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Born In: Superior, Wisconsin, USA Died on: Father: Scott Williamson Mother: Lucille Williamson Wife: Dolores Celeni Children: Scott R., Tamara E., Karen L., Oliver E. Jr. and Dean V. Number of Children: 5 Nationality: United States Education: B.Sc., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955 M.B.A., Stanford University, 1960 Ph.D., Carnegie-Mellon University (Economics), 1963
Academic Interests: Microeconomics, Economic Governance Major Books: The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (1964) Corporate Control and Business Behavior: An Inquiry into the Effects of Organization Form on Enterprise Behavior (1970) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (1985). The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press (1996) .Prices: Issues in Theory, Practice, and Public (1968). The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (1989)
Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (1990).
Nobel Prize for: "his analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm" Prize received date: Oct. 12, 2009
Career:
Director: Center: For the Study of Organizational Innovation, University of Pennsylvania,
(1976-83). Editor or Co-editor: Bell Journal of Economics, (1974-77, 1979-81). Consultant: National Science Foundation, (1976-77). Panel Member: Food Safety Regulation and Societal Impact, National Academy of Sciences, (1978-79). Consultant: Federal Trade Commission, (1978-80). Chair: Academic Senate: University of California, Berkeley, (1995-96). Committee Member: Supply Chain Integration, National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council, (1997-99) Committee Member: Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Academy of Sciences, 2006-.
Higher Education: The change of condition "My university teacher and mentor Kenneth Arrow remembers me as a student who asked good questions. Although I had not previously thought of myself in that way, on reflection I think that Arrow was right. I was forever curious about how things worked (or didn't work), which led me to identify lapses or anomalies and/or to push the logic to completion. Such an orientation would serve me well throughout my academic career. My initial thoughts of becoming a lawyer changed in high school as I became more attracted to math and science and began talking about being an engineer. My mother declared that M.I.T. was the place to go and, with the advice of the physics teacher at the local college, I enrolled in Ripon College, which had a combined plan with M.I.T." Marriage: Marriage Luck "That combination worked out well. My first jobs after graduation in 1955 were as a project engineer for G.E. and later with the U.S. government in Washington, D.C., where I met and married my wife, Dolores Celini. I applied to and was accepted into the Ph.D. program at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford, where I enrolled in 1958. To my surprise and delight, I discovered that much of my engineering training in mathematics and statistics and model building carried over. But there was more to it than that. My engineering training gave me a much more grounded foundation than would most undergraduate programs in any of the social sciences."
Although I would not come to appreciate this last until later, there was a major difference between engineering and economics with respect to hypothetical ideals. Thus whereas assumptions of weightlessness or perfect gas laws or frictionlessness etc. served the purpose of simplification in engineering, these assumptions would give way to realities (in the form of friction, resistance, turbulence, and the like) as engineering applications were attempted. In economics, however, assumptions of frictionlessness (of which the standard assumption of zero transaction costs was one) often went unquestioned or, even worse, were invoked asymmetrically. Thus whereas markets were subject to "failures" for which corrective public policy measures were prescribed, there was no corresponding provision for failures in the public sector. A more symmetrical approach would be to recognize that positive transaction costs were the economic counterpart of friction and that all forms of organization experience such costs albeit in variable degree (depending on the attributes of the transaction to be organized). I credit my engineering background with giving me a receptive attitude toward transaction costs, to include an interest in pinning down and working out the organizational ramifications of such costs.
Source of Inspiration:
Contribution By drawing attention at high theoretical level to equivalences and differences between market and non-market decision-making, management and service provision, Williamson has been influential in the 1980s and 1990s debates on the boundaries between the public and private sectors.
Family Life: