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AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION
 
CIVIL-MILITARY FUSION CENTRE
AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION
April 2013 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises
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Prospect for a Crisis in Post-2014 Afghanistan
Katerina Oskarsson
Governance and Economic Development Desk Officer katerina.oskarsson@cimicweb.org
This report provides a snapshot of
experts’ views on possib 
le scenarios that may unfold in Afghanistan after 2014. It also presents a brief overview of factors poised to shape the trajectory of the on-going transition and potential for a crisis in Afghanistan post-2014. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. 
Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text
fghanistan is amid transition which will set the stage for its future trajectory. The question of whether that trajectory will be relatively stable or whether Afghanistan is on a path to a renewed civil war has  been a subject of vigorous and inconclusive debate. While scepticism coexists with great hope for the future of post-2014 Afghanistan, there currently remain many uncertainties about the future political, security and economic environment in the country. Notably, there is a combination of factors poised by different degrees to shape whether Afghanistan will slide back to a crisis or whether it will sustain itself on a stable enough path. Those factors include: a level of overall Western assistance, implications of inevitable foreign aid cuts, sustainability of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), the outcome of the 2014 elections, the  prospect of a political settlement, future of the insurgency, and regional dynamics. In an effort to shed more light on a possible trajectory of Afghanistan after 2014, this report explores each of these intertwined and complex variables by synthetizing findings and debates of the research community on these issues and
Afghanistan’s post
-2014 trajectory in general. The report demonstrates that while the outlook for post-2014 Afghanistan remains rather blurry - as many of the variables are currently in flux, unpredictable or unfolding - there has emerged a certain degree of consensus among experts on the potential developments in post-2014 Afghanistan.
Possible Scenarios
 
Citha D. Maass and Thomas Ruttig, experts of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) outline four possible scenarios. In the first scenario, a situation in Afghanistan may
evolve into “a
fragile oligar 
chical system” held together by
 interdependence between the Afghan president and co-opted regional power brokers who would prevent an internal power struggle from spiralling into civil war in efforts to preserve their access to power and patronage. Under such a scenario, the Taliban would not be formally extended a share of power. The central government would be able to hold major urban centres while many
A
 
 
AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // PROSPECT FOR A CRISIS IN POST-2014
April 2013 Page 2
rural areas would fall under indirect control of the Taliban. Based on the second scenario, the power oligarchy would be extended to the Taliban and other insurgent groups as they would be formally integrated into the government. In both of these scenarios, the experts project that the
 political system “would continue to be
 burdened by inefficient, corrupt governance, a fragile balance of power, rampant crime, and the constant threat of civil war.
 Under the third scenario, the Taliban could seize control of the capital and large parts of the country. In a final scenario, Afghanistan could descend into civil war of varying intensity. According to some experts, descent into a civil war or falling under the
Taliban’s complete control
 is not inevitable. A March 2013 working paper by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) projects three likely outcomes
: “a weak and divided state, a state that either devolves into regions controlled by power
 brokers or warlords, or one that comes under at least partial
Taliban and extremist control.”
Anthony H. Cordesman of CSIS projects that the ultimate result may be an Afghanistan that fractures along ethnic,  sectarian, and tribal lines. While this outcome would weaken the central government, it does not necessarily entail a victory for the Taliban and other insurgent groups since they too face many challenges, including internal frictions, lack of public support and limited influence in many parts of the country. According to Corde
sman, “this may limit insurgent gains and control as
 well as mitigate the risk that Afghanistan will
 become a centre of terrorism.”
 Along similar lines, a different CSIS study projects that Afghanistan may
achieve relative stability “based on some form of de facto 
federalism or sharing of power   between the central
government and given factions”. In other words
, a fractured Afghanistan composed of national and local power  blocs may still be able to hold the country together and contain the insurgent groups including the Taliban. While such an outcome is far from desirable, it may be at least
“strategically viable”, notes Cordesman in his
 2013 Afghanistan field report. Similarly, Thomas Barfield, an expert from Boston University, assesses
“Afghans’
 
