Report

March 2013

Chinas Buddhist diplomacy

By Trine Angelskr
Executive summary
Ever since Chinas reform and opening up process began in the early 1980s the country has witnessed a tremendous religious revival. This poses challenges for the Beijing government, which has generally regarded religious matters as needing control. But controlling the population has become increasingly difficult as it becomes more educated, wealthy and confident. The religious revival also offers opportunities it has allowed the government to engage in religion as a political tool to promote Chinas soft power both domestically and internationally. This, however, only applies to religions the central government does not regard as a threat to its authority, most notably Chinese Buddhism. This report analyses how the atheistic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to utilise Chinese Buddhism as a diplomatic tool and recognise positive aspects of a religion it had tried to marginalise for many years. To examine how using religion as a political tool relates to the state of religious freedom in China at the moment, the CCPs politics of religion is analysed.

Introduction
Chairman Mao Zedongs strict, atheistic leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1949 to 1976 made it difficult, and at times impossible, to practise religion in China. Only worshippers belonging to a state-sanctioned patriotic religious association were allowed to register with the government and legally practise their religion. Currently there are only five officially recognised religions in China: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. Uniformity was imposed on all these religions and previously existing denominational and sectarian systems within them were broken down and banned. Proselytising in public or unregistered places of worship was not permitted. During the Cultural Revolution (196676) religion was defined as part of the Four Olds old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas that were to be eliminated from society. Churches, mosques, and temples were shut down and many were destroyed. Religious texts were burned and religious statues and artefacts were smashed, while many worshippers were imprisoned for practising their religion. A new, slightly softer course in the politics of religion was introduced when Deng Xiaoping seized power in the late 1970s. Freedom of religion was ensured in Article 36 of the

constitution of 1982. The constitution specifies that the state protects normal religious activities, but what the state considers normal is not defined. As the legal system in China is still at best immature, laws and regulations are neither uniformly nor strictly implemented in the country. It is the CCPs right to regulate religious institutions in minute detail. The Beijing government has repeatedly shown that it can and will crack down on any opposition. According to the U.S. Department of States International Religious Freedom Report 2011, China is listed as a chronic violator of religious freedom, together with countries such as North Korea and Saudi Arabia (U.S. DoS, 2011). To obtain a nuanced understanding of the current state of freedom of religion and the politics of religion in China, it is therefore not sufficient to analyse the legal and official framework in modern China, nor to focus solely on reports from Western sources documenting violations of freedom of religion. These reports often address violations affecting ethnic minorities, such as Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang or Tibetan Buddhists, and do not necessarily take into account other religious groups in China. By focusing on the largest religious group in China the Chinese Buddhists we might be equipped with a fuller understanding of the whys and hows of the religious policies and the state of religious freedom in China today.

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Renewed interest in religion

In the early 1980s China experienced a relatively large degree of liberalisation in the politics of religion. This changed dramatically after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. A second turn of events in the politics of religion became apparent in the wake of the Falun Gong protests in 1999, when 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners held hands in a circle around the CCP headquarters in Beijing. Beijing was caught off guard by the massive numbers of the protesters. According to classified reports from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing published by Wikileaks, what caused the biggest surprise was that approximately one-third of all the Falun Gong practitioners were members of the CCP and the central Beijing government itself (U.S. Embassy in Beijing, 2011). The event caused the central government to sharpen the distinction between religion and superstition: the former was to be approved of and the latter was to be banned. Falun Gong fell into the latter category and was later deemed as an illegal, evil cult, while Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism were still regarded as legitimate. The incident appears to have motivated Jaing Zemin, the then-president of the Peoples Republic of China, to recognise for the first time in the CCPs history that legitimate religions can contribute positively to social stability. However, if religious groups were to be governable, they had to be allowed a certain amount of religious freedom. If opportunities for legitimately practising religions were not made available by official institutions, the CCP leadership feared many people would seek alternatives, and shady underground religions could possibly fill this vacuum.

