The evolution of the safety culture of IMO: a case of organisational culture change

Kiriaki Mitroussi

Introduction
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as the only international regulatory body for safety affairs in the maritime industry is directly connected with the management and prevention of disaster, whether this alludes to marine accidents or sea pollution. Thus, it holds a great interest as the central subject of such a research. The way the IMO shapes, develops, and puts into practice the notion of marine safety and environmental protection not only reflects the organisation's attitude towards these issues but also affects the formulation of the international conception of marine safety. Most of the key players in shipping recognise in the organisation the authority to set safety standards to be achieved and be applicable to all, thus ensuring not only an acceptable level of safety but fair competition as well. In this way, the IMO is an interesting case of a UN agency. It is both efficient and effective, and in contrast with the majority of the UN departments in the sense that its own understanding of several topics, its principles, and its practices have implications for the wider maritime world they have a profound effect on international business. It is, in other words, an active body with powers, rarely enjoyed by other UN agencies, to regulate to a high degree the industry with which it deals. As a result, an examination of the IMO is essentially an investigation into the field of disaster prevention and risk management in the business of shipping worldwide. The IMO, as with any other organisation whether business, social, governmental, intergovernmental, or political, exhibits and is characterised by certain organisational features, one of which is the organisational culture. As culture we can define a system of values shared by all the members of an organisation, by an underlying philosophy that serves and reflects its core mission, its ``reason to be''. In the case of the IMO this culture can be described as ``safety culture'' since the organisation's main concern and primary aim has always been the safety at sea. Organisational cultures are likely to evolve in order to adjust to developments of a dynamic environment, that is they can be strengthened, be reshaped, or even change. In the same way, the IMO has responded to different forces within and outside the 16

The author Kiriaki Mitroussi is an appointed Lecturer at the University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece. Keywords Safety, Corporate culture, Organizational change, Shipping Abstract The focus of this paper is the UN's agency for the maritime affairs, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and more precisely its approach to maritime safety. Being the only international rule-maker, the sole setter of maritime safety standards that apply universally, the IMO exhibits increased interest especially with regard to its organisational culture, the safety culture that constitutes its core mission. An examination of the evolution of IMO's safety culture is in essence an examination of the international approach to disaster prevention and risk management in shipping and it is in fact the subject of our present study. Our investigation will reveal the various safety issues that have been treated by IMO as high agenda items in recent years, as well as the factors that can be regarded as instrumental in cultural change and, thus, in the evolution of IMO's safety philosophy. Electronic access The Emerald Research Register for this journal is available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm

Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . pp. 16-23 # MCB UP Limited . ISSN 0965-3562 DOI 10.1108/09653560310463810

The evolution of the safety culture of IMO

Kiriaki Mitroussi

Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

organisation, something that has been reflected in its priorities, its content, and its practices and that has affected its formation and application of the concept of safety. The aim of the present paper is to examine the changes that IMO's culture underwent during the last decade demonstrating in this way how the organisation's approach to safety, and so effectively the international approach to marine disaster prevention and management, has evolved.

The concept of organisational culture

The large number of definitions for organisational culture has developed around the notion of a cultivated system of values, ideology, strategy and practices. It has been described as the dominant values espoused by an organisation (Deal and Kennedy, 1982), the philosophy that guides an organisation's policy (Ouchi, 1981), a system of shared meaning (Robbins, 1990), or even the organisation's personality (Robbins, 1994). Organisational culture is ``a pattern of basic assumptions invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems'' (Schein, 1985). The major constituents of organisational culture are the values and mores of an organisation, the people who build them up and the environment closely connected with their formulation. The values are the basic concepts and beliefs, the purpose and the objectives according to which the organisation develops its sense of identity (Schein, 1980) and its public image. As a result, the organisation's ability to live by and up to its established values is of major importance not only to the achievement of its aims, but essentially also to its survival capabilities. The key people are the ones behind the creation, the transmission, the sustaining and even the changing of cultures. They are distinguished figures in the group who usually hold leading positions and have the responsibility and power to communicate assumptions and values to the members in a clear manner and ultimately set the cultural tone running through the organisation. When 17

