Fall

12

The Korean Provisional Government: the war against Japan

Soo K. Chae

G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y , G O V T 4 5 1 , P r o f e s s o r K a r b e r .

Chae 2

Table of Contents
Introduction I. The Shanghai Period: 1919~1932 Weakness I: Geographic Location Weakness II: Political Disputes, Left vs. Right The Decline of the Korean Provisional Government Military Accomplishments during Shanghai Period II. The Moving Period: 1932~1940 Sino-Japanese Tensions: The Manchuria Incident Seizing the Opportunity: The Korean Independence Party Hongkou Park Incident Chinese Response: Sino-Korean Alliance Rises Rising Korean Movement III. The Chongqing Period: 1940~1945 Government in the Making Declaration of War against Japan The Pacific War: The Imphal Front The Eagle Project Conclusion Bibliography pg. 3 pg. 4

pg. 10

pg. 21

pg. 31 pg. 33

Chae 3

Introduction
Modern form of Korean patriotism was prompted by Japans annexation of Korea in 1910, and formally declared itself as a movement in March 1st, 1919. In this day, known in history as the March First Movement, 33 representatives formally declared Koreas Declaration of Independence from Japanese imperialism, marking the dawn of a long and enduring fight for national independence for the Korean people. After 1910, overt nationalist movements became nearly impossible within Korean territory because of severe Japanese oppression. Korean nationalists, both left and right, fled outside of Korean borders, particularly Manchuria and Russian Maritime Territory, to carry on their fight for independence1. In April of 1919, the Korean Provisional Government was established in Shanghai with a grand purpose of engineering Korean movement for independence. Although whether the Provisional Government fulfilled its aspirations remains debated even in South Korea, there is no doubt that this temporary government was central to Korean resistance and the formation of modern South Korea in several ways. Most importantly, the government was not a re-institution of old Chosun monarchyinstead, it resembled, though not perfectly, a republic that is the earliest appearance of democratic principles in Korean history. This foundation of modern republic in Korea reflected the power that Korean people had manifested in the March First Movement.2 Korean historians divide the timeline of Korean Provisional Government into three segments based on its geographic locations: the Shanghai period, roughly from 1919 to 1932, the moving period, from 1932 to 1940, and the Chongqing period, from 1940 to 19453. This paper will examine each period, however with a strong focus on the last of the three, the Chongqing period, and investigate its successes and failures leading up to liberation of the Korean peninsula.
Ki-Baik Lee, A New History of Korea, (Cambridge, MA: Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute by Harvard UP, 1984), p. 338 2 Ibid., p. 344-345 3 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), Research on the Korean Independence Movement (Hanguk Dokripundongsa Yeongu), vol. 33, (2009): p. 62
1

Chae 4

I. The Shanghai Period: 1919~1932

The establishment of a provisional government in Shanghai was Koreas first adoption of democratic principles. The structure of governance was far from perfectit only consisted of a deliberative and an administrative organbut it was hopeful in its start. Despite being a temporary government in exile, and thus lacking direct contact with its population and main land, the Korean Provisional Government began by regrouping independent resistance forces that were fighting from Manchuria and Russia Maritime Territory. Contact with the Korean people was maintained through liaisons that were assigned to every province, county and town in the peninsula. This mechanism allowed for the government to accumulate financial donations and garner participation from anyone in any part of Korea, at least until Japanese supervision pivoted4. However, the Korean Provisional Government during Shanghai period was full of uncertainties. From simple questions like liaison assignments and fundraising to more fundamental issues, notably who and which ideological faction should lead the government and what the grand strategy of the Korean movement should be, much was left unanswered. Hence, the Korean Provisional Government during Shanghai period, despite its calling itself a government, was far from one; in fact, it was just another resistance organization at best. This section of the paper will analyze several setbacks that the temporary government encountered, and examine the Korean independence movement as a military mission during this period.

Weakness I: Geographic Location

As an esteemed international city, Shanghai provided many geographic advantages; it facilitated transportation of resources and gathering of information, and the French concession allowed political freedom that was rarely found

4 Lee, A New History of Korea, p. 345

Chae 5 elsewhere5. However, it also Shanghai as a strategic location had little to no other advantagesit was not a region heavily populated by Koreans, as had been the case for Manchuria and Russia Maritime Territory6. Table 1.
Region Southeastern Manchuria Maritime Province of Siberia (Russia Maritime Territory) United States and Hawaii Shanghai # Of Koreans in the area 600,000 200,000 6,000 400~700

Source: Lee, Chong-Sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1963), p. 129-130 Created by Soo K. Chae

As evident from the table above, Manchuria and Russia Maritime Territory were locations that were most heavily populated by Koreans at the time, and thus were locations that maintained the closest historical and geographical ties to the Korean peninsula. Naturally, organized resistance movements had been forming in these regions long before the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. Hence, despite its reputation as an international city, Shanghai was not the best location for a government, the focal point of Korean nationalism, to be based on, most importantly due to its geographic distance from major Korean revolutionaries7. What made matters worse was Chinas state of insecurity at the time. Social movements, historically referred to as the May Fourth Movement, were spreading throughout the nation, and Shanghai was no exception. Moreover, in addition to its internal troubles, China was also under severe threat of Japanese expansionism. Political and military insecurity within China significantly limited the scope of the 5 Hee-Kwon Kim, The Korean Provisional Government I: The Shanghai Period
( I: ), The History of Korean Independence Movement ( ), vol. 23, (2008): p. 303 6 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), (South Korea: The Independence Hall of Korea, 1989), p. 6 7 Ibid.

