Gainsborough, M.

, 2009, The (Neglected) Statist Bias and the Developmental State: the case of Singapore and Vietnam, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 7, 1317-1328. A Review by Siyaduma Biniza*

In his journal article, The (Neglected) Statist Bias and the Developmental State: the case of Singapore and Vietnam, Martin Gainsborough argues that the literature on developmental state uses a Weberian understanding of the state as the only analytical tool thus prescribing Weberian-state values normatively in the discourse. Furthermore, because of the dominant feature of international politics at the time of its emergence, the developmental state literature is not unaffected by the superpower struggles of the Cold War and the post-cold war period1. Thus, Gainsborough criticises the developmental state theory literature for its inherent Weberian-state bias; also pointing out the crucial fact that the literature is influenced by global politics. In closing he analyses the case of Vietnam and Singapore to prove his thesis by demonstrating that these two states, which are considered dissimilar in political science and academic literature, are in fact similar, if our analysis avoids the abovementioned bias and its consequences. Therefore, this paper argues that Gainsborough offers valuable insights which have significant consequences that invalidate the developmental state theory as an analytical tool for prescribing policy options for all states because of its inherent bias. Moreover, these consequence show that the developmental state theory can be used as a political tool. This has been overlooked by developmental state theorist, which neglects the role of global politics in the developmental trajectory of states. Thus the

Gainsborough argues that the literature on the developmental state is not unaffected by global power relations; and that the historical context leading to the emergence of the development state hinders accurate analysis of its workings. See (Gainsborough 2009).
1

developmental state theory take an isolated analysis of the state; focusing on the internal conditions that lead to development whilst ignoring the influence of global politics.

The Developmental State Theory The developmental state theory (hereafter referred to as DST) has become a prominent way of theorising about the development of states challenging the traditional notions proposed by democracy and free market advocates. The DST emerged from the seminal work of Chalmers Johnson, which is concerned with the role of the Japanese state in the countrys economic success. Johnson highlights the importance of the political elites wilfulness, their style of leadership, the economic bureaucracy and the autonomy of the state; as key ingredients of the developmental state2. As a result many other political theorists have contributed to the literature through their observations from the high-growth South-East Asian economies, which led to the emergence and conceptual prominence of the DST. The DST emphasises the importance of: a strong politically-willed developmental elite, the relative autonomy of the state from society, an insulated and wilful economic bureaucracy, the subjugation of civil society, control over private economic interests, and a legitimised technocracy; as the integral characteristics of the developmental state3. Therefore, the DST literature asserts a positive list of criteria that are integral for a developmental state; using South-East Asian cases as a sample from which it draws common characteristics. The assertion is that developmental states require strongly

Johnson argues that there is an intimate relation between private and public sectors in Japan; pointing out the intensity of state involvement in the market. See (Johnson 1982). 3 Gainsborough provides a concise overview of Adrian Leftwichs summative contribution in the literature on the developmental state. See (Gainsborough 2009).
2

politically-willed elites that can intervene in the market and co-ordinate private economic interests in favour of national goals such as high growth. And that this requires a civil society that can be subjugated and a technocratic bureaucracy that can design and implement policies successfully, which requires a certain level of state autonomy from private economic interests. But these prescriptions have been challenged. For example, Peter Evans asserts that the developmental state should not just seek autonomy from the private sector and society; instead, the state needs to exercise embedded autonomy to harness a mutually beneficial relation between private and public sectors to ensure development4. Moreover, Evans argues that the relationship between the state and private organisations should be such that the state can protect its nationalist bureaucratic interests from being veered by the dominant economic interests of the private sector; whilst allowing the state to co-ordinate both public and private interests in pursuit of development5. Therefore, Gainsborough notes that the key concern in the literature on the DST has been the role of the state in development and its influence in the market; in contrast to the traditional role played by the state in capitalist and socialist regimes6. But the validity of the developmental state theory has been challenged by many theorists who argue for the decline of state influence in the market or global changes that invalidate the theory. Challenges of the DST

Evans idea of embeddedness asserts the necessity of an interconnectedness between the state and society to ensure a two-way flow of ideas and learning that benefits both state and society. Therefore, the state and private organisations need to work together in ensuring development. See (Evans 1995). 5 Evans argues for the importance of the states role in development because it can limit detraction from the national, or public, goals of the state whilst allowing the pursuit of private interests. So the state needs to co-ordinate and negotiate for both national and private interests in its pursuit of development. See pages 10-78 of (Evans 1995). 6 Gainsborough argues that the DST literature has related states success to their ability to design and implement policy that enhances economic growth. See (Gainsborough 2009).
4

In an era of neoliberalism, the state can no longer interfere in markets as it may have in the past. Therefore, the central argument against, and for, the DST is that: those countries that seek to utilise the prescriptions of developmental state theory are either restricted in various ways through international law, making developmental state theory obsolete; or that these states have simply adjusted to these changes, which reinstates the relevance of the developmental state theory7. Therefore states either cannot implement any of the prescriptions of the DST which invalidates the theory; or the state have been forced to adapt to neoliberal changes when pursuing developmental interests, thus the prescriptions of the DST have to cognisant of this, which validates the DST. However, the assertion neoliberalism limits the actions that states can perform in developmental states has been challenged. For example, Hugo Radice asserts the importance of Marxist economics as an alternative to the neoliberal analysis and the underlying statist assumptions; which allows for the relevance of the DST8. Hugo argues that even though the developmental state theory is a point of departure for those who reject neoliberal ideology of contemporary politics; in the era of neoliberalism, globalisation and a declining role of the state - an effective alternative to neoliberalism needs to be centred on Marxs concept of class instead of a state-centric approach. Nevertheless, Gainsborough considers three main criticisms against the DST, namely that: the DST presents the state as a monolithic actor in development; the DST draws a sharp distinction between the elusive realms of the state and society; and that the

Gainsborough argues that even though developmental state theory might not be as prominent as it once was; its important elements are still relevant in policy-making and academic literature. See (Gainsborough 2009). 8 See (Radice 2008).
7

DST overemphasises the role of the state in development above the role of society9. These criticisms question the validity of the DST by highlighting the elusive distinction between the state, or public sector, and private organisations. Firstly the assertion is that the distinction between state and private organisations is difficult to discern, or blurry, which undermines these distinctions as they are drawn in the DST. Then, where this is not the case, criticisms have argued that the DST overstates the role of the state and private organisation in development thus neglecting the role of civil society. These criticisms are closely related to an analysis of state-centric theories by Timothy Mitchell. Mitchell argues that the assertion of public and private distinctions should not be understood as a representation of a totalised power structure; since there is as much conflict between these spheres, as there is amongst government agencies and between private organisations. Moreover, the complexity of this distinction should not lead us to reject the distinction any more than we should be persuaded to reject the theory of the state10. Regardless though, Gainsborough argues that these criticisms of the DST are unhelpful and that there is something more fundamentally wrong with the DST above and beyond the considerations of these criticisms. Weberian Statist Assumption Gainsborough asserts that the DST has a few fundamental assumptions about the state which are not universally true. The first assumption is the Weberian view of the state as a rational-bureaucratic actor. This results in the analysis of all states as Weberian rational-bureaucratic states when there are many non-Weberian states. Gainsborough argues that this assumption is universalised as though the Weberian state is the only

See (Gainsborough 2009). Mitchell argues that the complexity of the distinction between state and private organisations should not persuade political scientists to reject the distinction and replace it with a political system analysis since this does not solve the problem of elusiveness in the distinction; whilst he argues for an approach that can account for the salience and elusiveness of the state. See (Mitchell 1991).
9 10