Secondly, Chinese Buddhists do not have religious authorities outside the country that potentially could challenge the Chinese governments authority, unlike the Pope in Rome or the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. China does not accept bishops appointed by the Vatican nor Tibetan lamas appointed by anybody but the CCP. Leaders of any religion need to be vetted and cleared by the CCP and cannot simply be selected by the religious institution itself. In 1995 Beijing rejected the boy the Dalai Lama had selected to be the next Panchen Lama (the second-highest spiritual leader) and instead appointed Gyaincain Norbu at the time a six-year-old boy to the position. The boy the Dalai Lama had chosen has never been seen after the Chinese security forces detained him. In 2007 China promulgated regulations that only Beijing can approve living Buddhas and high lamas, including the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama. Beijing is worried about the growing stature of the Dalai Lama as a global Buddhist leader and is working hard to build credibility among Buddhists countries as well as among the nations Buddhists so that the CCP can select the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama without any great international or national outcries. Thirdly, Chinese Buddhism is not linked to separatist movements. Especially in the Muslim Autonomous Region of Xinjiang and the Tibetan Buddhist Autonomous Region of Tibet there has been strong and at times violent opposition to the way the government has controlled these regions. In official documents it is evident that it is particularly the ethnic minorities who are regarded as being religious. The Han ethnic majority, which constitutes 92% of the Chinese population, is referred to in official documents as not being particularly religious and it is claimed that the number of those who actually adhere to a religion is not great (MacInnis, 1989: 11). The majority of Chinese Buddhists in China, however, belong to the Han ethnic majority. Chinese Buddhism is therefore often referred to as Han Buddhism.

Buddhism not a threat to the governments authority

Currently, Chinese Buddhism is often more favourably treated than the other officially recognised religions, even though the government has been very specific about treating all these religions equally. This new, relatively tolerant attitude toward Chinese Buddhism is caused by the fact that the Beijing government has found Buddhism to be a convenient political resource for promoting its political goal of establishing a harmonious society domestically and to project China as a country striving to contribute to a harmonious world internationally. What then sets Chinese Buddhism apart from the other recognised religions in China? For one, it is not viewed as a threat by the Chinese authorities, for three main reasons. Firstly, Chinese Buddhism is to a large degree seen as a local religion. Even though Buddhism originated in India, it has been an integral part of the Chinese cultural and religious landscape for more than 2,000 years. On the other hand, Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam are often regarded as foreign religions a porthole of sorts through which foreign ideas and loyalties can enter China. Christian missionaries in particular have been regarded as tools of Western imperialism.

Buddhism as a political tool

In theory one might think that Daoism the only officially recognised religion that actually originated in China would be the preferred religion of the Chinese authorities. However, few people practise Daoism. Buddhism thus represents a much greater social force in society simply because of the large numbers of its practitioners. It is difficult to estimate the number of Buddhists and Daoists in China because they do not have congregational memberships and many practice exclusively at home. Chinese authorities tried for decades to marginalise and shrink any form of religion. Local authorities had personal interests in reporting low numbers of religious practitioners, because this could improve their chances of further promotion within the CCP. According to official numbers, there were over 100 million religious people in China in 1997. There were more than 13,000 Buddhist temples and monasteries and about 200,000 Buddhist

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monks and nuns in the country (State Council Information Office, 1997). However, a state-supported survey in 2007 conducted by researchers at East China Normal University revealed that, in fact, there are three times as many religious people in China as previously anticipated (Sun, 2007). This survey was conducted at the same time the Beijing government started to use Buddhism as a political tool both domestically and internationally. If carefully managed, religion is no longer necessarily viewed as an opiate of the masses. By underpinning nationalism, forming a moral foundation for the population, boosting the economy, serving as a buffer against the rapid spread of Christianity and serving as a diplomatic tool in Chinas international relations, Chinese Buddhism is rather viewed as something that may contribute positively to establishing a harmonious society and a harmonious world.

tions has proved to be very useful for local governments with poor economies. According to National Public Radio, the Nanputuo temples philanthropic foundation in Xiamen has given approximately $7 million in aid over the past 16 years (Lim, 2010). However this charitable work must be done discreetly, because the government does not want to be portrayed as being unable to provide welfare services to its people.

