Assess Brittle Fracture Risks

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture
DRAFT - API Recommended Practice For Fitness-For-Service
SECTION 3 - Assessment Of Existing Equipment For Brittle Fracture

(Draft - Revision 14 - MS Word 7.0) 3.1 3.1.1 General This section provides guidelines for evaluating the resistance to brittle fracture of existing carbon and low alloy steel pressure vessels, piping, and storage tanks. Assessment of other materials that could be susceptible to brittle fracture such as ferritic, martensitic and duplex stainless steels are not addressed explicitly. However, the same principles in this section can be used to evaluate these materials. The purpose of this assessment is to avoid a catastrophic brittle failure consistent with ASME Code Section VIII design philosophy. It is intended to prevent the initiation of brittle fracture; however, it does not ensure against cracks resulting in leakage, or ensure arrest of a running brittle fracture. Unlike other sections, where a flaw is first found and then evaluated, this Section is used to screen for the propensity for brittle fracture. Once crack like flaws are found, Section 9 can be used for the assessment. This section includes recommendations for; data collection requirements, criteria for assessing equipment based on its type, design details and condition, and allowances to account for actual stress, heat treatment condition, and steel manufacturing practices. Guidance is also provided for using Charpy V-notch data at one temperature for the qualification of equipment at another temperature, and for welding on equipment which does not meet recognized toughness standards. The Critical Exposure Temperature (CET) is used in this section and is defined as the lowest process or atmospheric temperature at which the equipment metal will be exposed to a given stress under either normal or upset conditions. The CET is derived from the operating conditions the component is subject to. The CET may be a single temperature at an operating pressure or an envelope of temperatures and pressures, e.g. vapor pressure curve for LPG streams. The CET is determined for different types of equipment as follows.
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.3.1
Pressure Vessels - the CET is defined as the minimum metal temperature at which a component will be subjected to a general primary membrane tensile stress greater than 8 ksi. The CET may also be defined as the minimum metal temperature at which the vessel will be subject to a pressure greater than 40% of the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) for vessels designed to the ASME Code Section VIII Division 1. For pressure vessels designed to a higher allowable stress than that permitted in this code, the CET may be taken as the minimum metal temperature at which the vessel will be subject to a pressure greater than 25% of the MAWP. The CET for pressure vessels is determined from the anticipated process and atmospheric conditions, as listed in paragraph 3.3.4.1. Piping - The CET is defined as the minimum metal temperature at which a component will be subjected to a general primary membrane tensile stress greater than 8 ksi. The CET may also be defined as the minimum metal temperature at which the piping system will be subject to a pressure greater than 40% of the design pressure. The CET for piping is determined from the anticipated process and atmospheric conditions, as listed in paragraph 3.3.4.1. Atmospheric Storage Tanks - The CET is defined as the lower of either the lowest one-day mean atmospheric temperature plus 15 F (8C), or the hydrostatic test temperature (see paragraph 3.3.4.2).
The Minimum Design Metal Temperature ( MDMT) is the term chosen for the brittle fracture evaluation of existing equipment. It may be a single temperature, or an envelope of acceptable operating temperatures as a function of pressure. With this definition, the MDMT permits consideration of lower than design pressure conditions. The MDMT is derived from mechanical and materials design data.
3.1.3.2
3.1.3.3
3.1.4
3-1
3.2 3.2.1
Applicability and Limitations of the Procedure(s) This section provides guidelines to assess the risk of brittle fracture of components in the following equipment: Pressure vessels constructed in accordance with any of the several editions of the former API/ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels for Petroleum Liquids and Gases, the several editions of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2, or to other recognized pressure vessel codes, or as nonstandard vessels, and for other vessels not built to a code or approved as jurisdictional special, Piping systems constructed in accordance with the ASME Code of Pressure Piping (B31.3); but the same guidelines may be used in assessing piping design to other codes, Aboveground storage tankage that is either welded or riveted, is non-refrigerated, operates at atmospheric or low pressure, and was constructed in accordance with any of the several editions of the former or current API Codes for Design and Construction of Storage Tanks; it is important to note that these guidelines are based primarily on experience and data associated with welded tanks. The Level 1 and 2 Assessment procedures in this section can be applied to components which do not have extensive damage resulting from locally thin areas, grooves and crack-like flaws. If this type of damage is determined by the Engineer to be significant, a Level 3 Assessment should be performed. Data Requirements In order to carry out a brittle fracture assessment, available data related to equipment types, the current and foreseeable future operating conditions, mechanical design, materials of construction, and operations and repair history should be gathered. These data, which should be available in the equipment files, are required for each pressure containing component of the equipment in order to identify the component that governs its brittle fracture limitations. A summary of the data that is required for an analysis is shown in Table 3.1. In addition to identification of equipment type (e.g. pressure vessels, tankage, piping) design and operating data will be required to perform a brittle fracture assessment. These data should include design pressure and temperature as well as the current wall thickness and the specified material type. Previous operating pressures and temperatures should be included as well as environmental exposure conditions. These data are used to establish the most severe operating and exposure conditions encountered during the life of the equipment. Information related to environmental exposure will also be needed to determine whether there is a risk of environmental cracking. Specific materials properties test data, such as Charpy V-notch and tensile data, if available, will be used for higher levels of assessment. The specified material type will either establish minimum properties or provide a basis whereby minimum properties can be determined. Additional data related to maintenance and operational history are required. Key maintenance information should include a history of any weld repairs (with or without PWHT) and a complete history of any hydrotests including records documenting the test pressure and metal temperature at the time of the test. The CET pressure-temperature envelope should be determined after complete consideration of all potential conditions using review procedures encompassing hazard analysis or other comparable assessment criteria. Of special concern with existing equipment is any change in the operation that has occurred after the equipment was originally placed into service which could cause a lower CET than it was originally designed for. In determining the CET, the current process design and safety philosophies should be employed. The CET pressure-temperature envelope as defined in Section 3.1.3 shall consider the following process conditions and ambient factors:
3.2.1.1
3.2.1.2
3.2.1.3
3.2.2
3.3 3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.3.4
3.3.4.1
3-2
a.
The lowest one-day mean atmospheric temperature, unless a higher temperature is specified (e.g., specifying a minimum required startup temperature and coincident pressure). In the latter case, it must be confirmed that the system capabilities to carry this out are available, can be monitored, are documented, are understood and followed by operations personnel. The lowest temperature under normal operating conditions. Startup, shutdown, upset conditions, standby, pressure tightness testing. The following items shall be considered: 1. 2. 3. Failure of warning and/or shut-down systems (e.g. a pump stops, control valve shuts, etc.), A colder than expected warming stream, Reboiler failure or stall (e.g., flow loss of reboiling medium, failure of a control valve, etc.), and The possibility of future field hydrotest.
b. c.
4. d.
Potential for autorefrigeration due to depressurization, either during operations or due to equipment failure (e.g., a safety relief valve sticks open). In some services where autorefrigeration can occur, equipment can be chilled to temperatures below the CET at an applied pressure less than that defined in paragraph 3.1.3.1. When this occurs the possibility of any repressurization of equipment before the material has had sufficient time to warm up to the CET must be considered. The effect of autorefrigeration on the equipment depends upon the state of the process fluid, for example whether the vessel contents are all liquid, all gas, or a mixture and how the vessel may be vented. Autorefrigeration, caused by depressurization, may also occur in a flowing system with a flashing liquid. As the pressure decreases, the temperature will follow the vapor pressure curve. For a pure gas, the effect of pressure on temperature is small and governed by Joule-Thompson cooling. However, when a vessel is depressurized through a long line, the gas flowing through the line may be cold because it was autorefrigerated in the vessel. Shock chilling (see Appendix I); the CET should not be higher than the temperature of the liquid causing the shock chilling.
e.
3.3.4.2
The CET for storage tankage is the lower of the coldest one-day mean atmospheric temperature plus 15F (8C), or the anticipated hydrostatic test temperature. Assessment Techniques and Acceptance Criteria Overview The Level 1 assessment procedures are intended to be used for equipment that meets recognized toughness standards. This can be determined from impact test results, the use of industry accepted impact test exemption curves, or comparison of the equipment to the original design code or standard toughness requirements. The Level 2 Assessment procedures for pressure vessels are divided into three methods. In the first method (Method A), equipment may be exempt from further assessment if it can be shown that the operating pressure/temperature is within a safe envelope with respect to component design stress and minimum acceptable temperature. In the second method (Method B) equipment may be qualified for continued service based on a hydrotest, possibly in combination with acoustic emission testing. In the third method (Method C) equipment may be qualified for continued service based on materials of construction, operating conditions, service environment and past operating experience. Separate
