bered group of Swiss infantry, armed with hand-held pikes, stood np to the cream of feudal armor, unseated the

knights from their armored chargers and ushered in a ~ew era of warfare. The Battle of Laupen was a tactical innovation which not only established the defense superiority of light infantry over the shock action of mobile and heavily armored forces, but also announced a political and social revolution. With striking similarity, this democratization of warfare was repeated 634 years later in the opening days of the 1973 Middle East War, when an Arab infantry force armed with antitank weapons met and brought to a halt an Israeli tank offensive.
Reprinted from

O
N

21

JUNE

1339,

an

outnum-

The implications of the Arab success have been widely discussed in the West. Numerous commentators have agreed that the balance has swung against the tank which has dominated the battlefield since World War II. Many have taken heart that the same weapons which provided the Arab success, the antitank guided missile ( ATGM ) and the hand-held antitank grenade launcher, would give NATO a greatly improved chance of offsetting the Warsaw Pacts tank superiority y in Central Europe. Indeed, one study has cIaimed that the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union are tank heavy, even tank de. pendent, suggesting that: Soviet tables of organization are unduly influenced b~ experiences gained

Survivsl [Grest Britain), Msy-June 1976. 67

November 1976

SOVIET ANTITANK

OEBATE

in a war of 30 years ago attd that a certain amount of battleship thinking permeates their military intellectual environment. 1 Another study concludes that Soviet reliance on tanks as the core of the armys shock and initial striking power is not likely to change. The debate in Western militar~ circles that followed the Yom Kippur War over the viability of armor in a battlefield environment dominated by precision-guided munitions has had no visible parallel in the USSR. . . .$ These conclusions reveal a na]vet6 about Soviet force structure and ignore recent Soviet doctrinal literature. The Soviet Union is not only. aware of the implications of the 1973 Middle East Warafter all, it was Soviet antitank weapons that the Arab forces usedbut demonstrates a deep appreciation of the potentials of antitank technology for the modern battlefield in professional military writings. Changes in Soviet doctrine and force structure reflect this concern, and the implications are important for Western defense. In mid-November 1974, a military science conference of the ground troops was held at tbe Malinovsky Tank Academy. 8 Participating were more than 200 marshals, generals and officers of the central appara~s, mi litary districts and groups of Soviet troops stationed abroad, commandants and instructors stationed at military and representatives of academiee scientific institutions. Their purpose was to discuss the tactical implications of the 1973 Middle East War, with particular focus on the future

Phillip A. Karber is Director, Strategic Studies, The BDM Corporation, Vienna, Virginia. 68

viability of armored vehicles on the modern battlefield. Subsequent discussions raised doubts about the perpetuation of Soviet offensive doctrine. This conference was followed by an unprecedented second conference in January 1975 at which A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense, and I. G. PavIovsky, Commander in Chief of the Ground Troops; strongly emphasized the lessons and implications of the October War, fiercely criticized current Soviet operational exercises and called for a doctrinal debate on the implications of antitank technology. To date, neither conference has been reported let alone analyzedin tbe West. Marshal Grechkos comments were incorporated in the second edition of his recent book: Combat actions in the Middle East, last unleashed more than once in the 10 years by the aggressive circles of Israrl, haoe put anew the question of the relationship of offense and defense Of g~O~nd troops, and have disclosed a number of characteristic phenomena in the struggle of offensive and defensive means and in methods of waging the firv battle. It is noteworthy that modern defense, in connection with the appearance in troop armaments-of powerful jiring means, has acquired greater stability. This is being caused jirxt of all by the fact that the main striking force of the attackers-tanks-has become more mdnerable, and the use of them on the battlefield, more complicated. The cent inuing process of perfecting the anti-tank weapon hax placed before science and technology a serious task in the business of tangibly raising the viability of tank troops and developing more effective ways and means of reliabl~ suppressing anti-tank defense. 4 Grechkos provocative comments
Military

