Geometry, Time and Force in the Diagrams of Descartes, Galileo, Torricelli and Newton Author(s): Emily R.

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Geometry, Time and Force in the Diagrams of Descartes, Galileo, Torricelli and Newton Emily R. Grosholz PennsylvaniaState University Mathematicsplays a centralrole in the description,explanationand manipulationof naturalphenomena.To what extent, and how and why mathematicsapplies to natureis a problem that has long occupied philosophers.Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Mach and Poincar6,to mention some of the most distinguishednames, offer global solutions to this problem that are based on deep-lying metaphysicalassumptions.In this essay, I would like to suggest an alternativeapproach,which is piecemeal ratherthan global, and historical before it is metaphysical. I want to propose, first, thatthe question of applied mathematicsbe recast as a question about how mathematicsand physics, a physics "always already"mathematized,are partiallyunified at various points in history,in such a way that they can sharecertain items, problems and methods while nonetheless remainingquite distinct. And, second, I suggest that these unificationsmay be quite heterogeneousand variableover time. If we consider Archimedes' combinationof geometry and statics, the Bernoulli's development of the theory of differentialequationsin the service of mechanics, and the twentiethcentury marriageof logic and computertechnology in all theirrich historicaldetail, we may decide that the factors thatdistinguish them are philosophically more interestingthan those they have in common. In short,perhapsphilosophersought to reason upwardsfrom case studies of the multifariousways in which mathematicaland physical domains can be joined, before they attemptto make global pronouncementsaboutthat union. The presentessay is one such case study.Its focus is the projectof a geometricalphysics presentedin Descartes'Principlesof Philosophy,and which also apparently dependson his is thatDescartes'conceptionof the "orderof reasons"both orgaGeometry.My argument nizes and impoverisheshis mathematicsand his physics, and moreoverinterfereswith his own intentionto unify them in a novel and more thoroughgoing way. Then I will show how his contemporaries Galileo andTorricelliprofitfrom possibilitiesthatDescartes' strongly reductionistmethodologyhas excluded,and so manageto achieve a deeperunificationof mathematicsand physics, specifically with respectto the parameters of time and force. In a famous passage in the Principles of Philosophy, PartII, section 11, Descartes announces a kind of identity between the object of geometrical study, space, and the object of physics, res extensa, matter.He writes: "If we concentrateon the idea which we have of some body, for example a stone, andremove from that idea everythingwhich we

PSA 1988, Volume 2, pp. 237-248 Copyright? 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

