Technical Aspects of Storage Tank Loss Prevention

Szu-Ying Huang and M. Sam Mannan Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-3122; mannan@tamu.edu (for correspondence)
Published online 8 February 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.11550

Storage tanks are the most common chemical containing vessels within the process industries. There have been many accidents associated within storage tank (material deciency, structure design failures, operation error etc.) or among storage areas throughout the history. Both human error and natural disasters can result in devastating incidents for tanks that are usually kept outdoors under weather inuences, as well as the tank bodies and accessories are poorly designed, abused, or are not effectively inspected and maintained. There are potential hazards which must be assessed carefully before construction, during operation, and after shutdown of any storage areas including hazardous or ammable chemicals. This article offers an overview of the tank and tank farm with signicant incident causes about aboveground tank design failures, operation problems, and maintenance issues, with the relating discussion about the implementation of process safety management and regulations. Also, some innovative storage unit technologies including groundings, roof design, safer lling procedures, and tank re mitigation systems are introduced to give a proper information session to help industry understand the tank hazards and implement C 2013 adequate actions to prevent incidents and losses. V American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 2836, 2013 Keywords: storage tank incidents; loss prevention; tank design; tank inspection; hazardous material storage regulations
INTRODUCTION

tanks. Also, as long as most oil and gas industry pay attention to low-pressure atmospheric tankage and the related loading/discharging of railcars, ships, and road trucks found in terminals or tank depots, being a specic area of tank farm incidents occurrence studies (BP Process Safety Series, 2005), reviews of previous storage tank studies will be considered and the main concern of this article. To analyze random process elements, there are three main parts which shall be considered carefully: design specications, operation conditions (pressure, temperature, ow parameters), and maintenance (including regular repair works, monitoring of abnormal cases, and re-startup checks). The tank selections (cone roof, open top, internal oating, etc) are based on the operating conditions, containing materials, and local environmental cases. Each of these requires more concern on technology innovations for the potential hazards due to their specications. The statistics [1] of tank and tank farm incidents expresses that overlling has caused 69 out of 242 reported tank-related incidents happening in the US region from 1960 to 2006, while in the same time range there were 80 lightning-caused res destroying many storage tanks. Many aspects of tank in process or even notin-use can go wrong. The tank spacing, grounding devices, relief valves, level control, monitoring system, and many other layers of protection in technical point of view shall be carefully analyzed. In summary, this article will provide the following information to review the process safety of storage tank and depot areas:  Learn from history: anything small can cause huge troubles  Tank and tank farm hazards analysis  Recent technology and regulations on loss prevention of tank and tank farms  What else can we do to make tank/tank farm safer
EXAMPLE CASE OF STORAGE TANK AND TANK FARM INCIDENT

Storage tanks are the fundamental for the storing of liquid, gas, and other chemical uids. Storage tanks provide accommodation of inventory for raw materials, additives reactants, intermediate materials, nished products, and wastes. Thus, the safety on tank itself is important, as it is the rst layer in contact with chemical materials and connected with other process devices. Among the various functions, design, and shapes of tanks, the most discussed and applied one is the category of aboveground storage tanks (AST). ASTs are easy to manage and maintain as long as they are above the ground and would suffer less from the soil contaminations, pressure of structure design, and spacing with other infrastructure system of the location of tank farm. Usually, crude oil products, intermediates, and raw chemicals with ammable or toxic hazards are likely to be stored in ASTs. This work will consider the more general classications of storage units by operation conditions and containing materials, with respect to the design differences on these two main categories of

