I

The discussion over how the new light infantry unit should be entp[oyed is continuing. Is it best suited for low, mid or highintensity warfare? Does it require more organic support, or are plugs the answer? What about mobility once it is deployed? [n this article, the author looks at some of these questions andpronoses a solution.

HE infantry communitys interest in light forces has had significant impact on the Armys programed force structure. The decision to forgo the mechanization of another infantry division, the creation of two new light infantry divisions and the conversion of two other divisions represent a major shift in emphasis. There have been a number of articles on the use of light infantry in a mid to highintensity environment. Some authors suggest the employment of light divisions in a European environment, while others sug gest that brigade or battalion-sized units might be more easily integrated into a European scenario: No one seriously questions the need for light infantry in builtup areas where close combat is the rule. This encompasses a good deal of Central Europe. But how is the currently programed light infantry supposed to move from one battle position to another? It is not going to walk from town to town. Air assault unifs do not even have sufficient helicopters to jitterbug acrossl the battlefield, let aIOne lesswell-endowed light infantry. Besides, what is a battalion commander supposed to do on a rainy, foggy night with a tank division bearing down on him? Helicopters will perform many valuable functions, but picki~~up passengers under direct fire fro~ massed enemy armor is not one of them Our current mechanized infantry tactics emphasize their mounted nature. Even when an M113 platoon dismounts,

the (armored personnel carrier) provides most of the tire power. With the Bradley fighting vehicle, this tendency increases. The infantry squid becomes a curious marriage of a 3,000-

~ith the Bradleyfighting vehicle . . . [the] itrfatrfrystyrad becomes a curious marriage Of a 3,W0.meter missilesysfenrwith a 2tWmeter, small-armssystem, The dismounted strength of a Bradleycompany will be a&out ha/f the stretrgth of its /ight infanfry counterpart.

meter missile system with a 200-meter, small-arms system. The dismounted ~ strength of a Bradley company will be, about half the strength of its light infantry~ counterpart. With his mounts increased),:. ,;, antiarmor role, the emphasis on mobile tat-, tics and the need to avoid being fixed at: close range, the Bradley-mounted infan-! tryman E not likely to find his way to the close terrain where his skills are moqt needed. Perhaps the Bradley company might be more appropriately viewed as missilefiring light armor with its own security force. When the opposing heavies fight each other to a standstill on the highspeed approaches, who is going to tight the close battle for the covered avenues? Who
!

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65

is going to man the strongpoints and repel the close assaults or alternatively make the assaults on enemy strongpoints? Is a battalion commander going to want to risk his high-value missile carriers at ranges at which dismounted infantry assaults? How are company commanders supposed to keep track of Bradleys in an overwatch position 2,000 meters away when his dismounted troopers are fighting for their lives against several times their number? A full-strength Bradley squad dismounts only six infantrymen. US doctrine calls for the dismounted platoon to maneuver as a group as if it were an Overstrength squad. Mechanized infantry was not always configured this way. In the mid-1960s, the two teams iu a mechanized infantry squad were Alfa and Bravo fire teams, not the carrier and the dismount teams. Airborne, leg and mechanized infantry were all c,ensidered more similar than dissimilar. The 1965 7-series field manuals carried the subtitle Infantry, Airborne and Mechanized, Infantry fought i= infantry regardless of how they were transported to battle, By the earIy 1970s, the doctrine changed. Influenced by several foreign armies, a transition was made to the concept of infantry fighting while mounted. Concentration was on the mobile fight between combat vehicles at extended ranges. Ml 6 rifles add little to this type of engagement. The Soviets are well aware of the US penchant for battle positions with longrange fields of fire. They have re-emphasized infiltration tactics through close terrain to penetrate forward positions. US exercises have pointed out this vulnerability. Infantry traveling through close terrain has been able to close with defensive units overmatching high-speed approaches with little diffkulty.

Enter the infantryman. But how is he going to enter? Tro~ps without overhead cover are the most vulnerable system of all. Tests conducted by the B undeswehr indicate that more than 95 percent of the infantry would become casualties in a Soviet-type barrage: Bunkered light infantry is a formidable protected force, and those same tests predict less than 10 percentcasualties. Without the ability to maneuver, the force is reduced to the crust defenses of the 1940s. By employing firepower to create a breach and the mobility differential between armor and foot infantry in exploitation, any contemporary tactician can make short work of such positions over an extended front. A division sector, at best one-thirtieth of the Central Front, is much too large to expose to this risk. Even most 10-kilometer brigade sectors are not likely light infantry candidates. But there are a lot of battalion sectors and strongpoints that are ideally suited to close-combat infantry tactics.

