E5178 - Calabar - Portside HAZOP Summary

WSP CEL Limited CEL House, Westwood Way Westwood Business Park Coventry UK CV4 8HS Tel +44
(0)24 7686 2000 Fax +44 (0)24 7686 2200
HAZOP REPORT FOR CALABAR PORTSIDE INDUSTRIAL PARK FUEL RETICULATION PROJECT
For AIKENBECK RESOURCES LIMITED - NIGERIA
Issue No. Compiled By
1 Peter Dixon
Approved By Date
27/03/2012
Ref: E5178 HAZOP Report Issue: P1 Date: 27th March 2012
Registered office: WSP House, 70 Chancery Lane, London WC2A IAF | Registered in England No. 3877626 | VAT Reg. No. GB 747 8097 84
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CONTENTS
Page No
REVISION RECORD SECTION 1 SECTION 2 SECTION 3 SECTION 4 SECTION 5 SECTION 6 INTRODUCTION STUDY DATES STUDY TEAM DOCUMENTATION METHODOLOGY SUMMARY OF HAZOP & KEY ISSUES ARISING
1 2 2 2 3 3 4
ANNEX 1 ANNEX 2 ANNEX 3 ANNEX 4 ANNEX 5
HAZOP AGENDA HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS LIST HAZOP COPY OF P&ID HAZOP GUIDE WORD KEY SHEET HAZOP RECORD
CALABAR PORTSIDE HAZOP REPORT AIKENBECK RESOURCES LTD - NIGERIA REF: E5178 / CALABAR PORTSIDE HAZOP SUMMARY Issue P1
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REVISION RECORD
Issue No. P1
Description of Revision
Page/Paragraph No.
Preliminary first issue for comment
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION The Cross River Sate Government (CRSG) is embarking on a Portside Development in the Calabar area of Nigeria for petroleum product receiving and storage. This report details the outcome of a HAZOP Study covering the proposed installation. Two dolphin berths are to be provided near the bank of the Calabar River to handle tankers of 25,000 DWT (Dead Weight Tonnage). Fuel is to be unloaded (or loaded) by hose connection to pipework which connects the dolphin platforms to a manifold system located in a common systems bunded area. The manifold system will initially allow for three different fuel types to be handled and distributed to seven separate tenant sites for storage. Mixed fuel from manifold flushing will be stored in an Intermix Tank within the common systems area. Intermix will then be either dosed back into bulk fuel during transfer or taken off site by road tanker. The three different fuel types are to be handled initially are gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil. The HAZOP study focussed on the unloading of unleaded gasoline due to its very low flash point (-46C) and high vapour pressure (boiling range 32 to 225C), compared to the other two products.
SECTION 2
STUDY DATES The HAZOP study took place over two days on 19th and 20th March 2012 at the La Cour Hotel, Ikoyi, Lagos. The agenda is included as Annex 1.
SECTION 3
STUDY TEAM The team members were: Niyi Oginni Unimawho Awafung Chief Op. Officer Aikenbeck Resources Ltd Proj. Devt Manager Aikenbeck Resources Ltd GWC GWC
Dr. Okey Onyemelukwe Principal Partner Chris Amgeehi Project Manager Ebola Lawal Dr. Ambekeh A Udida Margaret Eslen Manderson Okpo Utan Uye Utan Ukemeabasi Udo
Civil/Structural Eng. IAA Associates Director Director Director Terminal Manager Comml Manager Cross River State M of L&H Cross River State M of L&H Cross River State M of L&H ECM Terminal ECM Terminal
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John Wilmot Fransisco Doregos Richard Baard Jock Litterick Mark Pitout Clint Lakey Peter Dixon
Cost Consultant Design Manager Director Principal Associate Associate Mechanical Eng. Proc Eng / Leader
WSP Nigeria WSP Nigeria WSP Industrial WSP Consulting WSP Industrial WSP Industrial WSP CEL
A Team Members list completed at the meeting is included as Annex 2. Representatives from CAA Associates and the Ministry of Lands and Housing were present for the first day only, during which Section 1 was studied.
SECTION 4
DOCUMENTATION Copies of all design reports and drawings were available to the meeting. Principal documents referred to during the meeting were: W702 M-830 Rev. 6 W702 M-801 Rev. P2 W702 M-802 Rev. P1 W702 M-802 ?? W702 M-804 Rev. P2 W702 M-805 Rev. P2 W702 F-881 Rev. P1 510168 C1004 Rev. 1 GA Fuel Reticulation System Haz. Areas GA Fuel System, Dock Hazardous Areas Site Layout Foam System Site Plan P&ID Oil Pipeline Reticulation System 3D Model Fuel Reticulation System GA Fuel Reticulation System c/w Dock
SECTION 5
METHODOLOGY The conventional HAZOP technique was used for the study, that is: Define the intention for each line or sub-system. Identify relevant deviations (See Guide Word Sheet Checklist Annex 4). Look for causes of each deviation, assess the consequences and decide whether action(s) is required.