C 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers V

Chemical plant incidents attract unwanted attention. Tank and tank farm issues are not the exception. In November 2008, there was a catastrophic tank collapse happened in Allied Terminal Inc. Tank storage area at Chesapeake, Virginia. On the day of the incident, Allied employees were lling the incident Tank with liquid fertilizer UAN32 to check for leaks prior to painting the tank. During the lling, a welder and his helper sealed leaking rivets on the tank. At a ll level about 3.5 inches below the (calculated) maximum liquid level, the tank split apart vertically, beginning at a defective weld at midway up the tank. The liquid fertilizer overtopped the secondary containment, partially ooding the site and adjacent neighborhood. The collapsing tank wall seriously injured the welder
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and his helper. Over 200,000 gallons of the liquid fertilizer were not recovered; some entered the southern branch of the Elizabeth River, causing serious contamination. According to Chemical Safety Boards (CSB) investigation, the causes of the incident shall be traced back to 2 years before the incident tank was put into use [2]. Originally, the tank (numbering Tank 201) was used for petrochemical storage; Allied modied the welding in order to make it a liquid fertilizer container. Since the chemicals had different specic gravity, Allied Inc. contracted G&T to modify Tank 201 by replacing the vertical riveted joints with butt-welded joints. This was to increase the strength of the joints, which would permit an increase in the maximum liquid level and allow more fertilizer to be stored in Tank 201. In 2007, While G&T was modifying Tank 201, another contracted inspector HMT performed an American Petroleum Institute (API) 653 Out-ofService inspection saying that the safety lling height was 25.65 feet. This number was increased to 27.01 feet based on an April 2001 metallurgical test report provided by Allied Inc. On the day of incident, as the tank was being lled, when the tank reached a level of 26.72 feet, a vertical split started midway up the shell and rapidly ruptured to the oor and to the roof of the tank on the side opposite the workers. As the pressure of the liquid fertilizer inside the tank opened the split, the tank shell separated from the bottom and roof, quickly spilled and released the contents and caused damages. The main issues regarding this incident had brought multiple layers of problems. First, Allied did not ensure that welds on the plates to replace vertical riveted joints met generally accepted industry quality standards for tank fabrication. Second, the company had not performed postwelding inspection (spot radiography) required for the calculated maximum liquid level for the tank. Finally, the employer had no safety procedures or policies for work on or around tanks that were being lled for the rst time following major modications and directed contractors to seal leaking rivets while tank was being lled to the calculated maximum liquid level for the rst time. Making the responsible statement clearer, Allied Inc. did not use an authorized inspector or an engineer experienced in storage tank design to approve the modications to the tank. Their contractor of welding, G&T, did not use qualied weld procedures or welders to perform the modication in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI: Welding and Brazing Qualication. They did not require or perform spot radiography on tank, while in this case a thorough radiography crack check is necessary for hazardous contents. Last but not least, the testing contractor, HMT, calculated a maximum liquid level for the tank using the requirements for weld joints that are spot radiographed. HMT calculated a maximum liquid level for the tank based on an average wall thickness in lieu of a minimum wall thickness, which is likely to be overestimated. Starting from the incident, this brought out the issues that may lead of enormous accidents. On the other hand, if there is more understanding and awareness of the tank and tank farm hazard, the incidents can be more thoroughly controlled.
TANK HAZARDS AND TECHNICAL PROTECTIONS

both regularly during normal operating rounds and periodically by individuals who assure the mechanical integrity of the tanks. Periodic internal inspections of the tanks are by far the most important. These inspections should include thickness readings of the walls and the tank oor. The CSB has identied hot works around tanks as signicant ignition sources for tank res (CSB, 2009) [3]. A proper hot work permit system must be in place to prevent possible ignition sources from encountering ammable atmospheres. These hot work permits should incorporate gas testing for ammables. The followings are a series of hazards identication regarding tank and tank farms, the technical protection available for loss prevention and mentioning of related regulatory standards to guide and require the construction, evaluation, operation, and maintenance of storage tanks. Design Issues
Material Rupture and Corrosion

The failure of liquid storage tanks originates from inadequate tank design, construction, inspection, and maintenance. Tank design and construction have already been discussed throughout industry facilities, academic research, and various projects. The failure rate for tanks already in service can be reduced via tank maintenance and weld inspections. To minimize the severity of possible tank failures, there should be a secondary containment such as a dike surrounding the tank. In terms of tank inspection, prior to startup a close external inspection of leaks and corrosion should be made. External inspections should be performed
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Tank body structure and material hazards. The design of the storage tanks themselves is the rst aspect of the tank farm safety issue. A good design must balance the desired performance with allowable costs. The material selection of tank body according to tank area location, compatibility of materials storage, ease of fabrication, and resistance to corrosion [4] heavily inuences both factors. The most widely used tank materials are composed of carbon steel, due to high corrosion resistance or climate factors. Aluminum, stainless steel, and ber glass are also used as tank building materials in certain situations. API 650, the tank fabrication standard details the principles on steel structure and plates stresses requirements for different types of storage. Corrosion is also one of the main causes of storage tank structure failures excluding the material characteristics mentioned above. This phenomenon occurs in: (a) external surfaces exposed to the ambient environment, (b) under the tank bottom, and (c) the internal liquid/vapor space of the tank. The atmospheric corrosion usually takes place on the roof or shell, especially when storage depot is close to warm, humid regions. The oxidization from the air may cause tank corrosion, while strong winds can form rusts to scratch through tank body over time increase the severity of surface damage. The side/ bottom corrosion is usually due to ground level water layers, construction racks linked to tank supports (especially elevated tanks and spherical tanks). This is likely to happen on crude oil storage tanks with two-phase products that include corrosive chlorides; pitting from the latter will appear at the bottom part of tank surface. Internal corrosion, especially in two-phase systems, is very signicant factor for tanks containing rened hydrocarbon or acidic product tanks. The liquid-vapor interface has the most serious corrosion because of oxygen-moisture interaction. This kind of corrosion typically occurs in oating-roof, as the material is usually aluminum alloys which are relatively light and controllable, but have lower corrosion resistance. There are some related phenomena coming with corrosion-risky conditions, such as hydrostatic testing uid pitting, erosion due to lling impingment, static electricity, cavitation damage, thermal fretting/frictions, and hydrogen embrittlement. Along with these aspects, design considerations must also include the storage chemical properties, operating conditions, and the environment issues to produce a functional and safe storage tank system. Technical protection. Materials grouping in API 650 can be classied into three main factors of discussion: (1) killed/ semikilled (2) normalizing (3) quenching and tempering
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plates [18]. API 650 categorized the variables into eight groups (six main groups and two subcategories). The comparison of the property of these cases is listed in detail in the regulations, and minimum tolerances for tank performance are specied for industrial reference. Factors affecting brittle fracture are also presented. Brittle fractures can trigger huge failures for tanks, leading to accidental spills and releases from the structure cracks and rupture spots. Local stress allowance is important in analyzing the fracture issue. API 650 contains the averages of longitudinal and transverse plate Charpy V-notch test (CVN test) results for the eight categories of steel materials, and the acceptance requirements can explain design specication of storage tanks. Parameters such as operating temperature, welding, material compositions, and thicknesses are also considered as well in early design stage of material selection, surface treatment, and other analysis. Another important aspect of tank body condition can be done by radiography and nondestructive tank shell checking. This is signicant to observe and nd out the material structure failures. There are various nondestructive methods used to prevent tank collapse and failure on the structure design, built, and prestartup evaluation. Radiography of tanks is one of the most important, widely used one among the tools. The basic design is usually the sensor connected with the data acquisition system, monitoring the level of lling with regard to the welding surfaces, and tracks back the defects. The basic categories of the tools are: (a) spot radiography: a radiographic technology that allows real-time examination of the longitudinal weld; (b) full radiography: with Lethal material stored in the tank or tank is under extreme operation/maintenance conditions; and (c) nonintrusive tests: IR image, Sonics, Tank Floor, Electro-Magnetic Acoustic Transducers, thermal imaging.
Tank Roof Failures

