Soliven vs.

Makasiar 167 SCRA 393 Per Curiam Facts: Petitioners in this case were charged for libel. President Corazon Aquino filed a complaint-affidavit charging the petitioners for libel. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. Petitioner Beltran alleged that there was a violation of his constitutional right upon the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him without the personal determination by the judge of probable cause. He also contends that to allow this libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect of press freedom. The petitioner also contends that the president could not file the complaint affidavit herself because this would defeat her immunity from suit. This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them? 2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without determining probable clause? 3. Whether or not the President may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit? 4. Whether or not the charge of libel against the petitioners curtailed the freedom of the press? Held: There was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents. The petitions were dismissed by the court. November 14, 1988

Ratio:
1.

The alleged denial of due process of law was negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed" which waived his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

2.

In interpreting Article III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, the court held that what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. There is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Therefore, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. The court finds no basis to rule on the chilling effect on press freedom at this stage.

3.

4.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Justice Gutierrez, Jr. With regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later. A prosecution for libel should not be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be highly injurious. There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public issues when uttered or written by a media personality. In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied.