IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U . S .

TASK FORCE DEFENSE

A Monograph

by
Major Michael D. Burke Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

_.._

Emerqinq Soviet Doctrine: Implications for the U . S . Task Force Defense

Michael D. Burke Major, Infantry

U.S.

School o f Advanced Military Studies Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1 0 January 1989

hpproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

..
.-.

School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Title of Monograph

Major Michael D. Burke Emerging Soviet Doctrine and Its Implications for TF Defense.

Approved by:
.

/
/'

i
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9
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/
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'-'

.. , <. , . ' . ,
i

Lieute7mnt'Colonel Josep

Monograph Director M.P.A.

H.-Purvis,

C O l O M L. D. Holder, MA

d Q & &

Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Accepted this

16 dL

day of

198'. -

ABSTRFICT
EMEHT.ING SOVIET DOCTFIIME: I M P L I L A T I O N S F I X THE IJ. '5. Fj3F:CE DEFENSE, b v i'iajor ; I i c h a e l 2 . Buri:.e?9.5. A r m y .

TA

43 pages This monograph discusses selected aspects of Soviet offensive doctrine with emphasis on trends discussed in unclassified literature. Relevant U.S. heavy task force s then reviewed in light of what the Soviets are doctrine i doing and the implications for defense are highlighted. Subjects addressed in this paper include Soviet use of surprise, tempo, mobile groups, fire support and helicopters, and sophisticated combined arms tactics to deal Nith ii.S. defenses. Soviet concerns over "nuclearlike" weapons are discc!ssed along with relative views of a future high intensity battlefield. Fossible areas of concern for U . S . doctrine developers are identified and discussed along with some ideas for adapting our training to reflect current Soviet doctrine.
T h e paper concludes that tactical sursrise is lii::e?v to b e achieved by the Soviets. and that training and doctrine should reflect this situation. The paper also questions the validity of the assertion that a task: force can defsat a regiment, not because of deficiencies in U.S. doctrine or equipment, b u t as a function of high intensity mobile warfare. In addition, the monoaraph suaqests changine the composition of the OPFOF: at the NTC from 3 riile reqiment. to a tank: regiment. in order to mere c1 osei y model emerqi n g Suvi et: doctrine.

. ,.

T a b l e o f Contents
1ntroduc t i c i r i

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . .
5 6
/

11.

Emerging Soviet Doctrine................ Surprise Tempo.................................. Fire Support Forward Detachments and Deep Rattle.... Combined Arms i n t h e Close Battle...... Command and Control.................... Nuclear Posture and New Weapons..

............................... ...........................

1 r:i 12
14 15

111

. .. . . . U.S. Task F o r c e Defense.. . ... . .. ... . . . . Deep Operations ........................ Main Battle and Reserve Operations.. . . . Security Operations ....................
Command and Control.................... An a 1 y s i s

17
19
19

IV,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Surprise and Tempo.. . . . . .. . ... . . .. . . . . . Combined A r m s , Mobile Groups, and Deep ............... Battle.................. F i r e Support ........................... Security Operations. ...................
Command and Control....................
Cancl~.~.sions.............................

I ,

3iaqrams:

1. 2.
4.

-.
,l,

5.
6.

7.

a.
c

9.

Artillery Scipport.. . . . . . . .. . . . 1?42 Soviet Tank Corps... . . Soviet "shcc!:: subunits", 1945.. . . . . iask organized Soviet battalion.. U. S. Tasl:: force.. .. . . . . . . . Army forward detachment............ Division forward detachment.. Soviet division main attack.. . . . Soviet division supporting attack..

. ... . ...... . . .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . ..
e~ .ar 1 ve c

41 42

4z
44 4 ; 40

47
48
4G

AppeR?:
i ...
.,<.I
Y

7 :

1 Et

'i

Am 6 r i il 31: 1

Enanotez.......

... .. . .. ...........................
1;

E l
; Jc

E : bl

oarap: ,lY..............................

..

PART I :

INTRODUCTION

R e g a r d l e s s o+ t h e c i r c u r n s t a n c o s l e a d i n g t o war b e t w e e n
_I.

t h e Soviet Union and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e outcome of

tne
' 5

.-_

r c : n i l i c t w i l l &spend on ti?e sciccess 0 . q t h e i h r s a w +.act offensive.

will

Hv t h e nature o i t h e a l l i a n c e , t h e i n i t i a t i v e

b e c e d e d t o Warsaw P a c t f o r c e s , a n d NATO w i l l a w a i t t h e T h e s c ~ c c e s so f t h e d e f e n s e a t everv l e v e l w i l l if

blow.

d e t e r m i n e when,

ever, f r i e n d l v f o r c e s go o v e r t o t h e
T h e s t a t i o n i n g of 214.019 o u t o f
766,211

counter-offensive.

a c t i v e Army t r o o p s u n d e r s c o r e s A m e r i c a n d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o

meet a n v S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e h e a d o n . '
R e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e NFITO m i s s i o n a n d
Army w a s

t h e e n o r m i t y of. t h e c h a l l e n s g e f a c i n g t h e U . S . g i v e n p r o m i n e n c e b y t h e 1 7 7 6 e d i t i o n nf Operations.

F M 1!:!!::-5:

T h a t m a n u a l f o c u s e d t h e A r m y ' s a t t e n t i o n on t h e 1973 Y a m K i p p u r w a r a n d t h e t h r e a t p o s e d t h e S o v i e t Union. W i t h t h e a d o p t i o n oS

the
"ce~t.r.5l

t h e r e s u l t s of

b v t h e f o r c e s of
I 8

- ... .*.i..tive deiensc".

A t - - m v a u c t r i n e ,;ave p r i m a c v .C,

3;rt.tie" i n E u r o p e a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d an the p o s s i b i l i t v of war

b i t h t h e Russians. S i n c e 1 9 7 6 , t h e s w i i t g r o w t h of i n c r e a s i n g p a c e of S o v i e t power and t h e

t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e h a v e . % p u r r e d new w h i c h b o t h S o v i e t 2nd i n nature.

v i s i o n s of t h e n e x t b a t t l e f i e l d

American m i i i t a r v a u t h o r s h a v e c a l l e d "Air-Land"

..
* _
I,

! . +..

i e h e rii : iii .A

+r,e p r n d ! . i c t

i.,-,ilz

ST!.,

r . ,

'%.:e,-?;:LQl-, , : , . f

r=p1 __ !.<:>!:..-?.

<.,l-,ic:i-t

1 r,?::-!3,2:.t\:ecj

Hi
.j

r I_an d 5.st1 . : 1e
egari

"

'lor? c1.4

t-

r e n t 1< :

5ov i et p 1 an I-, er- c-

c:

r e r . 1 3 ~ 1 ~ e .:. ~ ~a . I . ~ i a C j , ~ th : qe

l i > : : e l i ? ~ , o r ;I d . + ,->zr':-

nuclear c o n f l i c t i n Europe,

i n l i g h t o i nuclear p a r i t y . "

T h e t h r e a t p o s e d b y t h e m i l i t a r y f o r c e s of t h e Soviet L i n i a n c a u s e d lLI.5. d o c t r i n e t o aijdress Soviet r a c a b i l i t i e s a t + i e l d m a n u a l s on t?,e

)

every l e v e l .

A c a p s t o n e s e r i e s of
(

Soviet A r m y

FB 100-2-1.

&

and

w a s p u b l i s h e d i n 1984.

E v e r y Army b r a n c h s c h o o l S o v i e t armv f i g h t s .

h a s i n s t r u c t i o n o n t h e way t h e

Conflict scenarios involving t h e t w o This Training

s u p e r p o w e r s are d i s c u s s e d a n d e x e r c i s e d r o u t i n e l y . f o c u s a l s o l e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Center (NTC) a t F o r t Irwin, California. t h e National

I n t h e M o j a v e d e s e r t t h e U.S.

Army c o n s t r u c t e d p e r h a p s

t h e most r e a l i s t i c combat t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t y e v e r b u i l t .

3 i s f a c i l i t y is a n i n s t r u m e n t e d t r a i n i n g area w h i c h p e r m i t s
A m e r i c a n task: f o r c e s a n d b r i g a d e s t o e n g a g e a n G p p o s i D s

F o r c e (OPFOR)

w h i c h uses S o v i e t d o c t r i n e a n d e q u i p m e n t A similar, but

m o d i f i e d t o r e s e m b l e R u s s i a n material.

smaller faci!it../

is rut-rentlv

b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d ir, E!-!rooe K C

a , l l a w f o r w a r d d e p l a y e d u n i t s t h e s.ame t r a i n i n g o p p o r t i . . ! n i t v .

A r e a i l of

t h e s e a t t e m p t s t o r e p l i c a t e combat a g a i n s t

S o v i e t f o r c e s on t h e n e x t b a t t l e f i e l d a d e q u a t e ?
w i d e r s t a n d Soviet t a c t i c a l

Do we

d o c t r i n e i n l i g h t o f Sovi,st T h e q u e s t i o n is

r e s p o n s e s t o t h e dynamics of warfare.?

critical i n view of
b"

t h e weignt accorded t o l e s s o n s learned

t r a i n i n $ !.tniti. a t t h e N T C a n d i n s o m b a t . - - i m t . ! l a t i o n s
* ;+

!..:zed

r ...-.j

: z c ; . . . . ?.!., .

.,7,-. .r I . . . _ =i T 3 1 1
. . .

VJ.~:;,Z

w e havr

zome'to e x p e c t .

t i i e n ~e ma.., f i n d ,our-sei',~ezi n

,:.
i

T h i s paper w i l l examine one element o f f o c u s i n g on

.-.

t he question b y

a b a s i c component of t h e n e x t b a t t l e f i e l d :
tasi:: f o r c e defense. The space

S o v i e t att.ac!:: and U.S.

.-..

a v a i l a b l e i n a i i m i t e d monograch w i l l exhaustive study of

n o t permit a truiy For

even a f a i r l y narrow s u b j e c t f i e l d . l i m i t e d my e x a m i n a t i u n t ' o a

t h a t r e a s o n 1"ve f u r t h e r s a m p l i n g of conduct of

t a c t i c a l c o n c e p t s which have an impact on t h e d e f e n s i v e engagements a t t h e t a s k f o r c e l e v e i .

Implications for

U.S.

T a s k F o r c e l e v e l defense r a i s e d

b v d e v e l o p i n g S o v i e t d o c t r i n e w i l l be examined, w i t h
emphasis on examining c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of and how t h e d e f e n s i v e framework reasons f o r doing t h i s . First, the Soviet attack. There a r e f o u r

i s affected.

i t has been m y experience

t h a t t a c t i c a l S o v i e t d o c t r i n e i s w e l l u n d e r s t o o d a= l o n g as

i t f i t s i n s i d e t h e " d o c t r i n a l template",

b u t not well

known

when i t i n v o l v e s f o r w a r d detachments which o p e r a t e o u t s i d e t h e template.

t.2

Second,
tt3a.t

t h e t a s k f o r c e l e v e l i s a good

lace

i1 l u s t r a t e

Sovi c - t d o c t r i n e is cifi..n.s.m: c and ~ e s o r l

Third,

.to changing t , a t t ? e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s .
i m p o r t a n t t o d i s p e l some of which w e view t h e S o v i e t s . some c o n c e p t u a l

i trlink: i t ~ . z

t h e temDlate m e n t a l i t y w i t h Finallv,

I believe there are

task
f ~ r c e

= u r r e n t U.S. d i f + i c u l t i e = i!i

d o c t r i n e which need t o be addressed.

I n s t r 8 - \ c t u r i n g t h i s monograph.
C C J ; ~ ~ ! : ; I of ~

I ' v e presumed a w o r k i n g

T-iir:et-:iiIsn ."=t::

f c r ~ e il~fe~~d io 'i ct e F i r , e ~ z c jST

i:

1. e a 5 t
-.
,:t;-td

<3.

:; 2. .:* 1 n g

.F 3 i ~jL I 11. :a r i
aCt,c!.:

.. ,

rq 1.

! 1pf

it.

I-:

dA :

I d

. . . :5 $2 : , \ 1 Et r - ! ?

-.r,e
!

7: . ! , :

c!ii..i.1icn.3l

dcc.trine.

Tke smoP:asi,z h e r e w 1 j.1 b e imp; ica.tio!-:z f c -

i n o r e ~ L I I e m e r - g i c g S o v i e t c o n c e p t s anc! t h e

future U.S. doctrine.

Only unclassified documents and

articles were used in preparation of this monograph.

This

had the important effect of limiting my soeculatian on the impact of still classified deuelupments. ana also circumscribed any reference to actual Soviet exercises other than what is available in open literature.
P4RT 11:

EMERGING SOVIET DOCTRINE

The Soviet Armv may b e characterized a s an

operationally based force. Combat involving a r m i e s . ,
Operations
(TVD).

Russians emphasize the nature of

Theater:? ~:!f Llilitary

f . ~ i . > r t t ~ ,and ,

In order to understand the Soviet's

tactical offensive doctrine and force structure, it is necessary to examine the operational framework: within which it is embedded.

The Soviets pride themselves on being the first nation to recognize the changing nature o f war and the first to (Thus. to its adjust their military art to those changes credit, Soviet military thenretical thought, having first sc!cceeded i n seeing these tendencies in the development of :m;it:ary affair-... cor-rectlx/ perceived and revea!+d t h e new component of military art. .speration Csicl art'."

...

The operational nature of the Soviet Grmy is embodied

in the eight !Soviet) principles governing modern warfare:
1 ) Flecibility and high tempo of combat operations.
2 j

Concentration of effort, 5 ) Surprise, 4) Combat activeness.

5 ) Preservation of combat effectiveness. 6 ) Realism. 7'
., -- . , : , ~ ~ ! ~ : ~ ~ F ,t. j ~~ ,~ & ~c ,t ~ i,g n t!-~r~uq?~ fhs er:eni'i's d e c t n .
7.

