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Introduction
Two industrial electricians began work in the basement electrical room one day. They wanted to take some physical measurements and knew the switchgear was energized but were in a hurry to get started. As they were taking measurements on the bus with a wooden ruler the metal tip of the ruler made contact with the bus and caused a massive electric arc. The arc-flash only lasted a fraction of a second. Although no one was electrocuted, one man died instantly from the arc-flash and the other man was badly burned. The man that died was within 24 inches of the bus while the other man was about ten feet away. The objective of OSHA, NFPA, ASTM, IEEE, and others is to protect the worker from electrical hazards. Potential hazards from electricity include shock, arc-flash, and arc blast. This paper will focus on arc-flash and its analysis. When the insulation medium, between phases or phase and ground, whether air, porcelain, polymer, or other medium can no longer support the applied voltage an electrical arc is formed. A short circuit or insulation breakdown is a switching action that creates a bypass around a circuit which involves either phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground or a combination. The heat generated by the high current flow may melt or vaporize the material and create an arc. This arc-flash creates a brilliant flash, intense heat, and a fast moving pressure wave that propels the arcing products. While commercial electricity has been around for over 100 years, the most common hazard of electricity has been electric shock or electrocution. As commercial electric systems grew, other hazardous effects such as arc-flash and arc-blast began to surface. The initiation, escalation, effects, and prevention of electrical arcs have been analyzed and researched since the early 1960s. Human errors and equipment malfunctions contribute to the initiation of an electrical arc. Engineering design and construction of arc resistant equipment as well as requirements for safe work practices are continuing to target the risk of electrical arc-flash hazard. As the demand for electricity increases, transmission and distribution utility systems are being upgraded. Transformers are being upgraded or replaced with higher KVA ratings and lower impedances at both the utility and industrial/commercial level. Also, as the demand for higher reliability also increases, transformers are being operated in parallel by closing a tie breaker. All of these modifications to the system can cause dramatic increases in the available fault current. More electrical energy throughput is a result of these modifications; however the downside is an increase in the electrical current to feed a fault to existing equipment in industrial and commercial facilities that may now be under-rated to interrupt available fault current. This increase in available fault current can wreak havoc on under-rated and/or improperly maintained equipment. As the awareness of the arc-flash hazard increases many are puzzled by phrases like; limited, restricted, prohibited approach Boundary, and flash protection boundary. Understanding these 1
terms is important to understanding arc-flash hazard protection. For more definitions that apply to arc-flash hazard refer to appendix A. Limited Approach Boundary- A shock protection boundary not to be crossed by unqualified persons unless escorted by a qualified person. Restricted Approach Boundary- A shock protection boundary to be crossed by only qualified persons. When crossed the use of shock protection techniques and equipment is required. Prohibited Approach Boundary- A shock protection boundary only to be crossed by qualified persons. When crossed the same protection is required as if direct contact is made with the live part. Flash Protection Boundary- Distance at which the incident energy level equals 1.2 cal/cm2 for faulting clearing time greater than 0.1 seconds. Use 1.5 cal/cm2 for clearing times that are 0.1 seconds or faster.
Limited Approach
Restricted Approach
Prohibited Approach
Figure 1-Limits of Approach Most employers and employees understand the analysis of electrical shock hazard but very few understand the electrical arc-flash hazard let alone how to properly perform an analysis. There are many pieces to this puzzle but after we analyze each of the pieces carefully we will find that they all fit together in a manner that provides electrical workers the protection they deserve. Listed below are the major pieces of the puzzle: ! Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis ! Compliance with regulations and standards concerning Arc-Flash Hazard Protection ! Using the proper method of calculation. NFPA 70E, IEEE Std 1584, or a combination of the two ! Using the proper procedures for accurately calculating Incident Energy ! Benefits of performing a detailed Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis?