a culture becomes weak and requires enhanced strengthening or transformation, leaders must recognise the problematic areas and have the ability and the commitment to redefine or replace the already existing assumptions with other more appropriate ones. The term ``environment'' encompasses everything that could be directly or indirectly relevant to the achievement of the organisation's goals and influence the success or failure of its efforts to fulfill its mission. It is not rare for a particular organisation's culture to prove effective for a certain time and within a set of conditions but whose effectiveness is seriously hindered when times and conditions change. On such an occasion the organisation, in order to survive, will have to re-evaluate, reinforce or even revise some of its assumptions and practices, that is, its culture. Technological advances, changes in the social milieu and the political scene, new codes of industrial ethics and values, economic shifts, the sensitivity of public opinion and the rise of public pressure groups are some of the major factors that constitute a dynamic environment and can contribute to the evolution of a given organisational culture.

Changing organisational cultures

Culture is the outcome of group learning. The process involves a shared problem definition and a shared recognition that something invented actually works and continues to work. When the established patterns no longer serve, at least to the required degree, the purpose of the organisation, then the latter may be facing the beginning of a cultural changing process. Although changing organisational cultures can be difficult, because once formed they tend to become entrenched (Robbins, 1990), there are some conditions that have been observed to favour and even initiate cultural change. A major facilitating force for cultural change is a dramatic crisis, which, however, is consciously perceived by the organisation's members (Harrison, 1995). When people recognise that significant aspects of the way in which the organisation operates are not any more effective and that the survival of the organisation is threatened, they are more willing to give up old values and practices and take up new ones. For instance, cultural

The evolution of the safety culture of IMO

Kiriaki Mitroussi

Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

change has been observed when the organisation experiences economic difficulty or inability to respond to drastic changes in the environment, which prevents it from achieving its goals and damages its public image and reputation. Second, a change in the organisation's leadership has been found to have an impact on cultural change. A new, respectful leadership carrying with them a new, clear set of values and ideas and the ability to communicate them successfully favour a shift in the existing culture. It may also be that not fundamental change but a strengthening of the current culture is required. This can prove very effective for organisations that have a feasible strategy and a solid culture but are not at the highest level of functioning that can be obtained within their basic cultural assumptions. ``Strengthening a culture means bringing it to the top of its capability without changing its fundamental values and beliefs'' (Harrison, 1995). This can be achieved by looking critically into the weaknesses and deficiencies of the organisation and primarily adjusting to the dynamic environment by reorganising and allocating resources to those areas which are crucial to success. The case of IMO comes, as we will see, closer to the notion of culture strengthening, rather than overall culture change. This was a cultural evolution that has affected deeply the international perception and practice of marine safety. In the following pages we will examine this evolution by looking into IMO's priorities, principles and objectives during the 1980s as well as the approach to safety in the 1990s.

practices, which was the original intention (O'Neil, 1995a). The culture of the IMO is identified as a safety culture with all the members of the organisation sharing the same values concerning safety and being dedicated to the aim of improving safety standards to the highest practicable levels. The concept of safety culture of the IMO also includes the notion of pollution prevention, as this is also an issue of safety: a safety of the environment, the oceans, the wildlife and the waterfowl and of the public health. The slogan ``Safer Shipping and Clearer Oceans'', which was adopted by the organisation and widely used especially in the 1980s and 1990s, epitomizes IMO's objectives and offers a successful representation of its culture.

IMO's concerns in the 1980s On many occasions the focus of the IMO changed and its objectives evolved. In the early years the IMO concentrated on developing international regulation and as a result the majority of its conventions were adopted between 1969 and 1979. As most of the key subjects were covered and the complexity in the industry increased, the aims of the organisation in the realization of its safety culture began to move in different directions. The 1980s, especially the first half, were distinctly marked by the focus on improving implementation of the conventions by offering technical assistance to developing countries. The change of emphasis from the adoption of new regulations to the effective implementation of existing instruments became an official policy of the IMO Assembly in 1979 (Srivastava, 1984), while the technical assistance programme, which had begun in the 1960s expanded in the The case of IMO 1980s and was formally recognised by the The purpose of IMO IMO Assembly in 1981 (IMO Assembly, IMO, which was adopted and convened in 1981). The technical cooperation activities of 1948 and entered into force in 1958, was IMO concentrated mainly on training, on created as an answer to the need for a developing human resources within universal permanent shipping body under developing countries and improving the whose auspices the already adopted quality of seafarers, the highlight of these international agreements would be kept up-to- efforts being the foundation of the World date and further measures would be promoted Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden in on a regular basis. In fact, the main concern of 1983. The need for global cooperation and the organisation became the development of for success of the technical assistance international machinery to improve safety at programme was emphasized on many sea, which concentrated on technical issues occasions in the 1980s (Srivastava, 1981, without ever actually tackling such sensitive 1982) but there was always a distinction between traditional, developed maritime areas as discrimination and restrictive 18

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Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

countries and emerging, developing ones and a question of lack of means and not of will with regard to the issue of problematic implementation (Srivastava, 1986). In later years when the will to implement the regulations would also be questioned irrespective of the maritime history of the country a new perspective had to be adopted. The sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 signified a shift of attention and, although effective implementation was still the issue, the emphasis was now on promoting safe shipboard management and changing attitudes for diligent application of rules, thus reducing the likelihood of human error (Srivastava, 1988). Generally, the increasing number of developing countries becoming IMO members and ratifying its conventions, and their lack of maritime expertise and financial and human resources made the provision of appropriate assistance to these states imperative (O'Neil, 1996a). On the other hand, Mr Srivastava, the Secretary-General during that period, played a very important role. Coming from a non-maritime country India and having a past professional experience in its public sector, he knew firsthand the requirements and problems of the development of maritime infrastructure, campaigned vigorously for the establishment and expansion of the technical assistance programme and of training (IMO News, 1981) and managed to be convincing in what he proposed and represented, bringing the IMO close to the developing world.

tended to treat safety issues on a fragmented basis, but now it adopted a more holistic approach to the safety concept and that was clearly exhibited in the joint meetings of the organisation's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), which started taking place in 1993. On top of the above, IMO started moving away from a mere technical domain to the encouragement and promotion of a new, for the maritime world, concept, that of a safety culture penetrating all the sectors and the people in the industry. It was appreciated that regulatory activity in itself is not sufficient and that for effective disaster prevention shipping needed something it always lacked: a more safety oriented attitude by all parties to make safety an integral part of the day-to-day activities. The adoption of a proactive stance and the support and promotion of the concept of safety culture marked the evolution of the IMO's organisational culture over the last decade. Within the realms of that effort, IMO became concerned with a number of safety issues. The ship-type approach Particular emphasis was given to the ship-type approach, which was used for a thorough review of safety legislation for both ro-ro ferries and bulk carriers, involving people from different sectors and enabling a more proactive activity (Pattofatto, 1996). With the dawn of the 1990s the appallingly high rate of bulk carrier losses and casualties 34 bulk carrier casualties in one year with 16 total losses and a cost of 250 lives (O'Neil, 1991) caused the Secretary-General to prepare a number of draft resolutions dealing with the safety of bulk carriers and submitting them to the 17th Assembly (IMO News, 1991). The industry was asked to put into effect a series of interim measures (IMO Assembly, 1991) but the increase in relevant accidents in 1994 Marika 7, Apollo Sea and Iron Antonis vanished without trace together with another seven bulker casualties and the loss of 130 lives (Lloyd's List, 1994a) caused the bulk carrier issue to be consistently on the agenda of the MSC (sessions 65th to 68th). The severity of the problem was once again exhibited with the loss of two more bulk carriers at the beginning of 1997, the Leros Strength and the Albion Two and of 47 lives, despite the fact that they had both undergone 19