Review

SOVIET ANTITANK signaled the beginning of the Soviet antitank debate, and, within the last year, Soviet journals have published more than 50 analytical articles discussing the implications raised by the effectiveness of antitank weapons as demonstrated in tbe Middle East conflict. J While debate has been confined mainly to the pages of the professional military journal Mitifary Hedd, cOncern over antitank technology is reflected in the increased coverage of tbe subject in wider circulation media such as Red Stars and Soviet Military Review 7 ( tbe latter publiehed in English). Given the quantity of writings, the high level of authorship and tbe clear expressions of concern, the Red Army evidently feels it has come up against a problem. However, before NATO embraces the ATGM as a deus e.r machivta, several points arising from the Soviet antitank debate need to be outlined: q Tbe current Soviet concern over antitank weapons, and particularly ATGMs, is not a feature of the last year only, but dates from the Khrushchev period. q The Red Army has not been putting all of its offensive eggs in the tank basket: The basic trend in Soviet force structure over the last decade has been just the reversea scaling down of the tank in favor of other combined arms elements. q Ironically, the system the army perceives as most threatened by antitank weapons is not the tank but their infantry combat vehiclethe BMP. q The Soviet debate over antitank weapons is not really a debate over antitank weapons per sethe capabilities and defensive potential of these weapons have been generally accepted. What ie being discussed is how to deal with the increased antiNovember 1976

DEBATE

tank threat while maintaining the Soviet doctrinal preference for the offensive. Each of these points needs more detailed examination:

.
THE ANTITANK THREAT

The Red Army has long been aware of the potentials of antitank weaponry. It was, in fact, one of the first armies to deploy ATGMs in large numbers, and to mount them on armored vehicles. As early as 1964 (upon seeing a firing demonstration of an ATGM against a tank), Khrushchev noted: ItAurt. After all, tce are spending a lot of money to make tanks. And if . a war breaks out, these tanks will burst into flames even before they reach the battle-line. 8 Throughout tbe intervening decade, Russian writers have often studied antitank weapons and shown a keen interest in the state of the art in Western ATGM technology. In 1967, Soviet military writers noted serious changes resulting from the tecbnoIogical improvements to ATGMs: A gualitativelu new method of combating tanks has appearedthe aritttank guided projwtile, which can destroy ang tank at a distance of up to several kilometers. g In 1972, the classic work Antitank Warfare 1 appeared, which paid particular attention to ATGMs, noting their significantly grester range and a~mor-penetrating power in comparison with tanks, their high kill probability, and that, under operational conditions, ATGM vehicles could achieve a favorable exchange ratio of 4 to 1 against tanks and double this against armored personnel carriers ( APCS ). In 1973, the authors of a book titled Tanks pointed out that no little danger for tanks is presented by 69

SOVIET ANTITANK

OEBATE

ATGMs, 1] Following the Middle East War (but in advance of the current debate), Soviet authors were q~ick to recognize that: Guided anti-tank missiles gave to tke infantry tkat wkick it never kad: tke probabilit~ of destroying tanks a,ikk one shot before tke tank could use its own uwapons against tke infantvg. Ii
SOVIET EMPHASIS Soviet allies ON TANKS Union have and the ada decided

While
Warsaw vantage

the Pact

in tanks vis-h-vis INATO,the Soviet Army has not neglected the to opinother combat arms. Contrary ions frequently expressed in the West over the last decade, the Soviet Army has actually reduced the importance of the tank in relation to the other combat armsparticularly. motorized infantry and artillery. In the early 1960s, the ratio of tank to motorized rifle divisions wae 1 to 1.8. By 1974, the Soviet Army had increased by 20 divisionsall motorized rifle-decreasing the ratio to I to 2.2. The increased Soviet emphasis on combined arms has run parallel with the doctririal shift from one variant nuclear war to the adoption of conventional options for the theater forces and was preceded by changes in Soviet ground force organization and command. la In the late 1950s, the Soviet Army was reorganizing to meet what were deemed to be the new demands of nuclear warfare. The artillery branch gave way to the nuclear rocket forces, and infantry was reemphasized in favor of tanks which might survive on a nuclear battlefield. However, with the conversion of the infantry forces to full mechanization, a rival branch to the tank troops, motorized rifle, 14was formed in 1963. At the same time, the concept of the
70

offensive in depth, which emphasized mechanized infantry, was reinstated. la This had been developed by Tukhachevsky in the 1930s but purged by Stalin. In 1967, the Soviet Army brought back the position of Commander in Chief of Ground Forces with the appointment of I. V. Pavlovsky \vho had been in charge of the buildup of Soviet motorized infantry forces on the Chinese border. In the same year, the Soviet Union conducted its first exercise emphasizing conventional rather than nuclear combat, and, from then on, numerous Soviet writers have stressed the importance of ground force arms other than tanks, and there was even the suggestion that the tank divisions be merged with motorized rifle divisions. Contrary to Western expectations and predictions, it took the Soviet Union 15 years to deploy a new main battle tank in Central Europe following the introduction of the T62. ( This is the T72 which is now undergoing initial deployment. ) Yet, over the same period, it designed, developed and deployed five major battlefield air defense systems, five major artillery systems and numerous armored personnel vehiclesin particular, the BMP. Unlike its Western counterparts or previous Soviet models, the BJ2P is not just an armored taxi but wields considerable firepower. This is not only for use against infantry and other armored personnel carriers, for the BMP also contains three eystems an AT(2M, a for combating tanks: turret-mounted 73mm antitank gun and at least one iWG7 antitank grenade launcher carried by a trooper inside. This emphasis on combined arms is reflected in the buildup of Soviet forces in Central Europe over the last five years, for, while the Soviet
Military Review

SOVIET ANTITANK

OEBATE

sPG9 IS 7311MI cafiher, rocket assistedand very efficient

loaded RPG7. Safety

pin is place on the fuse.

Sagger

mounted over the 73mm smooth bore gun on BMP

71

November 1976

SOVIET ANTITANK

OEBATE
outrun tbe infantry and arrive at the

Union has increased the numbei of its tanks in East Germany, artillery, logistics, antitank and air defense capabilities have been increased by larger margins. 16
SOVIET MOtORIZEO INFANTRY THAN TANKS

ARE MORE VULNERABLE

The threat to the Soviet combined arms buildup is of major importance in relation to the new Soviet antitank debate. What is clearly illustrated in recent Soviet writings on antitank weapons is not so much concern over the survival ability of tbe tank as of the operational viability of motorized infantry. The army had previously assessed APCS to be twice as vulnerable as tanks. Apparently, in exercises and field- tests since the Middle East War, the army bas found that the to the BMP is even more vulnerable
new than viet generation was writers of antitank believed, weapons Yet Sopreviously

recognize that the success of a conventional offensive is highly dependent upon the protection and mobility of motorized infantry. Until recently, the army assumed that the infantry, mounted in combat vehicles and ;\,ith the support of massed indirect fire artillery, could overrun NATO defenders and thus maintain a high rate of advance. However, recognition of the increased vulnerability of the f?MP to antitank weapons starts a chain reaction which seems to threaten the entire structure of Soviet offensive doctrine. If f3MPs are significantly more vulnerable than the tanks they are accompanying, they may be destroyed at a much faster rate; the infan@y may then have to dismount in order to carry out the attack on foot which makes the infantry more vulnerable. 17 Since infantry on foot are much slower than tanks, the tanks either 72

defenders lines unescorted, or they must reduce their speed and that of the attack. 1S In either case, the tanks become more vulnerable. Artillery can suppress antitank defenses, but this raises the possibility of a long-drawnout slugging match with lower rates of advance, greater ammunition expenditure and higher logistics requirements. Even more critical, the vulnerability of one component of the Soviet combined arms force places more ~train on the other elements and greatly magnifies the problems of corn. mand and control in small unitsa traditional Soviet weak point reflected in recent exercises. IV Ironically, then, the recent Soviet concern over antitank weapons has actually raised rather than lowered the status of the tank. Practically all of the articles have emphasized the greater vulnerability of the BMP. :0 It is the BMP, not the tank, which is perceived as the weak link in the combined arms chain.
MAINTAINING TIIEOFFENSIVE It is perhaps misleadi~g to classify the recent Soviet writings as an antitank debate, for there is really no argument over whether antitank iveapons are effective, and there is an apparently universal recognition that a tactical revolution is being brought about by the deployment of ATGMs. Nor does there seem to be much disagreement between Soviet commentators over the implicationsthey generally agree that the ground force component most threatened is the motorized infantry which, in turn, raises serious problems for the tempo and coordination of the offensive. What is being debated is how to overcome the challenge of antitank weapons and retain a high rate of advance

Military Review

SOVIET )INTITANK

DEBATE

against a strengthened NATO defensive capability. While Soviet writers do not ~ffer neat policy packages, several patterns appear to be emerging. Reminiscent of the debates over the reduction of ground f o r c es in the Khrushchev era, opinion groups seem to form around service branch rather than on the basis of personality cliques or modernist-traditionalist arguments. The various options can be grouped into three major categories:
THE NUCLEAR OPTION

For 30 years, the keystone of Soviet strategic and operational concepts for the employment of ground forces has been the of pensive. Starting with a massive bombardment of firepower, the ground forces would break through the prepared positions of the defender, and massive tank armies would follow to engage the opponents mobile reserves. At the end of World War II, the breakthrough phase was to be conducted by the massing of artillery fires. By the late 1950s, the massive conventional artillery barrage had been replaced by multiple nuclear strikes: by the late 1960s, the Soviet doctrine again considered the possibility of a conventional breakthrough. Despite three decades of doctrinal and technical development, the armored forces were still thought to be the prime means of exploiting a breakthrough. But ATGM technologies threaten the Soviet Army with a tactical revolution and the potential abandonment of the armored offensive. There is consequently a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to return to its earlier dependence upon nuclear weapons as a means of overcoming antitank defenses. Traditionally, the Soviet Union has not mirrored NATOS penchant for
November 1976

low-yield tactical nuclear weapons fired from self-propelled artillery, depending, rather, on higher yield and less accurate rocketdelivered warheads. However, the last few years have seen a new interest in, and admi ration for, self-propelled artillery in Soviet writings, with some linking of this with low-yield artillery-fired tactical nuclear weapons. *1 In addition, several Soviet writers have argued recently that the problems which antitank weapons pose for the BMP do not apply in a nuclear environment. The first reason put forward ia that, in anticipation of nuclear fires, the defender will have to dieperse his forces in case they fall victim to nuclear effects. J Second, with the use of highly accurate nuclear fire against the defensive positions, the infantry do not have to dismount from APCS and the attack can proceed at a high rate of advance. ::+ Evidently, the Soviet Union only sees antitank weapons as a threat when nuclear weapons are not ueed. Yet Soviet ground force commanders are clearly unwilling to discount the antitank problem by relying solely on nuclear weapons. For the present, the nuclear solution seems to have been ryled out by both political and operational considerations.
THE ARTILLERY OPTION

In countering antitank weapons, particular importance is attached to the role played by the artillery. Many Soviet authors, particularly those from the artillery branch, argue that only massive suppressive fire from artillery: . . . is capable of reliably destroying an enemys anti-tank defense. During fh e conduct of combat operations not involving the use of weapons of mass destruction such a task rests almost
73

SOVIET ANTITANK evztimty

DEBATE

upon the artillery. J The artillery branch apparently relishes this new role for two main reasons: that, within the Soviet Army, supervision of ATGMs falls under the artillery branch; and that this is a major opportunity for artillery to regain its pre-Khrushchev influence and command over resources. In the antitank debate, the proarmor writers insist that traditional indirect artillery fire is not sufficient to suppress antitank weapons. z~ The artillery advocates recognize this and repeatedly point out that artillery fire against antitank positions is much more effective when fired in a direct rather than an indirect mode. ~o But, to be truly effective in the direct-fire mode, artillery will have to be decentralized in battery-sized units down to battalion level and many direct fire weapons are needed to penetrate
a de fense. 27 To has crew ensure tactical to that the artillery and weapon enable the mobility

be expanded, and even greater strain will be placed upon an already frugal logistic structure. The artillery itself becomes much more exposed, and its decentralization becomes a major problem in coordinating massed fires. ME MANEUVER As
the the might troops be tank strongly OPTION officers than of with slow

expected, Rather

disagree

artillery

branch.

survive in close proximity to the tactical battle, the artillery must be armored and self-propelled. In fact, within the last year, the Soviet Union has deployed two new self-propelled large caliber artillery pieces with direct-fire capability. This emphasis upon decentralized direct-fire selfpropelled artillery demonstrates a major shift in traditional Soviet thought which hitherto emphasized massed indirect artillery barrages fired from towed equipment. ~~ As the Soviet experts themselves are wel~-aware, parceIing out artillery in battery-sized units and attempting to coordinate the artillery with tanks and infantry is not witbout its potential disadvantages: even a small-unit tactical assault is rendered enormously complex. Battalion staffs-traditionally lean in personnelwill have to 74

the offensive down, they want to speed it up. Arguing against holding the armored forces back as the infantry launch a dismounted attack, General Bukharenko of the tank troops states: [twould seem that in modern fast moving combat when each minute is precious, that this is not the best wag to use such high speed militarti rnate~iel. ~v Tank Troop General Skorodumov goes even further and attributes tbe vulnerability of Soviet APCS to the elowness of attack. 3~ These rejoinders by high-level tank officers raise some interesting points. First, they do not attempt to deny the effectiveness of antitank weapons. Second, where the tank advocates take exception to the artillery proponents is not in the use of fire suppression, but the restrictions such- dependence places upon the speed of the attack. Third, while tbe BMP was originally perceived as a potential competitor to tanks (having many of tbe characteristics of a tank and closely associated with the meteoric rise of the rival motorized infantry branch ), recently the tank branch has closed ranks with their armored brethren and become the most ardent defenders of the BMP. Basing their arguments on the BMPs superior speed and antitank armament, tbe tank commanders hold that not only should the infantry remain mounted, but that independent
Mititary Review

SOVIET ANTITANK

DEBATE

13iWP units should be used in daring surprise raids deep in the enemy rear. 31 But how can the vulnerability of BMP units to antitank weapons be reduced by placing greater emphasis upon them ? The key to this question may lie in the Soviet interest in the growing density of antitank deployment. Soviet writers have long held that densitythe ratio of force to spaceis the key variable inffueneing rate of advance, The greater the quantity of force in a given area, the slower the movement, and, conversely, with a low force-to-space ratio, the battlefield becomes granular rather than linear, fluid instead of static. Instead of nuclear weapons to disperse the defense, the armor advocates call for preemptive maneuverattacking the defense before it mobilizes and deploys a dense antitank defense. Soviet writers note that surprise attacks with conventional weapons offer the same opportunities as nuclear strikes for low force densities: fluidity of maneuver, and a high initial rate of advance. There are, then, several indications that, in tbe event of conflict with NATO, the Red Army would prefer to