tanks with limited roof apex angle. A Frangible roof is a roof to shell joint or junction that is weaker than the rest of the tank and will preferentially fail if the tank is over pressurized. Since this junction will fail before any other part of the tank, such as the shell, the bottom, or the shell to bottom joint, the bottom and shell can be relied on to be intact. e. Seismic Zone Design Failure: In API 650 Appendix E, there are series of advices mentioning the seismic issues about minimum requirement available in tank foundation design. Failure of tanks during Chilean earthquake of 1960 and Alaska earthquake of 1964 led to beginning of many investigations on seismic analysis of liquid storage tanks. Following two aspects came to forefront:  Due consideration should be given to sloshing effects of liquid and exibility of container wall while evaluating the seismic forces on tanks.  It is recognized that tanks are less ductile and have low energy absorbing capacity and redundancy compared to the conventional building systems. The failure modes of seismic design are likely to be: tear piping, base separated from shell, oating roof collapse, and sloshing wave damages [23]. Seismic motions caused tank roofs to lose buoyancy and go to the direction of gravity with relative velocity on seismic force. Even though API 650 Appendix E has been updated continuously, the API AST committees still consider these recommendations to be a work in progress. The earth activity zone regarding soil layer structures, earthquake scales, and seismic waves resulting sloshing waves had been causing many serious accidents to liquid storage tanks containing ammable chemicals, such as 1998 Turkey Ismit Tank farm incidents due to earthquake, and 2002 Japan Hokkaidos Chemical Tank Incidents [6] Technical protections. There are various ways to prevent tank roof failures. From a study done in 2004 by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company [7], the roof failure location, conditions, and possible consequence if the safeguard does not exist/function are listed as Tables 1 and 2. From the study, we can clearly see that the safeguard shall be put in place especially in terms of overpressure and overlling prevention, better basic structure of tank roof, good welding practices, and avoiding objects collision, such as heavy snow, rain, or other external loads. In this logic, the ventilation of excess pressure, storage contents, and rooftop loads shall be carefully designed and put in service. The instruments which monitor the level control and pressure rise due to various reasons need to be kept in function and connected to relief system and alarms. More examples will be given in later sections about operation errors. Walkways. Another attempt to create a bond between the roof and the shell relies on the tanks walkway. Nearly, all tanks have a walkway or ladder where the upper end is attached to the rim of the tank, and the lower end is resting on the oating roof. The quality of this electrical connection is questionable. The upper connection is a bolted hinge subject to loosening, corrosion, and surface-covering paints. The lower end is a pressure connection with only two wheels resting on rails and is also subject to corrosion and surfacecovering paints. This can also be a signicant consideration while dealing with roof failure prevention.
Potential Ignition Source and Flammable Vapor