A change in IMO's organisational culture

The alertness of the shipping industry following a marine disaster has been a phenomenon ever since the sinking of the Titanic. On several occasions a tragic accident has brought to the fore a number of safety issues which previously had not been given the proper attention by the maritime community. From the beginning of the 1990s, however, IMO appeared determined to shake off the characterization of it being simply reactive to marine disasters and it started talking about a philosophy of ``anticipating and preventing'' (O'Neil, 1990) and about ``becoming proactive rather than reactive in improving international legislation'' (O'Neil, 1991). Until then IMO

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Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

an enhanced survey and made inevitable the adoption of amendments to the SOLAS convention on bulk carrier safety. In the same way, ro-ros continued attracting IMO's special attention, after the 1988 and 1989 SOLAS amendments, and this was exhibited through a number of further amendments to SOLASL the May 1990, the May 1991 and the April and December 1992 amendments (Focus on IMO, 1997). After the fire on the ro-ro Scandinavian Star, which killed 158 passengers, and on the Moby Prince with the loss of 141 people, many parties the UK for example pressured for the adoption of more stringent measures. It took, however, another tragic disaster with the loss of more than 900 lives the capsizing of the Estonia in September 1994 to reopen the whole question of ro-ro safety. The SecretaryGeneral took the unprecedented step of ordering a complete review of ro-ro safety, establishing a panel of safety experts to recommend action (IMO News, 1994). The panel's report and recommendations were considered by the MSC in its 65th session in May 1995, and in November of the same year, at a special conference, agreement on the application of the full SOLAS 90 damage stability standard to existing passenger ro-ro ferries was achieved. The next time the question of ro-ro safety was addressed was in relation to the operation of passenger ships and was closely intertwined with the concept of embedding a safety culture in the industry. In November 1995 the Assembly adopted a draft resolution ``. . . recommending governments and international organizations concerned to initiate work with the aim of establishing a safety culture in and around passenger ships . . .'' (IMO Assembly, 1995). A more proactive stance to the question of roro safety was clearly adopted. Implementation With regard to the implementation issue, IMO's preoccupation in the last decade has been with ensuring uniform compliance of its regulations by all flag states, regardless of their maritime tradition and to develop a procedure for monitoring their application and enforcement. The MSC agreed that there was a need to improve both port and flag state procedures and in November 1991 the Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of regional port state control 20

arrangements similar to the Paris memorandum of understanding in Europe following a draft resolution prepared and submitted to the Assembly by the SecretaryGeneral himself. It was judged that port state control is most successful when organised regionally with the exchange of information and the quick identification of sub-standard ships. IMO's treaties gave governments the authority to inspect ships visiting their ports to see that they meet IMO requirements but had been limited to examining the relevant certificates and so the 1994 amendments to SOLAS came to extend port state's authority to include control of operational requirements, that is, the ability of the crew to carry out their duties. In respect of the flag state, in December in 1992, the MSC at its 61st session sanctioned the creation of a new sub-committee to probe flag-state implementation of international agreed conventions on safety and pollution prevention in an effort to limit the freedom of interpretation allowed by vague phrases such as ``to the satisfaction of administration'' contained in its conventions (Lloyd's List, 1993). In its first meeting in April 1993 under the title Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI) it approved guidelines for the authorization of organisations acting on behalf of the administration, which were adopted by the Assembly later in the year and were made mandatory as Regulation 1 of a new Chapter XI included in SOLAS with the 1994 amendments to the Convention. Through the years the sub-committee has been very active, addressing many contemporary issues and exhibiting IMO's determination for promoting implementation matters. Ship management the human element The other most attended problem has been the contribution of the human element whether shipboard or shore-based personnel to the occurrence of marine accidents. IMO's consistent efforts to improve ship operations and management and seafarers' standards led to the adoption of a new chapter in SOLAS Chapter IX in May 1994 and a revised STCW convention in July 1995. IMO shifted its emphasis from mainly technical aspects to dealing with human factors (Moloney, 1993). The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster underlined the importance of management and ship operations in promoting safety and

The evolution of the safety culture of IMO

Kiriaki Mitroussi

Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

environmental protection. IMO's first attempt to address this problem was made at the end of 1980s with the adoption of IMO guidelines on management for the safe operation of ships and for pollution prevention. At the beginning of the 1990s, with the high-profile marine accidents, IMO concentrated more on the issue, replacing in 1991 the already existing guidelines with a new updated version in resolution A.680(17). However, it also took the subject even further: in November 1993, and with the increasing worries about poor management standards, the Assembly adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) code with a view to making it mandatory the following year. One of the most discussed initiatives of IMO was the incorporation of the ISM code into the SOLAS as a new chapter, Chapter IX, by the 1994 amendments to the convention. Under the code it is clear that the so-called human element, which has been found to be responsible for 80 percent of the marine accidents, does not apply only to seafarers but includes those on shore as well. SOLAS Chapter IX introduced a more safety oriented attitude within the industry and was officially seen as instrumental to the concept of safety culture (IMO Assembly, 1995). The focus on operational error in the casualty statistics related to crew standard was first identified as a priority agenda item in May 1990 at the 58th session of the MSC, and in 1993 at the 64th session on the MSC it was agreed to speed up the review process of the STCW Convention by employing outside consultants and inviting international maritime training institutes to assist (IMO News, 1993). Through 1995, and as the 65th session of the MSC adopted the STCW amendments, IMO kept asserting that people remained the crucial element in the management of safety (Lloyd's List, 1995). Under these amendments IMO became the ``guarantor of the validity of a flag's certificates'' and it was given the power to control and the ability to react to ineffective administrations by refusing to approve their certificates (Grey, 1995). Mr O'Neil in his closing remarks at the IMO conference in July 1995 predicted that this could be the turning point in IMO's history and heralds a new dawn (O'Neil, 1995a), underlining the importance of the issue of the human element which has since been repeatedly raised in connection with the newly evolved concept of establishing a safety culture in the industry. 21

Safety culture The concept of safety culture in and around ships which came about through the procedures of developing and adopting the SOLAS Chapter IX and the revised STCW has been strongly advocated by IMO, particularly during and after 1995. In March 1995 the Director of the Maritime Safety Division stated that the underlying drive within IMO at that time was to become more proactive rather than reactive in preventing accidents (Mitropoulos, 1995), while in the same year Mr O'Neil advocated that IMO was trying to make safety part of the culture of shipping and not some sort of optional extra (O'Neil, 1995b). In a number of speeches given by the IMO's head the need for an attitude of a safety culture was firmly underlined (O'Neil, 1995c,d; O'Neil, 1996b,c; O'Neil, 1997). Another idea closely connected with IMO's implementation of a more proactive stance was also the adoption of formal safety assessment (FSA) for the management of safety in shipping, which essentially means setting safety goals by identifying particular hazards and risks that can be dealt with by risk management (Lloyd's List, 1994b). On the whole, IMO's concept of safety has evolved the past decade from a fixation on technical matters to the concentration on the human element in ship operations and on implementation; from a reactive attitude to accidents to the promotion of a safety culture and the adoption of formal safety assessment; and from a mere advisory role of the organisation to a supervisory and auditing role. In this way, the evolution of its culture becomes more than evident.

Factors affecting change

IMO as any other organisation is in a constant and active interaction with its immediate and wider environment and is affected by it. Significant changes that have taken place in the last years in the composition of the maritime industry have contributed to the IMO's choices and the evolution of its culture. The maritime scene The unfavourable economic conditions prevailing for long periods in the industry have been the root cause for many of the contemporary trends. Investment in new