launch a surprise attack without needing to rely upon massive mobilization of the rear echelon divisions in the Soviet Union or tilling out understrength forces of the Warsaw Pact. Such an attack, with in-place theater forces, might have a prospect of catching iVATO before, or in the process of, mobilization, thus preventing the West from establishing a linear and dense forward-deployed antitank defense. This would permit the Soviet UniOn to concentrate its forces in the weakest zones of the defense and so maintain their potential for a rapid rate of advance. Soviet commentators often make the point that NATO ground forces, particularly the West German and American Armies, are not geared to a prepared defense in depth, which would make the most favorable use of antitank weapons, but remain committed to the doctrine of a mobile defense based on brigade and division-level armored counterattacks. Thus, while the West still seems to believe that the tank is the best means of antitank defense, Soviet military writers are beginning to stress the offensive use of antitank weapons. .

NOTES
1 Colonel Obsolete?,<. E B. Amqi. Atkesor,, ,.1s the Sw. i,.t Arnw May 1974, PP 10-16. ATC. M ( ant, -tank mided missde. ), anti-tank mm o. a tracked base and , emdless g... 1.s a rule >elf-propelled) . tanks. ..df-~mpelled umts, BMP I mecbanked infantry Combat vehmlesl, Krenade-launehem NOW not only each sub-un,t has ant,.tank means but eaeh sold,er ,, ., The ltxm=rien.e of WarInto Traintnx Practices, -, Hwczkl, July 1975. Major Germ. [ of Tank .Troops I. Skorod.mov wr, tes that : .SMore effect,. methods mu,t be found for cmnbatuu? antbtsnk w.aPons havmw van... fim.c ra.ws .ATGM, we.ade-thrmvem, recoMess mm, and hekmwtem aimed wtb ant,ta.k wennons The,, have become formidable wap.n. f., use agm.st tanks and other rnnm?ed vehmles hav, ng vario.a armor thickmeases.-, ,,A. Attack at High Speed,,, Mdttarv Herald, March 1975. Lw.tenant General Kmttchuck states cateEor.

2 Jeffrey Record, .v!z, vg ttn the Soviet Amv, The Brooki. k-s Institution, Wsshmgto., UC. 1!J15, D 48. :3 .,,

Re~.,wd ,.
also ,%ft[,taw

Red Star. 16 November Herald, Jaua IY 1975,

19;4, P 1, D 16.

M,lztew

4 Marshal A. A. Grechko, Amed F . . . . . of the .?o.wt Stat., Second Edition, MOSCOW, USSR, 1976, p 198. F, For instance, Marshal G, Peredelsky, Cmn. rnandm of Rocket Troops. and Artillery. ha warned: .,Combat actiom m the course of the Ktddle East conllmt testify that modern aim-tank defense m the pmot of d defense. It >neludes

November 1976

75

SOVIET ANTITANK

OEBATE

For exmnD1e, see four.e.rtmle series by Colonel Red A. M. Latuki., ., Weapons AEainst .$t,w, 22 October 197.5: 12 November 1976. 4 De. ember 1976: and 13 December 1976.

Tanks,,,

7 B. Antsin, , Antitank Guided Missiles m De. fense,Sow,t M,ltt,aru Rev,etu, July 1975: and Lieutenant Colonel Y. Volodin, SAnt, tank Means ,n Defense,,. May 1975. SOiet M,l,tarv Reman, 8 Cited m T. W, Wolfe, S.m,et PCJWW and E. w?ns. 194$-1970, The Job, Hopk,ns Umvers,ty Press, Bmlt,rno, e, MD, 1970, D 175. 9 V. Ed,ted I. Len,,, a,, d the ,%wet Arnt.d Fovccs. by Colonel GenemJ A. S. ZheltrJv, M,htary House, MOSCOW, USSR, 19$7, P 264. Geek+l Zheltc,, IS bead of the Len,. Pokttmd Academy.