238 know is not essential to the natureof body; we shall easily understand that the same extension which constitutesthe natureof body also constitutesthe natureof space, and that these two things differ only in the way thatthe natureof genus or species differs from thatof the individual."(Miller and Miller 1983/4, p. 34). A physical object is thus Euclidean space. precisely and merely an instantiationof a region of three-dimensional And he reiteratesthis identificationof the subjectmatterof physics and that of geometry quite strongly in the last section of PartII of the Principles: "ForI openly acknowledge that I know of no kind of materialsubstanceother thanthat which can be divided, shaped, and moved in every possible way, and which Geometerscall quantityand take as the (Miller and Miller 1983/4,p. 77). object of theirdemonstrations." Behind this conflation of physical with mathematicalobjects lies Descartes' desire to intentionaland psychological qualities and explapurify physics of the anthropomorphic, nations of late Renaissancescience, of the iron filings which long for the loadstone and the planets which keep turningthemselves to avoid a sunburnon one side. And therein lies the origin of the austereand noble projectof modernscience, to know natureapart from the accidents of humanperceptionand perhapseven our conceptualcategories, to know naturewithout projectinga humanface on it. Matter,accordingto Descartes, has no attributesbesides the quantifiableones that stem from its extendedness.The essence of matteris thereforealso mathematical; matterhas an inherentstructurearticulableas Euclidean geometry.And since Descartes' great mathematicalwork, the Geometry,is designed to reformulateand rationalizeEuclideangeometry,his projectof mathematizing naturewould seem here to find its appropriate grounding. Philosophical historiansof the seventeenthcenturyhowever have not failed to notice thatDescartes' successes in mathematizingphysics are few and far between: he enunciates a theoremin optics, a characterization of inertialmotion and somethinglike a conservationof momentumprinciplefor impact.The rest of his physics, expounded at length in the Principles, the Worldand the Treatiseof Man (for Descartes, biology was a partof physics), is surprisinglyqualitativeand inexact;it advances by loose analogy and a quite imaginative arrayof "mechanisms". I would like to explain this puzzling incongruityat the heartof Descartes' projectas a consequence of the way his method leads him to organizegeometry and physics, for his stronglyreductionistand thereforehomogenizingway of arranginga subjectmatter impedes the developmentof his mathematicsand generatessevere conceptualproblems for his physics. And since it also leads him to conflate the domains of geometry and physics, it ultimatelytends to block their unification. Descartes holds thata subjectmattercan and should be organizedaccordingto "the orderof reasons,"as a linearprogressionfrom simples to complexes, such that each item in the chain is known without the aid of succeeding items and all items are known solely on the basis of those thatprecede them. Thus a subjectmatterbegins with items that are known in themselves, and becomes a progressionof successively more complex entities that are simples in some kind of association.The simples for Cartesiangeometry,as he announceson the first pages of the Geometry,are rectilinearline segments, and their form of association is proportions(Smith and Latham1954, pp. 2-5). The complexes are then problems (like the trisectionof the angle, or the instances of Pappus' problemdiscussed below) and higher algebraiccurves (like the conic sections, and some cubics), which Descartes ranges into hierarchiesin Books II and III of the Geometry. Descartes' choice of startingpoints, straightline segments which alone can standas terms in relationsof proportionality, helps to streamlineand reorganizegeometry.The closed algebraof line lengths thatopens the Geometryallows him to use algebrain the solution of geometricalproblems,and to define the multiplicationof line segments for any numberof factors, where classical Greek mathematicslimited the numberof factors

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to three. Thus, to choose the example centralto the Geometry,he is able to solve in a more general way thanpossible theretoforea locus problemfrom the canon of classical antiquitycalled "Pappus'problem". Nonetheless, Descartes' choice of such "simple"and homogeneous startingpoints also excludes certainother items from serving as terms in his proportions:areas and volumes (which the Greeks used in theirproportions),and curves and infinitesimals (which contemporarymathematicianswere using in theirproportions).Areas and volumes, aside from a fleeting mention in one paragraph which is left undeveloped,are never treatedin the Geometry,nor are infinitesimals. Curves are in one sense the subjectmatterof Book II of the Geometry,but Descartes' treatmentof them keeps sliding over to the problems, nexuses of straightline segments, in which they figure merely as constructingcurves. As is well known, Descartes banishes transcendental curves from geometry,but it is equally true that the tendency of his reductivemethod to pull the complexes back to the simples, in this case, the investigationof curves back to nexuses of straightline segments, severely restrictshis investigationof higher algebraiccurves. Nor does Descartes see in a clearly focussed way the power of his own innovationin the Geometry,which allows the investigationof curves as algebraic-geometrical-numerical hybrids, a multivalence that is the key to theirinvestigationand theiremployment in physics in the latterhalf of the seventeenthcentury.Descartes' intuitionismmakes him of algebra,and his insistence on the homogeneity of his subdistrustthe formal apparatus ject matterleads him to conflate numbersand line segments, ratherthan presentingthem as two distinct domains linked by a sharedstructure,thatis, the algebraof line lengths given at the beginning of Book I. For Descartes, curves are primarilyconstructingcurves, to be used to constructpoints in the solution of problems, and hence he never recognizes theirrich multivalence and variety. The mathematicsof Descartes' Geometry,prunedand homogenized as it is by the demandsof method, is then curiously inapt for the representations requiredby contemporaryphysics. I can best illustratemy argumentthus far by comparinghis treatmentof Pappus' problem with Galileo's analysis of free fall in the TwoNew Sciences. Pappus' problemis really a (countablyinfinite) set of problems,each of which asks for the determinationof a locus whose points satisfy one of the following conditions illustratedby the following diagram:Let the di denote the length of the line segment from point P to Li which makes an angle of (i with Li. Choose ot/3 to be a given ratio and a to be a given line segment (Bos 1981). (Diagram 1)

