Socrates and Alcibiades: The Alcibiades Major Robert R. Wellman History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4.

(Winter, 1966), pp. 3-21.

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EDUCATION IN ANTIQUITY

Socrates and Alcibiades :

The A lcibiades Major *

ROBERT R. W E L L M A N
SINCE SCHLEIERMACHER there has been little agreement as to the authenticity of the Alcibiades Major. Taylor, for example, doubts that Plato wrote the dialogue because of its language, its colorless portrayal of Alcibiades, and the textbook character of its substantive elements, and an impressive list of scholars seem to agree, although perhaps for different reasons. While fewer individuals-especially Friedlander and Vink-accept the dialogue as genuine, they at least have the ancient weight of Olyrnpiodorus, Proclus, and Plutarch behind them. Perhaps the most interesting view to be presented in recent years is that of Clark who, in a heroic effort at compromise, ascribes the first two thirds of the dialogue to a student of Plato and the final part to Plato himself. Presumably the bulk of the dialogue is ascribed to a nonPlatonic source since the majority of commentators question its authenticity, but I find Clark's position unconvincing, especially when she suggests that it was Plato's "usual affection for his pupils and associates" that prompted him to finish the work when the student died. (I) Regardless of the dialogue's authenticity, the Alcibiades Major is a vivid and compelling portrait of the erotic Socrates in pursuit of the beautiful Alcibiades, and, whether it was authored by Plato or not, we cannot help but agree with Olympiodorus that it is the gateway to Plato's dialogues. We have no way of determining the historical accuracy of the picture presented in the dialogue or whether it represents
* I am indebted to the Research Council of the University of Massachusetts for a grant that assisted in the preparation of this paper. Mr. Wellman is Associate Professor o f Education at the University of Massachusetts.

Winter 1966 3

the actual relationship that existed between Socrates and Alcibiades. But polemics concerning the historical Socrates and his actual beliefs and doctrines are, I believe, largely irrelevant, at least regarding his educational ideas. Various sources present us with a portrait of Socrates, and obviously the writings of Plato and Xenophon are primary. We may glean a consistent picture of Socrates and his educational ideas from all these sources by using PIato and Xenophon, perforce, as the final authorities. The view that emerges may or may not be that of the historical Socrates, but it hardly matters. It is a profound and meaningful theory and warrants our close attention in its own right, regardless of its authorship. (2) In this regard the Alcibiades Major is especially interesting to the educationist, for the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades is represented as intensively erotic or, what for Plato amounted to the same thing, intensively educational. An examination of the form and meaning of this relationship, therefore, should provide further insight into the Socratic view of education and its proper conduct with the young. The representation of Socrates in erotic pursuit of Alcibiades is surely correct since several other sources paint a similar picture. In Plato's Gorgias Socrates admits to being enamored of two things: Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, and philosophy (481d). The erotic setting of the Protagoras is furnished by reference to Socrates chasing the youthful beauty, Alcibiades, and the amorous tone is heightened by Socrates implying he loves Alcibiades even more since the youth has matured (3ogb, cf. Symposium 181d, 21ga). And the Alcibiades Minor, which undoubtedly was not composed by Plato, concludes with Socrates expressing the desire to overcome Alcibiades' many other lovers ( 1 5 1 ~ ) . Plutarch also provides support, both in his life of Alcibiades, which is probably in part based on the Alcibiades Major, and in the Moralia where he characterizes Socrates as yielding to the embraces of Alcibiades (Alcibiades i, 2 ; iv, 1-4; vi, 1-5;Moralia, "On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander the Great"). A major source that fails to mention the erotic relationship between the young man and his older lover is Xenophon. The principal reference to Alcibiades occurs in the Memorabilia where the author claims Alcibiades and Critias associated with Socrates for political ends and left him when they thought they had achieved proficiency in speech and action (I, ii, 12-40). While such a

HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

motive would hardly conduce to an intimate love affair such as described by Alcibiades in the Symposium, this is only a conjecture on Xenophon's part who was not, after all, on the scene all that much. Regardless, Xenophon's view does not preclude Socrates passionately loving Alcibiades, which is the brunt of most of our references, including the Alcibiades Major. The most complete picture of Socrates' love for Alcibiades outside the Alcibiades Major occurs in the Symposium. Since Alcibiades' speech in Plato's educational masterpiece serves as a suitable prelude to the remarks I wish to make about the Alcibiades Major, I will deal with it briefly before taking up the dialogue proper. It will be realized that it is impossible to extricate completely Alcibiades' speech from the totality of the Symposium. Since the dialectical levels of the Symposium are beyond my immediate concern, I will reserve lengthy comment for a longer study of Socrates which I hope to complete in the near future. While the present treatment is unfair to the poet Plato, I hope it is not unfair to the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades. The erotic banter between Socrates and Alcibiades following the latter's drunken interruption of Agathon's dinner party provides both an appropriate anticlimax to Diotima's higher mysteries of love and an introduction to Alcibiades' speech. In addition, the interlude serves to underscore again Socrates' intense love for Alcibiades: Socrates speaks of his "love for this fellow" and refers to "the time I fell in love with him" (2x3~-d). And when it is time for Alcibiades to follow suit with the earlier guests and make a speech to Eros, he demurs and proposes to praise Socrates instead on the excuse that if he praises a god or another person in Socrates' presence, Socrates will not leave him alone (214d). During the first part of the speech there is a passage that is especially interesting for the light it sheds on the erotic Socrates' relationships with Alcibiades (zlgd-216e). Alcibiades speaks of the effect of Socrates' words on him, such that he becomes wildly enraptured and emotional at the sound of his voice. Unlike the effect of an eloquent orator such as Pericles, who does not touch the spirit of a man, the speech of Socrates leaves him in such a frenzy of anxiety that he believes his life not worth living in its present state. So profound is Socrates' love that under its influence Alcibiades cannot but admit his own deficiencies and forgo power and prestige to seek his own good. So compelling is his love that it is only by withholding his ears entirely that Alcibiades can keep from