Colonel Mnlitary

F.bhsbuw

~ @a ha, f the ~~ .r~ic,e, ..,.,, ~he rent antitank debate ba.e focused . the BMP vulnerability exclusive+.. 1 fact, when tanks are mentmed, it ,. usually I a fwmable mntextthat is, that tanks are l-s vulnerable or that they should lead the abs=lt. The only tank-deckmted srt~cle \v,thi the last year was ColoIId N. ShaPO,,1OV, Teach,.% Crtw% to Combat Tank., Self PmDelled Amllew and ATGMfl Mdzt.zrv Herald, June 1976.
= ,,.

.f

10 Ma>.. General G. Biry.kov ( Ati,llew) and Colonel G. Mel.ikov, A,, titwth Wnrfaro, Progress Publmhw%, MOSCOW. USSR, 1972. 11 Y. A. KOSY,W, Y. ?& Orehkgv Fmmn, Tank,, Moscow, USSR, 1973. and N, N.

21 Colonel ;;;l, Artiller

P. Grigorwv, .. Development y.,, SOetet Mdtttwv Rwteto, ., Features of March 1974. O!J. at.

of CanAnfmst Modern

22 colonel v. Sa, k,, Combat,,, Mdttmru Herald, :,) P,sbakov and K,rpach,

12 Colonel N. N,k,t,n, in tbe Strufrxle -New With Tanks,,+ B.n,,er Ca+-rter, May.1974, See also Colonel N,kitm mid Ccdoel S. Petmv, .,lsI.ael. Awmessio. m October 1973.,, Mihtaw Historu Jon-ml, November 1974. 13 See Job Erickson, .%.tet Thcat,e_ Warf=r, Cmrzb,l,tu Doctrww, DeIJIwww,,ta a.,d Ob,oc. t,,.. Mom?rspb, March 1975; ad John Er, ekm,r,, SOWet M, M,l,II Post,,,, and Pol,c ,n Eu,,Jw, Stanford Research Inst,tute, Stanford, CA, 19;4. 14 1. S LYapunov, ,, Motorized Rifle Troops,., 130[akw,z Souiet Ermwbwedta, Third Ed,tion, 1970 15 Qti<,stimu of St.ategg ,md Opc,atwx,at A,t i,, SOwt M,kta,v Wink. 1917., 9J+0. Ed,ted by A B Kadisber, bfc.scow, USSR, 1965. See also CO1O..I P. Matmmov, .,017en8ive Battle ,. Depth,,, Sovt,t Mdztarv Rwietu, October 1970.

!* Colonel A, Rdi> wtrude IWY and Ant&Ttmk weapons; May 19;4.

Between ArtilMdttam Herald.

M D,r.ct file ~. .ver oen sight., mm.er can %.. the tarxet. ,d, rect rected onto the tnmet by a b.,,,,, some d,,tance from tbe guns.

~ben the fire is d,d,mlaced

?7 colonel v sehvm, ,,Dire$t F!..,,, Sovzet .Mibtnw Ec{. ,, Novmnbe, 1976. See .1.. Colonel v Selw.v,, .. AFtilletY Breaches [ Ant,-Tankl Sov,ct M{htaw R<mtotu. August 1975. Obstacles,,, 28 The .r,gina, ~t..Donent. of ,,lf.DroDelled a,. t,llew came from the tank brancb wb,ch armed that the.. weazms should fall under the!r ,urkdtctm, apparetl~ they lost. For a dew.ded dts. . . . .. . . see Mtmshal of Tank TmoPs I%vel A. Rotm,>trov. 1tme and the Ztudc, Mmaow. USSR, 1972. PO 266-69.

~:, ~ieutenan~

Gene,.,

~ukk,,ko,
Battle. .?

W.

the

Utility of the BMP November 1975.

fdttaw Hmdd.

Soviet 18 The problem ,> so severe that SW,d write.. have Proposed f m%ettinz the @MP and mountis the troom . . tbe backs of tanks as i World War 11. See Lm.tea.t Colonel M. Twbko,

76

Military Review