Ti?s=~

p r i n c i o l ~ salso guide -the e ~ o l i ! t ; o n of Zoviet fo?-ceces?.cr,

s.na aortrine.
l-he

.qoGiets vercei.ve t h a t the n a t u r e of fL!ti!rr

OperatlOnS w i l l b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by "decisiveness,

high and

_.

maneuverability, d . i v c r s i t . q of

intensity,

f a s t and s h a r p changes,
L's

m e t h o d s i n c c m h i n e d arms.

T h e S o v i e t s see

the next battleiieid

as inon-linear,

f l ~ ! i d . and c h a r a c t e r i z e d

by high i n t e n s i t y f i r e s .

They c h a r a c t e r i z e "air-land"

b a t t l e a s b l e n d i n g " c o m b i n e d arms b a t t l e " a n d " t h r e e

dimensional combat o p e r a t i o n s " i n t o o n e concept. conducting an

T h e S o v i e t s r e c o g n i z e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of

operational o f f e n s i v e . 7 They acknowledge t h e f o r m i d a b l e

c a p a b i l i t i e s o i a p r e p a r e d A m e r i c a n d e f e n s e a n d w o u l d seek

t o o b v i a t e i t i n f i v e ways;

1 ) S u r p r i s e , 2 ) Tempo, 3 ) T h e

use o f f i r e p o w e r t o a d j u s t f o r c e r a t i o s , 4) T h e u s e o f
forward detachments, maneuver g r o u p s , and v e r t i c a i the defense, and

e n v e i o p m e n t s t o d i s r u p t t h e c o n t i n u i t y of

5 ) C a r e s u l l y s t r u c t u r e d c o m b i n e d arms u n i t s t o c a r r y o u t t h e

a t t a c I:: s

.
SURPRISE

T h e m o s t c r i t i c a l elemert i n S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s w i l l b e t h e achievement of s u r p r i s e , p r e c i p i t a t i n g an oifenci.ie

a g a i n s t a n u n p r e p a r e d o r p a r t i a l l y p r e p a r e d NATU d e i e n s e .

=Is S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e b a t t l e s o n t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t
demonstrated, i a v o r of s u r p r i s e alters t h e c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s i n a n d is t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f operational

t h e attacker,

....

s u c c e ~ s . T h e B r i t i s h Arm:,
S.+::.:~C;:

states t h a t t h e Soviets w i l l npt

1.3

'.JU;.> ~ ! ~ , ! , . = i si ~ t r . . s i - i . s s

puaranteed,

s,;.?i! t h a :

1f

a.t.taci:. p l a i n s w e r e d e t e c . t e d e a r l ' ? , . t h e e n t i r e o i f e n i i . i e w n ~ ~ l a
be ;-.-.-,+ .t.poned."

I t follows t h a t there are three possible ooerational

scenarios t o consider. surprise. anyiua'y. First, t h e S o v i e t s do n o t a c h i e v e

b u t go ahead and a t t a c k a f u l l y p r e p a r e d defense Second, t h e S o v i e t s achieve p a r t i a l siurcrise, Third, NATO i s caught and t h e r e

a t t a c k a p a r t i a l l y p r e p a r e d defense. c o m p l e t e l y unaware,

t o t a l s u r p r i s e is achieved, The f i r s t . c a s e

a r e no defenses a t a l l .

is un1ib:ely g i v e n

t h e premium S o v i e t s p u t on s u r p r i s e . while nightmarish,

The l a t t e r s c e n a r i o ,

is u n l i k e l y g i v e n t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t
T h i s leaves t h e

NATO makes t o a v o i d b e i n g caught a s l e e p .

m i d d l e case,

a Soviet offensive against a p a r t i a l l y as a l o g i c a l p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e f o r The S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n determine

completed defense,

examining p o t e n t i a l S o v i e t a c t i o n s . of what degree' of

s u r p r i s e has been achieved ! . r i l l

t h e t a c t i c a l decision.

TEMPO
"The S o v i e t Army,"
i t has been s a i d ,
"9

" f i g h t s - t o move?

whereas Western a r m i e s move t o f i q h t . i n t e r n a l i z e tempo i n terms of a g a i n s t t h e enem)., depth.

S o v i e t eomm.ander+

simultaneous a c t i o n iJhile v i r t u a l l y

and speed o f

operations.

e v e r y c u r r e n t Western p u b l i c a t i o n on S o v i e t d o c t r i n e d e s c r i b e s o p e r a t i o n s as " f a s t paced" and g i v e s e x c e l l e n t examples o f d e p t h s of The compression o f

batt!e?ie!d

objectives,

few address t h e "why". the seoaration o i

3

t i m e i n terms of

-.
. &

e.~c,erit.s pr?!:iatei. :kern.

uraivsi
U.3.

w i t h i n t h e ,cnmm&.nd 3 . n t
ccmi nec tr!e

i4e i n

tr?e

A r m i h.

expression

" t u r n i n g i n s . i d e t h e enemy's d e c i s i o n c v r l e "

tc.

f r i e s c r i u e t b , e n e s i r e - J outcome.

Today, the Soviets are seeking t o increase the "simultaneity" of combat at every level and i n great depths. The late British military author Richard Simpkin discussed
t h i s in h i s book Race t o the Swift.

His ideas translate tu

a vision o f "simultaneous" combat over a great depth which contributes t o paralysis of the control mechanism of a force.'O This theme is echoed in Polish military writings,

where helicopter and fire strikes are seen a s a means of "splitting the enemy from within" a s opposed t o battering through the enemy from without. Assuming that the Polish

officers are writing with some knowledge of Soviet thought, it is logical t o conclude that the Soviets are striving t o increase the "tempo" of tactical combat by making deep, main, and rear battle occur together. This is in consonance

with the concept of nuclear scared operations, forward detachments, heliborne assaults, and unconventional warfare. Going a step further, i f the Soviets see nimultaneous offensive combat as a real possibility, then they are going t o be prepared to engage in such battles, but on their own terms.

FIRE SUPPORT
A s there would be only one main attack at f r o n t , army.
~~

and division, Soviet fire support for the main effort would

..

be lavish.
e:.;?ect

A Soviet regiment making the main attack could

tu rrcei',ve !ha suij3ortiliq f i r e c c.f at isast t o u r t-

six battalions of division controlled artillerv in additiun to the ar-tiller.,y of

the regiment.

I f t h e attack were

operationally important would b e a d d e d . planning figures.

f i r e s from A r m y - l e v e l

artillery

F i g u r e 1 o n p a g e 44 g i v e s some p o s s i b l e I n a d d i t i o n , forward detachments and

m o b i l e g r o u p s w i l l r e c e i v e p o w e r f u l f i r e s u p p o r t from a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s of
t h e d i v i s i o n a l s q u a d r o n and army l e v e l

helicopter regiments.

T h e e m p h a s i s o n aerial f i r e s u p p o r t

i s o n e of t h e most d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f e m e r g i n g S o v i e t

doctrine.

H e l i c o D t e r s a n s w e r many o f t h e p r o b l e m s t h e

S o v i e t s f o r s e e i n m a i n t a i n i n g a h i g h tempo i n t h e attack. I n c o n t r a s t t o U.S. d o c t r i n e , a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s are

c o n s i d e r e d f i r e s u p p o r t a s s e t s , p r o v i d i n g b o t h close a n d anti-tank

fires.

They are t h e modern v e r s i o n of t h e 11-2

S t o r n o v i k , t h e " f l y i n g t a n k " of

WWII f a m e .

On t h e

b a t t l e f i e l d h e l i c o p t e r s w o u l d p r o v i d e close a i r s u p p o r t . p a r t i c u l a r l y t o mobile groups. Helicopters w i l l be given

t h e m i s s i o n of p r o t e c t i n g a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s from U.S. counterattacks.

is

I n a r e c e n t l v p u b l i s h e d a r t i e l e , rlajcr J. F. t h e U.S.

Holcomc c+

Army, w o r k i n g w i t h t n e S o v i e t S t u d i e s C e n t e r at

S a n d h u r s t , p o i n t e d o u t ',the c r i t i c a l importance t h e S o v i e t s place i n h e l i c o p t e r s as mobile f i r e support. r a p i d l y a l t e r t h e c o r r e l a t i c n of T h e s e assets

forces tnrough p i n p o i n t
means.

d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy t a n k , a r t i l l e r y , a n d a n t i - t a n k Their usequlness

is

e v e n g r e a t e r i n s u o p o r t of

forwara

d e t 3 c h m e n t s amd mobi ? c yroupc_.

f.:~z+_ .sltjving f o r w c r d f n r : : z ' : :

Thrv Drovide s e c u r i t v f o r
..I

rspidl

~ ~ L ! n ~ ~ r ~ gqr;c!nd t ~ ~ , = ~ . : l ~ ~ ~
l4

t h r e a t s .And i f r e q u i r e d .

o.ther h e l i c o p t e r s .

The

a p p o r t i o n m e n t of combat h e 1 i c o a t e r n w o u l d b e i n r o n s n n a n c ?

w i t h t h e importance o f t h e mission;

t h e army f o r w a r d t h e main

detachment and d i v i s i o n a l f o r w a r d detachment of

e f f o r t d i v i s i o n would be h e a v i l y s u p p o r t e d b y o r g a n i c and Army l e v e l a s s e t s ; s o r t i es. The i m p o r t a n c e of overestimated. anti-tank f i r e s u p p o r t t o t h e a t t a c k cannot b e supporting a t t a c k s

P J O U ~ r~e c e i v e

fewer

T a k t i k a i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e d e n s i t y of

NATO

systems c o u l d r e a c h 50 o r . mare weapons p e r However, the majority fire

k i l o m e t e r i n a main d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r . of

t h e s e weapons w i l l be c o n c e n t r a t e d i n " g r o u p i n g s o f

weapons"

w i t h i n 1.5

kilometers of the front.

D i r e c t and

i n d i r e c t f i r e s m u s t a c h i e v e g r e a t e r t h a n 50% s u p p r e s s i o n t o
e n s u r e t h e success of t h e attack.'"

F i r e s u p p o r t i s used t o change t h e i n i t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n of forces.

For example,

Soviet planners consider a f i v e t o systems p e r k i l o m e t e r of the

one r a t i o o f t a n k s t o a n t i - t a n k front

as p r o v i d i n g a 92% p r o b a b i l i t y o f success f o r If w e a~is~m te h a t t h e r e a r e 2?!5 tanks and

attack."

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6iM . a d d i t i o n a l heavy and medium a n t i - t a n k systems ( l e s s h e l i c o p t e r s ) i n a U.S. s e c t o r of anti-tank

40 k i l o m e t e r s w i d t h ,

mechanized d i v i s i o n

i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e average

!AT)

weapons d e n s i t y i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y

22 weapons

per kilometer.

T h i s would r e q u i r e a d e n s i t v o f o v e r l!M at t ack frontage.

tanks per ki l o m e t e r of

B u t i f suDportinq

eirtiller'.,' : - : e u . t r . i ? ! . r e 5 i; : ! X of t h e A T weztnons. t n e n +?e

rr.q-~.:irernent f n r t a n k s d r o p s t o 5 i ) t a n k s p e r i : i l c m e t e r GF
i:--ont:..

I n t h i s case. a motor r i f l e d i v i s i o n w i t h 27!:! t35l::z.

c o u l d e x p e c t success i f t i l e a t t s l c k f r o n t a g e were l e s s t h a n 5 kilometers, which is a p p r o a c h i n g t h e " d o c t r i n a l " norms f o r

such an a t t a c k . FORWARD-DETACHMENTS The p r i n c i p l e ,

A N D DEEP RATTLE

" a c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e enemy's d e c t h " t h e S o v i e t c o n c e p t of deep

p r o v i d es t h e foundation f o r battle.

Deep b a t t l e i s a comprehensive c o n c e p t i n v o l v i n g The c e n t e r p i e c e of

combined arms and j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s .

combined arms deep b a t t l e appears t o b e t h e " m o b i l e group". M o b i l e groups, division, army, ( o r maneuver g r o u p s ) may be d e s i g n a t e d a t o r front. I n general, t h e S o v i e t s use Their deer,

m o b i l e g r o u p s as spearheads f o r

l a r g e r formations.

m i s s i o n s a r e i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d t o t h e S o v i e t t h e o r y of

b a t t l e w n i c h demands s i m u l t a n e o u s combat t h r o u g h t h e deDtn of t h e enemies f o r m a t i o n . The S o v i e t c o n c e p t o f m o b i l e larger

g r o u p s s t r i k i n g t o t h e enemy's d e p t h ahead of

f o r m a t i o n s i s r e c e i v i n g g r e a t emphasis because o f t h e need

tc d e s t r o v " r e r o s m a i s s a n c e s t r i i::e e c t n p l s x e s j " and ? c ~ c l e s . r

d e l i v e r y means.
l7

S o v i e t s t u d y i n t o t h e phenomenon of

p a s t wars, and

p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s r e i n f o r c e d S o v i e t t h e o r e t i c a l concepts c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f deep b a t t l e . The g e n e s i s of

'combined arms deep b a t t l e can b e f o u n d i n t h e h a r d l e s s o n s of t h e Eas.tern f r o n t . E a r l y attempts u s i n g pure tank

capab;e

s t r i k i n g .'orces r n a t t u r e i J i n t o a1 l - . s r m s f o r m a t i o n ;
L'f

,zf

the ene,r>v ,2e+erI=e

~ . ' - i ~

e;.:ploi t ing to oper ati g n a l d e p t h .

+ljt-mrd
t..c

" M o b i 1e Grnuos" w w - e

z.aerlr-hrnd o i f e n s i v e s

it cioth t h e tacticai a n 3

operational

level.

I n t h e Manchurian o f f e n s i v e of

AugUst

..

1945,

t.he Red Army d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t

i t had m a s t e r e d t h e

employment

o i maneuver groi-ips when i t e n c L i l f e d a l l o f

!F:gc!rc

.-.