Chae 6 young government8. Hence, geographic weakness of Shanghai resulted in prolonged uncertainty with regards to the path of the Korean Provisional Government.

Weakness II: Political Disputes, Left vs. Right

In addition to its geographic fragility, the government failed to mitigate ideological differences among major leaders of the independence movement. Political dissensions were created by conflicting ideologies within the government, and thus generated irresolvable confusion as to how the movement should proceed. There were three major factions. First was the pro-American group, led by President Lee Seung-Man, which advocated diplomatic solutions and believed that eventually, the United States would assist Korea as an ally. This group prevailed during the 1920s, but was challenged by a significant leftist faction. Its argument was fundamentally incompatible with that of the Siberia-Manchuria group, most notably Li Tong-Hui and Park Yong-Man, which challenged the formers reliance on the United States. This leftist group consisted of hawkish fighters who had been battling guerrilla warfare for years, and called for militarized operations against Japan, including those as ambitious as sending troops to drive Japanese forces out of the Korean peninsula. At this point, the Shanghai government had roughly 6,000 troops in the Korean Independence Army, albeit not yet a national army. While this leftist faction had little faith in potential aid from the United States or the United Nations, it aligned with the Soviet Union9. Third was a minor nationalist group led by Ahn Chang-Ho, a renowned figure in Korean history. Ahn supported fortification of national power through patriotic self-awareness. Ahn claimed that the independence movement should aim for a long-term achievement, which he defined as Koreas national empowerment through means including self-education and awareness10. Hence, despite that leaders of the independence movement assembled in Shanghai, a truly united nationalist front was far into the future. 8 Ibid., p. 17
9 10

Nym Wales, Rebel Korea, Pacific Affairs, vol. 15, No. 1, (1942): p. 36 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 28

Chae 7

The Decline of the Korean Provisional Government

The conflicting ideological strands weakened the authority and cohesion of the Korean Provisional Government to the extent of near anarchy. What made it most obvious were continuous resignations of key figures. In early 1920s, leftist Park Yong-Man refused to take a seat in the government when he saw that the pro- American group prevailedhe proceeded to create his own, anti-Provisional Government sector11. More resignations ensued, including leftist Yi Tong-Hui, nationalist Ahn Chang-Ho and Kim Kyu-Sik. These major leaders denounced the Korean Provisional Government as incompetent and damagedtheir resignation statements read, correcting the confused state of the government would only cause a greater struggle.12 In other words, the Korean Provisional Government lacked the authoritative influence that any government would be entitled to. Revolutionaries could not only leave the government, but also could create an anti-governmental institution, whenever they felt dissatisfied with its direction. Those that remained in the Shanghai government, such as President Lee Seung-Man, made several attempts to resolve its internal breakings, but did so with no fruitful results. In 1924, Korean Peoples Delegates Congress assembled in Shanghai in an effort to reach an agreement about the governments future. In an event attended by approximately 6,000 delegates fighting in Manchuria, Russia, Korea and the United States, two antagonistic strands were at odds with no room for cooperationone side argued that the existing Shanghai government should be reorganized in order to strengthen its lead in the independence movement, while the other advocated a foundation of a single, revolutionary party modeled after that of Sun Yat-Sen of China13. While President Lee Seung-Man is often blamed for his lack of leadership and breaking of the government, it is difficult to imagine that Shanghai Period would have evolved differently, had there been another leadership in place. Factionalism
Ibid. Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, (Berkley, CA: University of California, 1963), p. 150 13 Wales, Rebel Korea, p. 36-37
12 11

Chae 8 and ideological clashes were inevitable, as Korean nationalists were exposed to diverse ideologies, across the United States, China and Russia, none of which were in pre-colonial Korea, since their exile from Korea in 1910 These internal conflicts were aggravated due to the fact that the Korean Provisional Government was in exile, far from its own land, and thus was consistently subject to financial difficulties14. Uncertainty about the governments identity and chronic shortage of resources dominated during the Shanghai Period, gradually implicating the decline of the once ambitious, Korean Provisional Government.

Military Accomplishments during Shanghai Period

Figure A. Independent military campaigns during the Shanghai Period

*Yellow: Region heavily populated by Koreans *Purple: Location of major guerrilla units
Source: "Military Independence Army, Resistance Battles." Map. Lee Kyung Chan's Korean History Class. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://leekcp.new21.org/>.

14 Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 153-154.

Chae 9

Regardless of disappointing records of the young government, many Korean nationalists were continuing their pursuit of national independence. Due to the fact that the government was too exhausted from political disruptions and that it was without a national army, most military operations during this period were pursued by independent guerrilla units until 1931. Many nationalists carried out military campaigns, especially in Manchuria and Siberia, and several of the major battles were successful15. Map of the above displays the major battles that were executed during this period. It is noteworthy that independent guerrilla units engineered these battles with no significant assistance from the government or any foreign powers. The slight differences in names of the units are because these units, while fighting for the same cause, were independent of one another. Anti-Japanese militarism was quite active even in the absence of governmental leadership; the Greater Korean Independence Army, the largest unit then, consisted about 3,500 men across three battalions. Despite being chronically relocated from Manchuria, to Chientao area, to Siberia, these guerrilla units were continuously at war16. Most notable of the victories is the Battle of Qingshanli in 1920, when a Korean military unit led by Kim Cha-Jin conducted a surprise attack on Japanese forces from three directions in a narrow valley, resulting in thousands of Japanese casualties at the cost of only several hundred Korean lives. Therefore, failure of the Korean Provisional Government should not imply that the Korean independence movement at large was in decline. While segregated and lacking a grand strategy, many militarist leaders chased their dream of national independence.

15 Ibid., p. 158 16 Ibid., p. 159

Chae 10

II. The Moving Period: 1932~1940

The second of the three segments in the history of the Korean Provisional

Government is called the Moving Period. It is a period that succeeded the uncertainties and failures of the Shanghai period; despite its grand ambitions, the Korean Provisional Government could accomplish little with its premature form of republican governance and ongoing internal dissents. Lacking the crucial skeleton of what comprises an effective government, the Korea Provisional Government in the 1920s merely resembled just another resistance organization at best. The Moving Period was a period that breathed life into a declining government and a broken movement. It was not only the most turbulent period for the Korean independence movement, but also a period of growththere were many factors that contributed to the astonishing expansion of Korean resistance during this period, but this paper will argue that what summarily identified such development was the unraveling Sino-Japanese relationship, and consequent formation of Sino-Korean alliance against Japanese expansionism.

Sino-Japanese Tensions: The Manchuria Incident

Figure B. The extent of Japanese expansion

Source: Peck, Ira, and Steven Deyle. "Japanese Expansion." Map. South China Morning Post. N.p., 19 Sept. 2012. Web. <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1040212/mukden-incident-saw- japanese-military-invent-excuse-invasion>.

Chae 11 Two major events characterized mounting Sino-Japanese tensions in the beginning of 1930s. First was the invasion of Manchuria by the Imperial Japanese Army in September of 1931, historically known as the Manchuria Incident, and second was the Shanghai Incident in January of 193217. The eruption of the Manchuria Incident, a series of battles between China and Japan and Japanese occupation of Manchuria as a result, had both positive and negative effects on the Korean Provisional Government. It was damaging because Manchuria historically had two grave advantages: first, it was a strategic base for Korean operations across Siberia, Manchuria and China; second, it had been a sanctuary for Korean exiles and military organizations who fled away from Japanese oppression, ever since Japans annexation of Korea in 191018. Establishment of a Japanese puppet regime in 1932 in the area therefore was a serious blow to the Korean movement at largeall military operations based on Manchuria and significant number of Korean patriots were subject to Japanese assaults. This was further distressing because Koreans had already lost Siberia to Bolshevik power by this point, and there werent as much militarist activities in Mainland China19. However, Japanese occupation of Manchuria had an interesting side effect. Expansion of Japanese power created an unusual ally in Northeast AsiaAs Manchuria fell under Japanese control, Japanese expansionism was established as the foremost enemy to the Chinese people20. In other words, the prospect of Sino- Korean alliance gained mobility as the pre-existing antagonism towards Japan, established during World War I, dispersed among Chinese nationalists21. Shanghai Incident in January 28, 1932, further cultivated Chinese antagonism towards Japan. Shanghai Incident was a military clash between China and Japan, sparked by Japanese Marines attack of the Nineteenth Route Army located in Shanghai. Though Japan won a victory, it bled to earn it, as normal Chinese citizens,
Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 41 18 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 181 19 Ibid., p. 182 20 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 41 21 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 182
17

Chae 12 among which were students and workers, fought alongside the nations military22. Previously, China had restrained form expressing direct hostility against Japan due to high level of economic interdependence between the two nations; however, several outbreaks of hostile warfare led to reeling Sino-Japanese relations in the 1930s; this generated hope, especially among Korean nationalists, of a potentially powerful alliance that could alter the dynamics of Northeast Asia23.

Seizing the Opportunity: the Korean Independence Party

As a shrimp caught in the middle of two whales, Koreans struggled to secure its place as the conflict between two great Asian powers deepened. It was recognized that its foremost task was to overcome the shadows of the Shanghai Periodtensions between political parties of conflicting ideologies inflamed to the point of near anarchy in Shanghaifollowing the impeachment of President Lee Seung-Man, another nationalist leader, Kim Ku, the Police Minister to the Provisional Government, rose to prominence. Kim was a right-wing nationalist leader who had deep faith in the success of the Provisional Government24in order to grasp the developments brought by Kims leadership in the 1930s, it is important to understand two major institutions that significantly transformed the fate of the Provisional Government: The Korean Independence Party (KIP) and the Korean Patriotic Legion. Founded by Kim Ku and other right-wing nationalists, the Korean Independence Party was initially a secret institution. It didnt officially declare its establishment until February of 1930however, efforts to create a nationalist party, without significant rightist or leftist identities, had been going on for several years

Ibid. Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), (Seoul, South Korea: Hyean, 2001), p. 530 24 James Hoare and Susan Pares, Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABCCLIO, 1999), p. 80
23 22

Chae 13 at the least. The Korean Independence Party later became the foundation of the Korean Provisional Government25. What distinguished the KIP from other factional parties was that it was created by a group of nationalists, albeit with a slight rightist touch, to mitigate the differences between the left and the right26. However, more importantly, what made it remarkable was its alignment to terrorist tactics. Kim Ku, one of the founders of the KIP, had concluded that diplomatic focus of the Shanghai Period achieved little to none, and began seeking military operations that would attract the worlds attention and hopefully, support27. However, his party lacked military capabilities of its own, and the government was without a national armyhence, Kim resorted to terrorist activities28. Consequently, Kim covertly engineered the creation of the Korean Patriotic Legion in 1931. The Korean Patriotic Legion was a secret institution comprised of young patriots who were specially trained for terrorist activities against Japan, including destruction of public sites of importance and executions of critical Japanese figures29. In regards to the objective of this secretive institution, Kim Ku recorded: Hanyin Ae Guk Dan (Korean Patriotic Legion) is an organization created by me [Kim Ku] and other Korean patriotic independence comrades in order to save our nation through military effortsWe have trained [individuals] them to endure hostile treatments from enemies through courage and skills.30

25 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p.