Diagram1

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The problemis to find the pointsP which satisfy the following conditions.If an even number(2n) of lines Li are given in position,the ratioof the productof the first n of the di to the productof the remainingn di shouldbe equal to the given ratioo/[P,where a and P are arbitrary line segments.If an odd number(2n - 1) of lines Li are given in position,the ratioof the productof the first n of the di to the productof the remaining(n-1) di times a shouldbe equal to the given ratio at/p. (The case of threelines is an exception, since it arises when two lines coincide in the four line problem.)Therearein fact points which satisfy each such condition,andthey will form a locus on the plane. Since the Greeksinterpreted the productsof two and threelines respectivelyas areasand volumes, Pappus,reportingon the workof Apollonius,hesitatedto generalizebeyondthe case of six fixed lines. In the middle of Book I, Descartesdescribeshis attackon the problemand then proudly announces,"I believe thatI have in this way completelyaccomplishedwhatPappustells us the ancientssoughtto do," (Smithand Latham1954, pp. 26-7) as if he had solved the problem in a thoroughgoing way for any numberof lines. While it is truethathis combination of algebraic-arithmetical and geometricalresultsproducesan important advancein the solution of the problem,his treatment of the problemin the Geometryis hardlycomplete,for he adds only one new locus, the solutionto a five-line versionof the problem,to those already to four-lineversionsof it. known, thatis, the conic sections, which correspond Descartes'explanation of how he proposesto solve this problemoccursat the end of Book I, accompanied by a diagramof its fourline version(SmithandLatham1954, pp. 2635). (Diagram2) He chooses y equalto BC (whichis dl) andx equalto AB, and shows how all the otherdi can be expressedlinearlyin x andy. Then the proportions definingthe conditions for the cases of 2n and (2n - 1) lines given abovecan be rewritten as equationsin x and y. For 2n lines, the equationwill be of degreeat most n; for (2n-1) lines, it will be of degree at most n, but the highestpowerof x will be at most (n-1). (For2n and (2n-1) parallellines, wherey is the sole variableinvolved, the resultis an equationin y of degreeat most n.)

T sr E /A ,R " B \

D /---

'-

------------

2 Diagram

The point-wise constructionof the locus is then undertaken as follows. One chooses a value for y and plugs it into the equation,thus producingan equationin one unknown,x. For the case of 2n lines, the equationis of degree at most n and for (2n-1) lines, it is of degree at most (n-1). The roots of this equationcan then be constructedby means of intersectingcurves which must be decided upon. This procedure,infinitely iterated,gen-