Buffer against Christianity

By promoting Buddhism the authorities hope that this religion will serve as a buffer against the rapid spread of Protestantism and Catholicism or any foreign religion, for that matter. The Chinese authorities generally tend to put more trust in Buddhists than Christians and fear foreign interference in the countrys internal affairs disguised as religion.

Nationalism
Chinese Buddhists contribute to strengthening a Han identity and a nationalistic sentiment that the government sees may contribute to establishing a stable and harmonious society. According to Jayshree Bajoria, a senior researcher at the Council of Foreign Relations, for the past few years and in line with a lack of traditional communist ideology, the Chinese government has tacitly recognised nationalism as a source of the CCPs legitimacy and as a form of glue that binds society together (Bajoria, 2008). Chinese Buddhism has proven to be an excellent tool that can contribute to this process.

International relations
Chinese Buddhism is seen a useful diplomatic tool in Chinas international relations. Chinese Buddhism is thus considered as a means to gain power in terms of both Chinas domestic and international policies.

Chinas Buddhist diplomacy

Because China is too often portrayed in foreign media for negative reasons Tibetan self-immolations, violations of human rights, the CCPs campaign against Falun Gong members, crack-downs on Christian underground churches, corruption, pollution, food safety scandals, etc. China wishes to improve its image internationally. Buddhism is often perceived as a peaceful religion. By portraying itself as a Buddhist nation, the Chinese government hopes to assure the world that it is a responsible, trustworthy and friendly nation. Because China and India are competing for access to strategic harbours, airfields and energy supplies in their neighbouring Buddhist countries particularly in Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka we are witnessing both China and India engaging in Buddhism in order to project their soft power. India is the country where Buddhism originated and China is currently the country with the largest Buddhist population in the world. Until last year India had done little to promote its Buddhist heritage since Prime Minister Nehru welcomed the Dalai Lama to India after he fled from Tibet in 1959, which angered China enormously. Since then China has worked to establish itself as the worlds leading Buddhist country. Chinas Buddhist diplomacy is an inter-agency effort and represents a new strategy in projecting the countrys soft power. According to Holmes Welch, formerly assistant director of Harvards Center for the Study of World Religions, Mao considered Buddhism to be of no use domestically (Welch, 1972: 169-230). However, prior to the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) he tried to use Buddhism in Chinas international relations in an effort to persuade foreigners

Moral foundation
Despite the fact that the Beijing authorities have regarded religions as superstition and as a symbol of something reactionary, religious people have often been regarded as having high moral standards. Because there seems to be a moral vacuum in current state ideology, religion is seen as filling this vacuum and contributing to the establishment of a moral foundation.

The economy
Popular Buddhist temples attract hundreds of thousands of believers and tourists every year, generating huge revenues annually. The temples also serve as a catalyst for economic development for their surrounding counties and villages. Buddhism is also actively used to attract foreign investment, particularly from Taiwan and overseas Chinese people. The intention, as Yang Fenggang, director of the Centre on Religious and Chinese Studies, puts it, is to build a religious stage to sing the opera of [the] economy (Yang, 2006:109).

Charity
This is another central element in the governments positive view of Chinese Buddhism. Throughout this vast country the government faces great challenges to provide adequate social welfare. Collaborating with, and to a certain degree supporting, religious charitable organisa-

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that Buddhism was flourishing as never before, thus hoping to convince neighbouring Buddhist countries that China was not an alien country. This practice had ended by the start of the Cultural Revolution. The current Beijing governments aim of engaging with Buddhism, as described by Wang Zuoan, director of the State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA), is to Actively develop international religious exchanges and advocate the Chinese concept of religious harmony and to expand the influence of the Chinese concept of harmonious religion (Hua, 2011). This is intended to project China as a global patron and sponsor of the Buddhist world, through which Beijing hopes to promote international understanding and acceptance of its policies and actions regarding religions. In terms of the governments dealings with Buddhism, gaining acceptance of its religious policies implies gaining acceptance of the CCPs right to select religious leaders such as Tibetan Buddhist lamas. Chinas Buddhist diplomacy is mainly aimed at its Buddhist neighbours. Over the last few years the atheistic CCP has increasingly incorporated Buddhism as part of its soft diplomacy and is using the religion as a political vehicle to establish diplomatic common ground with its neighbouring Buddhist countries. As China attempts to increase its influence in the region, its government needs to communicate to wary neighbours that the countrys rise to power is a peaceful one. Chinas Buddhist diplomacy is additionally intended to project the country as the global patron and sponsor of the Buddhist world. China has made vigorous efforts to ensure that anybody with a Buddhist background feels connected with the country. As used to be the case in China, the various international Buddhist institutions have traditionally been very loosely connected to one another and there has been little overarching international structure. As we shall see, the CCP tried to change this when China hosted the first World Buddhist Forum in 2006. Chinas Buddhist diplomacy also appears to be aimed at its domestic audience. The Beijing authorities hope that promoting Buddhism internationally will generate strong appeal among Buddhists in China. They also hope to build stronger ties to both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

the hosting of a large-scale international religious conference. Xi Jinping, party secretary of Zhejiang at the time, helped organise the forum, which approximately 1,000 monks and experts from 35 countries attended. The forum marked a turning point in the governments official attitude towards religion in general and towards Buddhism in particular. In his speech at the forum, Ye Xiaowen the then-director of SARA described Buddhism as an ancient Chinese religion and China as a great Buddhist nation. The forums seem to be heavily impregnated with political missions. China has so far hosted three World Buddhist Forums, in 2006, 2009 and 2012. The forums have been a platform for the Chinese government to become a forerunner in the Buddhist world. Beijing hopes to utilise this clout to influence and define the future development of Buddhism. Chinas 2006 initiative was the first large-scale attempt to gather together in the country Buddhists from all over the world and from all different branches of Buddhism. The only significant person not invited to the events was the Dalai Lama. Indeed, one of the governments aims in supporting the forums appears to have been to parade the Beijing-selected Panchen Lama in an attempt to obtain tacit international recognition of Beijings legitimate right to select religious leaders. By obtaining such international recognition, Beijing hopes to undermine the status of the Dalai Lama who Beijing regards as a wolf in a monks robe. The ultimate goal is to influence the succession to the Dalai Lama. However, trying to compete with the Dalai Lama is not an easy task and the Chinese Buddhists simply cannot match his soft power. According to Andr Lalibert, a professor of political studies at the University of Ottawa, The Chinese leaders have yet to find a leader who can generate feelings of admiration comparable to those the Dalai Lama receives from foreigners (Lalibert, 2011: 116). Another mission of the forums appears to be to tie the mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong closer together: the second and third forums were partially held in Taiwan and Hong Kong, respectively. Chinas engagement with Buddhism as a political tool to promote itself as a peace-seeking and friendly nation striving to establish a harmonious society and a harmonious world also becomes evident when we examine the official slogans of the state-sponsored forums: A harmonious world begins in the mind, A harmonious world; A synergy of conditions and Common aspirations and actions towards a harmonious world. It is easy to dismiss these CCP-designed slogans as nothing more than empty rhetoric. However, it is worth taking a closer look at them because they point to issues that the government itself identifies as problematic and needing to be changed. By identifying a harmonious society as a political goal, there is a tacit recognition of modern Chinese society as affected by disharmony.

Chinese Buddhist diplomacy measures

There are three particular areas where Chinas Buddhist diplomacy is clearly visible: the sponsoring of international Buddhist conferences, the sending of Buddhist relics on tours to other Buddhist nations, and helping to revive important Buddhist centres in India and Nepal.

