed what had happened yet."

(11) WHY ARE YOU CALLING ZDC TO ALERT THEM TO LOOK OUT
FOR 77? WHY NOT OTHER CENTERS? [MUST HAVE THOUGHT
AIRCRAFT WAS HEADING BACK TO DC]

Interspersed were tasks for all Area 3 controllers to look for AAL77's beacon,
then to look for a hijack code, then primary targets.

(12) WHO WERE THE AREA 3 CONTROLLERS? WHAT EXACTLY

WERE THE INSTRUCTIONS YOU GAVE? WHERE WERE THEY
LOOKING FOR PRIMARY TARGETS?

(13) WERE YOU CHECKING RADAR TO SEE IF 77 CAME UP AS A

PRIMARY TARGET? DID YOU INSTRUCT OTHERS TO BE CHECKING
RADAR?

Clearing all aircraft to the nearest feasible airport to land

15
Checking on HNN Sector Team and getting staff relief for their positions

[DJH: STILL LOOKING FOR THEM - 2 POSSIBLITIES; EITHER UP IN

THE AIR NOT TRANSPONDING OR CRASHED

1. SEARCHING FOR PRIMARY TRACKS

2. CALLING OTHER CENTERS
3. CALLING SEARCH AND RESCUE]

Steve Lutomski (JF) - Search and Rescue

Supervisor of Traffic Management Coordinators

Sally Weed (JF)

Support Manager for Operations

Kevin Schott (JF)

Traffic Management Coordinator

Anthony Schifano (DJH)

Henderson Radar Associate

Conversation at beginning of transcript with DAC RA (Theresa Adams) about

screens

(1) WHAT WAS CONVERSATION ABOUT WITH DAC RA AT

BEGINNING OF TRANSCRIPT?

(2) WHERE WERE YOU LOCATED IN RELATION TO THE

HENDERSON CONTROLLER? WAS THE HENDERSON CONTROLLER
RUDY GAYDE OR CHARLES THOMAS WHEN THESE EVENTS WERE
OCCURRING?

0850: 77 Cleared to Falmouth

"I observed the aircraft starting a southwesterly heading and the aircraft went into
coast track."

(3) WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO GO INTO "COAST TRACK"? HOW DOES

THAT DIFFER FROM GOING TO A PRIMARY TARGET?

(4) WAS THE "SOUTHWESTERLY HEADING" A DEVIATION FROM

FLIGHT PATH? DID IT LOOK TO YOU LIKE 77 WAS STARTING A
TURN BEFORE IT WENT INTO COAST?

0856-0858: Tried to call flight but no response

16
Statement: Looked for primary target

(5} HOW LONG DID YOU CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE SCOPE FOR
PRIMARY TARGETS? WHERE WERE YOU LOOKING?

QB5B: Calls AA Dispatch - Jim McDonnell - asks him to try and reach the plane

0902: Calls back McDonnell - "we uh we lost track control of the guy he's in
coast track but we haven't we don't really know where his target is and we can't
get a hold of him" - asks to try again

0906:22: HNN RA to DAC RA: "this is Henderson American seventy seven eh

do you guys have radar on him is he over Falmouth or"

(6) WHY WOULD YOU ASK THE DAC RA IF THEY COULD SEE HIM
OVER FALMOUTH? ARE YOU NOT ABLE TO VIEW THAT LOCATION
FROM YOUR SCOPE?

(7) DAC RA REPLIES TO YOU AT 1306:26: "NO WE JUST MOVED THE

TRACK THERE WE NEVER YOU KNOW" WHAT IS SHE REFERRING
TO?

0909: Contacts AA Dispatch for third time - learns that AA 11 was hijacked

(8) PRIOR TO THIS CONVERSATION, WERE YOU AWARE THAT

OTHER PLANES HAD BEEN HIJACKED AND/OR HIT THE WTC?
WHAT DID YOU KNOW/FROM WHOM?

0910: (9) WHO IS THIS CONVERSATION WITH? DO YOU REMEMBER

WHAT WAS SAID?

0911: Contacts DAC RA; informs her of news from AAL Dispatch

0912-14: Series of "unintelligible" conversations from transcript

(10) WHAT WAS GOING ON DURING THIS TIME?

0914: Fourth call to AAL Dispatch; he says he's already talked to Center and
provided all he knows

(11) WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER THAT CALL? WHY DOES THE
TRANSCRIPT/TAPE END AT THAT POINT?

17
Statement: "I forwarded this information [news from AAL dispatch] to the radar
controller, my immediate supervisor, facility management who was present at the
time, and also notified the Dacos Sector of the situation."

(12) WHO WAS YOUR IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR? WHEN DID YOU

NOTIFY HIM OR HER? WAS HE OR SHE ALREADY AWARE OF THE
OTHER HIJACKINGS? IF SO, FROM WHOM?

(13) DID YOU COMMUNICATE TO YOUR SUPERVISOR OR OTHER

THE SOUTHWESTERLY COURSE YOU SAW THE AIRCRAFT START
BEFORE GOING TO COAST?

(14) WHAT INSTRUCTIONS DID YOUR SUPERVISOR OR OTHER

MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS GIVE YOU? WHAT WERE THEY DOING?

(15) WHO WAS THE FACILITY MANAGEMENT YOU REFERENCE IN

YOUR STATEMENT? SAME QUESTIONS AS ABOVE?

Rudolph Gayde (DJH)

Henderson Radar Position (0733-0843)

Gayde took hand off from ZDC, then was relieved by Charles Thomas

(1) AT WHAT POINT IN THE TRANSCRIPT WERE YOU RELIEVED OF

THE POSITION BY CHARLES THOMAS? WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER
THAT?

(2) ASK SITUATIONAL AWARENESS/OBSERVER QUESTIONS

Rhonda Adams (DJH)

Dacos Sector Radar Associate

Note: Dacos Radar - Joseph Eisert - deceased

0906:22: HNN RA to DAC RA: "this is Henderson American seventy seven eh

do you guys have radar on him is he over Falmouth or"

(1) WHY WOULD YOU ASK THE DAC RA IF THEY COULD SEE HIM
OVER FALMOUTH? ARE YOU NOT ABLE TO VIEW THAT LOCATION
FROM YOUR SCOPE?

(2) YOU REPLIED TO HNN RA AT 1306:26: "NO WE JUST MOVED THE

TRACK THERE WE NEVER YOU KNOW" WHAT WERE YOU
REFERRING TO?

18
0906:39: DAC RA SPEAKING TO HNN RA: "and his last clearance as far as you
know is on course to Falmouth and then jay on thirty four right well we're just
gonna treat him like non radar and we've already told the next sector they're
gonna have to sterilize for him until we find out

(3) WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO "TREAT HIM LIKE NON RADAR" - WHAT
PROCEDURE ARE YOU REFERRING TO?

Jeffrey Phillips (DJH)

Batesville Radar

Randy Kath (JF)

Impel Radar Coordinator

Steve Harting (JF) - Search and Rescue Effort

Traffic Management Coordinator

NEED TO SCHEDULE

Charles Thomas
Henderson Radar (0843-092?)

(1) What did you mean when you said that the track went into "coast"?

So is AAT-20 Timeline correct when it says: "0856:19: Both primary and

secondary radar contact was simultaneously lost. There is no longer any
information on AAL77 on the ZID radar displays."?

(2) When you notified your supervisors that the 77 was lost, did you inform them
of the plane's position before it dropped off of radar? In other words, did you
inform them that the plane had begun an unauthorized turn toward the south?

Richard Byard - Described by Linda Povinelli as the controller-in-charge who

briefed her on

19
0837: Call comes into Sgt Powell - Weapons position, from Boston TMU (Joe Cooper);
we have a hijack and need help; Powell puts Deskins on the phone - she takes
information.

0842: Huntress ID1 calls back Boston (Deskins must have relayed info to ID1); ID1
basically asks Boston to repeat airplane info - keep asking for a Mode 3.

0845: Huntress ID1 calls New York Center to alert them to hijack (first notification??)

Questions for ID 1 - Op Position

In your early conversations with Boston Center, you repeatedly ask for a Mode 3 so you
can locate AA 11 on your scope. Without a Mode 3, walk me through how you went
about trying to locate AA 11 as a primary target?

Rules of Engagement

Look at After Action

RADAR ISSUE:

Otis Scramble:

(1) What coordinates where given to the Otis pilots on take off? Who within NEADS
was deciding this issue and coordinating it with FAA? Who within FAA was controlling
the flights?

Langley Pilots:

Question about phantom aircraft that were reported by USSS, others, at the White House.