Winter 1966

sitting by his side until old age. And under the influence of Socrates alone does Alcibiades feel shame-shame that he falls victim to the crowd and fails to realize what he admits to be true in his cqnversations with his lover: "So I flee from him, and when I see him again and remember my former admissions, I am ashamed." Through the power of Eros, Socrates transforms his beIoved into a frenzied lover of himself. The in~portance of this idea is brought out later when Apollodorus reports that upon the completion of Alcibiades' speech, "there was some laughter at his candor which showed him still erotically inclined toward Socrates" ( 2 2 2 ~ )At . first this appears to be an odd statement, for is not Alcibiades' frankness caused by his drunkenness? Certainly strong drink tends to unravel the socially acceptable cloak most of us wear most of the time. But Alcibiades' candor manifests far more than inebriation, as Apollodorus notes, since it is only in the presence of his lover, and beloved, that it is natural, and perhaps requisite, that he be honest and forthright. The love relationship described by Alcibiades is a relationship in which the participants manifest and maintain their integrity at all levels of human association. As Senophon notes in his Syniposiuln, "there is no n~eaningfulhulnan association without love" (viii, 13). The compulsion of the erotic Socrates is the compulsion of good faith and probity which perforce obtain in the relationship between lovers. This is the point of the continuation of the erotic banter following Alcibiades' speech in praise of Eros incarnate, Socrates (zzzc-223b). Note, incidentally, the citation of Pericles and other good orators (hya0Gv pyr6pov). This is precisely Socrates' objection to the Sophists and the developing rhetorical tradition. It was not simply a polemic against ignorant and evil men blindly leading the ignorant crowd, for Pericles was neither ignorant nor evil. But even hyaOijv Pqr6pov, for all their goodness and skill, could not achieve the kind of meaningful human relationships demanded for the educative enterprise envisioned by Socrates. At best they could persuade the crowd to Ape+ 666~2, an unstable guide to correct action, for the relationship between the orator and his audience did not demand a genuine commitment on the part of individual listeners-a personal admission and conviction to a point of view and a course of action. For without Eros, according to Socrates, there could be no truth. These thoughts from the Symposium are elaborated in the Alcibiades

Major. In the opening lines of the dialogue Socrates is represented as Alcibiades' first lover who was prohibited from consorting with his beloved by his Saipwv. (3) Now that Alcibiades has attained manhood -and, incidentally, has been forsaken by his many other lovers who sought only physical pleasure from the beautiful youth-and the daimonic opposition has disappeared, Socrates has hurried to Alcibiades hoping there will be no further prohibition to fulfilling his desire. The erotic setting is heightened by a reference to Alcibiades' highmindedness, which accounts for his other lovers leaving him, and by reference to Socrates following the youthful beauty around even while the Saipwi. forbid intercourse-so overwhelming is the power of Eros in Socrates. (4) The reference to Alcibiades' highmindedeness introduces an instructive ambiguity that we are surely intended to keep in mind during the later discussion. Literally, the passage at io3b reads, "I have watched you. . . [Alcibiades]," says Socrates, "and I have a fair idea how you act with your lovers; for although there were many of them who were highminded (piyaAo@p6vwv), they discovered your highmindedness (+pov+a~c) too much and fled from you." pc/aA6@pov can mean highminded both in the sense of noble and in the sense of proud or haughty. Similarly, e p 6 v ~ p a m ay refer to high feeling or high spirit or, in the bad sense, pride, insolence, or arrogance. Since the context does not make the meaning clear-and it is difficult to believe it is not intentionalwe could just as well translate it, "your haughty lovers found you too arrogant." Thus we are informed early in the dialogue that Alcibiades' claim as a K ~ X O S ~ & ~ a B b(i25a), s as well as his lovers1--presumably the usual ~ d o ~lh y a 9 o i of Athens-may or may not be genuine. Obviously, the subsequent discussion allows us to guess they are not. Beyond the erotic setting, the Alcibiades Major is especially fruitful for the insight it provides into the meaning of Eros in the educative relationship. As in the Symposium,the necessity for integrity is emphasized and linked with the effect of the erotic Socrates on his beloved. While Socrates professes love for Alcibiades from the outset of the dialogue, the youth apparently does not reciprocate fully until the end. Throughout most of the conversation, therefore, Socrates reminds Alcibiades that he must answer the questions put to him as he genuinely believes. At xloa, for example, Socrates admonishes Alcibiades to "answer truly" so the discussion will not be in vain; or at 117c Alcibiades

W i n t e r 1966 7

is reprimanded for not doing his full share in understanding the argument; and at 126e and 127e Socrates urges him to do his best in answering. It is not until later in the conversation that Alcibiades gradually begins to realize why Socrates is invaluable to him as a lover, and it is not until the conclusion that the erotic relationship reaches a stage where there is no more need to admonish Alcibiades to be sincere. The reasons for this insistence on integrity premised in Eros are explicated in a passage early in the dialogue (~12d-1~4e). By the force of the argument, Alcibiades is driven to admit he does not know what is just and what is unjust and, indeed, is bewildered about the entire question of justice and injustice in the polis. In responding to the questions, however, the youth admits only that this seems to be the case according to what Socrates says. Socrates rebukes Alcibiades for this statement and proceeds to show by argument that in the dialogic fonn of interchange it is not the questioner who does the speaking but the answerer. In a dialogue, where the participants are engaged in resolving difficulties and perplexities, it is the answerer, in the genuineness of his answer, that actually does the speaking or the saying by his agreement or disagreement with the argument. The respondent is not agreeing or disagreeing because it pleases the questioner, the audience, or the public; he agrees when he is genuinely convinced that the discussion has reached a stage that he believes correct. This point, incidentally, will hopefully quiet the criticisms directed against Socrates in the slave boy experiment in the Meno. It is sometimes maintained that Socrates does not demonstrate that learning is reminiscence in his discussion with Meno's slave because he asks leading questions that literally put words into the boy's mouth. This utterly misses Socrates' point. No one, least of all Socrates, doubts that an intelligent man of mature years has more information in his grasp than an untutored lad; and no one doubts that young persons should be provided with as much information as they desire. Socrates' point is not that the boy literally remembers how to double the area of a square; clearly, Socrates shows him. His point is simply that the boy, in order to respond to the questions sincerely, has to exercise the same sort of intellectual skills as the questioner. It is the exercise of these skills, premised on integrity, that Socrates means by reminiscence. The idea of subjective integrity that emerges in the Alcibiades Major, while perhaps simple-and hopefully obvious-is absolutely funda-

mental to Socrates' educational position. One of the clearest statements of its importance occurs at the end of the section under discussion. At ~ ~ Socrates 4 e asks, "Is it not your desire to be persuaded? And is not the best means of persuasion when you state that you agree? Then answer the questions, and if yotr do not agree that the just is expedient, do not trust the words of others." And further, at 116d: "If anyone claims, then, to advise the Athenians or Peparethians, purporting to know justice and injustice, and if he claims that justice is sometimes evil, you will laugh and scorn him since you have said yourself that justice and expedience are the same." Without the inner conviction provided by the maintenance of integrity through the erotic relationship, knowledge is impossible. Socrates insists that knowledge, worthy of the name, is a subjective, internal matter. Genuine knowledge is something that is actively enfeoffed by the individual-to borrow a phrase from Montaigne. And the inner man is ultimately persuaded, not by the crowd or the lecturer, but by himself when he says it. As I mentioned earlier in relation to the h y a & i v brlr6pwv in the Sympositim, this is Socrates' fundamental objection to Sophistical education, that it does not, and cannot by its very nature, reach the inner man. In Socrates' view, the most Sophistical education can do is provide a veneer of polish and social grace, for the lecture, the oration, cannot enjoin the listener to participate and speak in the educative enterprise. The point of the dialogic form epitomizing, for Socrates, the educative process is the emotional commitment necessitated when the individual is required, because of Eros, to genuinely agree or disagree with arguments. (5) Those who claim that Platonic and Socratic education proceed wholly on the intellectual plane fail utterly to grasp the meaning of the dialogic form. The dialogue, as Socrates and Plato understand it, links the intellectual with the emotional levels of human experience and demands a visceral involvement without which education is impossible. Man's intellectual life is firmly and inextricably premised in his emotional life, and as Eros is neither god nor man but a Gaipwv mediating between the two, desiring but never attaining divinity, so Eros is the mediating energy between the divine aspect of man, the intellect, and his emotional involvement in earthly human experience (Synzposiunz, Diotima's speech). While developing the subjective integrity of the dialogue by means of his erotic relationship with Alcibiades, Socrates is also engaged in

Winter 1966 9

directing this energy toward its proper end. The first level of the dialectical development, following the erotic setting (103a-106a), cornprises nearly half the dialogue (106~-11gb). I identify this passage as the first dialectical level because its educative concern is with showing how disgraceful Alcibiades is due to his ignorance in what he professes to know-in Socrates' view, a necessary propaedeutic to education. (6) The discussion follows the usual pattern of the elenchus: In the r i ~ v ~ discussion following Alcibiades' proposal to advise the Athenians, the young man is unable to specify the 7ixy on which decisions of state are based. Hence the emotional level of human experience is reached through the acute feeling of shame: ''Surely this is shameful," says Socrates, "are you not ashamed to claim rnturllywv in matters in which ycu cannot even identify their ~Lxvq?'' (loge-~oga). And the first stage toward linking the emotional with the intellectual dimensions of educational experience, as well as the first stage toward the realization of ignorance, is achieved: Alcibiades is disgraced before his lover. We are reminded of the Lysis, where the intention of the discussion between Socrates and Lysis is to show Hippothales the proper way of conducting a love affair with a young boy-by disgracing and humbling him rather than puffing him up with conceit, for only in this way can the lover attack his beloved at the emotional level. It is appropriate that the attack of Socrates is directed toward the emotion of shame. Actually, shame is a bit too weak foralux6s.It is perhaps better rendered disgraceful, base, or ugly, bringing to mind the kind of conduct that shocks others and prompts acute pangs on the part of the perpetrator. a~uxvvr], the sense of shame, is the disgust one feels 'ipyov), lewd and base behavior, in the presence of a i u ~ ~ o u ~(aiuXp6s yia such as an especially licentious love afair or other forms of utterly disgraceful behavior. Thus the disgracefulness Socrates accuses Alcibiades of and the shame he attempts to elicit from the depths of the youth's being is erotically directed: to fail to know what one professes to advise on is as base and ugly as to be involved in illicit relations with young boys or women. Indeed, it is even more ugly, for the consequences of such ignorance are far more reaching and affect far more people. The introduction of alux6s at 108e is reminiscent of the ~ h v 8 of ~ ~ 0 ~ Pausanias' speech in the Symposiunl (180d ff) and the ignoble steed in the myth of the Phaedrus (246b). As the noble steed in the Phaedrlts is called K Q A ~ S , so aiux6~ denotes its opposite-ignoble, ugly, in-

10

HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

famous.(7) This becomes especially important later in the Alcibiades major when the ~ a A b ~ sh-ya06 of ~ 125a is gently set against Alcibiades' more profound and meaningful realization of his aiqCv? at 127d: to experience aioXCvv is to become acutely aware one is not dip ~ h ~ a O 6 ~ More of this later, however; for the moment, at 108e, before his erotic encounter with Socrates has had the opportunity to develop, it is too monstrous to consider the well-born, well-bred Alcibiades as anything b& ~/ ~ O ~ S . but ~ a h K The remainder of this passage is concerned with completing the clenchus. This is highlighted by the digression on the meaning of dialogue which I mentioned earlier and continued admonitions for the proper form of argument: an insistence Alcibiades must answer the que:;tions (114e) and a reminder of the contextual character of discussion (11gb-c). Finally, after he is unable to ascertain how he learned the science of justice and then fails to realize that justice and expedience are the same, Alcibiades is reduced to a state of bewilderment: "By the gods, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying, and I feel very strangely; for when you question me I seem to change my mind by the minute." This commences an interlude (116e-119b) that culminates the iirst section of the dialogue. Its purpose is not so n ~ u c h to reduce Alcibiades to a state of ignorance-he is not yet emotionally prepared for this final step-as to get the youth to ratiocinate on his own bewiIderment and wonder why he is at a loss to know what he thinks. The delineation of the knowing, the unknowing, and the ignorant-the unknowing who thinks he knows-is a gentle preparation for the not so gentle accusation at 118c: "Bless me, Alcibiades, but you are in sad straits. I hesitate to mention it, but I will say it anyway since we are alone: My friend, you are extremely stupid, and you say so yourself by your own tvords." This abrupt statement, one of the sharpest Socrates is represented making anywhere, does not startle or perturb Alcibiades as much as we might expect. Alcibiades' lack of perturbation is to be expected, for we are reminded a few lines later that the youth's r a y a A o ~ p o o b v ~ c ontinues to get in the way of genuine education (119~).This, of course, has been the basic difficulty throughout the first part of the conversation: While agreeing he may be a bit ashamed at logs, Alcibiades is in fact only embarrassed, and in a few moments his r c y a A o ~ p o o l i v ~ resurges in an arrogant claim that he discovered the science of justice on his own (loge-11od); later

Winter 1966

11

he attempts, though an irrelevancy, to deter from the argument ( i i j e ) ; and finally he becomes petulant and refuses to answer Socrates' questions (ilqd-e). ,ucyaAo@pou6vv remains with us, and we cannot expecl more until it is shattered through a deeper emotional probe. In addition, we must remember that the Alcibiades Major represents the first meeting of the erotic Socrates and the beautiful youth because of the daimonic prohibition. Not only does Alcibiades not return Socrates' love; he is unaccustomed to the Socratic way of life. The first level of the dialectic has moved through an attempt at emotional excitation to a description of its manifestation, the realization of ignorance, and a glimmer ( I ~ ~ ~ - - K Povhtj) O L ~ of its result, the desire on the part of the beloved for the lover. This section serves as a rapb8acy,ua, then, a model of the meaning of a love relationship with Socrates. The way is thus prepared for a more meaningful encounter with Socrates in the second half of the conversation-an encounter that will repeat the essential educative features of the first dialectical stage, only at a more profound level, and will culminate in a genuinely erotic relationship. If this educational view of the first half of the dialogue is correct, the il~eaning of the interlude ( I I ~ C - I ~including ~ ~ J , the Royal Speech, follows. Commentary on the Royal Speech has in general suffered from treating the passage as an entirety unto itself, or at best using 1 1 9 ~ 124b as the total context. (8) This is understandable, of course, since we can jump from Socrates' question at 119a directly to Alcibiades' question at 124b without any apparent hiatus or loss of meaning. I submit, however, that this very fact suggests the meaning of the interlude and the Royal Speech. At 119a Socrates asks if Alcibiades is willing to care (bc,uthrra) for himself. Rather than responding affirmatively and asking how he can best care for himself, he interjects the thought that perhaps this is not necessary since the rest of the Athenians are uneducated also: "I am sure my native ability alone will carry me to an easy victory." I base this view of Alcibiades' statement at 119b-c on translating ~ o t v l PovAtj j a t ~ l g b in , direct response to Socrates' question, as "Let's think for a moment." His complete response to the question is, K O L V ~OVA?^, ~ 8
% J K ~ ~ T L FK . ~ ~ T : OVLV O ~UOV ~ L~X~VTO ~S

a ~vy)(wpiiI. i 8o~o~uiior y&p pot oi rh. 79%

J K T ~ S l h i y w v b.nat8cv~oc~ 7 v a cAlcibiades' . agreement.in the second sentence could refer either to Socrates' question, will you care for yourself?, or to the earlier statements concerning Pericles and
?ro'Xcws r p h r
TOVTCS

12

HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

the ignora~ce of the Athenians. Since the very next sentence refers to the latter, I take K O ~ V Pouhlj ~ in the first sentence as a check on Socrates' cluestion-although the author of the dialogue surely intends the phrase to prepare us for Socrates' response at 124c. The purport of Alcibiades' statement at i i g b would then be, "Let's think about this matter for a moment, Socrates. For indeed, as you put it I agree, that the men in charge of the city's affairs appear to me to be uneducated, with a few exceptions." "If my competitors are mere amateurs," Alcibiades goes on to say, "then why should I worry? Since xny natural ability is more than enough to defeat them why should I go to all the trouble of caring for myself?" In agreement with Friedlander and others then, the Royal Speech serves to introduce the need to care for oneself. If my view concerning the stage of Alcibiades' educative development is correct, however, the purport of the Royal Speech goes beyond this and flows integrally into 1 2 4 ~ - dFor . Alcibiades is not yet prepared to understand the meaning of the Delphic motto, nor is he prepared to genuinely care for himself, since in spite of Socrates' biting accusation at 118c Alcibiddes does not yet realize his own ignorance. What must occur, in Socrates' view, is for Alcibiades to genuinely commit himself to the educative enterprise-deliberating together-to place all his intellectual and emotional powers in the service of the argument, and to believe in the efficacy of the discussion and not in his own natural prowess vis-a-vis his fellow man (cf. supra). As I see it, the purpose of the Royal Speech is not only to show Alcibiades the necessity of caring for himself, for given his present emotional development this can affect him at best only superficially. Perhaps even more important, the Royal Speech is intended to persuade Alcibiades of the necessity for common deliberation, and the passage culminates not at 124b when he admits that Socrates' words are "remarkably akin to the truth" that the Athenian can surpass the Spartan and Persian only by diligence and practice over himself, but a few lines later at the end of 124d when he agrees to deliberate in common with Socrates. izqc-d also opens the second dialectical stage of the dialogue. As I suggested earlier, the second stage repeats all the essential steps of the first; but with Alcibiades better prepared than before, each step penetrates further into the depths of human emotion and introduces dimensions of understanding that would have been futile during the first stage. 1 2 4 ~ - d provides the first illustration of this, thereby suggesting

W i n f e r 1966

13

that what follows will go considerably beyond the first half of the discussion. A t the beginning of the dialogue, the conversation gets under way by Alcibiades consenting to answer Socrates' questions (xo6b). I3e agrees to this procedure since he does not consider it difficult or troublesome (Xcrhcxbs).A similar introduction appears at 124~-d,except there is no doubt that the subsequent discussion will be difficult and troublesome. For now we are going to witness not simply replies to questions, but a genuine effort at common deliberation. We must deliberate together, says Socrates, for we badly need to attend ourselves. So there will be no carelessness or taking the easy way out ( p a h a ~ ~ a ~ t o v ) . And we will leave nothing unsaid ( h x o p p ~ r i o v )if the argument dictates it. Alcibiades agrees with Socrates and adds that in our present condition it would be unseemly to do otherwise. Thus, in the introduction to the second half of the dialogue we are again thrown into the erotic relationship, only at a higher level. In the presence of Eros, who has been with us from the beginning, it is not fitting-indeed it is disgraceful!to be careless or leave anything hidden from view. After the agreement to deliberate together, the parallels with the first section of the dialogue continue. The first part, you will recall, commences with Alcibiades agreeing he wishes to excel, and specifically to excel in ruling the Athenians, so he may become famous and esteemed by all society. So with part two: While Alcibiades wishes to care for himself ( 1 2 4 ~ ) ~ means for achieving this, in his view, is by the being good, and specifically, being good or excelling in managing the affairs of ~ a h o ~ i h~aeo (xz4e). l But this obviously requires intelligence (+phvlprs); and again as in the first stage of the dialogue we must ask what art ( 7 i ~ q this ) entails, that is, what knowledge (irtor+q) is required for exercising +p6vlpts in ruling ~ a h o rthya80i? i And as before, the discussion breaks down shortly thereafter, for Alcibiades is unable to defend his answer: Prudence (shpovhla) is required, the 'rpuov of which is friendship (@LA&) which apparently entails sameness of mind (bp6vora); but we can have justice without bpo'vora. "Bless me," declares Alcibiades, "I do not know what I mean. It is true that I have lived in a disgraceful condition without knowing it" (zzqd; cf. Symposium zl6b). This is a crucial point in the dialogue, for it marks the first point a t which Alcibiades manifests a genuine emotional upheaval due to the discussion itself. This is supported not only by the fact that Alcibiades utters it himself, but in the few lines following as well. Socrates imme-

14

HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

diately reassures the youth-something that was not needed while pride was still present. And Alcibiades responds by requesting help in escaping his disgraceful condition, whereupon they agree, with the assistance of Socrates' divining powers, to pursue the argument further. I submit the tone of this section differs sharply from anything we have encountered previously, a tone which suggests the start of a genuine emotional relationship between the two men that was not possible earlier. Also, Alcibiades agrees to dialogue with Socrates immediately and with conviction rather than, as heretofore, merely agreeing to answer questions: Answer, Alcibiades, and we will both benefit. It shall be, responds Alcibiades, so far as my part in answering goes. (9) As a result of the deepening of the emotional relationship between the two men, the beloved is transformed into the lover. Immediately following the emotional upheaval, at 128a, Socrates heightens the intensity of the discussion by returning to the question of caring for oneself suggested by the Royal Speech. Socrates does this, not because Alcibiades has suddenly become more intellectually capable of dealing with the question--or at least there is no indication this is the casebut because he is concerned to redeem himself in Socrates' eyes. Alcibiades is disgraced before his lover, and the question of fame and social esteem-the form the question takes immediately after the Royal Speech-is of far less immediate importance than maintaining the erotic relationship with Socrates. In this new situation, which did not obtain until his emotional upheaval, Alcibiades is ready to accept a probing question that reaches ultimately, although perhaps not in the Alcibiades Major, to the very roots of his being; for he is now pursuing the erotic Socrates, not the crowd. (lo) This transformation, which we encountered earlier in the Symposiurn, is restated at 131d-13zb before its final statement at the conclusion of the dialogue. Socrates shows that the true lover is the lover of the soul, and that his true object is the handsome or fair soul which develops its intelligence, not the beautiful body of a youth. Alcibiades readily agrees and expresses hope that he will stay handsome enough to attract Socrates, for he would despair if Socrates left him. The transformation of Alcibiades into Socrates' lover is the background for the remainder of the dialogue, especially the important mirror passage (132d-x33c), the passage 133~-x34d with its precursor at 1x5~-116e, and the conclusion. The mirror passage is prompted by the

discussion zt8a-131b: Caring for oneself is predicated upon knowing oneself, and the self, so far as we can ascertain at the present, (11) is the soul. Hence theinjunction of the Pythian Apollo enjoins us to know our SOUIS, which means ~ o ~ ~ o u C v ~ m o d e r a or t i self-discipline on (cf. Charmides 164b, Amatores 138a). But in what fashion can we clearly perceive the soul? For all the discussion it has caused among commentators, (12) it seems to me the mirror passage provides a straightforward answer to this question: one clearly perceives his own soul by looking deep into the soul of his lover, especially the divine part of his soul, intelligence or the potential for knowing. The analogical reasoning which leads to this conclusion also explains it. Socrates suggests at the outset of the passage that there is only one illustration of the Delphic motto-sight. If I wish to see my own eye I must look into the pupil of another's eye, that is, the part of his eye which exercises sight. And I can see my eye only by exercising this same excellence (hpcr+)of sight vis-a-vis that which exercises it in the other, or, Socrates adds, vis-a-vis a similar potential in nature. The other's eye and its potential for sight, therefore, is a necessary condition for seeing my own eye, although the actual exercising of sight must come from me and not the other. Also, a point frequently overlooked in discussing the mirror passage, in order for me to see my eye the other's eye must be open and perforce seeing, that is, exercising the same function as myself as I gaze at the reflection of my eye in the other's pupil. By analogy, if I am to know my own soul, I must look into or know (by the terms of the analogy, PAc?rrCov must be taken figuratively) my beIovedfs soul, and specifically that part of his soul-intelligence (coda) (13)-which exercises the divine process of knowing. I choose my beloved's soul as the mirror since, through the power Eros, it is the only one accessible to me. I know my own soul, then, only by exercising the soul's excellence of knowing vis-a-vis the potential for knowing in my loved one's soul. And as in the case of seeing, while I am the one who must do the knowing, my beloved's soul must be open and therefore knowing in its own right. Thus "he who gazes upon the divinity of his lover perceives himself most especially" (133~). As my perhaps tortured language is meant to indicate, it is fundamental to realize that the analogy with sight is intended to maintain the functional character both of the knowing involved in knowing oneself and the object of knowing, the potential for knowing of the be-

loved's soul. It is this functional connotation that makes it important to recognize that the other's soul is open when acting as a mirror; for unlike sight, where the object of my seeing is a ~ e r c e ~ t i bobject, le the object of my knowing in my beloved's soul is perforce the process of knowing itself: uo$ia, the seat of $p6ror~ ( 1 3 3 ~is )~ knowable only as a functioning manifestation. When I desire to know myself, therefore, I look upon the way in which my loved one knows. Since p x c a ~ i o vis clearly intended in a figurative sense, my "looking upon" is itself a process of knowing, which means I must manifest the same kind of knowing as my beloved. As the slave boy in the Meno had to think mathematically in order to understand Socrates' questions concerning the doubling of the area of the square, so I must think as my beloved in order to know myself. It is now clear why Socrates agrees to consort with Alcibiades only so long as he remains beautiful. The beauty of Alcibiades, now that he has attained manhood, is hopefully of the soul, not the body, so Socrates will remain only so long as he maintains beautiful knowing, for otherwise Socrates, in knowing himself, will become ugly in his thinking. Conversely with Alcibiades-and this is why the erotic Socrates is invaluable to him as a lover-if he desires excellence he must know himself through the beautiful knowing of Socrates. This is the point of the transformation of the beloved into the lover: it is only when the participants in the educative enterprise are both lovers and beloveds, engaging in a reciprocal love affair, that either can genuinely know himself. The point is restated in the Symposintn,where the function of beauty vis-avis the lover is not to improve the beautiful but to provide a medium (IOIKOS CV ~ah^w) in which the lover may become beautiful (zogb-c). The identification of self-knowledge (ycyvLu~ctv ahrhv) with moderation (~w$~oc~Gv~v), which Socrates repeats immediately upon the conclusion of the mirror passage ( 1 3 3 ~ ) is ) also now clear, as is the remainder of the passage 133c-134d. To know oneself in the sense suggested by Socrates is to manifest, in tune with one's beloved, competencies for knowing beautifully. Through knowing ourselves we develop our potential for knowing the world in which we live in beautiful terms: these categories of thought become our Weltanschautrng, or better, our Welterfahrung. Also, since the beautiful soul is the good and wise soul (125a, 132a), the man who knows himself knows goodIy and wisely. And since the good is that which is most beneficial (116c)

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and man naturally desires long-term "beneficienceU-that is, r~8atpovka or well-being (116a, i34a)-the man who knows goodly and wisely is good and wise: "Gazing upon divinity," Socrates says, "you will act well and rightly" (134d, cf. 116b). Knowledge is virtue, and he who sins does so, not purposely, but through ignorance. Having followed Socrates through the intricacies of these final passages, Alcibiades at last is in a position to "perceive only too clearly" ( 1 3 5 ~his ) present condition and what he must do to improve himself. Alcibiades is truly "wedded to ignorance," but not simply because he is unable to identify the art of managing the affairs of men. Even more startling-and without the emotional intimacy of the love relationship the candor required for this recognition is impossible-Alcibiades realizes he is not doing well; he is the opposite of ~aX'os ~&~ayaBo'~-he is evil. Alcibiades' genuine profession of ignorance at the conclusion of the dialogue is the realization that his ignorance is tantamount to sinning; he is no better than a wretched slave, in spite of his wealth, good looks, and influential friends. This completes the development of the dialogue. From the agreement to genuinely deliberate in common, the dialectic has moved to an intense emotional involvement and the consequent erotic relationship. From this vantage the educative process intensifies, and Alcibiades can finally advance to a recognition of his ignorance and its meaning. In his ignorant and sinful state, Alcibiades becomes the frenzied lover of the beautiful Socrates, and realizes he must pursue him as avidly as Socrates pursues him-unless the power of the poIis overcomes them both and prohibits intercourse.

Notes
I. WhiIe

the question of the authenticity of the Alcibiades Major is irrelevant to my present purpose, there is a wealth of references for anyone especiaIly interested in the subject. Among those who reject the dialogue as coming from the pen of Plato are J. Bidez, Eos; ou, Platon et ?Orient (Bruxelles, 1945)~ chap. 13; R. S. Bluck, "The Origin of the Greater Alcibiades," Classical Quarterly, n.s. iii (1953)~46-52; J. Bumet, Plafo's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrnfes and Crifo (Oxford, 1924), pp. 27-28 n.; E. R. Dodds, Gnomon, xxvii (1955)~ 164 (a review of Westerink's edition of Proclus' Commentary on the First Alcibiades); E. Dupreel, Les Sophistes: Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias (Neuchatel, 1949), pp. 151 ff., and La Legende Socratique et Les Sortrces de Plafon (Bruxelles, 1 9 2 2 ) ~ pp, 172-81; H. Gauss, Pl~ilosophischer Harldkommenfar zu

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HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

d e n Dialogelt Platos (Bern, 1952-1961), i, 2, 205 ff.; E. Hoffman, Piator1

(Zurich, 1950)~ p. 125; G. Jachmann, Der Platontext, Nachrichten dei. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen (i941), p. 308 ff.; J. Kerschensteiner, Platon rind der Orient (Stuttgart, 1943'3, p. 203 ff.; W. j. W. Koster, Le Mytlze de Platolt, de Zaratlloi~straet des Chuldeens (Leiden, 1951)~ p. 23 f.; W. Lutoslawski, T h e Origin and G r o w t h of Pluto's Logic (London, 1897), pp. 197-98; H. Raeder, Platolls philosopl~iscl~e , 24-25; Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory Entwickelung (Leipzig, ~ g o g )pp. of Ideas (Oxford, 1951)~p. 3 ; P. Shorey, W l l n t Pluto Said (Chicago, 1933), p. 415; E. de Strycker, "Platonica I: L'authenticitk du Premier Alcibiades," Etudes Classiques, xi (1942)~ 135-51; and A. E. Taylor, Plato, t h e M a n and h i s W o r k s (London, 1 9 6 0 ) ~ pp. 13 and 522. The two most staunch adherents to the authenticity of the dialogue are P. Friedlander, Der Grosse Alcibiades; ein w e g z u Plato (Bonn, 1921 and 1923) and C. Vink, Plato's "Eerste Alcibiades," and Pluto 11 (New York, 1964)~ een onderzoek naar zijn ulrtltenticiteit (Amsterdam, 1939), although authenticity is also maintained by A. Festugiere, Contemplation e f v i e corltemplative selo~lPlaton (Paris, 1935), pp. 67-68 and "Grecs et sage orientaux," Revue de PHistoire des Religions,. csss (1945)~p. 29 ff.; G. Grote, Plafo and t h e otlzer c o n l p a n i o ~ ~of s Socrafes (London, 1865), pp. 353-55; G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thougltt (London, ~ 9 3 5 p. ) ~ 8; G. Stallbaum, Platoitis opera olnnia (Berlin, 1826), v, 1, 295 ff.; and L. Stefanini, Platone (Padua, 1932), i, 78 ff. (1st ed.). Also see P. M. Clark, "The Greater Alcibiades," Classical Quarferly, n.s. v (1955), 231-40, and E. Delcominette, S u r I'authenticitk d u "Premier Alcibiadt" de Platon (Liege, 1949). In general, those who doubt the dialogue's genuineness argue that the language is anachronistic or un-Platonic for Plato's early period, that the arguments are tedious, and that the character portrayal of Alcibiades is not worthy of Plato, even the young Plato. Bidez presents an excellent summary of the usual arguments against authenticity (pp. 119-20); I find his presentation the most persuasive of those opposed to authenticity. Friedlander summarizes tht: arguments of the doubters by saying they amount to one: "I do not like it." Bluck is an exception: he argues for inauthenticity by translating airb rb abrb a t l29b and ~ j o d as "mind." I shall have more to say of this later (n. 11). Even the doubters, however, generally agree that it is "l'oeuvre trPs respectable d'un professeur Crudit et de noble inspiration" (Dupreel), that the substance of the dialogue is "authentiquement platonicien" (Bidez), and chat "there are several passages which it is hard to attribute to any lesser hand than Plato's" (Shorey); with a few exceptions, for example Jachmann, it is only with the "greatest reluctance" (Taylor) they ascribe the dialogue to a close student of the Platonic philosophy. Friedlander and Vink, on the other hand, counter these arguments, including Bluck's, with varying degrees of success and argue exhaustively and persuasively that the substance of the dialogue is worthy