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The HAZOP record follows in Annex 5. The record sheets primarily capture those deviations where action(s) was identified; they are not an exhaustive record of all discussion.
SECTION 6
SUMMARY OF HAZOP & KEY ISSUES ARISING Due to the large number of attendees and extended discussion of many aspects of the project, the HAZOP could not be completed rigorously for all secondary operations. However, the primary operations of fuel transfer in either direction between ship and shore were considered in detail and significant discussion of the secondary operations occurred in parallel. These were then reviewed at the end of the meeting and the actions identified added to the HAZOP record. A follow-up review of the completed design should therefore be considered. In addition to recommended actions, the HAZOP record highlights the key safeguards intended to mitigate or prevent the consequences of potential process deviations. It should be ensured that these or equivalent safeguards are included within the completed design documentation, particularly a Trip and Interlock Schedule and control system User Requirement Specification. Key issues identified by the HAZOP were as follows: Gasoline has a boiling point range starting at 32C. Since ambient temperature in the Calabar region will often exceed this, it will be difficult to maintain a prime on the unloading pumps due to vapour formation. Alternatives such as running the ships pumps to provide backing pressure will need to be considered. The ability of the control system to reliably prevent overfilling of tanks should be carefully considered. All tanks should ideally have duplicate and dissimilar high level detection instruments and more than one trip action is likely to be required to achieve an appropriate safety integrity level (SIL). Consideration should also be given to supplementing the PLC by hard wiring or by an independent programmable safety system for these critical trip actions. A clear interface protocol should be defined between the common systems control PLC and the tenant control systems to ensure that fuel transfer can only commence when a permissive signal has been received by the upstream system, and that the downstream receiving system has the priority to immediately stop a transfer.
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The reliability of Emergency Stops should be considered in comparison to Process Stops acting through the process control PLC. Strict procedures will be required to control the back-loading of fuel to a ship if there is to be no direct link between ship and shore control systems. Consideration should be given to the inclusion of actuated, fire safe, isolation valves on bottom outlets from large fuel storage tanks. Provision will be required to separate spilt fuel from rain water, both on the dolphin jetty and in the common systems bund. To this end, separate covered and contained collection of fuel from drainage or pressure relief will be required so that separation is only required from surface run-off. The extent of hazardous zone surrounding open sumps which may contain fuel should be reconsidered. This will be aided by the segregation of potentially very warm fuel from pressure relief and drainage.
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ANNEX 1
HAZOP AGENDA
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AGENDA
Date:
19th & 20th March 2012
Time:
09.00
Venue:
La Cour Hotel, 3, Cooper Road, Lagos
Personnel Present:
See separate Attendance Schedule
Introduction:
This is a 2 day Hazard Study meeting to identify any residual safety and operability issues within the process design for the Portside Industrial Park, Calabar.
Item 1. 2. 3. 4.
Description Attendee Introductions Introduction to HAZOP Procedure Introduction and Overview of Project HAZOP
Responsibility All PJD WSP Nigeria PJD
Time 09.00
Unloading line flush to Intermediate Tank Fuel unloading to tenant site Drains, platform sump and sump transfer Drains, bund area sump and sump transfer Tanker loading Intermix tank transfers / dosing Flow proving
5. 6.
Conclusions and next steps Project Meeting
All All
M:\PROJECTS\WSP\E5178\1 SAFETY\3 HAZARD STUDY\CALABAR - PORTSIDE - HAZOP MEETING AGENDA.DOC
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ANNEX 2
HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS LIST
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ANNEX 3
HAZOP COPY OF P&ID
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ANNEX 4
HAZOP GUIDE WORD KEY SHEET
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ANNEX 5
HAZOP RECORD
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Company: Aikenbeck Resources Facility: Portside Industrial Park Dwg No: No. W702-M-830 Rev 6 Dwg Title: Fuel Reticulation System - PID
Section Section 1
First Action Number Section Title 1 Unloading Line Flush
Section 2 Section 3 Section 4
39 66 74
Unloading Fuel to Tenant Site Loading Fuel to Ship from Tenant Site Fuel Dosing and Intermix Loading
Description To flush each unloading pump in turn for 1 minute each to the Inter-mix Tank. Expected total flush quantity is 12 tonnes. Adequate flushing confirmed by manual sampling. To unload fuel from a ship to a tenant site storage tank at a rate of 700 tonnes per hour. To load fuel from a tenant site to a ship using tenant's pumps and flow meters at a maximum flow rate of 700 tonnes / hour Dosing of fuel at low rate from the Intermix Tank into the unloading line during transfer to tenant storage, ensuring that overall fuel transfer remains within fuel specification. Also loading of an excess of Intermix to a road tanker. Proprietary flow proving unit used to verify the calibration of each product flow meter. Drains and pressure relief to the dolphin jetty sump. Transfer to the common services bund sump. Drains and pressure relief to the common services sump. Transfer to the Intermix Tank.
Section 5 Section 6&7
78 83
Flow Proving Unit Drains, Sumps and Transfer
Calabar HAZOP Record - Edited
Page 1 of 17
Printed on: 27/03/2012
Company: Aikenbeck Resources Facility: Portside Industrial Park Dwg No: No. W702-M-830 Rev 6 Dwg Title: Reticulation System - PID
Unloading Line Flush
Section name: Section 1 Leader / Scribe: PD/PD Date: 19/03/2012 Team: See Report
HAZOP ITEM PARAMETER NUMBER
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES Manual valve closed
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Include low current monitoring of pumps to detect no flow Consider position switches on key manual valves and include feedback information into control logic Detailed maintenance procedures required to ensure correct realignment of manual valves following maintenance operations Sequence must shut down in the event of a discrepancy See action 1 Consider whether any manual valves should be locked open
ACTION BY
ANSWERS AND COMMENTS
Flow
No Flow
Unloading pump runs dead headed
WSP
Manual valve closed
WSP
Manual valve closed
ARL
Automatic valve closed No prime on unloading pumps Flow Less Flow Manual valve not fully open
Unloading pump runs dead headed Pump cavitation
Incomplete line flush Unloading header and ship contaminated by mixed fuel from Intermix Tank Ship's pump running against substantially closed head Extemely flammable liquid discharged into open sump
Flow
Route open Reverse Flow but pump not running Air and fuel bleed to platform sump Air and fuel bleed to platform sump
Limit switches to be provided on both open and closed positions Low pressure on pump suction. Low current to pump Manual valves to have facility to be locked open or closed 3 NRVs in line to intermix tank. Discrepancy detected in control system will close actuated valves
WSP
WSP
No further action
Flow
Where Else
Confirm suitability of ship's pump to run in this way Clear operator procedure required to limit flammable release to a minimum
WSP
Zone 1 hazardous area covers ship and entire dolphin platform
ARL
Page 2 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Unloading operation to be continuously manned. Procedures required to achieve prompt shutdown from both terminal and from ship. Confirm that unloading hose system is fully specified within the piping spec. No further action Consider extending dolphin platform bund to capture leakage from intermediate hose connections Investigate standard practices for confirming absence of leaks before unloading commences No further action
ACTION BY
10
Flow
Where Else
Unloading hose failure
Significant environmental damage to river
ARL
11
Unloading hose failure
Significant environmental damage to river Procedures to determine number of hose sections required for type and size of ship
WSP
12
Tidal movement
Hose overextended
13
Intermediate hose joint leakage Intermediate hose joint leakage
Fuel spill outside of planned contained area
10
WSP
14
Fuel spill outside of planned contained area
11
ARL
15
Flow
Where Else
16
Flow
Where Else
17
Flow
Where Else
18
Drain valve High level switch on sump left open or and automatic pump out Loss of fuel to sump relief valve to Intermix Tank leakage Flow into Two actuated isolation header to valves and ability to tenant site monitor flow in header Leakage into Fire fuelled by entire Intermix Tank contents of Intermix Tank bund and (due to bottom entry) possible fire Flow into 2nd Only one inlet valve to the Cross contamination of unloading Intermix Tank should be headers and possible spill manifold open at any one time
No further action Actuated isolation valve to be close to tank, to close in event of fire and be firesafe design Add a NRV in each inlet line to Intermix Tank
12
WSP
13
WSP
Page 3 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES Ship's pumps also running during unloading
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Procedures required to ensure ship's pumps not run at same time as unloading pump Consider whether dual flame arresters with changeover valve required
ACTION BY
19
Pressure
More Pressure
Unloading is too fast or line velocity too high
14
ARL
20
Pressure
More Pressure
Blocked flame Overpressure and rupture arrester on of tank Intermix Tank Unloading hose air leak Unloading pumps cavitate causes loss of suction High vapour pressure of gasolene in warm ambient Unloading pumps cavitate temperature causes loss of suction Procedures to maintain hoses. Spare hoses.
15
WSP
21
Pressure
Less Pressure
No further action
22
Pressure
Less Pressure
16
Confirm expected temperature of fuel in ship and vapour fraction at unloading pumps. Consider whether ship's pumps can be used to provide backing pressure Review all possible causes of loss of prime of unloading pumps. Check pump minimum NPSH No further action Provide secondary high level monitoring to provide adequate safeguard against tank overfill. Consider SIL assessment
WSP
23
Pressure
Less Pressure
Power fluctuation High ambient temperature or solar gain
Unloading pumps lose prime
17
WSP
24
Temperature
More Temperature
Pipe expansion
Pipework stress design and expansion loops
25
Level
Failure of Intermix tank Overfilling and overflow of Greater Level level intermix tank transmitter
18
WSP
Page 4 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED System required to separate rain water from fuel drainage or spillage. Fuel sumps to be protected from rain water Clear procedures / check lists required to ensure that transfer not started without line flush and sample check Consider providing on site lab / office facility to ensure rapid turnround of sample test results Speed of system shutdown to be determined during commissioning Consider feasibility of unloading fuel using ship's pumps. Would require unloading pump bypass. No further action Confirm whether a Zone 2 area is required surrounding the Zone 1 sump in the corner of the bund. Investigate back-up water supply to supplement municipal supply
ACTION BY
26
Composition
Accumulation Extra of rainwater in Component sumps Line flush omitted before transfer to tenant Sample testing takes too long
Cannot pump out to Intermix Tank
19
WSP
27
Sequence
Step Omitted
Out of spec transfer
20
ARL
28
Sequence
Step Longer
Cannot achieve target unloading time of 24 hrs
21
ARL
29
Other
Shut down
Rapid closure of valves or Pressure surge damages stopping of pipework or pipe supports pumps
22
ARL
30
Other
Power/Servic e Failure
Local power failure
Unable to unload ship
23
WSP
31
Other
Maintenance/ Lack of pump Spares spares Extent of flammable zone
Delayed unloading
Pump spares requirements listed in pump specification
32
Other
Fire
Ignition of vapours from common area sump
24
WSP
33
Ignition of fuel spill
Fire damage to facility
Fire water storage to supply up to 3 foam monitors for 1 hour
25
WSP
Page 5 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES Static generation during fuel transfer
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION BY
34
Other
Static/Earthin g
Potential vapour explosion
Earth bonding and lightning protection specified
No further action Consider additional measures to prevent or separate fuel spills before they enter the storm water drain / river Consider options to contain, mitigate or recover spill from river Stroke times and trip delays to be set during commissioning Alarms and trips required from all process parameters to be set during commissioning Check applicable advice from "National Oil Spill Protection and Mitigation Agency" Consider provision for tanker bunkering. Consider provision of domestic fresh water supply to tanker Confirm civils provision to protect pipeline Ensure that valve VBA 184 is suitable for future addition of an actuator
35
Other
Fuel spills on roads and Environment common areas Uncontained fuel spill
Fuel run-off into stormwater channel
26
WSP
36
Spill finds its way to the river Valve failure trip occurs before valve has reached end of stroke Process deviations go undetected
27
ARL
37
Other
Commisionin Stroke times g of valves Alarm and trip settings
28
ARL
38
29
ARL
39
Other
Regs
30
WSP
40 41
What Else What Else
Bunkering Domestic fresh water Damage to existing NNPC oil pipeline Interaction with future 2nd tanker berth Storm water hits low level pipe Need to flush unloading line from 2nd berth
31 32
ARL ARL
42
What Else
Pipe fracture and oil spill
33
WSP
43
What Else
Cross contamination between systems
NRVs shown in each unloading line
34
WSP
Page 6 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION BY
44
What Else
45
What Else
46
What Else
Cannot flush branches for P&ID doesn't future work as products 4, 5 shown and 6 Cannot simultaneousl P&ID doesn't y unload work as products 4 to shown 7 from each berth Cannot simultaneousl P&ID doesn't y unload work as products 4 to shown 7 from each berth
Contamination
35
Unloading header must pass each product take-off branch in turn Unloading header from future 2nd berth must pass each product take-off branch in turn with separate connections to each For two unloading systems, VBA 185 and 186 need to be actuated and located downstream of the last product take-off Procedures required to prove a working radio channel (at agreed frequency) between ship and shore (common systems and tenant) before operations commence. Communication to be confirmed on regular (e.g. hourly) basis.
WSP
Loss of flexibiltiy
36
WSP
Loss of flexibiltiy
37
WSP
47
What Else
Loss of radio communicatio n between ship and shore
Radio fault
Inadequate monitoring of unloading operations
38
WSP
Page 7 of 17
Unloading Fuel to Tenant Site
HAZOP ITEM PARAMETER NUMBER 1 2 3 4 Flow Flow Flow Flow
DEVIATION No Flow No Flow Less Flow Less Flow
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED See actions 1 to 4 Sequence to abort if flow rate not achieved or high pressure detected See action 5 No further action Consider control of transfer rate using flow meter and pump VSD. Ensure that max line velocity to prevent static generation is not exceeded Check regulations regarding whether top or bottom entry to tenant tank is preferred A transfer permissive signal is required from the tenant for each of 3 products. Transfer can only proceed on receipt of this signal. Permissive signal to be via fibre optic cable (preferred for reliability) or ethernet radio See actions 8 to 11
ACTION BY WSP WSP WSP
Valve closed on tenant site Furthest tenant site at highest elevation Pumps sized for furthest tenant site at highest elevation
Pump dead headed
Flow meter will detect lack of flow. High pressure detection. Pumps specified to achieve 700 tonnes/hr to highest destination
39
Protracted unloading
Flow
More Flow
Excessive flow rate to nearest sites at lower elevation.
40
WSP
Flow
Tenant tanks at higher Potential for reverse flow elevation than when transfer route Reverse Flow ship, possibly opened with bottom entry Tenant site not ready for transfer
3 NRVs in line to tenant site. Discrepancy detected in control system will close actuated valves
41
WSP
Flow
Sooner Flow
Potential spill or flow to wrong destination
42
WSP
43
WSP
Flow
Where Else
WSP/ARL
Page 8 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES Another routing valve is open or passing
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Interlocks required to allow only one routing valve to be open at any time Transfer to be stopped if fuel flow detected on another product flow meter Consider additional physical safeguard or cover by procedures if transfer discrepancy detected Procedures required to prove a working radio channel (at agreed frequency) between ship, tenant site and common systems control room before operations commence. Communication to be confirmed on regular (e.g. hourly) basis. Provide increased separation between pipe rack and roadway Install physical barriers to protect pipework from road vehicles No further action See actions 16 and 17
ACTION BY
10
Flow
Where Else
Flow of fuel to incorrect destination
44
WSP
11 Loss of fuel to Intermix Inlet valve to Tank during transfer. Intermix Tank Discrepancy between fuel is passing unloaded and fuel received
45
WSP
12
46
WSP
13
Loss of radio Confusion between tenant Transfer permissive signal communicatio site and common system has ultimate control of n operators transfer
47
ARL
14
Flow
Where Else
Pipe damage due to Fuel spill due to pipe proximity of fracture caused by vehicle impact pipe rack to roadway
48
WSP
15 More Pressure Less Pressure Closed valve or ship's pump running Transfer line pressure higher than normal Transfer will be stopped if high discharge pressure detected
49
WSP
16 17
Pressure Pressure
WSP/ARL
Page 9 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES High ambient temperature or solar gain
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Pipework stress design and expansion loops to be included in tranfer pipe design Tenant should be required to issue a "Notice of Readiness" to confirm that they have sufficient ullage capacity in their receiving tank. Failure to comply should incur penalties. Tenant design guidelines to require multiple level monitoring and sufficient control system integrity to ensure that transfer permissive signal is withdrawn when high level is reached Consider requirement for secondary safety system (independent of process PLC) to ensure that transfer is stopped if permissive signal is withdrawn No further action Procedure required to sample from the ship before unloading and from the unloading line after line flush
ACTION BY
18
Temperature
More Temperature
50
WSP
19
Level
Greater Level
Insufficient ullage in receiving tank
Transfer has to be aborted before completion, resulting in delays to unloading
51
ARL
20
Receiving tank reaches high level
Tank overflow
52
WSP
21
53
WSP
22
Level
Less Level
Ship empty
Loss of pressure on the Unloading pumps cavitate pump discharge will stop transfer pumps
23
Composition
Different Stream
54
ARL
Page 10 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Include procedure to flush unloading line, even if there is no change of grade. No further action
ACTION BY
24 Loss of power to control PLC control system failure UPS for control system room. SCADA system failure. Fail Safe emergency stop Unloading continues, but provided in control room operator loses sight of to stop transfer what is happening Voltage spikes in incoming power supply Unloading hose uncoupled before draining complete Pumping continues after fire detected
55
ARL
25
Other
26
56
Consider providing backup SCADA system Consider provision of under and over voltage detection on incoming power supply to initiate switch to generator supply Consider key interlock system on double block and bleed to guard against maloperation Consider interlock to stop transfer operations if fire protection system is operated Confirm whether fire protection from hydrants is required over entire length of transfer pipelines Provide suitable level access for routine inspection of transfer pipelines
WSP
27
Damage to PLC or SCADA system
57
WSP
28
Other
Shut down
Fuel spill to dolphin platform or to river
Procedure to close block valve and drain hoses to dolphin platform sump before uncoupling hoses
58
WSP
29
Other
Fire
Continued fuel flow to fire
59
WSP
30
60
WSP
31
Other
Access
Tranfer pipeline traverses rough ground
Cannot inspect entire length of transfer lines
61
WSP
Page 11 of 17
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION BY
32
What Else
62
33
What Else
Low points in transfer lines
Transfer lines cannot be fully drained for maintenance
63
34 No high point Transfer lines cannot be fully drained or draining is vents on slow transfer lines Future expansion of facility to more than 7 tenant sites Each product header can be extended to create 2nd tier header above the initial 7 take-offs. Remote I/O cabinets are expandable
64
35
65
Review other Section 1 actions applicable fuel WSP/ARL transfer to tenant storage Ensure that transfer lines rise continuously to tenant WSP sites to permit gravity draining to common area sump Consider drainability of WSP expansion loops Consider requirement for venting of transfer lines WSP within the tenant site to permit draining
36
What Else
Layout issues
No further action
Page 12 of 17
Loading Fuel to Ship from Tenant Site
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Consider measures required to ensure that transfer rates do not exceed permitted maximum Consider including design criteria for back-loading within tenant design guidelines A transfer permissive signal is required to be sent to the tenant for each of 3 products. Transfer can only proceed on receipt of this signal. Permissive signal to be via fibre optic cable (preferred for reliability) or ethernet radio Common site operator must obtain confirmation from the ship that they are ready to receive transfer before issuing the permission signal Established and rigorous procedures are required to prevent overfill of ship's tanks Tenant should provide sample to confirm that fuel grade is suitable for the selected loading line
ACTION BY
Flow
More Flow
Pumping down hill
Static electricity hazard (and high reaction forces on pipework)
66
WSP
Flow
Less Flow
Tenant pumps too small for duty
Ship delayed at berth, incurring cost
67
WSP
Flow
Sooner Flow
Common site not ready for transfer
Potential spill or flow to wrong destination