ARMORED MECHINFANTRY

mwmwwxsus

Sometimes definitions clarify a point. Define armored infantry as infantry mounted in and fighting from heavily armed, armored vehicles. Bradley infantry is armored-infantry. Mechanized infantry is light infantry that is transported in lightly armored carriers. It is 1960s-era, twd-fire-team squad, Ml13transported infantry. Like its air assault counterpart, it has a customary means of transportation butfights at close quarters dismounted. Its <foxhole strength is double its Bradley counterpart, but it lacks the long-range firepower of 25mm chain guns and TOW antitank missile launchers

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Separating the [mechanized] infantry company from its carriers would be a standard drill, Unhorsed, the company would behave like any other infanhy company. The carrier sections could consolidate at battalion, be sent off to another task (perhaps providing mobility to a light unit) orsimplybe left behind.

(except in the improved TOW vehicle (ITV) company). It fights in urban and heavily wooded terrain like any other light infantry but has the protected mobility to move from one battle position to another or from town to town in concert with the mobile tactics envisioned in our current doctrine. Figure 1 shows the proposed organization. Compare it to the light infantry battalion in Figure 2. The company antitank section is eliminated. These spaces, with the machinegun teams in the platoon headquarters, provide the manpower for the fourth squad in each platoon. Each squad has a Dragon and an M60 machinegun. Because it has organic transportation, it can carry the added weapons. When dismounting, the platoon carries what it needs. If the company deploys without its carriers, it can deploy either Dragon or machinegun heavy, depending on the mission. The extra rifle squads maximize flexibility and provide the element the heavy

community is currently missing. The foursquad platoon has the manpower needed to seize and hold close terrain. Separating the infant~ company from its carriers would be a standard drill. Unhorsed, the company would behave like any other infantry company. The carrier se,ctions could consolidate at battalion, be sent off to another task (perhaps providin~ mobility to a light unit) or simply be le~f behind. The drill would be analogous tr# combat engineers reorganizing as infaq~ i try and would be practiced frequently. ~ Careful analysis should be made of the administrative vehicle structure. Mecha: nized units have a tendency to add support vehicles over time. Light infantry uniis will deploy with a very austere combat service support structure. Mechanized /light infantry can be similarly lightened. I We have increased, battalion manpower by about 100-40 carrier drivers, 50 maintenance people and about 10 in the transportation section. But we have certairily added teeth. Compared to its foot-mobile,

MILITARY REVIEW

o October 1986

, light infantry counterpart, mechanized light infantry has one-third more rifle squads and twice the ground-mounted machineguns, not counting the carriermounted 50-caliber machineguns. Dragon trackers are doubled and TO Ws quadrupled. Given the emphasis on the opening battles of the next war, the trend to trade off nondivisional support for added deployable combat units makes sense. We are trading some sustainability for initial combat power. The support spaces that are needed to convert three battalions in each of two divisions would require less head-

count than one Continental United States (CONUS)-based nondivisional engineer battalion. Which will better enhance our mobility and survivability in the openinq engagements? Mechanizing a light infantry unit is not a etrap-on augment ation. It fundamentally changes the structure of line battalions. It is clearly an organic change not amenable to a corps plug. We have added capability to the division. An alternative to fund the needed manpower might be to eliminate a separate unit earmarked as a plug for the light division. I doubt there are many division

IWechanizedLight Infantry Battalion

light Infantry Battalion

,@m IzQ @
18 17VTOW

4107

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12 MAW 12 h460 12 M113

6 MAW

k%chanizad Light Infantry Company

light Infantry Company

1 g
HQ
1 M113

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Figure 1

Hlic.neadwrters andkeadwarlwmmpw WNezdaua@ew lTWmpro,ed mwvih(cle Mhw.raedlum motank weapon Figure 2

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. . . annorplate [has] its advantages in a law to medium.intensity fight. . . . an Ml13.equippedforce is betterahle to cany on extensive mountedpat#u//ing and can do so with fewer casualties than a light unif augmented with some Hum. mere. This could mean the difference between success and failure in a low-intensity police action LJrshow of force,

commanders who would prefer an augmentation that has not trained day by day with his unit over organic capability, World War II experience with general headquarters ,pool units reinforces this point. Divisions in Europe quickly latched on to their nondivisional tank, antitank and antiaircraft battalions. The battalion, with fewer support spaces and vehicles than its armored infantry counterpart, may be a libtle more difficult to maintain. But the primary mission is not to closely follow fast-mOving tank units. Mechanized light infantry will spend a considerable amount of time out of its vehicles and on the ground. It tights as line infantry. It moves between fights at mechanized speed. Its light armor protection allows it to move in the face ofkmall arms and artillery fragments that can stop and destroy a foot-mobile unit.

