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Lim v. Diaz-Millares
Quickie: Nephew v supposed widow over administration. Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole, Cirilo can not compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. Nature: Certified case from CA Facts: Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of the late Jose Millarez who died intestate filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental apetition for his appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased. Petition: that the deceased left no relatives such as descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals. Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow of the late Jose Millarez, filedan opposition on two grounds: that the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate; and that the properties of the estate are the subject matter of a litigation between her as plaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant in Civil Case No. 2986.Trial of the case was postponed several times. When the case was called for hearing on March7, 1959, both parties manifested the existence of a litigation between them over the propertiesof the estate. trial court : expediente is ordered dismissed. Failing in his motion for the reconsideration of this order, the petitioner, Cirilo Lim, brought thecase to the Court of Appeals but that court has certified the appeal to SC Meanwhile, the civil case between the parties which was also elevated to the Court of Appeals(CA-G.R. 24561-R) was decided. CA: Accordingly, the judgment a quo is set aside and the records of this case are hereby remanded to the court a quo with instructions (1) that it appoint a qualified certified public accountant to examine with painstaking care the documentary evidence presented and to determine how much over and above the amount of P12,500 was invested by the late Jose Millarez and the plaintiff in the tobacco business together with the defendant Lim, and to assess the extent of the profits and gains derived from such investment; (2) to admit such other evidence as the court may consider material and relevant; and (3) to render judgment anew on the basis of the examination to be conducted by the qualified certified public accountant and such fu rther evidence, if any, as shall be presented, adjudicating in favor of the plaintiff Basilan Diaz-Millarez1/2 of the capital and 1/2 of the profits and gains derived therefrom that property pertain to the late Jose Millarez after the accounting shall have been accomplished. Issue/ Held: WON Cirilo can be an administrator of the estate- NO
3 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Reconsideration having been denied, ROSALIA and SERAFIN went up to the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, citing anew BEDA's conflicting interests as special administrator and as an interested buyer and his interference with and collection of the harvests of the Bitukang Manok property duly sold to ROSALIA CA, however, found the "petition insufficient in substance to merit due course" and ordered the dismissal thereof. Their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal having failed, petitioners instituted the present action for review SC issued a TRO restraining CFI and BEDA "from implementing the CFI's orders and from otherwise interfering in the possession by the petitioner Rosalia of a property known as "Bitukang Manok" of the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina ... from interfering in the cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing the possession of aforementioned property by said petitioner." In due course, a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect was handed down the SC. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN as well as to ROSALIA as buyer because of BEDA's interference with her enjoyment of the property Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly. In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the estate
Issue/s and Held: WON BEDAs appointment as special administrator is proper NO. Ratio: The sale to ROSALIA of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved and confirmed by CFI over the personal opposition of BEDA, which approval he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his (BEDAs) subsequent appointment as special administrator of the estate a year later created a clear conflict of interest that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject it to unnecessary suits. Title to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the estate through DEMETRIO (BEDA's predecessor as special administrator) and confirmed by the lower court has passed to petitioner ROSALIA's ownership and possession since the court's confirmation of the sale. The estate makes no further claim against the same but on the contrary has defended the sale and ROSALIA's title thereto, against BEDA's adverse opposition in the appeal brought in his personal capacity. Yet now, as complained of by ROSALIA, BEDA by virtue of his appointment as special administrator seeks in such other capacity to interfere in the harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate when in fact he is going against the official stand of the estate which upholds the sale It is readily seen that BEDA has been placed in an unduly favored position where he may use his position as special administrator to favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of the property for himself, even though he denies obliquely such personal interest. Broadly, BEDA simply argued that "there is no evidence or pleading of record that he is interested in the acquisition for himself of the Bitukang Manok property. But when he said that his actions respecting the Bitukang Manok was him acting on his acquired rights and interests of the majority of the heirs, that he had merely stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, that his concern and interest to protect the estate as special administrator" what he is really saying is that he is out to protect his claimed majority interest in the estate! Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on ROSALIA as an heir as well as the other heirs such as petitioner SERAFIN because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving their distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their co-heirs who have sold and assigned their rights and shares in the estate to BEDA)
FINAL WORDS: The Court does not look with favor on the practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such court employees so appointed as administrators in discharging their regular functions may be easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the administrator's fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-interest intrudes, thus, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and termination of the proceedings in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the estate settled expeditiously and promptly so that the benefits that may flow therefrom may be immediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs and beneficiaries. Probate courts are therefore enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their clerks of court or other court employees as administrators or receivers of estates or the like. On the consideration of the specific and limited powers of special administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (per Rule 80, Sec 1), the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of BEDA as special administrator to stand, insofar as taking care of the OTHER properties of the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property. The latter property shall pertain to ROSALIA's possession and enjoyment In the event that the CA finds cause to set aside the CFI's confirmation of the sale in ROSALIAs favor in the pending appeal of BEDA in his personal capacity, then shall be the time for the estate and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the property upon return to her of the purchase price paid by her FINALLY, the Court noted that the estate involved is not large and there seem to be no complicated questions that impedes its prompt settlement, but these notwithstanding, the CFIs avowed desire to terminate the proceedings once and for all, seemed to remain as such a mere DESIRE! The said estate proceedings have been pending now for over 13 years without the lower court once having appointed a regular administrator in accordance with the Rules of Court to take charge of the settlement thereof and the distribution and partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the
4 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" and "courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures." THEREFORE, the CFI Zambales is directed to name a suitable person or entity, who is competent and qualified and does not suffer from any proscribed conflict of interest, and preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs, to avoid any further bickerings as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the net estate among the heirs and persons entitled thereto AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
DISPOSITIF: The assailed CA decision is modified and in lieu thereof, judgment is entered allowing the appointment of BEDA Gonzales special administrator to stand, but only insofar as taking care temporarily of the OTHER properties of the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property previously sold by the estate to ROSALIA, who is entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby ordered lifted, except as to the portion thereof enjoining BEDA from interfering in the cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing the possession of the Bitukang Manok property by ROSALIA which is hereby made permanent CFI Zambales is ordered to implement the above directive to name a suitable person as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch and to submit a report of his action thereon to the Court within thirty (30) days from notice of entry of this judgment. So Ordered.