3.4 3.4.1 3.4.1.1
3.4.1.2
3-3
evaluation procedures for piping and tankage are provided which are based on a combination of these three methods. 3.4.1.3 A Level 3 Assessment may be used for equipment which does not meet the acceptance criteria for Levels 1 and 2. This equipment must be evaluated on an individual basis with the help of process, materials, mechanical, inspection, safety, and other specialists as appropriate. A Level 3 Assessment will normally involve a more detailed evaluation, using a fracture mechanics methodology (see Section 9.0), the factors that control the susceptibility to brittle fracture: stress, flaw size and material toughness are systematically evaluated. Level 1 Assessment Pressure Vessels a. A simplified flow chart of an overall brittle fracture assessment of pressure vessels is shown in Figure 3.1. The detailed procedures shown in the flow chart and described in the following paragraphs apply to carbon and low-alloy steels. Assessment Level 1 is appropriate for equipment that meets recognized toughness standards. This can be determined from impact test results, or from the use of industry accepted impact test exemption curves. A Level 1 assessment typically requires only a review of existing equipment records. Pressure vessels which have a MDMT equal to or colder than the CET, as demonstrated by conformance to recognized toughness standards described below, are exempt from further brittle fracture assessment provided conditions are not changed in the future. If a change in the operating conditions is made which effects the CET, a reassessment is recommended. These vessels require no special treatment other than to continue their inclusion in a normal plant inspection and maintenance program encompassing generally accepted engineering practices such as contained in API-510 or other recognized inspection code. Also, if the vessel is in a service where environmental cracking is possible, an appropriate inspection program should be implemented. Vessels that meet all of the following requirements of UG-20(f) of the ASME Code Section VIII Division 1 satisfy the requirements for a Level 1 assessment: 1. The material is limited to P-No. 1, Gr. No. 1 or 2 as defined in ASME Code Section IX, and the thickness, as defined in paragraph (e) below, does not exceed that given in (a) or (b) below: a) b) 2. 1/2 inches (12 mm) for materials listed in Curve A of Figure 3.2, and 1 inch (25.4 mm) for materials listed in Curve B, C, or D of Figure 3.2.
3.4.2 3.4.2.1
b.
c.
The completed vessel has been hydrostatically tested per the ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or other recognized pressure vessel construction code, provided the test pressure is at least 1.5 times the design pressure. Design temperature is no warmer than 650F (343C) nor colder than -20F (-29C). Occasional operating temperatures colder than -20F (-29C) are acceptable when due to lower seasonal atmospheric temperature. Thermal or mechanical shock loadings are not a controlling design requirement. Cyclic loading is not a controlling design requirement.
3.
4. 5. d.
The MDMT is the lowest value determined by one of the following methods:
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1.
Exemption curves in Figure UCS-66 of the ASME Code Section VIII Division 1 (shown as Figure 3.2), Impact test temperature meeting the requirements in paragraph UG-84 of ASME Code Section VIII Division 1, Exemption curves in Figure AM-218.1 of the ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2, or Exemption curves from other recognized codes and standards (see paragraph 2.2.2.c of Section 2).
2.
3. 4.
e.
When determining the MDMT, components, such as shells, head, nozzles, manways, reinforcing pads, flanges, tubesheets, flat cover plates, and attachments which are essential to the structural integrity of the vessel when welded to pressure containing components shall be treated as separate components. Each component shall be evaluated for impact test requirements based on its individual material classification (see Figures 3.2, and Table 3.3 and Table 3.4), thickness, and specified MDMT. The rules for establishing the governing thickness used to determine the MDMT are shown below. 1. Excluding castings, the governing thickness (TG) of a welded part is as follows: a. for butt joints except those in flat heads and tubesheets, the nominal thickness of the thickest welded joint (see Figure 3.3(A)), for corner, fillet, or lap welded joints, including attachments as defined above, the thinner of the two parts joined (see Figure 3.3(B),(C)), for flat heads or tubesheets, the thinner of two parts joined or the flat component thickness divided by 4 (see Figure 3.3(D),(E),(F)), and for welded assemblies comprised of more than two components (e.g., nozzle-toshell joint with reinforcing pad), the governing thickness and permissible MDMT of each of the individual welded joints of the assembly shall be determined, and the warmest of the MDMT values so calculated shall be used as the permissible minimum design metal temperature of the welded assembly.
b.
c.
d.
2. 3.
The governing thickness of a casting shall be its largest nominal thickness. The governing thickness of non-welded parts, such as bolted flanges, tubesheets, and flat heads, is the component thickness divided by 4 (see Figure 3.3(D)).
f.
When using the exemption curves in Figure 3.2 the MDMT for P1 Group 1 and 2 materials in the ASME Code can be lowered by 30F (17C) if the equipment was subject to PWHT and the reference thickness is less than or equal to 1.5 inches (38 mm).
3.4.2.2
Piping Systems a. Piping systems shall meet the toughness requirements contained in ASME B31.3 (or an equivalent piping design code if that code contains material toughness requirements), or possess a CET equal to or warmer than -20F (-29C). Low alloy steel, such as 2 Cr - 1 Mo, and other steels may lose ambient temperature ductility if exposed to high temperatures (above 750F (400C)) for long periods of time due to various thermal aging degradation mechanisms. These piping systems may require special precautions if a hydrotest of other low temperature pressurization is required.
b.
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c. 3.4.2.3
All weld repairs and alterations shall meet the requirements contained in API 570.
Atmospheric and Low Pressure Storage Tanks a. Atmospheric and low pressure storage tanks shall meet the Level 1 Assessment criteria contained in Figure 3.7, as applicable, and the accompanying notes. The Level 1 Assessment criteria requires that these tanks meet the toughness requirements contained in API 650, API 620 or an equivalent construction code. All repairs and alterations shall meet the requirements contained in API 653.
b. 3.4.3 3.4.3.1
Level 2 Assessment Pressure Vessels - Method A a. Pressure vessels may be exempt from further assessment at this level if it can be demonstrated that the operating pressure/temperature is within a safe envelope with respect to component design stress and the MDMT. It is assumed that the equipment will continue to be included in a normal plant inspection and maintenance activity encompassing API-510 requirements or other recognized inspection codes as appropriate. Also, if the vessel is in a service where environmental cracking is possible, an appropriate inspection program should be implemented. The MDMT may be further adjusted from that determined in the Level 1 assessment by considering additional temperature reduction allowances which may apply for pressure vessels whose actual operating stresses at the low temperature pressurization condition are below the allowable value from the original construction code at ambient temperature. For vessels designed to the ASME Code Section VIII Division 1, use Figure 3.4 (ASME Code Section VIII, Div.1, Figure UCS 66.1) and the procedure outlined in Table 3.4. For vessels designed to other codes, use Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4, but limit the temperature reduction to design stress values o o below 17.5 ksi (121 MPa). The MDMT shall be no colder than -150 F (-101 C) after adjustments using this procedure.
b.
3.4.3.2
Pressure Vessels - Method B a. A vessel may be qualified for continued service based on a hydrotest, possibly in combination with acoustic emission testing (AET). Figure 3.5 is used to determine a minimum acceptable temperature for operating pressures below the hydrotest pressure, using a philosophy similar to that used to develop the temperature reduction curve in the ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1 (Figure UCS 66.1 and shown as Figure 3.4 herein). 1. Test pressure should be 150% of the design pressure, corrected for the difference in allowable stresses between the design and hydrotest temperatures, but should not result in a general primary membrane stress higher than 90% of the specified minimum yield strength for the steel used in the construction of the vessel. The metal temperature during hydrotest, rather than water temperature, is the relevant parameter in a brittle fracture assessment. Therefore, it is preferable to measure and use this value directly. Records of the measured metal temperature used in the assessment should be kept. It may be advisable to perform acoustic emission testing during the hydrotest in cases where the quality of the welding or inspection is suspect. This may be the case for large, field fabricated pressure vessels. If the hydrotest is performed at a temperature lower than the MDMT as determined by a Level 1 assessment, it should be noted that there may be a significant risk of brittle fracture during the hydrotest.
2.
3.
4.
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5.
The MDMT shall be no colder than -150 F (-101 C) after adjustments using this procedure.
b.
The MDMT curve is established using Figure 3.5 and plotting pressure versus permissible temperature.
3.4.3.3