68
WSP
69
WSP
70
ARL
Level
Greater Level
Ship's tank overfilled
Fuel spill to river
Confirm that sufficient space is available in ship's tank and that spare tank(s) is available to provide excess capacity
71
ARL
Composition
Different Stream
Wrong fuel grade for selected line
Cross contamination
72
ARL
Page 13 of 17
Loading Fuel to Ship from Tenant Site
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED Confirm ability to close electrically actuated valves in the event of power failure.
ACTION BY
Other
Unable to close actuated valves and stop flow of fuel downhill to ship
Stand-by generators available
73
WSP
Page 14 of 17
Fuel Dosing / Intermix Loading
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION BY
These operations were discussed during the HAZOP study of Sections 1 to 3 and then reviewed at the end of the meeting. There was insufficient time available to complete a full HAZOP procedure. A further review should be considered at the end of detail design. Flow Where Else Spillage during road tanker loading Too much dosing Dosing of gasoline into kerosene Loss of fuel to river 74 A contained tanker loading bay is required, draining to suitable sump Procedures required to ensure that dosing does not exceed acceptable amount Procedures required to ensure that only appropriate dosing is done Procedures required to ensure that any Intermix sent off site is appropriately used or redistilled to original specifications HAC to be extended to include tanker loading bay. Remote I/O panels may need to be relocated WSP
Composition
Extra Component
Only about 12 tonnes of Fuel transferred goes out Intermix are expected per of specification flush Kerosene becomes hazardous in use. (Gasoline dosing not considered acceptable.)
75
ARL
76
ARL
Composition
Different Stream
Intermix sold as domestic fuel Road tanker loading not covered by current Hazardous Area Classification
Fire or explosion if used as a domestic fuel
77
ARL
Other
Fire
Fire during loading
Normal safeguards such as tanker earthing to be provided
78
WSP
Page 15 of 17
Flow Proving Unit
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION BY
This operation was briefly discussed during the HAZOP study of Sections 1 to 3 and then reviewed at the end of the meeting. There was insufficient time available to complete a full HAZOP procedure of the detailed operation of the proving unit. A further review should be considered at the end of detail design. Spill during Flow prover to be located Flow Where Else operation of Loss of fuel to river within the common flow prover systems bunded area Flow prover Unable to check shown on flowmeters or unload from Berth 1 Flow Later Flow future Berth 2 if Berth 1 unloading line not available only Different Stream Only one transfer tank shown with flow prover Need to drain flow prover to road tanker or sump / Intermix Tank before use on different product
No further action
79
Flow prover must usable with either unloading line Consider providing a transfer tank for each product to enable prover to be drained and refilled with compatible product Ensure sufficient access and mechanical handling aids to assist removal of ball Ensure operators are adequately trained for use of the flow prover
WSP
Composition
80
WSP
Other
Flow prover Maintenance/ ball needs to Mechanical handling injury Spares be removed Incorrect operation of flow prover Inexperience of operators Flow meter calibration errors
81
WSP
What Else
82
ARL
Page 16 of 17
Drains, Sumps and Transfer
Section name: Section 6 / 7 Leader / Scribe: PD/PD Date: 20/03/2012 Team: See Report
DEVIATION
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION NUMBER
ACTION REQUIRED
ACTION BY
These operations were briefly discussed during the HAZOP study of Sections 1 to 3 and then reviewed at the end of the meeting. There was insufficient time available to complete a full HAZOP procedure for the detailed operation of the sumps. A further review should be considered at the end of detail design. Discharge Flow No Flow pumps not Cannot empty sumps primed Accumulation Extra Cannot pump out to of rainwater in Composition Component Intermix Tank sumps Fuel spill elsewhere on Contaminatio Fuel washed to river with site, outside n rain water of proposed bunds Extent of flammable zone Ignition of vapours from common area sump
83
Ensure that sump transfer pumps are self priming See action 19 Design a containment system for all rainwater run-off from site roads to a single collection / holding point to allow separation or treatment before discharge to river See action 24
WSP
WSP
Composition
84
WSP
Other
Fire
WSP
Page 17 of 17