Maloles II v. Phillips
Mendoza, J. Quickie: Dr. De Santos filed a petition for probate of his will during his lifetime and Phillips was named executrix. RTC Branch 61 allowed the probated. Dr. De Santos died. Maloles (nephew) sought to intervene and prayed for issuance of letters of administration in his name. Phillips also filed a motion for issuance of letters of administration however, she later withdrew her motion and refilled a petition for the same purpose with the RTC Makati and this was assigned to Branch 65. Branch 65 granted Phillips petition. Maloles sought to intervene in the Branch 65 proceedings and prayed for issuance of letters of administration in his favour. Branch 65 ordered the transfer of records of the current proceedings to the Branch 61 but the records were returned to Branch 65. Branch 61 denied Maloles intervention. CA upheld the denial. Branch 65 allowed Maloles to intervene. CA reversed on the ground that Maloles had not shown any right or interest to intervene. HELD: Maloles, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose (Ozaeta v. Pecson).Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case. Nature: petitions for review on certiorari Facts: July 20, 1995 - Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will in the RTC Makati Branch 61. He alleged that (1) he had no compulsory heirs; (2) that he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; (3) that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2M; and (4) that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will was annexed to the petition. When the case was called for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any written opposition was ever filed and on motion of De Santos, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support of the petition. Feb. 16, 1996 - Judge Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will. Feb. 26, 1996 - De Santos died.
6 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 o Considering the refusal of Judge Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed, Branch 65 shall take cognizance of the petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept that the RTC of Makati City is but one court. Nov. 4, 1996 - Judge Abad Santos granted Maloles' motion for intervention. Phillips moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied.CA rendered a decision setting aside the trial court's order on the ground that Maloles had not shown any right or interest to intervene. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN Rationale - Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected at once. The probate during the testator's life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only questions that may remain for the courts to decide after the testator's death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases. After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the testator's death would be in order. After the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that Branch 61 of RTC Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed. The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latter's death. In other words, Maloles, instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court. Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100k (outside Metro Manila) or P200k (in Metro Manila) belongs to the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. Bacalso v. Ramolote - The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason that
ISSUES/HELD: 1. WON RTC Makati, Branch 65acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by Phillips. YES 2. WON Maloles, being a creditor of the de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by Phillips. NO 3. WON Phillips is guilty of forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters testamentary with RTC Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving the same restate estate of the decedent is still pending with the RTC Makati, Branch 61. NO Ratio: 1. RTC Makati, Branch 65acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by Phillips. Maloles - the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. The proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1. Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon Phillips petition for issuance of letters testamentary. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills. Art. 838 CC authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. Rule 76, 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.
7 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the same court. The apportionment and distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court. 2. No right to intervene Maloles - as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. CA Maloles is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties, Maloles can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence. The opposition must come from one with a direct interest in the estate or the will, and Maloles has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the opposition, that Phillips has deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 requires only an allegation of the probable value and character of the property of the estate. The true value can be determined later on in the course of the settlement of the estate. Rule 79, 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. Any person interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed. An "interested person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent. Even if Maloles is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Maloles, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator. Ozaeta v. Pecson - The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to dispose. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
3.
No forum shopping Maloles Phillips is guilty of forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary while the probate proceedings were still pending. There is identity of parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other. The petition for probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were terminated. The petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed by Phillips, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former.
9 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 March 13, 1997 the CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however denied by the CA in a Resolution dated August 27, 1997. In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting on the pending unresolved motions before it, issued an Order which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint special administrators of the estate of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the Undersecretary of the Department of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is finally appointed. Issues/Held: (These are all the issues presented in the case. Im iffy to omit anything since baka ang mga itanong ni Maam sa quiz ay yung mga obnoxiously difficult ones, since its take home. ) 1) W/N the CA gravely erred in dismissing the petition on technical grounds despite the SC resolution specifically referring the petition for a decision on the merits NO. 2) W/N Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II should be disqualified to act and serve as executors NO. 3) W/N the Marcoses have denied and disclaimed the very existence and validity of the Marcos Will NO. 4) W/N the Probate court gravely erred in failing to consider that its order of January 11, 1996, which admitted the Marcos will to probate and which directed the issuance of letters testamentary in solidum to the Marcoses as executors of said Marcos will was based on the evidence of the Republic alone NO. 5) W/N the Probate Court gravely erred in failing to consider that the Marcoses have obstructed the transfer to the Philippines of the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks NO. Ratio: 1) A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-901, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 19482, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case. Moreover, the Courts pronouncement in Suarez v. Judge Villarama is instructive: Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals. Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the improper remedy, the CA should not have dismissed therein petition. Petitioners arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February 5, 1997 Resolution reads:
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question; (2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto; (3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue; (4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and (5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Workmens Compensation Commission.
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied)
1
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
2
10 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance. o Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said resolution gave the CA discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it may deem proper. The resolution is clear that the petition was referred to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when the action it deemed appropriate was to dismiss the petition for having availed of an improper remedy. More importantly, the action of the CA was sanctioned under Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, therein petition offered no important or special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it at the first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper remedy was still available. The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner should have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which states: Section 1. Orders of judgments from which appeals taken. An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will; 2) At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of Ferdinand Marcos. Ozeata v. Pecson is instructive: The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the Philippines), the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application (23 C.J. 1023). x x x x The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242 N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the same principle. The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who is most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. After the admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393, 114 N.E. 854. x x x Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, to wit: Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: x x x x (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied) In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity. The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings: However, except for petitioner Republics allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament, so as to render them incompetent to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation . (Emphasis Supplied)
11 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty and discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules of orders of the court. Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence presented or alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However, after a painstaking review of the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed no error or gross abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation. o Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have already been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this Court in Dans, Jr. v. People. Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by this Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan. Hence, the so-called convictions against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor. o On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50 (nonpayment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC). o It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569, the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, said decision is still pending appeal. o Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual. This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure to file a return. The filing of a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same, however, cannot be said for failure to file a return where the mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification. Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same has no merit. Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will, and are, therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors thereof Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as officers of the court. This Court does not agree with the posture taken by petitioner, and instead, accepts the explanation given by respondents, to wit: Respondents opposed the petition for probate not because they are disclaiming the existence of the will, but because of certain legal grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the requisite interest to institute it; (b) the original copy of the will was not attached to the petition for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate. Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition, respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the probate proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion. Petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders were based solely on their own evidence and that respondents offered no evidence to show that they were qualified to serve as executors. It is basic that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Consequently, it was the burden of petitioner (not respondents) to substantiate the grounds upon which it claims that respondents should be disqualified to serve as executors, and having failed in doing so, its petition must necessarily fail. Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly objected to the transfer to the Philippines of the Marcos assets deposited in the Swiss Banks and thus the same should serve as a ground for their disqualification to act as executors. This Court does not agree. In the first place, the same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant consideration. Time and again, this Court has stressed that this Court is a court of law and not a court of public opinion. Moreover, petitioner had already raised the same argument in its motion for partial reconsideration before
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12 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 the RTC. Said court, however, still did not find the same as a sufficient ground to disqualify respondents. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997 Decision and August 27, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court in Special Proceeding No. 10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II. SO ORDERED. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Argument of appellant: section 3 of Rule 89, Rules of Court, is not applicable to the instant case on the ground that it refers to the personal and real properties of the deceased which are in the hands of the administrator, and not to the properties of the estate which are already in the hands of the heiresses. Held: untenable. The residuary funds in the hands of the Appellant are funds of the estate and the Court has jurisdiction over them and, therefore, it could compel the Appellant to deliver to the administrator of this estate the necessary portion of such fund for the payment of the Sideco claim.
Baluyut v. Pao
Aquino, J.: Quickie: Nephew v widow for letters of administration. Probate court appointed widow after only a very short examination during the hearing. Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six, leaving an estate allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos. A few weeks later, or on February 20, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator. Lower Court: appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator with a bond of P100,000. Mrs. Baluyut in her verified oppositionalleged that she was unaware that her deceased husband executed a will. She characterized as libelous the allegation as to her mental incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set aside. Lower court: cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator. In that same order the lower court noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified". Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order Lower Court: appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators. Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition asked that Espino, former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be appointed administrator should she not be named administratrix. 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed administratrix. She reasoned out that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no more interest in the decedent's estate because as a collateral relative he was excluded by Espino and other supposed descendants of the deceased who had intervened in the proceeding, and, therefore, it was not necessary to continue with the reception of his evidence.
71 SCRA 86 (1976)
Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its order of September 25, 1975 in Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray. At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and documentary evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut. Court to witness: Can you testify in English?-No, your Honor, Pampango. Q. Ilocano? A. No, your Honor. Atty. Salunat: She can testify in Tagalog your Honor, which comprehensible. Court: Your remember when you were born, Mrs. Baluyut? A. March 25, 1901. Q. Where did you graduate? Madres Dominicas. Q. When did you get married to Sec. Baluyut? A. I cannot remember the date but this was in Lingayen. Q. What church? A. A Catholic. Court: You want to ask more questions Attorney? Atty. Salunat: Just a few clarificatory questions, your Honor. Q. Do you know Gov. Espino? A. Yes. Q. Why do you know him? A. Because he is like a son to me. Q. Do you know whether Gov. Espino has any relationship with the late Don Sotero Baluyut? A. Yes, why not. Q. Will you please tell us what is the relationship if there is any? A. He is his son, sir. Atty. Salunat: I think that would be all, your Honor. Court: Submitted? Atty. Salunat: We will ask the Court to (be allowed to) submit a rejoinder, your Honor. Probate Court: terminated the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs. Baluyut as regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000 Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and the Espino spouses this special civil action of certiorari in order to set aside the This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order The Espino's in their comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut is aware that Jose Espino was acknowledged in a notarial instrument by Sotero Baluyut as his natural child. Mrs. Baluyut in her comment alleged that Alfredo G. Baluyut instituted the administration proceeding after he had failed to get from her a check for P500,000 belonging to the decedent's estate and that he grossly misrepresented that she was mentally incompetent. She further alleged that the order of the Juvenile and