M a n c n u r i a i n an o f f e n s i v r - l a s t i n g .ten a a y s . page 45 i l l u s t r a t e s t h e makeup o f type of

2 on
the

a W W I I tank corps,

u n i t f r e q u e n t l y c h a r g e d w i t h c o n d u c t i n g deep

operations.)
A variety of

evidence i n d i c a t e s t h a t S o v i e t p l a n n e r s

c o n s i d e r o p e r a t i o n s c o n d u c t e d a t Manchurian tempos iundamentai t o a ch ie ving s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s w i t h t h e m i n i m u m p o s s i b l e r i s k of nuclear holocaust. r e Soviet

e x p e r i e n c e on t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t and i n M a n c h u r i a c o n v i n c e d them t h a t t h e u s e o f operational v e r y m o b i l e spearheads a t t a c t i c a l and

level contributed decisively t o the r a @ i d t h e enemy.

'

destruction of

"Deep b a t t l e c o n c e p t s have

a c c o r d i n g l y e v o l v e d f r o m n a r r o w s t r i k e s deep i n t o t h e snemy's r e w t o b r o a d f r o n t e n c i r c l e m e n t
Front

on F r : > n t and m u l t i 3.ir

leve!s,

,using armv . s i z e d m o b i l e aro;!ps.

"I9

assaul.ts,

and a i r b o r n e l a n d i n g s .

H e l i c o p t e r s a r e t h e p r i m a r y means b y which a i r a s s a u l t f o r c e s a r e i n s e r t e d behind t h e covering f o r c e area, i n conjunction with t h e actions of ;2erhaps

f o r w a r d detachments. forward fire

Soviet t h e o r i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e combination of detachment.=, air a s a a ~ ! l t s ; . and ccmbat h e l i c o p t e r

..

:>t.ip~:,~.3?~ i '5

the

"iTc35l:

Tau'! -3

. ..

~!er~ei;.:.al:ing ;:he erleniy ' s t;ti:.ti::,zl

defer,.ce qL,icpl~.,:< t > e : - s D ~ . /

allowlni: t h e I - i i ! ? h e r commcnder to e x p 1 u i . t i n t o t h e enemy:'i.

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s " . 2u S o v i e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e appears t o be e v o l v i n g t o meet t h e demands of deep b a t t l e by p r o v i d i n g m o b i l e groups a t e v e r y 1eve1 : C u r r e n t sophi s t i c a t e d S o v i e t maneuver concepts, i n v o l v i n g c o n c e r t e d use o f m u l t i p l e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l maneuver groups, e x p l o i t s t h e f a c t t h a t q u a n t i t y has a M u l t i p l e maneuver groups o p e r a t e i n q u a l i t y o f i t s own. tandem, employing t e c h n i q u e s s p e c i f i c a l l y designed t o p r e empt, unhinge, and p a r a l y z e a defense. T h e i r sheer number c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f t h e i r success. E x t e n s i v e S o v i e t s t u d y o f p a s t o p e r a t i o n a l and t a c t i c a l 'maneuver i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e y must c o n t i n u e t o pay c l o s e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f o p e r a t i o n a l and t a c t i c a l maneuver.

The S o v i e t Army S t u d i e s O f f i c e the Soviets t o the f l e x i b l e ,

(SASO)

sees a r e t u r n b:i

tailored,

c o r p s and b r i g a d e

s t r u c t u r e which c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e m o b i l e groups o f t h e Second World War:

W i t h i n combined arms a r m i e s , t a n k o r mechanized c o r p s w i l l conduct o p e r a t i o n a l maneuver and employ i t s own t a c t i c a l maneuver f o r c e i n t h e process. Separate t a n k c o r p s o r b r i g a d e s w i l l s e r v e as army f o r w a r d detachments. M o t o r i z e d r i f l e d i v i s i o n s w i l l employ s e p a r a t e t a n k o r m o t o r i z e d r i f l e brigade=. as t h e i r i o r w a r d

COMBINED ARMS I N THE CLOSE RATTLE

The S o v i e t s a r e ree:.!amining t h e b a l a n c e of a l l arms necessary to conduct h i g h tempo w a r f a r e a g a i n s t a w e l l adversary. armed

The r e c e n t r e p u b l i c a t i o n of General F ; o t m i s t r o v ' s

1946 speech on B e r l i n o p e r a t i o n s i s i n d i c a t i v e uf S o v i e t
concern w i t h lrhe n a t u r e o i cnmbat i n Western Euroce.

r ~ p e ~ : : i ; i i i i- n . , 1 iijh.!: #>+' ~ i r : I e t n i z a t i a n and r e ~ c r ~ s t a t i o n . ir,

;-, 1,
~

-.

eech,

Genera? F:m::ni

s t r c v anal'.yzrd t n a a r u t . ? ?mi-

t?:at

hampered t h e S o v i e t s when t h e y c a c t u r e d Rer?i n .

Genera?

A o t m i s t r o v s t r e s s e d t h e c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e of combat,
:

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n "anti-tank"

terms.

What wori::ed i n

Poland d i d n o t wori:: i n B e r l i n .

He s t a t e d t h a t combined arms

.-

b.slance arc! t a i l o r i n g down t o t h e s u b u n i t l e v e l were c r i t i c a l t o t h e teinpo of of the attack. The f o r m e r commander s u b u n i t s " and t h e

5 t h Guards Tank Army spoke o f

"shock;

importance o f fighting.

i n f a n t r y i n p r o s e c u t i n g round-the-clock the

( F i g u r e 3 on page 46 d e p i c t s shock u n i t s o f

WWII variety.)

H e a l s o emphasized' t h e f l e x i b i l i t y i n h e r e n t .

i n t h e mechanized c o r p s s t r u c t u r e t o f a c i l i t a t e o f f e n s i v e

o p e r a t i o n s i n f o r e s t e d and u r b a n i z e d t e r r a i n . " "

Whether t h i s

presages e v e n t u a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f S o v i e t b a t t a l i o n s i n t o combined arms f o r m a t i o n s i s n o t y e t c l e a r , a strong p o s s i b i l i t y t h i s i s occurring.z4 although t h e r e i s Soviet b a t t a l i o n s

a r e n o r m a l l y h e a v i l y r e i n f o r c e d when i n t h e f i r s t echelon o r o p e r a t i n g independently.

H u t t h e arguments c o n c e r n i n g f o r c e

s t r u c t u r e s necessary t o m a i n t a i n o f f e n s i v e momentum i n close t e r r a i n would appear

t o he a5 ' V a l i d tGda:v

as i n V74c..

The??

appears t o be a. growing r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t w h i l e b a t t l e m i g h t be c e n t r a l l y planned, i t s execution w i l l be d e c e n t r a l i z e d :

The i n c r e a s e i n t h e s p a t i a l scope o f combat demands c r e a t i v i t y , d e c i s i v e n e s s , and independence on t h e battlefield. The Motor R i f l e (Tank) B a t t a l i o n i s t h e b a s i c combined arms s u b u n i t and t h e b a s i s f o r o r g a n i z i n g The c o o r d i n a t i o n o f s u b u n i t s o f t h e branches of t r o o p s . . changes which have t a k e n p l a c e i n weapons and i n e q u i p p i n g t h e H a t t a . l i o n w i t h v a r i o u 5 armament and equipment have a l s i j a f f a c t e d t h e n a t u r e o f scornbat. o f s m a l l s u b u n i t s : T h e c n i i d i I t i ~ r - : . . ! c f c o n 5 ~ ~ c t l nc g ~ m h . x th a : . , e chanqei: i t s : : , r . y a n i z i E i ; r , n h a 5 ktecnme mars i mzle::: T h e o e p t h ci i , .a-1 .. I:.a:xts ~ n c r e a s . j d : and t h e r-.s,i:e ij.t advar,:e i n 3.n , 2 7 . t e ~ . s i . . . e h-35 i n c r c . x z . e d . . . A commander v r h u c p e r a t e s aecorcing t 3 a p r e s e t p l a n w i t h o u t tal.::inq i n t o .accoc;nt changes i.r!lich C a i e o c c v r r i d , as a r u l e , w i l l s u f f e r f a i : u r e i n c o m a a t : f o r c!?mma.n!:! and c o n t r i i l i n t h i s t i a e k r i l l l a g b e h i n d t h e

development of

the actual situation.2s

G r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i s necessary a t t h e company and even p l a t o o n l e v e l because t h e s e u n i t s must be prersared t o operate i n "separate sectors, main f o r c e s . . . M i s t a k e s neutralize the effects sometimes Far away f r o m t h e t a c t i c s can Increasing

and s t e r e o t y p i c a l

of

many people."='

emphasis i s b e i n g p l a c e d by S o v i e t w r i t e r s on t h e n e c e s s i t y for
fluid

o p e r a t i o n s by " s u b u n i t s " a t e v e r y l e v e l . . T h i s i n both

emphasis on f l e x i b l e o p e r a t i o n s m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f o r g a n i z a t i o n and t a c t i c s . d e t a i l e d p i c t u r e of

F i g u r e 4 on page 47 p r o v i d e s a

how a l e a d S o v i e t b a t t a l i o n m i g h t be

o r g a n i z e d f o r combat.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The c o m p l e x i t y of t he next b a t t l e f i e l d challenges t he A Soviet the

S o v i e t s c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r t r o o p c o n t r o l methods. b a t t a l i o n c o n d u c t i n g an a t t a c k may r e c e i v e one o f f o l l o w i n g missions: force, f i r s t o r second echelon o f advance guard,

t h e attac!::

combined arms r e s e r v e ,

c o v e r i n q for-ce.

f1ani:ing force,

reconnaissance i n f o r c e ,

or tactical

a i r b o r n e landing force.z7

Given t h e l a r g e number of the b a t t a l i o n

a t t a c h m e n t s and t h e e x t r e i n e l y s m a l l s i z e of staff, t h e problem of even a s m a l l

c o n t r o l l i n g and c o o r d i n a t i o n t h e "subunit" becomes monumental. Drills

e f f o r t of

w e u s e d wherever (cormand SF!CI

p n s s i b l e t o s i m p l i f y t h e process n i

cont.ro1.

.
procescec- a t
stjet-".;

Aa.rt_omati o n of

r o m m a n d and c c n t r c l

p o s s i b l e ievei

i s seen as a " m u z t " .

The i n t e q r a t l o n of

14

automated command and c o n t r o l p r o c e s s e s i s e n t i r e i y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e d i a l e c t i c process o f military

..

development,

and t h e F h s s i a n s f e e l t h a t man and t e c h n o l o g y They s e e t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f the

a r e inatc!ral?,y compatible.

c a r e f u l t a i l o r i n g o f f o r c e s t o expected m i s s i o n s , i n t e g r a t i o n of needs of

new equipment a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l and t h e a u t o m a t i o n o f command c o n t r o l

t h e forces,

and communications as p r o v i d i n g t h e key t o t h e f u t u r e . 2e

NUCLEAR POSTURE AND N E W WEAPONS

One of t he s a l i e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a l l Soviet "nuclear scared" posture, and t h e

operations i s t h e i r

continuous planning f o r supported operations. consider However,

immediate t r a n s i t i o n t o n u c l e a r Emerging S o v i e t d o c t r i n e does n o t

t h e r e s o r t t o n u c l e a r weapons as i n e v i t % B l e . " 9 t h e S o v i e t s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e presence o f n u c l e a r

weapons mandates t h e c o n t i n u o u s performance o f m i s s i o n s i n a " n u c i e a r scared" posture. the n c i c l e a r .threst c l o s e prm::m:tt.:/

. .

A l l o p e r a t i o n s a r e planned w i t h
and f o r c s s c r e o n l y rn+ss*.i!~ r .

j.n

mind,

of

t h e enemy.

It i s t h i s

"ncic?ear a c a r & "

d o c t r i n e which d r i v e s t h e S o v i e t s t o seek h i g n tempo, d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e r a p i d intermi:: i n3 o f Sovie.t and N A T O f o r c e s i n f l s i d battles.":' The S o v i e t s are concerned t h a t d e v e l o p i n g t e c h n o l o g y has c r e a t e d " n u c l e a r - l i i r e " cunuentrona? ime*.i?.z. e f f e c t s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d u s i n q

The 4evelap,zent oS s m a r t cmunj.tinnr.

1 a i 1-

ci:31 c . : ; , .

.= .. . . a t t z r a b l e m i n e $ . , ar,c s . z ~ ~ t o : ~. ~ :~ t e , ~
i n

',*,. =ct:on m d a t t a c t : : s.:/stemc a r e p r o d u c i n q 2 " t - e ~ / o S u t ~ ~ t ~ i i " * ,- I--.,~ -ti-l . . . . . . . ~ + : ~ ?~ .5 ~, e ~ r - d . t t,I n c m a i n , , 5awiiet w r i t e r s . - - '
-,ir
" "

15

new weapons".

according t o former Chief o f

t h e General S t a f f

Marshal Akhromeyev,

"will

cmne c l o s e t o n u c l e a r weapons i n

power r a n g e and a c c u r a c y " 3 2 T h i s concern i s m a n i f e s t e d i n t h e etmphasis Oeinq o l s c e d on t h e a t t a c k f r o m t h e march by S o v i e t w r i t e r s : Today t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s i v e f r o m t h e l i n e o f march may be e f f e c t e d n o t o n l y i n t h e c o u r s e o f development of b a t t l e i n enemy defenses a t t a c t i c a l o r o p e r a t i o n a l depth, b u t a l s o a t t h e very beginning of t h e operation, i n c l u d i n g d u r i n g p e n e t r a t i o n of p r e p a r e d w e l l f o r t i f i e d ' d e f e n s e s , s i n c e a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s can a n n i h i l a t e o r dependably n e u t r a l i z e defenses by means o f n u c l e a r o r f i r e weapons.. .Then s w i f t l y b r e a k t h r o u g h i n depth.ss

No a r e a of d e v e l o p i n g t e c h n o l o g y concerns t h e S o v i e t
Army more t h a n t h e f i e l d i n g o f by t h e West. " s m a r t " weapons i n q u a n t i t y

P o l i s h m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g s emphasize t h i s p o i n t .

I n an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d " A n t i c i p a t e d L ' i t - e c t i o n s f o r change i n T a c t i c s of Ground Troops", Colonel S . Eoziej p o i n t s out t h a t

n u c l e a r weapons a r e g r o w i n g i n number and d e c r e a s i n g i n size, w h i l e c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons a r e s w i f t l v approaching t h e

thus " b l u r r i n g t h e

, : i e s t r L ! c t i v e n e c s o f n u c l s a r weapons. d i s t i n c t i o n " between t h e two. weapons, he argues,

The c a p a b i l i t i e s o f

modern of the Suc!,

f o r c e a "complete r e - e v a l u a t i o n

v e r y essence of

t h e defense on a f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d . "

weapons i n v e r t t h e C l a u s e w i t z i a n i d e a of

a w a i t i n g t h e Glow.

3 0 t h s i d e s have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l n u c l e a r and non-nuclear

= t r i b e weacons,
~.~. ~. .-;.,+.~:l.o,-c% ~.. c,+

i h i c h c a n cau5.e " a b r u p t cnanaes in t h e

Fnrcrs.
"5.4

"

!?he ,je.fender ma'.

qot ci=.oe i:i-,e

ini+iati.ve . t t ~ h e attacl:.er. b u t m a y attemrjt t r e

counterstroke immediately. The r e s u l t nay be comclete

10

chaos, with both sides engaging in offensive combat simultaneously.

..

The Russians are concerned about their own abilities to

f ieid ver*# destructive conventional weapons. but are

.-.

nonetheless prepared to e::ploit the effects of these weapons in the same manner as they would exploit nuclear strikes. However, they are gravely concerned that these developing technologies may herald a fundamental change in warfare, a change which might make the historical foundation of the Soviet Army irrelevant.
PART 111:
U.S.

TASK FORCE DEFENSE

American doctrine developers view any European battlefield as non-linear in nature. extraordinarily lethal, and complex.
F M 1<:!0-5states:

In high or mid-intensity conflicts, Army forces mu=t be prepared to fight campaigns of considerable movement. Even in conventional combat, operations will rarely maintain a linear character.sa
C o l o n e l Huba Wass de Czege, one o :

the orincioal "The b a . t t l e ,

is

authors of

l i : ? ! : ? 5 goes % furtner and savs:

especially i n the area where the battle outcome

ic, likely to b e intense. quick and deadlv.

decided.
50

So much

that The

it will be di+ficu?t to determine what is going on."y6

s critical to the close battle. task force role i

primary executor o+ the close battle.
,._.
= d . : . ,

It is the

FM 100-5 goes on to
1 5

that

it 1 ! s the eioce eattle w!-:ich

the brigade cammander'crass attaches tank and infantry companies to form the task force. Additional assets are

provided from. divirional units according to the situation.

. . dsi:. for..ce=
!

are usiua? l y defined as "tanl:: h e a v v " ~"rnech Battalions which have not been task Normally, the

heavy" or "balanced".

organized by the Brigade are called "pure".

task force will end up with some mix of between three to five companies.. Mechanized in-fantry battalions have an additional anti-tank company equipped with the Improved Tow 'Vehicle (ITV). For comparison purposes, a mechanized

infantry task force comprising two tank companies, two mechanized companies, and one anti-tank company will b e used
as a base.

(See figure 5 on page 46)

The modern Amer.ican task force is. as the Soviets recognize, the best equipped battalion level organization in
NATO.

Using the balanced task force above as an example, we

find 6 infantry platoons. '26 main battle tanks. Z4 c dnncln /mi ssi 1 r ar ned f i g h t i n g veh i c 1 es
~

twe1 v e ant i -tz r ! i::

mis3ile vehicies, and s i x lQ7 millimeter mortar-, available

to the commander.

Each of the tanks is, if one considers

weight and advanced armor, the best protected armored fighting vehicle in the world, and the infantrv fighting vehicle's protection rivals that of early WWII tanks.
Task::

force defensi'.,'edoctrine describes the basic

tVpec

fle>;ibility. of

R e g a r d l e s s of

t h e t y p e of

defense,

t h e conduct five

t h e d e f e n s e i s based an a frameworlr deep o p e r a t i o n s , s e c u r i t y area,

c o n s i s t i n g of

..

elements;

t h e main b a t t l e a r e a , and r e a r b a t t l e

reserve

.-.

operations,

In
as w e l l as command

t h i s section, and c o n t r o l .

I'll d i s c u s s t h e f i r s t f o u r

Hear o p e r a t i o n s w i l l be touched an b r i e f l y i n

t h e next section.

DEEP OPERATIONS
American p l a n n e r s a r e p l a c i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y g r e a t e r emphasis future,

on deep b a t t l e t o d i s r u p t and d e l a y , and i n t h e

d e s t r o y S o v i e t f a r c e s b e f o r e t h e y can engage i n

close battle. t h e success o f

T h e sciccess o f t h e c l o s e b a t t l e depends an
t h e deep b a t t l e i n d i s r u p t i n g t h e S o v i e t level offensive.

h i g h e r t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l t h i s s ~ i p p o s i t i o nof

I t was

t h e nature of Soviet offensive "AirLand"

o p e r a t i o n s which l e d t o t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f d o c t r i n e i n 1'?82.39 t h i s paper. function of above,

T h i s i s a s u b j e c t beyond t h e scope o f

biit i t wcuic b e r e m i s s n a t t c c o n s i d e r t h c t t h e
"deep o p e r a t i o n s " , particularly at c o r ~ s and

i s t o i s o l a t e t h e d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e and a l l o w t a s k fresh

: . , f a r c e s t o win t h e i r f i g h t s b e f o r e b e i n g overwhelmed b forces.

The t a s k f o r c e does n o t conduct i t s awn deep b a t t l e . The t a s k f o r c e commander c o n s i d e r s t h e e f f e c t o f h i g h e r deep

--

ciri h i % r:.i:?e..ati<:ms

own a r e a .

b u t h a s no c a p a b i l i t v ti? ei.:eci.it.e
iriaii.

,.b.,e .

> ,.

,.>tecc

battie.

Tar;;:.

Fur-crs

huwevrr,
but w i l i

l.e

;%ct:t

b.,'r

...

er

i n a l j r q e r deep operation,

be executini;

r.:Iw;e

c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s ,as p . ? . r t o+ t h a t p l a n .

M A I N BATTLE AND RESERVE OPERATIONS

'

U.S.

t a s k f o r c e can s u c c e s s f u l l y defend a g a i n s t a
F M 71-2

S o v i e t Regiment.

states:

" L h r i n g t h e defense,

the

b a t t s l i o n tasl:: f o r c e i s expected t o defend a g a i n s t and d e f e a t a t h r e a t regiment".*O Current

U.S.

doctrine states

t h a t t h e b r i g a d e s h o u l d be capable, AirLand R a t t l e , division., where of

w i t h i n t h e framework of

defending s u c c e s s f u l l y a g a i n s t a S o v i e t

T h i s same h i e r a r c h y i s c a r r i e d up t o Corps l e v e l 100-15 s t a t e s t h a t t h e Corps defends a g a i n s t and

d e f e a t s two o r t h r e e S o v i e t Armies c o m p r i s i n g a T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h c u r r e n t American t h o u g h t on t h e s t r e n g t h o f a p r e p a r e d defense, advantage.4z which c o n f e r s a minimum 3:l a battalion

A t t h e N a t i o n a l T r a i n i n g Center,

tasi:: f o r c e n o r m a l l y defends a g a i n s t a r e g i m e n t . C u r r e n t t a s k f o r c e d o c t r i n e does n o t s p e c i f y t h e average w i d t h o r d e p t h o f a t a s k f o r c e s e c t o r o r s i z e o f bat.tle position. a iin

I t i s s a f e t o presume t h a t i f d o c t r i n e

t h i s c a s e F M 71-2,

shews a t h r e t r e g i m e n t a t t a c l : : i n c or, a .3-

3 k i i o m e t e r wide f r o n t a g e ,

t h a t ?qoLl'ld a l s o b~

t h e w i d t h of task

s e c t o r f o r a t a s k f o r c e i n t h e defense.

I n practice,

f o r c e defensi./e f r o n t a g e s may be g r e a t e r t h a n s' k i i o m e t e r s , c h i e f l y as a f u n c t i o n of t h e number o f b a t t a l i o n s avai1;uie for which he i s

t o t h e b r i g a d e commander and t h e sectc: responsible.

,

S e c t o r de+enses

8%

the Ndtional Training t h a n 1C-12

I-, ,-, e ..E-T.

'
~~

for

e;.:=.m?l.e,

;,ts.?s

b e zreatiI-,r

! . : i l m x . , 3 e ri~ rr :.~

: , .L

dth.

The concept o f d e p t h i s c r i t i c a l t o A i r L a n d d o c t r i n e .

F M 71-2

states:

..

..

Task f o r c e commanders s t r u c t u r e t h e i r defenses by d e p l o y i n g u n i t s ' i n d e p t h w i t h i n t h e MHA. A mounted r e s e r v e o f one-quarter t o one-half o f t h e task: f o r c e s t r e n g t h p r o v i d e s a d d i t i o n a l depth and g i - Y e s t h e commander a inaneciver r -apabi i it v 'ag;inst t h e efiemy. A commander can c r e a t e a i i k e i y enemy avenues s f reser-ve b y t a k i n l ; r i s k on 1 ~ s s approach i n t h e MHA.4?

T h i s is a
d o c t r i n e of

d i s t i n c t change f r o m t h e " a c t i v e defens-e" t h e l a t e 1970'5, where a " s u b t r a c t e d " r e s e r v e

was viewed as e x c e p t i o n a l . task force w i l l

F M 71-2

Goes on t o say t h a t t h e

normally maintain

a company s i z e d r e s e r v e as

a counterattack force.44

Tank heavy r e s e r v e s a r e seen as

t h e i d e a l means of t h e offense. W e i g n t i n g of

s e i z i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e and g o i n g over t o

defensive e f f o r t i n t h e task f o r c e ,

d e f e n s i v e is a c h i e v e d by a number o f methods i n c l u d i n g :

1 ) A s s i g n i n g more maneuver u n i t s ,

2 ) Narrowing t h e d e f e n s i v e

b e e n moved t o t o p p r i o r i t y , I n terms of

a t least a t t h e b a t t a l i o n

t h e resources n o r m a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o

i : . ; % i .~ -'+ n ~ - a l i utn a s k f ~ j r c e .t + ~ e b e s t imrr.eriis.re ,use 0.f

e n g i n e e r i n g a,ssetr l i e s i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e c r i t i c a i sys+ems of t h e t a s k force. The growing a v a i l a b i l i t y of a r t i l l e r y

d e l i v e r e d mines l e s s e n s t h e requirement t o prepare extensive

m i nef ie ld s .

A m e r i c a n d i v i s i o n s h a v e some 50 a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s o r g a n i c t o t h e a v i a t i o n b r i g a d e , a n d t h e f i e l d i n g o f t h e AH$4 f a m i l y o i a r m e d h e l i c o p t e r s a t t h e C o r p s l e v e l g i v e s

A m e r i c a n f o r c e r a n all w e a t h e r p l a t f o r m c a p a b l e o f d e l i v e r i n g 1arqe n u m b e r s of
(PGM5).

p r e c i s i o n g u i ded muniti o n s

Attack: h e ? i c o p t e r s are c o n s i d e r e d -maneuver

e l e m e n t s and n o r m a l l y e n t e r t h e b a t t l e a t t h e d i r e c t i o n of c o r p s a n d d i v i s i o n s , b u t u n i t s down t o t a s k f o r c e l e v e l are g e n e r a l l y f a m i l i a r w i t h . t h e employment of

and r o i . t t i n e i v
,.

attack h e l i c o p t e r s
Training Center.

emplny 'them a t t h e N a t i o n a l
=L!ct:

ncwever.

t h e release o i

f u r m i d a b l s a s s e t = t o t h e th.zi:.

f o r c e wi l l b e e x c e p t i o n a l , a c c o r d i n g t o G e n e r a l S a i n t ,

IJSAREUF: c o m m a n d e r .

4p

A task f s r c e m a ?

w e l l end

LIP

operating

i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r b a t t a l i o n s as o a r t of a b r i g a d e or d i v i s i o n c o u n t e r a t t a c k .

SECURITY OPER6TIONS
F ! . !

71-2

states "The winner

i5

oi

the reconncisswisI:-: 7 3 2

c c ~ ! n k e i -r e r n n n a i c z a n c g ii,:ht

not-mai 11/ t . 5 ~ v i r t c r

battle.

1'47

This i s a n o t u t g r n w t h o+ a n a l y c , i s c i NTC

d e f e n = i v e engaqements a n d r e f l e c t s t n e i j r o n i n g c o n c e r n a t

every l e v e l w i t h t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e e n e m y ' s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . T h e C e n t e r f o r Army L e s s o n s L e a r n e d !CALL) at Fort

Leavenworth q u a n t i f i e d t h e r e s u l t s of t h e r e c c n n a i s s a n c o c o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . s k r u g g l e a.t t h e NTC a n d d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a b o u t 75% o f t h e t i m e , t h e s i d e which d e f e a t e d t h e

e n e m y ' s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e e f f o r t won t h e e n g a g e m e n t . 4 e T h e e m p h a s i s on t h e f o r w a r d s e c u r i t y f i g h t h a s l e d t o c o n s i d e r a b l e e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n , a l l d e s i g n e d t o defeat Soviet ground r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . T h e c o m m a n d e r may e l e c t t o ' d e p l o y a

c o m p a n y or c o m p a n y team i n t h e s e c u r i t y a r e a , i n e f f e c t e s t a b l i s h i n g a s m a l l c o v e r i n g f o r c e b e h i n d t h e b r i g a d e or d i v i s i o n c o v e r i n g force. I n , o t h e r schemes, ad hoc forces i n f a n t r y , and a n t i - t a n k

comprising scout platoons,, tanks,

assets a r e f o r m e d H i t h i n t a s k f o r c e t o f i g h t t h e f o r w a r d
battle.