39 Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government (Thesis. Wesleyan University, 2009), (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 2009), p. 48 27 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 531 28 James Hoare and Susan Pares, Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia, p. 90 29 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 49 30 Ibid., p. 51
26 Ji-Eun

Chae 14 Though not an official military, missions sought by the Korean Patriotic Legion were as ambitious as full-scale warfare. On January 8, 1932, a Korean patriot named Lee Bong-Chang threw a hand grenade during a state procession in Tokyo, with the intention of murdering the Japanese Emperor Hirohito. Lees mission failed, leading to his arrest and death sentence. However, this incident reflected both the fact that missions aimed by the Korean Patriotic Legion were far from trivial, and the extent of Chinese antagonism towards Japan. Following the incident, Chinas newspaper called Minkuo Jihpao under Guomindang reported, A Korean, Yi Pong- Chang, sniped at the Japanese emperor, but unfortunately missed31.

Hungkou Park Incident

Despite Lees failed mission, the Korean Patriotic Legion continued to pursue

ambitious terrorist attacksits greatest success was the Hongkou Park Incident. On April 29, the day in celebration of the Japanese emperors birthday, Yoon Bong- Gil, a 22 year old Korean patriot, threw a bomb that successfully exploded in the middle of a military parade in Hungkou Park, Shanghaithis incident injured many Japanese officials, among which were Shigemitsu, Japanese minister plenipotentiary to China, Major General Ueda, commander of the Ninth Division, and Admiral Nomura, commander of the Third Fleet, and killed General Shirakawa, the commander of Japanese forces in Shanghai32. Soon, Kim Ku, the leader of the KIP, announced that the incident was carried out by his ordersYoon Bong-Gil, who was arrested at the spot and executed at age 22, was an ardent member of the Korean Patriotic Legion. Yoon had made the following oath to the Korean Provisional Government: I make this oath as a member of the Korean Patriotic Legion to kill the military leaders of the enemy who are invading China in order to

31 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 184 32 Ibid., p. 185

Chae 15 redeem the independence and freedom of our country.33 This incident was among many other assassinations the Korean leadership pursued throughout China and Taiwan. The series of terrorist activities formulated an active movement to demolish major factors of Japanese imperialism. Hence, lacking the great military power that would have been necessary to challenge Japanese expansionism, Koreans sought covert campaigns against the top of Japans power ladder34. Figure C. The picture of Yoons arrest, Hungkou Park Incident

Source: Patriot Yun Bong-Gil. N.d. Photograph. Yun Bong-Gil.or.kr, n.p

Chinese Response: Sino-Korean Alliance Rises

Terrorist activities sought by the Korean Provisional Government had

serious ramifications. The government had to take flight from city to city in order to escape Japanese forcesthe years of fleeing began shortly after Hungkou Park Incident in Shanghai, and continued for approximately eight years, through out eight cities: 33 "Patriot Yun Bong-Gil." Yun Bong-Gil.or.kr. Web.
<http://yunbonggil.or.kr/language/english.html>. 34 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 530

Chae 16 Figure C: The Travel Route of the Provisional Government Shanghai (1919~1932) Hang Zhou (1932) Jia Xing (1935) Zhuan Jiang (1937) Chang Sha (1937) Guang Zhou (1938) Liu Zhou (1938) Che Jiang (1939) Chongqing (1940)35

Source: "Travel Route of the Korean Provisional Government." Map. History Course. Arim.pe.kr, Web.

However, armament of the Korean Provisional Government succeeded in grasping the attention of Chinese nationalists. Following the success in Hungkou Park, both leftist and rightist strands of the Korean movement began to build Sino- Korean alliance that would last until national independence of Korea. Although Chiang Kai-Shek was initially reluctant to provoke Japan, it soon became apparent that Sino-Japanese relationship had reached a dead endconsequently, Chiang Kai- Shek simultaneously supported Koreas right and left36. Chiang Kai-Shek and Koreas Right 35 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 52 36 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan
Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 536

Chae 17 Yoons success and the Korean Patriotic Legions bold missions enraged Japan, but cultivated precisely what Kim Ku had targetedit attracted Chiang Kai- Shek of Guomindang. Kim Kus commitment to terrorist activities did have direct effects on their own, but from the beginning Kim had a greater purpose of proving to Chinese nationalists his resolution to fight Japan, thereby elevating Sino-Korean ties in their common fight against Japanese expansionism37. Not only did Kim Ku escape Japanese oppression with the help of Chinese nationalists, he sat in a meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek between 1932 and 1933 hence, an unusual alliance between China and the Korean right had begun to take shape38. Uncomfortable relations of the past were resolved, and China appraised that a few Koreans achieved what a million Chinese could not39. Meeting between Kim and Chiang Kai-Shek was productiveKim confirmed financial assistance of 2,500 yuan a month, and also garnered military backings. Acknowledging that assassinating important figures could only be effective to a certain point, Chiang Kai-Shek suggested that Koreans soldiers be trained for bigger military operations. Consequently, Chiang launched a special training faction in Loyang branch for Korean men at the Chinese Military Academy in 1933; these men were to be located in Chinese Army and Air Force for safety reasons40. Chiang Kai-Shek and Koreas Left As Kim Ku and his rightist forces rose to prominence, a new figure, Kim Won Bong, elevated from the left to lead the Korean resistance movement. Kim had been leading the Righteous Patriotic Corps, a militarized activist organization that operated in and out of Korea. Although it previously disengaged itself form the Provisional Government in the 1920s, Kim Won Bong later joined the Provisional Government, having realized that segregated acts of violence without political 37 James Hoare and Susan Pares, Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia, p. 80 38 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 186 39 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p 531 40 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 186