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erates the curve point by point (Bos 1981). Thus it seems thatPappus' problemhas been reduced to the geometricalconstructionof roots of equationsin one unknown:the constructionof line segments on the basis of rationalrelationsamong other line segments. The combinationof algebraand geometryis worthyof note. By rewritingthe conditions of the problemas an equation,Descartes has convertedit from a proportionality involving lines, areasor volumes as terms (as it was in the classical formulation)to an equationaboutline segments. It has become an algebraicproblemto which techniquesfor simplifying and solving equationscan be applied.Yet it has not ceased to be a geometric problemas well, thoughthe algebraicconversionhas alteredthe geometry.The diagramis still centrallypresent,thoughit only involves rectilinearline segments;no areasor volumes intervenehere or as the focus of auxiliaryconstructions.The auxiliaryconstructions will be instead the constructionof each x for a given y, using certainchosen constructing curves as well as various geometricaltheorems.Because the problemcan be viewed simultaneouslyas algebraicand geometrical,results from both domainscan be broughtto bearupon it, thus organizingand facilitatingits solution.Also, Descartes' abstractstatement of the procedureseems to impose no limits on the numberof lines initially "given in of the Greekformulationentirely. position,"and thus to escape the strictures And yet Descartes' solution to Pappus'problemdoes not result directly in the discovery and investigation of a rich collection of new algebraiccurves. For one thing, the constructionof roots of higher algebraicequations,and thereforepoints on the relevant loci, is not as easy as Descartes' naive faith in the step-wise advance of reason envisages. And secondly, the stronglyreductionistdriftof Cartesianmethod keeps deflecting his interest from curves back to nexuses of line segments. The very first thing that Descartes says about his approachto Pappus' problemmay seem odd if we expect him to be primarily interestedin the loci which the problemgenerates(Smith and Latham1954,pp. 24-5). (I have correctedthe translationof the word "degre".) First, I discovered that if the question be proposedfor only three, four, or five lines, the requiredpoints can be found by elementarygeometry,that is, by the use of the ruler and compasses only, and the applicationof those principles which I have alreadyexplained, except in the case of five parallellines. In this case, and in the cases where there are six, seven, eight, or nine given lines, the requiredpoints can always be found by means of the geometryof solid loci, thatis, by using some one of the three conic sections. Here, again, thereis an exception in the case of nine parallellines. For this and the cases of ten, eleven, twelve, or thirteengiven lines, the requiredpoints may be found by means of a curve of level next higher (degre plus compose) thanthatof the conic sections. Again, the case of thirteen parallellines must be excluded, for which, as well as for the cases of fourteen,fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen lines, a curve of level next higher (degre plus compose) thanthe preceding must be used; and so on indefinitely. For in this passage, he is classifying cases of the problemnot by some featureof the locus generated,but ratherby what kind of curve can be chosen in the point-wise constructionof the locus, that is, in the constructionof the line segment x given the relevant equation in x and y and a definite value for y. He iteratesthis classification of cases at the very end of Book I in more explicitly algebraicterms.Otherwise stated,this classificatory scheme does not pertainto curves (describableby indeterminate equations in two unknowns) but to problems (describableby determinateequationsin one unknown). Curves intervene in this passage only as constructingcurves; each higher level of problem will requirea constructingcurve of higher level (degre plus compose). The diagramjust given contains no hint of the locus, only the nexus of line segments with their specified relations to an arbitrary point C of the locus. The implied auxiliary constructionwould be the determinationof the line segment x (for a given value of y) by

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means of certainconstructingcurves. The official subjectof these diagramsare line segments; constructingcurves also intervene,but we have never been told quidjuris and they are not what the diagramis about.Descartes' commitmentto the methodological presuppositionthat his geometry begins with proportionsamong rectilinearline segments only, structuresand narrowshis whole enterprise. Thus, Descartes' very first announcementconcerningthe Pappiancases is that he has discovered a way to generalize the classification of problems.And he reiteratesthis classification at the end of Book I and indeed on the final page of the Geometry.However, the announcementleaves vague what it means to say thatthe constructingcurves which are requiredfor each successive level of problemsare of "degreplus compose".Thus, Descartes' first way of groupingPappiancases is supplementedby a second, which explicitly classifies loci. But I want to arguethatthe fact that this classification of loci is given second is quite significant.Descartes is not interestedin classifying curves for their own sake; he undertakesthe second classification in orderto clarify the first, and regards the curves primarilyas constructingcurves. Galileo's treatment of free fall in the ThirdDay of his TwoNew Sciences requiresdiain Descartes'Geometry. TheoremI, PropositionI, gramsthatcould have no counterpart states : "Thetime in which any space is traversed by a body startingfromrest and uniformly acceleratedis equalto the time in which thatsame space would be traversed by the same body moving at a uniformspeed whose value is the mean of the highest speed and the speedjust beforeaccelerationbegan."(CrewanddeSalvio 1954, pp. 173-4). (Diagram3) As Koyrepoints out, the genius of this diagramis thatAB represents not the distance traversed(thatrole is played by the separateline CD) but the time elapsed.Galileo has C G A

Diagram 3

wrestedgeometryfrom the geometer'spreoccupation with extension,and put it in the service of the essentiallytemporalprocessesof physics (Koyr61939, pp. 67-73). WhatI want to stressaboutthe diagramis thatit involves areasand a process like integration with

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to AB representvelocities, respectto time; the parallelsof the triangleAEB perpendicular and the areaof the triangleas a whole, takento be a summationof instantaneous velocities, thereforerepresentsdistanceelapsed.In otherwords,in this diagramdistanceis represented in two differentways, as the line segmentCD andas the areaof triangleAEB; because the second representation is a two-dimensional figure,it can exhibit the way thatuniformly of a distance.Moreover,the increasingvelocity and time arerelatedin the determination triangleAEB is a summationof infinitesimalmomenti,andis able to be so in virtueof the painstakingdiscussionof the possibilityof continuouslyand uniformlyacceleratedmotion thatbegins the ThirdDay. Koyre observesthatDescartesthe physicistrejectsGalileo's argumentsaboutthe continuityof motion becauseof his commitmentto instants(Koyre has short-circuited the 1939, pp. 62-3); I want to point out thatDescartesthe mathematician possibility thatdiagramssuch as Galileo's have a place even in geometry. So too with the diagramto TheoremII, Proposition the one just I, which supplements discussed.The theoremstates:"Thespacesdescribedby a body fallingfromrest with unimotionareto each otheras the squaresof the time-intervals formlyaccelerated employedin these distances." Once againtherearetwo componentsto the diagram(Crewand traversing deSalvio 1954, pp. 174-6). (Diagram4) The line HI standsfor the spatialtrajectory of the into a sortof ruler,wherethe intervalsrepresenting distances falling body,butit is articulated traversed of time, HL, LM, MN etc., aremarked off, formingthe duringequalstretches I notes. AB represents time (dividedinto sequenceof odd numbers,1, 3, 5, 7... as Corollary instantaneous velocitiesraiseduponit, equalintervalsAD, DE, EF,etc.) with perpendicular this generatinga seriesof areas.Distancetraversed againhas two distinctrepresentations; time one is geometricandthe othernumerical. The distinctionis as important as the correof mechanicsandmathematics spondencein the investigations leadingfromGalileoto the calculusat the end of the century, in the reasoningthatgave Leibnizhis central particularly insightinto the calculus(Grosholz1982). But Descartes'conflationof numberandgeometry standsin the way of suchthinking.Nowherein the Geometry does Descartesdiscuss how to combinethe combinatorial of numbertheoryandgeometrical results. patterns AH

F_c N A

--

C B
4 Diagram

B
Diagram5

Descartes sketchedout a solution to it (Adamand Tannery1964/74, X: 219f). (Diagram5) Descartes, however, takes the line ADB to represent,not the time elapsed but the distance traversed.Since he considersthe lines parallelto AB as representing velocity, triangle ADE standsfor the "quantity of motion"expendedas the body traversesAD, and the DECB the same as the body traversesDB; since the latteris threetimes the quadrilateral former,he concludes thatthe body moves throughthe second intervalof distance three

lem of free fall. Beeckman proposed a version of it to him, and in his private journal,

As it happens,Descartes in his youth (in 1619 and again in 1629) consideredthe prob-