Of t e n , s u c h f o r c e s are g r o u p e d u n d e r t e m p o r a r y

h e a d q u a r t e r s i n o r d e r t o leave t h e r e g u l a r maneuver companies free t o conduct t h e maneuver b a t t l e .

COMMAND AND CONTROL

f i m e r i c a n combat b a t t a l i o n s h a v e a l a r g e a n d w e l l e q u i p p e d command a p p a r a t u s .

In b a t t l e , t h e t a s k f o r c e

c o m m a n d e r h a s a s t a f f of iiu t o 20 o f f i c e r s a n d some 3:) nonsommissioned officers. incluaing attachments.49

This staff

is almost a s l a r g e as t h e t h e s t a f f of
rwhich ha5 33-24

a Soviet regiment,

o f f i c e r s and

4 1 . 2

e n l i s t e d s o l d i e r s , incI.i!nir!c

of

t h e t a s k f o r c e c o n t r o l system.

The b a t t a l i o n e:cecutive

o f f i c e r p r e v i o u s l y s p e n t almost a l l h i s t i m e d e a l i n g w i t h

task f o r c e l o g i s t i c s .
O p e r a t i o n s Cent-.r
(TTJC,

N o w h e is l o c a t e d i n t h e T a c t i c a l

or m a i n command p o s t o f t a r t a s k

f o r c e ) w h e r e h e can b e s t c o o r d i n a t e t h e b a t t a l i o n ' s f i g h t w i t h o t h e r u n i t s and h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s . This frees t h e

commander, a l o n g w i t h h i s o p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e r ,

to direct the

main e f f o r t from t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

Other techniques such as

o r d e r s g r o u p s and m a t r i x o r d e r s have been i n c o r p o r a t e d t o s p e e d t h e c o m p l e x command a n d c o n t r o l p r o c e s s n e c e s s a r y t o s y n c h r o n i z e t h e d i s p a r a t e e l e m e n t s of t h e task f o r c e .

PART V:

ANALYSIS
" P r i n c i p l e s of Modern Combined

A l o o k at t h e Soviets'

A r m s Combat" s i d e - b y s i d e w i t h F M lW:)-5's " i m p e r a t i v e s of

t h e AirLand B a t t l e f i e l d " is i n s t r u c t i v e . s i d e b y s i d e l i s t i n g o f b o t h sets of

I have included a

p r i n c i p l e s i n Appendix

! p a g e 53! t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e s i m i l a r w e i g h t b o t h A m e r i c a n
imzdern

and S o v i e t o f f i c e r s a c c o r d t o v a r i o u s f a c e t s o f

w3rfare.

I t isn't

s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t!-:ey are b r o a d l y simiizr.

s i n c e f o r a t l e a s t 15 y e a r s e a c h side h a s r e g a r d e d t h e o t h e r

a s t h e primary opponent.
In general terms, S o v i e t a n d A m e r i c a n v i e w s o n f u t u r e
T a k t i k a and FM 100-5 s h a r e s t r o n g
m o d e r n b a t t l e as

b a t t l e are c o n g r u e n t .

s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of
I,

- ,.i r - l . . m d ' ' e

i n c h a r . * c t e r and 3.z b e i n g e , : t r a o r d i n a t - . l v
b o t h So;i:zt
3.62

!ett,al.

I L;=..-=ije L - ' i i t s \..slid tr. c o r , c l a d e th5.i:

A m e r i c a n G r m i e s r e c o a n i z e t h 3 . i an:.'
~ o ~ ! b l e d vinirnt.

b a t t l e b e t w e e n t h e two

high1.y m o b i l e .

and c h a r a c t e r i z r c b.v t;-:e

u s e of w e a p o n r y w h i c h n e i t h e r a r m y h a s c o m p l e t e l y mastered
or i n t e g r a t e d i n t o its o p e r a t i o n s .
Both forces e n v i s i o n

o p e r a t i o n s i n t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s a n d rtres.,r, t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f a v i a t i o n assetr.
T h e l a t e s t e d i t i o n o f FM lW3-5

provided

i m p e t u s f o r t h e r e b i r t h of

" o p e r a t i o n a l a r t " i n t h e Plmerican

Army, w h i c h , a s C o l o n e l L. I ) . Holder o f f e r s , h a d b e e n a n

area of c o n c e n t r a t i o n l e f t t o o u r r i v a l s f o r n e a r l y 30
years.
-1.

T h e i m p a c t of FM 100-5 i s m e a s u r a b l e .
'

T a k t i k a reflects

t h e acceptance of

"air-land"

as an emerging and v a l i d

theoretical

concept.

T h e 1987 e d i t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t t o t h e

e a r l i e r 1 9 8 4 v o l u m e , d e v o t e s more a t t e n t i o n t o t h e l o w l e v e l
m e e t i n g engagements, n i g h t meeting engagements, and t h e deiense against counterattacks. In an article e n t i t l e d

" S o v i e t s S i z e u p A i r l a n d B a t t l e " , W i l l i a m B u r g e s s maker t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e 1984 e d i t i o n of T a k t i k a w a s " o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t

t h e tactical

commander's a b i l i t y t o pre-emgt

AirLand S a t r l e

strikes." S i n c e t h e n , h e a r g u e s ,
their beliefs.

t h e Swiiets 5 a v e alterec

H e c i t e s Majur G e n e r a l

I.

Vorobeyev's

c r i t i c i s m of t h e 1 9 8 4 T a k t i k a .

who e s s e n c e s a i d t h a t t h e
110

nature

c7f

a u t o m a t e d s y s t e m s l i 1::e TACFIRE w o u l d s p e e d were

battle to such a p a i n t t h a t "normative t i m e s "

'' ob so 1 e t e

'I

.=2

H u t o n e s h o u l d n o t ;ump t o t h e c o n c l u r i o n that ?he

S o v i e . t s % r e :irimp?i< r e a c t i n g . t o G i n e r i i a n d o c t r : ~ - , a l
t_ ec i ir:c 1o g 1 c a 1
01-

deye 1 op men t.4.

J\i

i et 5

! . , f :i

1r : ,

.at-

. ' # ,

concerned b? developing technoloqies,

do not consider

E-I-IC~

developments to have

ail

operational impact until they have In other words. limited One of the

proliferated on the battlefield.

quantities of a new weapon are not decisive.="

key themes which recurs in virtually every pubiication and lecture of the U.S. Army Soviet Army Studies Office I S A S O )

is that the Soviet doctrine i s grounded in Soviet

experience, and i s evolutionary in nature. Despite similarities in the general principles of future battle, one should never forget the totally dissimilar heritage and theoretical foundation of the Soviet Army. Fundamental differences between the Soviet and Not all of these

Gmerican doctrine remain in several areas.

differences have direct implications for the task force defense, but same deserve further analysis. Let's look:

again at some of the areas discussed previou5ly.

SURPRISE AND TEMPO

Soviet tactical capabilities cannot b e measured without including the .value of surprise. Our defense calculations
9c!t

depend on sufficient time to structure t h e bartlefisld.

this fails to recognize the value which the R u s s i m s accord surprise. surprise. Soviet operational plan5 are keyed to achieving The greater the surpise, the higher will he the Not only timing of the attack, but

tempo of operations.

direction and strength will b e carefully concealed from the

Ll..f.

defender.

As

c ! i . = c ' . i E s e d earlier. t h e reEult

b ~ i l l

l:>::el\;

be a.!i -7,ttackagair::st a ~ a r t i a ' 1l >' prepared defense.

if v r e assi.!me t h a t the most probable fcrm o f
offensix.,e
s 5cviot

..

t.~~!.ild he an s t t a c k .qa.inst a partial!y

preos.rer,

defense,

w h a t t h e n w o u l d b e t h e t a c t i c a l form o f ' t h a t I d e a l l y , t h e Soviet p l a n f o r b a t t l e would s u r p r i s e

attack?

t h e d e f e n d e r a n d a l l o w -for t h e r a p i d p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e

..

co',.'ering f o r c e b y f o r w a r d d e t a c h n e n t s i n order- t o anqaqe

m a i n d e f e n s e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e c o v e r i n g force b a t t l e ,
and a t t a c k i n d e p t h w i t h f i r e s and a i r a s s a u l t f o r c e s .
A

crucial p o i n t :

t h e m a i n e f f o r t i s made p o s s i b l e b y

d i m i n i s h i n g t h e weight o f ' attack a s t h e d i s t a n c e from t h e

main e f f o r t increases.
O n c e come d e g r e e of s u r p r i s e is o b t a i n e d ,
the

i n i t i a t i v e 'must b e m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h t e m p o or t h e b e n e f i t s

of s u r p r i s e d i s s a p a t e .

Hy o v e r l o a d i n g t h e o p p o n e n t w i t h

m u l t i p l e s t r i k e s , t h e S o v i e t s w i l l d e l a y t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of s e c o n d a r y e f f o r t s u n t i l i t is t o o l a t e . From t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e t a s k f o r c e c o m m a n d e r , it is

less i m p o r t a n t t o s p e c u l a t e o n how t h e R u s s i a n s m i g h t
a c h i e v e s u r p r i s e t h a n i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s C S s u r p r i s e a n d h i g h t e m p o o p e r a t i o n s on 'The a m o u n t of t i m e a v a i l a b l e t o p r e p a r e a d e f e n s e . R e g a r d l e s s of t h e

s t a t e o f p r e p a r a t i o n s or t h e c o v e r i n g f o r c e s i t u a t i o n , t h e
task f o r c e
m!-ist

b e prepared t o engage i n a c t i v e combat

o p e r a - ti o n s .

COMBINED ARMS, MOBILE GROUPS, AND CLOSE BATTLE

S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s g i v e t a r more s h a p e t o t h e
? -

..9c* i - =on

-..__

tfie

b a t . t l e i i e ? d tnan

S ~ I Z I : ~ l. e~v

e l %?zri,:srt
3

TI:

provide.

A 1 t h o u g h FIjmeriean

doctrine holds that

cast: f c ~ c e

c.an d e + e * t a r e g i , m e n t , i t doe.;

nct f o l l o w t h a t a S c v i e t ~arrn;:

commander

(who d e t e r m i n e s r e g i m e n t a l attacl:: zones) wi 11

o b l i g e by c o m m i t t i n g a r e g i m e n t a g a i n s t each. f o r w a r d b a t t a l i o n task: f o r c e .

If h i s ( t h e army commander's) m i s s i o n
t h e n he w i l l t h e combat Terrain

i s t n break: t h r o u g h t o o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h ,

a t t e m p t t o f i n d ways t o f o c u s t h e m a j o r i t y o f power of

a d i v i s i o n a g a i n s t an i s o l a t e d b a t t a l i o n .

i s n o t as i m p o r t a n t as t h e c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s .
p e n e t r a t i o n t o g r e a t depth i s n o t r e q u i r e d , n o t be wasted. I n t a c t i c a l terms, c o u l d expect t o f a c e one situations;

If a

then assets w i l l

t h e d e f e n d i n g b a t t a l i o n commander ( o r more) o f t h e f o l l o w i n g

1 ) a t t a c k by an army f o r w a r d detachment,

2)

a t t a c k by a d i v i s i o n a l f o r w a r d detachment, t o two r e g i m e n t s

3 ) a t t a c k by up
ano

(depending on d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r w i d t h ! .

4! a s u p p o r t i n g a t t a c k c a r r i e d o u t by a r e g i m e n t o r l e s s .
Figures 6 through 9 (pages 49-52) contain a s e r i e s of

diagrams which d e p i c t p o s s i b l e S o v i e t a t t a c k v a r i a t i o n s . The d e t a i l s o f attention. t h e S o v i e t combined arms b a t t l e deserve

S o v i e t i d e a s o f combined arms b a t t l e go beyond The b a l a n c i n g o f a l l arms, appears t o W e in

combining tank:s w i t h i n f a n t r y . including helicopters,

w i t h t a n k s and a r t i l l e r y ,
future

b e a g r o h i n g concern i n terms of
t h e American Army t e n d t o be v e r y

organization.

"machine" c o n s c i o u s and

measure S o v i e t combat power i n terms o f numbers o f EllPs ana

tack:-,.

B u t as Genera;

R o t m i s t r n v ' = speech emphasized.

but

i t -5.
a l l

n i ? t ~ c h e w e i g k r k ,c+ armor which c r o w i t - ,

t h e balsnce

.arms !and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f a n t r y ) i n accordance w i t h t a c t i c a l

c s n d i t i o n s which i s i m p o r t a n t .

T h e c o m p o s i t i o n of

Russian maneuver u n i t s has .major

-.
..

implications.

I f t h e HTH equipped r e g i m e n t i s o r g a n i z e d t o
"shock: s u b u n i t s " i n t h e n t h e s e im: t z . close b a t t l e

i n c l u d e combined arms. shcci:: groucc- o r

t h e manner suggested b y General R o t m i s t r o v ,

would be w e l l s u i t e d t o e x e c u t e t h a t p o r t i o n o f i n v o l v i n g a s s a u l t and r e d u c t i o n o f defenses.

Artillery

s u p p o r t coctid be c e n t r a l l y managed a t r e g i m e n t , speed of advance of

s i n c e tne

t h e s e elements would be keyed t o t h e f i r e against b a t t l e positions.

s e q u e n t i a l massing o f

If w e

r e f e r a g a i n t o our U.S. numbers of

balanced t a s k f o r c e and examine t h e

i n f a n t r y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e commander, w e would a p p r o x i m a t e l y 150 dismounted w e

come up w i t h a f i g u r e of
personnel.