Chae 18 foundation and structure would never be enough to liberate Korea41. By 1935, Kim Won Bong established the Korean National Revolutionary Party with apparent commitment to communism, as opposition to the Korean Independence Party42. Sino-Korean alliance was also a critical part of Kim Won Bongs vision of Korean independence movement. In his competition to prevail over rightist Kim Ku in the Provisional Government, Kim Won Bong also sought assistance from Chiang Kai-Shek. Perhaps inevitably due to ideological alignments, Kim Won Bong also received significant aid from Guomindang and Chinese nationalists. Kim Won Bongs relationship with Chiang Kai-Shek and Guomindang was tighter than that of Kim Ku and his rightist faction. In 1932, Kim Won Bong succeeded in formally establishing Sino-Korean alliance with Guomindang, even receiving Chiang To, a significant Chinese official, to direct his strategies. Furthermore, Chiang granted economic assistance reaching 3,000 yuan a month for resistance activities, in addition to permission to utilize Chinese training facilities in Chinese Military Commission to train his leftist military forces; for safety purposes, Chiang provided military training and education of Chinese doctrines in the Sixth Branch Unit to Kim and his men43.

Rising Korean Movement

What further empowered the Sino-Korean alliance, and thus the Korean Provisional Government, was the eruption of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Having concluded that Koreas determination for national independence was a crucial factor to their military strategy against Japan, Guomindang increased its support for the Provisional Government44. The Korean rightists and the leftists saw this as a tremendous opportunity to solidify Sino-Korean alliance, which they also

41 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, (Folkstone, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005), p. 70 42 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 194 43 Ibid., p. 190 44 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 537

Chae 19 considered to be vital to the Korean independence movement, and began to mitigateor at least, put behindtheir ideological differences. From this point, where Sino-Japanese antagonism pivoted to the point of full- scale warfare, the Korean Provisional Government began to flourishthe political conflicts that marred its ambitions in Shanghai appeared to fade, at least temporarily. By August of 1937, Kim Ku led the Korean Restoration Movement, creating a rightist coalition. On the opposite side, Kim Won Bong and his Korean National Revolutionary Party were collaborating with other leftist factions45. Hence, with Kim Won Bong uniting the left and Kim Ku the right, independent factions that had failed to come together gradually formed meaningful coalitions. However, efforts for a united Korean front broke from the left, as Kim Won Bong collided with Communist Choi Chang-Ik. While Kim Won Bong dreamt a republic, built in collaboration with the right, as Koreas ultimate future, Choi envisioned a Communist Korea46. As unification of Korean forces was challenged, Chiang Kai-Shek came to its aidin meetings with Kim Ku and Kim Won Bong held in 1939, Chiang advocated that two ideologically conflicting factions unite for a greater cause47. The outcome was a joint statement, the Open Letter to Comrades and Compatriots, that read the following: Feeling pain over the mistakes that have been made frequently in the past, these two persons promise to cooperate with one mind in order to accomplish the great task of the sacred liberation of the Korean nation48. At the end of the day, complete unification of left and right was not achieveddespite that the two leaders displayed willingness to abide by Chiang 45 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, p. 73 46 Hee-Gon Kim, Research on the Provisional Government of Korea (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), (Seoul, South Korea: Jishik Sanupsa, 2004), p. 241 47 Ibid., p. 242 48 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, p. 73

Chae 20 Kai-Sheks proposal, their followers did not. According to Japanese records at the time, the two factions functioned separately regardless of the declaration: The two groups are still working separately. Kim Won-bong is relying on the Korean Volunteer Corps. In order to counter this, Kim Ku organized the Revoluationary Front Combat Area Maneuvering Unit in Liuchou, Kwangsi Province, in early February, 1939.49 However, what characterized the Moving Period and made it successful was

the deepening involvement of Chiang Kai-Shek and Chinese nationalists in the Korean independence movement. Particularly following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Koreans were considered to be essential to Chinas war against Japan. With regards to Chinas military strategy, specially trained Koreans in Japan could be used to engineer covert military operations, to gather information, or to execute special assassinations and confusion tactics50. Well aware of this fact, the Korean Provisional Government officially declared its commitment to war against Japan alongside China. For example, in 1939, Korean young men in Shanghai and other parts of China established the Korean Youths Battlefield Mission Corps and fought alongside Chinese guerrilla units with the purpose of successfully pioneering militarized independence movement51.

49 Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, p. 211 50 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 538 51 Ibid., p. 539

Chae 21

III. Chongqing Period: 1940~1945

After eight years of fighting on the move, the Korean Provisional Government

finally settled in Chongqing in 1940. The previous section analyzed how the Korean government developed from just another resistance institution to men with guns. Chongqing Period, while it lasted only for five years, which is the shortest of the three period divisions, was a period of rewardsin other words, the Korean Provisional Government finally established itself as what could truly be called a government. It re-organized its executive leadership, resolved structural defects of political parties, and most importantly, finally established a national military. Hence, the government could finally function as the centerpiece to the Korean independence movement. This section of the paper will analyze the structural developments of the Korean Provisional Government in the 1940s, examine how the world order during this period affected the fate of the government, and finally, discuss the role and successes of the government leading up to the liberation of the Korean peninsula.