1. World Buddhist Forums

A major shift in the CCPs view of Chinese Buddhism became publicly apparent in 2006 when China hosted the First World Buddhist Forum in the city of Hangzhou. This was the first time that the atheistic CCP had contributed to

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2. Competing with India

India has also recently stepped up its own Buddhist diplomacy, along with its military presence in the region. In 2011 India hosted the Global Buddhist Congregation in Delhi, timed to coincide with the 2,600th anniversary of Buddhas enlightenment. At this gathering the International Buddhist Confederation which was meant to serve as a common platform for Buddhists worldwide was founded. The confederation will be based in India. However, the Global Buddhist Congregation in Delhi coincided with a scheduled meeting between China and India to sort out a long-standing border dispute between the two countries. The Buddhist conference led to a diplomatic row between them, and China chose to cancel the scheduled border talks when New Delhi refused to give in to Beijings demand not to allow the Dalai Lama to attend the conference. China appeared to be worried that it could be used as a platform for Tibetans to criticise the Chinese governments handling of Tibetan Buddhists internationally.

tourist attraction. The GLNDDC has not entirely rejected the APECFs engagement in Lumbini. As of September 2012 the APECF was reported to have signed a memorandum of understanding with a British theme park developer, VTP Global, as lead development manager for the proposed international pilgrimage and tourism development in Lumbini (VTP, 2012). China wishes to continue to undermine the Dalai Lamas position in Nepal while building up its political and economic influence in the country. China is also engaged in the Pan-Asian project of reviving the Nalanda University in India. Nalanda was a great Buddhist university, established in the 5th century. The famed Chinese monk Xuan Zang travelled to Nalanda to study and teach Buddhism in the early Tang dynasty (618-907). When he returned to China several years later he brought with him several hundred Buddhist texts and, with support from the emperor, established a large translation bureau in China. Ever since the Indian government initiated the project to revive Nalanda in 2006 China has showed strong interest in it. Nalanda and Xuan Zang represent Indias and Chinas early bilateral relationship and are therefore valuable symbols of their current relationship. In 2011 China donated $1 million to the university. In the words of Wen Jiabao, former premier of the State Council, the donation was given: as a friendly gesture from the Chinese people to the Indian people (Chinese Embassy in India, 2011). The donation has, however, not been well received by all Indians as the money is earmarked to establishing a Chinese-style library. This has left many Indians with a bitter taste in the mouth.

3. Reviving important Buddhist centres

Traditionally, Bodh Gaya (where Gautama Buddha achieved enlightenment) and Sarnath (where he first taught the Dharma) in India have been considered the two main Buddhist pilgrim destinations. Now, however, with Chinese backing, Lumbini the birthplace of the Buddha in Nepal is challenging both Bodh Gayas and Sarnaths eminence. In recent years China has shown great interest in Nepal and hopes to dislodge it from Indias orbit as a satellite state. In March 2011 the commander-in-chief of Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly signed a $19.8 million defence agreement with the Nepalese army ignoring protests from the Nepalese Ministry of Defence because China would not tolerate a third country (i.e. India) coming in the way of the friendship between Nepal and China (Ranade, 2011a). Chinas objectives in keeping a tight grip over Nepal are many. Jayadeva Ranade, distinguished fellow at the Centre for Airpower Studies in New Delhi, claims that The highest priority is for neutralising the threat perceived as emanating from Tibetans in Nepal and their potential, in collusion with what Beijing calls hostile forces, for destabilising Tibet (Ranade, 2011b). The Dalai Lama has not been allowed to visit Lumbini since the late 1980s and Tibetan refugees in Nepal are shown little tolerance by the Nepalese government, mainly due to pressure from China. After the PLAs hard-ball visit in March 2011, the Asia Pacific Exchange and Co-operation Foundation (APECF), a Hong Kong-based and CCP-sponsored NGO, ostensibly in co-operation with the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, proposed a seemingly softer initiative a $3 billion plan to turn the Buddhas birthplace, Lumbini, into a first-class pilgrimage destination and tourist attraction. Plans included a new airport, highways, hotels and other amenities. However, following local protests due to lack of consultation, the Nepalese government later rejected the plan and soon thereafter itself constituted the Greater Lumbini National Development Directive Committee (GLNDDC) in a new attempt to establish Lumbini as a pilgrimage site and