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only of Plato himself. Other references of interest include Alain (Emile , 69 ff.; M. Chartier), IdPes: Platon, Descartes, Hegel (Paris, ~ g j z ) p. Croiset, Platon oeuvre completes (Paris, igzo), i, 50-59; H. Dittmar, Aeschines v o n Sphettos (Berlin, 1912), pp. 163-77; G. C. Field, Plato

nnd his Contemporaries; a study i n fourth century life and tholtght (London, 1 9 3 0 ) ~ p. 146 ff.; and cols. 2367-68 on Plato in Paulys.
This approach is, 1 believe, an appropriate modification for Socrates'
educational ideas of Schleiermacher's questioll for resolving the Socratic
problem.
3. Considering the importance Socrates attributes to the SaGwv later (r27e)
in pursuing the discussion further, and hence its intimate connection
with the erotic relationship between the two men, Bidez (op. cit., pp. 113-
14; de Strycker, op. cit., p. 144) is surely incorrect in saying that "Le
'signe dCmonique' de Socrate y recoit une importance excessive. . . ."
4. Clark (op. cit., p. 234, n. I) believes the situation that opens the dialogue
is "grotesque." I am at a loss to understand why, as I fail to comprehend
Bidez (op. cit., p. 105): "On y respire mle atmosphere abstraite, theo-
rique, tout entihe dominee par les problemes et no11 par les personnes."
Rather, with Friedlander (Plato 11, 232), from the begi~ining"the en-
counter [of Socrates and Alcibiades] is frought with a tension unequalled
in Plato," a tension provided certainly not by "une atmosphere ab-
straite," but by an intensely erotic atmosphere. Also see Alain (op. cit.,
p. 69 ff.). 5. Cf. R. Schaerer, La Questioii Platolricieiine (Neuchatel, 1938), pp. 51-52. Note especially p. 51, n. 2 : "Les Grecs du quatriPme sihcle n'ont aucun mot pour exvrimer exactement l'idee moderne de sinceritC. La notion se confond entikrement, pour Platon, avec celle de verith, de connaissance, de clartC, ou de realite. Repondre sincerement, selon lui, c'est repondre de son propre fonds: e t tav7bv, ou rkellement: dv7wF, ou c o n f o r ~ ~ i e ~ ~ i e i ~ t h sa propre pense'e: ps n a 2 G6Eav. 6. The identification of dialectical levels in Socratic dialogues is an arbi-
trary expedient for analytical purposes. The dialectical levels of any
given dialogue will vary accordingto the objectives of the analysis. In
the Alcibiades Major, for example, if the objective is to gain further in-
sight into the Socratic epistemology, the dialogue would be carved into
somewhat different dialectical levels than the ones I will identifv. Ulti-
mately, of course, a Socratic dialogue must be seen synthetically in its
entirety.
7. See Gorgias 4 7 4 ~ o n aiaxp6c and ~ a ~ b q . 8. While most commentators deal at least briefly with the Royal Speech,
I would refer especially to Bidez, op. cit., pp. 122-25; Bluck, op. cit.,
p. 47; n. 9; W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundameiztals of the History of his Development (Oxford, 1934), 131 f.; Friedlander (op. cit., pp. 235-36 and 350-51, n. 12). The argument over the oriental influence in the Royal Speech is one instance of restricting its context.
2.

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HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY

9. Friedlander (op. cit., pp. 235-36) disagrees; he believes the "pride of the young man begins to collapse" earlier, at 116e. This is too strong a statement for 116e, although I would agree Alcibiades is "perplexed." But given the fact this is their first direct encounter I cannot believe the "highminded" Alcibiades would collapse so quickly and easily. I have already cited the appropriate sections of the text 116e-llgb which I believe support this point of view. l o . This interpretation overcomes Taylor's (op. cit., p. 525) problem with this transitional passage as being "oddly abrupt." 1 1 . This apparent "adumbration of the Platonic 'idea' or form" (W. R. M. Lamb in the Loeb edition of the Alcibiades Major, p. 194, n. I) at 129b (add ~aLr6) and 130d (ah; 7'0 ah&)has caused some discussion amongst ' 0 as mind "and finds essencommentators. Bluck translates abA 7 tial support in this interpretation for the rejection of the dialogue" (Friedlander, op. cit., p. 351, n. 13). Since this is a later meaning of the phrase, it sounds strangely as though Bluck is at least partially assuming the very thing he sets out to demonstrate, although I have not read the introduction to his edition of the Alcibiades where I imagine he clarifies this point. Friedlander (Der Grosse, ii, 17), on the other hand, claims ah'o ~ i a ) h 6 occurs naturallv in its context and does not necessarilv carry a technical implication. Clark (op. cit., pp. 235-36) counters Bluck and cites Friedlander for support: she believes at 12gb it means something like "what exactly self is." The arguments of Friedlander and Clark are even more cogent - if we maintain a consistentlv functional connotation to +vx$, in which case the allusion is not to some mysterious "same-in-itself (Lamb's translation, which seems wholly unsatisfactory) but to the problem of knowing the very process of knowing itself. This is warranted, as I will try to show, by the mirror passage. Cf. infra and my "The Problem Posed at Charmides 165a-~66c,"Phronesis, ix, 2, 107-14. 1 2 . For comments on the mirror passage see, among others, Bidez, op, cif., pp. 114 and 119; Bluck, op. cit., p. 46, n. 2; Clark, op. cif., 236 ff.; Friedlander, Pluto I I , pp. 236-38 and 351-52; Jaeger, op. cit., p. 165, n. I ; Kerschensteiner, op. cit., p. 202, n. 3; de Strycker, op. cit., pp. 146-49; and E. des Places, Revue des Efudes Grecques, xliv (1931) 164. Clark's discussion is especially interesting, i n which she connects the mirror passage with the myth in the Phaedrus and the educative function of astronomy in the Timaeus. 13. O n the use of intelligence for co$ia see Festugiere, op, cif., p. 68,'n. 3.

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