weapon. It is a close-combat, close-terrain force. Unlike foot infantry, it can screen extended frontages. This is especially critical in the air-land battle as we concentrate forces in decisive sectors. It hae been suggested that light infantry be used in an : economy-of-force role to free heavies to maneuver. Historically, this type of mission was envisioned for highly mobile ,1 armored cavalry. A relatively immobile unit covering an extended front is likely to be overwhelmed. With the hordes potential opponents ~ can deploy in their assault echelons, it is a} llttle difficult to believe that sufficien}j,..f combat units will be available to dedictatd ~. ~ some to rear area combat. However, mech - { anized light infantry, with its vehicular mobility, is much more suited for the role of reaction force. Should helilift be avah - 7 ble, it can change mounts easily. Light infantry missions will increase with troop density. The need for holding covered approaches will increase as (hopefully) the battle for high-speed approaches grinds to a halt. Placing mechanized light infantry in the CONUS-based North Atlantic Treaty Organization-earmarked heavy divisions j

Mech infantry Becomes Light

Mechanized infantry can be assigned any of the traditional light infantry roles as it fights independently of its transportation. Unlike its armored (Bradley) counterpart, it is not wedded to a 3,000-meter

@
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October 1986

69 ,

is an optimal method of integrating them into the force. The substitution also reduces the cost of POMCUS (pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets). Cross attachment of infantry units can make a lot of sense. A mechanized light infantry company adds a lot of groundholding and patrolling manpower to a Bradley battalion. A Bradley company positioned behind a mechanized light infantry battalion provides long-range, antiarmor tires. In both cases, the crossattached force has the tactical mqbility for synchronized action. Mechanized light infantry also increases the flexibility of the heavies. Should we find ourselves in another conflict involving large infantry formations, these units can be unhorsed and deployed. Remember, they are trained to fight as infantry, not as mounted troops.

PureLightInfantry
HistQrically, light infantry operations are mounted at battalion level and lower. Conventional tactics are no good for light forces. Light forces may be deployed at the operational level of war, but they always fight at the tactical level. Normally, light forces are ill-armed to defend against armored vehicles, even in close terrain. These quotations answer the question, Is pure light infantry a tactical or operational concept? Most light infantry concepts are tactical ones. Yet, a division is a major subelement of an operational-level formation. Individual battalions can employ unconventional tactics. Divisions cannot. We may face a heavy opponent, or we may face an opponent best countered by the high tactical mobility of air assault. Strategically, mobile light infantry battalions and brigades may be needed as blocking units as our forces hurry across the globe. Tactically, we may need them to hold strongpoints around which more mobile units maneuver. Butonly in exceptional circumstances are we likely to need operational-sized units that maneuver at boot-leather speed. Light infantry is manpower-intensive. Unfortunately, this characteristic militates against the United States supplying light infantry to an allied effort. No other country can afford the density of high-cost, hlghtechnology systems the United States funds. Conversely, the United States is much less willing to generate additional military manpower. True, light infantry lends itseif to air assault tactics, especially in a Third World environment. But we are not adding helicopters commensurate with the need to move the formations we are cr~ati

fvlech Light Infantry Becomes Heawy

One need read only a few accounts of Vietnam tiretights where armor plate was available to gain an appreciation of its advantages in a low to mid-intensity tight. The ividespread availability of light antitank weapons means that any vehicle lighter than the Ml tank faces an ambush threat from light forces. However, an Ml13-equipped force is better able to carry on extensive mounted patrolling and can do so with fewer casualties than a light unit augmented with some Hummers. This could mean the difference between success and failure in a low-intensity police action or show of force. A mechanized company adds a highly mobile maneuver force to a leg light infantry battalion. It allows the battalion commander to concentrate on the defense in a timely manner. On the offense, the carriers allow rapid maneuver, increasing the tempo of the attack.

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Strategically, mobile light infantry battalions and brigades may he needed as blocking units aS our forces fmrryacross thaglobe. Tat-, tics//y, we may need them to hold stmngpoints around which more mobile units maneuver. But only in exceptional circumstances are we likely to needoperational-sizedunits that manetwerat boot-/eathersfleed. i

ing. In an allied environment, infantry will be in greater supply than helicopters. We do need the ability to act unilater. ally. But, in most of these scenarios, we are talking about brigades, not corps. Among the Rangers, the airborne and the Marines, we have significant capability.