4. Exhibiting Buddhist relics in other countries

Another initiative China has engaged in is lending out sacred Buddhist relics to other Buddhist countries in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust. Myanmar is an example of this. Myanmar has long been a strategic investment partner for China, especially while Myanmar was largely isolated from the rest of the world. When Myanmar began its current reform process, China was quickly faced with increasing competition from other countries and hence saw its own influence decline. One of Thein Seins first tasks as the newly installed president of Myanmar was to suspend the construction of a controversial $3.6 billion Chinese-backed hydropower dam in northern Myanmar. This has been seen as an attempt to build better relations with other countries and to make Myanmar less dependent on China. The Beijing government, still wanting to be on good terms with its geopolitically important neighbour, responded with a good-will gesture: in November 2011 China sent a holy Buddhist relic a tooth of the Buddha to Myanmar, where it was publicly displayed for 48 days. This was the fourth time since the 1950s that the tooth had been sent to Myanmar. The event represents not only a major event of the Buddhist believers, but also a fine story of China-Myanmar friendship, Xinhua, Chinas state-owned news agency, reported (Xinhua, 2011). Along with the tooth came a high-level Chinese government official delegation, led by

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the SARA director, Wang Zuoan, as well as the president of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC). The tooth is a highly venerated relic in Myanmar and attracts large crowds wherever it goes. The sending of this holy relic to Myanmar was expected to play an essential part in enhancing the understanding and mutual trust between the two peoples, Xinhua reported the day the holy relic arrived in Myanmar. Chinas gesture did not pass unnoticed by the Myanmar government. Top officials, including President Thein Sein, awaited the holy relics arrival to pay homage to it when it arrived in the capital, Naypyidaw. According to local media, even the former junta leader, Than Shwe, was reported to have been seen paying homage to the relic. Only two months after the exhibition of the Buddhas tooth, China and Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing friendly relationships between the Beijing Lingguang Temple, where the Buddhas tooth resides, and the Shwedagon Pagoda of Myanmar. The deputy director of SARA, Zhang Lebin, was reported to have expressed that this would enhance the bilateral ties between the two countries and boost world peace (Xinhua, 2012a). It is hardly believed that Buddhist institutions like the BAC in themselves will have a great impact on Chinas international relations. But, considering that these institutions are backed by Beijing, it is fruitful for the Chinese government that the BAC is legitimising its authority and establishing a platform for improving Chinas international relations. The holy relics of the Buddhas tooth and finger bone, with the latter normally residing in the Famen Temple in Xian, have also been sent on veneration tours to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Thailand. Additionally, as a result of poor language skills among Chinese Buddhist monks, SARA has arranged English-language training for Buddhist monks to better equip them to participate in international exchanges and faith diplomacy. In the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-15) it is stated that the government will support Promoting cultural exchanges in religion. China will support friendly exchanges between Chinese religious circles and foreign religious organisations (Xinhua, 2012b).

what is accepted religious practice on a micro level, such as proselytising outside government-appointed designated areas or burning paper money in Buddhist temple grounds, probably costs the government far less than the benefits it currently reaps from the increased stability and general satisfaction among the huge number of practising Buddhists in China. This applies as long as religious practice is not perceived as a threat to the governments authority. The dynamics of the politics of religion show that the government utilises Buddhism as a means of control. If we follow this line of thought a little further, it is possible to read this as the government, ironically, making use of Chinese Buddhism as a kind of opiate of the people. However, as Chinese Buddhists currently represent a powerful social force in society, they have strong cards in their hands when negotiating freedom of religious practice for themselves. For this reason we can see that the revival of Chinese Buddhism in China today is also a result of the government probably not having much choice in the matter and making the best of the prevailing situation. Many of Chinas neighbouring countries fear its economic and political rise. Beijings rhetoric concerning establishing a harmonious society and a harmonious world seems to be contrasted by the fact that China is currently involved in border disputes with many of its neighbours and that it claims large parts of the South China and East China seas. Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan in particular feel threatened by what they consider to be Chinas aggressive behaviour. Faith diplomacy might serve as a counter to this as a way of easing the fears of Chinas neighbours and hence benefiting Chinas international relations, as we have witnessed in Myanmar and Nepal.