Government in the making

Well aware of the benefits it could gain from struggling great powers, the leadership of the Provisional Government perceived a need to respond to turbulent world affairs and began to prepare for war itself. Preparing for war, in this case, meant rearranging the structure at large and instituting a government that would actually be capable of waging a war. This process had three big steps. First was fundamentalsolidification of executive leadership. A consensus was reached that the Korean Provisional Government needed a stronger, more centralized leadership, if it should prepare its people for war. In October of 1940, the government executed major constitutional reform, which altered its governance from collective leadership to one-man leadership. Under the previous collective leadership system, the elected president was at best regarded as a host for Cabinet meetings, and thus could not engineer with presidential leadership. Constitutional reform of 1940 altered this so that the elected president would symbolize the

Chae 22 Provisional Government, just like any president of a state would, and enabled him to hold powerful executive leadership over the Cabinet, as well as operate as the Commander-in-Chief of the national army52. Second was the unification of left and right. In addition to centralization of government leadership, the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing achieved what it couldnt for the previous two decades; it absorbed the Korean lefts to the government. Most notably, the Confederation of Chosun National Liberation formally joined the Provisional Government in December 1st, 1941this organization was a communist organization with a history of withdrawing from the Provisional Government during the Conference of Seven Organization for Unification of the Korean Revolutionary Movement53. Finally, after two decades of contentions, the left addressed its commitment to unifying the nation by committing to focusing all anti-Japanese capabilities to the Provisional Government.54 Third was the military. Kim Ku, the President of the Korean Provisional Government, realized the dire need for a national army. President Kim submitted a proposal to create the Korean Restoration Army in March of 1940by April, Kim not only received permission to establish the Korean Restoration Army, which would be the national army of the Korean Provisional Government, but also confirmed significant aid from Guomindang55, however under the condition that it would abide by the Nine-Clause Fixed Rules of Conduct.56 By September of 1940, the Provisional Government celebrated the inauguration of the official headquarters of the Korean Restoration Army57. Its inauguration declaration read: 52 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing
Period ( ), Research on the Korean Independence Movement (Hanguk Dokripundongsa Yeongu), vol. 33, (2009): p. 7 53 Ibid., p. 10 54 Ibid., p. 9 55 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 59 56 Man-Gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, p. 75 57 Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), p. 60

Chae 23 The Restoration Army of Korea shall continue its war of resistance in cooperation with the people of the Republic of China as part of the Allied Forces in order to defeat the Japanese imperialist, the common enemy, for the purpose of restoring the independence of our two nations.58 The establishment of the national army was further strengthened as President Kim pioneered military unification of left and right. The left, including Kim Won Bongs Korean Volunteer Corps, exceeded the right in its military capabilities, and President Kim saw it was imperative that the Korean military capabilities, historically segregated, merge together. Hence, in May of 1942, Kim Won Bongs Korean Volunteer Corps was absorbed into the Korean Restoration Army59, with Kim Won Bong, the communist-oriented man, as the Minister of Military Affairs to the Provisional Government60. However, the Korean national army was comprised of less than 1,000 men, who had been trained in Chinese military training centers, and was highly dependent on financial assistance form China61. Hence, the Korean Provisional Government finally instituted what any functioning government should be entitled toexecutive power, secure Cabinet and political parties, and a national military. Korean nationalists, finally, achieved a government. Whats remarkable is that China continued to play a significant role during the processas requested by President Kim Ku, Guomindang continued to provide economic assistance, ranging from a few hundreds to several thousand yuans a month62. However, it is noteworthy that Chiang Kai-Shek never formally recognized the Provisional Government, despite his years of commitment to providing economic and military assistance, perhaps because of his reluctance to 58 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 68 59 Ibid., p. 10 60 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 70 61 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), p. 26 62 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan
Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 542

Chae 24 further provoke Japan. In other words, Sino-Korean alliance was a diplomatic choice based on each states needs to collaborate against a common enemy63. Figure D. Photograph: Inaugural ceremony of the Korean Restoration Army, 1940.

Source: Headquarters of the Korean Restoration Army ( ). 1940. Photograph. Korea815, <korea815.org>

Declaration of War against Japan

The Chongqing Period was an era of global turmoil. While Peoples Republic of China continued its battle against Japan, World War II erupted in Europe in 1939. For the Provisional Government, global state of war was considered to be a grand opportunity to strengthen its movement, as was true for the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937. This was perhaps because of the realization that Korean power alone would not be enough to defeat the great Japanese empire. What the Korean leadership both wanted and predicted was an eruption of a great war in the Pacific theatreand this projection proved to be right on target. Japanese imperialism was continuing to expand with no apparent limitsince its annexation of Korea in 1910, it occupied Manchuria in 1931, and embarked on a 63 Ibid., p. 543

Chae 25 full-scale war against China in 1937. It wasnt long before Japanese expansionism reached Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, and proceeded to stretch out to India and Burma, with the goal of assembling with Germany in the Middle East64. The map below displays Japanese-occupied regions in East Asia by year 1942. Figure E. The Japanese Empire, 1942

Source: US Army, "The Japanese Empire 1942." Map. Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. Time Money and Blood, n.d. Web. <http://www.timemoneyandblood.com/HTML/PearlHarbor/coprosperity.html>.