Pressure Vessels - Method C a. Equipment assessment at this level is only applicable when no material impact test or toughness data are available. Service experience has been excellent with pressure vessels which have been built to the ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1 and other recognized standards. For this reason, pressure vessels with a governing thickness less than or equal to 0.5 in. (13 mm.), or which meet all of the following criteria, may be considered to be acceptable for continued service without further assessment. 1. As defined in ASME Code Section IX, P-1 and P-3 steels, where the design temperature is no higher than 650F (343 C). P-4 and P-5 steels may also be evaluated at this level, provided the proper precautions (e.g. preheating prior to pressurization) are taken to avoid brittle fracture due to in-service embrittlement. The equipment currently satisfies all requirements of a recognized code or standard (see paragraph 2.2.2.c of Section 2.0) at the time of fabrication. The nominal operating conditions have been essentially the same and consistent with the specified design conditions for a significant period of time, and more severe conditions (i.e., lower temperature and/or higher stress) are not expected in the future. The CET is no colder than -20F (-29C). The nominal uncorroded governing thickness is not greater than 2 in. (50 mm). The equipment is not in cyclic service (See Appendix I). The equipment is not in an active environmental cracking service (see Appendix G). The equipment is not subject to shock chilling (See Appendix I).
2.
3.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8. b.
An assessment for brittle fracture is not required for the following product forms and thickness. 1. ASME/ANSI B16.5 ferritic steel flanges used at a metal temperature of -20F (-29C) and warmer. Carbon steel with a thickness less than 0.098 inches used at a metal temperature of -50F (-46C), or warmer.
2.
c.
Pressure vessels that are assessed using Method C of the Level 2 Assessment procedure are qualified for continued operation based on their successful performance demonstrated during past operation. However, if a repair is required, the guidelines in Paragraph 3.6 should be followed to ensure that the risk of brittle fracture does not increase in the future.
3.4.3.4
Piping Systems a. Piping systems shall meet the assessment criteria contained in Figure 3.6 and the accompanying notes. b. The approach discussed in Paragraph 3.4.3.1 that provides an allowance for operating stress reduction below the allowable stress for pressure vessels, can also be applied to piping using the
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ASME Code Section VIII Figure UCS-66.1 (Figure 3.4). If this approach is used, the stress levels used in the assessment should include system stresses (i.e. from a piping flexibility analysis) in addition to membrane stresses from pressure loads. c. 3.4.3.5 All repairs and alterations shall be made in accordance with API 570.
Atmospheric and Low Storage Tanks a. Atmospheric and low pressure storage tanks shall meet the Level 2 Assessment criteria contained in Figure 3.7, as applicable, and the accompanying notes. All repairs and alterations shall be in accordance with API 653.
b. 3.4.4 3.4.4.1
Level 3 Assessment Pressure vessels, piping and tankage which do not meet the criteria for Levels 1 and 2 assessments must be evaluated on an individual basis with the help of process, materials, mechanical, inspection, safety, and other specialists as appropriate. Level 3 assessments will normally involve more sophisticated determinations of one or more of the three factors that control the susceptibility to brittle fracture: stress, flaw size and material toughness. Section 9 shall be used as a basis for a Level 3 Assessment. This approach may involve the assignment of partial safety factors. A risk analysis considering both the likelihood and potential consequences of a brittle fracture in the specific service should also be considered in a Level 3 Assessment. At this assessment level, the engineering judgment of the specialists involved may be used to apply some of the principles of Levels 1 and 2 without the specific restrictions used at those levels. Examples of some other approaches which may be considered are: a. Perform a heat transfer analysis to provide a less conservative estimate of the lowest metal temperature which the vessel will be exposed to in service. If loadings are always quasi-static, consider additional credits due to the temperature shift between dynamic (e.g., Charpy V-notch) and quasi-static toughness. Inspect all seam welds and attachment welds to the pressure shell for surface cracks using dye penetrant or magnetic particle techniques at the next scheduled turnaround and provide guidance on acceptable flaw sizes based on a flaw assessment (see Section 9.0). The extent of subsequent inspections should be based upon the severity of the service considering the conditions given in paragraph 3.3.4.1. Ultrasonic examination from the outside for cracks on the internal surface is permissible if a vessel will not be opened or has an internal concrete/refractory lining.
3.4.4.2
3.4.4.3
b.
c.
3.4.4.4
Weld repairs should be avoided, if possible. In many cases, weld repairs can be avoided by utilizing the
FFS assessment procedures in this document to evaluate a damaged component. However when
necessary, all proposals for weld repairs or alterations to the primary pressure shell should be reviewed by appropriate specialists. 3.4.4.5 It may be necessary to evaluate stresses using advanced techniques such as finite element analysis. Consideration should be given to localized or other loads (e.g. at nozzles), thermal transient effects, and residual stress. These additional considerations may result in different criteria for different locations within a piece of equipment. Assumed locations and orientations of crack-like flaws should be determined to guide the stress analyst. A Level 3 assessment will normally rely on a determination of maximum expected flaw sizes at locations of high stresses. In general, these postulated flaws should be assumed to be surface
3.4.4.6
3-8
breaking, and to be oriented transverse to the maximum stress. For welded structures, this often implies that the flaw is located within the residual stress field of a longitudinal weld. The maximum expected flaw size should be sufficiently large to assure that there is a reasonable probability of detection using practical NDE techniques. The detectable flaw size will depend on factors such as surface condition, location, accessibility, operator competence, and NDE technique. Section 9.0 should be used to derive limiting depths for crack-like flaws. In addition, the aspect ratio of the assumed flaw should be large enough to ensure that the calculations are not highly sensitive to small variations in flaw depth in the through thickness direction. To reduce this sensitivity, a minimum crack-like flaw aspect ratio of 6:1 is recommended. However, it may be appropriate to verify the sensitivity of the result by plotting the critical length versus depth. 3.4.4.7 The use of material toughness data from appropriate testing is the preferred basis for advanced assessments. Where this is not practical, appropriate and sufficiently conservative estimates must be determined. Methods for obtaining or estimating fracture toughness are described in Appendix F. Remaining Life Assessment - Acceptability for Continued Service Remaining life is not normally an issue associated with an equipments resistance to brittle fracture. Therefore, equipment evaluated using a Level 1 or 2 assessment procedure should be acceptable for future operations as long as operating conditions do not become more severe and there is no active material degradation mechanism that can result in propagation of crack-like flaws. If this is not the case, a Level 3 assessment should be performed, and a remaining life associated with the time a flaw grows to critical size can be calculated. Pressure vessels constructed of materials which satisfy the requirements of a Level 1 or Level 2 assessment are considered acceptable for continued service. Pressure vessels can be fully pressurized within the limits of their design parameters at any metal temperature above the MDMT. Piping systems constructed of materials which satisfy the requirements of a Level 1 or Level 2 assessment are considered acceptable for continued service. Piping systems can be fully pressurized within the limits of their design parameters at metal temperature above the MDMT. The acceptability of piping systems for continued service can be determined by using similar methods as those to evaluate pressure vessels. There are two facts which distinguish piping from pressure vessels and make piping less likely to experience brittle fracture. Firstly, because the metal thickness is generally less than inch, even for high pressure systems, the MDMT for a particular thickness as illustrated in Figure 3.2 is more easily attainable. Secondly, there is less likelihood to have to crack-like flaws in piping systems because there are fewer longitudinal weld seams (i.e. seamless pipe). Storage tanks constructed of materials which satisfy the requirements of a Level 1 or Level 2 assessment are considered acceptable for continued service. For materials represented by Curve A or for unknown materials, the minimum shell metal temperature is 60 F or as shown in Figure 3.6. Storage tanks can utilize maximum liquid levels at a metal temperature warmer than the MDMT. Remediation Methods are available which can be used, either alone or in combination, to reduce the risk of a catastrophic brittle fracture of a pressure vessel, piping system, or storage tank. The remediation methods described in this paragraph are not the only acceptable methods but are examples of the type of methods that have been successfully employed in the past. New methods and modifications of these techniques are always being developed and refined.
3.5 3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.5.4
3.6 3.6.1
3.6.2
3.6.2.1 Limiting Operation - The limitation of operating conditions to within the acceptable operating pressuretemperature envelope is the simplest type of remediation effort. This method, however, may be impractical in many cases because of the requirements for stable process operation. The most successful, and effective, technique for limiting operation has been the controlled start-up procedure.
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This is due to the fact that many petroleum and chemical processes that undergo this type of assessment for brittle fracture were originally designed for substantially warmer temperatures, above the temperature range where the risk of brittle fracture must be addressed. 3.6.2.2
Controlled Start-Up Procedure - Using a controlled start-up procedure to control the pressurization of equipment within the limitations of an acceptable pressure-temperature operating envelope is a viable and often used method to overcome the limitations of low material toughness properties and risks of catastrophic brittle fracture.
Pressure vessels that are assessed using Method C of the Level 2 Assessment procedure are qualified for continued operation based on their successful performance demonstrated during past operation. However, whenever repair welding, PWHT and hydrotesting are conducted, the following guidelines should be followed to ensure that the risk of brittle fracture does not increase in the future. These guidelines are also recommended for piping systems. Recommendations for repairs to atmospheric storage tanks are included in API 653.
3.6.3
3.6.3.1
Welding Guidelines - the following are recommended for repairs:

a. All weld repairs or alterations shell should be in accordance with API-510 or API 570, as applicable. When possible, cutting though or along existing pressure retaining weld seams, or within a distance of the greater of 1 inch (25 mm) or twice the plate thickness from the edge of the weld, should be avoided. When this cannot be avoided, procedures should be established to remove the old weld and heat affected zone material. Base plate should be inspected prior to making any cuts into the shell to first assess the material condition. The size of the repair, or location of a new nozzle or alteration, should be adjusted as required based on the findings of the base metal inspection. All weld bevels prepared by oxyacetylene cutting should be ground to eliminate the potential for any heat affected material remaining on the weld bevel surface. All weld bevels, and a band of adjacent base material that is at least the larger of 2 in. (50 mm) or twice the nominal plate thickness wide, should be inspected by liquid penetrant (PT) or magnetic particle (MT) techniques prior to any welding to identify surface breaking flaws. All flaws not meeting the acceptance criteria in the ASME Code Section VIII Appendices 6 and 8 shall be removed. All Category A, B and D welds (as defined in ASME Code Section VIII Division 1) should be full penetration and full fusion. Back gouging, followed by PT or MT of the back side of the root pass, is also required when the weld is made from both sides. For carbon steel materials, preheat to a minimum of 200 F (93C) whenever the plate thickness exceeds 1 in. (25 mm). For thinner plates, use a 60 F (16C) minimum preheat. All final welds should be examined on both the inside and outside surfaces where accessible, using either PT or MT techniques. This inspection should be performed after any required PWHT. All detected flaws should be removed. All design and/or repair details with any required calculations, specified inspection, and testing should be documented and included in the vessels permanent file.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
I.
3.6.3.2
PWHT Guidelines - welds should be subject to PWHT for any of the following cases:
a. The plate material and the site of any new welds are such that PWHT is required by the Code used in the design, fabrication, modification and repair of the vessel.
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b. 3.6.3.3
PWHT is required based on the vessel service.
Hydrotest Guidelines - hydrotesting in accordance with the original construction code is recommended for the following:
a. Addition of nozzles over 2 in. (50 mm) nominal pipe size into shells or heads over 0.5 in. (13 mm) in thickness. Removal, replacement, or addition of any shell or head plate, where the longest weld dimension of the replacement plate exceeds 12 in. (300 mm). Complete or partial removal and replacement of more than the following lengths of pressure retaining weld (partial removal of a weld is defined as removal of more than one-half of the original weld thickness): 24 in. (600 mm) of circumferential weld in cylindrical shell sections 12 in. (300 mm) of all other Category A, B or D welds as defined in ASME code Section VIII, Division 1.
b.
c.
3.7 3.7.1
In-Service Monitoring There is little that can be accomplished by in-service monitoring of equipment to alleviate the risk of brittle fracture because the factors that contribute to this phenomena, stress level, material toughness, and flaw size are difficult to monitor.
3.7.2
Monitoring for Degradation of Low Alloy Steel Notch Toughness - Certain materials, such as the chromium-molybdenum low alloy steels suffer from a loss of notch toughness due to exposure at high temperatures. This degradation is often monitored over the service life by means of sentinel material included within a pressure vessel. Periodically, a portion of this material is removed and tested to monitor for the degradation of material toughness as a result of the exposure at temperature. The degradation of properties is evaluated against minimum acceptable criteria for resistance to brittle fracture which have previously been established. The evaluation of fitness-for-service for pressure vessels which no longer meet the original criteria generally requires that a Level 3 assessment be conducted. Monitoring for Criticality of Growing Flaws - Flaws which develop or propagate during the service life of equipment can have a detrimental affect on the risk of brittle fracture. The assessment of each type of flaw is prescribed in other sections of this Recommended Practice, see Section 2 for an overview. Assessment of Non-Growing Flaws Detected In-Service - During the course of in-service inspections or other forms of examination for other purposes, flaws may be detected. These could include original material or fabrication flaws. Furthermore, these defects may or may not be in excess of the requirements of the original design and construction code. In addition, while these flaws may have been innocuous, their presence may affect current or altered design and operating parameters. Alternatively, flaws may have developed or resulted from service exposure, excessive operating conditions, or maintenance-related activities. The influence of such flaws on the increased susceptibility for brittle fracture should be assessed. This assessment will generally require either a Level 2 or 3 analysis.
Documentation The documentation for each level of brittle fracture assessment should include the information cited in paragraph 2.8 of Section 2.0 and the following specific requirements:
3.7.3
3.7.4
3.8 3.8.1
3.8.1.1
Level 1 Assessment - A report covering the assessment evaluation conducted, specific data used, and the criteria which have been met by the results obtained from that evaluation.
3-11
3.8.1.2
Level 2 Assessment - Documentation shall consist of a report written by a qualified technical specialist and included in the equipment history record file. This report shall address the reason for the assessment, the assessment level used, the engineering principles employed, the source of all material data used, identification of any potential material property degradation mechanisms and the associated influence on the propagation of flaws, and the criteria applied to the assessment procedure. Level 3 Assessment - The documentation shall cover the reason(s) for performing a Level 3 assessment, all fitness-for-service flaw assessment issues, and shall be written by a qualified technical specialist. This report shall also address the engineering principles employed including stress analysis methods and flaw sizing, the source of all material data used, identification of any potential material property degradation mechanisms and the associated influence on the propagation of flaws, and the criteria applied to the assessment procedure.
All documents pertaining to the assessment for brittle fracture shall be retained for the life of the equipment in the equipment history file. This includes all supporting documentation, data, test reports, and references to methods and criteria used for such assessments and evaluations. For vessels exposed to identical conditions, a single document with appropriate references is adequate. Referenced Publications, Tables and Figures API, "Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: Maintenance Inspection, Rerating, Repair and Alteration," ANSI/API Std. 510, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 1992. API, "Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Rerating Of In-Service Piping Systems," ANSI/API 570, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 1993. API, "Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-Pressure Storage Tanks," ANSI/API Std. 620, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 1992. API, "Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage," ANSI/API Std. 650, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 1992. API, "Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction," ANSI/API Std. 653, American Petroleum Institute, Washington D.C., 1992. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Pressure Vessels Division 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, NY, 1992. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Pressure Vessels Division 2 - Alternative Rules, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, NY, 1992. ASME, Process Piping ASME Code For Pressure Piping, B31, ASME B31.3, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, NY 1992. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Pressure Vessels Division 1, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, NY, 1992. McLaughlin, J.E., Sims, J.R., "Assessment of Older Equipment for Risk of Brittle Fracture," ASME PVPVol. 261, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, 1993, pp. 257-264.
3.8.1.3
3.8.2
3.9 3.9.1
3.9.2
3.9.3
3.9.4
3.9.5
3.9.6
3.9.7
3.9.8
3.9.9
3.9.10
3-12
Table 3.1 Overview Of Data For The Assessment Of Brittle Fracture A summary of the data that should be obtained from a field inspection is provided on this form. Equipment Identification: Equipment Type: _____ Pressure Vessel Component Type & Location: Year Of Fabrication:
_____ Storage Tank
_____ Piping Component
Data Required for Level 1 Assessment (V - indicates data needed for pressure vessels, T - indicates data needed for tankage, and P - indicates data needed for piping) Design Temperature {V,T}: Original Hydrotest Pressure {V,T]: Temperature During Original Hydrotest Pressure {V,T}: Nominal Wall Thickness of all components {V,T,P}: Critical Exposure Temperature ( CET) {V,T,P}: Minimum Design Metal Temperature ( MDMT) {V}: PWHT done at initial construction? {V}: PWHT after all repairs? {V}: Additional Data Required for Level 2 Assessment (In Addition to the Level 1 Data): Weld Joint Efficiency (level 2) {V,T,P} : Corrosion Allowance {V,P}: Maximum Operating Pressure {T,P}: Charpy Impact Data, if available {V,T,P}:
3-13
Table 3.2 Assignment of Materials to Curves in Figure 3.2
Curve
Material
All carbon and all low alloy steel plates, structural shapes and bars not listed in Curves B, C, and D below. The following specifications for obsolete materials are also included in Curve A: A7, A10, A30, A70, A113, A149, A150, S1, S2, S25, S26, S27, A201, A212. 1. SA-285 Grades A and B SA-414 Grade A SA-442 Grade 55>1 in. if not to fine grain practice and normalized SA-442 Grade 60 if not to fine grain practice and normalized SA-515 Grades 55 and 60 SA-516 Grades 65 and 70 if not normalized SA-612 if not normalized SA-662 Grade B if not normalized All materials of Curve A if produced to fine grain practice and normalized which are not listed for Curve C and D below; Plates, structural shapes, and bars, all other product forms (such as pipe, fittings, forgings, castings, and tubing) not listed for Curves C and D below; Parts permitted under UG-11 shall be included in Curve B even when fabricated from plate that otherwise would be assigned to a different curve. SA-182 Grades 21 and 22 if normalized and tempered. SA-302 Grades C and D SA-336 Grades F21 and F22 if normalized and tempered SA-387 Grades 21 and 22 if normalized and tempered SA-442 Grades 55 < 1 in. if not to fine grain practice and normalized SA-516 Grades 55 and 60 if not normalized SA-533 Grades B and C SA-662 Grade A All material of Curve B if produced to fine grain practice and normalized and not listed for Curve D below SA-203 SA-442 if to fine grain practice and normalized SA-508 Class 1 SA-516 if normalized SA-524 Classes 1 and 2 SA-537 Classes 1 and 2 SA-612 if normalized SA-662 if normalized
2.
3.
4. C 1.
2. D
Notes: 1. When no class or grade is shown, all classes or grades are included. 2. The following shall apply to all material assignment notes. a. Cooling rates faster than those obtained in air, followed by tempering, as permitted by the material specification, are considered to be equivalent to normalizing and tempering heat treatments. b. Fine grain practice is defined as the procedures necessary to obtain a fine austenitic grain size as described in SA-20.
3-14
Table 3.3 Impact Test Exemption Temperature for Bolting Materials
Specification SA-193 SA-193 SA-193 SA-193 SA-307 SA-320 SA-325 SA-354 SA-354 SA-449 SA-540 Note:
Grade B5 B7 B7M B16 B L7, L7A, L7M, L43 1, 2 BC BD --B23/24
Impact Test Exemption Temperature (F) -20 -40 -50 -20 -20 Impact Tested per Specification -20 0 +20 -20 +10
Bolting materials are exempt from assessment due to loading conditions.
3-15
Table 3.4 Procedure for Determining MDMT
Step 1
Required Actions Establish nominal thicknesses [General Note (1)] of welded parts, non-welded parts, and attachments under consideration both before and after corrosion allowance is deducted (tn and tn - FCA respectively), and other pertinent data applicable to the nominal thicknesses such as: o All applicable loadings and coincident minimum design metal temperature (MDMT) (General Note 2) o Materials of construction o Weld joint efficiency, E (General Note 3) o Nominal uncorroded thickness TN (in) (General Note 1) o Required thickness in corroded condition for all applicable loadings, tr (in), base on the applicable joint efficiency (General Notes 2 and 3) o Applicable material toughness curve(s) of Figure 3.2. o Corrosion allowance, FCA (in) Select MDMT from Figure 3.2 (General Note 4) for each nominal uncorroded governing thickness (General Note 5)
Determine the ratio
tr E * t n FCA
or
S *E* (General notes 3,6 and 10) SE
4 5 6
Using the ratio from Step 3 to enter ordinate of Figure 3.7, determine the reduction to be applied to the MDMT found in Step2 (General Notes 7 and 8) Determine the adjusted MDMT for governing thickness under consideration. Repeat for all governing thicknesses (General Note 5) and take warmest value as the lowest allowable MDMT to be marked on nameplate for the zone under consideration (General Note 9), see UG-116. See UG-99 (h) for coldest recommended metal temperature during hydrostatic test (General Note 6). See UG-100(c) for coldest metal temperature permitted during pneumatic test General Note 6).
General Notes: (paragraph references UG and UW refer to the ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1) 1. For welded pipe where a mill undertolerance is allowed by the material specification, the thickness after mill undertolerance has been deducted shall be taken as the uncorroded nominal thickness tn for determination of the MDMT to be stamped on the nameplate. Likewise, for formed heads, the minimum specified thickness after forming shall be used as tn . 2. Loadings, including those listed in UG-22 (see Table 4.1), which result in general primary membrane tensile stress at the coincident MDMT. 3. E is the joint efficiency (Table UW-12) used in the calculation of tr; E* has a value equal to E except that E* shall not be less than 0.80. For castings, use quality factor or joint efficiency E whichever governs design. 4. The construction of Figure 3.2 is such that the MDMT so selected is considered to occur coincidentally with an applied general primary membrane tensile stress at the maximum allowable stress value in tension from Table 1A of Section II Part D. 5. See Paragraph 3.4.1.1.d for definitions of governing thickness. 6. If the basis for calculated test pressure is greater than the design pressure [UG-99(c) test], a Ratio based on the tr determined from the basis for calculated test pressure and associated appropriate value of tn FCA shall be used to determine the recommended coldest metal temperature during hydrostatic test and the coldest metal temperature permitted during the pneumatic test. See UG-99(h) and UG-100(c). 7. Use of Figure 3.7 to reduce the MDMT is limited to stationary vessels. See UCS-66(b). 8. For reductions in MDMT up to and including 40F, the reduction can be determined by: reduction in MDMT = (1.0 - Ratio)100 F. 9. A colder MDMT may be obtained by selective use of impact tested materials as appropriate to the need (see UG-84). See also UCS-68(c). 10. Alternatively, a Ratio of S*E* divided by the product of the maximum allowable stress value in tension from Table 1A of Section II Part D times E may be used, where S is the applied general primary membrane tensile stress and E and E* are as defined in General Note (3).
3-16
Figure 3.1 Overall Brittle Assessment Procedure for Pressure Vessels
Obtain Equipment Data.
Determine the CET.
Evaluation Method:
Level 1
Level 2 Method A
Level 2 Method B
Level 2 Method C
Level 3
MDMT <= CET?