References
Bajoria, Jayshree. 2008. Nationalism in China. Council on Foreign Relations, April 23rd. <http://www.cfr.org/china/ nationalism-china/p16079> Chinese Embassy in India. 2011. Chinese ambassador to India Zhang Yan presents one million US dollar donations to Nalanda University. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, November 17th. <http://www. fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t878305.htm> Hua, Chunyu. 2011. (China will launch a number of international exchanges in the field of religion, advocating the concept of harmonious religion1). Xinhua, January 10th. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2011-01/10/c_12965618.htm> Lalibert, Andr. 2011. Buddhist revival under state watch. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 40(2): 107-134.

Conclusion
Over the past ten years the Chinese government has realised that religion can be employed as a form of statecraft to boost its soft power in the world. The atheistic CCP had previously prohibited religious practice, but is now trying to shape and domesticate it and use it as a diplomatic tool to promote its soft power. Religion in China is thus not merely subject to state authority; it is a branch of the government itself. While China has experienced tremendous economic growth in the last couple of decades, its leaders have not been able to stop social unrest at home. To accept small violations of
1 Authors unofficial translation.

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Lim, Louisa. 2010. Beijing finds common cause with Chinese Buddhists. National Public Radio, July 22nd. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=128691021> MacInnis, Donald E. 1989. Religion in China Today: Policy and Practice. Maryknoll: Orbis Books. Ranade, Jayadeva. 2011a. China strengthens hold on Nepal, comes to Indias doorstep. DNA, June 24th. <http:// www.dnaindia.com/world/column_china-strengthenshold-on-nepal-comes-to-india-s-doorstep_1558386> Ranade, Jayadeva. 2011b. China includes Nepal in its circle of friendship. DNA, August 22nd. <http://www. dnaindia.com/world/report_jayadeva-ranade-china-includes-nepal-in-its-circle-of-friendship_1578358> State Council Information Office. 1997. Freedom of religious belief in China. October. <http://www.china.org. cn/e-white/Freedom/f-1.htm> Sun, Yiwei. 2007. (Survey of contemporary Chinese religious beliefs2). (Oriental Outlook), 169(6), February: 28-32. U.S. DoS (U.S. Department of State). 2011. International Freedom of Religion Report 2011. April 14th. <http://www. state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm>
2 Authors unofficial translation.

U.S. Embassy in Beijing. 2011. 22.07.1999: Falun Gong crackdown, day three. Aftenposten, March 28th. <http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/ article4075684.ece> VTP Global. 2012. Lumbini, Nepal. September 13th. <http://www.vtpglobal.com/2012_Sep_lumbini-nepal.html> Welch, Holmes. 1972. Buddhism under Mao. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Xinhua. 2011. Sacred Buddha tooth relic arrives in Yangon. China Daily, November 22nd. <http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-11/22/content_14144484. htm> Xinhua. 2012a. China, Myanmar sign MoU on setting up friendly religious relations. Xinhuanet, February 22nd. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2012-02/22/c_131425541.htm> Xinhua. 2012b. Full text: National Human Rights Action Plan of China (20122015). Xinhuanet, June 11th. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2012-06/11/c_131645029_8.htm> Yang, Fenggang. 2006. The red, black and grey markets of religion in China. Sociological Quarterly, 47(4): 93-122.

The author
Trine Angelskr holds an MA in religious studies/Chinese studies from the University of Oslo. She has lived in China for several years and has attended Fudan and Peking universities. She has fieldwork experience from China and speaks Chinese. Her main research interests include the state and religion in China, lay religious practice and human rights. She has been an adviser to Amnesty International Norway.

The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre Norsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging

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