NFPA 70E provides the formulas and tables needed to solve for the incident energy. On the surface it may appear relatively easy to perform an arc-flash calculation. But as one gets deeper and deeper into the calculations it can become very puzzling. The three-phase bolted fault current on the low side of a transformer feeding a line of switchgear can be calculated. Use the worst case by assuming an infinite bus to give maximum fault current. An infinite bus assumes that the impedance ahead of a device is essentially zero. Then assume a fault clearing time of around 0.2 seconds and a working distance of 18 inches. Based on this data, one may think they are calculating the worst-case scenario for incident energy in calories per centimeter squared (cal/cm2). Using three-phase bolted fault current values based on an infinite bus may result in calculating faster time-current response from protective devices resulting in lower calculated incident energy values as well as lower flash boundary values. The end result could be the worker has a false sense of protection, when in fact, he is under protected. It is also important when applying current-limiting fuses to calculate a realistic value for fault current based on system impedance. A current-limiting fuse by definition interrupts all available current above its threshold current and below its maximum interrupting rating and limits the clearing time to equal to or less than one-half cycle at rated voltage. Proper maintenance and coordination of protective devices is paramount when doing an arc-flash hazard analysis. Lets take a look at an example. A 1000 kVA 13.8/0.480 kV transformer with 6 % impedance should give approximately 20 kA bolted fault current at 480 volts assuming an infinite bus. With a clearing time of 0.11 seconds at 18 inches the incident energy is approximately 4.4 cal/cm2. However, after a thorough analysis of the system the fault current was closer to 10 kA due to system impedance. The clearing time is now 2.5 seconds due to the lower fault current being in the long-time pickup range of the protective device. At a distance of 18 inches the incident energy is now 53.2 cal/cm2. See figure 2 for incident energy versus time graph. The person working on this switchgear would most likely receive life-threatening external and internal burns as well as broken bones from the arc blast. When an electrical arc is struck, there is an explosive liberation of energy which includes a shock wave. A very serious burn can result without ever making physical contact with the energized equipment.
15ka
10ka
0. 01
0. 07
0. 13
0. 19
0. 4
0. 7
2. 5
Time(seconds)
Figure 2-Energy vs. Time Graph 5
electrical systems, as well as existing system upgrades, should be designed with worker safety as well as reliability in mind. It will be imperative that new electrical workers be properly trained in the hazards as well as given the best information and PPE to protect them from these hazards. An Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis and finding the proper PPE is more than just calculating a bolted fault current based on an infinite bus. An Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis starts with gathering up-to-date equipment information, then performing a detailed analysis comprised of a load-flow study, short circuit study, and protective device coordination study as well as an equipment evaluation to determine that the current withstand rating is acceptable. For facilities with generators and large motors (100 hp or larger) a motor starting and fault contribution analysis should also be performed. When the arc-flash hazard label is put on the equipment, you can sleep better at night if you know the arc-flash study was performed with the most up-to-date information and methods. Site assessment and Data Gathering: An initial site visit to gather data and a site overview is vital. The system one-line diagram, see figure 3, and supporting schematics and documents should be checked and updated during the field visit. Data gathering consists of all equipment nameplate data, protective device settings, and load information. Any planned facility upgrades within the next few years should also be noted as this could impact analysis. Source impedance data from the electricity provider will also be required to accurately calculate the short-circuit current. The data gathered from the initial field visit is CRITICAL in performing a safe and realistic arcflash Hazard Analysis.
Short Circuit Analysis: The field data is used to build a system model. Short circuit studies are done to determine the magnitude of the prospective currents flowing through the power system at various time intervals after a fault occurs. Once the model is built a short circuit analysis is performed. The short circuit data is used to determine the bolted three-phase short circuit current, which is in turn used to calculate the arcing fault current. Protective Device Coordination Analysis: Protective devices like fuses, circuit breakers, and relays have curves that are plotted on loglog graph paper in current versus time like that shown in figure 4. Several of these curves are placed on graph paper. Protective device coordination is a process in which these device curves are set in a manner such that when a fault occurs that the protective device closest upstream of the fault opens as rapidly as possible to minimize hazardous conditions to people, protect valuable equipment, and isolate the problem with minimum disruption to the balance of the electrical system. The equipment and protective device data that was input initially to build the system model is used for protective device coordination analysis. When facilities are changed or upgraded it is necessary to revisit the existing protection scheme to determine if changes need to be made to ensure that devices are coordinated properly. A change in load or equipment could change the timing and coordination of the protective devices.
Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis: Arc-Flash Analysis Evaluation calculates the incident energy and arc-flash boundary for each location in a power system. Trip times from protective device settings and arcing fault current values from the short circuit analysis are used in arc-flash hazards analysis. Incident energy and arc-flash boundaries are calculated following the NFPA 70E or IEEE 1584 Standards. Clothing requirements are specified for given tasks. Arc-Flash Hazard warning labels showing flash protection boundary, incident energy, Arc Resistant clothing class required, and other valuable data system can be printed on stick-on labels and easily placed on equipment. Figure 4 and 5 show the results of an Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis and an Arc-Flash Hazard warning label respectively.
ARC FLASH EVALUATION REPORT (IEEE 1584)
PROTECTIVE BUS NAME DEVICE NAME 1 2 3 4 5 B1-46KV B2-2400 B3-2400 B4-480 B5-480 46KV BUS C1 RELAY C1 FDR RELAY SUB-C MAIN 480 FDR
ARCING BREAKER BUS BOLTED PROT DEV BOLTED FAULT TRIP/DELAY OPENING TIME (SEC) GROUND FAULT (KA) FAULT (KA) TIME (SEC) 16.75 8.94 8.11 13.71 13.67 16.75 8.94 8.11 13.71 13.67 16.75 7.52 6.95 10.56 10.25 0.125 0.268 4.057 2.76 0.03 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083 YES YES YES YES YES
ARC FLASH WORKING INCIDENT GAP BOUNDARY DISTANCE(I ENERGY REQUIRED PROTECTIVE FR CLOTHING 2 (MM) (IN) N) (CAL/CM ) CLASS 153 36 36 18 18 NA NA 390 302 28 18 18 18 111 76.1 2.31 ****DANGEROUS!!NO FR CLASS ****DANGEROUS!!NO FR CLASS CLASS 1, FR SHIRT & PANTS
Equipment Evaluation Analysis: The Equipment Evaluation Analysis compares equipment withstand ratings with calculated operating and short circuit analysis. This is very important when upgrading electrical facilities, especially when increasing available power or adding/replacing transformers, motors or generators. Systems may be paralleled to increase reliability. This has a significant impact on the available short circuit current to a downstream device. Circuit Breakers and other devices that are under rated for 9
fault current withstand pose a serious arc and blast hazard to anyone close to the device. Figure 6 shows the results of a typical Equipment Evaluation Analysis.
ALL PROTECTION DEVICES-EQUIPMENT EVALUATION REPORT BASED ON ANSI FAULT ANALYSIS CONTINUOU VOLTAGE(K S AMPS INT KA CLOSERATING% DESCRIPTIO V) LF/DEV/RATI CALC/DEV/S LATCH KA VOLT/INT/CN BUS/DEVICE NG% ERIES CALC/DEV L SPS 12003000A SPS121-31.5 AK-25 EC-2 AK-50 POWER SENSOR MA 12002000A MA 250 3.76 1200 0.31 360.11 400 90.03
DEVICE/BUS MANUFACT URER B1-46KV SEIMENS 480 FDR GE SUB-C MAIN GE SWGR C-1 ALLISCHALMERS
STATUS
PASS FAIL
46 0.48
0.0 50.0
PASS
0.48
480 600
0.0 42.0
80.0 0.00
SYMM
PASS
2.4
0.00 35.96
0.00 58.00
1.24
" Since the system is modeled on software it will be easy to make future changes or upgrade with minimal expense or effort. " Drastically lessen your chances of having to make a very unpleasant visit to survivors. Last but not leastITS THE RIGHT THING TO DO!!
Summary
If employers and employees are NOT proactive in this effort then the accident noted in this article may apply to you. Treatment costs for burn victims can approach a half-million dollars a month. A fatality in the workplace has been estimated at 8.5 million dollars. Cost should never be a consideration when it comes to safety in the workplace especially for the hazards that electrical workers face. Electrical workers rarely get a second chance to return to their previous job assignment following an accident. They are either killed or maimed for life. Obviously, the best way to prevent an arc-flash hazard is to totally de-energize the equipment. However, even if you can totally de-energize the equipment you must open devices upstream. It is best if this can be done remotely, but if it cannot be, you must be trained and know the proper arcflash protection required for the given task. Proper procedures for lockout/tagout call for testing for zero voltage and applying grounds. This will also require proper training and PPE. There is no substitution for training and following proper procedures in the electrical business. You will probably not get a second chance if you are involved in an electrical accident. There is no product or process, which cannot be de-energized, worth more than a human life. Yet, decisions are made every day not to de-energize or circumvent the lockout/tagout procedures that compromise a persons safety.
Appendix A-Definitions
Limited Approach Boundary- A shock protection boundary not to be crossed by unqualified persons. Restricted Approach Boundary- A shock protection boundary to be crossed by only qualified persons. When crossed the use of shock protection techniques and equipment is required. Prohibited Approach Boundary- A shock protection boundary only to be crossed by qualified persons. When crossed the same protection is required as if direct contact is made with the live part. Flash Protection Boundary- Distance at which the incident energy level equals 1.2 cal/cm2 for faulting clearing time less than 0.1 seconds. Use 1.5 cal/cm2 for clearing times greater than 0.1 seconds. Incident Energy- The energy of this arc-flash coming into contact with a surface. Bolted Fault Current- A short circuit between two or more different phase conductors in which the impedance is virtually zero. Arcing fault current- Flow of current through a path consisting of vapor. The vapor has a substantial higher resistance than the solid metal. For low voltage circuits the arc consumes most of the available voltage leaving only the difference between system voltage Eo and arc voltage Varc. It is this difference (Eo - Varc) that forces the current through the system impedance. The arc-flash is like a laser but is not quite as hot. A laser can create heat as high as 100,000 oK while the arc-flash can approach 20,000 or 35,000 oC. Essentially an electric are creates a radiation burn.
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Qualified worker- A person who has received training on equipment and hazards on a particular piece of equipment. Flash Hazard-A dangerous condition associated with the release of energy caused by an electric arc.
References R. A. Jones, Staged Tests increase Awareness of Arc_flash Hazrds in Electrical Equipment, IEEE Trans Ind. Applicat., vol 36, No. 2, pp 659-667, March/April 2000. Lanny Floyd, Continuing Journeys in Arc-Flash Injusry Prevention: IEEE Std 1584, IEEE Trans Ind. Applicat., vol 9, No. 3, pp 659-667, May/June 2003. Craig Wellman, Don't Get Burned - Perform Arc-Flash Calculations,Electrical Contracting & Engineering News, March 2003. Ralph Lee, The Other Electrical Hazard, Electric Arc Blast Burns, IEEE Trans Ind. Applicat., vol 36, No. 2, pp 659-667, March/April 2000. Leslie Geddes, Handbook of Electrical Hazards and Accidents, CRC Press, 1995. Power Systems Engineering Committee, IEEE Recommended Practice for Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Analysis, IEEE Std 399-1997. IEEE-SA Standards Board, Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, IEEE Std 242-2001. National Fire Protection Association 70E-2000 edition. National Electrical Code- 2002 edition. IEEE Standard 1584-2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, Industry Applications Society.
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Biography John Lane, PE is an Electrical Safety Engineer at the AVO Training Institute in Dallas, TX. He graduated from Oklahoma State University in 1986 with a degree in Electrical Power Engineering. He worked for ARCO Transportation in the pipeline division while going to college. After college he worked for General Electric Company three years where he participated in the Field Engineering Program in Schenectady, NY. John has worked for various consultants and electric utilities and been involved in different areas of electrical power for 17 years including system planning, system protection, and engineering manager. He is a member of the IEEE Industry Applications Society and Power Engineering Society. He is a register engineer in Texas, California, and Oklahoma. John can be reached at john.lane@avointl.com
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