Considering Japans unstoppable drives for conquest and escalating national power, the Korean leadership had forecasted an international war involving China, Japan and the United States. Hence, the United States entering into the Second World War and thus leading the pacific theatre to burst into flames, as provoked by Japans attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, was the final opportunity for national 64 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), p. 21

Chae 26 independence for the Korean Provisional Government. The grand strategy of the government had been for the Korean forces to fight against Japan alongside Chinese and American powers65. This strategy worked well, as proven by Chiang Kai-Sheks acknowledgement of the Korean Provisional Government as the sole recipient of Chinese aid in the Pacific War66. Consequently, approximately two days after Pearl Harbor, as soon as a war erupted between the United States and Japan, the Provisional Government officially declared war against Japan. The declaration of war read67: 1941. 12. 9: Declaration of War against Japan In the name of thirty million Koreans and their government, we sincerely endorse the declaration of war on Japan by China, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia, and other nations, because it is the most effective means of defeating Japan and recognizing East Asia. We hereby declare as follow68: The people of Korea, having already joined the anti-imperialist front, and as a formal battle unit, declare war on the Axis Powers. 1910 treaty of annexation and all other unequal treaties are not effective. Also, we declare that lawful privileges earned by non-aggression powers in Korea will be honored. We will fight until Japanese forces are relinquished completely from Korea, China and the Pacific. We will not recognize Chang-chun and Nanking regimes created under Japanese forces We uphold that the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration must be implemented in bringing forth national independence of Korea, and celebrate in advance the victory of the democratic front.69 * 65 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), p. 81 66 Hyon-Hui Lee, Research on the History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Insijungbusa Yeongu), p. 541 67 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), p. 81 68 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 69 69 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing
Period ( ), p. 82 * Translated from Korean to English by Soo K. Chae

1. 2.

3. 4. 5.

Chae 27 This declaration reiterated that Korea was also an active participant of anti- imperialist front, implicating a demand that Korea be deemed as legitimate as other allied states, including China, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Austria. Moreover, the Korean Provisional Government declared that war on Japan would continue until Japanese forces are completely expelled from the Pacific, while admitting privileges earned by non-aggression states within Korea during period of Japanese colonization. Furthermore, the Provisional Government declared war on Germany in order to gain a seat in the San Francisco Conference, which was to be held in 1945. This conference was only admitted for states that had declared war on Germany prior to March 1st, 194570. The Korean Provisional Government expressed to Washington its aforementioned desire to participate in the Pacific War through Chinese diplomatic channels. T. V. Soong, the Chinese foreign minister to the United States, and President Roosevelt had many discussions to resolve the Korean dilemma; despite that the effect of the Korean military itself was minimal, the two acknowledged that the Korean militarys uniqueness could be utilized in secret operations across Korea, China and Japan. Consequently, Secretary of State Sumner Welles confirmed that the allied powers would assist Korean military with its organization, military equipment and strategies to operate from Chinese bases. However, neither of the great powers formally recognized the legitimacy of the Korean Provisional Government. Hence, while deeming the Korean military as useful, the Korean Provisional Government was not considered as equal71.

The Pacific War: The Imphal Front

As the Korean Restoration Army entered the Pacific War, Japanese forces were successfully expanding into Southeast Asia. Taking Malaysia and Singapore in the spring of 1942, Japan proceeded to reach Burma with the hope of assembling 70 Ibid., p. 83 71 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953, p. 27

Chae 28 with German forces in the Middle East. This inevitably resulted in hostilities between British and Japanese forces located in Burma. With the request of the British military, the Korean Restoration Army was dispatched to the British military in 194372. Despite its lacking military capabilities, Korean Restoration Army proved its worth through means other than direct battles. The British army needed agents speaking fluent Japanese to gain information or interrogate its captives; this was especially true in this particular front, because information was especially useful in guerrilla wars. In 1944, soldiers of the Korean Restoration Army fought alongside British forces in the Imphal front, a region heavily attacked by Japanese forces, and contributed to British victory. The Korean Restoration Army fought with British military until July of 1945, when Japanese forces were completely expelled from Burma73.

The Eagle Project

During the last months of the Pacific War, the Korean Restoration Army collaborated with the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to launch a forcible entry operation into Korea. Despite that the United States was reluctant to formally recognize the Korean Provisional Government, it allowed the OSS to train soldiers of the Korean army with the purpose of dispatching them into Korea and relinquishing Japanese forces74. The Korean peninsula was geographically crucial region for the U.S., as it was a bridging region between China and Japan, and served many strategic opportunities like penetrating into Japanese bases. As a result, the United States OSS had been training soldiers of the Korean Restoration Army since the spring of 1943 with the goal of executing joint operations with the allied forces75. 72 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing
Period ( ), p. 84 73 Ibid., p. 85 74 Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006), p. 19 75 Jongsuk Chay, Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953, p. 27

Chae 29 Figure F. Activities of the Korean Restoration Army This map summarizes military operations sought by the Korean Restoration Army. 1941: Declaration of War against Japan and Germany

Chongqing, Headquarters of the KRA

The Eagle Project: The Korean Restoration Armys plan to penetrate into Korea

Korean Restoratio n Army dispatched to India, Myanmar front, 1943

Source: "Activities of the Korean Restoration Army ( )." Map. History Course. Arim.pe.kr, Web.