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times as quickly.The reasoningthus leads him to suppose thatin uniformlyaccelerated motion like free fall the velocity increasesproportionally to the distancetraversed,not to time. This was a common mistakein the late sixteenthand early seventeenthcentury;but Descartes' laterattackon the problemin 1629 and his continuingcriticismsof Galileo show thathe never learnedto see the crucialdifferencebetween takingtime ratherthan space as the important parameter (Koyre 1939, pp. 40-5.) And thoughin these early solutions,the geometricalrepresentation is suggestivelyclose to Galileo's, Descartes'interestin it neverrevives, especially afterwhat Koyre calls the "revolution of 1630"when Descartesdecides thatknowledge shouldbe reconstructed accordingto the "orderof reasons."Up to this point, I have triedto indicatehow Descartes' reconstruction of mathematics foreclosesuponmathematical structures thatmight have been useful to him in the mathematization of physics. Now I wantto arguemore in the vein of Koyre thathis reordering of physics also interferes with thatprojectof mathematization. In the Principles of Philosophy, the startingpoints, the simples, for Cartesianphysics are bits of matterin uniform(unaccelerated) rectilinearmotion. Bits of matterare associated when they sharea common (uniform,rectilinear)motion;Descartes says repeatedly in sections 27 - 32 of PartII thatthe unity of a materialbody is precisely the common to no othermode (Miller and motion, or common rest, of its parts,and can be attributed Miller 1983/4, pp. 52-5). Materialunities are deflected or disruptedwhen they collide with other bits of matter;collision for Descartes is the only kind of physical interaction. The three laws of motion given in PartII (sections 37 - 52) define inertialmotion, which inheres in and signals the unity of materialbits, and mathematizeimpact as seven rules, in each of which particlesof various sizes and speeds collide along straightlines (Miller and Miller 1983/4, pp. 59-69). The consequentchanges of speed are instantaneous,and conserve the total "momentum," the productof "bulk"and speed, of the system. Finally, since Descartes identifies space and matter,he denies the void; so the jostling of bits of matterpacked togetheras a plenum createsvortices, matterflowing in circuits, which then serve as a furtherlevel of associatedcomplexes. This version of physics affordedthe first systematiccompetitortheoryfor outmoded Aristotelianismin the seventeenthcentury;Descartes'Principles stood as the primary it. Descartes' physics textbookuntil Newton's deliberatelynamedPrincipia supplanted articulation of inertialmotion andof a conservationlaw for impactare scientific developments of the highest order.But his physics is also an impoverishment, primarilybecause it leaves out of accountprocesses which are temporalanddynamical.Moreover,Descartes' field of geometry,so ordered,and his field of physics, so ordered,are strangelyill-suited to each other,an odd couple thatdoesn't really quite generatethe new science. For example, the shapedvolumes that are supposed to serve as the geometricalgenera for specific bits of matterhave no explicit place in the Geometry,which is concernedprimarily with straightline segments and secondarilywith plane curves. And even if Descartes' geometry did contain such items, deep problemsconcerningthe coherence of associated bits of matterthatrun all throughthe Principles reveal that geometricalshape, even when taken togetherwith common motion, is insufficientas a principleof unity for physical objects. By contrast,the straightline segments of the Geometryseem to correspondnicely to the inherentlyuniform,rectilinearmotion of the bits of matterwhich are the simples in the physics. Descartes' quantifiedmodel of impact specifies thatbodies in uniformrectilinear motion collide along straightlines, and that the change in their motion, to new uniform speeds accordingto formulaethatpreservethe total quantityof what we would call momentum,is instantaneous.In this model, however, thereisn't really any interesting geometricalcontext for the line; it is not the side of a triangle,the diagonal of a parallelogram or the ordinateof a curve. Just the straightline itself, along which two materialpar-

