Thayer Consultancy

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Briefing: China in Vietnams Internal Politics Carlyle A. Thayer March 21, 2013

[client name deleted] Q1. It looks like the tensions between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea have declined, or at least less high be addressed/raised by both countries. Is this correct? And if so, why did that happen? ANSWER: In October 2011, during the visit of Vietnams party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing, the two party chiefs witnessed the signing of an Agreement on Fundamental Principles to Settle Maritime Disputes. Later the then vice president Xi Jinping visited Vietnam. Since then there has been a lowering of tensions in the South China Sea. Vietnam has generally fallen in with bilateral diplomacy while insisting if third parties are involved a multilateral path must be pursued. Late last year when a cable cutting incident occurred Vietnam downplayed it. Vietnam has been circumspect in giving its support to the Philippines. A former senior US defense official claims that despite US pressure to support the Philippines, Vietnam has prevaricated. China has acknowledged Vietnams position. Net assessment: Vietnam and China have a dense network of party to party, military to military and state to states ties. Both have worked hard to compartmentalize the South China Sea dispute in order to prevent it from damaging bilateral relations across a number of areas where both are cooperating. Vietnam is currently trying to arrange a visit by president Truong Tan Sang to China. At the same time Vietnam is hoping to entice Secretary of State John Kerry to visit and lobby him for a visit by President Barack Obama later in the year. Reportedly stalled negotiations on a strategic partnership have been revived as a result of Vietnams decision to respond positively to proposals the US recently put on the table. Q2. Is there a pro-China faction in the Vietnamese Communist Party/Government? If it exists, who are part of it, how big is their influence and how do they deal with the general anti-Chinese sentiments among the Vietnamese population? ANSWER: There is a loose faction (or grouping) in the Vietnam Communist Party who view the United States in ideological terms. They argue that the US seeks to overthrow Vietnams socialist regime through the plot of peaceful evolution by promoting human rights and democracy. The label pro-China may not capture the

2 dynamics in play. Some view China as a long-term socialist ally. Others are concerned not to antagonize China because of the consequences that might follow, such as economic sanctions. Vietnam, after all, has a US $13 billion trade deficit with China. The so-called pro-China group also asks what has Vietnam gained by turning to the United States? In their view, very little. They want more US assistance in cleaning up Agent Orange and unexploded wartime ordnance. They also want the US to remove restrictions on the sale of military technology and weapons. However, they fear being drawn into an anti-China containment strategy. It is impossible to quantify the size of a pro-China faction. It is not so powerful to dominate decision-making yet it is sufficiently strong to restrict relations with the United States from going to far. The pro-China faction is probably better characterized as a group that opposes developing closer relations with the US because of the risk of Chinese displeasure and the risk that the US would promote regime change in Vietnam. When Xi Jinping visited Vietnam in late 2011, he warned each senior Vietnamese leader he met of the consequences of tilting towards the United States. In June 2011, China and Vietnam signed a joint statement agreeing, inter alia, to steer public opinion. In other words, both agreed to restrict public protests in their countries. Vietnam cracked down on public dissent and bloggers. Vietnamese officials tell the protestors that they are harming bilateral relations. Vietnam also highlights the modernization of its military to win over domestic anti-China nationalists. Vietnam also uses propaganda to highlight diplomatic protests against Chinese activities in the East Sea that encroach on Vietnamese sovereignty. Q3. What is the role and position of the Vietnamese intelligence services in this? ANSWER: Very little is known about the role of domestic security and military intelligence. The few leaked reports from the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and unverifiable claims by bloggers seems to indicate a streak of paranoia that conflates domestic patriotism with the anti-China views of anti-communist overseas Vietnamese. It is the latter who are viewed as the instigators of domestic anti-China protests. The MPS argues that overseas Vietnamese are using anti-China sentiment to drive a wedge between the people and the party or order to sow discord and weaken the regime with the aim of eventually overthrowing it. MPS officials are ever alert to any sign of collusion between Beijing and Washington at Vietnams expense. The bottom line is that the US cant be trusted as it will sell out Vietnam in order to improve relations with China. The usual line is that the US will not contest Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea in return for freedom of navigation for the US Navy to transit the South China Sea. At the same time the MPS is also wary of Chinas attempts to manipulate Vietnamese party politics through influencing individuals officials along the border and officials in provinces where China has invested. Military intelligence General Directorate II (GDII) has provided reports on the role of suspected U.S. intelligence agents in making contact with Vietnamese with the aim of engaging in hostile acts against the Vietnamese party-state. By some

3 accounts, GDII reports have fueled opposition within the military to stepping up defence relations with the United States. Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, China in Vietnams Internal Politics, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 21, 2013. Thayer Consultancy Background Briefs are archived at Scribd.com