form of state when in fact non-Weberian state are common and should not be seen as aberrations11. This assumption, according to Gainsborough, is what leads to the unsound analysis of the strength of state, which is measured according to how effective they are in providing public goods12. Therefore, this results in normative application of Weberian-state values to analyse non-Weberian states according to their capacity in pursuing Weberian-state values. However, an objection Gainsborough might that, even though the DST has an inherent Weberian-state assumption, other state forms do not have a positive relation to development. This is a view supported by Leftwich who argues that, even though institutions such as the World Bank have taken a Weberian approach to development, even the most unpromising states can improve by advancing good governance in pursuit of developmental goals; instead of the opposite, which he refers to as bad governance13. But this is precisely what Gainsborough highlights; that not all states pursue Weberian-state values and that, for such states, development might mean something completely different to attaining Weberian values and the provision of public goods. Moreover, the Weberian assumption leads to normative application of Weberian-state values in the DST, such that developmental states are seen as desirable states over other pre-existing state-types. Gainsborough argues that when scholars analyse the capacity of states, they do so in terms of public goods delivery as if these goods are universally valued in the same way14. He argues further that, even though we can compare non-Weberian states to Weberian states, it would be more plausible to
Gainsborough quotes a passage from Beatrice Hibou who asserts that Webers th eory on the state does not preclude non-Weberian states; and that such states are common in the non-Western world. See (Gainsborough 2009). 12 According to Gainsborough, this is what underlies the distinction between weak and failed states. This analysis compares all state under DST related to how these states are effective in designing and implementing policies for economic development. See (Gainsborough 2009). 13 Here Leftwich is arguing in favour of good governance as a prerequisite for development; where good governance is pursuit of Weberian-state values and the delivery of public goods. See (Leftwich 1993) 14 See (Gainsborough 2009).
11

analyse what non-Weberian states desire and measure them according to their own objectives15. This is further illustrated by Leftwichs contributions to the DST, in which he argues that autonomy and authority of bureaucracies in developmental states allows them direct control of the economy and, that this is what separates predatory states such as those common to Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America where bureaucracies are an actual hindrance to developmental progress because of their politics of patronage16. Therefore, the literature on the DST is biased towards a Weberian conception of the state, which affects the objectivity of the analysis. This results in a normative application of Weberian-state values in a universalistic way. Thus, the Weberian state bias invalidates the DST as an analytical tool to prescribe policy options for states because of its narrow conception of the state. Neglecting Cold War Political Effects Gainsborough points out that the DST literature neglects the strong influence of global politics in the analysis of developmental state. A direct consequence of overlooking the Weberian-state bias neglects the ideological effects of global politics in the DST. AS a result most political theorists tend to think that they are making an objective analysis of developmental states; without cognisance of the normative elements in their analysis, which is influenced by global politics in its biased view that all states are Weberian. Therefore, Gainsborough reminds us that the DST emerged during the Cold War

Gainsborough argues that non-Weberian states may not value delivery of public goods, since they might value patronage instead; and that social order and total control may not be a non-Weberian state priority, since they rely on disorder to rule in the first place. See (Gainsborough 2009). 16 Leftwich is arguing about the importance of national politics, which he asserts from a Weberian state assumption as discussed. However, his argument is positioned as an objective observation of the workings of states in the abovementioned geographic regions. See On the Primacy of Politics in (Leftwich 2000).
15

motivated by the need to understand the economic success of US-aligned states in Asia17. Moreover, even though the Cold War has long ended, the DST is still being used as a political tool to promote certain values. Therefore Gainsborough notes that developmentalism is incentivised whilst other values are shunned and punished. This results in a positive view if a state has distinct public-private divisions with an autonomous public sector in pursuit of non-universal goods being viewed as a good state18. Therefore the DST is more influenced by global politics than it is about the state in an objective sense. This is caused by the Weberian state assumption which results in a Weberian-normative analysis of the state instead of an objective analysis. Thus all developmental states are analysed in relation to dominant global power structures. Singapore and Vietnam Gainsborough compares Singapore with Vietnam to prove his thesis. These two countries have been considered different in many respects by the literature. Vietnam is seen as disorderly, having unlawful citizens and blurry state-private separations; and Singapore is seen as orderly with law-abiding citizens and distinct public-private sectors characterised by low corruption19. Furthermore, analysts would argue that, even though the Peoples Action Party (PAP) of Singapore has won all elections since the late 1950s, there is room for opposition; whilst Vietnams Communist Party does

Gainsborough argues that, even though the DST was not merely an attempt to understand economic success, it was definitely motivated by the need to promote certain values that were aligned with US interest; as opposed to alternative values, the same way that modernisation theory did the same thing. See (Gainsborough 2009). 18 Gainsborough here notes that neoliberalism is widely documented for its celebration of success stories whilst it demonises aberrations. See (Gainsborough 2009). 19 See (Gainsborough 2009).
17

not allow for opposition20. Moreover, the highlighted differences are entangled with Cold War politics and thus emphasising very objective political differences. For example, Gainsborough argues that, at close inspection, the two countries are very similar because of their common Confucian heritage. Firstly, both political elites have the same perception towards opposition as illustrated by the unfair advantage Singapore where the PAP took 82 of the 84 seats in parliament after a 66% victory in the polls during their 2006 elections21. In addition, the state-private distinction is no clearer in Singapore than it is in Vietnam; as illustrated by the successional victory of the past Singaporean prime ministers son and his wifes positions as chief executive of a government-linked enterprise22. Therefore, the difference that most political literature emphasises disappears when we take a closer and more objective observation of what actually occurs in these states. Thus, Gainsborough argues that since Vietnam stands in opposition to transnational capitalism, there is an incentive to depict it as disorderly, economically uncertain and demonise it as a pariah; as a political tool to encourage its full integration into the global capitalist system. On the other hand, Singapore is more aligned with transnational capitalism and thus it is depicted it in a different light which overlooks nepotism and seeming corruption23. Therefore, a states position in relation to global politics has far-reaching consequences, which includes politico-economic privileges as a result of their depiction in the global political system. Furthermore, this might have an effect on the developmental

Here, Gainsborough emphasises the fact that, aside from demographic differences, most of the literature focuses on the differences between the two states. See (Gainsborough 2009) 21 See (Gainsborough 2009). 22 Gainsborough argues that the public-private distinction is just as blurry in Singapore as it is in Vietnam. See (Gainsborough 2009). 23 Gainsboroughs main point here is that a countrys standpoint in relation to global power divisions has far-reaching consequences on how we analyse the politics of that country, which political theorists and the DST overlook. See (Gainsborough 2009).
20

trajectory of states; since their standpoint in relation global politics and the dominant economic order has far-reaching consequences. This is especially the case in a predominantly neoliberal world. Moreover, these are consequences that the DST overlooks in favour of domestic political conditions that do not take into consideration the states position in global politics; whilst asserting normative policy suggestions that are meant to foster economic growth without cognisance of effect global politics and the states position in the international system. Thus, the biased focus on intrastate politics in the DST neglects the significance global power politics and its effects on development; making development seem like the consequence of isolated national politics and economic structures. Conclusion The prominence of the DST has raised many objections against its validity, which have focused on the distinction between state and private organisations in society. However, having considered some of the unhelpful criticism against the DST, this paper has argued that Gainsborough offers invaluable insights. These insights have significant consequences that invalidate the DST as an analytical tool for the prescription of policy options for developmental states; because of the Weberian state assumption. Moreover, since the DST is not unaffected by global politics, Gainsboroughs insights highlight the fact that the DST also neglects the role of international power relations in the developmental trajectory of states.

Bibliography Chang, HaJoon. "The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic Development." In Rethinking Development Economics, edited by HaJoon Chang, 4160. London: Anthem Press, 2003. Evans, Peter B. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. Gainsborough, Martin. "The (Neglected) Statist Bias and the Developmental State: the case of Singapore and Vietnam." Third World Quarterly 30, no. 7 (October 2009): 1317-1328. Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 19251975. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982. Leftwich, Adrian. "Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World." Third World Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1993): 605-624. Leftwich, Adrian. "States of Development." In On the Primacy of Politics in Development, by Adrian Leftwich, 160-164. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. Meyns, Peter, and Charity Musamba. The Developmental State in Africa: Problems and Prospects. INEFReport, Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg: University of DuisburgEssen, 2010. Mitchell, Timothy. "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics." The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (March 1991): 77-96. Radice, Hugo. "The Developmental State under Global Neoliberalism." Third World Quarterly 29, no. 6 (July 2008): 1153-1174. Weiss, Linda. "Developmental States in Transition. Adapting, Dismantling, Innovating, not Normalising." The Pacific Review 13, no. 1 (2000): 2155.

* Siyaduma Biniza is currently a final-year student at the University of Cape Town studying towards a B.Soc.Sci in Politics, Philosophy and Economics.