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tides bump into each other,does not bring any furthermathematicsinto play, which might illuminatethe physical situation. So far, the links between Descartes' geometry and physics seem to be missing or trivial. And yet, having stipulatedthat all materialparticles are shaped volumes and that all interactionis collision and thus covered by the seven rules, Descartes appearssatisfied thatin principle the work of mathematizing physics is complete. (However,in his (forthcoming)Alan Gabbey argues thatDescartes indeed envisaged a more complete physics, thatwould relate the precise microscopic phenomenaof the Principles to the macroscopicworld of machines, free fall, projectile motion, etc., more fully and mathematically.) What about the curves thatfigure in the Geometry? Descartesdiscusses curves in the of bits of matterstemmingnot from the natureof matter Principles only as the trajectories or motion, but from externalexigencies imposed by the plenum:motion in a plenumcan only take place, if at all, in a circuit.And the boundaryconditionimposed by the existence of the plenum is not strongenough to determinewhat precisely the curve might be, so that then the peculiargeometricalpropertiesof thatcurve might be exploited in the service of physics, as Newton exploits the propertiesof the ellipse in PropositionXI, Book I of the Principia, where he derives the inverse squarelaw (Motte and Cajori 1934, pp. 40-2). Moreover,Descartes' inability to focus on curves as algebraic-geometric-numerical hybridscontributesto his inability to regardcurves as representativeof the relations among continuously varying parameters. Nothing in Descartes' Principles is comparable to Galileo's famous analysis of projectilemotion (Crew and deSalvio 1954, pp. 248-50), which takes the paraboliccurve of a projectile'strajectoryto express relations among time, distance, velocity and the accelerationof gravity,or to Newton's PropositionXI, where the elliptical trajectoryof a point mass circling a center of force does much the same. The most significant employmentof curves in early modem physics doesn't occur to Descartes. And of course some of the most importantsuch curves were transcendental, curves which he had excluded from mathematicsaltogether. Descartes' organization of physics excludes the investigationof acceleratedlinearand curvilinearmotion. The problemsconcerningcontinuouslyvaryingforces which pose such and successorsis simply avoided. thornyandfruitfulproblemsfor his contemporaries Significantly,Descartes'most mathematically sophisticated attemptto quantifyphysics occurs in a context where the temporalanddynamicdimensionsof the subjectmatterare irrelevant; optics is very close to a purephysical geometry,with light rays playing the roles of lines. In a sense then Descartesnevermakes the transition from kinematicsto dynamics, as his contemporaries Galileo andTorricellisucceed in doing. For Descartes,no physical parameter, includingof course what he calls "force,"variesin any essentialor interesting way with time, and strictlyspeakingbodies never accelerate.(The accountof the acceleration due to gravitynearthe surfaceof the earththathis vortex theoryprovidesfor macroas Descarteshimself admits.) scopic phenomenais too complicatedto be quantifiable, Torricellilearnedfrom his masterGalileo the importanceof the parametertime in the analysis of physical situations,and develops a more sophisticatedaccount of percussion. He argues that the percussion of a falling object exercises an infinite force accumulatedin the intervalof time requiredfor its fall, because any such finite intervalcontains an infinity of instants,in each of which the body exerts the simple impulsion of its weight; this infinite accumulationis extinguished as the object struckabsorbsthe shock in a finite intervalof time, containing an infinity of instantsas well. Thus equilibriumis reestablished. According to Torricelli'sanalysis, then, each momentorequiresan instantof time for its generationor its extinction. Though he supposes thatmomentiare finite and thus their summationis infinite, he reasons about force as a continuously varying magnitude, something like an integraltaken with respect to time. Moreover,as Galileo also does on other occasions, Torricellistudies the continuousaccumulationof impulsions as a limiting case of a finite numberof successive small blows. (My exposition here is indebtedto

246 DeGandt (forthcoming).)This is just the kind of reasoningNewton uses in PropositionI, Book I of the Principia, which is Newton's version of Kepler's Law of Areas (Motte and Cajori 1934, pp. 40-2). (Diagram6) e f

"!

""-..

E .. .

".

d
C

i .// i'
. Z :?.

...5

A 6 Diagram The claim is: "The areaswhich revolving bodies describe by radii drawnto an immoveable center of force do lie in the same immovableplanes, and are proportionalto the times in which they are described."Newton's proof is illustratedby the figure. S is the center of force. A body proceeds on an inertialpathfrom A to B in an intervalof time; if not deflected, it would continueon in a second, equal intervalof time along the virtualpath Bc. However, Newton continues, "when the body is arrivedat B, suppose that a centripetalforce acts at once with a greatimpulse,"so that the body does not arrive at c, but at C. Then cC ( =BV) representsthe deflection of the body due to the force; of the force. The perimeter indeed, cC = BV becomes the geometricalrepresentative ABCDEF.. representsthe trajectoryof the body as it is deflected at the beginning of each equal intervalof time by discrete and instantaneousimpulsions from S. Newton then uses the Euclideantheoremthat triangleswith equal bases and equal elevations have equal areas, to show that the areaof triangleSAB = the areaof triangleSBc = the areaof triangle SBC; this equality extends to trianglesSDC, SED, SFE... by the same reasoning,so thatequal areas are describedin equal times. We have only, Newton concludes, "to let the numberof those trianglesbe augmented,and their breadthdiminishedin infinitum"for this result to apply to a continuouslyacting force and a curved trajectory. S Descartes' diagramof Pappus' problemis ambiguousbecause his treatmentof it allows it to representnot only a geometric locus, but also an algebraicequationin two unknowns.Because it can be read in both ways, both geometric and algebraicresults can be broughtto bear on the problem,and theircombinationis the key to Descartes' success. Here I would like to urge an interestingparallelbetween the partialunificationof two mathematicaldomains, and of a mathematicaldomain and a physical domain.

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it must be readboth as a collectionof finite Newton's diagramis likewise ambiguous; line segments,and as a colis composedof rectilinear lines and areas,wherethe perimeter is a curve.The lection of infinitesimalas well as finite lines andareas,where the perimeter of Euclideantheoremsto the problem.The second makes firstreadingallows the application the diagramrelevantto the kind of continuousmotionandforce Newton is interested in, as well as Kepler'sLaw of Areas.And it moreovercentrallyinvolves reasoningsaboutproporlines andareas.Thus in this diagram, tions involving areasandcurves,andinfinitesimal of a Newton can combinethe resourcesof geometryandmechanicsin the demonstration VI andXI he buildsinto his diagramsthe georesult.And when in Propositions fundamental of the ellipse on the one hand,andGalileo'sresultaboutfree fall as well as a metricstructure is rich indeed. of force on the other,the outcomeof the combination subtlerepresentation The only diagramsin Descartes'Geometrythathave physical significanceare the "optical ovals" at the end of Book II (Smithand Latham1954, pp. 114-149).When he discusses he generatesthem by point-wiseconstructhem in orderto exhibit theiropticalproperties, tion. Nowhere does he give an equationfor one of them,thoughhe does use algebrato discuss theirproperties. OpticspresentsDescarteswith a seriesof problemsconcerningthe conditionsunderwhich reflectedlight rays, straightline segments,will convergeat a given of the point of convergencewhich interestsDescartes,not the point. It's the construction of curve of the curvedreflectingsurface.Moreover,since for Descartesthe propogation the parameter of time doesn't enterinto the conceptualsituationat all. light is instantaneous, And in the Principles, none of the diagramshave any geometry that hooks up in any interestingway with the results of the Geometry.The spheres and concentriccircles that show up in many of them are mathematicallyinert and isolated; they have none of the suggestive algebraicstructurethatDescartes might have conferredon them if he had been since interestedin curves (or surfaces) as geometrical-algebraic hybrids. Furthermore, the vortex hypothesis doesn't specify the geometricalshape of planetarycircuits, the of trajectoriesis arbitrary and so disconnected with choice of circles as representations the mechanical context. The sphericalshape of the Cartesiancorpuscles, second element and unmotivatedby his physical theory.There is simply no matter,is likewise arbitrary area of overlap, accompaniedby appropriately bivalentdiagrams,on which Descartes' mathematicsand physics can meet and mingle. The point I want to make aboutthe geometrical-dynamical reasoningscarriedon by and try to anaGalileo, Torricelliand Newton is thatthey take time as the centralparameter whose terms lyze force as a summationof infinitesimals;theirdiagramsinvolve proportions include areas,curvedlines, numbers,infinitemagnitudes,and infinitesimals(lines or areas); and they use curves, sometimestranscendental, to representthe continuouslyvaryingrelations between physicalparameters includingtime and force. All these aspectsof theirwork Descartesexcludes from his own, becauseof the stronglyreductionistway in which he has restructured his geometryandphysics. Thus he is never able to integratemathematics and physics in fulfillmentof the inspiringpromissarynote given in PartII of the Principles.

References Adam, C. and Tannery,P. (eds.) (1964/74), Oeuvresde Descartes. Paris:Hermann. Bos, Henk (1981), "On the Representationof Curves in Descartes' Geometrie",Archive for History of Exact Sciences 24: 295-338. Crew,H. and deSalvio, A. (eds.) (1954), Dialogues ConcerningTwoNew Sciences. New York:Dover.

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DeGandt,F. (forthcoming),"L'analysede la percussion chez Galilee et Torricelli". Gabbey,A. (forthcoming),"Descartes'Physics and Descartes' Mechanics:Chicken and Egg?". Grosholz, E. (1982), "Leibniz' Unification of Geometrywith Algebra and Dynamics", Studia LeibnitianaSonderheft13: 198-208. Koyre, A. (1939), Etudes Galileennes: La loi de la chute des corps. Paris:Hermann. Miller, V.R. and Miller R.P. (eds.) (1983/4), Principles of Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel. Motte, A. and Cajori,F. (eds.) (1934), Principia. Berkeley:Universityof California Press. Smith, D.E. and Latham,M.L. (eds.) (1954), The Geometryof Rene'Descartes. New York:Dover.