If w e l o o k a t t h e HTK equipped r e q i m e n t ,

would f i n d a t o t a l o f

7X! dismounted i n f a n t r y . s 4

This four

t o one advantage c o u l d be v e r y i m p o r t a n t i n t h e t e r r a i n o f West Germany. The n i n e i n f a n t r y companies of t h e regiment

c o u l d become "shock s u b u n i t s " ,

sapper e n g i n e e r u n i t s ,

w o r k i n g close1 y w i t h t a n k s , and m o r t a r s t o

heavy a r t i l l e r y .

r e d u c e American companies piecemeal. and d e n s i t y o f echelonment o f anti-tank

The d e p t h o f d e i e n s e

weapons w i l l d e t e r m i n e t h e
I f a S o v i e t b a t t a l i o n is i::ept

t h e regiment.
it w i l l

i n second echelon, committed.ss

r e c e i v e a t t a c h m e n t s o n l y when

The tank: and BMF r e g i m e n t s ,

1 .

a l o n g w i t h t h e independent

..e.ni:: b a t t a l i ' l n , m a y . f o r m m o b i l e grsx!pr,

m o r ~ decentral i Z T C
combat

tasl:: o r g a n i z i l c
the b a t l a i i o n
iwhich

F5ni

trained f o r level.

at

The d i v i z i o ? independent

tank b a t t a l i o n ,

t o d a y c o m p r i s e s 51 t a n k s i n f i v e c o m p a n i e s ) , r e i n f o r c e d b y a BMP a n d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n ! t h r e e r i f l e companies, three

h o w i t z e r b a t t e r i e s , a n d o n e mortar b a t t e r y ) , m i g h t b e c o m e
t h e fOrVJard d e t a c h m e n t
of

t h e d i v i s i o n and e x e c u t e a deep the division

tactical mission.

The a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s of

would s u p p o r t t h e f o r w a r d d e t a c h m e n t . BMP r e g i m e n t

The r e m a i n d e r o f t h e

( t w o r i f l e and one t a n k b a t t a l i o n ) might follow

t h e f o r w a r d d e t a c h m e n t and b e a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n of c o n d u c t i n g tactical e x p l o i t a t i o n t o d e s t r o y a r t i l l e r y and command p o s t s . The t a n k r e g i m e n t might b e r e t a i n e d t o

c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n a l p e n e t r a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e w a k e of t h e

a s s a u l t BTR u n i t s a n d b e y o n d t h e d i s r u p t i o n c a u s e d b y t h e
lead mobile groups.

A t a r m y l e v e l , a f o r w a r d d e t a c h m e n t m i g h t be b u i l t
around t h e independent t a n k regiment, which t o d a y c o n s i s t s

of t h r e e t a n k b a t t a l i o n s w i t h 150 t a n k s t o t a l , a n d a BMP
b a t t a l i o n w i t h 45 BMPs.'~ When c o m m i t t e d , t h i s unit miaht a

S e r e i n f o r c e d by o n e o r more a r t i l l e r ' v b a t t a l i a n s .

m u l t i p l e rocket l a u n c h e r b a t t a l i o n , a n d a s s o r t e d e n g i n e e r s and air defense.

I t would a l s o b e s u p p o r t e d b v t h e armv
w h i c h d e p l o y s 40 Mi-24

a t t a c k helicopter regiment,

HIND a n d

20 M i - 8

#IF a i r c r a f t .

T h e l i k e l i h o o d i s h i g h t h a t t h e Zr:w

f o r w a r d d e t a c h m e n t would o p e r a t e i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a n army l e v e l a i r a s 3 a u l t a n i t of b a t t a l i o n s i z e .
W O L I b ~e ~
TL

Obvicusl./.

this

a f o r m i d a b l e E1:riking

Lorco.
L)?

nat.c!rr oF c o m b a t a g a i n s t f o r w a r n aotacl-:m-.nts.

i n d e e d , a g a i n s t 3n.v " m o b i l e g r a c . p " i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d . F:-,rr.Jard a e t a c h m e n t s a r e z e s n

3.5

advanced guards.

a n d ccJ?ne:t

w i t h them i s seen as an e x t e n s i o n of
. .

combat a g a i n s t a S o v i e t Forward detachments

regiment. w i l l

They a r e n o t advance guards.

iise h i g h speed cclc!mn t a c t i c s and a v o i d b a t t l e w i t h

..

defending forces., i i n l e ~ s t h e i r m:is5ion c a l l s f o r it. The U.S. Army has e x p e r i e n c e d e a l i n g w i t h a t l e a s t one B a t t l e g r o u p P e i p e r spearheaded t h e 1st

f o r w a r d detachment;

SS P a n i e r D i v i s i o n s a s s a u l t i n t h e Ardennes i n 1344.
F o r t u n a t e l y f o r U.S. Panrer Peiper. forces, t h e remainder of t h e 1st

SS

D i v i s i o n was p r e v e n t e d f r o m j o i n i n g B a t t l e g r o u p The i m p a c t o f even one f o r w a r d detachment was f e l t

a i l t h e way t o 1 2 t h Army Group h e a d q ~ i a r t e r s . ~ ~ The concept of any d e t a i l f o r w a r d detachments i s n o t addressed i n T h e i r presence may compel t h e

i n cur d o c t r i n e .

d e f e n d i n g t a s k f o r c e t o engage a f o r w a r d detachiment w h i i e t h e covering f o r c e b a t t l e i s s t i l l i n progress

7).
t c j

(see f i g u r e

I f a f o r w a r d detachment

is t o be h a l t e d , i t w i l l have

be h e a v i l y engaged by f o r c e s from t h e t a s k f o r c e

i n i t i . a l ? y , and p o s s i b l y b.y b r i g a d e a n d d i ~ i i s i o n a lr e s e r v e s
such as a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s . S i n c e f o r w a r d detachments w i l l t h e t a c t i c a i main a t t a c k ,

n o r m a l l y o p e r a t e i n t h e zone o f

t h i s means t h a t a t a s k f o r c e engaging a f o r w a r d detachment

w i l l

n o t be i n a f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n t o engage f o l l o w i n g

motor r i f l e o r t a n k r e g i m e n t s c o n d u c t i n g t h e main a t t a c k .
T!ie task:: f o r c e mist be g i v e n t h e f l e x i b i l i t v

t o ccnduct

_.
.-.

!nc::l:>

1 15

;:3cet-.3t! o i i ?

>>I,I-,

Y-se +II~*,*J.~:-.c!

cje.taci-ment w h i le ?.,-:e

r_o.vrri!ig f o r c e dela:.~ the advanciny main attack::.

1: . :
i-, [)

I.$ t h e r e
force
r m ~ i s t

-l.isstati.tia? - I.

covs?r.i,nq f u r c e ,

therl t h e tar-::

conduct o p e r a t i o n s designed t o h a l t t h e f o r w a r d detachment and r e l y on b r i g ' a d e t o s t o p t h e remainder. Forward detachments m u l t i p l y by s e v e r a l t i m e s t h e t h r e a t t o t h e t a s k + o r c e r e a r area., particulariy j f the-y

operate i n conjunction w i t h a i r assaults.

Command p o s t s and i n behind

t r a i n s can e i t h e r be o r g a n i z e d t o f i g h t o r t u c k maneuver u n i t s . The s i z e of

t h e main command p o s t and

combat t r a i n s make i t d i f f i c u l t t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e l a t t e r , w h i l e t h e l a c k o f heavy weapons m i t i g a t e s a g a i n s t t h e former.

I n any case,

t h e t a s k f o r c e m u s t proceed under t h e

assumption t h a t t h e s e r e a r elements may f i n d themselves i n v o l v e d i n combat a c t i o n s w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l f o r c e s

s i m c i l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e maneuver teams.

The e x t e n s i v e use o f h e l i c o p t e r s by t h e Russians poses a s i g n i f i c a n t t h r e a t t o t h e a l l elements of t h e task force.

S o v i e t w r i t i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t up t o 25% o f a l l f i r e s may come f r o m c l o s e s u p p o r t h e l i c o p t e r s . = e

A S o v i e t attack:

h e l i c o p t e r squadron o r g a n i c t o t h e d i v i s i o n m i g h t uss between two and s i x armed h e l i c o p t e r s t o s t r i k e a cnmpar:v team d e t e c t e d i n movement. t h e SU-25 important. s u p p o r t of invohed.
I n order

C l o s e s u p p o r t a i r c r a f t such a=

m i g h t be i n c l u d e d i n t h e a t t a c k ,

i f t h e t a r g e t was

L a r g e r s t r i k e packages s h o u l d be expected i n army f o r w a r d detachments, w i t h 16-24 aircraft

t r - mcI>.de. t h e t a s l : : f o r c e m u z t b e g r e p a r r 6

tz

en.;age a i r

fht-eats.

I n t h e ne3.r t e r m .

l i t -

ijeren-c
consist o i and E m a i l

n r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o the task f o r c e w i l l s.houlder . f i r e d m i s s i l e s .

acctomatic cannon f i r e .

arms.

The lack of effective air defense may have the

...

consequence of severely restricting movement of friendly forces, precisely when thev must move.

..

FIRE SUPPORT
The improvements to Soviet artillery are significant beyond fire support terms. Mobility and protection prolong

the life expectancy o f Russian artillery in the face of rapid U.S. counterfire.

The increased range of army and

f r o n t artillery permits massing of fires laterally and from

greater distances behind advancing Soviet columns, while increasing numbers of self-propelled armored artillery units permit direct attachment of more artillery units to maneuver battalions and forward detachments.

The close integration

of artillery with manec!ver arms in turn eases the artiliery

requirements for neutralizing defenses, because the Soviets depend on direct observation of targets by artillery commanders to synchronize fires during the accompaniment phase o i fire support. Frotecting the force from t h e fire striL:es e i the attacking Soviet force should b e the first consideration of
the

task!: force commander.

Task::forces positioned in 11ly:el.y

main effort sectors must b e reinforced with sufficient engineer units to allow very rapid preparation of protected positinns.
init-~et t:te

A survivabi1it.y priority for task force eiements

:incor;:rorated : n t o
ope de+ei-tsec

71 ,*.r?s. O t h e r t n e a s u t - e s c i i c h a ,

reverse . ; 1

m u s t b e a d ~ e p t e d wJhereVSr -FeasiS?e.

Wht?n e x t . e n s i v e

engineer support isnt available. t h e

armor on an MZ B r a d l e y may be t h e o n l y p r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o the i n f a n t r y during Soviet f i r e s t r i k e s . Separating t he

i n f a n t r y from t h e t r a c k s may work if adequate t i m e i s a v a i l a b l e t o prepare p o s i t i o n s , of the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s of h u t would be r i s k v i n view

S o v i e t a r t i l l e r y on i n f a n t r y The M 1 and

occupying h a s t y p o s i t i o n s . against i n d i r e c t f i r e .

M 2 are well protected

T h i s advantage s h o u l d be e x p l o i t e d companies t o a v o i d near t h e c a r r i e r s a t least u n t i l

by p r a c t i c i n g r a p i d r e p o s i t i o n i n g of i n d i r e c t f i r e and k e e p i n g t h e infantr.;

where immediate p r o t e c t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e ,

p o s i t i o n s w i t h overhead cover a r e completed. The t a s k f o r c e commander m u s t n o t f o r g e t t h a t t h e Soviets intend t o a l t e r the " c o r r e l a t i o n s of forces" f i r e support. Systemic a n a l y s i s o f S o v i e t f o r c e s has through

spawned emphasis on c o u n t e r f i r e t o d i s r u p t S o v i e t f i r e support. of C o l o n e l Tom W h i t e ' s a r t i c l e , " D i s r u p t i n g t h e Tempo importance c f

Soviet Operations",

p o i n t s out the c r i t i c a l

f i r e s u p p o r t t o S o v i e t ma.neuver succes.5, a n d t h e a b s o i u t e n e c e s s i t y t o 1::eep S o v i e t a r t i l l e r y from d o m i n a t i n g t h e c i o r e battle."9 sufficient B r i g a d e and d i v i s i o n commanders must d e v o t e resources t o t h e c o u n t e r f i r e . W i t h o u t such be

s L i p p o r t 3 t h e task: f o r c e ( s ) f a c i n g t h e main e f f o r t w i l l r a p i d l y overwhelmed.

SECURITY OPERATIONS
P r o t e c t . i n g t h e f o r c e al5.o e n t a i l s degrs.ding t h e So,,iet r13~C71?1-,;(1s~~.r,ce. capatji 1 i t y b.:~ e',iery p o s s i ~ l e:nes.ns.
!Ima~tzr-.

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e can be d i . v i ded i n t o a c t i v e and p a s s i ve meacure5.

M e m i s t n c t fall

i n t o the t r a p cf

as;rurning S o v i e t

ground r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i s t h e e n d - a l l Soviets intelligence. example,

t o providing the for

D u r i n g t h e Second World War,

30% of a l l . a i r . s o r t i e s were r e c o n n a i s s a n c e
The S o v i e t s admonish commanders t o make fi-tl 1 use

..

o f a spectrum of

i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g sources.

Our

operations s e c u r i t y

(OPSEC) m u s t b e e q u a l l y b r o a d band.
t h e ground

T h i s i s n o t t o deny t h a t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of recon b a t t l e . commander,

It i s v i t a l l y important t o t he Soviet

and may be i m p o r t a n t enough t o mount

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i n f o r c e o p e r a t i o n s by companies and b a t t a l i o n s t o g e t t h e necessary i n f o r m a t i o n . The S o v i e t s

r e c o g n i z e t h a t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i n f o r c e may j u s t as e a s i l y c o n v e r t t o spearheads i f t h e s i t u a t i o n d e v e l o p s f a v o r a b l v . " The c o u n t e r - r e c o n n a i s s a n c e battle i s a potentially

v i o l e n t f i g h t waged b e f o r e and d u r i n g t h e c l a s h of main elements. T h i s may be a m i s s i o n which t h e t a s k f o r c e can f o r c e b u i l t around t h e scoc!t

a c c o m p l i s h w i t h an ad-hoc platoon.

H u t a o i n g i t i n such a manner w i l l Drevent t h e

acquisition

of key i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h e enemy.

The tasi::

f o r c e commander may see i n e x c r u c i a t i n g d e t a i l t h e c o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t l e , b u t m i s s t h e more i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n h i s own r e c o n n a i s s a n c e c o u l d p r o v i d e h i m i f n o t involved i n the security b a t t l e . M y conclusion i s t h a t

company teams w i 11 p r o b a b l y be r e q u i r e d t o conduct c o u n t e r v - c ? , . : G ~ < ~ Ic;sarriIe ?.~

n p r r e t . ic n c wh

! .l

.srot..tt+ condctc?.

n t a l 1 !. q e n c e

op6rations.