dissatisfaction with a centralized [government] that cannot cope with the country’s regional
diversity or with expectations for local self-
rule” 
Afghanistan’s fragmentation.
 Similarly, Toby Dodge of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) forecasts that the Afghan  pre
sident will likely have to embrace the rules of Afghan politics that existed prior to 1979 in which “the
centre returns to a mediating role between the regions
.” The IISS study
assesses that there appears to be no alternative to this outcome as international attention shifts elsewhere and access to financial assistance, that has  bound an elite to the central government, diminishes. In his testimony to the British parliament in July 2012 Stuart Gordon forecasted a likely scenario of
“somewhere towards status quo and 
areas, but with a central degree of authority and stability”
. In contrast, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
anticipates “a 
continued escalation of violent conflict fuelled  by the departure of foreign security forces an
d subsequent increased humanitarian need”
. As the number of post-2014 international forces drop, Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) projects that local militias will likely re-form in their attempt to prevent the Taliban from returning. However, this could trigger ethnic and communal conflict, potentially resulting in a reversion to rule  by faction leaders and a countrywide struggle for power. Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND Corporation forecasts:
What eventually will happen, then, is not clear . Ideally, the Afghan government will survive the economic crisis; the country will elect a new government as it is scheduled to do in 2014
and will hold its own militarily, although probably not to the nation’s frontiers. The Taliban
 
 
AFGHANISTAN IN TRANSITION // PROSPECT FOR A CRISIS IN POST-2014
April 2013 Page 3
and the Haqqani Network will expand their area of influence, probably with assistance from  Pakistan, while Afghan opponents of the Taliban and Pashtun domination will prepare their own defences. The civil war will escalate, and in a worst-case scenario, Afghanistan will descend into chaos
 — 
a giant Somalia in the heart of Asia.
While some observers draw parallels with the post-1989 situation which resulted in civil war, it is far from obvious whether the current situation will arrive at the same outcome. According to British Commons cross-
 party defence committee’s chairman James
Arbuthnot, experts who gave evidence to the committee concluded
“there was a 
of Afghanistan descending into civil war.”
Given the current political and security situation in Afghanistan, the IISS volume
“Afghanistan to 2015 and beyond”
 
argues for “a cautious but highly
,” and projects that Afghanistan will not rapidly ret
urn to civ
il war. While the IISS’
experts expect Afghanistan to remain weak and unstable, they assess that a rapid state collapse is unlikely
 because the “centre of government in Kabul has been reconstituted to the extent that it will manage to hold
together, place limits on the ability of the insurgents to operate within the country and on external actors who
seek to undermine internal instability.” Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in February 1989, contrary
to widespread expectations at the time, N
ajibullah’s unpopular regime was able to remain in power and hold
on to the large cities for over three years thanks to continued Soviet military and economic assistance. According to IISS
’ experts
, today, the central government has more power  than Najibullah had in 1989-92  primarily because Afghan president Hamid Karzai has deployed financial resources to support elite who are dependent on him financially and politically. Secondly, the current government has also made strategic inroads
into the Pashtun community and “this has the potential after 2015 to limit the Taliban’s capacity to
successfully launch a sustainable political and military offens
ive.”
Drawing on the lessons-learned from the post-Soviet withdrawal, Mark N. Katz of the Middle East Policy Council projects the following:
 
 
Following the withdrawal of ISAF forces by the end of 2014, American and allied military and economic assistance to the Afghan government may enable it to maintain power in the major  population centers.
 
It is far from obvious that the Taliban will return to power, despite the likelihood that they will continue to receive Pakistani assistance so long as the Kabul government continues to receive significant aid from the US and its coalition allies.
 
Opposition to the central government may decline after the ISAF forces withdraw. The effectiveness of Afghan government forces may rapidly increase once they are responsible for their own survival (as demonstrated after the Soviet withdrawal).
 
The central government’s power is likely to diminish
 rapidly if US and allied support ends. Ultimately, as British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond and many other observers conclude, nobody can say
“with certainty”
 what the future for Afghanistan will be. Despite this uncertainty, a mix of economic, political and security factors outlined below will shape the overall trajectory of post-2014 Afghanistan.

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