`r
Operation within the MDMT Envelope?

`r

`r

`r

`r
Vessel Is Suitable For Service.
Vessel Is Not Suitable For Operation!
Maintain Inspection Per API 510.
Change In Service?
`r
3-17
Figure 3.2 Minimum Allowable Metal Temperature For Pressurization of Equipment without Impact Testing
140 120 Minimum Design Metal Temperature, F 100 80 60 C 40 20 0 -20 -40

-50
-60
Impact Testing Required
-80 0
0.394
Nominal Thickness, inches
Notes: 1. Curves A through D define material specification classes in accordance with Tables 3.2 and 3.3. 2. Equipment whose CET is above the appropriate material curve is exempt from further brittle fracture assessment. 3. This figure is identical to Figure UCS-66 of ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1.
3-18
Figure 3.3 Some Typical Vessel Details Showing the Governing Thicknesses
tb B A
X 1 ta X
Section X-X
tg1=ta tg2=ta (seamless) or t b (welded) (A) Butt Welded Components
tc C tb ta
tc C
2 tb ta
tc C tb 3 ta
tg1=min (ta, tb)
tg2=min (tb, tc)
tg3=min (ta, tb)
Note: Using tg1, tg2, and tg3, determine the warmest MDMT and as the permissible MDMT for the weld assembly. (B) Welded Connection with Reinforcement Plate Added
3-19
Figure 3.3 (continued) Some Typical Vessel Details Showing the Governing Thicknesses
1 A Groove tg1= ta (for A welded 4 or nonwelded) 2 C tc (C) Bolted Flat Head or Tubesheet and Flange 1 A 2 tg1= ta (for A welded 4 or nonwelded) tg2=min (ta, tb) The governing thickness of A is max (tg1, tg2) tb (E) Flat Head or Tubesheet with a Corner Joint tg2=tc ta A
Groove
ta
2 B
tg1= ta (for A welded 4 or nonwelded) tg2=tb The governing thickness of A is max (tg1, tg2) tb
(D) Integral Flat Head or Tubesheet Groove
ta
3-20
Figure 3.3 (continued) Some Typical Vessel Details Showing the Governing Thicknesses
tb
ta
ta
tb
A Pressure Part tg1=min(ta, tb)
A Pressure Part
(F) Welded Attachments as Defined in UCS-66(a) Notes: tg = governing thickness of the welded joint as defined in UCS-66.
3-21
Figure 3.4 Reduction in Minimum Design Metal Temperature Based on Available Excess Thickness PART UCS - Carbon and Low Alloy Steel Vessels
1.0
Ratio: trE*/(tn-FCA) or Ars
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0 0 20 40 60 F
Notes (references are to General Notes of Table 3.4): 1. Nomenclature: tr = required thickness of the component under consideration in corroded condition for all applicable loadings [General Note (2)], based on the applicable joint efficiency E [General Note (3)] in. tn = nominal thickness of the component under consideration before corrosion allowance is deducted, in. FCA = Future corrosion allowance, in. E* = as defined in General Note (3)
80
100
120
Ars
Ars = S * E * SE where S* is the applied general primary membrane tensile stress, S is the maximum allowable stress value in tension from Table UCS-23 times E and E and E* are as defined in General Note (3).
Alternate ratio based on stress;
o
2.
The value of Ratio (y-axis) is equal to 0.4 for all temperatures exceeding 105 F.
3-22
Figure 3.5 Minimum Allowable Metal Temperature Reduction Based on Hydrostatic Proof Testing
1.1
Maximum Expected Operating Pressure/Hydrotest Pressure
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Permissible Temperature Reduction Below Hydrotest Temperature, F
Corresponds to Design Pressure
Notes: o 1. The pressure ratio for all temperatures less than or equal to 35 F is 0.67. o 2. The pressure ratio for all temperatures greater than or equal to 105 F is 0.25.
3-23
Figure 3.6 Level 2 Brittle Fracture Assessment of Carbon Steel Piping
Piping Does Not Meet the Level 1 Assessment Criteria.
Obtain Information For A Level 2 Assessment.
Yes
Is Metal CET <= -150 F (1)?
No
Yes
Is Shock Chilling Possible (2)?
No
Yes
Is Vibration Or Low Temperature Impact Possible (3)?
No
Is Nominal Pipe Wall Thickness > 0.5 in.?
No
Is Metal CET <= -50 F (1)?
No
Piping Meets Level 2 Assessment Criteria!
Yes
Yes
Yes
Does Component Meet Operating Experience Criteria (4)?
No
High Level Of Concern for Brittle Fracture Level 3 Assessment Required!
Yes
Is Cir. Stress > 7 ksi Or Long. Stress > 9 ksi (5)?
No
3-24
Notes for Figure 3.6 1. Experience suggests that brittle fracture of piping is usually associated with unanticipated low temperature excursions. Shock chilling is a rapid decrease in metal temperature caused by a sudden flow of liquid, which is o o o o colder than -20 F (-29 C), and which is 100 F (55 C) or more, below the metal temperature of the equipment before cooling. In addition to a liquid, a two phase fluid may need to be considered when evaluating potential shock chilling. One example of this is a flare header that receives sub-cooled or flashing liquid from a safety valve discharge. Visible vibrations of a portion of the piping system could initiate cracks which are cause for a high level o of concern of brittle fracture. If the system could be subject to an impact load while it is below -20 F (o 29 C), a high level of concern exists. Impact loads include hammering from flow or aggressive repeated strikes from tools or mobile equipment. etc. Minor impacts from hand tools other than deliberate hammering, should not be a concern. Acceptance based on successful operating experience is based on the following: a. The nominal operating conditions have been essentially the same and consistent for a significant period of time and more severe conditions (i.e., lower temperature and/or higher pressure) are not expected in the future. In addition, the maximum design temperature and pressure have not been exceeded for a significant period of time. (Note safety valve discharge lines usually do not meet this criteria.) (See Note 1) The piping is not in a stress corrosion cracking environment such as non-PWHT pip ing in DEA, MEA, NaOH, or KOH. This restriction does not apply to seamless pipe in wet H2S service or seamless and welded pipe in anhydrous ammonia service unless there are clear indications of cracking in the piping. Is the piping system in good condition as determined by inspection? Does the piping system have adequate flexibility by virtue of freedom/condition of supports as determined by visual inspection?
2.
3.
4.
b.
c. d.
5.
Guidelines for stress calculations are as follows: a. The circumferential stress should be calculated from nominal wall thickness less corrosion allowance, less manufacturing tolerance, or the actual measured thickness. The total longitudinal stress should consider pressure, weight, thermal expansion/contraction and imposed displacements, but exclude stress intensification factors. The thermal stress does not have to consider a full design range, such as would result from a system with a high design temperature. It should best reflect the actual stress imposed at low temperature.
b.
3-25
Figure 3.7 Brittle Fracture Assessment for Storage Tanks
Obtain Information for a Brittle Fracture Assessment.
Level 1 Assessment.
Tank Meets Toughness Requirements In Current Construction Code (1)(2)?
`r
Level 2 Assessment.
`r
Tank Continues To Operate in the Same Service (10)?
`r
Prior Hydrotest Demonstrates Fitness-For-Service (3)?

I
Tank Is Suitable for Continued Operation!
Is the Future Service More Severe (11)?
`r
`r
Tank Thickness <= 0.5 inches (4)?
`r
Operating Temperature Above 60 F (5)?

I
`r
Membrane Stress <= 7 ksi (6)?

I
`r
Tank Exempt from Impact Testing (7)?

I
`r
Tank Full at Lowest One Day Temperature (8)?
Perform Level 3 Assessment?
`r
`r
Hydrotest to Demonstrate Fitness-For-Service (3)?

I
Level 3 Assessment Satisfied?
`r
`r
Rerate Tank Based on Prior Operating History (9)?
Retire Tank!
3-26
Notes for Figure 3.7

The assessment procedure as illustrated in Figure 3.7 shall be used for Level 2 assessment of aboveground atmo spheric storage tanks in petroleum and chemical services. Each of the key steps on the decision tree are numbered corre sponding to the explanation provided as follows: 1. Atmospheric storage tanks constructed in accordance with API Standard 650 (seventh edition or later) include requirements to minimize the risk of failure due to brittle fracture. Tanks constructed to earlier version of this Standard may also be shown to meet these the API 650 (seventh edition or later) toughness requirements by impact testing coupon samples from a representative number of shell plates. Many tank continue to operate successfully in the same service were not constructed to the requirements of API Standard 650 (seventh edition or later). These tanks are potentially susceptible to failure due to brittle fracture and require a Level 2 Assessment. For purposes of this assessment, hydrostatic testing demonstrat es that an aboveground atmospheric storage tank in a petroleum or chemical service is fit for continued service and at minimal risk of failure due to brittle fracture, provided that all governing require ments for repair, alterations recon struction, or change in service are in accordance with API Standard 653 (including a need for hydro static testing after major repairs, modifica tions or reconstruction). The effectiveness of the hydro static test in demonstrating fitness for con tinued service is shown by industry experience. If a tank shell thickness is no greater than 0.5 inch, the risk of failure due to brittle frac ture is minimal, provided that an evaluation for suitability of service per API 653, Section 2 has been per formed. The original nominal thickness for the thickest tank shell plate shall be used for this assessment. No known tank failures due to brittle fracture have occurred at shell metal temperatures of 60 F or above. Similar assurance against brittle fracture can be gained by increasing the metal temperature by heating the tank contents. Industry experience and laboratory tests have shown that a membrane stress in tank shell plates of at least 7 ksi is required to cause failure due to brittle fracture. Tanks constructed from steel listed in Figure 2-1 of API Standard 650 can be used in accordance with their exemption curves, provided that an evaluation for suitability of ser vice per Section 2 of API Standard 653 has been performed. Tanks fabricated from steels of unknown toughness thicker than inch and operating at a shell o metal temperature below 60 F can be used if the tank meets the requirements of Figure 3.8. The origi nal nominal thickness for the thickest tank shell plate shall be used for the assessment. For unheated tanks, the shell metal temperature shall be the design metal temperature as de fined in 2.2.9.3 of API Standard 650. The risk of failure due to brittle fracture is minimal once a tank has demonstrated that it can operate at a specified maximum liquid level at the lowest expected temperature without failing. For the purpose of this assess ment, the lowest expected temperature is defined as the lowest one day mean temperature as shown in Figure 2-2 of API Standard 650 for the continental United States. It is necessary to check tank log recorded and meteorological records to ensure that the tank has operat ed at the specified maximum liquid level when the one-day mean temperature was as low as shown in Figure 2-2 of API Standard 650. An evaluation can be performed to establish a safe operating envelope for a tank based on the past operating history. This evaluation shall be based on the most severe combination of temperature and liquid level experienced by the tank during its life. The evaluation may show that the tank needs to be rerated or operated differently; several options exist: a. Restrict the liquid level, b. c. d. 10. Restrict the minimum metal temperature, Change the service to a stored product with a lower specific gravity, or Combinations of a., b., and c., above.
o
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. 7.
8.
9.
An assessment shall be made to determine if the change in service places the tank at greater risk of failure due to brittle fracture. The service can be considered more severe and creating a greater risk of brittle fracture if the service temperature is reduced (for example, changing from heated oil ser vice to ambient temperature product), or the product is changed to one with a greater specific gravity and thus increasing stresses. A change in service must be evaluated to determine if it increase the risk of failure due to brittle fracture. In the event of a change to a more severe service (such as operating at a lower temperature or handling product at a higher specific gravity) it is necessary to consider the future service conditions in the fitness-for-service assessment.
11.
3-27
Figure 3.8 Exemption Curve for Tanks Constructed from Carbon Steel of Unknown Toughness Thicker Than inch o and Operating at a Shell Metal Temperature Below 60 F
70 Safe for Use 60
Shell metal temperature, F
50 Additional Assessment Required 40 Safe for Use
30
20
10
0 0.0 0.5 0.875 1.0 1.5 2.0
Shell Thickness, in.
Note:
The above exemption curve between 30 F and 60 F is based on Curve A in Figure 3.2. The other parts of the curve were established based on successful operating experience.
3-28
3.10 3.10.1
Example Problems A pressure vessel, 1 inch thick, fabricated from A-285 Grade C in caustic service was originally subject to PWHT at the time of construction. Determine the MDMT. Solution - Based on Curve A in Figure 3.2, an MDMT of 68 (20C) was established for the vessel without any allowance for PWHT. Applying the allowance for PWHT reduces the MDMT by 30F (17C) and established a new MDMT of 38F (3C).
3.10.2
A horizontal drum 1.5 inches (38 mm) thick is fabricated from A-516 Grade 70 steel which was supplied in the normalized condition. There is no toughness data on the steel. Determine the MDMT. Solution - Since A-516 Grade 70 is manufactured to a fine grain practice and was supplied in this case in the normalized condition, Curve D of Figure 3.2 may be used. In this case, the MDMT is -15F (26C).
3.10.3
A reactor vessel fabricated from A-204 Gr B (C- Mo) has the following material properties and dimensions. The reactors were designed to ASME Code Section VIII, Division 1. Develop a table of MDMT as a function of pressure based on Paragraph 3.4.3.1 and the allowances given in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4. Vessel Information Allowable stress Design pressure Inside Diameter Operating pressure Wall Thickness Startup pressure Weld Joint Efficiency Corrosion Allowance MDMT at Design Pressure = = = = = =
=
17,500 psi (121 MPa) 390 psi (26.5 atm) 234 inches (5943.6 mm) 240 psi (1633 atm) 2.72 inches (69 mm) 150 psi (10.2 atm) 1.0
1/ 16 in. (1.6 mm)
= =
110F (43C) (see Curve A of Figure 3.2)
Impact test data is not available.
Solution - The membrane stress for a cylindrical pressure vessel as a function of the pressure is (see Appendix A):
234"0.0625" = 116.97" 2 t c = 2.72"0.0625" = 2.66" Rc = 116.97 S * E * = P + 0.6 = 44.6 P 2.66
3-29
Using this relationship, a table of MDMT can be established as a function of pressure based on Paragraph 3.4.3.1 and the allowances given in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4.
P psi (atm) 390 (26.5) 240 (16.3) 157 (10.7)
S*E* psi (MPa) 17,400 (12) 10,700 ( 74) 7,000 (48)
Ars =
S *E* SE
T F (C) 0 (0) 38 (21) 105 to 260 (58 to 144)
MDMT F (C) 110 (43) 72 (22) 5 to -150F (-15 to -101)
1.00 0.61 0.40
The operating pressures and corresponding values of the MDMT in this table must be compared to the actual sphere operating conditions to confirm that the metal temperature (CET) cannot be below the MDMT at the corresponding operating pressure.
3.10.4
A sphere fabricated from BS 1501 - 213 Grade 32A LT (ASME SA414 Grade G equivalent) has the following material properties and dimensions. Develop a table of MDMT as a function of pressure based on Paragraph 3.4.3.1 and the allowances given in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4. Vessel Information Allowable stress Design pressure Inside Diameter Wall Thickness Weld Joint Efficiency Corrosion Allowance CA MDMT at Design Pressure = = = = = = = 30,500 psi (211 MPa) 250 psig (17 atm) 585.6 inches (14874.2 mm) 1.26 in. (32 mm) 1.0 1/ in. (1.6 mm) 16 75F (24C), (see Curve A of Figure 3.4)
Impact test data is not available.
Solution - The membrane stress for a spherical pressure vessel as a function of pressure as (see Appendix A):
585.6"0.0625" = 292.77" 2 . "0.0625" = 1198 . " t c = 126 Rc = S *E* = P 292.77 + 0.2 = 122 P . 2 1198
3-30
Using this relationship, a table of MDMT can be established as a function of pressure based on Paragraph 3.4.3.1 and the allowances given in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4. Note that in developing this table, temperature reductions for vessels fabricated to Codes other than ASME Section VIII, Division 1 are not permitted for stresses above 17,500 psi.
P psi (atm) 250 (17.0) 143 (9.7) 100 (6.8) 57 (3.9)
S*E* psi (MPa) 30,500 (211) 17,500 (121) 12,200 ( 84) 7,000 ( 48)
Ars =
S *E* SE
T F (C) NA 0 (0) 30 (17) 105 to 225 (58 to 125)
MDMT F (C) 75 (24) 75 (24) 45 ( 7) -30 to -150 (-34 to -101)
NA 1.0 0.7 0.4
3.10.5
A spherical pressure vessel has the following properties and has experienced the following hydrotest conditions. Using Paragraph 3.4.3.2 and Figure 3.5, prepare a table showing the relationship between operating pressure and MDMT. Hydrotest pressure Design pressure Metal temperature during hydrotest = = = 300 psi (20.7 bar) 200 psi (13.8 bar) 60F (16C)
Solution - The maximum measured metal temperature during hydrotest was 50 F. To be conservative, 10F is added to this and the analysis is based on a hydrotest metal temperature of 60F.
Operating Pressure psi (bar) 200 (13.8) 180 (12.4) 150 (10.2) 120 (8.3) 90 (6.2) 75 (5.1)
Operating Pressure/ Hydrotest Pressure 0.67 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.25
Temperature Reduction F (C) 35 (19.4) 43 (24) 55 (31) 70 (39) 90 (50) 105 to 210 (58 to 117)
MDMT
F (C) 25 (-4) 18 (-8) 5 (-15) -10 (-23) -30 (-34) -45 to -150 (-43 to -101)
3-31
3.10.6
A demethanizer tower in the cold end of ethylene plants typically operate colder in the top portion and warmer at the bottom which is kept warm with a stream circulated through a reboiler. As a result, the top portion of the tower is normally constructed from a 3% Ni steel toughness tested down to approximately -101C (-150F), while the lower portion of the tower is normally constructed from a fully killed fine grained and normalized carbon steel which is toughness tested down to approximately -46C (-50F). The potential for brittle fracture exists because if the reboiler does not operate, cold liquid will flow down the tower into the carbon steel section, causing it to operate significantly lower than -46C (50F), the temperature at which the steel was toughness tested. Perform a brittle fracture assessment of ethylene plant demethanizer tower considering all aspects of operation. Solution - A brittle fracture assessment consistent with Paragraph 3.4.4 (Level 3 assessment) can be performed on the demethanizer tower. The approach is illustrated with reference to a typical older vintage demethanizer tower as illustrated in Figure 3.1E.
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Figure 3.1E Schematic Of Demethanizer
Temperature (oC) -100 -50