15 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Domestic Relations Court declaring her an incompetent was issued in a blitzkrieg manner because it was based on the report of Doctor Lourdes V. Lapuz which was filed in court just one day before the order was issued. Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and not the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that should decide the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix. Alfredo G. Baluyut disclosed that Sotero Baluyut executed a notarial will on April 14, 1973. In that will he bequeathed to Mrs. Baluyut his one-half share in certain conjugal assets and one-fourth of the residue of his estate. The remaining threefourths were bequeated to his collateral relatives named Irene, Erlinda, Estrellita, Eliseo and Alfredo, all surnamed Baluyut, and Emerita, Emilio and Benjamin, all surnamed Miranda. The testator designated Mrs. Baluyut as executrix. Espino is not mentioned in that will. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate. Certiorari lies when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed by the lower court or if the petitioner's contention is clearly tenable or when the broader interests of justice or public policy justify the nullification of the questioned order (Manila Electric Company and Sheriff of Quezon City vs. Hon. Enriquez and Espinosa)
Issue/ Held: WON the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.- YES! Ratio: We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust. Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position. Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals) In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate. As it now turned out, he is one of the legatees named in the decedent's alleged will. Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court ) After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule 82, Rules of Court Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her
Capistrano v. Nadurata
Romualdez, J. Quickie: Petra de los Santos died. Guillerma Capistrano, et al (professing to be her halfsiblings by the same mother) commenced proceedings for the appointment of Justo Buera as the administrator of Petras estate. The application was opposed by Pedro and Juan de los Santos (who also claimed to be half-brothers of Petra). Later, Leon Nadurata intervened and interposed also an opposition to Capistrano, et al.s application, claiming to be Petras surviving spouse. CFI overruled both oppositions and appointe d Buera as administrator of Petras estate. HELD: The selection of an administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the discretion of the court (Sec. 642, Subsec. 1, Code of Civil Procedure). The record does not contain anything tending to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. On the contrary, the act of the lower court is not only indicative of sound discretion, but is right and just; for the evidence shows that Leon Nadurata is not surviving spouse of Petra, who died widow and not twice widow, and that the opponents Pedro and Juan de los Santos are not, as they pretend to be, brother of the aforesaid deceased. Nature: Appeal from the judgment and orders of the CFI (1) appointing Justo Buera as the administrator of the estate of Petra de los Santos; (2) declaring who the heirs of Petra are; and (3) directing the prosecution against certain parties who committed falsification and perjury during the proceedings Facts: Guillerma Capistrano, et al applied for the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of the estate of Petra de los Santos, deceased. The application was opposed by Pedro and Juan de los Santos who prayed instead that Pedro be appointed administrator. Then, Leon Nadurata intervened, asserting himself to be the surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos, and praying that the letters of administration be issued to him. After a lengthy discussion was made in the lower court of the question whether or not Leon Nadurata is the husband of the said deceased, and whether Capistrano, et al, or the opponents de los Santoses, are her nearest relatives, the lower court had appointed Justo Buera special administrator Also, the lower court declared Leon Nadurata NOT to be the surviving spouse of Petra and that the latter's nearest relatives are not the de los Santoses (who are NOT Petras brothers) but that the applicants Capistrano, et al are her true brothers by the same mother. Upon these findings, the lower court confirmed the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of the estate. From this judgment Nadurata and the de los Santoses appealed Issue/s and Held: WON the lower court erred in: (a) Overruling of their opposition to the confirmation of the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator NO! (b) The declaration that the applicants are the sole heirs of the deceased to the exclusion of said opponents YES!
Arevalo v. Bustamante
Diaz, J. Facts: 2 years and some months after Bernabe Bustamante died, his widow, Rufina Arevalo promoted the record of his Intestate. She was appointed by the CFI of Manila as judicial administrator. She presented the inventory of properties and months later, the Commissioners of Appraisal and Claims filed its report. Maria Bustamante and Corazon Reyes Reyes, claiming to be heirs of Bustamante, filed their objections against the inventory. Children of Antonio Oliveros did the same. And Perfecto Bustamante, brother of the said deceased filed objections against the report of the Commissioners on their part Before the court could act on the objections raised against the report of the Commissioners, Arevalo died. Ariston Bustamante, Rufinas heir, was appointed as administrator of the estate of Bernabe. Ariston proceeded to prepare and submit the final account of the administration of the said Intestate and the proposed participation. When this became known to the heirs of the late Bernabe, Maria Lourdes de los Santos, Maria Pilar de los Santos and Jose Maria Bustamante, and guardians of minors Alfonso Antonio Oliveros filed their objections. o the new administrator, not being an heir of the Bernabe or having their property interest in relics, should not be appointed Administrator o that in the project of partition, several heirs were ignored. o that being the heir of Rufina and also the administrator of the same, he has interest opposed to those of each and every one of them o that the accounts presented do not include income from all assets of the intestate o the expenses that are dated in said account are excised and unjustified CFI issued an order revoking the appointment of Ariston as Receiver of Intestate concerned, and ordered the submission of a person suitable to be appointed as judicial administrator. Issues/Held: WON the revocation was proper? YES Ratio: Removal from office always involves correction or punishment, but the cancellation of the order of appointment is made by reason of disability. Interest adverse to the intestate or to others who are interested in them is reason enough for the disability of the appointed judicial administrator. The court has discretion to name the judicial administrator whom he considered more qualified to defend and ensure the interests of the intestate. The revocation of Aristons appointment does not infringed Article 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides for the removal of a Manager for leaving accounts or administering the goods or for stopping fulfilling orders that were given, or for hiding, which is not the case.
19 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Issue/Held: W/N under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it should be the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator. Yes. Ratio: Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. o This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. o This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules. o It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration. In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. o Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors." On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice.
20 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 o Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. o In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of coadministrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court. WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as coadministratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Issue/Held: Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate- BOTH; JOINT ADMINISTRATION Ratio: The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will; The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives; Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
23 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage; Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I. From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here. (Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian) Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate. One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated. (Capistrano v. Nadurata )
Issue/s and Held: WON the CFI Judge Barrios committed error in dismissing the petition? NO. Ratio: PROPRIETY OF REMEDY: The Court takes cognizance of the fact that SALVACION might have been misled into believing that she could obtain re-opening of the case and sue to administratrix by the CFI when she was required to seek the re-opening of the estate proceedings of her father CLETO BUT it is also obvious that the remedy for SALVACION is NOT reopening of the special proceedings since these have already been closed and such remedies have already been clearly lost. Her proper recourse should have been the ordinary appeal and to claim recovery of possession of Lot No. 2850 there As regards the administratrix FLORA, she is a stranger who does not have a material interest in the properties of the estate. She has, therefore, NO RIGHT to intervene or appeal against any order of the CFI dictated to her, although the same may be seemingly harmful (to the estate).
25 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 FOR SALVACION to protect her rights, she did not need to resort to the re-opening of the estate proceedings nor was there any need for her to sue the administratrix of JAGUNAP to effect such re-opening. She has another easy and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law (Art. 217, Code of Civil Procedure). FINALLY, as to the settlement proceedings of CLETO which has already been closed in due course and his property awarded and distributed to his heirs, it is grossly reprehensible to require, let alone order, its reopening not only against the law but also offending public policy! refuses SALVACIONs requested resort, with the costs to the AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Trillana v. Crisostomo
Feria, J. Nature: appeal from an order of the CFI Bulacan Facts: CFI Bulacan denied Crisostomo et als petition for relief from the judgment of the said court allowing the will of Oct. 19 executed by the deceased Damasa Crisostomo. Crisostomo et als assignment of errors: o The judgment of January 5 was obtained through fraud - the proponents of the will did not cause personal notice of the hearing to be made upon the legal heirs of the decedent, contrary to the requirement of Rule 77, sec. 4. o The lower court failed to perform its legal duty to set date for proving the will of Aug. 16, 1948; o The failure to set aside a date for proving the will of August 16 with the will of Oct. 19 was entirely due to the lower court's fault or negligence - the will of Aug. 16, 1948 was sent together with a writing called "Manifestation" by registered mail on Oct. 30, 1948, from Manila to the CFI Bulacan, by Atty. Barnes, and said will must have been received by the Clerk of Said Court on or after Nov. 1, 1948, the date when the subsequent will of Oct. 19, was filed for probate. Issue/Held: WON CFI erred denying the petition for relief. NO Ratio: We can not consider now for the first time in this appeal the question whether the lower court complied with the requirement of said sec. 4 of Rule 77, for that question has not been raised in the court below, either in their original petition for relief or in their MR, of the order denying their petition for relief. And there being no evidence to the contrary, the legal presumption is that the court which probated the will, complied with its duty and acted in lawful exercise of its jurisdiction in probating said will. Besides, they, in their petition for relief, stated that "This Honorable Court set its hearing of the petition for allowance of the will of Oct. 19 on Dec. 2, 1948. Copy of this order was published in "The Star Reporter", newspaper of general circulation in Bulacan on November 5, 12 and 19 respectively, and the corresponding notices served by the office of the Clerk of Court, in accordance with law". And their attorneys had not denied said statement. Having failed to show that the judgment of the lower court, probating the will of testatrix, was obtained through fraud, the lower court did not commit any error in denying the petition for relief, and therefore it is not necessary for us to discuss and pass upon the other propositions of the appellant.
28 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof. An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant, although originally a party to the probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case. On March 12, 1956, the Court (Judge Emilio Rilloraza, presiding) granted Adelas motion A series of long pleadings were presented by the parties, following a motion of reconsideration, containing arguments and authorities sustaining their respective theories. On June 2, 1956, vacation Judge Jesus Y. Perez, handed down an Order, the material portions of which follow xxx xxx xxx AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sustains the motion for reconsideration filed by the administrator and hereby sets aside the order of March 12, 1956. Adela Santos Gutierrez, on June 26, 1956, moved for the reconsideration of the above Order, contending that her motion on February 8, 1956, was not a leave for intervention (Rule 13). At most, the rule on transfer of interest pendente lite (Sec. 20, Rule 3), should be applicable, not that of intervention. On August 10, 1956, Judge Rilloraza, who had already returned from vacation, set aside the order of Judge Perez, stating ..., this Court is of the opinion that the order of this Court dated June 2, 1956 should be, as it is hereby set aside. Let the administrator and/or his attorney furnish henceforth Adela Santos Gutierrez, through counsel, copies of all pleadings, motions, etc., to be filed in this case. Issue/Held: Whether Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in the probate proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower court YES. Ratio: It cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos on November 11, 1954. While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending before the Rizal CFI, Pasig Branch. o Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. o Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). o No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Thus, in the case of Sandoval v. Santiago, G.R. No. L1723, May 30, 1949, this Court said: ". . . and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction
The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to intervene in this probate proceeding. The Administrator contends that she has no such right because she had already assigned all her rights to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera. Although at the outset, Adela Santos Gutierrez had the right to intervene herein as one of the legal heirs of the deceased Irene Santos, yet, when she filed her manifestation, accompanied by the Deed of Sale and Assignment, informing this Court that she had assigned all her rights and interest as such heir to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, said Adela Santos Gutierrez had ceased to have any interest in this estate and without such interest, she could no longer intervene in this proceeding. The assignment, it copy of which is attached to the record, is in the form of a public deed which is entitled to be accorded the presumption of validity so that until the same is annulled in the corresponding action filed by Adela Santos Gutierrez in the Pasig Branch of this Court, her interest would merely be a contingent one, that is, depending upon the contingency of a decision declaring such annulment of the deed of assignment. This contingent interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required in order that a person may be a party, must be material and direct, and not indirect or contingent (II Moran's Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., pp. 391-92). We quote the following from Moran's Rules of Court: xxx xxx xxx
In the same way, since the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be considered as heir is dependent upon the contingency that she would succeed in her case for annulment of the Deed of Assignment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, her contingent interest is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceeding.