E5178 - Calabar - Portside HAZOP Summary

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E5178 - Calabar - Portside HAZOP Summary

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WSP CEL Limited CEL House, Westwood Way Westwood Business Park Coventry UK CV4 8HS Tel +44

(0)24 7686 2000 Fax +44 (0)24 7686 2200

For AIKENBECK RESOURCES LIMITED - NIGERIA

Issue No. Compiled By

Ref: E5178 HAZOP Report Issue: P1 Date: 27th March 2012

ANNEX 1 ANNEX 2 ANNEX 3 ANNEX 4 ANNEX 5

Preliminary first issue for comment

19th & 20th March 2012

La Cour Hotel, 3, Cooper Road, Lagos

See separate Attendance Schedule

Responsibility All PJD WSP Nigeria PJD

Conclusions and next steps Project Meeting

M:\PROJECTS\WSP\E5178\1 SAFETY\3 HAZARD STUDY\CALABAR - PORTSIDE - HAZOP MEETING AGENDA.DOC

HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS LIST

HAZOP COPY OF P&ID

HAZOP GUIDE WORD KEY SHEET

First Action Number Section Title 1 Unloading Line Flush

Section 2 Section 3 Section 4

Section 5 Section 6&7

Flow Proving Unit Drains, Sumps and Transfer

Calabar HAZOP Record - Edited

Printed on: 27/03/2012

Unloading Line Flush

HAZOP ITEM PARAMETER NUMBER

POSSIBLE CAUSES Manual valve closed

ANSWERS AND COMMENTS

Unloading pump runs dead headed

Manual valve closed

Unloading pump runs dead headed

Manual valve closed

Unloading pump runs dead headed

Unloading pump runs dead headed Pump cavitation

Zone 1 hazardous area covers ship and entire dolphin platform

Calabar HAZOP Record - Edited

Printed on: 27/03/2012

Unloading Line Flush

HAZOP ITEM PARAMETER NUMBER

ANSWERS AND COMMENTS

Unloading hose failure

Significant environmental damage to river

Unloading hose failure

Intermediate hose joint leakage Intermediate hose joint leakage

Fuel spill outside of planned contained area

Fuel spill outside of planned contained area

Calabar HAZOP Record - Edited

Printed on: 27/03/2012

Unloading Line Flush

HAZOP ITEM PARAMETER NUMBER

POSSIBLE CAUSES Ship's pumps also running during unloading

ANSWERS AND COMMENTS

Unloading is too fast or line velocity too high

Power fluctuation High ambient temperature or solar gain

Unloading pumps lose prime

Pipework stress design and expansion loops

Calabar HAZOP Record - Edited

Printed on: 27/03/2012

Unloading Line Flush

HAZOP ITEM PARAMETER NUMBER

ANSWERS AND COMMENTS

Cannot pump out to Intermix Tank

Out of spec transfer

Cannot achieve target unloading time of 24 hrs

Local power failure

Unable to unload ship