IFM 71-1 o f f e r s ti7.i.z as a p o s s i b l E c-olwkion.

i n a s s i g n i n g a company team t c

There i s a t r a d e - o f f

t h i s mission.

There >nay be t o o many avenues t o cover t o

send a company f o r w a r d and s t i l l m a i n t a i n an e f f e c t i v e reserve. The company team ~ i s e di n a forwar.d r o l e may n o t be given t he Soviet Likewise, t h e makeup o i

a v a i l a b l k to r e c o n s t i t u e t h e reserve, proclivity for f o r w a r d detachments.

t h e t a s k f o r c e may l i m i t t h e commander's o p t i o n s .

COMMCIND AND CONTROL

The S o v i e t s have a p o t e n t i a l problem w i t h q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e unknowable. I n o r d e r t o use n o r m a t i v e

s o l u t i o n s i n combat s i t u a t i o n s ,

t h e S o v i e t commander is

c r i t i c a l l y dependent on reconnaissance. becomes more and more d i s o r d e r l y , i n t e l l i g e n c e w i l l decrease. yaps,

Gs t h e b a t t l e f i e l d
usable

t h e amount of

To account f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e a l a r g e fudge f a c t o r i n lieu

the Soviets w i l l plan f o r

of hard information.

I f American t a s k f o r c e s p r o v e
battle,
it

p a r t i c u l a r l y adept a t t h e c o u n t e r - r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w i l l r e s o r t t o reconnaissance i n .Force, a t e c h n i q u e w h i c h was o f t e n used i n World War However, t h i s is n o t t h e p r e f e r r e d method o i g a i n i n g and w i l l be undertak:en o n l y a t t h e d i r e c t i o n

II.&=

intelligence, of

t h e h i g h e r commander.bz The problem o f c o n d u c t i n g o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t an e l u s i v e

opponent i m p a c t s d i r e c t l y on t h e S o v i e t b a t t a l i o n commander. The d i f f e r e n c e between what t h e Russian b a t t a l i o n commander e:.:p?cCs on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and what he g e t s may b e c r i t i c s !

+ ,.LJ .. t h o

:S(.~CC~SB

cf

t ? ~ eS o v i e t s . i n a c h i r v i n q an c p e r a t i c r , a i

break:C_ hr- ouy h

"The command and c o n t r o l problem is p a r t i c u l a r l y a c u t e

a t subuni,t l e v e l . B a t t a l i o n commanders. . a r e o f t e n young and i n e x p e r i e n c e d , and t h e y a r e a i d e d by a s t a f f c o m p r i s i n g o n l y f o u r o f f i c e r s and p r a p o r s h c h i k i ( w a r r a n t o f f i c e r s ) and n i n e o t h e r ranks. T h i s does n o t m a t t e r as l o n g as t h e b a t t a l i o n is o p e r a t i n g as. a mere cog in a r e g i m e n t a l machine. I t matters v e r v much indeed, however, when t h e b a t t a l i o n i s a c t i n g i n an independent o r semi-independent i:apacit.jl f o r i n s t a n c e as a f o r w a r d r a i d i n g o r o u t f l a n k i n g detachment, o r a s an advance guard.

..

Here may be t h e A c h i l l e s h e e l o f h i g h tempo f l u i d S o v i e t operations,

if w e can f i n d ways t o e x p l o i t i t .

PART V r

CONCLUSIONS
the

However d e s i r a b l e a . f u l 1 y p r e p a r e d defense may b e , Soviets w i l l d i c t a t e t h e time, place, and s t r e n g t h of

the

a t t a c k and w i l l surprise.

do e v e r y t h i n g c o n c e i v a b l e t o a c h i e v e
extremely

Although t o t a l s u r p r i s e i s u n l i k e l y , and c o n s e q u e n t l y , many,

s h o r t warning is n o t , m a j o r i t y of

if n o t t h e

main b a t t l e a r e a t a s k f o r c e s and c o v e r i n g f o r c e s

w i l l

be engaging f r o m o n l y p a r t i a l l y p r e p a r e d p o s i t i o n s . of

One s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem would be t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n k P : e inter-German .time. Sorder.

therebv e l i m i n a t i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i a n

T h i s i s n o t p o l i t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e Mest Germs!? Therefore, t r a i n i n g s c e n a r i o s s h o u l d be

government.

m o d i f i e d t o r e f l e c t an a t t a c k on a p a r t i a l l y o r unprepared defense. assuming v a r y i n g degrees o f .surprise.

Close combat d o c t r i n e f o r t h e heavy t a s k f o r c e s h o u l d

be modified t o recognize t h e t s i l o r e d ,
:2f

combined arms n a t u r e

'the Sovie.t a ' t t a r k .

M e muzt s t o p c o n s i d e r i n a t h e S o . , : ! . ~ . t

:-.ei_:i:Tien!i n i s o l c t i i m a n d b e g i n 1anlir:sg , s t t f i e t o t a l tz'.c't:cal p i r t ~ i r e . A S o v i e t r e g i m e n t does n o t f i g h t a l o n e

zts p a r t o f

blut p e r i o r m s m:Ejsicfz,

a coherent o p e r a t i o n a l

plan.

The a c t u a l

f o r c e a g a i n s t which t h e t a s k f o r c e d e f e n d s f o r c e s from reconnaissance elements,

may r u n t h e r a n g e of mobile groups.

to

to reinforced regiments conducting a

Exainining a S o v i e t r e g i m e n t

" d o c t r i n a l " attaci::.

in the

a t t a c k i s u s e f u l a5 a s t a r t i n g p o i n t a n d p r e v e n t s "mirror
imaging", b u t s h o u l d n o t b e t h e s o l e b a s i s of

our t a c t i c a l

defensive doctrine. I n t e l l i g e n c e estimates s h o u l d a l s o i n c l u d e a n e v a l u a t i o n of t h e necessary f o r e s t e d and urban t e r r a i n . The Soviets h a v e

i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y t o e x p l o i t less approach, and are a p p a r e n t l y them. The t a s k f o r c e p l a n

d e s i r a b l e a v e n u e s of considering

w a y s t o m a k e use of

s h o u l d a t least a d d r e s s s u r v e i 1l a n c e and c o n t i n g e n c y m e a s u r e s f o r t h e s e areas.

From t h e brigade perspective.

sector r e s p o n s i b i l i t y must n o t b e s o l e l y b a s e d on h i g h s p e e d
avenues, b u t on a d e t a i l e d a s s e s s m e n t of Soviet

c a p a b i 1 i t i es. If
t h e NTC: is t o c o n t i n u e r e a l i s t i c a l ? y s i m ~ i l a t i n g C ~ E

n e x t armored b a t t l e f i e l d ,

t h e n r e s o u r c e s must b e p r o v i d e d

to

a l l o w a f u l l r a n g e of p o t e n t i a l e n e m y c a p a b i l i t i e s t o b e
duplicated. presented, The f u l l combined a r m s t h r e a t s h o u l d b e

not

jus.t t h e

major v e h i c l e s y s t e m s .

I t is

u n r e a l i s t i c to believe t h a t such an upgrade could be campls.ted i n t h e near f u t u r e . ivailable.

Ar-.!:iller-l/

Hut a l t e r n a t i v e s a r e
b e p l a n n e d tb t h e OF'FI~F:
3 ~ ~ 1

str.ti::es s h o u l d

e z a c t l y a s t , h e i r Sowlet c o u n t e r p a r t s w o u l d p l a n t h e m , .then b e eycecnted t h r o u g h f i r e s u p p o r t mechanisms.

Consideration should be given to converting t h e c u r r e n t

OPCOR HMP r e g i m e n t t o a t a n k r e g i m e n t , w h i c h w o u l d more

. I

n e a r l v a l i g n t h e n u m b e r s of p e r s o n n e l

carriers and

..

d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y a v a i l a b l e w i t h what t h e a c t u a l enemv u n i t would Forward detachment scenarios and

vertical envelopments should b e used i n t r a i n i n g r o t a t i o n s

along with t h e c u r r e n t selections.

Defense problems s h o u l d

l i m i t t h e a m o u n t of p r e p a r a t i o n t i m e a v a i l a b l e t o t a s k force.

Greater n u m b e r s o f a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s s h o u l d b e

p r o v i d e d f o r OPFOR m a i n a t t a c k s a n d m o b i l e g r o u p s . S o v i e t attack h e l i c o p t e r s w i l l m a k e t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a hazardous place f o r f r i e n d l y units. T h e n e a r term s o l u t i o n

t o o u r a i r d e f e n s e s h o r t a g e s l i e s i n i m p r o v i n g our
c a m o c i f l a g e d i s c i p l i n e when s t a t i o n a r y , a n d d e v e l o p i n g a i r d e f e n s e d r i l l s f o r movement. A i r o v e r w a t c h of t a n k s b y

d e s i g n a t e d B r a d l e y s a n d p r o f i c i e n c y w i t h .XI c a l i b e r m a c h i n e g u n s w i 1 I assist movement.

The contir?ued mnderniiation
be examined

of

S o l - i e t f i r e c u p p o r t mc!zt

by Americans n o t o n l y i n t e r m s o i its a b s o l u t e

q u a n t i t y , b u t i n t e r m s of i t s p o t e n t i a l

t o change

c o r r e l a t i o n of f o r c e s .

If

S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s are

t o h a v e a n y r h a n c e of s u c c e s s , S o v i e t f i r e s u p p o r t m u s t b e
extremely e f f e c t i v e i n neutralizing a considerable portion
of

t h e iJ.S.

t a c t i c a l defense.
'_he s1-1cces5 or
.F.3'i

From t h e t a s k f o r c e l u r E of t h e deep b a t t l e m a v

perspective,
be1.i

hii-qe o n h e i - i c a n

!counterfire.

-.

iiie

c c u n t e r i i r r pr'zorr

.. .

ir t h e r e f o r e of c r i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e . t o t h e t a s k f o r c e
c: cj m n a n d e r

W h i l e t h e NTC s u f f e r s

from resow-ce c o n s t r a i n t s ,

b a t t a l i o n l e v e l s i m u l a t i o n s a r e almost t o t a l l y open ended. Command p o s t e x e r c i s e s o f f e r t h e b e s t near t e r m means o f s t c ! d y i n g emerging S o v i e t d o c t r i p e a n d i t s p o s s i b l e e f f e c t t h e task force. E x c e l l e n t p r o d u c t s a r e a v a i l a b l e to

on

commander t h a t make i t p o s s i b l e t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e dynamic n a t u r e of Soviet t a c t i c a l doctrine. Simulations r e f i n e

o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s and p l a n s w i t h i n t h e scope of s o p h i s t i c a t e d and f l e x i b l e o p e r a t i n g framework.

If t h e r e i s a b o t t o m l i n e t o t h i s monograph i t is t h a t
American t a s k f o r c e d o c t r i n e i s f a i r l y comprehensive, d e s c r i b e s i n some d e t a i l what a t a s k f o r c e must do i n defense. When a p p l y i n g i t , c a u t i o n must be e x e r c i s e d t o d i s c r e t e engagements and

a v o i d v i s u a l i z i n g b a t t l e as a s e r i e s o f

between c o n v e n i e n t l y c a t e g o r i z e d elements.

It i s only too

easy t o a r r i v e a t t h e b e l i e f t h a t by l o o k i n g a t t e r r a i n and "doctrinal" factors, behavior. one can p r e d i c t S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e and

W e

Ecut war

1s a two sided b u s i n e s s .

should W e must battle,

n o t presume t h a t a Eussian would be so o b l i g i n g . develop a mindset which r e c o g n i z e s t h e f l u i d i t y o f and an awareness o f i n t e n s i t y combat.

t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s n a t u r e 0.f h i g h W e have w r i t t e n about non-1 i n e a r AirLand b a t t l e .

If w e

b a t t l e f i e l d s since the inception of

T n g a g e t h e S o v i e t s i n ccimbat w e w i l l have ever!,

11u

upFortunitv

e:.;perienre one.

A r t i l i e r v LJensities: 1. A s a i n s t p r e p a r e d d e f a n s a s o n m a i n axis. ..lC-2-2W per- kiiometer.

...;a.r~,rtz

2.
3.

A g a i n s t h a s t y d e f e n s e o n m a i n axis...ru-86 O n a s u p p o r t i n g axis...45 weapons/km

-_

weaponsikm

Artillery support of a main axis division attacking a partially prepared dctense.

EN
D 10

x
I
EN

.,
.. .

-.

..
RECON
SUBGROUP

, ,
T34

.
T34

FEO A

1
.

I LCC
I SQD

Figure 5 :
.cis i e n s e

t
I

. I -

.... .

.. .

x
I

Figure 8 : S n v i a t b i v i s i o n c o n d u c t i n g t h e m i i n at:a,:i: ;z;in.s~ a partial i:< p r e p a r e d 11.3. d e f e n s e . E a s e u u p o n T h s h , . - i e t conduct 8 : t g a r . b v ~ : o i u n a l G l a n t z . 5 A \ j i j . 31-d -,,.137. O c e r s t i o n s . S r i t i s h A r m y F i e i d Manual.

m
I

i'

APPEND I X
Soviet Principles of Combined Arms Combat:
1 ) Constant h i g h combat readiness formations, units, and subun i ts. 2 ) High aggressiveness, decisiveness, and the uninterrupted conduct of battle. 3) Surprise in operations. (most important principle) 4) Coordinated joint use of branches of troops and special troops i n combat, and maintenance of continuous interaction between them. 5 ) Decisive concentration of the main efforts of the troops on the main axis at the needed time. 6 ) Maneuver by subunits and units, and by nuclear and fire strikes. 7 ) Thorough consideration and utilization of moral, political, and psychological factors in the interesrs of carrying out the assigned mission. 8 ) Comprehensive support to combat. 9 ) Maintenance and timely restoration of the combat capability. 10) Firm and continuous troop control and persistence in attaining planned goals and in fulfilling adopted decisions and assigned missions.

AirLand Battle Imperative6

Ensure unity of effort Anticipate events on the battlefield Concentrate combat power against enemy vulnerabilities Designate, sustain and shift the main effort 5 ) Press the fight 6 ) Move fast, strike hard, finish rapidly 7 ) Use terrain, weather, decption, and OPSEC 8) Conserve strength for decisive action 9 ) Combine arms and sister services t o complement and reinforce 10) Understand the effects of battle on soldiers, units, and 1 eaders
1) 2) 3 1 4)

ENDNOTES

1. Defense D.C.. 1988)

Almanac, September/October, . D.26.

(Washington

2. Glantz, David M., "Soviet Oifenc-ive Ground Doctrine Since 1?45", (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1 9 8 8 ) p . 51-.12.
3. Glantz, David'M., "The Nature of Soviet Operational Art", Parameters. Spring 1985. p.4.

4. Armv Field Manual, Volume 11-Part 2~ Soviet Operations , (London, England, April 1986!, p. 2-1 thru 2-9.

5 .
6

Reznichenko, V.
Ibid., p. 20.

G., Taktika, (Moscow, 1987),

p.

75.

7 . Hines, John G., Soviet Front ODerations In EuroDePlanninq for Encirclement, (Ft. Leavenworth, 1988). Hines argues that the Soviets would encircle, rather than attempt to break through the powerful U.S. forces.

3. Armv Field Manual. V o l n m e 11-Part & Soviet ODerations. op-cit.. p . 4-6.

9 . Donnelly, C. N . , Lecture given to the officers of the 9 8 5 at Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, FHG. VII (US) Corps in 1

10.

Simpkin, Richard, Race to the Swift, (London, 1 ? 3 5 !

11. Koziej, S., "Anticipated Direction for Chanoe in Tactics of Ground Troops, Soviet Future War. ! F t . Leavenworth Originally published in September 1936. translated i n 1987, published i n April 1987!, p . 4 thru 9.

12. Holcomb, James F.. "Recent Developments in Soviet Helicopter Tactics", (Soviet Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, March 17881, p. 12 thrci 14.
13. Dragunskiy, D. A., The Motorized f i i f l e !Tank! Battalion Combat (Moscow, 7 April 1986) JPHS, UMA-88, 24 Mar 1988, see tactical examples.
14.
15.

Holcomb, J a m e s F.,

op.cit.. p. 1 1 , 13. I ? .
I

.Tal::tii:a.lP137, co.cit.

p.

?5. SZ,

$5.

,-, -3a.
I

.- .

51

H i n e s , o p . c i t . . p.18 t h r u 21. Hines u s e s t h e " V o r a s h i l o v F a p e r s " , r e c e n t l y d e c l a s s i f i e d , f a r much of h i s a n a l y s i s . Also i n c l u d e d i n t h e a n a l y s i s w a s a n o r m a t i v e g r a p h s h o w i n g p r o b a b l e attacl:: s u c e s s as a f u n c t i o n of t a n k / a n t i - t a n k d e n s i t y . In calculating the c o r r e i a t i o n of f o r c e r . t h e S o v i e t s c o n s i d e r t h e r a t i o s i n b o . t h t h e s p e c i f i c attacl:: s e c t o r a n a i n d e p t h t h r o u g h t h e defense. N o t e d S o v i e t r e s e a r c h e r C. N . D o n n e l l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t w h i l e advanced t a n k p r o t e c t i o n modifies t h e outcomes, i t i s n ' t enough t o i n s u r e s u c c e s s .
16. 17. G l a n t z , David M., "The N a t u r e of Soviet O p e r a t i o n a l A r t " , op.cit., p.6. F a r a f a s c i n a t i n g d i s c u s s i o n on t h e u s e of f o r w a r d d e t a c h m e n t s i n t h e M a n c h u r i a n c a m p a i g n , see C o l o n e l G l a n t i , A u a u s t Storm: S o v i e t T a c t i c a l and O p e r a t i o n a l Combat M a n c h u r i a . 1945. L e a v e n w o r t h P a D e r s N o . 8, ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , K s . , J u n e , 1983) 18. G l a n t z , David M., "Soviet O p e r a t i o n a l F o r m a t i o n f o r B a t t l e - A P e r s p e c t i v e " , Soviet Military Readings, ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , 1988), p.45 t h r u 48.
19.

S m i t h , D.L., a n d Meier, A.L., "Ogarkov's R e v o l u t i o n " , I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e f e n s e R e v i e w , J u l y 1987. p.870.

X!.
21.

R e z n i c h e n L : o . V.

G.,

Talttika,

(1987), o o . c i t .

p.

13.

G l a n t z , D a v i d M . , " F a r c e S t r u c t u r e i n L i g h t of Contemporary Requirements", (Unpublished, F t . Leavenworth, 1988), p . 9 t h r u 10.

22. 2;.

Ibid.,

p.

11.

" S p e e c h of M a r s h a l F : o t m i s t r o v a t 1946 C o n f e r e n c e on Berlin Operation", Reprinted i n Report - JPRS '?MA 86009, Sep 85, p . 25. Colonel G l a n t i also emphasizes t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h i s s p e e c h i n c u r r e n t S o v i e . t d e v l o p m e n t z . See a l s o G l a n t i , " F o r c e R e q u i r e m e n t s " , o p . c i t . ,p . 8 .
24. G l a n t z , David M . , "Soviet O f f e n s i v e Ground D o c t r i n e S i n c e 1945". ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , Ks., SASQ, 1987. R e p u b l i c a t i o n of a n a r t i c l e w h i c h a p p e a r e d i n U n i v e r s i t v R e v i e w , 1983) A l s o , " F o r c e S t r u c t u r e i n L i g h t of C o n t e m p o r a r y R e q u i r e m e n t s " , a p . c i t . . 25.

Dragunskiy,

D.

A.,
~

op.cit.,
Tal:.til:a,

p.

2 thru

i1.

26.
"7.

Re~nichefil::~ Y. . G. Dragunckiy.

(1987!. o o . c i t .

._p .

89.

._

".

A.,

oo.cit..

p.

- .
.-

28. Sov'iet A r m y S t u d i e s O f f i c e . "Impact of t h e Dialectical Process: P e r i o d s of H i . l i t a t - v D e v e l o p m e n t . " . ! F t . L e a v e n w o r t h ' . C i p r i l 1 9 8 7 ) . p . I!:!.

2?. R e z n i c h e n k o , V.G., e t al., T a k t i i r a , !Moscow,l987), p . 6 t h r u 10. The view of t h e S o v i e t s t o w a r d s . n u c l e a r weapons must b e c o n s i d e r e d as a t w o s i d e d i s s u e . The S o v i e t s a r e f u l l y c o g n i z a n t o f t h e p o l i t i c a l v a l u e of n u c l e a r a r m a m e n t , a n d t h e ri'?j!.::si n h e r e n t i n a n u c l e a r See K e n n e d y , F a u l , T h e H i r e a n d F a ? ? nf t h e armed w o r l d . Great P o w e r s . !New Y o r k , 1988!, p . 5 0 0 t h r u Sl!:]. T h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y h a s e v o l v e d f r o m a " n u c l e a r " use p o l i c y t o o n e w h i c h is " n u c l e a r s c a r e d " . See D o n n e l l y , C. N., "The D e v e l o p m e n t o f S o v i e t M i 1i t a r y D o c t r i n e " , S o v i e t M i 1 i t a r v Readinas, (Ft. L e a v e n w o r t h , 1988), p . 1 t h r u 8 . See also G l a n t z , " S o v i e t Ground D o c t r i n e " c i t . .

30. D o n n e l l y , C.N., "The S o v i e t O p e r a t i o n a l Maneuver G r o u p : A N e w C h a l l e n g e f o r NATO", S o v i e t M i 1 i t a r v Headinas, !Ft. L e a v e n w o r t h , 1988), p.9 t h r u 26.

31.
22.

Smith, D.L.,

a n d Meier, A.L.,

op.cit.,

p.

864.

H u r g e s s , W i l l i a m , " T h e S o v i e t s Size Up A i r L a n d B a t t l e " , A r m y , J u l y 1986, p . 47. Hurgess r e f e r s t o an a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d b y Major G e n e r a l I . V o r o b i e v , of t h e Frunze Academy, i n O c t o b e r of 1985.
77

.--._..

R e z n i c h e n k o , V.E.,

Tal::tika,

op.cit.

,! M o ~ c ~ P J19E17). ,

p.78

34.
35.

Koziej, S.,
J F 100-5.

op.cit.

p.

6 t h r u 7.

Ooerations,

(Washington D.C.,

1?86), p .

2.

36. Was D e C z e g e , H u b a , "Understanding and Develocinq Combat F o w e r " , AMSF' C o u r s e 2 T a c t i c a l D v n a m i c r f i e a d i n c r . FT. L e a v e n w o r t h , i988!, p . b.
I

57.
33.

J F

1!:>i:!-5.

oc.cit.

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F M 71-2. T h e Tank a n d M e c h a n i z e d I n f a n t r y ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , J a n u a r y , 1988), p . 4-2.

Homjue.

Force,

.is?.

Battle: Monroe,
40.
41.
p.

The

J o h n L . , From A c t i v e D e f e n s e & + AirLand D e v e l o p m e n t of Armv D o c t r i n e 1?73-1973. V i r g i n i a , 1984), c h a p t e r 1.

op.cit.,

iFt.

FB 71-2,

p.

1-7.

1!:)!:!-?5, C o r p c O n e r a t i o n s ,
6-1.

i t d a s h i n g t o n D.C..

:798).

44.

Ibid.,

p.

4-6

45..

71-2.

op.cit.

, . p.

4-25.

46. S a i n t , C r o s b i e E., a n d Y a t e s . Walter H . , " A t t a c k H e l i c o p t e r Operatio'ns i n t h e AirLand Battle: Clare O p e r a t i o n s " . M i l i t a r v R e v i e w . J u n e 15'88, p . 2 t h r u 15
47. 48.

J F

71-2.

op.cit.,

p.

4-3.

C e n t e r f o r Army L e s s o n s L e a r n e d ,

I n t e r v i e w s and

issue materi a1 s.
49. F A 71-2. o ~ . c i t . , p . 2-2 t h r u 2-6. The o f f i c e r s are: T h e X O , S-1, S-2, a s s t S-2, S-9, S-3 a i r , c h e m i c a l o f f i c e r , t w o l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , ALO, FSO, e n g i n e e r , a i r d e f e n s e , S-4, BMO, s i g n a l o f f i c e r , s u r g e o n , a n d c h a p l a i n . T h e HHC c o m m a n d e r a n d XO a l s o assist t h e s t a f f . Most of t h e s e s t a f f o f f i c e r s a r e a s s i s t e d b y o n e o r more N C O s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e 5-3 h a s 7 N C O s , a n d t h e 5-2 h a s 3 .

5Q. F i g u r e s d e r i v e d b a s e d o n d a t a g i v e n i n o ~ . c i t, . p. 4-13.

1!:!!:!-2-5,

51. H o l d e r , L. D . , " C a t c h i n g Up W i t h O p e r a t i o n a l A r t " , AMSP C o u r s e 3 R e a d i n g s T h e C o n t e m p o r a r v P r a c t i c e O f O p e r a t i o n a l A r t , ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , 1988). p . 4 . 52.

Burgess,

William,

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p.

4 6 . 47.

=_ ad. S o v i e t Army S t u d i e s O f f i c e , " S o v i e t F u t u r e War", ( F t . L e a v e n w o r t h , 1987). I n s i g h t s d e r i v e d f r o m r e a d i n g a l l f i v e a r t i cl es.

54.

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Dragunsl::i:.,,

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55.
56.

A.,

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57. M a c D o n a l d , C h a r l e s H . , A T i m e F o r T r u m p e t s , iNew York. 1985). T h e e s c a p a d e s o f KampFy.ruppe F e i p e r a r e d e s c r i b e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e book. 58.

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59. W h i t e . T h o m a s E.. " D i s r u p t i n g t h e Tempo o f S o v i e t O p e r a t i o n s " . M i l i t a r v R e v i e w , November 1'?97. p . 2 t h r c ! 1 1 .

/.;I

....

c,. i L.,., .iiet

~ & e r a t i u n % , . u ~ ~ i t 9.5-6. . .

$1.

iFt.
bL.

H o u s e , J o n a t h a n C . . .Toward C o m b i n e d Arm-j l.larfare. L e a v e n w o r t h , 1984!, p . 122. :bid.,

p.
122.

63.

Heznichenko,

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G., T a k t i k a , 0 p . c i t .

p . 57.

..
,

64.
65.

D i c k C. J . , " S o v i e t B a t t l e D r i l l s , V u l n e r a b i l i t y o r S t r e n g t h ? " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Defense Review, May, 1985, p . 6 6 5 . The O F F O R r e q i m e n t a t F o r t I r w i n i5 a c t u a l l y made i i c ' o f a U.S. mechanized b a t t a l i o n and a .tank b a t t a l i o n . F551 S h e r i d a n l i g h t t a n k s a r e m o d i f i e d t o resemble e i t h e r a i 72 t a n k o r a BMP-1. There a r e a l s o a few Russian MTLB p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s and a h a n d f u l o f M113s m o d i f i e d t o l o o k There a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s i n l i k e BMFs. the O P F O R t o man t h e 90 BMPs and 40 t a n k s of t h e r e g i m e n t and f i g h t dismounted. I n f a n t r y u n i t s , i n c l u d i n g Marines, a r e sent t e m p o r a r i l y t o F o r t I r w i n t o p r o v i d e t h e dismounted t r o o p s f o r t h e OPFOR. T h e i r numbers r a n g e from 150-250 p e r s o n n e l . T h i s f a l l s w e l l s h o r t of t h e 700 p e r s o n n e l a S o v i e t m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t dismounts, b u t is f a i r l y c l o s e t o what a t a n k r e g i m e n t m i g h t dismount.

..

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