Feed 1
Tray 62
Feed 2
Normal Operation
3-1/2 % Ni
Potential Excursion
Tray 33
Potential Violation
Feed 3
Tray 32
29 mm Tray 24
Original MDMT (based on Impact Tests)
Tray 1
Position
2300 mm
Detail B Temperature Profile Along The Length Of The Tower Detail A Typical Design Material: ASTM A516 Grade 70 (KCS) Minimum Recorded Yield Strength at Room Temperature: 45 M/mm2 Pressure: 37.2 Bar-g Toughness: 34/32J @ -46 oF PWHT: Yes Weld Joint Efficiency: 1.0
However the principles should be equally applicable to a wide range of process equipment. Two notable exceptions are fixed tubesheet exchangers and piping, since the highest applied stresses in this equipment may be caused by thermal loadings, not internal pressure. The basis is to use established fracture mechanics principles as outlined in Section 9, to estimate the limiting flaw size in a vessel, and to review how this changes as the temperature in the vessel drops during an excursion. The resulting graph of limiting flaw size versus temperature is referred to as a Fracture Tolerance Signature (FTS). The FTS provides an overview of the "safety factor" in terms of limiting flaw size,
3-33
both against a datum such as a new vessel meeting all code rules, or other similar pieces of equipment which have demonstrated satisfactory performance. In addition, it is possible to select a lower excursion limit by establishing a flaw size which can be detected with sufficient confidence using practical non-destructive examination (NDE) techniques. The FTS can then be used to develop a modified MDMT diagram, onto which the excursion limits can be superimposed. It is an assumption in the development of the methodology that for this particular Level 3 assessment, the equipment has been fabricated to code standards at the time of construction, as well as being impact tested and subject to full radiography. It is also a requirement that the vessel material specifications are known, and documented, as is the inspection history. This is essential to enable reasonable assumptions to be made about basic toughness properties, stress levels, and likelihood of fabrication or service induced flaws. It is specifically not intended to apply this methodology to process equipment of unknown quality or uncertain history. Assessment Approach Since the approach is to calculate a limiting flaw size, it is clear that applied stress and material toughness must be known. The fracture assessment process used is a Level 3 Fracture Assessment as outlined in Section 9, and assessment is limited to the lower carbon steel section of the tower, since this is the only section to experience an MDMT violation (see Figure 3.1E). Flaw Since no specific flaw is being considered, a reasonably conservative yet representative hypothetical surface breaking crack, with an aspect ratio (2c:a) of 6:1, is assumed to lie on the inside surface of the vessel, within and parallel to a longitudinal weld seam. Potential flaw could be assumed elsewhere in the vessel and, if necessary, can be considered by adjusting the applied stresses, or the stress intensity solution. However, as will be seen latter, the relative nature of the results as expressed by the FTS are not significantly affected by such variations, though the minimum excursion temperature will be. Stress Four load sources typically describe the relevant stress applied to the vessel. These are hoop stress from internal pressure, residual stress in welds, local stress effects from nozzles and attachments, and thermal transient stresses during the upset. In addition, consideration must be given to occasional loads such as wind, or deadloads from weight on a horizontal drum. The latter are ignored in this example. For optimum use of a Level 3 Assessment from Section 9, stresses are classified into primary and secondary, as well as membrane and bending. The pressure stress is evaluated using the code formulae as a primary membrane stress (see Appendix A). The residual stress can be estimated based on whether post weld heat treatment (PWHT) has been performed. For the PWHT condition, the residual stress used in our assessment equals either 15% or 30% of the weld metal room temperature yield strength. Since low temperature vessels are generally subject to PWHT, the residual stress in this example is taken as 15% Sy and is classified as a secondary bending stress. It is not practical in a global assessment to adequately evaluate the effect of local stresses at nozzles and attachments. This can be partly achieved by the application of a stress multiplier. However, depending on the multiplier selected an on the estimated magnitude of these local stresses, supplementary detailed analyses at these local areas may be required. However, alternatives can be considered such as intense NDE at all local stress concentrations. In addition, it is not a forgone conclusion that these areas are any more vulnerable to fracture than the shell, considering proper reinforcement, the random orientation and positioning of flaws relative to maximum stress, and the beneficial effects of shakedown or warm prestressing during hydrostatic test. In this study, a nominal stress multiplier has been applied to all primary stresses. Thermal transient stresses are of particular interest since their magnitude and effect are not obvious. This is particularly important since one of the fundamental objections to grandfathering is the cyclic aspect of the excursion. These may be evaluated by a variety of closed form solutions or finite element
3-34
studies. In this example an excursion model consisting of a piston of cold liquid at constant temperature defined by the specific contingency, is assumed to move down the tower, cooling the vessel from its pre-excursion steady state temperature to the cold liquid temperature. Heat transfer starts instantly and is made via a film coefficient. No heat flows from the atmosphere. Finite element studies provide a description of the stress versus time history in Figure 3.2E, and confirm that the maximum transient stress can be readily evaluated from the equation also shown in Figure 3.2E.
Figure 3.2E Evaluation Of Transient Thermal Stress

Transient Thermal Stress - -35 oC to -100 oC with h=1135 W/m 2-oC
45
40
35
Stress (N/mm2)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0
20
40
60
80
100 120 140 160 180 200
Time (seconds)
Notes: 1. The equation for the transient thermal stress is:
E T 16 3.25 15 . + 0.5 exp (1 )
where,
E T
= =
Modulus of Elasticity, N/mm Temperature difference; the difference between the steady state wall temperature before the excursion and the temperature of the fluid causing o the excursion, C, o Thermal expansion coefficient, 1/ C, Biot Modulus (see Note 2), Poisons ratio, Thermal stress N/mm .
2
= = = =
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2.
The Biot Modulus is given by the following equation:
=
where,
hL k
h k L
= = =
ILOP FRHIILFLHQW :PR& thermal conductivity of the shell material, :PR& shell wall thickness, m.
The finite element study defines the controlling stress as a through thickness bending stress with tension on the inside surface. The resultant stress is considered to be a primary stress and for further conservatism in this example, it is broken down into equal membrane and bending components. The transient thermal stress has a relatively small magnitude. -100C (-148F) liquid flowing over a -35C (31F) shell gives rise to a maximum stress of 41 N/mm 2 (6 Ksi), which, if treated as a cyclic stress, is negligible with respect to fatigue crack growth. The final treatment of stresses involves the addition of a "safety factor" in the form of a stress multiplier to all primary components. In this example a factor of 1.3 has been used. This provides allowance for potential variations in thickness and minor structural discontinuities, such as tray support rings. The basis of 1.3 lies in the assumption that the effect of a local stress concentration factor (e.g. at a weld toe) will rapidly decrease from a high value at the surface to a much lower value at a crack tip which is located below the surface. Therefore, the influence of a surface residual stress on a crack tip of reasonable depth will be greatly diminished. This principle is generally supported by the treatment of cracks at the toe of fillet welds in a Level 3 Assessment in Section 9. Applied stresses are summarized in Table 3-6.1E. Table 3.1E Inspection Summary Required For The Assessment Of Local Metal Loss Source Of Stress Pressure Stress = 153 M/mm
2
Stress Classification
20 Pm = 153 + (13 . ) = 211 N / mm2 2 20 Pb = (13 . ) = 13 N / mm2 2
Residual Stress = 67 M/mm
Transient Stress = 153 M/mm
Qm = 67 N / mm2
Notes: 1. A stress concentration factor of 1.3 is used in the analysis. o o 2. The thermal transient is based on 72 C liquid on a 35 C shell. Toughness Since definitive toughness data on process equipment is normally only available in the form of Charpy energy at one temperature, it is necessary to adopt a lower bound approach to describe the variation of toughness with temperature. The most widely used data is the KIR curve from Figure F.3 in Appendix F, shown in Figure 3.3E. To use this curve it is necessary to estimate the Nil Ductility Temperature (NDT) in order to position the temperature axis on an absolute scale. For this assessment we selected 40 Joules (30 Ft-lbs.) as the NDT. Charpy V energy is obtained from a longitudinal specimen. This has been adopted as the basis in this example. It should be noted that Appendix F recommends the less
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conservative value of 20 J (15 Ft-lbs). Where an impact temperature corresponding to 40 J is not available, actual values are extrapolated to give an effective 40 J test temperature using the relationship 1.5 J/C (0.6 Ft-lbs./F). For this assessment the lowest average Charpy value was used for determining the NDT, as opposed to the lowest minimum. The use of actual values is illustrated in Figure 3.3E. Figure 3.3E Toughness Evaluation Using The KIR Curve
Temperature ( oC)
220
-89
-67
-44
-22
22
44
67
89
111
200
180
Shabbiis (WCAP - 1623) Ripling and Crosley HSST, 5th Annaula Information Meeting, 1971, Paper No. 9 Unpublished Data
KIR (ksi {nches}0.5)
160
140
120
100
MRL Arrest Data 1972 HSST Info MIG
80
60
40
20
-160
-120
-80
-40
40
80
120
160
200
Temperature ( oF)
Notes: o 1. Actual Charpy data: 33/32 Joules at -46 C o o o o 2. Equivalent temperature at 40 Joules from: -46 C + (40 C - 33 C)/1.5 = -41 C; therefore, o NDT (0) in this figure, indexes to -41 C.
Mechanical Properties Actual material properties obtained from equipment records should be used for yield strength and Charpy energy. Other properties are readily available from sources such as ASME Section 2; however, a correction function can be adopted to increase the value of yield strength at low temperature. While this was used in the example its effect is primarily a higher plastic collapse limit, which is not a typical limiting factor for low temperature brittle fracture. Fracture Tolerance Signature (FTS) The stress and toughness parameters described above are solved for a series of temperatures and expressed as a plot of limiting flaw size versus temperature as illustrated in Figure 3.4E. The critical flaw depth is in the through thickness dimension, and is expressed as a percentage of all thickness with a 6:1 aspect ratio maintained. The absolute factor of safety in the critical flaw size is undetermined, but is a function of the assumptions made with respect to lower bound toughness, stress, stress multiplier, and the NDT indexing temperature.
3-37
Figure 3.4E illustrates the influence of the transient operation on the limiting flaw size. Line segment AB represents steady operation, and defines the limiting flaw for gradual cool down to -36C (-33F) where the limiting flaw is 25% of the wall thickness. The exposure to cold liquid at -72C (-100F), begins at B and results in an almost instantaneous drop in limiting flaw size to 21% of the wall thickness at C. This occurs as a result of the applied thermal stress. The initial impact of the thermal transient decreases as the shell cools, decreasing the temperature difference between the shell and the cold liquid. During this period the toughness falls, but the thermal stress reduces, with the net result that the limiting flaw size reduces to 17% of the wall thickness at D. At this point the metal temperature reaches equilibrium with the cold liquid, and over line segment D-E a return to steady state cool down continues. The limiting flaw size is 12% of the wall thickness at E, the minimum temperature reached.
Figure 3.4E Fracture Tolerance Signature
100
90
80
70
Crack Depth Percent For A Design Pressure of 37.2 Bar-g & Temperature Excursion of -36 oC to -72 oC
60
50
40
Crack Depth = 16%
30
20
E
B
D
C
10
0 -140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
20
Temperature (oC)
The shape of the FTS curve in Figure 3.4E follows that of the KIR curve, and is modified only the impact of the transient effect. More or less conservative stress/flaw assumptions will lower or raise the curve vertically, and assuming a lower NDT will move the curve horizontally to the left. For this reason the curve provides useful insight into brittle fracture resistance during an excursion. However, the flatness of the curve makes limiting temperature predictions highly sensitive to the minimum flaw size. This in turn is greatly influenced by type and extent of inspection, and factors such as probability of detection (POD) of flaws. While work still needs to be done to clarify POD issues, application of detailed NDE to a vessel should enable a minimum flaw size to be assumed with sufficient confidence to enable the FTS to be used to specify a minimum excursion temperature. Figure 3.5E suggests a flaw depth of 4.5 mm (0.177 in) should be detectable using a suitable magnetic particle technique (MT), with a confidence level greater than 90%. For the 6:1 aspect ratio assumed in developing the FTS, this implies a crack of length 27 mm (1.063 in).
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Figrue 3.5E Comparison Of Inspection Methods - Probability Of Detection Curves