Roof problem hazards. Except for the installation failure itself, tank roofs can experience several other hazardous cases which will lead to potential damage. From a incident investigation study of a naphtha tank re in Singapore [5], they found a main factor causing this incident was also roof failure, due to a combination of heavy rain, maintenance problems, and inherent design features caused the oating roof on naphtha tank to start sinking. Tank roof safety is sure to be a signicant issue regarding loss prevention. a. Internal Beam Rupture: usually triggered by material corrosion or pitting. The welding of the roof and tank body is an important failure point, as damage to the joint can be the starting point of both atmospheric corrosion and internal corrosion. The structure damage of the tank beam may even inuence the rim seals, the deck, and the construction pontoons. b. Vent System Failures: the vacuum or overpressure due to operation problems, ventilation system aws, and incorrect setting procedures, or inadequate inspection and maintenance of the vent controls. c. Snow/Rain Topping issue: Leaks can occur as the weight and drifts of heavy snow or rain cause ttings, joints, and sometimes even the entire tank to shift. This process can also cause leaks and disruptions to the ttings. Snow covering a tank roof can prevent leaking gas from escaping and thus create a pocket of gas that can fuel a massive explosion. Besides, exhaust vents for tank top can be clogged by heavy snow or rain if the collecting and draining systems were not properly designed according to the climate of that storage area. d. Frangible Roof-Shell Joints: a term dened in the main tank construction standards BSEN 14015 and API650. The concept of frangible roof only applies to at bottom, cone roof
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Tank fire hazards. With existence of ignition sources from nearby area of the tanks, the failures from design issues mentioned above will be the source of signicant hazards. The possible ignition sources are everywhere in tank area: welding equipment, cables, static electricity, and other
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Table 1. Internal oating roof tank hazards (Adapted from Ref. [12]). Operating Mode Startup Normal operations Maintenance Inspection Startup Normal operations Potential Hazards Filling the tank with legs landed Excessive ll rate Release of hydrocarbon vapors from unexpected source in roof seal Release of hydrocarbon vapors to environment during internal inspections Flammable environment in head space If operators are not aware of oating roof level, may inadvertently land the roof, creating vapor in head space Minor res during maintenance Product on the roof Roof hangs up, causing internal re High snow loads, with less heat available in IFR design Static electricity and induced charge differentials Mixer motor replacement creates ammable head space Worker injury due to reduce working space from oating roof Cause On initial ll, this should normally occur Operator error Maintenance in tank Internal inspection as required by regulations On initial ll, this should normally occur Instrument error, operator error Effects if No Safe Guard in Place Effect range from no impact to possible re or environmental release Environmental release, possible roof sunken, or pool re Worker injury Environmental release Effect range from no impact to possible re or environmental release Effects ranging from seal re to explosion Minor re during maintenance Fire in head space Flammable space below oating roof or burning liquid above oating roof Increase snow removal on the cone roof, with commensurate worker injury exposure Provides an ignition source which can ignite vapors stemming from a seal leak, leading to seal re Possible re, worker injury Possible re, worker injury

Maintenance Normal operations Normal operations Normal operations Normal operations

Maintenance in tank, maybe more difcult to clean IFR tank prior to maintenance Roof hangs up on columns, earthquake Hangs up on columns, earthquake, turbulence during ll, wax build-up High snow loads, but less benet from product heat, area above roof open to environment Fluid ow, improper grounding, wax buildup, lightning Mixer motor failures that requires tank entry Inherent IFR tank design

Maintenance Maintenance

Table 2. Cone roof tank hazards (Adapted from Ref. [12]). Operating Mode Startup Maintenance Normal operations Potential Hazards Flammable environment in head space Minor re during maintenance High snow load Cause On initial ll, this should normally occur Maintenance in tank High snow loads, but less benet from product heat, vents and open manways open to the environment Operator error, level indication and alarm failure lightning Mixer motor failure Typical causes of leaks in rotating equipments Internal inspection as required by regulation Effects if No Safe Guards in Place Possible re or explosion Minor re during maintenance Snow removal on the cone roof, potential for worker injury exposure Spill crude to the environment, potential for pool re Provides an ignition source which can ignite vapors through an opening in the tank Possible tank re Effect range from seal re to explosion Environmental release

Normal operations Normal operations Maintenance Normal operations Inspection

Overll Static electricity and induced charge differentials Mixer motor replacement leads to ammable environment in tank Process safety hazard from vapor recovery system Release of hydrocarbon vapors to the environment during internal inspection