29 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 by the mere fact of dividing and distributing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves". But even if the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court. In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in the courts of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this case, within a reasonable time thereafter. (Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, Aug. 22, 1951; Espinosa v. Barrios. 70 Phil. 311). We agree with appellee that the motion in question is not one of intervention, but solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related to the case. Evidently, the use of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in the case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later informed the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might have been affected. Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings (Judge of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. David, et al., G.R. No. 45454, April 12, 1939, cited in Francisco's Rules of Court, Vol. I, Part I, p. 639, emphasis supplied). The circumstances stated above do not fit the status of Adela in the probate proceedings; she was not a third person; she was an original party therein. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if they are required to furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so, will give appellee her day in court and provide protection to the administrator himself. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in conformity with the law and jurisprudence. The same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against the appellants Jose D. Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera, in both instances. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur. Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor
Tinga, J,: Quickie: Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Respondent alleges that she is one of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag. Ismael Tayag died intestate. According to petitioners, respondent should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayags estate because if in Uyguanco v. Court of Appeals, the claim of filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason that it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the decedents estate. The Court held that respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petition ers opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that, respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement proceedings. Facts: Respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. Respondent alleged in the petition that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own. Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised. Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition using her own money. Argument of petitioners: respondent should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayags estate. If, following the case of Uyguanco v. Court of Appeals, the claim of filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason that it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the decedents estate. Thus, petitioner claims, respondent may no longer maintain an action to prove that she is the illegitimate child of the decedent after the latters death. Issue: whether respondents petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. Held/Ratio:
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,[14] the Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an interested party. Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition. Petitioners thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayags death, respondents illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedents estate which the Rules require to be material and direct, may no longer be established. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondents successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an illegitimate child. respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioners opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation. We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the decedents illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be material and direct. The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that, respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement proceedings
32 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition. Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Issue/s and Held: WON Judge Pescon committed error in appointing two special coadministratrixes for the estate of PABLO, one for the CPG properties and the other for his exclusive, paraphernal properties YES! Ratio: There is nothing wrong in the respondent judge exercising his discretion and appointing NATIVIDAD as special administratrix, for which he had taken into consideration the beneficial interest of NATIVIDAD in the estate of the decedent and her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. HOWEEVR, Judge Pecson's subsequent act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community property, and MARIA as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive property of the decedent, does not seem to be in conformity with logic or reason It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as
34 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. NATIVIDAD has (or claims to have) the same beneficial interest AFTER the denial of the wills probate as she had PRIOR to it, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court! Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present case would have, under the law, the right of usufruct over one-half of the exclusive properties of the decedent aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. The beneficial interest required as a qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of a decedent is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some part thereof. The petitioner being entitled to one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as much if not more interest in administering the entire estate correctly, in order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste, improvidence or mismanagement thereof. The good or bad administration of the property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. According to section 2, Rule 75, "when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse." That is the reason why, according to section 4, Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines," and section 6, Rule 79, provides for appointment of one administrator in case of intestacy, except in certain cases in which two or more joint, but not separate and independent, administrators may be appointed under section 3, Rule 82. Therefore the administrator appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive property of a deceased spouse shall also administer, liquidate and distribute the community property, because the estate of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered, liquidated and distributed, consists not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of the assets of the conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as determined after the liquidation thereof in accordance with the provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the Civil Code. There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate administrators, specially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the present case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach; and if the estate inventoried should not be sufficient to pay the dowry and the parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges and obligations of the partnership, the provision of Title AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN XVII of the Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference of credits shall be observed. If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the present case, in every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other administrator, which can not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only one. As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and duties are limited to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased." (Section 2, Rule 81.)
Matias v. Gonzales
Concepcion, J. Quickie: Aurea filed a petition for the probate of her aunts will. Basilia, aunts first cousin, opposed. CFI denied probate of the will. Aurea appealed and the case was pending before SC. Basilia moved for dismissal of the special administrator of the estate and for the appointment of Ramon Plata. CFI dismissed Rodriguez and appointed Basilia as special administratrix to be assisted by her niece, Victorina. Ramon Plata was also appointed as co-administrator. Aurea asked the order to be set aside upon the ground that Basilia is over 80 years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties. Basilia resigned and recommended the appointment of Victorina. Victorina and Platas request to collect the rents and sell the palay was grantet by the C FI. HELD: In her motion, Basilia prayed for the dismissal of Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Aurea had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina, would be considered for the management of said. As a consequence, Aurea had no opportunity to object to the appointment of Basilia as special administratrix, and of Victorina, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of Feb. 27, 1956, to this effect, denied due process to Aurea. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. Nature: Petition for Ceriorari Facts: May 15, 1952 - Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased except the properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias and Rafael Matias is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will. Judge Gonzalez issued an order denying the petition for probate. Aurea brought the matter on appeal to SC, where it is now pending decision. Feb. 17, 1956, Basilia moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. On the date of the hearing, Rodriguez did not appear. Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time within which to answer the charges preferred against him by Basilia and for another postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted, and Basilia introduced evidence in support of said charges.
36 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 that on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud resigned as special administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules of Court do not permit the appointment of more than one special administrator; that Rodriguez was removed without giving Aurea a chance to be heard in connection therewith; and that Ramon Plata and Victorina were authorized to collect the rents due to the deceased and the produce of her lands, as well to sell her palay, without previous notice to Aurea.. Issue/Held: WON the orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. YES Ratio: Although Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his removal, dated Feb. 17, 1956, the record shows that Aurea received copy of said motion of Feb. 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing thereof. Again, notice of the order, dated Feb. 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to Feb. 27, 1956, was not served on Aurea. In her motion, Basilia prayed for the dismissal of Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of said estate. Aurea had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina, would be considered for the management of said. As a consequence, Aurea had no opportunity to object to the appointment of Basilia as special administratrix, and of Victorina, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of Feb. 27, 1956, to this effect, denied due process to Aurea. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of Basilia. Otherwise respondent Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted and advised by her niece Victorina," and that the latter "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia." Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed 3 special administrators Basilia, Victorina and Ramon Plata. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213, an issue arose between Aurea and Basilia regarding the person to be appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The former proposed Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of Victorina. CFI decided the matter in favor of Rodriguez and against Victorina, upon the ground that, unlike the latter, who, as a pharmacist and employee in the Santa Isabel Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of Cavite, is a resident thereof. In other words, the order removing Rodriguez and appointing Victorina to the management of the estate, amounted to a reversal of the aforementioned order. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Raquel was denied, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by Aurea. The probate of said alleged will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea has as the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument a special interest to protect during the pendency of said appeal. Roxas vs. Pecson - a widow, designated as executrix in the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which had denied in an order pending appeal, "has. the same beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN the will, which is now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court." Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. The rule in Roxas v. Pecson to the effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there were 2 separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar there is only 1 special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint several special coadministrators Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower court should re-hear the matter of removal of Rodriguez and appointment of special administrators, after due notice to all parties concerned, for action in conformity with the views expressed herein
38 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages. The name of the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left hand margin of the first four pages and at the end of the will. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. About in the center of her name she placed her thumbmark. The three witnesses likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of the will. On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential to the validity of the will that the person writing the name of the maker of the will also sign. Under the law prior to the amendment, it had been held by this court that where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912), 21 Phil., 461). But his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment introduced into the law the following sentence: 'The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance. There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation. This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116-117). The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will. The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales are sufficiently refuted by quoting the last clause of the body of the will together with the attestation clause, both of which are written in the Tagalog dialect. o As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and o AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document. The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered. Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Liwanag v. CA
Concepcion, J.: Quickie: Liwanag was appointed as special administratix of the estate of Pio Liwanag. A case was filed against her for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by Pio Liwanag. Petitioner argues that a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased. The Court held that The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Facts: Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag, respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime. petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint: as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased.
Argument of petitioner: pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased," and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her as a special administratrix. Issue/Held: whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix. Yes. Ratio: In Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased Pio D. Liwanag, a similar action for foreclosure, although of another mortgage and an identical motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed ourselves as follows: o Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets. Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
Anderson v. Perkins
Reyes, J.B.L., J.: Quickie: Special administrator v wife over the issue of selling the deceaseds personal effects (to preserve their value). It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold;" .BUT until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. Nature: Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila Facts: Special proceedings were commenced by a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. The special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death. About two years later, the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard, the court required the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator submitted to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to enumerate. Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made. LOWER COURT- approved the proposed sale; MR denied
41 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
Also named CRISANTA! Daughter and mother have the same name. Ano to junior? GASTADOR!!!! 5 The CA affirmed the dismissal of the intestate proceedings 6 I dont know why her law degree and law firm experience are relevant
3 4
43 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Bena Jean (one of BELINDAs heirs) later filed a Motion for Appointment as Administrator of the Estate of CRISANTA. DOLORES opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the latter has neither proven her kinship with CRISANTA nor shown any particular qualification to act as administratrix of the estate RTC Malabon appointed DOLORES as special administratrix upon a bond of P200K. The probate court, however, merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the heirs of BELINDA, stating that they were mere strangers to the case and that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding RTC held that DOLORES has amply proven her kinship with ROBERTO as his lawfully wedded wife, and therefore her kinship, by operation of law, with decedent CRISANTA. RTC grounds its jurisdiction in the rule that in the probate proceedings, the probate court has the power to determine questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, the recognition of a natural child, the validity of disinheritance effected by the testator, and the status of a woman who claims to be the lawful wife of the decedent. The heirs of BELINDA moved to reconsider. MR denied. BELINDAs heirs elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court dismissed the petition. It ruled that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in appointing DOLORES as special administratrix~ hence, this petition AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN executor or general administrator is appointed. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement. The principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs In many instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed. Section 1, Rule 80, provides: Appointment of Special Administrator. When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary OR administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased. The phrase by any cause includes those incide nts which transpired in the case at bar, clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator. The probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint DOLORES as special administratrix. The deceased CRISANTA left a document purporting to be her will where her adopted son, ROBERTO, was named as the sole heir of all her properties. However, pending probate of the will, ROBERTO died leaving his widow, DOLORES, as his sole heir.