The Eagle Project, designed by the OSS, consisted of three stages. First was for the Korean Restoration Army to penetrate into Seoul through U.S. submarines; second, for them to construct a strategic base within Korea and generate public sentiment for an uprising; third, to contact the OSS, acquire military weapons through U.S. military aircrafts, and initiate strikes against Japanese forces76. One hundred Korean soldiers were trained under the commander of the Eagle Project, 76 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), p. 88

Chae 30 Captain Clyde B. Sargent, in Tuchao77. President Kim Ku approved this plan in April 3rd, 194578. Unfortunately, however, the Eagle Project was never actually carried out. Before the mission could take place, Japan declared its surrender through the Potsdam Declaration. President Kim Ku was nonetheless willing to proceed with the Eagle Project, and made concessions with OSS to dispatch Korean Advance Corps into Korean peninsula in August 16, 1945. After two failed attempts, the Korean Advance Corps was forced by Japanese military to return to Chongqing, not having executed their planned operations.79 Had the war lasted a little big longer, and had the Eagle Project been performed, it is possible that the history of modern Korea would have unraveled quite differently.

77 Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 226 78 Si-Jun Han, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), p. 87 79 Ibid., p. 90

Chae 31

Conclusion
Surprisingly, leadership of the Korean Provisional Government did not welcome Japans surrender in the Pacific War. The Eagle Project, which it considered to be the final chance for Korean independence, was shattered as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 resulted in an abrupt end of the Second World War. With Japans complete surrender in August 15, the hope of national independence was also surrendered. Kim Ku, the President of the Korean Provisional Government, recorded in his biography: I have received news that the Japanese surrendered. The news is by no means a good one. I feel like our last hope is gone. All preparations that we put in so much effort for many years have become obsolete. Our well-trained soldiers who were supposed to be provided with secret weapons, and be sent to Korea in American marine ships so that they can attack major Japanese military headquartersnow all the fights have ended. - Kim Ku, Baekbumilji80 Throughout its journey, the Korean Provisional Government was largely dependent on its alliance with China and the United States. It was evident from the beginning that Korean power alone would not suffice to bring forth national independence against the Great Japanese Empire. However, even after gaining what he so long fought for, President Kim perhaps predicted the era of turmoil that would consume the Korean peninsula once again. The Korean Provisional Government, even at the dawn of national independence, failed to resolve two major predicaments that would later lead the peninsula to another great war. It failed to mitigate the ideological differences that dominated the independence movement; while the left and the right collaborated temporarily under the name of nationalism, they were bound to clash to an even 80 Ji-Eun Park, In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government, p. 74

Chae 32 greater extent when that nationalist sentiment faded and the common enemy, Japan, was expelled. Furthermore, the Korean Provisional Government was still under severe foreign influence, albeit not in an imperialist sense. Throughout the movement, and especially since the Moving Period, the government depended on Chiang Kai-Sheks military and economic assistance; with the eruption of the Pacific War, it relied on the United States. It was perhaps inevitable that even when the Korean peninsula was finally liberated, the stakeholders of the Korean movement would clash for their own interests. The dream of national independence sought by the Korean Provisional Government was a difficult one. Throughout three major periods, the Shanghai Period, the Moving Period, and the Chongqing Period, the Korean Provisional Government gradually developed from a fragmented independence group, to men with guns, to, finally, a government. Though in a largely simplified form, this paper analyzed the evolution of the Korean Provisional Government and the independence movement it pursued. To conclude, this paper will close with lasting questions. What if the Pacific War lasted several days longer and the Eagle Project was carried out successfully? What if the government had found more effective means of resolving the ideological differences between the communist-oriented left and the democratic right, like any mature government would have done? What if the Korean Provisional Government didnt rely so much on China and the United States? And finally, did the Korean Provisional Government succeed? These questions have been heavily debated in Korean history, and many experts remain skeptical about the successes of the Korean Provisional Government. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that this first form of republican governance in Korean history significantly altered the fate of the Korean peninsula.

Chae 33

Bibliography
Chay, Jongsuk. Unequal Partners in Peace and War: The Republic of Korea and the United States, 1948-1953. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Print.

Cho, Soon Sung. Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950; an Evaluation of American Responsibility. Berkeley: University of California, 1967. Print. Chu Hon-Su, History of the Korean Provisional Government (Daehanminguk Imsijungbusa), (South Korea: The Independence Hall of Korea, 1989), Dudden, Alexis. Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i, 2005. Print. Han, Si-Jun, The Status and Role of the Korean Provisional Government during the Chongqing Period ( ), Research on the Korean Independence Movement (Hanguk Dokripundongsa Yeongu), vol. 33, (2009) Han, Sng-ju. The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Berkeley: University of California, 1974. Print. Hoare, James, and Susan Pares. Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1999. Print. Kang, Man-gil. A History of Contemporary Korea. Folkstone, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2005. Print. Kim, Hee-Kwon, The Korean Provisional Government I: The Shanghai Period ( I: ), The History of Korean Independence Movement ( ), vol. 23, (2008): Lee, Chae-Jin. A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006. Print. Lee, Chong-Sik. The Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1963. Print. Lee, Hyun-Hee, Taehan Min'guk Imsi Chngbusa Yn'gu. Sul: Hyean, 2001. Print. Lee, Ki-bak. A New History of Korea. Cambridge, MA: Published for the Harvard- Yenching Institute by Harvard UP, 1984. Print.

Chae 34 Millett, Allan R. The War for Korea: 1945-1950 : A House Burning. Lawrence, Kan.: Univ. of Kansas, 2005. Print. Park, Ji Eun. In Search for Democracy: The Korean Provisional Government. Thesis. Wesleyan University, 2009. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, 2009. Print. "Patriot Yun Bong-Gil." Yun Bong-Gil.or.kr. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://yunbonggil.or.kr/language/english.html>. Yu, Maochun. OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War. New Haven: Yale UP, 1996. Print.