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miscellaneous sources from human error. Static electricity is dependent on two properties: generation and accumulation. Generation of static electricity occurs whenever two objects are rubbed against each other. With the existence of ammable fuel vapor on the top of storage tank, near leaking or release points, and even the more serious vapor cloud formed near tank farm, the ignition sources may cause major incidents. The generation of static electricity cannot be completely prevented but should be reduced for tank safety. API 2003 mentions several means of static electric generation: ow generation, pumping, changes in vortex or pipeline diameter, ow through lters or ttings, splashing, spraying, and tank lling. Under ideal conditions, though, the charge immediately dissipates. The generation of static electricity can be handled without hazard if accumulation does not occur. Accumulation occurs when the generation of electricity is greater than the dissipation. 0.16% of tanks have a rim re every year, 95% of those are caused by lightning. The sparks are due to the accumulation of electricity and can lead to huge res and losses. Technical protection. Inerting [16] [17]. The elimination of ammable fuel vapors in commercial aircraft fuel tanks is a principal safety priority. Proper inerting of a fuel tank can signicantly decrease the risk of explosions and res. Liqueed Natural Gas (LNG) carriers and ground level tank farms are required to have inerting systems to prevent such incidents. Inerting refers to the rendering of the ullage (the air above the fuel) unable to propagate a reaction given ammable conditions and an ignition source. In this case, it refers specically to reducing the oxygen concentration in the tank. This effectively eliminates one side of the re triangle. Usually, a pump is used to exhaust the oxygen rich waste to ambient pressure, an inert gas generating system in order to improve the performance of the permeable membrane air separator component and to insure sufcient generation of inert gas when available source air pressure is low. Nitrogen inerting systems are another safeguard which is often employed. Chemical plants that have xed roof tanks and are concerned about ammable atmospheres or the inhalation of moisture may relay on nitrogen pads. Compressed nitrogen is piped into the vessels and maintains a few ounces of pressure. This avoids the potential for air to be sucked out of the tank as the internal pressure drops due to cooling or liquid being pumped out. Shunts for floating roof tanks. NFPA 780 requires that stainless steel shunts be spaced no more than 10 feet apart around the roof perimeter. These shunts are bolted to the edge of the oating roof and connect with the inside of the shell. Unfortunately, shunts do not bond well for several reasons. First, some components of heavy crude oil, such as wax, tar, and parafn, tend to coat the inside of the tank wall, forming an isolating barrier between the shell and the shunts. Second, rust on the inside of the shell creates a high-resistance connection between the shells and the shunts. Third, 10 to 25% of tanks are painted on the inside, typically with an epoxy-based paint which insulates the shell from the shunts. Finally, large tanks may become elliptically distort by several inches, which can cause the shunts to pull away from the shell. Another method uses shunts submerged in the stored product. These submerged shunts may provide some benets when arcing occurs, since no air is present, however, the submerged shunts still rely on pressure contact that is subject to all the conditions outlined above. In addition, submerged shunts are exceedingly difcult to inspect and maintain. Roof-shell bonding cable. Another method is to install a cable from the top of the shell to the middle of the roof, typically on the order of 250 to 500 MCM. The cable is con32 March 2013 Published on behalf of the AIChE

nected to the top of the rim near the top of the internal ladder, suspended along the bottom of the ladder, and bonded to the center of the roof. The cable must be long enough to connect to the roof at its lowest position. Although at 60 Hz this cable has low impedance, at lightning frequencies it has very high impedance. For example, at 100 kHz, the impedance of 100 feet of 250 MCM cable is estimated at over 32 ohms. Therefore, when thousands of amps of electricity ow across the tank, the impedance of the roof-shell bonding cable is too high to prevent sustained arcing at the shunts. A Retractable Grounding Assembly device (RGA) was developed by Lightning Eliminators & Consultants, Inc., creates a permanent electrical bond between the roof and shell. When properly applied, multiple RGAs provide low-impedance pathways to safely discharge the long duration current responsible for many tanks res. The RGA attaches between the roof and shell with a wide, spring-loaded cable constructed from 864 strands of #30 AWG tinned copper wire braided to form a wide, at strap 1.625 inches wide by 0.11 thick. This has been studied and proved to be applicable for most grounding and current suspending case. Loading rates. Loading of liquid contents, as mentioned in the hazard section, is also an important factor of static electricity generation and accumulation. There are multiple ways to eliminate this charge gathering. A previous study [8] on the IEC TC31/101 JWG29 new model for IEC Technical Specication 60079-32-1, Explosive AtmospheresPart 32-1: Electrostatic hazards Guidance, Britton and Smith model was introduced and was able to address range of ow rate for transfer of single-phase, static-accumulating ammable liquids into vertical cylindrical tanks containing no signicant sediment or water bottom. The research had put together a series of theoretical analysis on factors having impact on dielectric constant, threshold surface potential, and maximum velocity of lling/loading to storage tanks. They also provided comparisons between smaller and larger size tanks in various chemical properties and lling depth. This shall be a referable model development in the static electric reduction for practical use. Operation Issues
Common Operational Hazards