Issue/s and Held: WON the appointment of DOLORES as special administratrix of the estate left by CRISANTA was proper YES! Ratio: Heirs of BELINDA argued that since DOLORES does not have any right to inherit from their grandmother CRISANTA, either by her own right or by the right of representation, she is not qualified to be appointed as administratrix of the estate; and that in contrast, they are CRISANTAs only compulsory heirs. They insist that DOLORESs late husband, ROBERTO, was just a nephew of CRISANTA and not her legally adopted son UNTENABLE! The appointment of a SPECIAL administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a REGULAR administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent The facts of this case show that ROBERTO is the legally adopted son of CRISANTA. Thus, when CRISANTA died, her estate passed to him, her surviving adopted son. And when ROBERTO later died, pursuant to the law on succession, his own estate which he inherited from CRISANTA passed on to his surviving widow, DOLORES While it is true that DOLORES is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir of CRISANTA and is considered a third person to her estate, nonetheless, DOLORES is undeniably entitled to the administration of the said estate because she is an heir of her husband ROBERTO, whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother CRISANTA The appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an
44 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Thus, DOLORES has much stake in CRISANTAs estate in case the latters will is allowed probate. It needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. Thus, the preference of DOLORES is sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. BELINDAs heirs invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of REGULAR administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of aSPECIAL administrator. It has long been settled that the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular administrators On the plea of BELINDAs heirs for this Court to appoint their co-petitioner, Bena Jean, as the regular administratrix of the estate of CRISANTA, the matter should be addressed to the probate court for its consideration. It is not for this Court to preempt the discretion of the probate court and appoint a regular administrator in the present action. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN
DISPOSOTIF: The petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
46 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 try questions which arise incidentally in a cause over which such courts have jurisdiction and the determination of which are necessary to a lawful exercise of the powers expressly conferred in arriving at a decision. There seems, however, to be a general tendency, in the absence of express and specific restrictions to the contrary, to uphold the exercise by these court of such incidental powers as are, within the purview of their grant of authority, reasonably necessary to enable them to accomplish the objects for which they were invested with jurisdiction and to perfect the same. And it has been held that statutes conferring jurisdiction on such courts, being remedial and for the advancement of justice, should receive a favorable construction, such as will give them the force and efficiency intended by the legislature." The tendency in the US indeed has been towards the enlargement of the powers of probate courts. In the beginning these courts were possessed but limited powers. Having originated from the ecclesiastical courts of England, their jurisdiction, following their English patterns was practically limited to the probate of wills, the granting of administrators, and the suing for legacies. But, though they still are often unadvisedly described, particularly in Connecticut, as courts of limited, inferior or special jurisdiction, they have outgrown their limitations and have become courts with considerably increased powers The policy of dispatch and economy - It will be recalled that the appellants could have raised the question of jurisdiction before the CFI and the SC before. The questions raised in the appeal at bar could have been passed upon once for all in the first appeal. We cannot encourage a practice that trenches violently upon the settled jurisprudence of this court that the policy and purpose of administration proceedings is to close up, and not to continue an estate, and that the State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a considerable portion of the sate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished consumes any considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure" (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng) AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN liability of an administrators and require them to file an adequate bond is not only ultra vires but a violation of the constitutional inhibition that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty and property without due process of law. "The usual method of enforcing the liability on an administration bond is by an action brought on the bond in a court of law, although in some jurisdictions other forms of remedy are provided by statute" The only procedure by which the liability of an executor or administrator and his sureties be enforced on their bond is, therefore, by an ordinary action in court. The failure of the sureties to appeal from the order of summary execution issued by the court below on their bond after a mere service of notice did not legalize said summary procedure and the order of summary execution issued by the lower court, which were otherwise illegal and ultra vires.
Separate Opinions; VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting: Chapter XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is headed "Wills and the allowance thereof, and duties of executors", contains no provision concerning the enforcement of the liability of an executor or administrator on his bond and of that of his sureties. According to article 1853 of the Civil Code, "the guarantor may set up against the creditor all the defenses available to the principal debtor and which may be inherent in the debt;." In an administration bond the executor or administrator stands in the place of the principal debtor; his sureties may, therefore, set up all the defenses to which he may be entitled, and which are inherent in the obligation. The procedure by which such defenses may be set up is the ordinary one established by the said Code of Civil Procedure by means of an action in court wherein may contain general or special denial, a special defense or a counterclaim. (Secs. 94 and 95, Act No. 190.) The said Code has not established any special procedure by which an executor or administrator with a mere notice to his sureties does not afford them an adequate opportunity to set up the defenses which the law guarantees to them. To enforce the
48 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15, 2007, claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the income and assets of the estate inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato. In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. o The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate. On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents appointment as joint special administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate, reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate. Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond on May 22, 2007, praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an administrators bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the appointment of respondents as special co-administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured the RTC that they would faithfully exercise their duties as special administrators under pain of contempt should they violate any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office. In an Order dated June 29, 2007, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective comments or oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners Motion for Inventory and to Render Account, and respondents Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond. Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition, stating that they have already filed a comment on petitioners Motion for Inventory a nd to Render Account. They asserted that the RTC should, in the meantime, hold in abeyance the resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond. On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. o Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of special administrators. o Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them. o Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for P2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for P1,500,000.00, and respondents alleged misrepresentation that AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN petitioners owed the estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid. Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment on March 10, 2008, to which, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment on March 17, 2008. In its Order dated March 13, 2008, the RTC granted petitioners Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of the estate. o The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to have failed to enter the office of special administration despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not entered the office because they were waiting for the resolution of their motion for exemption from bond; (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima, instead of them who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c) declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing and evidence against them. On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such. o According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon.
Issue/Held: W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing RTC decision. Partially granted. Melinda should not be regular administratrix, but special administratrix together with Renato and Erlinda. Ratio: The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the decedents estate under the Rules of Court provide Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
49 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. Sec. 3. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. Before an executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows: (a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him; (b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the court; (c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court; (d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed. Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may be issued. o The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. o Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them the obligation to post an administrators bond of P200,000.00. However, taking into account the arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated Bian Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalis ays appointment and substituted her with Erlinda. A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the administrators bond is a pre-requisite to respondents entering into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office. This Court disagrees. o the RTC revoked respondents appointment as special administrators for failing to post their administrators bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so. o Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the
50 DE LA CERNA SPECPRO DIGESTS 2011 estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedents esta te requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. o Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration. On the other hand, the Court finds the RTCs designation of Melinda as regular administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion. o Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of the special administration. o Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the same was canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the parties counsels. The February 8, 2008 hearing was again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation of the Hall of Justice. Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29, 2008, reiterating their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator and for the revocation of the special administration. o It may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melindas appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules. AMIN | CHA | JANZ | KRIZEL | VIEN manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents estate, but her appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardos estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate under the same administrators bond she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs.
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008. These acts clearly