The evolution of the safety culture of IMO

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Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

tonnage and proper repairs and maintenance have been discouraged by high building costs, low freight rates and the 1970s massive oversupply of vessels and caused the world fleet to be characterised by old and badly maintained ships. In the same way, the proliferation of flags of convenience designed to suit owners' requirements for operation of sub-standard ships without having to face stringent enforcement of safety measures, the weakness of flag states to carry out successfully their statutory duty of surveying, and the decline of the quality of classification society inspections, as societies sought to maintain their client base under commercial pressures (Lloyd's List, 1993b) influenced IMO's decisions. One such example would be the establishment of a new flag state implementation sub-committee and generally IMO's attempts to ensure implementation of its conventions through the flag and port state activities. IMO's focus on the human element and crew standards can be seen within the context of the internalization of shipping and the use of multi-national crew. The increasing supply of seafarers from non-traditional labour supply areas with insufficient training, infrastructure and doubtful certificates of qualification, the questionable seafarers' commitment with the weakening of the links between shipboard personnel and ownership and language and communication problems among ratings, officers and even passengers inhibit the safe ship operation by increasing the risk of human error. Added to all the above, the fragmentation of the shipping industry has also been a cause of concern for the IMO. The fact that so many different companies and nationalities are involved in the operation of a single ship in terms of ownership, registration, management, manning etc. spreads the accountability for its safety very thinly and makes IMO's work even more strenuous. Pressures on IMO A number of additional factors made necessary and signified a change in IMO's safety orientations. At the beginning of 1990s IMO faced a major survivability problem due to the lack of financial support and its falling credibility, both of which are recognised as factors facilitating change in organisations. At that time, two of its largest contributors, Liberia and Panama proved unable to fulfill their financial obligations and as a result 22

many of IMO's activities were suspended and much of its work slowed down. On the other hand, a number of marine disasters highly publicized, continuous pressure from politicians and unilateral initiatives, the mass media and green organisations, like the Friends of the Earth and Green peace International both of which have been admitted as non-governmental consultative members to IMO proved on many occasions driving forces for IMO's work. The role of the Secretary-General Mr William O'Neil, who took over after a 15-year leadership by Mr Shrivastava, managed to personally signify many times a shift in the organisation's priorities and affect the evolution of its safety culture. Bringing in a solid background of maritime and management experience he represented ``an efficiency and clarity of purpose'' as opposed to ``the traditional IMO well-mannered diplomacy and charm'' (BIMCO Bulletin, 1991). Three times he dared to break from the customs and practices of his predecessors and used his influence on the organisation as a whole in significant marine safety matters, opening the bulk carrier and ro-ro safety debate and putting his weight behind the revision of STCW Convention by bringing it forward from 1998 to mid-1995 without having to resort to undermining compromises.

Conclusions
This paper has attempted an examination of the evolution of the organisational culture of IMO, an investigation into its safety culture. According to our findings, IMO's concept of safety has gone through a number of different phases responding each time to the industry's needs, aiming at resolving complicated safety matters and being reflected in the targets the organisation set each time to eliminate or reduce the likelihood of accidents. The focus of interest of the IMO has shifted many times from the concerns about the safety implications of particular types of ship to the concentration on the involvement of the human factor in marine casualties and from adopting regulations connected with technical issues to designing official instruments for safe practices in ship operation and processes for risk management. The safety culture of the IMO did gradually evolve during the last

The evolution of the safety culture of IMO

Kiriaki Mitroussi

Disaster Prevention and Management Volume 12 . Number 1 . 2003 . 16-23

decade but whatever change has been observed it has been connected with the safety issues the organisation treated as high priority agenda items and always with the aim of strengthening its culture rather than changing it completely. Our examination has also shown that the organisational culture of the IMO has been subject to the same factors recognised as contributory to change in also other business, political or intergovernmental organisations, such as a dynamic environment, a crisis and a change in leadership. IMO's priorities and course of action have clearly been affected by the aforementioned forces as we have already seen. We can, therefore, conclude that first of all although the core mission of the IMO has remained unaltered, in the sense that its culture has always been and still is a ``safety culture'', the approach to achieving it has taken different forms. In this way, an evolution in the organisational culture of IMO triggered by certain factors can clearly be observed. However, when we talk about cultural evolution in the case of IMO we talk about the strengthening of its organisational culture and not a complete and fundamental change in its philosophy and system of shared values.

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