Tank overpressure and vacuum. Operations and situations which may result in tank overpressure are: (1) pumping rate failure; (2) temperature change; and (3) physical state change due to failure of venting systems or poor practices. OSHA Standard 45 CFR 39.20-11 has mentioned the hazard and protection of the overpressure. Cargo tanks venting system should be capable to ventilate 1.25 times the maximum transfer rate, while the pressure in the vapor space of each tank connected to the vapor collection system does not exceed the maximum designed working pressure of this tank. Overpressure is usually caused by excessive operating pressure, resulting in rupture of hoses or tank, or release of cargo through the pressure relief valves (if rupture disk and ttings do not properly adjunct), with possible risk of injury and spillage. Vacuum, on the other hand, created in tank during pumping out, or as a result of tank cooling after system cleaning, or after discharge of heated cargo. Vacuum could result in damage to tank shell [11]. Workers must ensure that tank is vented (via manhole or air-line) during cargo discharge or after steam cleaning, or discharge of heated cargo. Tank level measurement and overfilling. Hazards associated with operating procedures are important to consider when designing tank farms. Proper management of the
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storage area can prevent incidents. Level measurement is vital to preventing overlling. The loss of level control has contributed to three signicant industrial incidents: 1. In Australia, the Esso Longford explosion in September 1998 resulted in two fatalities, eight injuries, and more than $1 billion in losses. 2. In the United States, the BP Texas City explosion in March 2005 caused 15 fatalities and more than 170 injuries, profoundly affected the facilitys production for months afterward, and created losses exceeding $1.6 billion. 3. In the United Kingdom, the Bunceeld explosion in December 2005 injured 43 people, devastated the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, and led to total losses of as much as $1.5 billion. Tank lling requires proper procedures and protection systems. Overlling usually leads to major accidents [9]. The key causes of this failure are: lack of hazard recognition, underestimation of overlling frequency, insufcient training for operators, ill-dened safety ll limits, and lack of applicable mechanical integrity. Atmospheric tanks (internal design pressure >2.5 psig) should be vertical cylinders constructed above ground. A vertical, xed-roof tank consists of a cylindrical metal shell with a permanently attached roof that can be at, conical, or domeshaped, among other styles [13]. Fixed-roof tanks are used to store materials with a true vapor pressure less than 1.5 psia. These tanks are less expensive to construct than those with oating roofs and are generally considered the minimum acceptable for storing chemicals, organics, and other liquids.
Technical Protection for Overpressure and Overlling

 Minimizing the potential for and exposure to toxic releases;  Maintaining adequate spacing for emergency personnel, including reghting;  Minimizing the exposure to re radiation;  Considering the prevailing wind directions in site layout;  Considering potential future expansions during site layout. The relative elevation of a site area is important to consider when designing site layout. Whenever practical, locate open ames (process units with heaters, direct red utility equipment) at higher elevations than bulk quantities of ammables (tanks and storage); this minimizes the potential for the ignition of vapor releases or liquid spills as spills will migrate downhill [22]. Where it is not feasible to locate storage tanks at elevations lower than process areas, increased protection measures may be required to offset the increased potential for ignition. These measures may include: dikes, high-capacity drainage systems, vapor detection, increased re protection, shutdown systems, and other safety systems. NFPA 30 [14] has mentioned series of tank spacing according to the category of tanks, tank body diameter, and operating conditions. For specically large oil tanks, the spacing shall be paid special attention to. From a study by Meng et al. [15] that when the capability of oil tanks signicantly increases, the risks substantially increase due to high property density and energy density, thus people cannot ignore the risk anymore. The Domino effects regarding the safety performance increases as the tank capability increases. Standards still require updates as the tank spacing and siting issues come to ultra-large oil tanks. As a summary, the hazards of tanks and storage area can be drawn into a shbone gure as Figure 1. The operation, installation, and related design/maintenance are important in the hazard analysis and loss prevention.
REGULATIONS ABOUT TANK AND TANK FARMS

Overpressure and vacuum protection. Each xed roof tank should be provided with proper over pressure and under pressure devices. These devices must be properly sized for the worse possible conditions and be periodically inspected to assure that they are serviceable. Vents must be tamper proof. Vents must be checked for buildup or choking. No alterations must be made to the vents or the relief devices without the use of Management of Change policies. Overfilling and tank capacity. Before designing or selecting a tank, the capacity needs to rst be determined. The total capacity is the sum of the inactive capacity and the overll protection capacity. The inactive working capacity is the volume below the bottom invert of the outlet nozzle, normally at least 10 inches above the bottom seam to avoid weld interference [10]. The net working capacity is calculated as the volume between the low liquid level and the high liquid level. For an in-process tank, the net working capacity is calculated by multiplying the required retention time of the liquid by its ow rate. In some cases, the required networking capacity may be divided up into multiple tanks if the size of a single tank is physically unrealistic, or if separate tanks are needed for other reasons, such as dedicated services or rundowns. Tank Spacing and Facility Siting [11] When discussing the safety of tank farms, it is of upmost importance to take into account the siting of the entire area. The relative positions, distances, and levels control for each vessel are just some of the factors that should be taken into further considerations. The impact of potential incidents may also be addressed by the following factors, among others:  Adequately separating tanks;  Segregating different risks;  Minimizing the potential for an impact or explosion;
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Among the previous sections, we had mentioned the hazards and technical protections regarding tank and tank farm. We also referred to regulation requirements pointing out failures and guiding inspection procedures. In this section, the study offered more overall regulatory standards. Tank standards are written by committees comprised of individuals from tank operating companies, tank building companies, and consultants. The multiple standards that apply to above ground storage tanks are as follows for reference: API Standard Related to Tanks API Standards 650, 653, and 620 are the primary industry standards by which most aboveground welded storage tanks are designed, constructed, and maintained. These standards address both newly constructed and existing ASTs used in the petroleum, petrochemical, and chemical industries. API 650 is considered to be the most general and widely used standards for inspector certication and procedure of tank design, installation, operation, and evaluation compliance. There are other related standards which are compensation of the instrumentation guides, such as 2000, 2517, and 2550 [19]. These guidelines point out signicant issues for measuring tank capacity, containments, and construction work of ASTs. API-650 Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage API-651 Cathodic Protection for Above Ground Petroleum Storage Tanks API-652 Lining of Above Ground Petroleum Storage Tanks API-653 Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction
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Figure 1. Fishbone risks about tank farm (Adapted from Ref. [1]).

API-620 Design and Construction of Large Welded Low Pressure Storage Tanks API-2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks API-2517 Evaporating Losses from External Floating Roof Tanks API-2519 Evaporating Losses from Internal Floating Roof Tanks API-2350 Overll Protection for Petroleum Storage Tanks API-2015 Cleaning Petroleum Storage Tanks API-2550 Measurements and Calibration of Petroleum Storage Tanks For Individual Certication Program of inspectors, there are three mostly required API items: API-510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code API-570 Piping Inspection Code API-653 Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration Reconstruction

DOT-49 CFR 172 Hazardous materials, provisions, communications, emergency response, training requirements, and security plans OSHA Standards
Frequently Cited

The following standards were the most frequently cited by Federal OSHA from October 2009 through September 2010, in Oil And Gas Field Services (SIC code 138).       Guarding oor and wall openings and holes Permit-required conned spaces Mechanical power-transmission apparatus Logging operations Specications for accident prevention signs and tags Abrasive wheel machinery

and

Other Highlighted Standards

General Industry (29 CFR 1910) Non-API Codes Related to Tanks Except for API codes, other institutes consulting tank and tank farm sustainability also provide reference tools and suggestions for handling hazardous materials regarding storage tanks. NFPA-30 mentions important factors of tank spacing and depot arrangements. CFR standards include mostly oil or chemicals pollution prevention and bulk material storing issues. NFPA-30 National Fire Protection Association Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code EPA-40 CFR 112 Oil Pollution Prevention and Response; Non-transportation related onshore and offshore facilities DOT-33 CFR 154 Facilities transferring oil or hazardous materials in bulk DOT-33 CFR 155 Oil or hazardous material pollution prevention regulations for vessels DOT-33 CFR 156 Oil and hazardous materials transfer operations
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 1910 Subpart D Walking-working surfaces  Fixed industrial stairs  1910 Subpart E Exit routes, emergency action plans, and re prevention plans  Emergency action plans  1910 Subpart G Occupational health and environment control  1910 Subpart H Hazardous materials  Flammable and combustible liquids  Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals  Hazardous waste and emergency response Standard In general, ASTs are primarily regulated by states laws as well as the overall design rules regulated by federal guidelines. The requirements can usually found in environmental regulations and/or the re code. There may be a requirement to paint the tank, or a ll pipe, a certain color to
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identify its contents, provide alarms in addition to those federally required, and registration of the tank.
FUTURE WORK ON TANK LOSS PREVENTION

The important good work practices are important to both facility and surrounding area. A good safety integration program with strict installation, code review, operation, maintenance, and follow-up evaluation shall be done by the facilitators. With the need of new technology in the future, there are several parts needed to be taken into consideration: New, Corrosion-Proof, and Chemical-Resistant Materials ASTM standards include discussion concerning appropriate corrosion-resistant materials. Many studies also focus on tank design and material selections. ASTM D3299 mentioned the specications of commercial storage tanks and their building materials, glass-ber-reinforced polyester or vinylester thermoset resin fabricated by lament winding for above-ground vertical installation, which were likely chosen to contain aggressive chemicals at atmospheric pressure, which is the usual operation area conditions. The corrosion study is not only important for tank body but also for the surrounding dikes, connected piping systems, and coatings near monitoring devices. Choosing adequate tank body materials is the rst step. The material shall be compatible to the chemicals stored inside. What can be done and controlled except for original materials shall be the exterior addition of corrosion prevention. Anodes are the better direction for most of the storage tanks. They are usually long-line, exible, cable-like anodes, placed in continuous close proximity to the target structure, and provide uniform distribution of current. The anodes allow current to ow long distances down the center conductor, while allowing sufcient cathodic protection current to continuously pass through the conductive polymer all along the length of the anode. The fabric materials, better conductive polymers which can prevent being corroded, and a tight adhesion to the target tanks are the issues future research shall focus on. Good Measuring Methods and Tools to Prevent Overfilling There are many facilities and companies trying to nd out a better solution for tank gauging with the instrumentation proved for least interruption to the system. Radar tank gauge is one potentially useful method which can be further developed into quicker, more accurate reading values. There are two dened methodologies initiated by TankGauging Inc. as in Figure 2, which are to improve measurement for overlling: single point measurement and continuous measurement. Installation and integration of third-party equipment from industry leading manufacturers into a central system of control for remote monitoring and alarm in addition to the required local alarms at the crucial process value point. Single point measurement devices can be installed at the high level. Common technologies used are mechanical switches, electronic conductor, or optical sensors. For continuous measurement, a standard level gauge is a common solution. Any of the major gauging technologies can be used: oat and tape, servo, radar, or magneto-astrictive technologies. The process shall be kept in a smooth surface while taking measurement, which is usually in the prestartup check or normal pressure conditions. Optimization Control [19] Facilities with storage tank area shall consider a well-distributed system including control center, response system, monitoring devices, and unit siting. Especially in tank farms, the
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Figure 2. Overlling prevention measurements with radar devices (a) single point measurement (b) continuous measurement (TankGauging Inc., Tank System Instrumentation Design). [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