1
0.8
+ +
+
UT - Nordtest
POD - Probability Of Detection
0.6
+
0.4
+
UT20
Inspection Method
UT - Nordtest
AE + UT
MPI
0.2
0
0 2
4
10
12
14
Defect Size - Crack Depth (mm)
Specific Example Figure 3.6E summarizes the evaluation of a potential thermal excursion for the demethanizer tower illustrated in Figure 3.1E. Table 3-6.1 list the stresses and other factors assumed in conducting the evaluation. An important aspect of the required data is a realistic estimate of the critical exposure temperature (CET). This is the measured metal temperature, or more likely the vessel temperature predicted by process simulation programs during an excursion. The excursion temperature in the example illustrates that an MDMT violation will not occur in the 3.5% Ni section above tray 33. Hence the evaluation need only consider the lower carbon steel section.
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Figure 3.6E Demethanizer MDMT verse Location

20
10
Normal operation
0
-10
+ +
Coldest KCS Temperature = -72 oC Excursion Temperature MDMT Largest Excursion Temperature = -49 oC
-20
-30
Temperature (oC)
-40
-50
-60
-70
+ +
+
-80 oC
Excursion Limit
-66 oC
-80
-90
-100
-101 oC
-110
62
57
52
43
40
33
32
29
28
25
24
18
Tray Numebr
The excursion temperature plotted in Figure 3.6E defines two cases to be considered. 1) The lowest temperature in the carbon steel section is at tray 32 and a pre-excursion temperature of -35C (-33F) and an excursion delta of 37C (67F) to -72C (-100F). 2) The largest delta of 49C (88F) occurs from a steady state temperature of -12C (+10F) at tray 24 to give an excursion temperature of -61C (-78F). To illustrate the influence of inspection on the results, it is assumed that the tower has been 100% visually inspected internally. In addition, it is assumed that all internal weld seams are inspected by wet fluorescent magnetic particle methods, and angle probe ultrasonics, from the bitmetallic weld to a circumferential weld between trays 24 and 25. It is assumed that nay flaw indications would be removed by light grinding. As part of such an assessment it would also be reasonable to conduct a hydrostatic test at 150% of design pressure. These assumptions allow the carbon steel section to be evaluated by two approaches. 1) The visually inspected region can be assessed using basic MDMT principles in accordance with the "code compliant approach." 2) The MT/UT inspected region can be assessed using the more sophisticated FTS approach. Figure 3.7E illustrated the MDMT approach for two constant flaw sizes. One is 6.2 mm deep, (22% of the wall thickness), and was selected to pass through original design conditions. For clarity, the effect of the transient stress is ignored in Figure 3.7E. The 22% curve illustrates that the excursion temperature at tray 24 of -61C (-78F) is within the acceptable MDMT zone and, provided that additional transient stresses can be accommodated within the excursion margin, the MDMT can be set at -66C (-87F) based on operating rather than design pressure. This check is made by evaluating the critical flaw size during the excursion, using an FTS for tray 24, and ensuring it is always above 22%. The check is made using tray 24 temperature and excursion conditions, with operating pressure applied rather than design. The check confirms that in this case -66C (-87F) is an acceptable excursion limit below tray 24.
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Figure 3.7E Pressure Temperature Relationship for Contsant Defect Size - Killed Carbon Steel Section
45
40
Potential Margin For Region Inspected By MT Required Excursion Limit - Tray 32 = -72 oC
MDMT as Defined by the Impact Test Temperature
35
32
Pressure (bar-g)
30
16% Defect (4.5mm)
Normal Operation Required Excursion Limit - Tray 24 = -61 oC
25
22% Defect (6.2mm)

20
Excursion Margin Tray 5 & Below = 5 oC
15 -140
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-36
-20
Temperature
(oC)
The second feature apparent from the 22% curve is that a violation still exists at tray 32. Tray 32 is however, located in the section of the tower that was subject to MT/UT inspection. Thus it can be assessed on the basis of a smaller flaw size. The 4.5 mm (16% of the wall thickness) curve in Figure 3.7E represents this criterion as proposed earlier. It is clear that the -72C (-168F) excursion is accommodated, even at design pressure. The FTS curve, (Figure 3.4E), suggests that a 4.5 mm limiting flaw is critical below -80C (-112F) when analyzed at full design pressure. In practice the contingency is unlikely to violate design conditions, hence there is an in-built conservatism over the more realistic operating case. An FTS for the operating case results in -111C (-168F) as the limiting temperature. To be of value to operating personnel, and to compare it with the excursion temperature, it is useful to express the result in the form of an excursion limit for the tower, as shown in Figure 3.6E. This allows a direct comparison of normal operation, excursion temperature, MDMT and excursion limits. This distinction between the MDMT and the excursion limits is to differentiate between the "code compliant" and non code compliant aspects of the assessment. The purpose of the analysis is to establish reasonable excursion limits and to quantify the risk associated with excursions below the MDMT. It is not meant to encourage normal operation at temperatures lower than the MDMT, as might be implied by redefining the MDMT to below code compliant limits. In practice, alarms and operating procedures would be put in place to minimize the likelihood of reaching the excursion limits, and process modification such as moving cold feeds higher up the tower could be considered. However alarms and procedures themselves have a probability of failing. Recommendations and Conclusions For this particular type of Level 3 assessment only, equipment to be evaluated should meet the following criteria: 1. 2. Meets the design and fabrication requirements of a recognized code of construction. Demonstrates, by measured values, minimum toughness of weld, HAZ and plate materials.
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3.
Was inspected 100% radiographic standards or volumetric equivalent.
Where a Level 3 assessment is made, its acceptability should be subjected to suitable criteria such as the following: 1. Where no additional detailed inspection for surface breaking flaw is performed by an appropriate NDE technique, the excursion limits should be no lower than the MDMT as developed by a "code compliant" approach. Where MT or equivalent is carried out around nozzles and attachments, the MDMT may be based on a 25% or 6 mm (0.25 in) deep flaw, whichever is the lower. Where an appropriate NDE technique is used to preclude the existence of flaws with sufficient confidence, (typically 100% MT), the excursion limit can be based on the FTS using a minimum flaw size of 4.5 mm (0.177 in). The assessment is only valid if the service conditions in the vessel are essentially unchanged or less severe than those experienced in the past. Poor operation in terms of control techniques leading to frequent cycling, should be discouraged by limiting the number of excursions allowed during the life of the vessel. Hydrostatic testing at a temperature sufficiently high to ensure material toughness is above the lower shelf is recommended, preferably in combination with acoustic emission monitoring.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
This is an example of a Level 3 Assessment. It is not intended to be a "prototype" for all Level 3 assessments, since there are many different approaches which can be used successfully at this level.
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DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - API Recommended Practice For Fitness-For-Service

SECTION 3 - Assessment Of Existing Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

3.4 3.4.1 3.4.1.1

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Welding Guidelines - the following are recommended for repairs:

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

PWHT is required based on the vessel service.

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

_____ Storage Tank

_____ Piping Component

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Table 3.2 Assignment of Materials to Curves in Figure 3.2

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Table 3.3 Impact Test Exemption Temperature for Bolting Materials

Grade B5 B7 B7M B16 B L7, L7A, L7M, L43 1, 2 BC BD --B23/24

Bolting materials are exempt from assessment due to loading conditions.

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Table 3.4 Procedure for Determining MDMT

Determine the ratio

S *E* (General notes 3,6 and 10) SE

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Figure 3.1 Overall Brittle Assessment Procedure for Pressure Vessels

Obtain Equipment Data.

Determine the CET.

MDMT <= CET?

Operation within the MDMT Envelope?

Operation within the MDMT Envelope?

Operation within the MDMT Envelope?

Operation within the MDMT Envelope?

Vessel Is Suitable For Service.

Vessel Is Not Suitable For Operation!

Maintain Inspection Per API 510.

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

140 120 Minimum Design Metal Temperature, F 100 80 60 C 40 20 0 -20 -40

Nominal Thickness, inches

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

tg1=ta tg2=ta (seamless) or t b (welded) (A) Butt Welded Components

tg1=min (ta, tb)

tg2=min (tb, tc)

tg3=min (ta, tb)

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

(D) Integral Flat Head or Tubesheet Groove

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

A Pressure Part tg1=min(ta, tb)

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Ratio: trE*/(tn-FCA) or Ars

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

DRAFT - Section 3: Assessment Of Equipment For Brittle Fracture

Figure 3.6 Level 2 Brittle Fracture Assessment of Carbon Steel Piping

Piping Does Not Meet the Level 1 Assessment Criteria.

Obtain Information For A Level 2 Assessment.

Is Metal CET <= -150 F (1)?

S E (General notes 3,6 and 10) SE

SE psi (MPa) 17,400 (12) 10,700 ( 74) 7,000 (48)