POTENTIAL

DEPLOYMENTS

Stopping a sudden lunge by a heavily armored opponent in Central Europe is viewed as the Armys most demanding task. It is also one of the least likely. The creation of light forces has been viewed asa move to increase ourcapability to react to more likely scenarios in the Third World. We face the tradeoff between curability torespond quickly to a distant trouble spot and our ability to sustain heavy combat once we arrive. The light infantry division emphasizes strategic mobility at the expense of firepower and battlefield mobility. It can be airlifted in about 500 C141 sorties. 1 It has been pointed out that it may be able to deploy quickly, but it may not be able to survive once deployed. The light infantry division has neither the brigade antitank companies of the airborne division no~ the suft3cient organic 155mm artillery

of the air assault division. Southwest Asia is the most distant and difficult area for deployment. All of the indigenous armies and potential foes deploy large armored formations. While much of the terrain is mountaino&, more of it is suitable for mechanized movement. Third World nations everywhere are increasingly heavily armed. The heavy threat is great, even in areas thought of as infantry country. North Korea has 2,800 tanks, Cuba has 540 and Vietnam has 2,500. One-third of the Nicaraguan army is mechanized. 1 Given our adversarys firepower, how, ~ much foot-mobile light infantry do we riced? SL 7 fast transports can sail from ~ the East Coast to the Persian Gulf in 17, , days. How much light infantry is going to ~ be airlifted in behind the airborne? ~, ~M ; It is difficult to question the need for the , 82d Airborne and the Ranger regimerit. ~ They provide the capability to handle q wide range of threats from terrorism! to providing tbe break-in force to enter ~ hostile theater in a large conflict. But we are creating four light dfvisions ~ based in the 50 states, all with apparent strategic reserve roles. Are we lik ,Y to insert a corps-size force by air? Even f we move the assault elements, the sustaini L supply tonnages and the follow-on forcek will most certainly be delivered by sealifti.

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Octobsr 19S6

Vietnameaa Wger scout and 9th Infantry Divialon troops (background) walfto ba exfracatad by UHIIJ Hueya, Long An Prodnca, 30 October 1968

*
a

Infhe#tehmgOe/ta, the9fh
Division dismmmtedits mechanizadinfantfibattalion. But [eventuaiiy], it depioyedan armored cavahy regiment, a mechanized brigade and cavai~ squadrons. . . as weii as the wyanic armor of severai infantry divisions.. . . in a iow to mid-intensity envimnmenf, pmtectedmobiiity has proved its worth.

Recent US military demonstrations in Central America allowed sufficient time to move materiel in by sea. One of those demonstrations was an exercise by a Texas National Guard armored unit. Replacing some light infantry battalions with mechanized light infantry certainly adds to the divisions weight, It also adds a lot of capability. An ITV company would be a welcome addition io an airlifted light infantry unit facing an opponent with armor and a tire support system capable of delivering a high explosive on antitank guided missile positions. At 26,000 pounds, the ITV is easily transportable. By comparison, the Bradley is 50,000 pounds, and the light armored vehicle (LAV) is about 28,000 pounds. The Ml 13 represents an available and relatively inexpensive mount. However, any vehicle that provides battlefield mobility in the face of small arms and artillery fragments fits the concept. LAVS, wheeled armored vehicles and a plethora of others may prove to be superior. But

Ml 13s are here now with little strain on the US treasury. With Gramm-RudmanHollings a reality, this becomes increasingly impdrtant. Replacing one-third of a divisions light infantry begs the question of its supporting artillery. The versati~ty of 155mm tubes almost dictates their use. If the light infantry unit deploys alongside heavy units, TACFW?E (Tactical Fire Direction System) will be very important. Without digital tire support communica- tions, the light unit will have great difficulty integrating into the fire support system of the heavy unit. Mechanized infantry is proposed to till two requirements. First, it provides the manpower and close-combat capability to fight in urban and wooded close terrain that is missing in long-range, engagement-oriented heavy forces. It does so while retaining battlefield mobilityboth the ability to move at vehicular rates and the ability to move in the face of smallarms and artillery tire. ,1