production, storage, transport, and evaluation of tanks and containing chemicals, shall be considered as a target for an optimization control program. The proven solution for liquid bulk storage and distribution is an uprising issue nowadays in tank eld. The new technology gives tank farm the automation at most, but the near-miss events or actually incidents still happen even with the least portion of human error participation. This is why we have to consider a best, optimized way to deal with bulk storages. Optimization in tank farm can be separated into several aspects: optimized safety, optimized reliability, optimized tank life sustainability, and optimized automation with communication and management assurance. Safety integrated level is used and studied as a criterion of tank management in automation instruments. Flow-weighbridges, hydraulic uid piping, leak detection (pump stations, sensor, and alarm), and pressure control (valves, ttings, and indicators) should be combined together as a whole program to design and run a storage eld. Each node of the control line should be clearly dened and communicated to employees, while all the online workers get adequate training and proper work shifts. The automation system should also consider the re protection, sprinklers, and other related emergency response that a facility needs to have.

LITERATURE CITED

1. J.I. Chang and C.-C. Lin, A study of storage tank accidents, J Loss Prevention Process Ind 19 (2006), 5159.
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2. CSB, Seven Key Lessons to Prevent Worker Deaths During Hot Work In and Around Tanks, February 2010. 3. CSB, CSB Conducting Full Investigation of Massive Tank Fire at Caribbean Petroleum Rening. Available at: http://www.csb.gov/newsroom.htm. Accessed November 17, 2009. 4. P. Myers, Aboveground Storage Tanks, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1997, 519562. 5. T.V. Rodante, Investigation of a naphtha storage tank re, Process Saf Prog 24 (2005), 98107. 6. J. Lieb, Updated on API 650 App. E: Seismic Zone Design, September 2006 API meeting proceedings. 7. Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, Fire Hazard Assessment for Valdez Crude Tank Internal Floating Roofs, Final Project Report, 2004. 8. L.G. Britton and H.L. Walmsley, Static electricity: New guidance for storage tank loading rates, Process Saf Prog, 31 (2012), 219229. 9. A. Summers, Dont Underestimate Overlling Risks, SISTECH Solutions, Chemical Processing, article 143, 2010. 10. F.M. Davie, P.F. Nolan, and T.W.S. Hoban, Case histories of incidents in heated bitumen storage tanks, J Loss Prevention Process Ind 7. 1994, pp. 217221. 11. BP Exploration & Production Inc., BP Tank Farm and (Un) Loading Safe Operations Manual Booklet, ICheme, 2004. 12. Capstone Engineering, Valdez Crude Tank Internal Floating Roofs for Alyeska Pipelines, Anchorage, Alaska, Final Report Rev 0, January 29, 2004. ` , Kamal Gursahani, Rosa13. Yacine Amrouche, Chaitali Dave bella Lee and Lisa Montemayor, General rules for above-

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ground storage tank design and operation, Chemical Processing, 2002. NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code 2000 Edition. National Fire Protection Association, 2000. M. Yifei, Z. Dongfeng, L. Yi, and W. Wendong, Study on performance-based safety spacing between ultra-large oil tanks, Process Saf Prog. 31 (2012), 398401. C. Daniel, and Joseph F. Louvar, Chemical Process Safety Fundamentals with Applications, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ 2002. S.A. Manatt, Fuel tank inerting system, United States Patent 4556180, 1985. W.R. Kanne Jr., D.A. Lohmeier, K.A. Dunn, and M.H. Tosten, Metallographic analysis of helium-embrittlement cracking of repair welds in nuclear reactor tanks, Mater Characterization 30 (1993), 2334. RRY03: Societal RiskInitial Brieng to Societal Risk Advisory Group, HSE Research Report, 2009, UK. The Bunceeld Incident, Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board, Vol 1, 2008. S. Mannan, A Technical Analysis of the Bunceeld Explosion and Fire, Proceedings of the HAZARDS XXI Conference, Manchester Conference Centre, Manchester, United Kingdom, November 1012, 2009. M. Sawyer, Tank Farm Safety, Presentation to the MKOPSC Steering Committee, August 3, 2010. O.R. Jaiswel, D.C. Rai, M. and S.K Jain, Review of Code Divisions on Design Seismic Forces for Liquid Storage Tanks, IITK-GSDMA-EQ01-V1.0, IITK-GSDMA Project on Building Codes.

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