4

The Categories

of Human

Experience

37

THE

CATEGORIES HUMAN
1908

OF

EXPERIENCE

M A N K I N D HAS C R E A T E D association as its general form of

life. This was not, so to speak, the only logical possibility. The human species could just as well have been unsocial; there are unsocial animal species as well as social ones. Because of the fact of human sociality, however, we are easily misled into thinking that categories which directly or indirectly ?g~5ociTgica onesare the only, and universally applicable, categories ihTeTms of which w~my contemplate the contents of human experience. This notion, however, is completely erroneous. That we are social beings subjects these contents to a certain point of view, but i t is by no means the only possible one. To name a completely contrasting point of view, one can observe, study, and systematize the contents which, to be sure, exist and are realized only within society
purely in terms of their objective content. The inner validity, co-

herence, and objective significance of ali sciences, technologies, and arts are completely independent of the fact that they are realized within and find their preconditions in a social life, just as independent as their objective sense is of the psychological processes through which their discoverers found them. They can naturally also be considered under the latter psychological or the former social point of view. I t is completely legitimate to inquire
From Soziologie (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1908), pp. 771-75. Translated by Donald N. Levine. 36

under what social circumstances the natural science we possess can come into being. But questions concerning the correctness of its propositions, their systemtc cohererice, and the adequacy or inadequacy of its methods hve' fio E5oIogM&f" Hfrion whatsocver. Such matters are nwhere irinhcd by tlie fact of their social historical emergence, but are governed exclusively by immanent, timeless, that is, purely objective, norms. A l i contents of life, therefore, are subject to this dual categorization. They can be considered as results of social development, as objects of human interactions, butTRey^lTwTtheq^^ lion be considered with respect to their objective contenta;=|efe inents of logical, technical, aesthetic, or metaphysical continua, possessing their meaning i n themselvesjand not i n the historical actualities which depend on social reTtinships. In addition to these categories, now, we must consider two other essential ones. A l i those contents of life are directly borne ly i n d i v i d u ^ ^ S o m e one persfT*h""s cncivd them. They fill lhe corisciousness of someone; they bring someone pleasure or |>ain. Although they are social, they are at the same time individual, intelligible i n terms of the psychic processes in this or that individual. From the teleological point of view, they issue i n determinate meaning for this or that individual. I t is of course Irue that they would not have come into being i f this individual did not live i n society, but just as little would they have become social i f they had not been borne by individuais. I f I ask what ueeds drive this individual to his religious activity, what personal destinies have moved h i m to found a sect, what value this action nnd experience has for the development of his psyche, this order of questioning does not in the slightest compete with one which subordinates the srrie facts to the point of view of societywhat historical milieu has produced those inner needs; what forms of interactions among individuais and i n their relationship to outsiders make them into a "sect"; what enrichments or cleavages the public mind experiences through that sort of religious movement. Individual and society are, both for historical' understanding and for normative iudgment,\methodolgical coraceps. This is so t ;ither i n that they divide given events and conditions among

38

PHILOSOPHY

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THE

SOCIAL

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The Categories

of Human

Experience

39

themselves or in that they deal with the unity of the given, which we cannot directly comprehnt},by rgriizing it under two different points of view, comparable to the wy picture is considered now as a physiological and optical phenomenon, now as a cultural product, or now with respect to the technique of painting, now with respect to its content and aesthetic value. To express this with that radicalism of conception which in practice is naturally approached only fragmentarily, ali human psychic events and ideal constructions are to be understood as contents and norms of i n dividual life, and just as thoroughly as contents and norms of existence i n social interaction, as for Spinoza the cosmic-absolute existence is to be conceived now under the attribute of extension, now (and just as completely) under that of thought una eademque res, sed duobus modis expressa ["one and the same thing,
1

but expressed in two modes."] Beyond these last two standpoints, there is a third one which is methodologically coordinate with them, even though our means to develop i t with respect to the totality of individual problems are much more incomplete and its theoretical generality is restricted i n actual cognition to very few considerations. I have already stressed that association was only the historical-social form which the human species gave to its life and which is by no means identical with the ltter when i t comes to scientific conceptual analysis. One can therefore examine the givens and contents of historical reality independent of their specifAc social gnesis and significance according to the value and meaning which they possess as elements of the life of humanity, as stages of its development. To say that this " h u m a n i t y " possesses no concrete context, no unified consciousness, no continuous development is by no means a valid objection to using the concept. " H u m a n i t y " is, i f you w i l l , an "idea," just like "nature," perhaps also like "society." I t is a category under which individual phenomena can be observed withActually, at this point Simmel introduces a fourth category. Ali together, the fundamenta] categories in terms of which human experience may be viewed are: (1) society; (2) objective culture; (3) individual personality; and (4) humanity. ED. ? '
1

out saying that what is designated thereby leads an isolated existence or is to be distilled as a special quality. We can, however, ask of every human condition, quality, or action: What does this mean ns a stage of the development of humanity? What preconditions must the entire species have attained for this to be possible? What lias humanity as a biological, ethical, and psychic type thereby vvon or lost i n value? I f these questions can be answered i n a rcrtain way, i t is by no means excluded that they can be answered in a completely opposite way from the standpoint of the society lo which the acting individual belongs. That may as a rule not lie true. I t may be that what affects the entire history of humanity for better or for worse usually has the same significance for the uarrower, socially bound circle; what is socially essential may without further consideration even be something essential for the development or for the system of humanity. Be ali that as i t may, i t does not affect the fact that the ordering and evaluation of any given content of life according to the viewpoint of the whole of humanity is i n principie different from that which proceeds from lhe viewpoint of society, and that both viewpoints are independent of one another i n their underlying motives, however much they may consider one and the same fact, or human being, or cultural content in terms of their respective hierarchies. Although the category of the values and developments of the human type is methodologically as distinct from the category of lhe being and action of the individual as from that of the life of social interaction, the first two of these categories nonetheless stand i n an inner relationship which places them as i t were as one party over against the social category as a second party. The material of the idea of humanity and the questions based on it are Individual. I t is n l y a rnatter of secondary interest whether the activities of these individuais contribute to the condition and development of humanity i n the form of sociation or i n that of a purely personal activity in thought, sentiment, or artistic works, in the biological improvement or deterioration of the race, or i n lhe religious relationship to gods and idols. The existence and conduct of the individual must of course occur in some such. form, which provides the technique or the connecting link through

40

PHILOSOPHY

OF

THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES

which individuality can b.goiBgJM}ratcaUy._ effetive element of humanity. "But for ali the indisputable indispensability of these i n dividual forms, among which sociality stands uppermost, humanity and the individual remain thepolar concepts frthe oBservatiiff Kumn life. Objectivly"and'hs correlation may not b f very extensive importance when contrasted with the fact of societyalthough this chapter has shown its efncaciousness i n a series of historical epochs, and modern individualism has been traced back to i t more than once. But at the very least i t remains the ideal auxiliary construction by means of which "society" is shown its place i n the series of concepts which methodically order the study of life. Just as within societal development the narrower, "more socialized" group attains its counterpart (internally or historically, on a cyclical or simultaneous basis) i n that i t expands to the larger group and is specialized to the individual element of societyso from this ultimate point of view society as a whole appears as a special form of aggregation beyond which, subordinating their contents to other forms of observation and evaluation, there stand the ideas of humanity and of the individual.
2
2

The earlier sections of the chapter to which Simmel alludes appear as chapter 16 of the present volume. ED.