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HEAVY VERSUS LIGHT

1

Second, mechanized infantry provides thelightciivision with a mobile force. Its ITVS add much-needed under armor antitank capability. By employing carriers in shifts, itispossible to move a large portion of the parent light force by bounds. In meeting these two requirements, we create a unit with improved versatility. If anything, history has taught us to expect the unexpected. General purpose forces have repeatedly proved their worth often by performing roles their creators did not foresee. Vietnam wasviewed as atypical light infantry country. In the Mekong Delta, the 9th Division dismounted its mechanized infantry battalion. But, before it was through, it deployed an armored cavalry regiment, a mechanized brigade and cavalry squadrons of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, as well as the organic armor of several infantry divisions. They were among the last units withdrawn.
NOTES 1
Ma, OGee,al HW+Wd G Cr@,e!, Jr anOL,etenan, Coloe, Ja,ed

Even in a low to mid-intensity envmonment, protected mobility has proved its worth. Some mayobjec~to the lesseningcf strategic mobility. Butwhataretheprobabilities of need? We are more likely to deploy a large force by sea than by air. Any large force is likely to be engaged for extended periods. Thenumber of military operations that have lasted a week is ove~whelmed by the nuniber that have lasted months and years. Mechanized light infantry, if necessary, can deploy without mostor allof its carriers and receive them as reinforcement. Substituting mechanized light infantry for foot infantry in one-third of the battalions adds a tremendous amount of versatility and combat power. Should we not organize for the most likely requirementsustained combatand retain an option for tbe exceptionair deploymentrather than concentrate just onthe exception? %

Dev,d J 0,.,,, Oc!obe< 1983

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Amor

OPera,,ons

Ann., f.

seP$emb,,. tlw lhltan. ,

L. Bales, He.wy+ght 1984, and Lieutenant and L,ghl D,wsmn,, 2 L,eutenan! gad., lfatry, 3 See,

C.annectton Colonel Robe M,ltt.T Re!,w, Jack B St 1984 F,eld

D,,,,,.., lfantry, July-Agusl S K,llebrew, NATO De@,rence MaY7985, PP2-15 ght Conect,on 0Per8tros, Harneti, Br,OqmeA,r A,,ault PP43-60 Heavy-L, 100-5 M

9 L,eulenant Co,cmel Robe. G $ry Ifmtv, h M,y-June 1978, P 29

Chadrue

Requew Deoaament

Colonel July.Ag

Wood, (FMI

for examPle,

Manual

10 FM 5-101 10 Eng,nee, Combat Operz,rons, Wash, gton, D )C ,1979 APP,6,x D Pro.ertEoilhe 11 Ma,o, scco!t R McM#chael, -. --. !,.. -?5 DP24.25and27 Review, sep!e,l,..! 12 Wtll,arrIJ 01s,, 1 The L,ght Force in,t,at,ve, 1985,03
,7

of the Army. ,) M,l,fpy, d. f ,.

L#ght Infantry, M<l>fa( Rev@v

men! of the Army, Washington, D C P3-9 4 Coloe!W B,ce Mooeand Ma,oGlenn ,tho Deseti Howlo Fqh!, Mr/(fav Revtew,

Jauav1985,

5 FM 77-1, Tank and MechantzeO l. fantq Company Team (How to F,ght), DePmlment of the Army, Wa#ungton, D C 30 June 1977, PP 527. 6 FM7-15, Rrf!. PleCoons .nd Sq.adslnfantT ,zad. De,adment olthe Arm,, WaShlnoton, DC 7 C N Donnelly, De feses; lntemet,onal 8 Cap!e,n 9,.9 Holes GregOv a.d A,rbor.e ,1965 and Mach.Antltimk Plug.

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The US A,r Fmcehas

271 C7418 Thel.ternat!on.a Ma,or EOoe !n.t,!.tefor?!p?!{, General (WA Hunt The Useot AaWs,, Olf#ce, News W;$hB+ka, t \

14 The Mwfaryt?ala.ce, leg,. S1.6,,s, band.., Eng

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15 L,eulenat General Jultan J,. Vrelnam S1dSes SharDe!nQ foRe,lorce mgton, OC 16 Sbelby Washington Mtl,tsV Jdgme!,-US v374, PP 16-17 L DC S1aton ,1981

Ewel! a.d fhe Combat

So.,it Tactics ior O.ercom#.g Delense Rev,ew Ju1Y1979 Fonlenot and Captain 1. fantV. Mallnew May-June

NATO D R.hens, 1978,

Govern meni?<J#>l$ng Orde, of Battle US

V,etnam P334

Me.d,,9Fe.ces

and M8)or

>

MILITARY REVIEW

c October 1986